Ella Marie D.

Padua

CAOS vs. PERALTA

115 SCRA 843

FACTS: This case originated in Digos, Davao del Sur, involving the late Dr. Rodolfo
Caos, who owned the Caos Hospital there. The respondent here was former CFI
Judge Elvino Peralta. There was an incident which led to the filing of a criminal case
by Caos. He reserved the right to file a separate civil action under the rules on
criminal procedure. Caos filed a separate civil case, but arising out of the same
incident. Both of the cases were assigned to Judge Peralta.
When Judge Peralta noticed that the 2 actions arose out of the same incident and
the accused in the criminal case is also the defendant in the civil case, and the
offended party in the criminal case is the plaintiff in the civil case, he ordered the
consolidation of the 2 cases under Rule 31, Section 1, to be tried together.
Dr. Caos objected to the consolidation because according to his lawyer,
consolidation of cases under Rule 31, Section 1 applies only when there are 2 or
more civil cases to be considered.

ISSUE:
1: Was the consolidation proper?
2: How do you reconcile these cases because the degree of proof in the criminal
case is not the same in the civil case?

HELD:
1. The order of consolidation is correct. Rule 31, Section 1 allows the consolidation
of a criminal and civil case because of the fact that there is a common question of
fact or law between them and that they are pending before the same court. As a
matter of fact, before the same judge.
2. The consolidation was proper under Rule 31 because there is a common question
of fact and law. They can be consolidated but for purposes of decision, the court will
now apply two (2) different criteria: Proof beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal
case and preponderance of evidence in the civil case. So there is no incompatibility.

Ella Marie D. Padua

RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION vs. IAC

November 27, 1987
FACTS:
A driver of the construction company collided with a car, killing the owner. What was
filed was a criminal case against the driver. No reservation was made. Therefore the
civil liability arising from the crime is already instituted. The driver was convicted.
On appeal, the driver died.
ISSUE:
What will happen to the civil liability arising from the crime? Can you enforce it
against the employer based on Article 103, RPC on subsidiary liability?
HELD:
NO, because there was no judgment of conviction which became final. There must
be a judgment of conviction against the employee; it must be final; he must be
proven insolvent. But because he died, the victim cannot enforce the subsidiary
liability of the employer.
However, if this was quasi-delict, you can file a direct action against the employer
because in quasi-delict, the liability of the employer is primary, not subsidiary. The
SC treated the case as an action for quasi-delict against the. The death of the
accused during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction
became final and executory extinguished his criminal liability but not his civil
liability should the liability or obligation arise not from a crime but from a quasidelict. The liability of the employer here would not be subsidiary but solidary with
his driver unless said employer can prove there was no negligence on his part at all,
that is, if he can prove due diligence in the selection and supervision of his driver.

Ella Marie D. Padua

COJUANGCO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
203 SCRA 629
FACTS:
In this case, there was an independent civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from defamation filed by Cojuangco against a media company. So there were
two (2) cases a criminal action for libel under the RPC and a civil case for damages
arising from defamation under Article 33 of the Civil Code. The question is: can the
two cases be consolidated under Section 2? One argument is that you can only
consolidate the civil action if it is not independent action.
ISSUE:
May a civil action for damages arising from defamation (independent civil action)
and the criminal case for libel be consolidated?
HELD:
YES, they can be consolidated under Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, citing again the
case of Caos vs. Peralta, because there is a common question of law and fact.
Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court authorizes consolidation of actions
involving common questions of law or fact pending before the court. The purpose or
object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or
abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court,
and save unnecessary costs or expense, the attainment of justice with the least
expense and vexation to the parties litigants. This provision applies to both civil and
criminal actions. What is involved is the crime of libel. As correctly stated by
petitioners, per the third paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, the criminal case for libel and the civil action for damages arising
therefrom must be filed in the same court.. While there maybe 2 separate actions
in libel damages and criminal case Article 360 orders the consolidation of the
two. That is mandated under Article 360.

Ella Marie D. Padua

PEOPLE vs. ARAGON
94 Phil. 357
FACTS:
The defendant in the above-entitled case is charged in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu with the crime of bigamy, for having contracted a second marriage with one
Efigenia C. Palomer while his previous valid marriage with Martina Godinez was still
subsisting and had not been dissolved. While the case was pending trial, Efigenia C.
Palomer filed a civil action in the same Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
defendant-appellant, alleging that the latter "by means of force, threats and
intimidation of bodily harm, forced plaintiff to marry him", and praying that their
marriage be annulled. Thereupon Defendant-Appellant filed a motion in the criminal
case for bigamy, praying that the criminal charge be provisionally dismissed, on the
ground that the civil action for annulment of the second marriage is a prejudicial
question. The court denied this motion on the ground that the validity of the second
marriage may be determined in the very criminal action for bigamy. Against this
order this appeal has been presented to this court.
ISSUE:
Is there a need to wait for the result of the case filed by Efigenia before the case of
Bigamy could be tried?
HELD:
No. It is not necessary to pass upon this question because we believe that the order
of denial must be sustained on another ground. Prejudicial question has been
defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which (question) is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. There is no question that if the allegations of the
complaint on time the marriage contracted by defendant-appellant with Efigenia C.
Palomer is illegal and void. Its nullity, however, is no defense to the criminal action
for bigamy filed against him. The supposed use of force and intimidation against the
woman, Palomer, even if it were true, is not a bar or defense to said action.
Palomer, were she the one charged with bigamy, could perhaps raise said force or
intimidation as a defense, because she may not be considered as having freely and
voluntarily committed the act if she was forced to the marriage by intimidation. But
not the other party, who used the force or intimidation. The latter may not use his
own malfeasance to defeat the action based on his criminal act. It follows that the
pendency of the civil action for the annulment of the marriage filed by Efigenia C.
Palomer, is absolutely immaterial to the criminal action filed against defendantappellant. This civil action does not decide that defendant-appellant did not enter
the marriage against his will and consent, because the complaint does not allege
that he was the victim of force and intimidation in the second marriage; it does not

determine the existence of any of the elements of the charge of bigamy. A decision
thereon is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore,
not a prejudicial question.