Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2d 875
I.
2
Both appellants urge that the district court erroneously refused to dismiss the
Williams testified that about three months prior to his arrest, which occurred on
July 30, 1980, Tharpe started coming by his house and talking about drug deals.
Williams testified that Tharpe came to his house about six to eight times in
May, at least ten times in June, and about eight times the last two weeks in
July. According to Williams, on these occasions and during phone
conversations, Tharpe told Williams that unidentified persons were chasing him
and threatening to kill his children; that his wife had to have a lung removed;
that he had stomach cancer; and that he needed money desperately.
Williams also called three witnesses who testified collectively that they had
seen Williams upset either after or while he had talked with Tharpe either in
person or on the phone.3 One witness testified that he was at a restaurant with
Williams and Tharpe, during which time Tharpe told Williams that his family
was being harassed. In addition, DEA agent George A. Auflick, who
supervised the government's operation, testified that Tharpe had been an
informant with the DEA for the greater part of two years prior to the date of
Williams' arrest; that he, Auflick, had never met Williams until the date of
arrest; that he had had phone conversations with Williams concerning a cocaine
deal he was trying to set up with Williams prior to Williams' arrest; and that
during the course of these conversations and on the date of Williams' arrest he
thought that Tharpe was Williams' brother-in-law. All of the above testimony
was uncontradicted.
Rather, Williams made out an arguable case for entrapment, which the jury,
who had the opportunity to judge the demeanor of the witnesses, rejected.6 This
jury finding is important because it is a finding that Williams was predisposed
to commit the crimes of which he was convicted. Although we might consider
it extreme and outrageous for a largely unsupervised DEA informant to solicit
innocent persons into drug deals by invoking their sympathies,7 we do not
consider it extreme and outrageous under the facts of this case for such an
informant to invoke the sympathies of a former brother-in-law already
predisposed to engage in dealings in marijuana. Thus, we reject Williams' due
process claim.
II.
8
Appellant Struyf asserts that he was denied his right to a speedy trial under the
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 3161-3174 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(the Act) and under the sixth amendment to the Constitution. Under the Act
9 any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant ... shall
[I]n
commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the
information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a
judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last
occurs.
10
11
Section 3161(h) of the Act sets forth those periods of delay excluded in
computing the time within which the trial must be commenced. The following
exclusions are relevant to Struyf's claim: "delay resulting from any pretrial
motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing or
Struyf's argument that the statutory time period was exceeded rests in large part
on his inclusion of the time periods during which various pre-trial motions of
his codefendants were pending.8 Section 3161(h)(7), however, makes clear that
" 'an exclusion applicable to one defendant applies to all codefendants.' "
United States v. Fogarty, 692 F.2d 542, 546 (8th Cir.1982) (quoting United
States v. Edwards, 627 F.2d 460, 461 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 872,
101 S.Ct. 211, 66 L.Ed.2d 92 (1980)). This court has interpreted section
3161(h)(7) in the same manner. United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1358
(11th Cir.1982).
13
Days
Defendant
Date
Event
Elapsed
--------------------------------------------------------All
defendants 08-27-80 Indictment (Record,
vol. 1, at 1)
7
Struyf
09-04-80 Motion to withdraw
(Id. at 5)
09-22-80
Order (Id. at 97)
Gidus
09-11-80 9 motions (not part of
record)
09-22-80 Order (Id. at 96)
Struyf
09-18-80 22 motions(Id. at
12-95)
10-02-80
Order (Id. at 111)
Williams
09-25-80 3 motions(Id. at
98-109)
10-02-80
Order (Id. at 111)
12
Struyf
10-15-80 Motion to suppress
(Id. at 115)
02-03-81
Order (Record,
vol. 2, at 164)
14
Struyf
10-21-80
12-04-80
Struyf
10-27-80
Williams
02-03-81
10-24-80
11-06-80
11-06-80
Williams
11-13-80
Struyf
12-15-80
12-18-80
Gidus
12-23-80
01-28-81
02-03-81
Struyf
02-13-81
Williams
02-18-81
02-27-81
Struyf
03-03-81 Trial
--------------------------------------------------------Total elapsed time
31
15
Because the amount of includable time was well within the seventy-day limit,
we reject Struyf's claim that he was denied his right to a speedy trial under the
Act.
16
The United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct.
17
2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, outlined the factors to be considered: (1) the length of
delay; (2) the reason for delay; (3) the defendant's assertions of his right; and (4) the
prejudice to the defendant. "The first prong of Barker, the length of the delay, is
merely a threshold 'triggering mechanism.' The Court need not inquire into the other
factors unless there has been a delay of such length as to be 'presumptively
prejudicial.' "
18
Id. (quoting United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir.1978)).
19
We hold that the seven month delay in this case was not "presumptively
prejudicial" under the first prong of the Barker test. Accordingly, we need not
inquire into the other factors. Cf. Varella, at 1359 and cases cited therein
(concerning delay from the date of the arrest of, or service with a summons on,
the defendant to the filing of the indictment or information). Thus, we deny
Struyf's claim that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
20
AFFIRMED.
Williams' trial took place in April 1981. Williams was arrested in July 1980
The record is barren of any evidence that the government suggested to Tharpe
that he approach Williams in particular
Struyf entered into a stipulation with the government in which he waived trial
by jury; codefendants Williams and one Gidus were tried before a jury