Motion To Dismiss Lawsuit Against Warren Jeffs, Snow Christensen & Martineau

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 1 of 57
Brent O. Hatch (5715)

Mark F. James (5295)
Mitchell A. Stephens (11775)
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE, P.C.
10 W. Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-6363
Facsimile: (801) 363-6666
Attorneys for Snow Christensen & Martineau, P.C. & Rodney R. Parker
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
ALYSSA BISTLINE; RUBY JESSOP;
SUSAN BROADBENT; GINA ROHBOCK;
NOLAN BARLOW; JASON BLACK; MAY
MUSSER; HOLLY BISTLINE; T.B.; M.B.; P.
B.; A.B.; A.B.; DERRELL BARLOW;
ALICIA ROHBOCK; R.R.; R.R.; B.J.R.;
WALLACE JEFFS; LAWRENCE BARLOW;
STEVEN
DOCKSTADER;
MARVIN
COOKE; HELEN BARLOW; VERGEL
BARLOW; CAROLE JESSOP; BRIELL
LIBERTAE DECKER; LYNETTE WARNER;
AMY
NIELSON;
SARAH
ALLRED;
THOMAS JEFFS; and JANETTA JESSOP
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU,

P.C. AND RODNEY R. PARKERS
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
Civil No. 2:16-cv-00788-EJF
WARREN STEED JEFFS; RODNEY R.

PARKER; SNOW CHRISTENSEN &
MARTINEAU, P.C.; and JOHN DOES I
THROUGH X
Defendants.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Snow Christensen & Martineau,
P.C. and Rodney R. Parker (collectively SCM) hereby submit this Motion to Dismiss. This
Court should not dignify Plaintiffs claims against SCM by allowing such baseless, scandalous
and legally meritless claims to continue.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
STANDARD OF REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ii
STATEMENT OF ALLEGED FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
iii
A.
B.
SCM Never Represented in Any Capacity the Overwhelming

Majority of the Plaintiffs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
iv
Plaintiffs Individual Factual Allegations Do Not Establish a

Claim Upon Which Relief Properly May Be Granted. . . . . . . . . . .
viii
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PLAINTIFFS FIRST FIVE CLAIMS FAIL BECAUSE SCM DID

NOT OWE A DUTY TO THE PLAINTIFFS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.
A.
B.
C.
Plaintiffs Legal Malpractice Claim (Claim #1) Fails Because

SCM Did Not Represent the Overwhelming Majority of the
Plaintiffs in Any Capacity and Certainly Not in Connection with
Determining the Truthfulness of the FLDS Church and/or the
Legitimacy of Warren Jeffs as Its Prophet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Plaintiffs Fail to Allege that the Scope of the Alleged

Representation Supports the Duty They Claim. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Plaintiffs Second Through Fifth Claims Likewise Fail Because

SCM Did Not Owe or Breach a Duty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PLAINTIFFS CLAIM UNDER THE TVPRA (Claim 6) FAILS

AS A MATTER OF BASIC STATUTORY APPLICATION. . . . . . .
II.
A.
B.
10
Section 1583 is Inapplicable Because SCM Did Not

Kidnap or Carry Away Anyone and the FLDS Members
Were Not Slaves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11
Section 1589 is Inapplicable Because SCM Did Not Receive

the Labor or Services of FLDS Members and Did Not
Participate in a Venture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.)

C.
Section 1591 is Inapplicable Because SCM Did Not Engage

in Trafficking or Participate in a Venture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17
PLAINTIFFS SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FAILS,

INCLUDING BECAUSE THERE IS NO PRIVATE CAUSE OF
ACTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18
PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE A COGNIZABLE RICO

CLAIM (Claim 8). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS FURTHER FAIL BECAUSE THE

COURT CANNOT ADJUDICATE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS. . . . . . . . . . .
23
PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS ALSO ARE BARRED BY THE

APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
29
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
iii
INTRODUCTION
A lawyers representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not
constitute an endorsement of the clients political, economic, social or moral views or activities.
See Utah R. Profl Conduct, Preamble; id. R. 1.2(b) (same); ABA Model R. Profl Conduct
1.2(b) (same). Indeed, this foundational legal tenant is so enshrined that it predates both the
Constitution and the country. For example, John Adams, who helped draft the Declaration of
Independence, was the second President of the United States, and also was a skilled lawyer,
recognized that representing a client was not the same thing as endorsing or conspiring in the
actions of a client. Thus, when British soldiers were charged with murder after the Boston
Massacre and had difficulty finding legal counsel, Adams successfully represented their cause
despite his personal beliefs and public opinion. Abraham Lincoln, who as President emancipated
the slaves, as a lawyer represented slave-holder Robert Matson. Plaintiffs here wrongfully seek
money from SCM for doing what the U.S. Constitution provides and following the example of a
long tradition of great lawyers.
Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that they are victims of actions committed by Warren
Jeffs and other leaders of the FLDS Church. If true, SCM unequivocally and emphatically
condemns any and all unlawful actions that Plaintiffs allege Warren Jeffs and the FLDS Church
committed.
Those alleged actions, however, were neither committed by nor are they legally
attributable to SCM.
SCM provided legal advice and services to its clients, including the FLDS Church and
the UEP Trust. That provision of professional services does not establish a basis for charging
SCM with liability for Jeffs and/or the FLDS Churchs alleged wrongs. SCM is no more
i
responsible for Warren Jeffs actions than the doctor who kept him healthy, the contractor who
built his churches, or the innocent followers who dedicated their time and resources to
maintaining the FLDS Church. A lawyers representation of a client does not constitute an
endorsement of the clients political, economic, social or moral views or activities, nor does it
establish legal liability of the lawyer for the clients acts.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 697 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). The plausibility standard requires
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a
complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendants liability, it
stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
A complaint must offer more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation to survive dismissal. Id. at 677-78.

Moreover, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Id. [C]ourts are not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007) (internal quotations omitted); see also Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1252 (10th Cir.
2006) (recognizing that courts accept well-pleaded facts, not conclusory allegations).
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement. Id. (citation omitted). Where
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
ii
misconduct, the complaint has allegedbut it has not show[n]that the pleader is entitled to
relief. Id. at 1950 (citation omitted).
STATEMENT OF ALLEGED FACTS
Plaintiffs lengthy Complaint eschews the short plain statement standard expressed by
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, the Complaint contains lengthy legal
argument and repetitive, irrelevant allegations. Cf. Glenn v. First Nat. Bank in Grand Junction,
868 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 1989) (The law recognizes a significant difference between notice
pleading and shotgun pleading.). Ultimately, while the Complaint provides long allegations
about the FLDS Church and the wrongs allegedly perpetuated by its leaders, the Complaint fails
to link those alleged actions to any legally culpable conduct of SCM.
Because of the length of the Complaint and the repeated inclusion of irrelevant
allegations and arguments, this section does not attempt to summarize all of the allegations of the
Complaint. Instead, this section summarizes the legal work that SCM performed and each
individual plaintiffs alleged claims. Neither the scope of SCMs legal work nor Plaintiffs
individual allegations establishes SCMs liability for Warren Jeffs alleged conduct.
The Plaintiffs individual allegations also confirm the many failings of the claims for
relief Plaintiffs assert. Approximately the first half of Plaintiffs Complaint is spent presenting
generalized and argumentative conclusions. However, when Plaintiffs purport to allege and
identify their own experience and damages, it becomes even clearer that Plaintiffs have not and
cannot establish a claim against SCM upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b). Among other reasons, SCM did not have an individual attorney-client relationship with
any of the Plaintiffs concerning any of the actions Plaintiffs complain about, and therefore owed
iii
them no duty.1 SCM and its attorneys are entirely unfamiliar with the overwhelming majority of
SCM likewise did not subject any of the Plaintiffs to slavery or sex
the Plaintiffs.
trafficking, nor did it control a criminal RICO enterprise that allegedly injured any Plaintiff.
Moreover, the individual Plaintiffs repeatedly complain about events that plainly occurred well
outside of any applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiffs further incorporate religious questions
concerning the FLDS Church, allege actions that Plaintiffs voluntarily took because of their
former belief in that church, and demand compensation because they were shunned from the
religion they now publicly decry. SCM as a matter of law is not liable for these types of claims
and allegations.
A.
SCM Never Represented in Any Capacity the Overwhelming Majority of the

Plaintiffs.
Over the course of their 120-page complaint, Plaintiffs suggest that SCM broadly
represented the FLDS Church, the UEP Trust, and every member and former member of the
FLDS Church. Plaintiffs provide virtually no details regarding the alleged nature or scope of
SCMs alleged representation.
Rather, Plaintiffs Complaint alleges SCM provided
representation to the FLDS Church, the UEP Trust, and all members and former members with
1
Several Plaintiffs contend that SCM represented them in connection with specific
proceedings. For example, Amy Nielson alleges that she retained SCM to fight for custody as
part of a legal proceeding initiated by her former husband. [Complaint 410]. Even if accepted
as true, that allegation fails to establish the scope of the duty Ms. Nielson alleges namely an
obligation to investigate and inform Ms. Nielson regarding religious matters. Countless lawyers
represent parties who hold religious beliefs that counsel knows are incorrect. Likewise, a
lawyer may know that a clients spouse is an insufferable wretch, a complete jerk, or any
number of other truths. However, they have no obligation to offer unsolicited (if not unwanted)
advice about such personal matters. The scope of the duty owed by attorneys . . . is limited to
those areas that lie within the matter for which the professional is retained. Schnitzer Invest.
Corp. v. Kronenberg, 1994 WL 539282 at *2 (D. Or. 1994). Not one of the plaintiffs alleges that
he or she retained SCM for the purpose of advising on the legitimacy of the FLDS Church or
Warren Jeffs calling as the prophet of the FLDS Church.
iv
respect to all or virtually all conceivable legal and religious issues that may have involved or
confronted any of them. Plaintiffs Complaint falls woefully short of stating a plausible claim.
In the limited instances where the Complaint does reference specific representation by SCM, the
conclusory allegations about that representation either are contrary to published case law or
make clear the unrelated nature of SCMs representation.
For example, Plaintiffs allege in paragraphs 23 through 32 of their Complaint that SCM
assisted in restructuring the UEP Trust in order to provide Warren Jeffs with the ability to control
FLDS Church members. Plaintiffs allege this was a key element of a scheme between Warren
Jeffs and SCM. In fact, however, in Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998), the Utah
Supreme Court explained why the UEP Trust was amended. The Court described the dissension
that had occurred in the FLDS Church in the late 1960s or early 1970s, which led to a split
within the FLDS Church in 1984 and, ultimately, to litigation involving the UEP Trust. See id.
at 1240. As a result of that litigation, the Utah Supreme Court ultimately reversed the findings of
the trial court that the UEP Trust was a charitable trust, holding instead that that the trust named
specific beneficiaries (none of whom is a plaintiff in this case) and that the trust was a private
and not charitable trust. Id. at 1251-1252. See also Snow, Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberg,
2013 UT 15, 3-10, 299 P.3d 1058.
The Utah Supreme Court stated:
In response to our decision, the sole surviving beneficiary of the UEP Trust,
Rulon Jeffs, acting for himself and as the president of the Corporation of the
FLDS Church, and other trustees amended and reinstated the UEP Trust. It is
undisputed that the amended UEP Trust is a charitable trust. Unlike the original
trust documents, which essential limited the class of beneficiaries to the UEP
Trust founders, the 1998 restatement substantially broadened the class of
beneficiaries to include FLDS Church members who consecrate their lives,
times, talents, and resources to the building and establishment of the Kingdom
v
of God on Earth under the direction of the President of the [FLDS] Church.
Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, 4. The Utah Supreme Court goes on in Lindberg to describe how the
UEP Trust and its president, Warren Jeffs, were sued in 2004 and that Mr. Parker of SCM
entered an appearance as counsel for the UEP Trust and the FLDS Church in those actions but
later then withdrew when he was discharged by his clients. Id. at 7. In fact, SCM ceased
representing any person or entity related to the FLDS Church for several years starting in 2004,
as a result of Jeffs prophetic declaration to answer them nothing, meaning that he would not
allow any defense to [a legal] action. [Complaint 93].
Because the UEP Trust was left without legal counsel, the Utah Attorney General entered
an appearance on its behalf. At the request of the Utah Attorney General, the trustees of the UEP
Trust were suspended, an independent special fiduciary was appointed by the court to administer
the trust, and in December 2005, the court entered an order reforming the trust. Id. See also
Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, 8-10. SCM has never represented the reformed trust, and the Utah
Supreme Court specifically found SCM had no attorney-client relationship with the reformed
trust. See Lindberg. Thus, even had SCM somehow improperly aided the creation of an illegal
instrumentality (Complaint at 29), that instrumentality was in the hands of the state as of
June 2004 and ceased to exist as of December 2005 over 10 years ago. See Lindberg, 2013 UT
15.
In 2008, the State of Texas raided the YFZ Ranch and removed many FLDS Children
from their homes. As a result of that effort, SCM was hired by FLDS Church leadership to try
and restore the children to their homes. Plaintiffs suggest that SCM represented all residents
of the YFZ Ranch. [See Complaint 117]. In fact, SCM had been hired by Willie Jessop acting
vi
on behalf of the FLDS Church, which owned the YFZ Ranch and had expressed concerns for its
affected members. Most of those members had their own lawyers who were privately retained or
were appointed by the State of Texas to represent their interest. In any event, other than Ruby
Jessop, Steve Dockstader, and Thomas Jeffs, Plaintiffs do not even claim that they were
residents of the YFZ Ranch at the time of SCMs alleged representation. SCM also was hired
by the FLDS Church leadership to challenge the State of Utahs continued involvement in the
UEP Trust. That matter was presented to the court on the basis of association standing, with the
FLDS Church leaders again acting as the leaders of that association. [See, e.g., Complaint
119].
Yet another typical example relates to Amy Nielson. She alleges that SCM represented
her in connection with a lawsuit her former husband had filed to fight for custody and reestablish a relationship with his children. [Complaint 410]. Ms. Nielson alleges that she was
encouraged by FLDS leaders to retain SCM in connection with that proceeding and acted in
accordance with their instructions. [Id. 410-11]. Ms. Nielson does not contend that SCM
failed to faithfully fulfill this representation. Indeed, the Complaint does not even indicate the
ultimate outcome of that legal proceeding.
Instead, Ms. Nielson alleges that during her
deposition she heard and saw evidence she did not want to hear or see. That evidence contained
information and evidence that contradicted the phrase The Prophet only does right.
[Complaint 416].
In short, the conclusory allegations that SCM represented and owed duties to all present
and former FLDS Church members, which in turn allegedly required SCM to tell all former and
current FLDS Church members that Warren Jeffs is a bad man and not a true prophet and advise
vii
them of Warren Jeffs bad acts apparently without regard to whether SCM even had knowledge
of those acts is not only utterly nonsensical, it is premised on conclusory factual allegations
that are contrary to the known evidence contained in public court files and published cases of
which this Court properly may take judicial notice. With respect to Ms. Nielson and any other
plaintiff whom SCM allegedly directly represented, the allegations also entirely fail to consider
the scope of the alleged representation or establish a breach of SCMs duties associated with that
representation.
B.
Plaintiffs Individual Factual Allegations Do Not Establish a Claim Upon

Which Relief Properly May Be Granted.
Alicia Rohbock: Ms. Rohbock alleges that on April 21, 1997, she was spiritually
married to FLDS Prophet Rulon Jeffs when she was 20-years-old. [Complaint 200].
Rulon Jeffs died, and Ms. Rohbock spiritually married LeRoy Jeffs on October 15, 2002.
[Id. 203]. Ms. Rohbock gave birth to a daughter [o]n September 27, 2003. [Id. 205].
However, the Prophet did not consider her qualified to be a mother so her daughter lived with
someone else. [Id.]. In March of 2005, Ms. Rohbock separated from her second husband who
had been declared a Son of Perdition by the FLDS Church. [Id. 206]. Ms. Rohbock then
entered into a new spiritual marriage [o]n June 24, 2005. [Id. 207]. On January 8, 2007
Ms. Rohbock was informed that the Prophet had received a revelation that she was immoral
(guilty of sexual sin), had lost her priesthood blessing, [and] needed to repent. [Id. 209]. As a
result, Ms. Rohbock no longer had the Holy Ghost and was treated as an outcast. [Id. 210].
Ms. Rohbock then had another child with her latest husband. [Id. 212]. Ms. Rohbock again
was informed that the Prophet had not found her worthy to go with the family and as a result
she was to live in the basement of th[e] house. [Id. 213]. In 2011, Jeffs instructed Ms.
viii
Rohbock to move to a home in Colorado City but also instructed the rest of the family to act
like you cant see her. [Id. 217]. Ms. Rohbock then was denied admission to the FLDS
Churchs elite membership the United Order. [Id. 218]. Subsequently, Ms. Rohbock
briefly was admitted to the United Order but then was expelled from the FLDS Church after
Jeffs received revelation that [she] had engaged in lesbian behavior with her sister. [Id. 219].
After receiving this final revelation from Jeffs, [Ms. Rohbock] returned to her home, took her
children, and fled . . . knowing that she was damning herself and her children to Hell for
eternity. [Id. 220]. Ms. Rohbock claims to have suffered mental anxiety because of being
found constantly unworthy of religious advancement by the Prophet despite her best efforts.
[Id. 218].
Ruby Jessop: Ms. Jessop alleges that in 2001 at the age of 14 she was forced into a
spiritual marriage . . . in a secret spiritual wedding ceremony . . . officiated by Jeffs. [Id.
221]. Ms. Jessop was a minor at the time and alleges she was raped by her spiritual husband.
[Id.]. The marriage legally was formalized two years later, and Ms. Jessop then had six children
with her husband. [Id. 222]. In 2008, Ms. Jessop went to the YFZ Ranch where she resided
at the time of the Texas raid in 2008. [Id.]. By that point, Ms. Jessop was approximately 21.
[See id. 221]. Ms. Jessop left he FLDS Church in 2012, when she was approximately 24.
[Id. 223]. When Ms. Jessop attempted to serve legal papers concerning her children, the
Hildale City Attorney (not SCM) and the Colorado City Marshals Office interfered. [Id. 22324]. Ms. Jessop alleges that SCM briefly appeared in a legal proceeding and was adverse to her.
[See id. 225].
ix
Susie Broadbent: Ms. Broadbent alleges that the FLDS Church had absolute control
over . . . the major events in her life before she escaped from the FLDS Church. [Id. 228]. In
2003 at the age of 16, Ms. Broadbent entered into a spiritual marriage at a marriage ceremony
performed by Jeffs. [See id. 229]. Sometime thereafter, she was raped by one of the sons of
the first wife. [Id. 232]. She subsequently proceeded to escape the FLDS Church . . . but
was immediately cut off from all contact with her FLDS family. [Id.].
Gina Rohbock: Ms. Rohbock entered a spiritual marriage [o]n December 28, 2001
at the age of 16. [Id. 234]. Ms. Rohbock then entered into a second marriage [o]n April 29,
2002.
[Id.].
In early 2007, the company Ms. Rohbocks husband worked for began
involuntarily docking his pay in order to make donations to the FLDS Church, ostensibly so that
the FLDS Church could pay legal fees. [Id. 236-41]. In 2010, Ms. Rohbocks husband quit
and wanted to take [a new] job, but Lyle Jeffs instructed Richard stay with a Priesthood
company. [Id. 241-42]. The Rohbocks followed that counsel based on their belief that
Defendant Jeffs [sic] was The Prophet. [Id. 244]. Ms. Rohbocks husband obtained new
employment, but again did not receive full compensation. [Id. 245-49]. Ms. Rohbock and her
husband then left the FLDS Church in or around February 2012. [Id. 253]. Ms. Rohbock
contends that if she had any understanding of . . . Jeffs confessions and convictions at the times
these events actually occurred, she and [her husband] would have left the FLDS Church and
[community] and would not have turned down [a better employment] offer. [Id. 254].
Jason Black: Mr. Black alleges that in late 2011 and early 2012, the FLDS Church
began implementing its United Order doctrine. [See id. 257-58]. Mr. Black was deemed
unworthy to be in the [United Order], but his wife and six daughters were considered worthy to
x
be members. [Id. 258]. At first, he and his wife were required to separate themselves
physically, live in different parts of the home, avoid any physical contact beyond handshakes,
and to limit their conversations. [Id.]. However, Mr. Blacks wife was ready to remain with
[Mr. Black] and able to keep the family intact. [Id. 259]. As result of their rejection of the
FLDS Churchs teachings regarding the United Order, Mr. Black his wife and their children
are considered apostates and share in the heartache suffered by thousands of the FLDS. In
addition, he lost his job at an FLDS Church controlled business. [Id.]. Mr. Black contends that
if SCM had not represented Jeffs or told the critical truth to the FLDS, untold injury to the
FLDS, their families and their finances would have been avoided. [Id. 262].
Nolan Barlow: Mr. Barlow claims that he was raised in the FLDS Church. [Id.
263]. Mr. Barlow and his wife . . . qualified for inclusion in the United Order. [Id. 265].
However, Mr. Barlow then began investigating to prove the correctness of the FLDS Church
and its teachings. [Id. 266]. This investigation led [Mr. Barlow] to two conclusions: first,
that he and the FLDS, not the apostates, had been deceived and, second, that the deception was
systematically destroying the FLDS. [Id. 267]. Accordingly, Mr. Barlow left the FLDS
Church. [Id.]. Mr. Barlow complains that SCM disclosed nothing about why Jeffs had been
arrested and tried to the FLDS members. [Id. 264]. Mr. Barlow claims that if he had been
advised earlier of Jeffs admissions that he was not a prophet, he and his family would have
been free to make their own religious choices. [Id. 268].
May Musser: Ms. Musser, who is now 19-years-old, successfully escaped [the FLDS
Church] three years ago in fear of being forced into a sexual relationship with an adult male
member or leader of the FLDS Church by FLDS leaders, including Jeffs. [Id. 270]. As a
xi
minor, Ms. Musser ran away from her home in Hildale, Utah. [Id. 274]. Ms. Mussers mother
caught her and she was corrected, that is sent away to a home of repentance or correction . .
. . While there, she was required to repent and attempt to show her devotion to the FLDS Church
or risk permanent disassociation with her family and community. [Id. 275]. Ms. Musser
ran away again and ultimately the police located her and forced [Ms. Musser], as a minor, into
her mothers car. [Id. 276-77]. Ms. Musser then told Lyle Jeffs that she was an apostate.
[Id. 277]. As a consequence, Ms. Musser was labeled a Forever No Member and is [c]utoff from the FLDS. [Id. 278-79].
Holly Bistline: Ms. Bistline was married [i]n December of 1991. [Complaint 280].
Later, Warren Jeffs instructed [Ms. Bistline] to divorce [her husband], and Ms. Bistline acted
in compliance with that directive. [Id.]. Her husband was sent away from his family to
repent at a distance. [Id.]. Ms. Bistlines family grieved for the loss of their husband and
father. [Id.]. Ms. Bistline then spiritually married again on January 18, 2004. [Id. 281].
On April 20, 2013, FLDS Church leader Lyle Jeffs instructed [Ms. Bistline] to leave her home
with her children and live apart from [her second husband]. [Id.]. The separation from [her
husband] was welcome . . . . [Id.]. However, some of her children stayed with their father.
[Id.]. Ms. Bistline left the FLDS Church on December 17, 2013. [Id. 284]. She and her
children are safer and happier than they have ever been. [Id. 285]. However, leaving the
church cost her and her children the association and relationships they had because [t]heir
FLDS loved ones treat them as apostates. [Id.].
Alyssa Bistline: A. Bistline is the daughter of Holly Bistline. [See Complaint 280]. A.
Bistline feared that if she left the FLDS Church she would surely go to Hell. [Id. 286].
xii
Nevertheless, A. Bistline and her mother decided to leave the FLDS Church. [Id. 283-92]. A.
Bistline claims that [i]f only she had known earlier [that the FLDS Church was not true and
Warren Jeffs was not a prophet] she could have gone to high school, gotten a jump on college,
and prepared financially for her future. [Id. 290-91]. A. Bistline filed suit to help the FLDS
take steps toward the front of the class. [Id. 292].
Wallace Kenton: Mr. Kenton is the son of the former prophet Rulon Jeffs and is Warren
Jeffs half-brother. [Id. 290]. In 2004, [Mr. Kenton] was expelled from the FLDS Church . . .
. [Id. 294]. Later in 2004, Jeffs instructed [Mr. Kenton] to divorce his wife. [Id. 295].
In March of 2005, Jeffs instructed Mr. Kenton to marry his spiritual wife. [Id. 295]. On
March 20, 2006 Mr. Kentons spiritual wife was instructed to leave him. [Id. 296]. In
2007, [Mr. Kenton] was partially re-admitted to the FLDS Church . . . . [Id. 297]. [He] was
later permanently expelled on January 10, 2010, and told he was ineligible to ever repent and
return. [Id. 300]. Mr. Kenton then started to investigate his half-brother and the FLDS
Church and realized that Defendant Jeffs was a fraud. [Id. 301]. Notably, Mr. Kenton
alleges that SCM appeared in legal proceedings against [Mr. Kenton]. [Id. 301].
Lawrence Barlow: Mr. Barlow was expelled from the FLDS Church in 2012. [Id.
303]. Mr. Barlow was spiritually married on December 6, 1996. [Complaint 309]. Between
2002 and 2006, Mr. Barlow started and then assigned a company to Jeffs. [Id. 311]. From
2009 to 2011 Mr. Barlow then worked on projects that personally benefitted Lyle [Jeffs]. [Id.
308]. On October 28, 2012 Jeffs received a revelation from the Lord that caused Mr.
Barlow to be expelled from the FLDS Church. [Id. 313]. Mr. Barlow eventually chose to
accept the revelation was from the Lord, and was told to go far away, never return, and have
xiii
no contact or communication with his wife or family again. [Id.]. Thereafter, Mr. Barlow
became aware that Jeffs was defrauding the FLDS and destroying FLDS families. [Id. 316].
Mr. Barlow and his wife experienced profound shunning and harsh and unkind behavior and
loss of medical help from FLDS Church members as a result of revelation from Jeffs to Leave
Apostates Alone, Severely. [Id. 319-20]. Mr. Barlow claims that if SCM had advised [him]
. . . about Jeffs true nature and conduct . . . incalculable heartache, pain, and financial ruin
would have been avoided. [Id. 321].
Steven Dockstader: In late 2004, Mr. Dockstader was ordered by FLDS leadership to
leave his home . . . and move to Texas . . . to participate in the building of the YFZ Ranch. [Id.
323]. Mr. Dockstader then began engaging in hard physical labor, although he was a minor
at the time. [Id.]. Mr. Dockstader continued hard labor at the YFZ Ranch until November
2011. [Id. 325]. [I]n late 2011 . . . FLDS leaders excommunicated and exiled [Mr.
Dockstaders] parents . . . for murder of the unborn, essentially a catch all sin . . . . [Id. 327].
Mr. Dockstader was approximately 19 at the time. [See id. 323]. Mr. Dockstader then started a
successful company with his brothers and was told by Jeffs that he needed to pay more in
religious contributions, upon threat of expulsion. [Id. 330]. Mr. Dockstaders brothers
further were informed that he lived and breathed an apostate element so that they would stop
all association with him. [Id. 334]. Mr. Dockstader left the FLDS Church and joined his
expelled parents. [Id. 335].
Derrell Barlow: Mr. Barlows father was sent away from his family and work months
before [Warren] Jeffs admitted . . . that he was not the prophet. [Id. 336]. Mr. Barlow did not
know about Jeffs confession that he was a religious fraud. [Id.]. After Jeffs convictions . . .
xiv
[Mr. Barlow] started to access information in an effort to find answers to the questions he could
no longer dismiss from his mind. [Id. 338]. What he found shocked him to his core. [Id.].
[W]hen he approached his wife and others, he was disbelieved, treated as an apostate, expelled
from the FLDS Church, and his wife left him with their children. [Id. 340]. Mr. Barlow
contends that if SCM had shared this information . . . [Mr. Barlow] would not have lost his
family; rather they would have found it shocking like he did . . . and would have been able to
make difficult but informed choices. [Id.].
Marvin Cooke: Mr. Cooke was born and raised in the FLDS Church and believed in the
United Effort Plan, which he describes as a system of communal living. [Id. 341]. That
system required . . . absolute obedience to the Prophet. [Id.]. Mr. Cooke worked in the
commercial flooring business and had three wives and fathered 23 children. [Id. 342]. Mr.
Cooke was astonished to be expelled from the FLDS Church on December 4, 2012 for child
murder (a miscarriage) and for adultery. [Id. 344]. Upon his expulsion from the FLDS
Church, he fell into a depressed state . . . . He lost his family, his business, and he suffered from
severe mental and emotional distress as a result of being expelled from the FLDS Church . . . .
[Id. 345].
Helen Barlow: Ms. Barlow moved to Colorado City . . . with her family in 1986. [Id.
346]. She then married in 1991. [Id.]. Ms. Barlow and her husband donated their house to the
UEP Trust to remain in good standing with FLDS leadership. [Id.]. Ms. Barlow was admitted
to the FLDS Churchs United Order, although she thought the selection process felt entirely
arbitrary. [Id. 354]. Warren Jeffs directed that members of the United Order should have
limited contact with FLDS Church members who were not admitted to the United Order. [Id.
xv
355-57]. Ms. Barlow found that instruction entirely impractical and almost impossible and
regularly did not obey all the separation rules. [Id. 357]. Due to [her] failure to abide by all
[United Order] rules, she and her family began to lose favor in the eyes of Jeffs and other FLDS
leaders. [Id. 358]. Ultimately, members of the FLDS Church refused to associate with Ms.
Barlow. [Id. 361-63]. As a result, the family was financially devastated. [Ms. Barlow] was
further devastated and broadly humiliated by being declared an apostate. [Id. 363].
Vergel Barlow: Mr. Barlow is married to Helen Barlow, among others. [Id. 364]. Mr.
Barlow consecrated [his] home to the UEP Trust, as was required to remain in good standing
with FLDS leaders. [Id. 365]. Mr. Barlow was made a part of the FLDS private security
force (the God Squad) [i]n our around 2007. [Id. 378]. Mr. Barlow was accepted into
the FLDS Churchs United Order but began losing favor with [Warren] Jeffs and his cohorts
after the imposition of the [United Order] restrictions on the general FLDS population. [Id.
379]. Mr. Barlow thought certain restrictions were ridiculous and refused to follow them. [Id.
379]. In 2013, Mr. Barlow was declared an apostate. [Id. 384]. Mr. Barlow claims that he
had been kept in the dark about Jeffs multiple confessions that he had never been the Prophet
and the evidence supporting Jeffs convictions. [Id. 385]. Mr. Barlow claims that had he
been made aware of these critical facts . . . [he] would have left the FLDS Church with his
family and not be subjected to the suffering he endured before and throughout his involvement in
Jeffs reign. [Id.].
Carole Jessop: [I]n 2003, shortly after her 18th birthday, [Ms. Jessop] was required to
meet with Jeffs, who asked [her] if she was ready to be married, and [Ms. Jessop] said no. [Id.
386]. Later that day, she lost her job and was ordered not to associate with any of her
xvi
friends. [Id.]. Two weeks later, Ms. Jessop married Vergel Barlow because she was faced
with the prospect of being expelled from the FLDS Church. [Id. 387-88]. Ms. Jessop saw
the devastation resulting from Jeffs reign as a religious test that was preceding the destruction of
the world and ushering in the millennium. [Id. 390]. In March of 2006, Ms. Jessops inlaws were expelled from the FLDS Church, and Ms. Jessop and her husband were required to
support their families. [Id. 392]. Ms. Jessop was not selected as a member of the FLDS
Churchs United Order, although some of her family members were, which created a division in
her family. [See id. 394-95]. Ms. Jessop and her family refused to follow FLDS Church
directives, which resulted in the whole family losing favor with Jeffs and his FLDS leaders.
[Id. 396]. Ms. Jessop then learned of Jeffs confessions that he was not the prophet . . . [and]
left the FLDS Church and was declared an apostate. [Id. 397]. Ms. Jessop claims that if she
had not been kept in the dark . . . [and] had been told about Jeffs confessions, she would have
left the FLDS Church. [Id.].
Briell Libertae Decker, fka Lynette Warner: [W]hen [Ms. Decker] was 18 years old,
she was coerced by Jeffs to enter into a plural spiritual marriage with him as the Prophet. [Id.
399]. Ms. Decker participated in extensive training at the hands of various elite FLDS
members that was designed to achieve . . . her absolute obedience and loyalty to the FLDS
Church and its leader. [Id. 400]. Ms. Decker attempted to leave the FLDS Church in
October 2011 but was returned to her parents. [Id. 403]. On May 22, 2012, Ms. Decker
permanently left the FLDS Church and began to overcome significant challenges and started a
new life far from the FLDS Church and its reach in Tennessee. [Id. 404]. Ms. Decker
xvii
contends that SCM failed to give the FLDS the critical information they needed to know about
Jeffs. [Id. 406].
Amy Nielson: Ms. Nielson alleges that in 1991, she was married to Wallace Jeffs. They
had seven children together. [Id. 407]. Ms. Nielson alleges she never fell in love with her
husband and was told by FLDS leaders she could receive a release from her marriage. [Id.
407]. [S]he chose not to request a release. [Id. 407]. Wallace Jeffs was exiled by [Warren]
Jeffs from the FLDS community and Ms. Nielson was told that she would be re-married. [Id.
408]. Years later, she learned that she was to marry the Prophet as his 61st wife. [Id.]. She
never married Warren Jeffs, however, because he was arrested. [Id.]. In 2011, Wallace Jeffs
filed a lawsuit naming [Ms. Nielson], [Warren] Jeffs, FLDS Bishop Lyle Jeffs and other FLDS
leaders as defendants in an effort to locate [Ms. Nielson] and their children . . . and to try to
convince [Ms. Neilson] that she was being defrauded by the FLDS Church and its leaders. [Id.
410]. She alleges Lyle Jeffs arranged for SCM to represent her in the lawsuit. [See id. 41112]. The only payment that Ms. Nielson alleges was made to SCM for this representation was
provided to her by Lyle Jeffs. [Id.]. During Ms. Nielsons deposition in the lawsuit, she heard
and saw evidence she did not want to hear or see. [Id. 416]. By the time Amy left SC&Ms
office and had reached the parking lot, she was grateful and relieved that she would not have to
marry Defendant Jeffs, and she turned to her son and told him that they were going to
California. [Id. 416]. Ms. Nielson claims at some point thereafter, it was clear Parker had
stopped representing her. [Id. 419]. Ms. Nielson alleges she had always understood that
[Parker] had been chosen by God to protect the people and that the people had paid him
thousands of dollars for that protection. [Id. 411]. She alleges Parker never told her about
xviii
the things she needed to know the most to make informed decisions about her children and for
herself (i.e., that the FLDS Church and its leadership allegedly are a fraud). [Id. 421]. Ms.
Nielson claims that she was always entitled to know the hidden and forbidden side of her
religion. [Id. 425]. Ms. Nielson filed suit to make it clear to her friends and family that the
fear they feel can end as they take control. [Id. 425].
Sarah Allred: Sarah Allred moved to Short Creek in 1998 when she was 18-years-old
and later that year married Richard Allred. [Id. 426]. They had six children together. [Id.].
Richard was absent from his family for long periods of time, and at times Sarah and some of
her children were placed in hiding by [Warren] Jeffs. [Id. 427]. Sarah was expelled from the
FLDS church and separated from her children. Sarahs children turned against her, which she
blames on the FLDS Church. [Id. 427-30]. Sarah alleges she knew that Parker was the
spokesman and head lawyer for the FLDS. She trusted that he was protecting her. [Id. 437].
Sarah claims she had donated money to the FLDS church to pay for Parkers services and
would never have thought of using a lawyer that had not been approved by FLDS leaders. [Id.].
Sarah claims that her husband had also told her that he [Parker] conveyed messages to and from
the Prophet while in jail. [Id.].
Thomas Jeffs. Thomas Jeffs grew up in Herriman and at some point moved to Short
Creek. [Id. 438]. Thomas worked hard for FLDS owned and/or controlled businesses,
including acting as Lyle Jeffs body guard, and he gave much of his salary to the FLDS Church.
[Id. 440-44]. Thomas was chosen to move to Texas around November 2009 to take part in
the continued construction of the YFZ Ranch. [Id. 445]. He was allowed into the United
Order but then was kicked off the Ranch by Lyle Jeffs, because the Prophet had issued a
xix
revelation that Thomas was immoral. [Id. 445-47]. After Defendant [Warren] Jeffs was
arrested, Thomas often observed or assisted Lyle to set aside thousands of dollars for the defense
attorneys, with Defendant Parker sometimes named specifically as the recipient.
Thomas
observed Lyle keeping careful records of the amount of money paid to the attorneys. The
attorney fees became exorbitant after Jeffs arrest and the raid on the YFZ Ranch. [Id. 444].
Thomas left the FLDS church in 2013 . . . . [Id. 448]. Like the other FLDS and most of his
family, Thomas had no knowledge of [Warren] Jeffs admission that he was a fraud or the
actions for which he was sentenced to life in prison. All of that information was kept from him
by FLDS leaders and lawyers who he trusted for protections. [Id. 449].
Janetta Jessop: Janetta Jessop was born and raised in Short Creek to a family who had
been devout FLDS for multiple generations. [Id. 450]. Janetta married FLDS Prophet Warren
Jeffs on October 25, 2003. She was Jeffs 63rd wife, and she considered marriage to the
FLDS Prophet . . . the greatest honor a woman and her family could receive. [Id. 452-53].
Janetta was unhappy in her marriage to Jeffs and her living arrangements, and at times lived in a
house of hiding in Short Creek. She then moved to a location in Colorado. Janetta was
disturbed by Warren Jeffs obsession with his 13-year-old wife, Ida, and Jeffs lack of
attention toward Janetta. [Id. 457-63]. Toward the end of 2004, Janetta knew she could not
continue to live the way she was living. [Id. 467]. Janetta worked at the Hildale Clinic, but
her father had her turn all of the money she earned over to the Prophet for his use to pay FLDS
expenses, including attorney fees. [Id. 471]. Janetta alleges [s]he had been raised to trust
and believe that the FLDS lawyers were protecting the FLDS and her, but she was not sure what
they were protecting her from. [Id. 471]. In 2006, Janetta left Short Creek. Her father and
xx
mother refuse to have any contact with her. [Id. 472]. Over the past nine years, she has
been in and out of hospitals multiple times for psychiatric treatment . . . . [Id. 472].
xxi
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs repeatedly claim that Warren Jeffs and/or other FLDS Church leaders
mistreated and spiritually misled them. This Motion to Dismiss does not address claims that
Plaintiffs may have against those leaders or even the FLDS Church. Instead, this Motion
addresses Plaintiffs efforts to hold SCM liable for the alleged actions of its former clients.
I.
PLAINTIFFS FIRST FIVE CLAIMS FAIL BECAUSE SCM DID NOT OWE A
DUTY TO THE PLAINTIFFS.
Plaintiffs first five claims for relief require the Plaintiffs to establish that SCM owed
them an individual legal duty. See, e.g., Christensen & Jensen, P.C. v. Barrett & Daines, 2008
UT 64, 22, 194 P.3d 931 (legal malpractice action requires a duty of the attorney to the client
from their relationship); Giles v. Mineral Res. Intl, Inc., 2014 UT App 259, 6, 338 P.3d 825
(To prove a breach of fiduciary duty claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant
owed a duty . . . .); Gilbert Development Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 2010 UT App 361, 20, 246
P.3d 131 (To prevail on a claim of fraudulent nondisclosure, [plaintiff] must . . . [prove] a legal
duty to disclose . . . .); Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 11, 94 P.3d 919 ([A] duty to disclose
is a necessary element of the tort of negligent misrepresentation.).
[T]he determination of whether a legal duty exists falls to the court. Normandeau v.
Hanson Equip., Inc., 2009 UT 44, 18, 215 P.3d 152; accord Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App
77, 8, 67 P.3d 1017 (Whether a duty of care is owed is entirely a question of law to be
determined by the court.).
In this case, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs fall far short of
establishing a legal duty between SCM and Plaintiffs. And, as discussed in detail below, even
had there been a duty and there was not the scope of that duty would not have included
telling Plaintiffs (and all other former and present members of the FLDS Church) that Warren
1
Jeffs was an alleged fraud or that the FLDS Church allegedly is false. Because Plaintiffs do
not and cannot assert legally cognizable claims against SCM, SCM should be dismissed from
this lawsuit.
A.
Plaintiffs Legal Malpractice Claim (Claim #1) Fails Because SCM Did Not
Represent the Overwhelming Majority of the Plaintiffs in Any Capacity and
Certainly Not in Connection with Determining the Truthfulness of the
FLDS Church and/or the Legitimacy of Warren Jeffs as Its Prophet.
There is no dispute that, over a period of time, SCM represented the FLDS Church,
certain of its leaders, and/or the UEP Trust.
Indeed, Plaintiffs repeatedly reference Snow,
Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, 299 P.3d 1058. [See Complaint 44-58].
In that case, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the law firm of SCM entered an
appearance as counsel for the UEP Trust and the FLDS Church. Snow, Christensen &
Martineau, 2013 UT 15, 7 (emphasis added).2 Plaintiffs try to improperly convert SCMs
representation of the FLDS Church into a duty of representation of all individual members of
the FLDS Church. [See, e.g., id. 38]. Indeed, Plaintiffs claim that they are similarly situated
with several thousand other persons . . . by virtue of their status as past or present members of the
FLDS Church. [Complaint 1].3
Accord Snow Christensen & Martineau, 2013 UT 15, 14 (recognizing SCMs former
representation of the UEP Trust); id. 15 (SCM had formerly represented the UEP Trust . . .
.); id. 44 (SCM previously represented the UEP Trust); id. 55 (SCM represented the UEP
Trust). Plaintiffs also allege that SCM wrote letters and appeared in other legal proceedings on
behalf of the United Effort Plan or the Fundamentalist Church. [Complaint 40; accord id.
93 ([SCM] accepted service of process on behalf of the FLDS Church and the UEP Trust);
94 (same).
2
Therefore, according to Plaintiffs, SCM owed an impossible duty to thousands of current

and former FLDS Church members the identities of almost all of whom were not even known
to SCM to protect them from their own religious beliefs by convincing them that Warren Jeffs
is a fraud and that the FLDS Church is not true.
2
Representation of the FLDS Church and the UEP Trust does not establish an
attorney/client relationship with the entire membership (past and present) of the FLDS Church.
Even when the connection between counsel and alleged client is far closer than the facts alleged
in this case, courts have recognized that an attorney-client relationship is not created merely by
proximity. For example, the fact that an attorney represents a corporation does not make that
attorney counsel to the officers and directors of the corporation. Kline Hotel Partners v. Aircoa
Equity Interests, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1193, 1195 (D. Colo. 1989). Likewise, the Utah Supreme
Court has acknowledged that the general rule [is] that an attorney who represents a limited
partnership represents only the entity itself, not the individual limited partners. Kilpatrick v.
Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, 46, 37 P.3d 1130. Proximity does not create an attorney
client relationship. That standard of law is particularly important when it is not a few limited
partners at issue, but rather the membership (present and former) of an entire church.
Plaintiffs generally concede that SCM was retained by the FLDS Church and not by them
personally. In fact, Plaintiffs allegations recognize that there was a wall between SCM and the
members of the FLDS Church. For example, paragraph 304 of the Complaint alleges there was
a process you were required to follow as a member of the FLDS Church to obtain legal
assistance. First, you approach the Prophet for guidance and counsel. . . . If a personal matter
arose that the Prophet felt should be defended, he would direct individual FLDS members to
meet with . . . legal liaison. [Complaint 307 (emphasis added)]. SCM did not represent the
FLDS Church members directly unless SCM was specifically retained to represent a particular
FLDS member, which occurred on only a handful of occasions. Rather, if FLDS Church
members had legal issues, they approached the leader of the FLDS Church, who would decide
3
whether to refer church members to the churchs legal counsel. Thus, while SCM on a few
occasions did represent specific members of the FLDS Church, it did so with respect to specific
legal needs after approval from the FLDS Church.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs allege that there was an implied professional relationship
between SC&M and Plaintiffs herein and similarly situation persons. [Complaint 9]. Indeed,
Plaintiffs go so far as to claim that every past and present FLDS member had an implied
attorney-client relationship not just with SCM but also with SCMs unidentified associated cocounsel and other lawyers or law firms. [Id. 5]. Notably, Plaintiffs never detail when this
alleged implied relationship started or ended, the scope or subject of the supposed implied
representation, or even all the lawyers that allegedly (impliedly) represented them. Plaintiffs
conclusory implied attorney-client relationship theory fails based on the facts alleged.
An attorney-client relationship exists when a person reasonably believes that the
attorney represents the persons legal interest. Rodericks v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, 40, 54 P.3d
1119. In order for a person to reasonably believe that an attorney represents that person, (1)
the person must subjectively believe the attorney represents him or her and (2) this subjective
belief must be reasonable under the circumstances. Id. The reasonable belief must be
induced by representations or conduct of the attorney. Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799
P.2d 716, 727 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Thus, in order to establish an implied attorney-client
relationship, Plaintiffs must establish both that they subjectively believed that relationship
existed and that their subjective beliefs were objectively reasonable because of SCMs
representations or conduct. Even assuming Plaintiffs actually believed that SCM was their
personal legal counsel, they absolutely fail to establish the second required element. The totality
4
of the evidence alleged does not establish an objectively reasonable belief that SCM represented
Plaintiffs personally. See generally Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, 49, 37
P.3d 1130 ([A] court looks at the totality of the circumstances.). Were it otherwise, no law
firm could represent a company or organization without the risk of being found to represent
every individual constituent affiliated with that entity.
Both this Court and the Tenth Circuit have declared that an alleged client cannot establish
an objectively reasonable belief of representation where the alleged client communicated with
the attorney but only addressed matters related to the representation of an entity. See, e.g., Cole
v. Ruidoso Mun. Schools, 43 F.3d 1373, 1384-85 (10th Cir. 1994) (ruling there was no
reasonable basis for [alleged] belief where alleged client consulted the law firm only for the
purpose of carrying out her duties as principal to the entity); Nelson v. Supernova Media, Inc.,
2011 WL 223797 at *2 (D. Utah Jan. 24, 2011) (rejecting claim of attorney-client relationship
where discussions were related to [counsels] role as attorney for the . . . [e]ntities and not as
[alleged clients] counsel). The facts in this case, as alleged in the Complaint, are even further
removed from establishing an attorney client relationship than those cases. The overwhelming
majority of Plaintiffs never even claim to have communicated with SCM. Plaintiffs never
provided SCM with confidential information. Plaintiffs never signed an engagement agreement
with SCM. In fact, in some instances SCM was directly adverse to Plaintiffs. [See, e.g.,
Complaint 301 ([SCM] represented and acted as legal counsel for [third-party] against
[plaintiff].)]. There are no well-pled facts that would support a conclusion that SCMs own
conduct and representations created an objectively reasonable belief that SCM represented the
entirety of the FLDS Church membership.
5
Undeterred by the lack of well-pleaded facts, Plaintiffs suggest that they paid SCM for
legal services. However, the details of Plaintiffs allegations confirm their efforts to improperly
convert their alleged financial support of the FLDS Church and SCMs representation of the
FLDS Church into the representation of the FLDS Churchs thousands of current and former
members. For example, Plaintiffs allege that the FLDS leaders required donations from the
FLDS people to build up the kingdom and pay the fees of their lawyers. [Complaint 439].
Regardless of whether those funds actually were paid to SCM,4 donations to the FLDS Church
do not constitute payments to SCM. Plaintiffs alleged donations to the FLDS Church do not
establish an attorney-client relationship with SCM.
Plaintiffs do not allege and cannot establish an objectively reasonable basis for finding
that an attorney-client relationship existed between them and SCM. Certainly, Plaintiffs have
not presented sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiffs legal malpractice claim against SCM should be dismissed.
B.
Plaintiffs Fail to Allege that the Scope of the Alleged Representation

Supports the Duty They Claim.
A lawyer does not have a duty to disclose every known fact to a client. The scope of the
duty owed by attorneys . . . is limited to those areas that lie within the matter for which the
professional is retained. Schnitzer Invest. Corp. v. Kronenberg, 1994 WL 539282 at *2 (D. Or.
1994); cf. Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1988) (ruling law
4
The FLDS Church owes significant amounts to SCM for services provided by SCM. While
Plaintiffs are quick to suggest that SCM acted as their legal counsel, it is telling that Plaintiffs
have never offered to pay SCM that outstanding balance, or any portion thereof, directly. Based
on Plaintiffs allegations, each plaintiff would be jointly and severally liable to SCM for costs
and attorneys fees owed SCM by the FLDS Church.
6
firm hired to determine marketability of title owed no duty to disclose to investors that title was
transferred from an interested party at an inflated price). This standard is inherent in the Rules of
Professional Responsibility. Rule 1.4 declares as follows:
(a)
A lawyer shall:
(a)(1) promptly inform the client of any [conflict of interest];
(a)(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the clients
objectives are to be accomplished;
(a)(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
(a)(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
(a)(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyers conduct
when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the
Rules of Professional Conduct
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
Utah R. Profl Conduct 1.4 (emphasis added). The comments go on to explain that [t]he client
should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation and the means by which they are pursued, to the extent the client
is willing and able to do so. Id. cmt. 5 (emphasis added). Not surprisingly, section 20 of the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers also recognizes that [a] lawyer must keep a
client reasonably informed about the matter. Restatement (Second) Law Gov. Lawyers 20
(2000).
In this case, Plaintiffs allege that SCM failed to disclose that Warren Jeffs admitted he
was not a prophet and that the FLDS Church is an alleged farce. [See, e.g., Complaint at 268
(complaining Plaintiff had not been advised, for example, of Jeffs admission that he was not a
prophet); id. 336 (alleging Plaintiff did not know Jeffs admitted in several recorded and
videotaped statements that he was not the prophet)]. However, Plaintiffs never allege that SCM
was hired to provide legal services to Plaintiffs that would require the disclosure of that type of
7
information. Indeed, Plaintiffs never even attempt to identify the scope of the implied attorneyclient relationship they allege.
Instead, Plaintiffs allege a vague implied attorney-client
relationship with the entire FLDS Church membership (current and former) and then assume that
implied relationship encompassed a duty to disclose everything to Plaintiffs regardless of any
connection to the implied objectives of the representation Plaintiffs suggest impliedly existed.
Such allegations do not withstand legal scrutiny. See Utah R. Profl Conduct 1.4 cmt. 5.
Plaintiffs allegations also seek to broaden the duty to disclose well beyond its legal
limits. Even if SCM had represented all of the Plaintiffs individually (it did not), [t]he scope of
the duty owed by [SCM] . . . is limited to those areas that lie within the matter for which [SCM
was] retained. Schnitzer Invest. Corp., 1994 WL 539282 at *2. There is no allegation and can
be no allegation that SCM was retained to determine the legitimacy of the FLDS Churchs
religious beliefs or Warren Jeffs role as prophet. SCM owed no duty to Plaintiffs. Even if it
had owed a duty, however, the scope of that duty would not have included disclosing alleged
religious determinations about the FLDS Church.5
C.
Plaintiffs Second Through Fifth Claims Likewise Fail Because SCM Did Not
Owe or Breach a Duty.
Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their fiduciary duty, fraudulent nondisclosure, or negligent

misrepresentation claims for the same reason their first claim fails SCM owed Plaintiffs no
duty. Without first establishing that SCM owed and breached a legal duty, Plaintiffs second
through fifth claims each fails as a matter of law. See Giles, 2014 UT App 259, 6 (To prove a
5
For this same reason, Ms. Neilsons claim fails. Ms. Nielson alleges that she retained SCM
to fight for custody as part of a legal proceeding initiated by her former husband. Even if true,
the scope of that representation did not impose a duty to advise Ms. Nielson that the FLDS
Church allegedly is false.
8
breach of fiduciary duty claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant owed a duty . . .
.); Gilbert Development Corp., 2010 UT App 361, 20 (To prevail on a claim of fraudulent
nondisclosure, [plaintiff] must . . . [prove] a legal duty to disclose . . . .); Smith, 2004 UT 55,
11 ([A] duty to disclose is a necessary element of the tort of negligent misrepresentation.).
Plaintiffs cannot make that showing. See generally Rose, 2003 UT App 77, 8 (Whether a duty
of care is owed is entirely a question of law to be determined by the court.).
Lacking any other alleged relationship, Plaintiffs yet again turn to SCMs alleged role as
Plaintiffs implied lawyers to try and establish a legal duty. In particular, Plaintiffs breach of
fiduciary duty claim alleges that SCM was acting in a position of trust, confidence and with
special powers associated with their status as lawyers.6
[Complaint 146].
Plaintiffs
fraudulent nondisclosure claim makes the conclusory allegation that SCM was acting as legal
counsel for Plaintiffs. [Complaint 151; accord id. 163 (SC&M were their lawyers)].
Likewise, Plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation claim relies upon Plaintiffs alleged status as
clients of SCM, allegations that SCM was representing the individual interests of Plaintiffs,
and the conclusory assertion that SCM did not act as reasonable attorneys under the
circumstances. [Id. 171, 172, 176]. As shown, Plaintiffs effort to establish an implied
Plaintiffs also allege in their fiduciary duty claim that a fiduciary duty existed because there
was a relationship of trust and confidence. [Complaint 143]. However, Plaintiffs have not
alleged and cannot allege facts that would establish, among other requirements, an
overmastering influence, dependence, or trust justifiably (and with mutual understanding)
reposed. First Sec. Bank of Utah N.A. v. Banberry Dev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1333-34 (Utah
1990) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have not alleged that they ever met or spoke with SCM or
that they individually retained SCM in a manner that would invoke any claim alleged in their
Complaint, let alone that SCM agreed to a relationship where the property, interest or authority
of the [Plaintiffs] [was] placed in the charge of [SCM]. Id. at 1333.
9
attorney-client relationship with SCM fails. Accordingly, so do Plaintiffs additional claims for
relief that also rely upon that alleged relationship.
Plaintiffs Fifth Claim for Relief alleges civil conspiracy. In order to establish a claim for
civil conspiracy, Plaintiffs mush show there was a single plan to commit an unlawful act, the
essential nature of and general scope of which was known to and agreed upon by each person
who is to be held responsible for its consequences. Whipple v. State, No. 10-811, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 109630, at 45-46 (D. Utah Aug. 24, 2011). A required element of Plaintiffs Civil
Conspiracy claim is an underlying tort. See, e.g., Estrada v. Mendoza, 2012 UT App 82, 13,
275 P.3d 1024; Puttuck v. Gendron, 2008 UT App 362, 21, 199 P.3d 971. Where, as here,
plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded any of the basic torts they allege . . . dismissal of their
civil conspiracy claim is appropriate. Estrada, 2012 UT APP 82, 13 (omission in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
II.
PLAINTIFFS CLAIM UNDER THE TVPRA (Claim 6) FAILS AS A MATTER

OF BASIC STATUTORY APPLICATION.
Plaintiffs make the conclusory allegation that SCM is liable for the unlawful facilitation
by [it] of Jeffs ongoing scheme and plan to force FLDS parishioners and their children into
forced labor, sex trafficking, and sexual and other forms of slavery pursuant to the Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). [Complaint 180]. Plaintiffs support that
conclusory allegation with yet another terse and insufficient conclusory statement the ongoing
legal measures, acts and omissions of [SCM] constitute a violation. [Complaint 186, 188,
191]. Plaintiffs then cite to three specific statutory provisions that allegedly support their claims.
See 18 U.S.C. 1583, 1589, 1591. Plaintiffs allegations are frivolous.
10
A.
Section 1583 is Inapplicable Because SCM Did Not Kidnap or

Carry Away Anyone and the FLDS Members Were Not Slaves.
18 U.S.C. 1583 is entitled Enticement into slavery and declares as follows:

Whoever
(1) kidnaps or carries away any other person, with the intent that such other
person be sold into involuntary servitude, or held as a slave;
(2) entices, persuades, or induces any other person to go on board any vessel or to
any other place with the intent that he or she may be made or held as a slave,
or sent out of the country to be so made or held; or
(3) obstructs, or attempts to obstruct, or in any way interferes with or prevents the
enforcement of this section,
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. 1583. Plaintiffs allegation that SCM violated this federal statute is meritless.
Plaintiffs Complaint does not specify how Plaintiffs contend SCM violated this
provision. Instead, Plaintiffs merely repeat their conclusory statement that [a]s averred more
particularly herein, the ongoing legal measures, acts and omissions of [SCM] constitute a
violation of 1583. See generally, Arena Land & Investment Co. v. Petty, 69 F.3d 547 (10th
Cir. 1995) (It is neither the courts nor the [defendants] role to sift through a lengthy,
conclusory and poorly written complaint to piece together the cause of action.). Even when
Plaintiffs lengthy, conclusory and poorly written Complaint is reviewed in detail, the allegations
do not support a violation of section 1583.
First, there is no allegation and can be no good faith allegation that SCM kidnap[ed] or
carr[ied] away any other person for any purposes, let alone with intent that such other person
be sold into involuntary servitude, or held as a slave. 18 U.S.C. 1583(a)(1). There also is no
allegation and can be no allegation that SCM entice[d], persuade[d], or induce[d] any other
11
person to go on board any vessel for any reason, let alone so that the person may be made or
held as a slave. Id. 1583(a)(2). Likewise, there is no allegation and can be no allegation that
prior efforts were made to enforce this section, let alone that SCM obstruct[ed] . . . or in any
way interfer[ed] with those enforcement efforts. Simply stated, Plaintiffs have not and cannot
allege even the basic foundations of a claim under this section.
Second, regardless of the wrongs Warren Jeffs allegedly committed, it is legally incorrect
to refer to the FLDS Members as slaves or involuntary servants under 18 U.S.C. 1583.
The relevant statutory framework was enacted by Congress to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment.
See U.S. v. Kozminksi, 487 U.S. 931, 944-45 (1988).
Indeed, Congress
specifically borrowed language from the Thirteenth Amendment when drafting its provisions.
See id. (The pivotal phrase, involuntary servitude clearly was borrowed from the Thirteenth
Amendment.). Accordingly, the applicable statues have been construed in a way consistent
with the understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment, which was enacted after the Civil War to
abolish slavery. Id. [I]nvoluntary servitude necessarily means a condition of servitude in
which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use of threat of physical restraint or
personal injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process. Id. at 952.
Slave has been defined as a person who is wholly subject to the will of another, one who has
no freedom of action and whose person and services are wholly under the control of another, and
who is in a state of enforced compulsory service to another. U.S. v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76, 78
(S.D. Cal. 1947).
The facts of U.S. v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), are instructive when considering the
application of this statute. In that case, two mentally retarded men were found laboring on a
12
Chelsea, Michigan dairy farm in poor health, in squalid conditions, and in relative isolation from
the rest of society. Id. at 934. The victims were in their 60s during the period in question
although they viewed the world and responded to authority as someone of 8 to 10 years. Id. at
934-35. The victims worked on the . . . dairy farm seven days a week, often 17 hours a day.
Id. at 935. The victims were not provided with adequate nutrition, housing, clothing, or medical
care. Id. They were directed not to talk to others. At the same time . . . relatives, neighbors,
farm-hands and visitors were discouraged from contacting the two men. Id. The men were
directed not to leave the farm, and on several occasions when the men did leave, the [owners] or
their employees brought the men back and discouraged them from leaving again. Id. When the
owners of the farm were prosecuted, the government argued that the men were psychological
hostages that had been brainwash[ed] into serving and believing they had no alternative but
to work on the farm. Id. at 936. The Supreme Court reversed the resulting conviction, ruling
that mental oppression was not sufficient to establish slavery or involuntary servitude. The
Supreme Court explained that Section 1583 is inapplicable when an individual asserts that his
will to quit has been subdued by a threat which seriously affects his future welfare but as to
which he still has a choice, however, painful. Id. at 951.
At its core, Plaintiffs slavery claim is premised upon the notion that they were
brainwashed into believing the FLDS Church and its leaders and therefore acted in accordance
with its teachings and Warren Jeffs instructions. Plaintiffs do not contend that they entirely
lacked freedom of action. To the contrary, Plaintiffs uniformly allege that at some point they
elected to leave the FLDS Church and then did so. Under the standard established by the
13
Supreme Court in Kozminksi, Plaintiffs were neither slaves nor involuntary servants.
Accordingly, their claims under 18 U.S.C. 1583 fail for this additional reason.
B.
Section 1589 is Inapplicable Because SCM Did Not Receive the Labor or
Services of FLDS Members and Did Not Participate in a Venture.
18 U.S.C. 1589(a) makes it illegal to provide[] or obtain[] the labor or services of any
person . . . (1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical
restraint; (2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another
person; (3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or (d) by means of
any scheme, plan or pattern intended to cause that person to believe . . . that person or another
person would suffer serious harm. 18 U.S.C. 1589(a). Section 1589(b) in turn makes it
illegal to knowingly benefit[], financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation
in a venture which has engaged in any of the prohibited acts. Id. 1589(b).
Plaintiffs fail to identify whether they have attempted to assert a claim under section
1589(a) or 1589(b). Not surprisingly then, Plaintiffs also fail to explain how Plaintiffs contend
SCM allegedly violated either statutory subsection. Instead, Plaintiffs repeat the conclusory
statement that [a]s averred more particularly herein, the ongoing legal measures, acts and
omissions of [SCM] constitute a violation of 1589. [Complaint 186]. See generally Arena
Land & Investment Co., 69 F.3d 547 (It is neither the courts nor the [defendants] role to sift
through a lengthy, conclusory and poorly written complaint to piece together the cause of
action.). Again, Plaintiffs allegation that SCM violated 18 U.S.C. 1589 is meritless.
There is no allegation that SCM provide[d] or obtain[ed] the labor or services of a
person as required by section 1589(a). It did not. As with other related provisions of the code,
Section 1589 was passed to implement the Thirteenth Amendment against slavery or
14
involuntary servitude. See U.S. v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623, 629 (6th Cir. 2014). Congress
declared that Section 1589 is intended to address the increasingly subtle methods of traffickers
who place their victims in modern-day slavery, such as where traffickers threaten to harm third
persons, restrain their victims without physical violence or injury, or threaten dire consequences
by means other than overt violence. H.R. Conf. Rep. 106-939, at 101. Accordingly, section
1589 is entitled Forced Labor. See 18 U.S.C. 1589. In this case, Plaintiffs do not allege that
they ever performed forced labor or service for SCM. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that they donated
to the FLDS Church and the FLDS Church used some of those donations to pay SCM. That
allegation is a far cry from either the requirements of or purpose behind section 1589(a).7
Plaintiffs also cannot establish that SCMs participation in a venture which has engaged
in the providing or obtaining of labor or services by any of the means described in subsection
(a). 18 U.S.C. 1589(b). The requirement of participation in a venture has not been defined
in the context of 18 U.S.C. 1589(b).
However, courts regularly have interpreted the
substantially similar requirement that a RICO defendant participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of [an] enterprise. See 18 U.S.C. 1962. In that context, courts have rejected
allegations that the provision of legal services constitutes participation in an enterprise. See,
e.g., Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1348 (8th Cir. 1997) ([A]n attorney or other
There also is no allegation and can be no good faith allegation that SCM threatened or
carried out any type of physical or other serious harm. See 18 U.S.C. 1589(a). Indeed,
Plaintiffs do not even allege that they were afraid of SCM. To the contrary, Plaintiffs declare
that they had a relationship of trust and confidence with SCM. [Complaint 143].
15
professional does not conduct an enterprises affairs through run-of-the-mill provision of

professional services.).8
Participation in a venture requires active involvement and control over the alleged
venture. Cf. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185-86 (1993) ([W]e hold that to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprises affairs . . . one must
participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.); Ellsworth Paulson Constr.
Co. v. 51-SPR-LLC, 2008 UT 28, 15, 183 P.3d 248 (recognizing joint venture requires a
mutual right to control). Doing business or interacting with an alleged venture is insufficient.
Cf. Univ. of Maryland at Baltimore v. Peat, Marwick, Main & Co., 996 F.2d 1534, 1539 (3d Cir.
1993) (Simply because one provides goods or services that ultimately benefit the enterprise
does not mean that one becomes liable under RICO as a result). Indeed, if the law were
otherwise, every person or entity that did business with the FLDS Church would be subject to
criminal liability pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1589(b). In fact, if mere interaction with a venture
were enough to create culpability under section 1589(b), it would create the anomalous situation
where regular FLDS Church members (the alleged victims) would themselves be guilty. It is
undisputed that FLDS Church members benefitted financially or by receiving anything of
value from the FLDS Church for example they received housing and sustenance from the
UEP Trust. See id. Further the FLDS Members received that benefit from participation in a
venture i.e., because of their membership in the FLDS Church. However, it would be absurd
See also Baumer v. Pachl, 8 F.3d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1993) (ruling attorney did not
participate in the conduct of an enterprise where he never held any formal position but rather
provid[ed] legal services); Goren v. New Vision Intl, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 728 (7th Cir. 1998)
([S]imply performing services for an enterprise, even with knowledge of the enterprises illicit
nature, is not enough . . . instead the individual must have participated in the operation and
management of the enterprise itself.).
16
8
to conclude that FLDS Members had violated Section 1589(b) when, as Plaintiffs allege, Warren
Jeffs had complete and absolute control of the FLDS Church and was responsible for the
inner workings of the FLDS Church and the UEP Trust. [Complaint 15-16]. It is equally
absurd for Plaintiffs to allege that SCM is liable under the same statute because it did business
with but did not control the FLDS Church.
Plaintiffs conclusory claim under 18 U.S.C. 1589 fails as a matter of law, regardless of
whether section 1589(a) or 1589(b) is applied.
C.
Section 1591 is Inapplicable Because SCM Did Not Engage in Trafficking

or Participate in a Venture.
18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1) makes it a crime to knowingly, recruit[], entice[], harbor[],

transport[], provide[], obtain[], advertise[], maintain[], patronize[], or solicit[] a person
knowing . . . that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion . . . or any combination of
such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act. 18 U.S.C.
1591(a)(1).
Section 1591(a)(2) makes it a crime to knowingly benefit financially or by
receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in any the
actions prohibited by section 1591(a)(1). Congress explained, Section 1591 creates a crime for
trafficking persons, and in particular for punishing sex trafficking. H.R. Conf. Rep. 106-939,
at 100, 102. Again, Plaintiffs suggestion that SCM somehow violated Section 1591 is frivolous.
As with Plaintiffs other claims, the Complaint fails to identify which subsection
Plaintiffs contend SCM violated or any facts that support an alleged violation. Instead, Plaintiffs
yet again make the same conclusory allegation that [a]s averred more particularly herein, the
ongoing legal measures, acts and omissions of [SCM] constitute a violation of 1591.
[Complaint 188]. As before, that conclusory statement is insufficient. See generally Arena
17
Land & Investment Co. v. Petty, 69 F.3d 547 (10th Cir. 1995) (It is neither the courts nor the
[defendants] role to sift through a lengthy, conclusory and poorly written complaint to piece
together the cause of action.).
Plaintiffs contention that SCM violated Section 1591 is meritless. There is no allegation
and could be no good faith allegation that SCM engaged in sex trafficking. See H.R. Conf.
Rep. 106-939, at 100.
Further, while Plaintiffs allege a number of legal and spiritual
marriages, they do not allege that they were the victims of prostitution or similar commercial
sex acts. 18 U.S.C. 1591(a). A long-term, committed and familial relationship with a spouse
(legal or spiritual) is not a commercial sex act, even if the person feels compelled by outside
influences to enter into the relationship. Finally, as explained already, SCMs provision of legal
services to the FLDS Church does not and cannot establish its participation in a venture which
has engaged in sex trafficking.
For all these reasons, Plaintiffs Sixth Claim for Relief is frivolous, and should be
rejected as such.
III.
PLAINTIFFS SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FAILS, INCLUDING BECAUSE

THERE IS NO PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION.
Plaintiffs seventh cause of action cites 18 U.S.C. 2 and then alleges that SCM is
civilly liable for aiding and abetting the commission of the felonies described herein.
[Complaint 195].
That claim fails because, in addition to the multiple reasons already
discussed, 18 U.S.C. 2 does not create a private civil cause of action.

18 U.S.C. 2 provides that [w]homever commits an offense against the United States
or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal. 18 U.S.C. 2. As discussed already, SCM did not commit, urge, or abet the alleged
18
crimes about which Plaintiffs complain. However, even ignoring that reality, Plaintiffs claim
still fails for another reason. The statutory provision Plaintiffs rely on does not create a private
cause of action.
The Supreme Court has recognized that while criminal liability may flow from a
violation of 18 U.S.C. 2, it does not follow that a private civil aiding and abetting cause of
action must also exit. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164, 190-91 (1994). Instead, the Supreme Court recognized that creating a private
cause of action for alleged aiding and abetting violations would work a significant shift in
settled interpretative principals regarding implied causes of action.
Id.
Accordingly, the
Supreme Court decline[d] to rely only on 18 U.S.C. 2 as the basis for recognizing a private
aiding and abetting right of action. Id.; see also Lamont v. Haig, 539 F. Supp. 552, 558 (D.S.D.
1982) (To the extent plaintiffs complaint purports to state a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. 2
. . . it is dismissed.); Arena Land & Inv. Co. v. Petty, 906 F. Supp. 1470, 1478 (D. Utah 1994)
(dismissing claim based upon aiding and abetting). Plaintiffs seventh cause of action fails as a
matter of law.
IV.
PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE A COGNIZABLE RICO CLAIM (Claim 8).

Plaintiffs eighth and final cause of action purports to state a claim based on alleged
violations of the RICO laws.
[C]ourts have found that alleged RICO violations must be
reviewed with appreciation of the extreme sanctions it provides, so that actions traditionally
brought in state court do not gain access to treble damages and attorney fees in federal court
simply because they are cast in terms of RICO violations. Dempsey v. Sanders, 132 F. Supp. 2d
222, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Indeed, RICO has been described as the litigation equivalent of a
19
thermonuclear device and, as a result, courts should strive to flush out frivolous RICO
allegations at an early state of the litigation. Schmidt v. Fleet Bank, 16 F. Supp. 2d 340, 346
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a civil RICO claim must allege the defendants (1)
participated in the conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.
Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 2006); accord Olson v. Belvedere Assn, 2015
WL 1520911 at *3 (D. Utah April 2, 2015) (same).
[B]road-brushed and conclusory
allegations are not sufficient. Ad-X Intl, Inc. v. Kolbjornsen, 97 F. Appx. 263, 265 (10th Cir.
2004). Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiffs Complaint does not meet this
standard.9
Among other deficiencies, Plaintiffs have not and cannot establish that SCM
participated in the conduct . . . of an enterprise. See Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1269 (10th
Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has adopted the operation or management test to determine
In addition to the substantive problems with Plaintiffs RICO claim, it also has not been
properly pled. At a minimum, [p]laintiffs are required to assert, in good faith and subject to
Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P., the RICO subsection or subjections on which they rely and support each
claim with allegations of [f]act. Olson, 2015 WL 1520911 at *3. Plaintiffs fail to do so.
Moreover, both this Court and the Tenth Circuit have refused to search through the several
paragraphs of the plaintiffs Introductory Allegations and attempt to match the factual
assertions with the elements of all subsections of the RICO statute to determine if the complaint
states a claim for relief. Hart v. Salois, 605 Fed. Appx. 694, 701 (10th Cir. 2015) (Nor are
defendants required to piece together the plaintiffs complaint.); accord Arena Land &
Investment Co. v. Petty, 69 F.3d 547 (10th Cir. 1995) (It is neither the courts nor the
[defendants] role to sift through a lengthy, conclusory and poorly written complaint to piece
together the cause of action.); Glenn v. First Nat. Bank in Grand Junction, 868 F.2d 368, 371
(10th Cir. 1989) ([T]he plaintiffs allegations are too vague and conclusory to state a claim
under RICO.); cf. Glenn, 868 F.2d at 371 (The law recognizes a significant difference between
notice pleading and shotgun pleading.).
20
9
whether the defendant has conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise by having
some part in directing the affairs of the enterprise. Id. For liability to be imposed under that
test, the defendants must have participated in the operation or management of the RICO
enterprise . . . . Id.; see Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185-86 (1993) ([W]e hold that
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprises affairs,
1962(c), one must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.). In this
case, Plaintiffs identify the enterprise as the FLDS Church and the UEP Trust.
[See
Complaint at 198].
SCM never operated or managed the FLDS Church or the UEP Trust. To the contrary,
Plaintiffs allege that Jeffs had complete and absolute control of the FLDS Church and was
responsible for the inner workings of the FLDS Church and the UEP Trust. [Complaint 1516]. Not surprisingly then, Plaintiffs RICO claim merely alleges that SCM acted as lawyers
to the FLDS Church and the UEP Trust by: (1) serving as legal counsel in eviction proceedings
brought by the UEP Trust (before the State of Utah seized control in 2005); (2) providing a legal
defense of criminal charges for those of Jeffs favored cohorts who faced criminal and civil
liability; and (3) through the ongoing provision of legal advice related to these issues.
[Complaint 198-99]. However, [f]urnishing a client with ordinary professional assistance,
even when the client happens to be a RICO enterprise, does not establish RICO liability.
Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1348 (8th Cir. 1997). Indeed, the authority confirming this
basic rule is legion. See, e.g., Goren v. New Vision Intl, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 728 (7th Cir. 1998)
([S]imply performing services for an enterprise, even with knowledge of the enterprises illicit
nature, is not enough to subject an individual to RICO liability . . . instead the individual must
21
have participated in the operation and management of the enterprise itself.) Nolte v. Pearson,
994 F.2d 1311, 1316-17 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming directed verdict ruling that law firms drafting
of documents sent to prospective investors did not establish RICO liability even though court
found fraud had been committed and investors relied on the documents prepared by law firm);
Azrielli v. Cohen Law Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 521-22 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding no RICO liability
where defendant acted as no more than [an] attorney); Baumer v. Pachl, 8 F.3d 1341, 1344 (9th
Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal of case against attorney whose role was limited to providing
legal services); cf. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 174-75, 184-86 (1993) (ruling
accounting firm did not participate in the management or operation of alleged enterprise, even
though it provided professional auditing services to the alleged enterprise).10
The Tenth Circuit has advised that courts should refuse to search through the several
paragraphs of the plaintiffs Introductory Allegations and attempt to match the factual
assertions with the elements of all subsections of the RICO statute to determine if the complaint
states a claim for relief. Hart v. Salois, 605 Fed. Appx. 694, 701 (10th Cir. 2015); accord Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.). However, even if the Court engaged in that analysis,
the inescapable conclusion is that Plaintiffs RICO claim against SCM fails as a matter of law.
See also Baumer, 8 F.3d at 1344 (Whether [the attorney] rendered his services well or
poorly, properly or improperly, is irrelevant . . . .); Gilmore v. Berg, 820 F. Supp. 179, 182-83
(D.N.J. 1993) (ruling preparation of allegedly misleading opinion letter still constituted the
rendition of professional services and does not constitute participation in the direction of the
affairs of alleged RICO enterprise).
22
10
V.
PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS FURTHER FAIL BECAUSE THE COURT CANNOT

ADJUDICATE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS.
Paragraphs 200 through 466 of the Complaint contain Plaintiffs statement of Damages
Averments Pertaining to Particular Plaintiffs. In that portion of the complaint, after the causes
of action have been alleged, Plaintiffs allege their individual experiences and alleged damages.
Although the details of each Plaintiffs story are unique, Plaintiffs repeatedly make the same two
general allegations. Specifically, Plaintiffs repeatedly claim that they have been injured because
(1) they were treated as an outcast and apostates and shunned by the FLDS community; and (2)
they have left the FLDS Church earlier if they had known about Jeffs admissions in which he
claimed (although he apparently later retracted them) that he was not a true prophet and his
criminal convictions. Indeed, the following chart identifies the types of allegations that are
repeatedly made by the individual Plaintiffs:
Plaintiffs Were Shunned from FLDS
Community and Treated as Apostates.
Plaintiff was treated as an outcast, was
called worthless and a wicked soul and grew
extremely depressed as a result.
Complaint 210
Plaintiffs Delayed Leaving Church

Because They Were Unaware of
its Alleged Falsity.
Had [Plaintiff] had any understanding of
what was occurring in Texas or of Defendant
Jeffs confessions and convictions at the
times these events actually occurred, she
[and her husband] would have left the FLDS
Church . . . .
Complaint 254
The mental anxiety [Plaintiff] experienced

from being a ghost in her own home, being
constantly unworthy of religious advancement
. . . was absolutely unbearable.
Had [Plaintiff] been advised, for example,
Id. 218. of Jeffs admissions that he was not a
prophet, he and his family would have been
[Plaintiffs] are considered apostates and share free to make their own religious choices
in the heartache suffered by thousands of the [and] would have left the FLDS Church
FLDS.
years earlier . . . .
Id. 259
Id. 268
Leaving the FLDS Church cost [Plaintiff] and If she had known the basic truths about Jeffs,
her children the associations and relationships [Plaintiffs] choice [to leave the FLDS
23
they had with parents, brothers, sisters, and Church] would have been easy and she
most of her extend family and friends. Their would have made it years earlier.
FLDS loved ones treat them as apostates and
Id. 281.
refuse to have any contact with them.
Id. 285. If [SCM] had not represented Jeffs or told
the critical truth to the FLDS, untold injury
Plaintiff lost her entire social network, her to the FLDS, their families and the finances
friends, her relatives and nearly everyone she would have been avoided.
cares about. They too would have fled the
Id. 261
FLDS Church . . . if they had been told some
basic truths.
[Plaintiff] learned some of the critical facts
Id. 291. that had been kept from him, including Jeffs
confession which should have been brought
[Plaintiff] experienced profound shunning and to the FLDS . . . .
harsh and unkind behavior from her family,
Id. 265
friends and loved ones, which continues to this
day.
If only [Plaintiff] had known earlier [that
Id. 319. the FLDS Church allegedly is false] she
could have gone to high school, gotten a
[Plaintiff] suffered from severe mental and jump on college, and prepared financially for
emotional distress as a result of being expelled her future.
from the FLDS Church and cut off from
Id. 288.
communication with his wives and children
who he loves.
Had [Plaintiff] been made aware of these
Id. 345. critical facts by [SCM] . . . he would have
left the FLDS Church with his family . . . .
[Plaintiff] was . . . devastated and broadly
Id. 380
humiliated by being declared an apostate.
Id. 363 If [Plaintiff] had not been kept in the dark
by Jeffs and the lawyers . . . she would have
[Plaintiff] was also firmly instructed not to left the FLDS Church . . . .
associate with any FLDS or former FLDS.
Id. 391.
She grew increasingly lonely and feared
constantly for her children.
If [Plaintiff] had known the facts which
Id. 433-34
Parker helped conceal from her and the
FLDS, she would have been able to leave
years earlier and on her own terms with
family and friends.
Id. 416.
Plaintiffs common allegations constitute religious issues not justiciable by this Court.
Plaintiffs cannot recover for their exclusion from a religious community. Nor can the Court
24
properly adjudicate whether Plaintiffs were harmed by their continued and/or discontinued faith
in a religious organization. It was never the duty or place of SCM to protect the religious
liberty of the FLDS either individually or collectively [Complaint. 414]; to tell Plaintiffs
about the things [they] needed to know the most to make informed decisions about [their]
children and for [themselves] [id. 415]; or to inform the FLDS so they could make their own
religious choices. [Id. 419]. Indeed, prerequisite to SCM and/or Parker even being able to
inform the FLDS of such matters, and assuming the existence of a duty to inform, SCM and
Parker must have known that Warren Jeffs and the FLDS Church were a fraud. Thousands of
faithful FLDS Church members still today would bet their lives against such a determination
even were this Court in a position to adjudicate the question.11
The
First
Amendment
prevents any branch of government from making any law respecting an establishment of
religion or impeding the free exercise of religion. U.S. Const. am. I; see also Utah Const.
Art. 1, 4. Because of those Constitutional protections, [i]t is well established . . . that courts
should refrain from trolling through a persons or institutions religious beliefs. Colorado
Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1261 (10th Cir. 2008). Most often, this principle has
been expressed in the terms of a prohibition of excessive entanglement between religion and
government. Id.; see also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) (It
is not only the conclusions that may be reached by the Board which may impinge on rights
guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to findings and
conclusions.). Indeed, it is beyond peradventure that civil courts cannot adjudicate disputes
turning on church policy and administration or on religious doctrines and practice. Natal, 878
One Plaintiff, Amy Nielson, goes so far as to allege she had always understood that [Parker]
had been chosen by God to protect the people. [Id. 405].
25
11
F.2d at 1576-77.
Plaintiffs repeated allegations implicate this First Amendment rule by
invoking religious questions that cannot properly be resolved by a court.

First, the Court cannot entertain or grant relief based on Plaintiffs allegations that the
FLDS Church and its members have ostracized Plaintiffs by treating them as apostates. The
mere expulsion from a religious society, with the exclusion from a religious community, is not a
harm for which courts can grant a remedy. Burgess v. Rock Creek Baptist Church, 734 F. Supp.
30, 33 (D.D.C. 1990). To the contrary, there is a constitutionally protected privilege to engage
in the practice of shunning. Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., 819
F. 2d 875, 877 (9th Cir. 1987) (refusing to hear plaintiffs allegations that she was shunned by her
friends and neighbors after leaving the Jehovahs Witness faith); see also Sands v. Living Word
Fellowship, 34 P.3d 955, 958-89 (Alaska 2001) ([T]he free exercise clauses of the First
Amendment . . . protect the alleged shunning as a religious activity . . . .); Anderson v.
Watchtower Bible & Tract. Soc. of New York, Inc., 2007 WL 161035 at *21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan.
19, 2007) (recognizing a constitutionally-protected right to direct [church] members to shun
former members).
Second, the Court cannot entertain or grant relief based on Plaintiffs allegations that they
were in fact being defrauded through their sincere religious beliefs because they were duped
into remaining members of the FLDS Church. [See Complaint 266]. To avoid conducting
heresy trials, courts may not adjudicate the truth or falsity of religious doctrines or beliefs.
Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W. 2d 672, 678 (Tex. 1996). Approximately 70 years ago the United
States Supreme Court addressed a case in which several defendants claimed, by reason of their
alleged high spiritual attainments and righteous conduct, to have the power to heal persons and
26
diseases and solicited donations designed to support their good works. U.S. v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 79-80 (1944). When the defendants were charged with fraud, the Supreme Court
refused to allow the trial court to consider whether those religious experiences were true.
Although the Supreme Court recognized that the particular beliefs before it might seem
preposterous, it declared that courts are not in a position to adjudicate religious beliefs in order
to compensate former believers or punish existing believers:
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof
of their religious beliefs or doctrines. Religious experiences which are as real as
life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be
beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before the
law. Many take their gospel from the New Testament. But it would hardly be
supposed that they could be tried before a jury charged with determining whether
those teachings contained false representations. The miracles of the New
Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after death, the power of prayer are deep in
the religious convictions of many. If one could be sent to jail because a jury in a
hostile environment found those teaching false, little indeed would be left of
religious freedom. . . . The religious views espoused by respondents may seem
incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are subject
to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same
can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. . . . The First Amendment does
not select any one group or type of religion for preferred treatment. It puts them
all in that position.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Supreme Courts admonition is apt. It recently has been estimated that 42% of
Americans have switched religions at some time in their lives.12 Roughly 18% of Americans
have left a particular religion and now consider themselves Unaffiliated with any religious
organization.13 If Plaintiffs are allowed to place their former religion on trial and seek damages
by arguing that they were delayed in discovering the falsity of that religion, then so too could
12
13
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/chapter-2-religious-switching-and-intermarriage/
Id.
27
millions of others who have changed their religious beliefs. For example, a dissatisfied member
of the LDS Church could claim he had been duped into paying for and serving a two-year
mission and (like Plaintiffs) would have gotten a jump on college, and prepared financially for
[his] future if he had only been told that Brigham Young married Clarissa Decker when she was
15.14 [See Complaint 288]. A former Catholic could claim that had she been told that Pope
Julius II allegedly was a sodomite covered with shameful ulcers,15 her decision to abandon her
faith (like Plaintiffs) would have been easy and she would have made it years earlier. [See
Complaint 281]. Or the members of any Christian faith could claim that they were not
sufficiently informed of the physical infeasibility of virgin birth, resurrection, or Lazareths
restoration from the dead, and therefore seek the return of a lifetime of tithes. Such claims, of
course, are neither justiciable nor compensable. The Court is not in a position to adjudicate
religion, including by ruling that parishioners either would or should have abandoned their faith
earlier or were harmed because they did not do so. Cf. NLRB, 440 U.S. at 502 (It is not only the
conclusions that may be reached by the Board which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the
Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to findings and conclusions.).
Plaintiffs repeat allegations that they have been shunned by the FLDS Church
membership and injured by their prolonged involvement with that faith are not justiciable under
the United States Constitution or the Utah Constitution. The Court should decline to consider
those claims.
14
15
See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Brigham_Young%27s_wives#cite_note-joj-1
See Louis Crompton, Homosexuality and Civilization, 322 (2003).
28
VI.
PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS ALSO ARE BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS.
Even assuming that SCM owed a legal duty to Plaintiffs (it did not), that the breaches
Plaintiffs allege were within the scope of that duty (they were not), that SCM had breached its
duty (it did not), and that this Court could adjudicate the Plaintiffs causal theory (it cannot),
Plaintiffs claims still would be barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.
The applicable statutes of limitations are set forth by Utah Code and cannot seriously be
disputed. A four-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiffs legal malpractice, breach of
fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and civil RICO claims. See generally Utah Code Ann. 78B-2307.16 Plaintiffs fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are subject to a three-year statute
of limitations. See generally Utah Code Ann. 78B-2-305; see also Mackay v. Americas
Wholesale Lender, 2012 WL 464648 at *2 (D. Utah Feb. 13, 2012) (The statute of limitations
applicable to a negligent misrepresentation claim is three years.).17 SCMs alleged misconduct
falls well outside of those limitations periods.
Plaintiffs allege that SCM modified the UEP Trust and in so doing helped develop the
legal framework within which Jeffs and his favored cohorts acted to enforce their lewd . . .
wishes upon the FLDS people. [Complaint 16; see also id. 32 ([A]pplying the powers that
16
See also Martin v. World Mkt. Alliance, Inc., 2007 WL 2892635 at *4 (D. Utah Sept. 27,
2007) ([I]n Counts 7 and 8, Mr. Martin alleges a claim for professional negligence, and a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty, respectively, which both have a four-year statute of limitations . . . .
); Manzanares v. Terry, 2014 WL 5847572 at *4 n.16 (D. Utah Nov. 12, 2014) (applying fouryear statute of limitations to RICO and civil conspiracy).
Plaintiffs assert a claim for Violation of the TVPRA. Depending upon when the alleged
violations occurred (the statute was amended in 2008 to change the statute of limitations from
four years to as long as ten years). See 18 U.S.C. 1595. However, as previously discussed,
Plaintiffs TVPRA claim fails as a matter of law.
29
17
were significantly strengthened by [SCM] through their creation of a fundamentally illegal Trust
. . . .)]. Ironically, the amendment Plaintiffs complain about the 1998 Restatement
benefitted FLDS Church members. As the Utah Supreme Court previously recognized, before
the 1998 Restatement, the UEP Trust was not charitable because it benefitted specific
individuals. Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 2013 UT 15, 4. As of 1998, the sole surviving
beneficiary of the UEP Trust was Rulon Jeffs. Id. The 1998 Restatement that SCM drafted
was enacted to ensure the UEP Trust was a charitable trust. As a result, the 1998 Restatement
substantially broadened the class of beneficiaries to include FLDS Church members. Id.
(emphasis added).
Even assuming that drafting legal documentation to modify a trust, with the consent of
the sole surviving beneficiary and all trustees, constitutes an actionable tort (it does not) and that
Plaintiffs were harmed by being added to the beneficiary class (they were not), Plaintiffs claims
still are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. It is undisputed that SCM ceased any
involvement with the UEP Trust by at least June 2005, when a Utah court took control of the
UEP Trust and appointed Bruce Wisan as replacement fiduciary. Since that time, the UEP Trust
has been managed by Bruce Wisan, with oversight by the Utah Attorney General and the Third
District Court. See generally id. at 1223-25 (addressing trust history).
Both the Utah Supreme Court and Plaintiffs own Complaint recognize the relevant
timing of SCMs involvement with the UEP Trust. [D]uring 1997 and 1998, Jeffs and several
of his favored cohorts addressed amending the UEP Trust. [Id. 25-28 (emphasis added)].
These meetings led to what Plaintiffs refer to as the 1998 Restatement. [Id. 28]. In 2004,
SCM entered an appearance as counsel for the UEP Trust in two legal actions. See Snow
30
Christensen & Martineau, 2013 UT 15, 7. SCM later withdrew when it was discharged by
the UEP Trust. Id. Thereafter, the State of Utah appeared and asked for appointment of a
special fiduciary. Id. 7-9. Accordingly in June 2005 the Court suspend[ed] the trustees
of the UEP Trust and appoint[ed] Bruce Wisan as special fiduciary. Id. 8. SCM has not
represented the UEP Trust since that time. See generally id. 34-55. Put simply, although
Plaintiffs allege that they were injured as a result of the 1998 Restatement of the UEP Trust, that
amendment occurred over 17 years ago.
Moreover, the UEP Trust has been under the
management of a special fiduciary overseen by the Utah Attorney Generals office for over 11
years since June 2005. Any claims arising from SCMs alleged involvement with the UEP
Trust, even if such claims legally could have existed, would have expired long ago.
Plaintiffs also contend that Warren Jeffs confessed (to an FLDS member, not to SCM)
that he was not a prophet. [Complaint at 42-43; see also id. 110-11]. Plaintiffs contend
that SCM failed to inform the FLDS [members] of Jeffs confessions which were critical to the
decisions the FLDS [members] were being required to make by their Prophet. [Id. 43].
However, the timing of this alleged claim again falls well outside the statutes of limitations. In
particular, Plaintiffs allege that Jeffs statements were made in January of 2007. [Complaint
42 (emphasis added)]. Those statements immediately were reported to the public and made
publicly available.18 Again, any claim arising from SCMs alleged failure to forward Jeffs
statements to current/former members of the FLDS Church in 2007 arose and expired long ago.
See, e.g., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fePt8-VndY (Warren Jeffs Prison Video Part

1). Of course, even this video standing alone is less than clear. On the one hand, Jeffs
indicates that he is not a prophet. On the other hand, Jeffs instructs his visitor not to interrupt
him because the Lords still dictating through him.
18
31
Plaintiffs are likely to argue that the application of the statutes of limitations should be
tolled. However, that argument only emphasizes the religious questions inherent in Plaintiffs
Complaint. The Utah Supreme Court has refused to toll the statute of limitations . . . [where] a
plaintiff cannot make the initial showing that he did not know and could not reasonably have
discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action. Colosimo
v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2007 UT 25, 24, 156 P.3d 806. In other words, in
order to toll any statute of limitations, Plaintiffs would have to prove to the Court (among other
things) that not only did they not know that Warren Jeffs was not a Prophet and that the FLDS
Church was false, but also that they could not reasonably have discovered those alleged religious
truths. As explained already, the Court is not in a position to adjudicate when a parishioner
reasonably should have discovered that Warren Jeffs was not a prophet or that the FLDS
Churchs teachings were flawed. Current members of the FLDS Church apparently still believe
Warren Jeffs is a prophet and that the teachings of the FLDS Church are true.
In short, SCMs alleged wrongful conduct occurred more than four years ago.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims, even were they legally cognizable, are barred by the applicable
statutes of limitations.
CONCLUSION
SCMs representation of the FLDS Church and its leaders does not constitute an
endorsement of [their] political, economic, social or moral views or activities. Utah R. Profl
Conduct, Preamble; id. R. 1.2(b) (same); ABA Model R. Profl Conduct 1.2(b) (same). Nor does
it establish SCMs liability for actions allegedly committed by the FLDS Church and its leaders.
32
Nevertheless, that is the essence of Plaintiffs Complaint against SCM. Plaintiffs claims against
SCM lack any legal merit and should be dismissed with prejudice as a matter of law.
DATED this 14th day of July, 2016.
Respectfully submitted
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE P.C.
By:
/s/ Mark F. James

____________________
Brent O. Hatch
Mark F. James
Mitchell A. Stephens
Attorneys for Snow Christensen & Martineau, P.C.
& Rodney R. Parker
33

Motion To Dismiss Lawsuit Against Warren Jeffs, Snow Christensen & Martineau

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Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 1 of 57

Brent O. Hatch (5715)

SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU,

Civil No. 2:16-cv-00788-EJF

WARREN STEED JEFFS; RODNEY R.

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 2 of 57

STATEMENT OF ALLEGED FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SCM Never Represented in Any Capacity the Overwhelming

Plaintiffs Individual Factual Allegations Do Not Establish a

PLAINTIFFS FIRST FIVE CLAIMS FAIL BECAUSE SCM DID

Plaintiffs Legal Malpractice Claim (Claim #1) Fails Because

Plaintiffs Fail to Allege that the Scope of the Alleged

Plaintiffs Second Through Fifth Claims Likewise Fail Because

PLAINTIFFS CLAIM UNDER THE TVPRA (Claim 6) FAILS

Section 1583 is Inapplicable Because SCM Did Not

Section 1589 is Inapplicable Because SCM Did Not Receive

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 3 of 57

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.)

Section 1591 is Inapplicable Because SCM Did Not Engage

PLAINTIFFS SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FAILS,

PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE A COGNIZABLE RICO

PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS FURTHER FAIL BECAUSE THE

PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS ALSO ARE BARRED BY THE

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 4 of 57

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 5 of 57

A complaint must offer more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation to survive dismissal. Id. at 677-78.

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 6 of 57

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 7 of 57

SCM Never Represented in Any Capacity the Overwhelming Majority of the

Rather, Plaintiffs Complaint alleges SCM provided

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 8 of 57

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 9 of 57

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 10 of 57

Instead, Ms. Nielson alleges that during her

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 11 of 57

Plaintiffs Individual Factual Allegations Do Not Establish a Claim Upon

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 12 of 57

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 13 of 57

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Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 24 of 57

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 25 of 57

In this case, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs fall far short of

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 26 of 57

Indeed, Plaintiffs repeatedly reference Snow,

Therefore, according to Plaintiffs, SCM owed an impossible duty to thousands of current

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 27 of 57

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 28 of 57

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 29 of 57

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 30 of 57

Plaintiffs Fail to Allege that the Scope of the Alleged Representation

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 31 of 57

Case 2:16-cv-00788-EJF Document 11 Filed 07/14/16 Page 32 of 57

Instead, Plaintiffs allege a vague implied attorney-client