SPOUSES DEL CAMPO V.

ABESIA 160 SCRA 379

Facts:

The case involves two friendly parties who are co-owners of a corner lot
Later on, the two parties decided to divide the co-owned property into two
lots. 30 square meters went to the plaintiffs and 15 square meters went to the
defendants. From the sketch plan, both parties discovered that the house of
the defendants occupied a portion of the plaintiffs adjacent lot, eating 5 sqm
of it. The parties then requested the trial court to adjudicate who should take
possession of the encroached 5 sqm.

The trial court ruled that Art 448 does not apply. The owner of the land on
which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one
who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land
if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose
to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof. Since art 448 does not apply, the Plaintiff cannot
be obliged to pay for the portion of defendants house that entered into the 30
sqm lot, AND Defendant cannot be obliged to pay for the price of the 5 sqm
their house occupied. Why? The RTC believed the rules of co-ownership
should govern, and not that of accession.

RTC then assigned the full 30sqm to Plaintiff and ordered Defendants to
demolish the 5sqm part of their house encroaching the 30sqm lot of the
Plaintiffs. Defendants where aghast at having to axe the family home, hence
they appealed.

CA affirmed the decision.

Issue: Whether or Not Article 448 of the Civil Code is applicable to a builder
in good faith when the property involved is owned in common.

Held: When the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears

that the house of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square
meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built
in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should
apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil
Code may apply even when there was co-ownership if good faith has been
established.
Applying the aforesaid provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs have the right
to appropriate said portion of the house of defendants upon payment of
indemnity to defendants as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, the plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to pay the price of the
land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably
much more than the value of the portion of the house of defendants built
thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The defendants
shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiff upon such terms and
conditions that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall
fix the terms thereof. Of course, defendants may demolish or remove the
said portion of their house, at their own expense, if they so decide.
Article 448 of the New Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price
of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or
planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent,
if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees
after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease
and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply
where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for
then he did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to
another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person
under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of coownership. However, when, as in this case, the co-ownership is terminated
by the partition and it appears that the house of defendants overlaps or
occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs
which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of
Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi
agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there
was co-ownership if good faith has been established. Applying the aforesaid
provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs have the right to appropriate said
portion of the house of defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants
as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs may
oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land occupied by their house.
However, if the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of

the portion of the house of defendants built thereon, then the latter cannot be
obliged to buy the land. The defendants shall then pay the reasonable rent to
the plaintiff upon such terms and conditions thatthey may agree. In case of
disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course,
defendants may demolish or remove thesaid portion of their house, at their
own expense, if they so decide.

TECHNOGAS PHILIPPINES vs. CAG.R. No. 108894 February 10,

1997PANGANIBAN,
J.:
FACTS:
The parties in this case are owners of adjoining lots in Paraaque,Metro
Manila. It was discovered in a survey, that a portion of abuilding of
Technogas, which was presumably constructed by itspredecessor-in-interest,
encroached on a portion of the lot ownedby private respondent Edward Uy.
Upon learning of the encroachment or occupation by its buildingsand wall of
a portion of private respondents land, the petitioneroffered to buy from
defendant that particular portion of Uys landoccupied by portions of its
buildings and wall with an area of 770square meters, more or less, but the
latter, however, refused theoffer
The parties entered into a private agreement before a certain Col.Rosales in
Malacaang, wherein petitioner agreed to demolish thewall at the back
portion of its land thus giving to the privaterespondent possession of a
portion of his land previously enclosedby petitioner's wall.
Uy later filed a complaint before the office of Municipal Engineer
of Paraaque, Metro Manila as well as before the Office of theProvincial
Fiscal of Rizal against Technogas in connection with theencroachment or
occupation by plaintiff's buildings and walls of aportion of its land but said
complaint did not prosper; so Uy dugor caused to be dug a canal along
Technogas wall, a portion of which collapsed in June, 1980, and led to the
filing by thepetitioner of the supplemental complaint in the above-entitledcase
and a separate criminal complaint for malicious mischief against Uy and
his wife which ultimately resulted into theconviction in court Uy's wife for the
crime of malicious mischief;
ISSUE:WON the petitioner is builder in good faith.
HELD: YES.
We disagree with Respondent Courts reliance on the cases of
JM Tuason & Co Inc vs Vda de Lumanla and J M Tuason & Co
Inc vs Macalindong, in ruling that the petitioner "cannot beconsidered in
good faith" because as a land owner, it is "presumedto know the metes
and bounds of his own property, specially if thesame are reflected in
a properly issued certificate of title. One whoerroneously builds on the
adjoining lot should be considered a builder in (b)ad (f)aith, there being
presumptive knowledge of theTorrens title, the area, and the extent of the
boundaries." There isnothing in those cases which would suggest that
bad faith isimputable to a registered owner of land when a part of his
buildingencroaches upon a neighbor's land, simply because he issupposedly

presumed to know the boundaries of his land asdescribed in his certificate of

title,
Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since
noproof exists to show that the encroachment over a narrow,needle-shaped
portion of private respondent's land was done inbad faith by the builder of the
encroaching structures, the lattershould be presumed to have built them in
good faith. It ispresumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the
samecharacter in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he isbuilding on
is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in histitle.
Hence, such good faith, by law, passed on to Pariz'ssuccessor, petitioner in
this case. The good faith ceases from themoment defects in the title are
made known to the possessor, byextraneous evidence or by suit for recovery
of the property by thetrue owner.
Consequently, the builder, if sued by the aggrieved landowner forrecovery of
possession, could have invoked the provisions of Art.448 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
The owner of the land on which anything has been built,sown or planted in
good faith, shall have the right toappropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting,after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles546 and 548,
or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the
one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot
beobliged to buy the land if its value is considerably morethan that of the
building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of
the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of thelease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
The obvious benefit to the builder under this article is that,instead of being
outrightly ejected from the land, he can compelthe landowner to make a
choice between the two options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying the
indemnity required by law,or (2) sell the land to the builder. The landowner
cannot refuse to exercise either option and
compel instead the owner of thebuilding to remove it from the land
In view of the good faith of
both
petitioner and privaterespondent, their rights and obligations are to be
governed by Art.448. Hence, his options are limited to: (1) appropriating
theencroaching portion of petitioner's building after payment of proper
indemnity, or (2) obliging the latter to buy the lot occupiedby the structure. He
cannot exercise a remedy of his own liking

BALLATAN vs. CAG.R. No. 125683 March 2, 1999

FACTS:
The parties herein are owners
of adjacent lots located at Block No. 3,Poinsettia Street, Araneta University
Village, Malabon, Metro Manila. Lot No. 24, isregistered in the name
of petitioners Eden Ballatan and spouses Betty Martinez andChong
Chy Ling. Lots Nos. 25 and 26, are registered in the name of
respondentGonzalo Go, Sr. On Lot No. 25, respondent Winston Go, son of
Gonzalo Go, Sr.,constructed his house. Adjacent to Lot No. 26 is Lot No. 27,
and is registered in thename of respondent Li Ching Yao.
In 1985, petitioner Ballatan constructed herhouse on Lot No. 24. During the
construction, she noticed that the concrete fenceand side pathway of the
adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached onthe entire length of
the eastern side of her property. Petitioner Ballatan called theattention of the
AIA to the discrepancy of the land area in her title and the actualland area
received from them. The AIA authorized another survey of the land
byEngineer Jose N. Quedding. On June 2, 1985, Engineer Quedding found
that Lot No.24 lost approximately 25 square meters on its eastern boundary
that Lot No. 25,although found to have encroached on Lot No. 24, did not
lose nor gain any area;that Lot No. 26 lost some three (3) square meters
which, however, were gained byLot No. 27 on its western boundary. In
short, Lots Nos. 25, 26 and 27 movedwestward to the eastern
boundary of Lot No. 24. On the basis of
this survey,petitioner Ballatan made a written demand on respondents Go to
remove anddismantle their improvements on Lot No. 24. Respondents Go
refused. The parties including Li Ching Yao, however, met several times to
reach an agreement onematter. On April 1, 1986, petitioner Ballatan
instituted against respondents Go aCivil Case for recovery of possession
before the RTC, Malabon. The Go's filed their"Answer with ThirdParty Complaint" impleading as third-party defendantsrespondents Li Ching
Yao, the AIA and Engineer Quedding. On August 23, 1990, RTC decided in
favor of petitioners. Respondents Go appealed. On March 25, 1996, theCA
modified the decision of the trial court. It affirmed the dismissal of the thirdparty complaint against the AIA but reinstated the complaint against Li Ching
Yaoand Jose Quedding. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari. Petitioners questionthe admission by respondent CA of the thirdparty complaint by respondents Goagainst the AIA, Jose Quedding and Li
Ching Yao. Petitioners claim that the third-party complaint should not have
been considered by the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction due to thirdparty plaintiffs' failure to pay the docket and filing feesbefore the trial court.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in admitting the third-party complaint despite the
failure of respondents GOs to pay the docket and filing fees before the trial
court.

RULING:
The third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the complaint
of petitioners against respondents Go. The complaint filed was for
accion publiciana, i.e., the recovery of possession of real property which is a
real
action. The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the c
omplaintmust be accompanied the payment of the requisite docket and filing
fees. In real actions, the docket and filing fees are based on the value of the
property and the amount of damages claimed, if any If the complaint is filed
but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the court acquires jurisdiction
upon full payment of the
fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring
prescription. Where the fees prescribed for the real action have been paid
but the fees of certain related damages are not, the court, although having
jurisdiction over the real action,
maynot have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim fordamages.
Accordingly, the court may expunge those claims for damages, or allow,on
motion, a reasonable time for amendment of the complaint so as to allege
the precise amount of damages and accept payment of the requisite legal
fee. If there are unspecified claims, the determination of which may arise
after the filing of thec omplaint or similar pleading, the additional filing fee
thereon shall constitute a lienon the judgment award. The same rule also
applies to third-party claims and othersimilar pleadings. In the case at bar,
the third-party complaint filed by respondentsGo was incorporated in their
answer to the complaint. The third-party
complaintsought the same remedy as the principal complaint but added a pra
yer forattorney's fees and costs without specifying their amounts. The Court
of Appeal didnot err in awarding damages despite the Go's failure to specify
the amount prayedfor and pay the corresponding additional filing fees
thereon. The claim for attorney'sfees refers to damages arising after the filing
of the complaint against the Go's. The additional filing fee on this claim is
deemed to constitute a lien on the judgment award.

PLEASANTVILLE V CA
FACTS:
1.Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9
at Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In1975, respondent Eldred
Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was
vacant.
2.Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register of
Deeds a TCT in his name. It was then that hediscovered that improvements
had been introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken
possession thereof.
3.It appears Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from
C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusivereal estate agent of
petitioner. Under the Contract to Sell on Installment, Kee could possess the
lot even before the completionof all installment payments.
4.Kee paid CTTEI the relocation fee of P50.00 and another P50.00 for the
preparation of the lot plan. These amounts were paid
prior to Kees taking actual possession of Lot 8.
5.After the preparation of the lot plan and a copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI
through its employee, Zenaida Octaviano,
accompanied Kees wife, Donabelle Ke
e, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed by Octaviano
was Lot 9.
6.Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a store, an auto
repair shop and other improvements on the lot.
7.After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico confronted him.
The parties tried to reach an amicable settlement, but failed.
8.Jardinicos lawyer wrote Kee, demanding that the latter remove all
improvements and vacate Lot 9. When Kee refused to
vacate Lot 9, Jardinico filed with the MTCC, a complaint for ejectment with
damages against Kee. Kee, in turn, filed a third- party complaint against
petitioner and CTTEI.
9.The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable
to CTTEI. It further ruled that petitioner and CTTEI could not successfully
invoke as a defense the failure of Kee to give notice of his intention to begin
constructionrequired under paragraph 22 of the Contract to Sell on
Installment and his having built a sari-sari store without the priorapproval of
petitioner required under paragraph 26 of said contract, saying that the
purpose of these requirements was merelyto regulate the type of
improvements to be constructed on the lot.
10.However, the MTCC found that petitioner had already rescinded its
contract with Kee
over Lot 8 for the latters failure to pay
the installments due, and that Kee had not contested the rescission. The
rescission was effected in 1979, before the complaint was instituted. The
MTCC concluded that Kee no longer had any right over the lot subject of the
contract between him

and petitioner. Consequently, Kee must pay reasonable rentals for the use of
Lot 9, and, furthermore, he cannot claimreimbursement for the improvements
he introduced on said lot.
ISSUE 1: Is Kee a builder in good faith?
HELD:YES.At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that
said lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot
delivered to him was not Lot 8. The steps Kee had taken to protect his
interests were reasonable, for the final delivery of subdivision lots to their
owners is part of the regular course of everyday business of CTTEI. Thus,
Kee is in good faith and petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
ISSUE 2: WON the holding of the Court of Appeals is correct. WON Art 448
applies.
HELD: The holding of CA is INCORRECT. Art 448 APPLIES.
The rights of Kee and Jardinicovis-a-viseach other, as builder in good faith
and owner in good faith, respectively, are regulated by law (i.e., Arts. 448,
546 and 548 of the Civil Code). It was error for the Court of Appeals to make
a "slight modification" in the application of such law, on the ground of
"equity". At any rate, as it stands now, Kee and Jardinico have amicably
settled through their deed of sale their rights and obligations with regards to
Lot 9. Thus, we delete items 2 (a) and (b) of the dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals' Decision holding petitioner and CTTEI solidarily liable.
In sum, we rule that Kee is a builder in good faith. The disposition of the
Court of Appeals that Kee "is entitled to the rights granted him under Articles
448, 546 and 548 of the New Civil Code" is deleted, in view of the deed of
sale entered into by Kee and Jardinico, which deed now governs the rights of
Jardinico and Kee as to each other. Therefore, Art 448 applied and a DOS
was subsequently executed.
Petitioner fails to persuade this Court to abandon the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals that Kee was a builder in goodfaith. The
roots of the controversy can be traced directly to the errors committed by
CTTEI, when it pointed the wrong property to WilsonKee and his wife. It is
highly improbable that a purchaser of a lot would knowingly and willingly
build his residence on a lot owned by another, deliberately exposing himself
and his family to the risk of being ejected from the land and losing all
improvements thereonUnder the circumstances, Kee had acted in the
manner of a prudent man in ascertaining the identity of his property. But as
Kee is a layman not versed in the technical description of his property, he
had to find a way to ascertain that what was described in TCT No.
69561 matched Lot 8. Thus, he went to the subdivision developers agent
and applied and paid for the relocation of the lot, as well as
for the production of a lot plan by CTTEIs geodetic engineer. Upon Kees
receipt of the map, his wife went to the subdivision site accompanied by
CTTEIs employee, Octaviano, who authoritatively declared that the land she
was pointing to was indeed Lot 8.

Having full faith and confidence in the reputation of CTTEI, and because of
the companys positive identification of the prop
erty, Keesaw no reason to suspect that there had been a misdelivery.At the
time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he
bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the
lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kees good faith. Petitioner failed to
prove otherwise.The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the
agent, done within the scope of his authority, and should bear the
damagecaused to third persons.On the other hand, the agent who exceeds
his authority is personally liable for the damage.

SPOUSES JUAN NUGUID AND ERLINDA T. NUGUID VS. HON. COURT

OF APPEALS AND PEDRO P. PECSON
G.R. No. 151815. February 23, 2005
Facts: Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot on which he built a 4-door 2storey apartment building. For failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at
public auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it to the spouses
Juan and Erlinda Nuguid. Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale
before the RTC of Quezon City, which upheld the spouses title but declared
that the apartment building was not included in the auction sale. This was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals and thereafter by this Court. On June
23, 1993, by virtue of the Entry of Judgment, the Nuguids became the
uncontested owners of the 256-square meter commercial lot. As a result, the
Nuguid spouses moved for delivery of possession of the lot and the
apartment building.
The trial court, relying upon Article 546[1][7] of the Civil Code, ruled that the
Spouses Nuguid were to reimburse Pecson for his construction cost, the
spouses Nuguid were entitled to immediate issuance of a writ of possession
over the lot and improvements. The RTC also directed Pecson to pay the
same amount of monthly rentals to the Nuguids as paid by the tenants
occupying the apartment units. Pecson duly moved for reconsideration, the
RTC issued a Writ of Possession,directing the deputy sheriff to put the
spouses Nuguid in possession of the subject property with all the
improvements thereon and to eject all the occupants therein.Pecson then
filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the order of payment of construction costs but
rendered the issue of possession moot on appeal.
Frustrated by this turn of events, Pecson filed a petition for review before this
Court. On May 26, 1995, the Court handed down the decision remanding to
the trial court for it to determine the current market value of the apartment
building on the lot. The value so determined shall be forthwith paid by
Spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid] to Pedro Pecson otherwise the petitioner
shall be restored to the possession of the apartment building until payment of
the required indemnity.
On the basis of this Courts decision, Pecson filed a Motion to Restore
Possession and a Motion to Render Accounting, praying respectively for
restoration of his possession over the subject 256-square meter commercial
lot and for the spouses Nuguid to be directed to render an accounting under
oath, of the income derived from the subject four-door apartment from
November 22, 1993 until possession of the same was restored to him.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are liable to pay rent over and above
the current market value of the improvement and that such increased award
of rentals by the RTC was reasonable and equitable.
Held: It is not disputed that the construction of the 4-door 2-storey apartment,

subject of this dispute, was undertaken at the time when Pecson was still the
owner of the lot. When the Nuguids became the uncontested owner of the
lot, by virtue of entry of judgment of the Courts decision, the apartment
building was already in existence and occupied by tenants.
Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to appropriate the
improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity or
to sell the land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides
that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the
necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention
until full reimbursement is made. As we earlier held, since petitioners opted
to appropriate the improvement for themselves as early as June 1993, when
they applied for a writ of execution despite knowledge that the auction sale
did not include the apartment building, they could not benefit from the lots
improvement, until they reimbursed the improver in full, based on the current
market value of the property.
Despite the Courts recognition of Pecsons right of ownership over the
apartment building, the petitioners still insisted on dispossessing Pecson by
filing for a Writ of Possession to cover both the lot and the building. Clearly,
this resulted in a violation of respondents right of retention. Worse,
petitioners took advantage of the situation to benefit from the highly valued,
income-yielding, four-unit apartment building by collecting rentals thereon,
before they paid for the cost of the apartment building. It was only 4 years
later that they finally paid its full value to the respondent.
Given the circumstances of the instant case where the builder in good faith
has been clearly denied his right of retention for almost half a decade, we
find that the increased award of rentals by the RTC was reasonable and
equitable. The petitioners had reaped all the benefits from the improvement
introduced by the respondent during said period, without paying any amount
to the latter as reimbursement for his construction costs and expenses. They
should account and pay for such benefits.
We need not belabor now the appellate courts recognition of herein
respondents entitlement to rentals from the date of the determination of the
current market value until its full payment. Respondent is clearly entitled to
payment by virtue of his right of retention over the said improvement.

G.R. NO.157044. OCTOBER 5, 2005

ROSALES VS. CASTELLFORT
FACTS:Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales andLily Rosqueta-Rosales
(petitioners) are the registered
owners of a parcel of land with an area of approximately 315 square meters,
covered byTransfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36856[4] and designated as
Lot 17, Block 1 of Subdivision Plan LRCPsd-55244 situated in Los Baos,
Laguna. On August 16, 1995, petitioners
discoveredthat a house was being constructed on their lot,without their
knowledge and consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort
(Castelltort).It turned out that respondents Castelltort and his wife Judith had
purchased a lot, Lot 16 of the same Subdivision Plan, from respondent Lina
Lopez-Villegas (Lina) through her son-attorney-in-fact ReneVillegas
(Villegas) but that after a survey thereof by geodetic engineer Augusto
Rivera, he pointed to Lot17 as the Lot 16 the Castelltorts purchased.
Negotiations for the settlement of the case thus began, with Villegas offering
a larger lot near petitioners lot inthe same subdivision as a replacement
thereof. In the alternative, Villegas proposed to pay
the purchaseprice of petitioners lot with legal interest. Bothproposals were, h
owever, rejected by petitionerswhose counsel, by letter of August 24, 1995,
directed Castelltort to stop the construction of and demolish his house and
any other structure he may have built thereon, and desist from entering the
lot. Petitioners subsequently filed on September 1, 1995 a complaint for
recovery of possession anddamages with prayer for the issuance of a
restrainingorder and preliminary injunction against spouses-respondents
Miguel and Judith Castelltort before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, docketed
as Civil Case No.2229-95-C.
ISSUE:Under Art 448, who has the right of option?
HELD: Under the foregoing provision (Art 448), the
landowner can choose between appropriating the building by paying the
proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless its
value is considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the
builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent.[34] If the parties cannot come
to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land,a rule that accords with the
principle of accession, i.e.,that the accessory follows the principal and not
theother way around. Even as the option lies with
thelandowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, ispreclusive. The landowner
cannot refuse to exerciseeither option and compel instead the
owner of thebuilding to remove it from the land.The raison detre for this
provision has beenenunciated thus:Where the builder, planter or sower
hasacted in good faith, a conflict of rights
arisesbetween the owners, and it becomesnecessary to protect the owner of
theimprovements without causing injustice tothe owner of the land. In view of

theimpracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has

provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the
option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or
to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper
rent. He cannot refuseto exercise either option. It is the owner of the land
who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and
because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing.

ALVIOLA VS. CA
Facts:- Victoria Tinagan bought 2 parcels of land and took possession
thereof with her son, Agustin
- after 10 years, Alviola occupied portions thereof, built a copra dryer and
store, tolerate occupancy by Victoria and Agustin
- after 15 years, Victoria and Agustin died
- wife of Agustin (referred as Tinagan) filed a complaint for recovery of
possession against Alviola
RTC/CA: in favor of Tinagan, Alviola to vacate and remove store and dryer,
pay rentals until improvements are removed
- Alviola contends that Victoria ceded her right over the property in favor of
Alviola, Tinagans tolerated their occupancy making the landowners in bad
faith and they, Alviolas in good faith, copra store and dryer are of permanent
structures thus cannot be removed
Issue; W/n Article 454 may be applied where the landowner is in bad faith,
the BPS in good faith? NO
Held:- Tax declarations of the 2 parcels of land declared to be in the name of
the Tinagans
- bad faith on the part of Alviola upon construction of improvements despite
being fully aware that the parcels of land belonged to Victoria Tinagan
- bad faith also on the part of Tinagans (wife of Agustin and children)
because they had knowledge of the constructions and still tolerated their
occupancy thereon
-in pari delicto, treated as if both parties acted in good faith, 448 is applicable
not 454
- but 448 will not apply upon the dryer and store being transferable in nature
- to fall under 448, the construction must be of permanent character, attached
to the soil
- if transitory, there is no accession and the builder must remove the
construction
- proper remedy was an action to eject the builder from the land

Spouses Firme vs. Bukal Enterprises and Development Corp.

[GR 146608, 23 October 2003]
Facts: Spouses Constante and Azucena Firme are the registered owners of
a parcel of land located on Dahlia Avenue, Fairview Park, Quezon City.
Renato de Castro, the vice president of Bukal Enterprises and Development
Corporation authorized his friend, Teodoro Aviles, a broker, to negotiate with
the Spouses Firme for the purchase of the Property. On 28 March 1995,
Bukal Enterprises filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
with the trial court, alleging that the Spouses Firme reneged on their
agreement to sell the Property. The complaint asked the trial court to order
the Spouses Firme to execute the deed of sale and to deliver the title to the
Property to Bukal Enterprises upon payment of the agreed purchase price.
On 7 August 1998, the trial court rendered judgment against Bukal
Enterprises, dismissing the case and ordering Bukal Enterprises to pay the
Spouses Constante and Azucena Firme (1) the sum of P335,964.90 as and
by way of actual and compensatory damages; (2) the sum of P500,000.00 as
and by way of moral damages; (3) the sum of P100,000.00 as and by way of
attorneys fees; and (4) the costs of the suit.
The trial court held there was no perfected contract of sale as Bukal
Enterprises failed to establish that the Spouses Firme gave their consent to
the sale of the Property; and that Aviles had no valid authority to bind Bukal
Enterprises in the sale transaction. Bukal Enterprises appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. The
appellate court ordered the Spouses Firme to execute the Deed of Absolute
Sale transferring the ownership of the subject property to Bukal Enterprises
immediately upon receipt of the purchase price of P3,224,000.00 and to
perform all such acts necessary and proper to effect the transfer of the
property covered by TCT 264243 to Bulak Enterprises; and directed Bukal
Enterprises to deliver the payment of the purchase price of the property
within 60 days from the finality of the judgment. The Court of Appeals held
that the lack of a board resolution authorizing Aviles to act on behalf of Bukal
Enterprises in the purchase of the Property was cured by ratification;
inasmuch as Bukal Enterprises ratified the purchase when it filed the
complaint for the enforcement of the sale. The spouses Firme filed the
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether there was a perfected contract between the Spouses Firme
and Bukal Enterprises, the latter allegedly being represented by Aviles.
Held: There was no consent on the part of the Spouses Firme. Consent is an
essential element for the existence of a contract, and where it is wanting, the
contract is non-existent. The essence of consent is the conformity of the
parties on the terms of the contract, the acceptance by one of the offer made
by the other. The Spouses Firme flatly rejected the offer of Aviles to buy the
Property on behalf of Bukal Enterprises. There was therefore no concurrence
of the offer and the acceptance on the subject matter, consideration and
terms of payment as would result in a perfected contract of sale. Further,
there was no approval from the Board of Directors of Bukal Enterprises as
would finalize any transaction with the Spouses Firme. Aviles did not have
the proper authority to negotiate for Bukal Enterprises. Aviles testified that his
friend, De Castro, had asked him to negotiate with the Spouses Firme to buy
the Property. De Castro, as Bukal Enterprises vice president, testified that he
authorized Aviles to buy the Property. However, there is no Board Resolution
authorizing Aviles to negotiate and purchase the Property on behalf of Bukal
Enterprises. It is the board of directors or trustees which exercises almost all
the corporate powers in a corporation. Under Sections 23 and 36 of the
Corporation Code, the power to purchase real property is vested in the board
of directors or trustees. While a corporation may appoint agents to negotiate
for the purchase of real property needed by the corporation, the final say will
have to be with the board, whose approval will finalize the transaction. A
corporation can only exercise its powers and transact its business through its
board of directors and through its officers and agents when authorized by a
board resolution or its by-laws. Aviles, who negotiated the purchase of the
Property, is neither an officer of Bukal Enterprises nor a member of the Board
of Directors of Bukal Enterprises. There is no Board Resolution authorizing
Aviles to negotiate and purchase the Property for Bukal Enterprises. There is
also no evidence to prove that Bukal Enterprises approved whatever
transaction Aviles made with the Spouses Firme. In fact, the president of
Bukal Enterprises did not sign any of the deeds of sale presented to the
Spouses Firme. Even De Castro admitted that he had never met the
Spouses Firme. Considering all these circumstances, it is highly improbable
for Aviles to finalize any contract of sale with the Spouses Firme.

Furthermore, the Court notes that in the Complaint filed by Bukal Enterprises
with the trial court, Aviles signed the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping was not
accompanied by proof that Bukal Enterprises authorized Aviles to file the
complaint on behalf of Bukal Enterprises. The power of a corporation to sue
and be sued is exercised by the board of directors. The physical acts of the
corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural
persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific
act of the board of directors. The purpose of verification is to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and that it
is filed in good faith. True, this requirement is procedural and not
jurisdictional. However, the trial court should have ordered the correction of
the complaint since Aviles was neither an officer of Bukal Enterprises nor
authorized by its Board of Directors to act on behalf of Bukal Enterprises.

Viajar v. CA
Facts: The spouses Ricardo and Leonor Ladrido were the owners of Lot
7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan situated in barangay Cawayan,
Pototan, Iloilo (154,267 sq. ms., TCT T-21940 of the Register of Deeds of
Iloilo). Spouses Rosendo and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a
parcel of land described in their title as Lot 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of
Pototan. On 6 September 1973, Rosendo Te, with the conformity of his
wife, sold this lot to Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for P5,000. A
Torrens title was later issued in the latters names. Later, Angelica Viajar had
Lot 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the possession of
Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido
refused. The piece of real property which used to be Lot 7340 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay Guibuanogan, Pototan,
Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089 sq.ms.; that at the time of the cadastral
survey in 1926, Lot 7511 and Lot 7340 were separated by the Suague River;
that the area of 11,819 sq.ms of what was Lot 7340 has been in the
possession of Ladrido; that the area of 14,036 sq.ms., which was formerly
the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926, has also
been
in the possession of Ladrido; and that the Viajars have never been in actual
physical possession of Lot 7340.
On 15 February 1974, Angelica and Celso Viajar instituted a civil action
for recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido (Civil
Case 9660) with the CFI Iloilo. Summoned to plead, Ladrido filed his answer
with a counterclaim. The Viajars filed their reply to the answer.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead Rosendo Te as
another defendant. The Viajars sought the annulment of the deed of sale and
the restitution of the purchase price with interest in the event the possession
of defendant Ladrido is sustained. Te filed his answer to the amended
complaint and he counterclaimed for damages. The Viajars answered the
counterclaim. During the pendency of the case, Celso Viajar sold his rights
over Lot 7340 to his mother and co-plaintiff, Angelica F. Viajar. For this
reason, Angelica F. Viajar appears to be the sole registered owner of the lot.
On 25 May 1978, Ricardo Ladrido died. He was substituted in the civil
action by his wife, Leonor P. Ladrido, and children, namely: Lourdes
Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido, as parties
defendants. After trial on the merits, a second amended complaint which
included damages was admitted. On 10 December 1981, the trial court
rendered its decision in favor of Ladrido, dismissing the complaint of
Angelica and Celso Viajar with costs against them, declaring Leonor P.
Ladrido, Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P.
Ladrido as owner of the parcel of land indicated as Lots A and B in the
sketch plan situated in barangays Cawayan and Guibuanogan, Pototan,
Iloilo, and containing an area of 25,855 sq.ms., and pronouncing that as
owners of the land, the Ladridos are entitled to the possession thereof.
Not satisfied with the decision, the Viajars appealed to the Court of

Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo on
29 December 1986 (CA-GR CV 69942). The Viajars filed a petition for
review on certiorari.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit without
pronouncement as to costs.
1. Accretion belongs to riparian owners Article 457 of the New Civil
Code provides that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters."
2. Change in the course of the river gradual The presumption is that the
change in the course of the river was gradual and caused by accretion and
erosion (Martinez Caas vs. Tuason, 5 Phil. 668; Payatas Estate
Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55; C.H. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil.
133). In the present case, the lower court correctly found that the evidence
introduced by the Viajars to show that the change in the course of the
Suague River was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion is not clear
and convincing. The Ladridos have sufficiently established that for many
years after 1926 a gradual accretion on the eastern side of Lot 7511 took
place by action of the current of the Suague River so that in 1979 an alluvial
deposit of 29,912 sq.ms. (2.9912 hectares), more or less, had been added to
Lot 7511 (Lot A: 14,036 sq.ms., Lot B, 11,819 sq.ms. and Lot C, which is
not in litigation, 4,057 sq.ms). The established facts indicate that the eastern
boundary of Lot 7511 was the Suague River based on the cadastral plan. For
a period of more than 40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River
overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually
received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river. The
consequent increase in the area of Lot 7511 due to alluvion or accretion was
possessed by the defendants whose tenants plowed and planted the same
with corn and tobacco. The quondam river bed had been filled by accretion
through the years. The land is already plain and there is no indication on the
ground of any abandoned river bed. Under the law, accretion which the
banks or rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters becomes the property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks.
(Art. 366, Old Civil Code; Art. 457, New Civil Code which took effect on 30
August 1950 [Lara v. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 778]. Therefore, the accretion to
Lot 7511 which consists of Lots A and B belong to the Ladridos.
3. Finding of facts by lower court conclusive upon Supreme Court The
trial court found that the change in the course of the Suague River was
gradual and this finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme
Court found no valid reason to disturb the finding of fact.
4. Section 45 and 46 of Act 496, Land Registration Act Section 45 of Act
496 provides that the obtaining of a decree of registration and the entry of a
certificate of title shall be regarded as an agreement running with the land,
and binding upon the applicant and all successors in title that the land shall
be and always remain registered land, and subject to the provisions of this
Act and all Acts amendatory thereof." Section 46 of the same act provides

that No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner

shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession."
5. Registration does not protect riparian owner against diminution of
the area of registered land; Interpretation of Article 366 of the Civil
Code with the Land Registration Act / Torrens System The rule that
registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual
changes in the course of an adjoining stream is well settled. In Payatas
Estate
Improvement Co. vs. Tuason (53 Phil. 55), it was ruled that Article 366 of
the Civil Code provides that any accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effects of the current belong to the owners of the
estates bordering thereon. Accretions of that character are natural incidents
to land bordering on running streams and are not affected by the registration
laws. It follows that registration does not protect the riparian owner against
diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of
the adjoining stream. Similarly in C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia (109 Phil. 133), it
was ruled that if the land in question has become part of ones estate as a
result of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact
that the accretion to his land used to pertain to another's estate, which is
covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, cannot preclude the former from
being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the
course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the
owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New).
Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams
and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the
Registration Act.
6. No damages recoverable from Ladridos As the Ladridos are the
owners of the premises in question, no damages are recoverable from them.

Reynante v. CA
Facts: More than 50 years ago, Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the
late
Don Cosme Carlos, over a fishpond located at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan with an area of 188.711 sq. m. (TCT 25618, Land Registry of
Bulacan). During the tenancy, Reynante constructed a nipa hut where he and
his family lived and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan) he had planted on
lots 1 and 2 covering an area of 5,096 sq. m. and 6,011 sq. m. respectively.
These lots are located between the fishpond covered by TCT 25618 and the
Liputan (formerly Meycauayan) River. Reynante harvested and sold said nipa
palms without interference and prohibition from anybody. Neither did the
late Don Cosme Carlos question his right to plant the nipa palms near the
fishpond or to harvest and appropriate them as his own. After the death of
Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs entered into a written agreement denominated
as Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagsasauli ng Karapatan dated 29 November
1984 with Reynante whereby the latter for and in consideration of the sum
of P200,000 turned over the fishpond he was tenanting to the heirs of Don
Cosme Carlos and surrendered all his rights therein as caretaker or
"bantaykasama
at tagapamahala. Pursuant to the said written agreement, Reynante
surrendered the fishpond and the 2 huts located therein to the heirs of Don
Cosme Carlos. The heirs of Leoncio and Dolores Carlos, and the heirs of
Gorgonio and Concepcion Carlos thereafter leased the said fishpond to one
Carlos de la Cruz. Reynante continued to live in the nipa hut constructed by
him on lots 1 and 2 and to take care of the nipa palms he had planted
therein. On 17 February 1988, the heirs formally demanded that Reynante
vacate said portion since the latter had already been indemnified for the
surrender of his rights as a tenant. Despite receipt thereof, Reynante refused
and failed to relinquish possession of lots 1 and 2.
On 22 April 1988, the heirs filed a complaint for forcible entry with
preliminary mandatory injunction against Reynante with the MTC
Meycauayan Bulacan (Branch 1, 3rd Judicial Region, Civil Case 1526)
alleging that the latter by means of strategy and stealth, took over the
physical, actual and material possession of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of
the kubos or huts bordering the Liputan River and cutting off and/or
disposing of the sasa or nipa palms adjacent thereto. On 10 January 1989,
the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint and finding that
Reynante had been in prior possession of lots 1 and 2.
The heirs appealed to the RTC Malolos Bulacan (Branch 8, 3rd Judicial
Region) and on 8 August 1989 it rendered its decision in favor of the heirs,
and reversed the decision of the lower court. The Court ordered Reynante to
restore possession of the piece of land, together with the sasa or nipa palms
planted theron; without pronouncement as to attorney's fees, and each party
bearing their respective costs of the suit.
From said decision, Reynante filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
review. On 28 February 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision

(CA-GR 19171), affirming the decision of the lower court in toto, and thus
denied the petition seeking to issue a restraining order. On 5 November
1990, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
Reynante. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 28 February 1990 and reinstated the decision of the MTC
Meycauayan, Bulacan (Branch I).
1. Action for forcible entry An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting
process and actual title of the property is never determined. A party who can
prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in
his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on
the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria (German Management &
Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76216, September 14, 1989, 177
SCRA 495, 498, 499). On the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior
physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer
even if he should be the owner of the property (Lizo v. Carandang, 73 Phil.
469 [1942]). In the present case, the Court of Appeals could not legally
restore the heirs' possession over lots 1 and 2 simply because Reynante has
clearly proven that he had prior possession over lots 1 and 2.
2. Reynante in prior possession Reynante was in possession of the
questioned lots for more than 50 years. He was the caretaker of the fishpond
owned by the late Don Cosme Carlos for more than 50 years and that he
constructed a nipa hut adjacent to the fishpond and planted nipa palms
therein. This fact is bolstered by the "Sinumpaang Salaysay " executed by
Epifanio Lucero, Apolonio D. Morte, and Carling Dumalay, all of whom are
disinterested parties with no motive to falsify that can be attributed to them,
except their desire to tell the truth. Moreover, an occular inspection was
conducted by the trial court dated 2 December 1988 which was attended by
the parties and their respective counsels. The court observed that the
controversial premises is beyond the titled property of the plaintiffs but
situated along the Liputan, Meycauayan River it being a part of the public
domain. On the other hand, the heirs based their claim of possession over
lots 1 and 2 simply on the written agreement signed by petitioner whereby
the latter surrendered his rights over the fishpond. There is nothing,
however, on the document that the tenant was giving other matters not
mentioned in the document. Neither was there any mention of the hut and
nipa palms for such to be included in the subsequent least to de la Cruz, a a
circumstance that gives the impression that said hut and palms do not
belong to the heirs.
3. Disputed lands not included in TCT 25618 The disputed lots involved
in the present case are not included in TCT 25618 as per verification made
by the Forest Management Bureau, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. That tract of land situated at Barrio Liputan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan containing an area of 1.1107 hectares as described in

the plan prepared and surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Restituto Buan for
Reynante falls within Alienable and Disposable Land (for fishpond
development) under Project 15 per B.F.L.C. Map 3122 dated 8 May 1987.
4. Requisites of accretion Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the
following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water;
and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a
river (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-61647, October 12, 1984,
132 SCRA 514, cited in Agustin v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos.
66075-76, July 5, 1990, 187 SCRA 218).
5. Accretion does not automatically become registered land Granting
without conceding that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation and
while it is true that accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually
receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owner of
the banks (Article 457), such accretion to registered land does not preclude
acquisition of the additional area by another person through prescription. In
Ignacio Grande, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. (GR L-17652, 30 June
1962, 115 Phil. 521) it was held that "an accretion does not automatically
become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is
covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing;
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another.
Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided
in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and
Cadastral Act does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and,
thereafter, protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection,
the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws, wherein
certain judicial procedures have been provided." In the present case,
assuming that the heirs had acquired the alluvial deposit (the lot in question),
by accretion, still their failure to register said accretion for a period of 50
years subjected said accretion to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.

Ronquillo v. CA
Facts: Rosendo del Rosario was a registered owner of a parcel of land
known as Lot 34, Block 9, Sulucan Subdivision, situated at Sampaloc, Manila
and covered by TCT 34797 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. Florencia
and Amparo del Rosario were daughters of said Rosendo del Rosario.
Adjoining said lot is a dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub occupied
by Mario C. Ronquillo since 1945. Both del Rosario and Ronquillo have filed
with the Bureau of Lands miscellaneous sales application for the purchase of
the abandoned river bed known as Estero Calubcub and their sales
applications, dated 5 August 1958 and 13 October 1959, respectively, are still
pending action before the Bureau of Lands. Del Rosario claims that long
before 1930, when TCT 34797 over Lot 34 was issued in the name of
Rosendo del Rosario, the latter had been in possession of said lot including
the adjoining dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub, having bought
the same from Arsenio Arzaga. Sometime in 1935, said titled lot was
occupied by Isabel Roldan with the tolerance and consent of del Rosario on
condition that the former will make improvements on the adjoining dried-up
portion of the Estero Calubcub. In the early part of 1945 defendant
occupied the eastern portion of said titled lot as well as the dried-up portion
of the old Estero Calubcub which abuts del Rosario's titled lot. After a
relocation survey of the land in question sometime in 1960, del Rosario
learned that Ronquillo was occupying a portion of their land and thus
demanded Ronquillo to vacate said land when the latter refused to pay the
reasonable rent for its occupancy. However, despite said demand Ronquillo
refused to vacate. On the other hand, Ronquillo claims that sometime before
1945 he was living with his sister who was then residing or renting Del
Rosario's titled lot. In 1945 he built his house on the disputed dried-up
portion of the Estero Calubcub with a small portion thereof on the titled lot
of del Rosario. Later in 1961, said house was destroyed by a fire which
prompted him to rebuild the same but, this time it was built only on the
dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub without touching any part of
del Rosarios titled land. He further claims that said dried-up portion is a
land of public domain.
Rosendo, Amparo and Florencia del Rosario lodged a complaint with the
CFI Manila praying, among others, that they be declared the rightful owners
of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub. Ronquillo filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case since the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub is public land
and, thus, subject to the disposition of the Director of Lands. The Del
Rosarios opposed the motion arguing that since they are claiming title to the
dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub as riparian owners, the trial court has
jurisdiction. The resolution of the motion to dismiss was deferred until after
trial on the merits. On 26 December 1962, the trial court rendered judgment
ordering Ronquillo to deliver to del Rosario the portion of the land covered
by TCT 34797 which is occupied by him and to pay for the use and
occupation of said portion of land at the rate of P5 a month from the date of

the filing of the complaint until such time as he surrenders the same to del
Rosario and declaring Del Rosario to be the owners of the dried-up portion
of estero Calubcub which is abutting del Rosario' property; with costs
against Ronquillo.
On appeal (CA-GR 32479-R), the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court on 25 September 1975 and declared that since Estero
Calubcub had already dried-up way back in 1930 due to the natural change
in
the course of the waters, under Article 370 of the old Civil Code which it
considers applicable to the present case, the abandoned river bed belongs to
the Del Rosarios as riparian owners. Consequently, respondent court opines,
the dried-up river bed is private land and does not form part of the land of
the public domain. It stated further that even assuming for the sake of
argument that said estero did not change its course but merely dried up or
disappeared, said dried-up estero would still belong to the riparian owner,
citing its ruling in the case of Pinzon vs. Rama. Upon motion of Ronquillo,
respondent court modified its decision on 28 January 1976 by setting aside
the first portion of the trial court's decision ordering Ronquillo to surrender
to the Del Rosarios that portion of land covered by TCT 34797 occupied by
the former, based on the former's representation that he had already vacated
the same prior to the commencement of this case. However, the appellate
court upheld its declaration that the Del Rosarios are the rightful owners of
the dried-up river bed. Hence, the petition for review.
On 17 May 1976, the Supreme Court issued a resolution requiring the
Solicitor General to comment on the petition in behalf of the Director of
Lands as an indispensable party in representation of the Republic of the
Philippines, and who, not having been impleaded, was subsequently
considered impleaded as such in the Courts resolution of 10 September
1976.
In his Motion to Admit Comment, the Solicitor General manifested that
pursuant to a request made by this office with the Bureau of Lands to
conduct an investigation, the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau sent
a communication informing him that the records of his office do not show
that Mario Ronquillo, Rosendo del Rosario, Amparo del Rosario or
Florencia del Rosario has filed any public land application covering parcels
of land situated at Estero Calubcub, Manila as verified by its Records
Division. The position taken by the Director of Lands (in his comment on 3
September 1978, in the 4 May 1989 reply, and 17 August 1989 comment)
explicates that Article 370 of the old Code does not apply as the abandoned
riverbed as such was abandoned not by the natural change in the course of
the river but by the drying up of the bed caused by human activity. The
Director of Lands also added that the del Rosario and Ronquillo have
claimed pending sales applications over the dried portion of the estero
(admitting thus that it is public land under the authority of the Bureau of
Lands), which were rejected as the Manila City Engineers Office needed the
dried portion of the estero for drainage purposes. On 29 June 1979,

Florencia del Rosario manifested to this Court that Rosendo, Amparo and
Casiano del Rosario have all died, and that she is the only one still alive
among the private respondents in the case. In a resolution dated 20 January
1988, the Court required Ronquillo to implead one Benjamin Diaz pursuant
to the former's manifestation that the land adjacent to the dried-up river bed
has already been sold to the latter, and the Solicitor General was also
required to inquire into the status of the investigation being conducted by
the Bureau of Lands. In compliance therewith, the Solicitor General
presented a letter from the Director of Lands to the effect that neither of the
parties involved in the present case has filed any public land application. On
3 April 1989, Ronquillo filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari, this time
impleading the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which
subsequently bought the property adjacent to the dried-up river bed from
Benjamin Diaz. In its resolution dated 10 January 1990, the Court ordered
that DBP be impleaded as a party respondent. On 13 September 1990, DBP
filed a Manifestation/ Compliance stating that DBP's interest over TCT
139215 issued in its name (formerly TCT 34797 of the Del Rosarios and
TCT 135170 of Benjamin Diaz) has been transferred to Spouses Victoriano
and Pacita A. Tolentino pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated 11 September
1990.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the remaining effective portion
of the appealed decision which declares Del Rosario as riparian owner of the
dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub.
1. Findings of appellate court conclusive to the Supreme Court;
Exceptions The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it
from the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is limited to the review of errors of law, and that said
appellate court's finding of fact is conclusive upon this Court. However,
there are certain exceptions, such as (1) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; (3) when there
is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the
judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings
of fact are conflicting; and (6) when the Court of Appeals in making its
findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee.
2. Evidence reveal change in the course of river not caused by natural
forces A careful perusal of the evidence presented by both parties in the
case at bar will reveal that the change in the course of Estero Calubcub was
caused, not by natural forces, but due to the dumping of garbage therein by
the people of the surrounding neighborhood. There is nothing in the
testimony of lone witness Florencia del Rosario nor in said relocation plan
which would indicate that the change in the course of the estero was due to
the ebb and flow of the waters. On the contrary, the testimony of the
witness belies such fact, while the relocation plan is absolutely silent on the
matter. The inescapable conclusion is that the dried-up portion of Estero

Calubcub was occasioned, not by a natural change in the course of the

waters, but through the active intervention of man.
3. Article 370 of the old Civil Code applies only to natural change in
the course of the waters; Law clear, no room for interpretation Article
370 of the old Civil Code which provides that "the beds of rivers, which are
abandoned because of a natural change in the course of the waters, belong
to
the owners of the riparian lands throughout the respective length of each. If
the abandoned bed divided tenements belonging to different owners the new
dividing line shall be equidistant from one and the other." The law is clear
and unambiguous; and leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies
only if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on
alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions 23 nor to
accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage
systems.
Considering the finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was
actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370
does not apply to the present case and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be
entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
4. Dried up portion of Estero Calubcub belongs to public domain;
Land used for drainage purposes cannot be subject of a miscellaneous
sales application The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be
considered as forming part of the land of the public domain which cannot
be subject to acquisition by private ownership. This is made more evident in
the letter, dated 28 April 1989, of the Chief of the Legal Division of the
Bureau of Lands, stating that the alleged application filed by Ronquillo no
longer exists in its records as it must have already been disposed of as a
rejected application for the reason that other applications covering Estero
Calubcub, Sampaloc, Manila for areas other than that contested in the
presented case, were all rejected by the office because of the objection
interposed by the City Engineer's office that they need the same land for
drainage purposes. Since the land is to be used for drainage purposes the
same cannot be the subject of a miscellaneous sales application.
5. Del Rosario and Ronquillo estopped from claiming land is not
public land The fact that Ronquillo and del Rosario filed their sales
applications with the Bureau of Lands covering the subject dried-up portion
of Estero Calubcub cannot but be deemed as outright admissions by them
that the same is public land. They are now estopped from claiming
otherwise.

Vda. De Nazareno vs Court of Appeals

Facts: A parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City is
said to have been formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up
Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river. Sometime in
1979, Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their
houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners predecessor-ininterest. In the latter part of 1982, Salasalan and Rabaya allegedly stopped
paying rentals. As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for
ejectment with the MTC Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. A decision was
rendered against Salasalan and Rabaya, which decision was affirmed by the
RTC Misamis Oriental, Branch 20. The case was remanded to the Municipal
trial court for execution of judgment after the same became final and
executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of judgment before
the RTC Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 and subsequently, a case for certiorari
for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC of
Misamis Oriental, Branch 25; both of which were dismissed. The decision of
the lower court was finally enforced with the private respondents being
ejected from portions of the subject lots they occupied.Before he died,
Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey
plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title
over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved survey
plan could be released to the applicant, it was protested by private
respondents before the Bureau of Lands. The report of the Land Investigator,
made in compliance with the order of the District Land Officer, recommended
the Survey Plan MSI-10-06-000571-D (Lot 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of
Antonio Nazareno be cancelled and that private respondents be directed to
file appropriate public application. Based on the report, the Regional Director
of the Bureau of Lands rendered a decision ordering an amendment to the
survey plain of Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the
private respondents. Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with
the Undersecretary of Natural Resources and OIC of the Bureau of Lands;
which was denied.The petitioners, Desamparada vda. De Nazareno and
Leticia Tapia Nazero filed a case before the RTC, for the annulment of the
verification, report and recommendation, decision and order of the Bureau of
Lands regarding the parcel of land. The RTC dismissed the complaint for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, resulting to the finality of the
administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint. Hence,
the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the subject land is public land.
Held: Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion
to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which provides:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
In the case of Meneses v. CA, this Court held that accretion, as a mode of

acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence
of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river
(or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion
which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the
current of waters.
The application of the rules on alluvion cannot be made in the present case
as the first and second requirements of the rules were not met. Thus, the
Nazarenos cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner. By their own
admission, the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and
other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan
River bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the
accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual
and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of Manila, this
Court held that the word current indicates the participation of the body of
water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners
submission not having met the first and second requirements of the rules on
alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.
Petitioners are estopped from denying the public character of the subject
land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio
Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application MSA (G-6) 571. The
mere filing of said Application constituted an admission that the land being
applied for was public land, having been the subject of Survey Plan MSI-1006-000571-D which was conducted as a consequence of Antonio Nazarenos
Miscellaneous Sales Application wherein said land was described as an
orchard. Said description by Antonio Nazareno was controverted by the
findings of the ocular inspection that said land actually covers a dry portion of
Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River.
In Republic v. CA, it was ruled that the requirement that the deposit should
due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes
from Article 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention.
Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in
Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not formed solely by
the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is
also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was
deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain. In
the present case, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of
sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations.
As the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio Nazarenos labor
consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land, the same would still
be part of the public domain.