1.

Colombia Pictures vs CA
[G.R. No. 110318. August 28, 1996.]
Petitioners claim:
- Petitioners, thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the National Bureau
of Investigation for violation of PD No. 49, as amended, and sought its
assistance in their anti-film piracy drive. Acting on such request, NBI Senior
Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warrant with the court a quo
against Sunshine seeking the seizure, among others, of pirated video tapes of
copyrighted films all of which were enumerated in a list attached to the
application; and, television sets, video cassettes and/or laser disc recordings
equipment and other machines and paraphernalia used or intended to be
used in the unlawful exhibition, showing, reproduction, sale, lease or
disposition of videograms tapes in the premises.
- According to petitioners, after complying with what the law then required, the
lower court determined that there was probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant. It is further argued that any search warrant so issued in
accordance with all applicable legal requirements is valid, for the lower court
could not possibly have been expected to apply, as the basis for a finding of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement
cases involving videograms, a pronouncement which was not existent at the
time of such determination.
Respondents claim:
- Private respondents predictably argue in support of the ruling of the Court of
Appeals sustaining the quashal of the search warrant by the lower court on
the strength of that 20th Century Fox ruling which, they claim, goes into the
very essence of probable cause. At the time of the issuance of the search
warrant involved here, although the 20th Century Fox case had not yet been
decided, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Section 3, Rule 126 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure embodied the prevailing and governing
law on the matter. The ruling in 20th Century Fox was merely an application
of the law on probable cause. Hence, they posit that there was no law that
was retrospectively applied, since the law had been there all along. To refrain
from applying the 20th Century Fox ruling, which had supervened as a
doctrine promulgated at the time of the resolution of private respondents'
motion for reconsideration seeking the quashal of the search warrant for
failure of the trial court to require presentation of the master tapes prior to
the issuance of the search warrant, would have constituted grave abuse of
discretion.
Ruling:
- There is merit in petitioners' impassioned and well-founded argumentation. In
fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for
the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity
of search warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a
guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in copyright
infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the
master tape and the pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the
decision in said case could lead to no other conclusion than that said

directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in

all or similar copyright infringement cases. Judicial dicta should always be
construed within the factual matrix of their parturition, otherwise a careless
interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the writer with the vice of
overstatement and the reader with the fallacy of undue generalization.
It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may
appear to do, that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of
master tapes of the copyrighted films is always necessary to meet the
requirement of probable cause and that, in the absence thereof, there can be
no finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.

2. Ching vs. Salinas

G.R. No. 161295, June 29, 2005
Facts:
- Jessie G. Ching is the owner and general manager of Jeshicris Manufacturing
Co., the maker and manufacturer of a Utility Model, described as Leaf Spring
Eye Bushing for Automobile made up of plastic.
- On September 4, 2001, Ching and Joseph Yu were issued by the National
Library Certificates of Copyright Registration and Deposit of the said work
described therein as Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile.
- On September 20, 2001, Ching requested the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for police/investigative assistance for the apprehension
and prosecution of illegal manufacturers, producers and/or distributors of the
works.
- After due investigation, the NBI filed applications for search warrants in the
RTC of Manila against William Salinas, Sr. and the officers and members of the
Board of Directors of Wilaware Product Corporation. It was alleged that the
respondents therein reproduced and distributed the said models penalized
under Sections 177.1 and 177.3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293.
Issues:
- Whether or not the subject matter is covered by the Copyright of the
Intellectual Property Code?
Ruling:
- It is worthy to state that the works protected under the Law on Copyright are:
literary or artistic works (Sec. 172) and derivative works (Sec. 173). The Leaf
Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion fall on neither classification.
- Being plain automotive spare parts that must conform to the original
structural design of the components they seek to replace, the Leaf Spring Eye
Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion are not ornamental. They lack the
decorative quality or value that must characterize authentic works of applied
art. They are not even artistic creations with incidental utilitarian functions or
works incorporated in a useful article. In actuality, the personal properties
described in the search warrants are mechanical works, the principal function
of which is utility sans any aesthetic embellishment.
- Neither are we to regard the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing
Cushion as included in the catch-all phrase other literary, scholarly, scientific

and artistic works in Section 172.1(a) of R.A. No. 8293. Applying the principle
of ejusdem generis which states that where a statute describes things of a
particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the
generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those
particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the
state which would repel such inference,[46] the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and
Vehicle Bearing Cushion are not copyrightable, being not of the same kind
and nature as the works enumerated in Section 172 of R.A. No. 8293.

(b) Derivative Works under Sec. 173

Section 173. Derivative Works. - 173.1. The following derivative works shall also be
protected by copyright:
(a) Dramatizations, translations, adaptations, abridgments, arrangements, and
other alterations of literary or artistic works; and
(b) Collections of literary, scholarly or artistic works, and compilations of data and
other materials which are original by reason of the selection or coordination or
arrangement of their contents. (Sec. 2, [P] and [Q], P.D. No. 49)
Section 173.2. The works referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Subsection 173.1
shall be protected as new works: Provided however, That such new work shall not
affect the force of any subsisting copyright upon the original works employed or any
part thereof, or be construed to imply any right to such use of the original works, or
to secure or extend copyright in such original works. (Sec. 8, P.D. 49; Art. 10, TRIPS)
Note: Derivative works are original work.
There must be compliance of the requirements:
1. must borrow the original and expressive content
2. the work must alter not merely copy. / must have substantial variation
Article 5 of civil code.
No right can spring from an unlawful act.
3. Laktaw vs. Paglinawan
44 Phil. 855 (1918)
Facts:
- Laktaw is the registered owner and author of a literary work entitled
Diccionario Hispano-Tagalog (Spanish-Tagalog Dictionary) published in the
City of Manila in 1889 by the printing establishment La Opinion.
- Paglinawan without the consent of Laktaw, reproduced said literary work,
improperly copied the greater part thereof in the work published by him and
entitled Diccionariong Kastila-Tagalog (Spanish-Tagalog Dictionary).

The act of Pagliwanan is a violation of article 7 of the Law of January 10,

1879, on Intellectual Property, caused irreparable injuries to Laktaw who was
surprised when, on publishing his new work entitled Diccionario TagalogHispano (Tagalog-Spanish Dictionary) he learned of the fact, and (4) that the
damages occasioned to him by the publication of Paglinawan's work
amounted to $10,000. Laktaw prayed the court to order the Paglinawan to
withdraw from sale all stock of the work of Paglinawan to pay him the sum of
$10,000, with costs.
Paglinawan in his answer denied generally each and every allegation of the
complaint and prayed the court to absolve him from the complaint.

Law:
Article 7 of the Law of January 10, 1879, on Intellectual Property:
Nobody may reproduce another person's work without the owner's consent, even
merely to annotate or add anything to it, or improve any edition thereof.
Issue:
- Whether or not Paglinawan violated Article 7 of the Intellectual Property Law
(1879)?
Ruling:
- Yes, Paglinawan violated Article 7 of Intellectual Property Law.
- It is not necessary that a work should be an improper copy of another work
previously published. It is enough that another's work has been reproduced
without the consent of the owner, even though it be only to annotate, add
something to it, or improve any edition thereof.
(c) Published Edition of Work
Sec. 174
Section 174. Published Edition of Work. - In addition to the right to publish granted
by the author, his heirs, or assigns, the publisher shall have a copyright consisting
merely of the right of reproduction of the typographical arrangement of the
published edition of the work. (n)
Note: Separate right of the publisher exclusively on typographical arrangement.
(5)Works Not Protected
Sec. 175
(a)Unprotected Subject Matter
Sec. 175
Section 175. Unprotected Subject Matter. - Notwithstanding the provisions of
Sections 172 and 173, no protection shall extend, under this law, to any idea,
procedure, system, method or operation, concept, principle, discovery or mere data
as such, even if they are expressed, explained, illustrated or embodied in a work;

news of the day and other miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items
of press information; or any official text of a legislative, administrative or legal
nature, as well as any official translation thereof (n)
4. Joaquin vs Drilon
G.R. No. 108946. January 28, 1999.
Petitioners Claim:
- Petitioner BJ Productions, Inc. (BJPI) is the holder/grantee of Certificate of
Copyright No. M922, dated January 28, 1971, of Rhoda and Me, a dating
game show aired from 1970 to 1977 claims that there is an infringement on
the copyright of the show "RHODA AND ME" both in content and in the
execution of the video presentation are established because respondent's
"IT'S A DATE" is practically an exact copy of complainant's "RHODA AND ME"
because of substantial similarities. As may [be] gleaned from the evidence on
record, the substance of the television productions complainant's "RHODA
AND ME" and Zosa's "IT'S A DATE" is that two matches are made between a
male and a female, both single, and the two couples are treated to a night or
two of dining and/or dancing at the expense of the show. The major concepts
of both shows is the same. Any difference appear mere variations of the
minor concepts.
Respondents Claim:
- Both public and private respondents maintain that petitioners failed to
establish the existence of probable cause due to their failure to present the
copyrighted master videotape of Rhoda and Me. They contend that petitioner
BJPI's copyright covers only a specific episode of Rhoda and Me and that the
formats or concepts of dating game shows are not covered by copyright
protection under P.D. No. 49.
Issue:
- Whether the format and mechanics of a TV show may be subject of a
copyright.
Ruling:
- To begin with the format of a show is not copyrightable. Section 2 of P.D. No.
49, otherwise known as the DECREE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
enumerates the classes of work entitled to copyright protection, does not
include the format or mechanics of a television show. For this reason, the
protection afforded by the law cannot be extended to cover them. The
copyright does not extend to an idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it
is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
5. Pearl and Dean, Inc. vs SMI
G.R. No. 148222. August 15, 2003

Pearl and Dean (Phil.), Inc. is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of

advertising display units simply referred to as light boxes. These units utilize
specially printed posters sandwiched between plastic sheets and illuminated
with back lights. Pearl and Dean was able to secure a Certificate of Copyright
Registration over these illuminated display units. The advertising light boxes
were marketed under the trademark Poster Ads. From 1981 to about 1988,
Pearl and Dean employed the services of Metro Industrial Services to
manufacture its advertising displays.
Two years later, Metro Industrial Services, the company formerly contracted
by Pearl and Dean to fabricate its display units, offered to construct light
boxes for Shoemarts chain of stores. SMI approved the proposal and ten (10)
light boxes were subsequently fabricated by Metro Industrial for SMI. After,
Pearl and Dean, received reports that exact copies of its light boxes were
installed at SM malls.
In the light of its discoveries, Pearl and Dean sent a letter to both SMI and
NEMI enjoining them to cease using the subject light boxes and to remove the
same from SMIs establishments. It also demanded the discontinued use of
the trademark Poster Ads, and the payment to Pearl and Dean of
compensatory damages in the amount of P20million.
Upon receipt of the demand letter, SMI suspended the leasing of light boxes
and NEMI took down its advertisements for Poster Ads from the lighted
display units in SMIs stores. Claiming that both SMI and NEMI failed to meet
all its demands, Pearl and Dean filed this instant case for infringement of
trademark and copyright, unfair competition and damages.

Issue:
- Whether the engineering or technical drawings of an advertising display unit
(light box) are granted copyright protection (copyright certificate of
registration), is the light box depicted in such engineering drawings ipso facto
also protected by such copyright?
Ruling:
- NO. Petitioner P & Ds complaint was that SMI infringed on its copyright over
the light boxes when SMI had the units manufactured by Metro and EYD
Rainbow Advertising for its own account. Obviously, petitioners position was
premised on its belief that its copyright over the engineering drawings
extended ipso facto to the light boxes depicted or illustrated in said drawings
- First, petitioners application for a copyright certificate clearly stated that it
was for a class O work under Section 2 (O) of PD 49 (The Intellectual
Property Decree) which was the statute then prevailing. Said Section 2
expressly enumerated the works subject to copyright:
SEC. 2. The rights granted by this Decree shall, from the moment of creation,
subsist with respect to any of the following works:
xxx xxx xxx
(O) Prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags, and box wraps;
xxx xxx xxx

Although petitioners copyright certificate was entitled Advertising Display

Units (which depicted the box-type electrical devices), its claim of copyright
infringement cannot be sustained.
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. Being a
mere statutory grant, the rights are limited to what the statute confers. It
may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects and by the
persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the statute. Accordingly, it
can cover only the works falling within the statutory enumeration or
description.
P & D secured its copyright under the classification class O work. This
being so, petitioners copyright protection extended only to the technical
drawings and not to the light box itself because the latter was not at all in the
category of prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags and
box wraps. Stated otherwise, even as we find that P & D indeed owned a
valid copyright, the same could have referred- only to the technical drawings
within the category of pictorial illustrations. It could not have possibly
stretched out to include the underlying light box. The strict application 1[9] of
the laws enumeration in Section 2 prevents us from giving petitioner even a
little leeway, that is, even if its copyright certificate was entitled Advertising
Display Units. What the law does not include, it excludes, and for the good
reason: the light box was not a literary or artistic piece which could be
copyrighted under the copyright law. And no less clearly, neither could the
lack of statutory authority to make the light box copyrightable be remedied
by the simplistic act of entitling the copyright certificate issued by the
National Library as Advertising Display Units.
In fine, if SMI and NEMI reprinted P & Ds technical drawings for sale to the
public without license from P & D, then no doubt they would have been guilty
of copyright infringement. But this was not the case. SMIs and NEMIs acts
complained of by P & D were to have units similar or identical to the light box
illustrated in the technical drawings manufactured by Metro and EYD Rainbow
Advertising, for leasing out to different advertisers. Was this an infringement
of petitioners copyright over the technical drawings? We do not think so.

6. Filipino Society of Composers vs Tan

G.R. No. L-36402. March 16, 1987.
Plaintiff-appellant:
- is the owner of certain musical compositions among which are the songs
entitled: "Dahil Sa Iyo", "Sapagkat Ikaw Ay Akin," "Sapagkat Kami Ay Tao
Lamang" and "The Nearness Of You."
- filed a complaint with the lower court for infringement of copyright against
defendant-appellee for allowing the playing in defendant-appellee's
restaurant of said songs copyrighted in the name of the former.
Defendant-appellee,
- countered that the complaint states no cause of action. While not denying the
playing of said copyrighted compositions in his establishment, appellee

maintains that the mere singing and playing of songs and popular tunes even
if they are copyrighted do not constitute an infringement under the
provisions of Section 3 of the Copyright Law.
Issue:
- whether or not the playing and signing of musical compositions which have
been copyrighted under the provisions of the Copyright Law (Act 3134) inside
the establishment of the defendant-appellee constitute a public performance
for profit within the meaning and contemplation of the Copyright Law of the
Philippines; and assuming that there were indeed public performances for
profit, whether or not appellee can be held liable therefor.
Ruling:
- NO. It has been held that "The playing of music in dine and dance
establishment which was paid for by the public in purchases of food and drink
constituted "performance for profit" within a Copyright Law." Thus, it has
been explained that while it is possible in such establishments for the patrons
to purchase their food and drinks and at the same time dance to the music of
the orchestra, the music is furnished and used by the orchestra for the
purpose of inducing the public to patronize the establishment and pay for the
entertainment in the purchase of food and drinks. The defendant conducts his
place of business for profit, and it is public; and the music is performed for
profit.
- Nevertheless, appellee cannot be said to have infringed upon the Copyright
Law. Appellee's allegation that the composers of the contested musical
compositions waived their right in favor of the general public when they
allowed their intellectual creations to become property of the public domain
before applying for the corresponding copyrights for the same is correct.
- The Supreme Court has ruled that "Paragraph 33 of Patent Office
Administrative Order No. 3 (as amended, dated September 18, 1947) entitled
'Rules of Practice in the Philippines Patent Office relating to the Registration
of Copyright Claims' promulgated pursuant to Republic Act 165, provides
among other things that an intellectual creation should be copyrighted thirty
(30) days after its publication, if made in Manila, or within the (60) days if
made elsewhere, failure of which renders such creation public property."
Indeed, if the general public has made use of the object sought to be
copyrighted for thirty (30) days prior to the copyright application the law
deems the object to have been donated to the public domain and the same
can no longer be copyrighted.Under the circumstances, it is clear that the
musical compositions in question had long become public property, and are
therefore beyond the protection of the Copyright Law.