A NORM : a standard of appropriate behaviour for an actor with a given identity give rise to collective expectations - they have

two components : prescription (what

to do) and parameters (under which circumstances )
Sometimes confused with INSTITUTIONS (bundles of norms and rules, such as
sovereignty) - whereas constructivists talk the language of norms, sociologists talk
a language of institutions to refer to the same behavioural rules.

NEO-REALIST AND NEO-LIBERAL VIEWS

Norms, to neo-realists, are epiphenomenal : they do not matter in themselves, but
only to the extent they are reflected, or backed by, powerful actors (Mearsheimer,
Gilpin). Norms are created to serve the interests of states and thus will not be
influential when they lie outside the states interests.
Neo-liberals give more weight to the idea that norms influence behavior (Keohane).
But because they also begin from a rationalist standpoint, still the roles of norms is
limited and instrumental. Norms are reduced to intervening variables between
material conditions and the behavior of the state. Adhering to a norm might create a
cost that states consider in making a decision. However, norms can also provide
benefits for states in that they make it easier to cooperate by reducing transaction
costs and uncertainty. As a result, states will calculate whether or not abiding by a
norm makes sense in a cost-benefit fashion.
Very hard though for the latter perspective to make sense of taken for granted,
deeply internalized norms. Moreover there is no clear-distinction between a rational
logic of consequences and a norm following logic of appropriateness (see below).

ROLES
multiple roles played by norms :
1) regulatory norms : they constraint behaviour
2) constitutive norms : they constitute actors : help us to make sense of the identity
of actors and the sources of their preferences - how ? they shape what actors
see in the realm of possibility/frame their imagination
3) prescriptive norms : they empower and enable action

LOGIC OF APPROPRIATENESS, LOGIC OF CONSEQUENCES AND LOGIC OF

ARGUING
March and Olsens seminal distinction :
logic of consequences : agents calculate the consequences of alternative courses
of action to choose the one that maximize utility
logic of appropriateness (about the constitute power of norms over interests and
action) : agents are rule followers, they internalize norms and rules as script to
which they conform no longer for instrumental reasons- they will chose action on
the basis of standards of in/appropriateness depending on their own identity and
situation.
Similarly Elster contrasted instrumentally rational action that cares about
consequences with norms understood as internalized Kantian imperatives (blind,
almost unconscious, compulsive).
But there is no clear distinction between a rational logic of consequences and
a norm-following logic of appropriateness. How we calculate consequences is
often far from obvious and not easily separable from our understating of legal or
moral norms. Time is especially important in order to understand how the two logic
interrelates. At any point in time, it may be useful to think of actors making a choice
between i) consequentialist ii) calculation of iii) interests and i) normative ii)
evaluation of iii) appropriateness. But over the long run, the obviousness of certain
norms (e.g. slavery, human rights, military conquest) became such an accepted and
unquestioned feature of the political/legal landscape that are part of how actors
routinely calculate consequences and the costs/benefits of alternative courses of
action.
Risse adds a third logic of action, the logic of arguing. Actors have to adjudicate
which norms applies in order to reach a reasoned consensus. He builds on
Habermass theory of communicative action.