Totality Rule

PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and ALEXANDER BUNCAN, petitioners, vs.

STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and MARTINA GICALE, respondents.
G.R. No. 140746. March 16, 2005.*
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA.
FACTS:
Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his mother Martina Gicale,
respondent herein. It was then raining. While driving north bound along the National
Highway in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, a passenger bus, owned by Pantranco North Express, Inc.,
petitioner, driven by Alexander Buncan, also a petitioner, was trailing behind. When the two
vehicles were negotiating a curve along the highway, the passenger bus overtook the
jeepney. In so doing, the passenger bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.
Crispin reported the incident to the Talavera Police Station and respondent Standard
Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard), insurer of the jeepney. The total cost of the repair was
P21,415.00, but respondent Standard paid only P8,000.00. Martina Gicale shouldered the
balance of P13,415.00. Respondents demanded reimbursement from petitioners, but when
the latter refused, respondents file a complaint for sum of money with RTC Manila.
Petitioners claimed that RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the MTC should have
jurisdiction over the case, considering the amounts claimed of the two respondents
individually.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
Yes. The RTC has jurisdiction over the case because the amount to be considered is not the
amount claimed separately by the respondents, but their total amount when combined.
Under the totality rule where there are several claims or causes of action between the
same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall
be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions.Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides: Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action.A party may in one
pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have
against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions: x x x (d) Where the claims in
all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount claimed
shall be the test of jurisdiction. The above provision presupposes that the different causes
of action which are joined accrue in favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same
defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties is involved. The issue of whether respondents
claims shall be lumped together is determined by paragraph (d) of the above provision. This
paragraph embodies the totality rule as exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129
which states, among others, that where there are several claims or causes of action

between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.
Totality Rule
REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS,
IGNACIO BINONGCAL & FERNANDO CALION, respondents.
No. L-66620. September 24, 1986.*
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order of RTC Benguet Province.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Binongcal and Calion with
the RTC. Her first cause of action is against Binongcal for non-payment of PhP 11,643.00
representing the cost of tires which the latter purchased from petitioner. The second cause
of action is against Calion for refusing to pay the amount of PhP 10,212.00 representing the
cost of tires which he purchased on credit from the petitioner.
Binongcal and Calion moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction considering that the amounts they allegedly owe the petitioner falls within the
jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. They further aver that their obligations are separate
and distinct from each other, and therefore, cannot be combined under the totality rule.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality rule is applicable in the case at bar.
HELD:
No. The totality rule is not applicable in the case at bar because the claims against
Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct from one another.
Where two or more plaintiffs sue one defendant in a single complaint or one plaintiff sues
several defendants in a single complaint, based on several causes of action for or against
each, respectively, the totality rule applies only where (a) the causes of action arose from
the same series of transactions; and (b) there is a common question of fact or law among
them.Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more
plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint, as
well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of action against two or more
defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the causes of action in favor of the two or
more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact,
as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3. These requisites were not met in this case.
Moreover, in the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is
subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears
that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents

Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its
jurisdiction.
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC. v. FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC.
FACTS:
Juana Complex and other neighboring subdivisions instituted a complaint on January 20,
1999 for damages who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road. The complaint alleged that
were regular commuters and motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of
Manila and Calamba.
RTC issued TRO ordering Fil-estate for a period of 20 days. RTC then conducted several
hearings to determine the propriety of the issuance. Fil-estate then filed a motion to dismiss
arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed
as a class suit.
Fil-estate filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that JCHA failed to satisfy the
requirements for the issuance of WPI. RTC denied the motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration filed by fil-estate.
On appeal, CA partially granted the petition, granting the writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby annulled and set aside but the portion of the omnibus denying the motion to dismiss
is upheld. CA also ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action as alleged in
the complaint.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit (2) WON a WPI is warranted.
HELD:
(1) The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz
Road, is initially shown to be of common or general interest to many persons. The records
reveal that numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying
their intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly
situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in
closing and excavating the La Paz Road.
(2) In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of violation of
their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use of La Paz Road is disputable
since they have no clear legal right therein.

GOLDEN ARCHES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. ST.FRANCIS SQUAREHOLDINGS,

INC.
FACTS:
Petitioner Golden Arches Development Corporation (petitioner) entered into a lease contract
over a property owned by Prince City Realty, Inc. located at the corner of Julia Vargas Avenue

and Bank Drive, Ortigas Center, Mandaluyong City. The lease contract commenced on June
27, 1991 and was to terminate on February 27, 2008.
On November 2, 2006, however, petitioner informed St. Francis Square Holdings, Inc.
(respondent), successor-in-interest of ASB Holdings, Inc. by which Prince Realty, Inc.
eventually became known, of its intention to discontinue the lease.
Amicable negotiations between the parties having failed, respondent filed on May 4, 2007 an
action for breach of contract and damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaluyong. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action and
improper venue. It claimed that respondent maintained its principal address in Makati as
records of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2007 show. By filing the
complaint in Mandaluyong, petitioner concluded that respondent violated Section 2, Rule 4
of the Rules of Court. Opposing the Motion to Dismiss, respondent claimed that it had closed
down its office in Makati effective December 31, 2005 as it now holds office in Mandaluyong
City of which petitioner is aware.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss and Golden Arches motion for reconsideration, finding that
venue was properly laid down considering that St. Francis Squares Articles of Incorporation
having stated that its principal office is located in Metro Manila, and that the instant case
was filed in Mandaluyong Cty which is part or a place within Metro Manila. CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
(1) WON St. Francis Square violated Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court in filing an action
for breach of contract and damages against Golden Arches in the RTC of Mandaluyong.
HELD:
NO. Respondents complaint, being one for enforcement of contractual provisions and
recovery of damages, is in the nature of a personal action which, under Section 2, Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, shall be filed at the plaintiffs residence. Specifically with respect to a
domestic corporation, it is "in a metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its
principal office is located as stated in the articles of incorporation." The letters of petitioner
itself to respondent indicate the address of respondent to be at St. Francis Square Mall, Julia
Vargas, Ortigas Center, just as the letters of respondent to petitioner before the filing of the
complaint indicate its (respondents) address to be at St. Francis Square Mall, Julia Vargas,
Ortigas Center. Petitioner was thus put on notice that at the respondents filing of the
complaint, the latters business address has been at Mandaluyong.
Although respondents Amended Articles of Incorporation of 2007 indicates that its principal
business address is at "Metro Manila", venue was properly laid in Mandaluyong since that is
where it had actually been "residing" (or holding its principal office) at the time it filed its
complaint. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, quoted earlier, authorizes the plaintiff
(respondent in this case) to make a choice of venue for personal actions whether to file the
complaint in the place where he resides or where defendant resides. Respondents choice
must be respected as "[t]he controlling factor in determining venue for cases is the primary
objective for which said cases are filed." Respondents purpose in filing the complaint in

Mandaluyong where it holds its principal office is obviously for its convenience and for
orderly administration of justice.

United Overseas Bank Phils. v. Rosemoore Mining & Development Corp.

Statement of the Case:

This is a resolution of these two consolidated cases, G.R. Nos. 159669 & 163521,
which though with distinct courts of origin, pertain to issues stemming from the same loan
transaction. Petitioner herein is United Overseas Bank Phils. Respondent herein is
Rosemoore Mining & Development Corporation.

Facts:
Rosemoore Mining & Development Corporation (Rosemoor) in order to secure a credit
facility amounting to 80Million executed a mortgage agreement with United Overseas Bank
Phils. (Bank) which covered 6 parcels of land in Bulacan all registered under Rosemoor and 2
more in Nueva Ecija under the name of a certain Dr. Pascual.

Rosemoor defaulted which caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties. The
bank was the highest bidder in all of the foreclosure proceedings. Hence the filing of the
case by Rosemoor before the Manila RTC and Malolos RTC. (The issue of the case, filing of 2
actions in 2 different courts)

Manila RTC: (Personal Action)

Rosemoor filed an action to receive the remaining proceeds of the loan. However, the
Bank filed a motion to dismiss the case because it contends Rosemoor is violating forum
shopping, having initiated a case in Malolos RTC. However the motion to dismiss was denied,
likewise it was dismissed by the CA holding that there was no forum shopping.

Malolos RTC: (Real Action)

Rosemoors second action, now with Dr. Pascual, was filed in Malolos RTC. They
alleged that the redemption period for the Bulacan properties have not yet expired. The
bank filed a motion to dismiss the case due to violation of forum shopping but the likewise it
was denied by the RTC and CA.
Hence the two petitions were consolidated by the Supreme Court. Hence the case.

Issue:
Did Rosemoor committed forum-shopping in filing the Malolos case during the pendency of
the Manila case?

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Rosemoor, and affirming the ruling of the lower
courts that there was no violation of forum shopping.

The Malolos case was filed for the purpose of restraining the Bank from proceeding with the
consolidation of the titles over the foreclosed Bulacan properties because the loan secured
by the mortgage had not yet become due and demandable. While the right asserted in the
Manila case is to receive the proceeds of the loan, the right sought in the Malolos case is to
restrain the foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to secure a loan that was not yet due.

Moreover, the Malolos case is an action to annul the foreclosure sale that is necessarily an
action affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies. The Manila
case, on the other hand, is a personal action involving as it does the enforcement of a
contract between Rosemoor, whose office is in Quezon City, and the Bank, whose principal
office is in Binondo, Manila. Personal actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendants or any of the
principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

It was subsequent to the filing of the Manila case that Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual saw the
need to secure a writ of injunction because the consolidation of the titles to the mortgaged
properties in favor of the Bank was in the offing. But then, this action can only be
commenced where the properties, or a portion thereof, is located. Otherwise, the petition for
injunction would be dismissed for improper venue. Rosemoor, therefore, was warranted in
filing the Malolos case and cannot in turn be accused of forum-shopping.

Furthermore, the Bank challenges the Malolos RTCs jurisdiction over the action to nullify the
foreclosure sale of the Nueva Ecija properties along with the Bulacan properties. This
question is actually a question of venue and not of jurisdiction, which if improperly laid,
could lead to the dismissal of the case.
The rule on venue of real actions is provided in Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which reads in part:
Section 1. Venue of Real Actions. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
xxx
The venue of the action for the nullification of the foreclosure sale is properly laid with the
Malolos RTC although two of the properties together with the Bulacan properties are situated
in Nueva Ecija. Following the above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court, the venue of real
actions affecting properties found in different provinces is determined by the singularity or
plurality of the transactions involving said parcels of land. Where said parcels are the object
of one and the same transaction, the venue is in the court of any of the provinces wherein a
parcel of land is situated.

Juasing Hardware v. Hon. Mendoza

Statement of the Case:
This is a special civil action for certiorari.
Facts:
Juasing Hardware, a single proprietorship, represented by its general manager Ong, filed a collection for
money suit against Pillar Dolla, alleging in its complaint that despite repeated demands respondent Dolla refused to
pay the purchase price of items, materials and merchandise which she bought from Juasing Hardware.
Pillar Dolla, on the other hand, answered the complaint by questioning the legal personality and the capacity
to sue of Juasing Hardware. Dolla, filed a Motion to Dismiss for Juasing Hardwares lack of capacity to sue.
Respondent Judge Mendoza dismissed the complaint and denied the admission of the amended complaint
by Juasing.
Issues:
Whether or not Juasing Hardware has the capacity to sue?
Whether or not it was right for the respondent Judge to outright dismiss the complaint and deny the
petitioner admission to amend the complaint?
Held:
I.

Juasing Hardware has no capacity to sue.

The Supreme Court held that Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that only natural or
juridical persons or entities are authorized by law to be parties in a civil action.

Since petitioner is not a natural person, it cannot also be considered as a juridical person since Article 44 of
the New Civil Code enumerates what are juridical persons and as single proprietorship, is it not included in the
enumeration.
"Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by
law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which
the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member."

There is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court. The law merely
recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single
individual, and requires the proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits, register the business name,
and pay taxes to the national government. It does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship
nor empower it to file or defend an action in court.
II.

It was not right to dismiss it.

However, the Supreme Court further held that the descriptive words "doing business as `Juasing Hardware'"
may be added in the title of the case, as is customarily done.
Section 4 of Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 4. Formal Amendments. A defect in the designation of the parties may be
summarily corrected at any stage of the action provided no prejudice is caused thereby to
the adverse party."
The defect of the complaint in the instant case is merely formal, not substantial. Substitution of the party
plaintiff would not constitute a change in the identity of the parties. No unfairness or surprise to private respondent
Dolla, defendant in the court a quo, would result by allowing the amendment, the purpose of which is merely to
conform to procedural rules or to correct a technical error.
In the more recent case of Shaffer vs. Palma that "the courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings
to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented and the case
decided on the merits without unnecessary delay." This rule applies with more reason and with greater force when, as
in the case at bar, the amendment sought to be made refers to a mere matter of form and no substantial rights are
prejudiced.

ANITA MANGILA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LORETA GUINA,

respondents.
Doctrine:
A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct
from the personality of the owner of the enterprise.[40] The law merely recognizes the

existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by

a single individual and requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and permits,
register its business name, and pay taxes to the national government.[41] The law does not
vest a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend
an action in court.
Facts:
Petitioner Mangila is an exporter of sea foods, while private respondent Guina is the
president and general manager of Air Swift International which is engaged in freight
forwarding business. Petitioner contracted the private respondent for shipment of
petitioners products (seafood), to Guam (USA). Petitioner agreed to pay private respondent
cash on delivery. On the first shipment, petitioner requested for 7 days within which to pay
private respondents. However, for the next 3 shipments, petitioner failed to pay private
respondent the shipping charges. And despite several demands, petitioner never paid
private respondent. Thus, private respondent filed a civil case before the RTC of Pasay for
collection of sum of money.
However, the summons was not served by the sheriff on petitioner as the latter had
transferred residence to San Fernando, Pampanga. Later on, sheriff found that petitioner had
left the Philippines for Guam. Thus, construing the departure as done with intent to defraud
her creditors, private respondent filed a motion for preliminary attachment. The trial court
granted the request of its sheriff for assistance from their counterpart in RTC Pampanga,
thus, a notice of levy with the order, affidavit and bond was served on petitioners household.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to discharge attachment without submitting herself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, pointing out that she had not been served a copy of the
complaint and summons; hence, the court has not acquired jurisdiction over her person. The
trial court granted the motion to discharge attachment upon filing of petitioners counter
bond; however, the trial court did not rule on the question of jurisdiction and validity of the
writ of preliminary attachment.
On February 9, 1989, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground
of improper venue. Private respondents invoice for the freight forwarding service stipulates
that if court litigation becomes necessary to enforce collection xxx the agreed venue for
such action is Makati, Metro Manila.[13] Private respondent filed an Opposition asserting that
although Makati appears as the stipulated venue, the same was merely an inadvertence by
the printing press whose general manager executed an affidavit[14] admitting such
inadvertence. Moreover, private respondent claimed that petitioner knew that private
respondent was holding office in Pasay City and not in Makati.[15] The lower court, finding
credence in private respondents assertion, denied the Motion to Dismiss and gave petitioner
five days to file her Answer. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this too was
denied.
After trial, the court, in its decision, ordered the petitioner to pay private respondent.
Hence, petitioner filed an appeal before CA, which rendered a decision affirming the decision
of the trial court. CA upheld the validity of the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment
and concluded that the trial court did not commit any reversible error. Hence, petitioner filed
a petition before SC.

Issue:

Whether or not there was improper venue by reason thereof that what was alleged in
the complaint as the residence of the herein petitioner and respondent is the place of
business of their respective businesses being sole proprietorships thus not having a distinct
and separate juridical personality from the owners thereof and cannot sue and be sued upon
in a court of law.
Ruling:
In the instant case, it was established in the lower court that petitioner resides in San
Fernando, Pampanga[35] while private respondent resides in Paranaque City.[36] However,
this case was brought in Pasay City, where the business of private respondent is found. This
would have been permissible had private respondents business been a corporation, just like
the case in Sy v. Tyson Enterprises, Inc. However, as admitted by private respondent in her
Complaint [37] in the lower court, her business is a sole proprietorship, and as such, does
not have a separate juridical personality that could enable it to file a suit in court.[38] In
fact, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships to file a suit in court. A sole
proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
personality of the owner of the enterprise.[40] The law merely recognizes the existence of a
sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single
individual and requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and permits, register its
business name, and pay taxes to the national government.[41] The law does not vest a
separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend an
action in court.[42]
Thus, not being vested with legal personality to file this case, the sole proprietorship
is not the plaintiff in this case but rather Loreta Guina in her personal capacity. In fact, the
complaint in the lower court acknowledges in its caption that the plaintiff and defendant are
Loreta Guina and Anita Mangila, respectively. The title of the petition before us does not
state, and rightly so, Anita Mangila v. Air Swift International, but rather Anita Mangila v.
Loreta Guina. Logically then, it is the residence of private respondent Guina, the proprietor
with the juridical personality, which should be considered as one of the proper venues for
this case.
All these considered, private respondent should have filed this case either in San
Fernando, Pampanga (petitioners residence) or Paranaque (private respondents residence).
Since private respondent (complainant below) filed this case in Pasay, we hold that the case
should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.

BAUTISTA VS. CAUSAPIN Jr.

Doctrine:
THE PROVISION IN THE RULES ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING:
RULE 7, SECTION 5 OF THE RULES OF COURT

Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court which already incorporated Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91,[1][19] as
amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94[2][20] requires the plaintiff or principal party to
execute a certification against forum shopping, to be simultaneously filed with the complaint or initiatory pleading.

Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court prescribes:

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving
the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action
or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULE ON FORUM SHOPPING ON CAVILE CASE:

In Cavile, the Court recognized an exception to the general rule, allowing substantial compliance with the
rule on the execution of a certificate of non-forum shopping:
The rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a
case and the signing by only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on
forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of
substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is because the
requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely
underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded. It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable
circumstances.
We find that the execution by Thomas George Cavile, Sr. in behalf of all the other petitioners of the
certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules. All the petitioners, being
relatives and co-owners of the properties in dispute, share a common interest thereon. They also share a common
defense in the complaint for partition filed by the respondents. Thus, when they filed the instant petition, they filed
it as a collective, raising only one argument to defend their rights over the properties in question. There is sufficient
basis, therefore, for Thomas George Cavile, Sr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners that they have not
filed any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, nor is there other pending action or
claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Moreover, it has been held that the merits of the
substantive aspects of the case may be deemed as special circumstance for the Court to take cognizance of a
petition for review although the certification against forum shopping was executed and signed by only one of the
petitioners.

FACTS:
This is an administrative Complaint filed by Atty. Facundo T. Bautista (Atty. Bautista) against Judge Blas
O. Causapin, Jr. (Judge Causapin) for gross ignorance of the law.

In the Resolution of Motion to Hold Defendants in Default in a partition case, Judge Causapin dismissed
the complaint without prejudice on the ground that plaintiffs Reynaldo Mesina and Nancy Polangco did not sign the
verification and certification on non-forum shopping attached to the complaint, in violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court. He cited the ruling in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, that [w]here there are two or more
plaintiffs or petitioners, a complaint or petition signed by only one of them is defective, unless he was authorized by
his co-parties to represent them and to sign the certification. Judge Causapin observed further that compulsory
parties were not properly named in the complaint, in violation of Rule3, Sections 2, 3, and 7 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, Judge Causapin held in the end that defendants could not be declared in default for not answering a defective
complaint, which in law does not exist.
Atty. Bautista averred that Judge Causapin, in dismissing the complaint exhibited gross ignorance of the
law and utter lack of professional competence. Atty. Bautista disputed the application of and insisted that Cavile v.
Heirs of Clarita Cavile was the more appropriate jurisprudence. In Cavile, the Supreme Court recognized the
execution of the certificate of non-forum shopping by only one of the petitioners, on behalf of all other petitioners
therein, as substantial compliance with the Rules of Court. In addition, Judge Causapin cannot motu proprio dismiss
a case without complying with Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that the dismissal of a case
without prejudice shall be upon motion and hearing. Atty. Bautista denied that there were other compulsory heirs
who were not impleaded in the complaint, and even if there were, the non-inclusion of compulsory parties was not a
valid ground for dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Causapin guilty of gross ignorance of the law?

HELD:
YES. The conclusion of Judge Causapin that Cavile does not apply to this partition case displays his
ignorance of the law and lack of competence. Without notice and hearing, Judge Causapin dismissed the complaint
in the said civil case because of the purported defect in the certificate of non-forum shopping. Thus, plaintiffs were
not afforded the opportunity to explain, justify, and prove that the circumstances in Cavile are also present in their
case.
Before a complaint can be dismissed for lack of a proper certificate of non-forum shopping, notice and
hearing are required. Judge Causapin had the discretion of (1) setting a preliminary hearing specifically on the defect
in the plaintiffs certificate of non-forum shopping; or (2) proceeding with the trial of the case and tackling the issue
in the course thereof. In both instances, parties are given the chance to submit arguments and evidence for or against
the dismissal of the complaint. Judge Causapin neither conducted such a preliminary hearing or trial on the merits
prior to dismissing the case.
Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires
no less. The mistake committed by respondent Judge is not a mere error of judgment that can be brushed aside for
being minor. The disregard of established rule of law which amounts to gross ignorance of the law makes a judge
subject to disciplinary action.

Lack of certification against forum shopping

[G.R. No. 139018. April 11, 2005]

ESTHERLITA CRUZ-AGANA, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE AURORA SANTIAGO-LAGMAN (In her
capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Malolos, Bulacan) and
B. SERRANO ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
Facts
Petitioner, sole heir of one Teodorico Cruz, claiming she is the sole owner of the lot in
question, filed a complaint for annulment of title with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injuction against respondent. Petitioner further claims that the said lot was fraudulently
transferred to respondent. The case was then raffled to the sala of Judge Aurora SantiagoLagman.

Respondent filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim however petitioner moved
to dismiss on the ground of non-compliance of the certificate of non-forum shopping.

In denying the petitioners motion to dismiss, the court reasoned that the
respondents counterclaim is compulsory, therefore excluded for the coverage of Section 5,
Rule 7 of the rules of court which requires the filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping.
Issue
What is the nature of the respondents counterclaim?
Can a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer be dismissed on the ground of a
failure to accompany it with a certificate of non-forum shopping?

Ruling
A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief, which a defending
party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is
necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
plaintiffs complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court,
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the
complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive.
A compulsory counterclaim set up in the answer is not an initiatory or similar pleading.
The initiatory pleading is the plaintiffs complaint. A respondent has no choice but to raise a
compulsory counterclaim the moment the plaintiff files the complaint. Otherwise,

respondent waives the compulsory counterclaim. In short, the compulsory counterclaim is a

reaction or response, mandatory upon pain of waiver, to an initiatory pleading which is the
complaint.
Respondents counterclaim as set up in its answer states:
3. That because of the unwarranted, baseless, and unjustified acts of the plaintiff, herein
defendant has suffered and continue to suffer actual damages in the sum of at
least P400,000,000.00 which the law, equity, and justice require that to be paid by the
plaintiff and further to reimburse the attorneys fees of P2,000,000.00.
It is clear that the counterclaim set up by respondent arises from the filing of
plaintiffs complaint. The counterclaim is so intertwined with the main case that it is
incapable of proceeding independently. A compulsory counterclaim does not require a
certificate of non-forum shopping because a compulsory counterclaim is not an initiatory
pleading. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Jimenez vs. Sorongon, et al.,

FACTS:
Jimenez(Petitioner) is the president of Unlad Shipping and Management Corporation a
local manning agency, while Antzoulatos, Alamil, Gaza and Avgoustis are the respondents
herein and are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services Inc, a local
manning agency. In Aug. 19, 2003, Petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the office of the
prosecutor of Mandaluyong city against the respondents for syndicated and large scale
illegal recruitment. Respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit and
denying the complaint. Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counter affidavit. An
Information for the said crime was filed before the RTC-Mandaluyong.

On Dec. 4, 2004, the prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the information and
respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their comment to the opposition; however, the judge
denied the motion as it found existence of probable cause and issued warrants against the
respondents. Respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause
to defer the enforcement of the warrants or arrest. Petitioner filed his opposition with the
motion to expunge, contending that Alamil being a fugitive from justice had no standing to
seek any relief and that the RTC found probable cause. Respondent filed a motion for
inhibition against Judge Umali for being biased or partial. The said judge voluntarily inhibit
herself and the case was re-raffled to Judge Sorongon.

On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of
probable cause to prosecute the respondents. On April 26, 2006, Alamil moved to expunge
the motion for being prohibited pleading since the motion did not have any conformity from
the city prosecutor. In its May 10, 2006 order, the RTC denied the petitioners motion for

reconsideration, finding that the petitioner merely reiterated arguments in issues that had
been finally decided.

On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioners notice of
appeal since the public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no
civil interest in the case. On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to
expunge, claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right to appeal the RTC order
dismissing the case; the respondents fraudulent acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced
him.

ISSUE:
(1)

WON the Petitioner has the legal personality to assail the dismissal of the case

HELD:
No. It is well settled that the real party in interest is the People of the Philippines and is
represented by the prosecutors. All criminal actions commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In
appeals of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals and before this Court, the Office of the
Solicitor General is the appellate counsel of the People; The People is the real party in
interest in a criminal case and only the Office of the Solicitor General can represent the
People in criminal proceedings pending in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court.

(2)
RTC?

WON Alamil is a fugitive justice and therefore has no right to seek any relief from the

HELD:
NO. Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTCs jurisdiction.

As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary
appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case,
respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is
not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.

Declaration in Default
ROBERTO OTERO, petitioner, vs. ROGER TAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 200134.August 15, 2012.*
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA.

FACTS:
Tan filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Otero for his failure and refusal
to pay, despite several demands, the amount of PhP 270,818.01 representing the aggregate
amount of petroleum products which he purchased on credit from Tan.
Despite receipt of the summons and a copy of said complaint, Otero filed to file his answer
with the MTCC. Because of this, Tan filed a motion with the MTCC to declare Otero in default.
However, Otero opposed this, claiming that he was not able to receive the summons and the
copy of the complaint. The hearing was the rescheduled but when Otero failed to appear, he
was declared in default and Tan was allowed to present his evidence ex parte.
The MTCC ruled in favor of Tan and Otero was ordered to pay his obligations to Tan. Otero
appealed to the RTC on the ground that the decision of the MTCC was baseless and that he
was deprived of due process. RTC upheld the decision of the MTCC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTCCs declaration of Otero in default cause him the deprivation of due
process.
HELD:
No. MTCCs declaration of Otero in default did not deprive him of due process.

Based on by Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a defendant who fails to file an
answer may, upon motion, be declared by the court in default. Loss of standing in court, the
forfeiture of ones right as a party litigant, contestant or legal adversary, is the consequence
of an order of default. A party in default loses his right to present his defense, control the
proceedings, and examine or cross-examine witnesses. He has no right to expect that his
pleadings would be acted upon by the court nor may be object to or refute evidence or
motions filed against him. However, a defendant who was declared in default may
nevertheless appeal from the judgment by default, albeit on limited grounds.
It was also emphasized by the Court that adefendant who has been declared in default is
precluded from raising any other ground in his appeal from the judgment by default since,
otherwise, he would then be allowed to adduce evidence in his defense, which right he had
lost after he was declared in default.

Kilosbayan Foundation v. Janolo

Facts:
On July 9, 2007, private respondent Gregory Ong (Ong), following the promulgation of the
Courts Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita filed a petition under Rule 108 of the
Rules Court for the amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation of the entry on
citizenship in his Certificate of Birth, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 11767-SJ and raffled to
Branch 264 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City over which public respondent
Leoncio Janolo, Jr. presided. Via the present recourse of certiorari and prohibition,
petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation assail four Orders and
the Decision emanating from the proceedings in the RTC case.
As Ongs petition was set for hearing by the RTC on August 7, 14, 21 and 28,
2007, petitioners-therein oppositors filed on August 6, 2007 a motion for voluntary
inhibition, which the RTC denied by Order of August 7, 2007, a day after it was filed and prior
to the hearing on the motion. Despite the pendency of petitioners motion for
reconsideration, the RTC proceeded to hear Ongs petition on August 14 and 21, 2007. It was
only by Order of September 17, 2007 that the motion for reconsideration was resolved, a
copy of which was received by petitioners on October 4, 2007.
Meanwhile, by Order of August 21, 2007, the RTC declared petitioners in default. Petitioners
motion to vacate the order of default was likewise denied by Order of October 4, 2007, a
copy of which was received by petitioners on October 17, 2007. Subsequently, the RTC
granted Ongs petition and recognized him as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
by Decision of October 24, 2007.
Issue:
WON the RTCs declaration of default correct?
Ruling:

The question on the propriety of the remedy availed of by petitioners is resolved in Cerezo v.
Tuazon, where the Court discussed the various remedies available to a party declared in
default, including a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default if the
trial court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly declared a
party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration. A party declared in
default may thus alternatively file a petition for certiorari assailing both the order of default
and the judgment of default. On the choice of remedy, the Court finds petitioners recourse
procedurally allowable. The same, however, cannot be said as to the choice of court forum.
The hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for appeals
and petitions for extraordinary writs. The rule on hierarchy of courts is not absolute, and the
Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly with it. A
direct invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction may be allowed where there are special
and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
Petitioners further complain that public respondent proceeded to hear the case and declared
them in default without first resolving their pending motion. Records show that petitioners
filed on August 13, 2007 an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the August 7, 2007 Order
and for deferment of the hearings set on August 14, 21 and 28, 2007. Petitioners, thereafter,
did not appear in the various settings, they alleging that the question of voluntary inhibition,
which they deem to be an overriding consideration partaking of a highly prejudicial matter,
had yet to be resolved by the trial court.
While there is no specific rule providing for a definite period of time within which to resolve a
motion for reconsideration of an order denying inhibition, judges must endeavor to act
promptly on it within the mandatory 90-day period so as not to interrupt the course of trial.
Petitioners thereafter filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Vacate the August 21, 2007
Order, insisting that the Omnibus Motion presented a prejudicial issue that should have been
resolved first before the trial court proceeded with the case. Notably, in both the Motion to
Vacate Order and the Memorandum and/or Submission, petitioners relied only on this ground
and impliedly waived other defenses or grounds for the lifting of the default order.
For a motion to lift an order of default to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) it
must be made by motion under oath by one who has knowledge of the facts; (2) it must be
shown that the failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence; and (3) there must be a proper showing of the existence of meritorious defense.
As the trial court observed, the motion to vacate or set aside the order of default
failed to comply with paragraph (b), Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, it noting, inter
alia, that the motion was not under oath, it failed to explain or justify why movants have not
filed any opposition to the petition, and it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit.
Indeed, a trial court has no authority to consider a motion to lift the order of default
where such motion was not made under oath. Moreover, a motion to lift an order of default
must allege with particularity the facts constituting the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect which caused the failure to answer.