Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 108494 September 20, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SAMUEL MARRA y ZARATE, ALLAN TAN, alias "Allan Yao,"
PETER DOE, PAUL DOE and TOM DOE, accused.
SAMUEL MARRA y ZARATE, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City, Samuel Marra y
Zarate, John Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe and Tom Doe were charged with the crime of murder for the
fatal shooting of one Nelson Tandoc on March 7, 1992. 1 On June 4, 1992, an amended information
was filed wherein Allan Tan, alias "Allan Yao," was indicated as an accused instead of John Doe. 2 A
warrant of arrest was thereafter issued against Allan Tan 3 but the same was returned unserved, 4 hence
trial proceeded with regard to herein accused-appellant Samuel Marra alone.
Duly assisted by counsel, appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on May 15, 1992. 5 After trial
on the merits, judgment was rendered by the court below on October 8, 1992 finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, attended by the aggravating circumstance of nighttime,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was further ordered to pay the heirs of
Nelson Tandoc the sums of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P50,000.00 as actual damages,
P100,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs. 6
The prosecution's eyewitness, Jimmy Din, positively identified appellant as the triggerman in the
killing of Nelson Tandoc. Din recounted that at around 2:00 A.M. on March 7, 1992, he and his
friend, Nelson Tandoc, were conversing with each other in front of Lucky Hotel located at M.H. del
Pilar Street, Dagupan City, which was owned by the witness' father and of which he was the
administrator. He noticed a man pass by on the opposite side of the street. The man made a dirty
sign with his finger and Din informed Tandoc thereof. The man repeated his offensive act and called
them by waving his hands. Infuriated, they followed the man until the latter stopped in front of the
Dunkin' Donuts store at the corner of Arellano and Fernandez streets. They demanded an
explanation from the man but they were not given any. 7
At that instant, two men arrived and one of them inquired what was going on. Tandoc informed him
that they were just demanding an explanation from the man. Din was surprised when Tandoc

unexpectedly slapped one of the two men. A brawl ensued, with Tandoc clashing with the two men
while Din exchanged blows with the man who made the dirty finger sign. After the fisticuffs, their
three opponents ran away in a westward direction. 8
Tandoc and Din then decided to walk back to the hotel. When they were about to enter the place,
they noticed that the men with whom they just had a fight were running towards them. Sensing
danger, they ran inside the annex building of the hotel and immediately secured the lock of the
sliding outer door. They entered a room and waited until they felt that the situation had normalized.
After ten to fifteen minutes, thinking that the men were no longer in the vicinity, they left the room.
Having decided to go home, Tandoc opened the sliding door. All of a sudden, Din saw Appellant,
who at that time was wearing a security guard's uniform, shoot Tandoc with a revolver. There was a
fluorescent bulb installed at the front of the hotel which enabled Din to identify the assailant. Tandoc
was shot in the middle of the chest and he fell down. Then, Din saw four to five men scamper away
from the scene. 9
Aware of his injury, Tandoc told Din, "Tol, I was shot." The latter tried to chase appellant and his
companions but he failed to catch up with them. Din and his wife then brought Tandoc to the Villaflor
Hospital. The victim was taken to the emergency room but he expired an hour later. 10
At about 3:45 A.M. of March 7, 1992, SPO3 Reynaldo de Vera of the Dagupan City Police Station
received a report about a shooting incident at the annex building of the Lucky Hotel. He proceeded
to the crime scene along with SPO4 Orlando Garcia, SPO3 Mauricio Flores and SPO3 Noli de
Castro. Upon their arrival about five minutes later, they were informed by the wife of Jimmy Din that
the victim had been brought to the Villaflor Hospital. They proceeded to the hospital where Din
informed them that he could recognize the man who killed Tandoc and that the killer was, at that
time, wearing the polo shirt of a security guard's uniform. 11
They decided to proceed to an eatery called "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw." Seeing the security guard of a
nearby bus company, they inquired from him if he knew of any unusual incident that happened in the
vicinity. The guard said that he saw the guard of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," together with some
companions, chasing two persons running towards M. H. del Pilar Street. He further added that the
man was wearing a polo shirt of a security guard's uniform. Asked where that particular guard might
be, he pointed to a man eating inside the eatery nearby. The man eating was not in a security
guard's uniform. 12
They approached the man and inquired whether he was the security guard of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw,"
which the latter answered in the affirmative. After a series of questions, they learned that he was
Samuel Marra, that his tour of duty was from 7:00 P.M. of a preceding day to 6:00 A.M. the following
day, that he was still on duty at around 2:30 in the morning of March 7, 1992, and that the firearm
issued to him was in his house. Upon their request to see the firearm, they proceeded to Marra's
residence at Interior Nueva Street. 13
When they arrived, Marra took a .38 caliber revolver from inside an aparador and handed it to De
Vera. De Vera also found five live bullets and one spent shell. Smelling gunpowder from the barrel of
the gun, De Vera asked Marra when he last fired the gun but the latter denied ever having done so.
Abruptly, De Vera asked him point-blank why he shot Tandoc. Marra at first denied the accusation
but when informed that someone saw him do it, he said that he did so in self-defense, firing at the
victim only once. Tandoc allegedly had a samurai sword with him at the time of the incident.
However, persistent efforts on the part of the policemen to thereafter locate said bladed weapon
proved futile. Marra also admitted that prior to the incident, he chased the victim and Din. The
officers then took Marra to the police station where he was detained. 14

Meanwhile, De Vera went to Villaflor Hospital from where he fetched Din and brought him to the
police station. There, Din definitely identified Marra as the assailant. During the investigation, De
Vera also found out that Marra had not firearm license. 15
Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer of Dagupan City, testified that he conducted an
autopsy on a certain Nelson Tandoc. He found a gunshot wound on the victim with the point of entry
of the left side of the anterior chest wall and the point of exit at the lower left portion of the right
shoulder. 16
Prosecutor Gregorio Gaerlan, stepfather of the victim, testified on the funeral, burial and other
expenses incurred by the family. He declared that they paid Funeraria Quiogue P25,000.00 for its
services; Villaflor Hospital, P2,875.00 for the confinement of Tandoc; St. John Memorial Cathedral,
P350.00; Eternal Garden, P3,000.00 for the interment fee and P150.00 for the rent of the tent during
the burial; and that they spent P2,300.00 for the video tape expenses and P11,800.00 for food and
drinks during the wake. 17
Understandably, appellant gave a different version of the incident. Marra declared in court that he
used to work as a security guard at "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw" from seven o'clock in the evening to six
o'clock in the morning of the following day. On March 6, 1992, he reported for duty at seven o'clock
that evening as was his usual practice. At around four o'clock down of the following day, he went
home to change his clothes. He proceeded to the Five Star Bus Terminal which was adjacent to
"Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw." He saw Neneng, the cashier of said eatery, and together they orderedarroz
caldo. Later, at about 5:00 A.M., he was approached by four policemen who inquired if he was a
security guard. He answered in the affirmative. He was also asked about his sidearm. When he
answered that it was at his residence, they all went to his house to look for it. After he handed over
the firearm to the policemen, he was brought to the city hall where he was detained. 18
Under cross-examination, he insisted that when he handed the gun to the policeman, there were five
live bullets, and not four live bullets and one empty shell as claimed by the prosecution. Prior to the
incident, he had never met Jimmy Din nor does he know of any cause why Din would harbor any ill
feelings against him. 19
After a careful scrutiny of the records and an objective evaluation of the evidence, the Court is not
disposed to reverse the judgment of the lower court, the decision of the latter being amply supported
by the established facts and fully sustained by the applicable law.
In assailing the decision of the court below, the defense argues that "Jimmy Din . . . was not able to
identify the assailant in a definite and believable manner." It goes on to state further that " Jimmy Din
was inside the hotel when Nelson Tandoc was shot and his vision was o(b)structed by the door.
Jimmy Din was also not familiar with the accused. Under the circumstances by which he allegedly
witnessed the shooting, how could be identify clearly an assailant at the distance of 45 meters?" 20
Appellant's counsel is only partly correct, having conveniently failed to mention other vital parts of
Din's testimony. An impartial review of said testimony readily reveals that Din was indeed in a
position to know the identity of the assailant. Firstly, Din knew for a fact that the persons he and
Tandoc fought with near the Dunkin' Donuts store were the same men who chased them while they
were on their way back to the hotel because he was able to take a good look at them. During the
chase, he naturally turned around to look at the men who were running after them and who were at
that time in front of the Balingit Trading store which was well-lighted. 21 It logically follows that they
were the same persons who were waiting for them when they later came out of the hotel, and he was
familiar with their identities because of their previous encounter.

Secondly, we do not agree with appellant that the door blocked the view of Din. Said door, partly
made of plywood, had a spring hinge which makes it possible for the door to close by itself.
However, at that time the spring hinge had been weakened by long and constant use such that it
would take some time for it to close the door, thereby allowing Din sufficient opportunity to have an
unobstructed view of the scene outside. 22
Thirdly, Din was quite near the victim and appellant, which proximity, enabled him to clearly see
what really happened. He thus readily perceived the actual shooting at the time when Tandoc
pushed the door open. At that precise moment, Din was at the left side of Tandoc and about four to
five meters away from the assailant. 23
Lastly, the place was brightly illuminated by a 20-watt fluorescent bulb installed on the outside wall in
front of the hotel. Marra was only about three meters away therefrom. Such physical conditions
would undeniably afford a clear view from inside the hotel of the immediate area outside and in front
of the same where the incident took place.
The prosecution presented another vital witness in the person of Sgt. Reynaldo de Vera, whose
testimony we shall repeat here for easy reference. In capsulized form, De Vera narrated the
sequence of events that happened after he and his companions went to the crime scene to conduct
an investigation. Having received information that a man in a security guard's uniform was involved
in the incident, they sought information from a security guard of a nearby bus terminal. Said security
guard pointed them to Marra, who at that time was eating in a carinderia nearby. Informed by Marra
that his gun was at his residence, they all went to Marra's residence to get the same. After receiving
said firearm, De Vera asked appellant why he killed Tandoc but Marra initially denied any
participation in the killing. Nevertheless, when confronted with the fact that somebody saw him do it,
Marra admitted the act although he alleged it was done in self-defense. This testimony of De Vera as
to the confession of Marra is of significant weight, but the admissibility thereof shall also be passed
upon.
Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(a)ny person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. . . . ." The critical inquiry
then is whether or not Marra was under custodial investigation when he admitted the killing but
invoked self-defense. We believe that he was not so situated.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It
is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process
of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to
operate. 24
In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial investigation when he made the admission.
There was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a statement. Indeed, he could have
refused to answer questions from the very start when the policemen requested that they all go to his
residence. The police inquiry had not yet reached a level wherein they considered him as a
particular suspect. They were just probing into a number of possibilities, having been merely
informed that the suspect was wearing what could be a security guard's uniform. As we held
in People vs. Dy: 25 "What was told by the accused to Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement not
elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner. No written confession was sought to be
presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. 26 The trial Court, therefore, cannot be

held to have erred in holding that compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial investigation
is not applicable in the instant case, . . . ."

Accordingly, the testimony of Sgt. de Vera assumes a dominant dimension because it totally
destroys the defense of denial cum alibi subsequently raised by appellant. In his answers to Sgt. De
Vera, appellant expressly admitted that he shot Tandoc, albeit with an exculpatory explanation. This
admission of Marra is in complete contrast to the statements he later made in open court.
In addition, the law provides that the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein may be given in evidence against
him and, in certain circumstances, this admission may be considered as part of the res gestae. In a
similar situation involved in the aforecited case ofPeople vs. Dy, this Court held:
. . . the oral confession made by the accused to Pat. Padilla that "he had shot a
tourist" and that the gun he had used in shooting the victim was in his bar which he
wanted surrendered to the Chief of Police (t.s.n., October 17, 1984, pp. 6-9) is
competent evidence against him. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged may be given in evidence against him (Sec. 29 [now Sec.
33], Rule 130). It may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae. The rule
is that, any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is
competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood
all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must
be given in substance. (23 C.J.S. 196, cited in People vs. Tawat, G.R. No. 62871,
May 25, 1985, 129 SCRA 431). (Italics supplied.)
In any event, even without his admission, the case against appellant has been duly established by
the other evidence of the prosecution, as earlier discussed. However, persistently arguing for an
acquittal, the defense points out that when the police officers saw Marra, he was not in a blue
uniform whereas Din testified that the person who shot Tandoc was wearing the polo shirt of a
security guard's uniform. This is a puerile argument since appellant himself removed any lingering
doubts on this point. He said that on ending his tour of duty at 4:00 A.M. of March 7, 1992, he
decided to go home to change clothes, after which he went to "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw" to eat. This
explains why, at the time the police officers saw him, he was already in civilian clothes. The shooting
had taken place earlier at around 2:00 A.M. At that time, Marra was still in his security guard's
uniform, being then on duty.
However, while we agree that the crime committed by appellant was murder qualified by treachery,
we reject the finding that the same was aggravated by nighttime. No evidence was presented by the
prosecution to show that nocturnity was specially sought by appellant or taken advantage of by him
to facilitate the commission of the crime or to ensure his immunity from capture. 27 At any rate,
whether or not such aggravating circumstance should be appreciated, the penalty to be imposed on
appellant would not be affected considering the proscription against the imposition of the death penalty at
the time when the offense in the instant case was committed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Samuel Marra y Zarate
guilty of the crime of murder and imposing upon him the penalty and civil liabilities therein stated is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11 th Judicial
Region, Digos, Davao del Sur convicting defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of The crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos sufficiently established
beyond reasonable doubt, of the offense charges , pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 9, in relation to General Order No. 6, dated September 22, 1972, and General
Order No. 7, dated September 23, 1972, in relation further to Presidential Decree No.
885, and considering that the firearm subject of this case was not used in the
circumstances as embraced in paragraph I thereof, applying the provision of
indeterminate sentence law, accused Ruben Burgos is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as minimum
penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum penalty, pursuant to sub-paragraph B, of
Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with accessory penalties, as provided
for by law.
As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this case (Homemade
revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered
confiscated in favor of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Likewise, the subversive documents, leaflets and/or propaganda seized are ordered
disposed of in accordance with law.
The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal possession of firearm in
furtherance of subversion in an information which reads as follows:
That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above- named accused with
intent to possess and without the necessary license, permit or authority issued by the
proper government agencies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
keep, possess, carry and have in his possession, control and custody one (1)
homemade revolver, caliber .38, make Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221,

which firearm was issued to and used by the accused at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, his area of operations by one Alias Commander Pol for the New People's Army
(NPA), a subversive organization organized for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines through lawless and violent means, of
which the accused had knowledge, and which firearm was used by the accused in
the performance of his subversive tasks such as the recruitment of New Members to
the NPA and collection of contributions from the members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of the lower court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, it appears
that by virtue of an intelligent information obtained by the Constabulary and INP
units, stationed at Digos, Davao del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok
personally and voluntarily surre0ndered to the authorities at about 9:00 o'clock A.M.
at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters, stating that he was forcibly
recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the
use of firearm against his life, if he refused.
Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one (1) chopa of rice
and one peso (P1.00) per month, as his contribution to the NPA TSN, page 5,
Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units,
composed of fifteen (15) members, headed by Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC),
on the following day, May 13, 1982, was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to
arrest accused Ruben Burgos. The team left the headquarter at 1:30 P.M., and
arrived at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM where through the help of Pedro
Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to locate accused, who was plowing
his field. (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team and Pat. Bioco
asked accused about his firearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused
denied possession of said firearm but later, upon question profounded by Sgt.
Alejandro Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a place below
their house where a gun was buried in the ground. (TSN, page 8, Hearing-October
14, 1982).
Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and dug the grounds,
after which he recovered the firearm, Caliber .38 revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for
the prosecution.
After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive
documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of qqqcogon at a distance of three
(3) meters apart from his house. Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath said
cogon grass and likewise recovered documents consisting of notebook colored
maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the prosecution; a pamphlet consisting of
eight (8) leaves, including the front and back covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan
ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo, Leninismo

Kaisipang Mao qqqZedong dated December 31, 1980, marked as Exhibit "C", and
another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang Mindanao, March
and April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages, marked as Exhibit "D" for the
prosecution.
Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its recovery, readily
admitted the same as issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a
certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's
Army, responsible in the liquidation of target personalities, opposed to NPA
Ideological movement, an example was the killing of the late Mayor Llanos and
Barangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos, Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16,
Hearing-October 14,1982).
To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a former NPA convert
was presented, who declared that on March 7, 1972, in his former residence at
Tiguman Digos, Davao del Sur, accused Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his
companions Landrino Burgos, Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his house
at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and called him downstair. Thereupon, accused told
Masamlok, their purpose was to ask rice and one (1) peso from him, as his
contribution to their companions, the NPA of which he is now a member. (TSN,
pages 70, 71, 72, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their group otherwise, he
and his family will be killed. He was also warned not to reveal anything with the
government authorities. Because of the threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlok
joined the group. Accused then told him, he should attend a seminar scheduled on
April 19, 1982. Along with this invitation, accused pulled gut from his waistline a .38
caliber revolver which Masamlok really saw, being only about two (2) meters away
from accused, which make him easily Identified said firearm, as that marked as
Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 72, 73, and 74, Hearing-January 4,
1983).
On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied by his father,
Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went to the house of accused and
attended the seminar, Those present in the seminar were: accused Ruben Burgos,
Antonio Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and one alias
Jamper.
The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very distinctly that he is an
NPA together with his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he
encouraged the group to overthrow the government, emphasizing that those who
attended the seminar were already members of the NPA, and if they reveal to the
authorities, they will be killed.
Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and documents, then
finally shouted, the NPA will be victorious. Masamlok likewise Identified the
pamphlets as those marked as Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for the prosecution.
(TSN, pages 75, 76 and 77, Hearing-January 4, 1983)
Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar Gomez, who
likewise expounded their own opinions about the NPA. It was also announced in said

seminar that a certain Tonio Burgos, will be responsible for the collection of the
contribution from the members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing- January 4, 1983)
On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to Captain Bargio of the
Provincial Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove that on May 19,
1982, he administered the subscription of th extra-judicial confession of accused
Ruben Burgos, marked as Exhibit "E " for the prosecution, consisting of five (5)
pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his confession, Fiscal
Lovitos, realizing that accused was not represented by counsel, requested the
services of Atty. Anyog, whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist
accused in the subscription of his extra-judicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from English to
Visayan language, resulting to the deletion of question No. 19 of the document, by an
inserted certification of Atty. Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his having
understood, the allegations of his extra-judicial statement.
Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to him his
constitutional rights to remain silent, right to counsel and right to answer any question
propounded or not.
With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty.
Anyog and Fiscal Lovitos, without the presence of military authorities, who escorted
the accused, but were sent outside the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the
accused. (TSN, pages 36-40, nearing November 15, 1982)
Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the subject firearm, Sgt.
Epifanio Comabig in-charge of firearms and explosives, NCO Headquarter,
Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, was presented and testified, that
among the lists of firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in the name of
accused Ruben Burgos, neither was his name included among the lists of persons
who applied for the licensing of the firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1745.
After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its case and offered its
exhibits, which were all admitted in evidence, despite objection interposed by
counsel for accused, which was accordingly overruled.
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case against him is stated in the decision
as follows:
From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought
him to the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur, and arrived there at about 3:00
o'clock, on the same date. At about 8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was
investigated by soldiers, whom he cannot Identify because they were wearing a
civilian attire. (TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June 15, 1983)

The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was detained with
respect to the subject firearm, which the investigator, wished him to admit but
accused denied its ownership. Because of his refusal accused was mauled, hitting
him on the left and right side of his body which rendered him unconscious. Accused
in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity, crying and with emotional attachment,
described in detail how he was tortured and the ordeals he was subjected.
He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again confronted with subject
firearm, Exhibit "A", for him to admit and when he repeatedly refused to accept as his
own firearm, he was subjected to further prolong (sic) torture and physical agony.
Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black cloth with pungent effect on his
eyes. He was undressed, with only blindfold, pungent water poured in his body and
over his private parts, making his entire body, particularly his penis and testicle,
terribly irritating with pungent pain.
All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The process of beating,
mauling, pain and/or ordeal was repeatedly done in similar cycle, from May 13 and
14, 1982. intercepted only whenever he fell unconscious and again repeated after
recovery of his senses,
Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and physical ordeal he
was seriously warned, if he will still adamantly refuse to accept ownership of the
subject firearm, he will be salvaged, and no longer able to bear any further the pain
and agony, accused admitted ownership of subject firearm.
After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but accused was made to sign
his affidavit marked as Exhibit "E" for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages,
including the certification of the administering officer, (TSN, pages 141-148, HearingJune 15, 1983)
In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him, accused, by way of
explanation and commentary in details, and going one by one, the allegations and/or
contents of his alleged extrajudicial statement, attributed his answers to those
questions involuntarily made only because of fear, threat and intimidation of his
person and family, as a result of unbearable excruciating pain he was subjected by
an investigator, who, unfortunately he cannot Identify and was able to obtain his
admission of the subject firearm, by force and violence exerted over his person.
To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive activities, and also
to support his denial to the truth of his alleged extra-judicial confession, particularly
questions Nos. 35, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, along with qqqs answers to
those questions, involving Honorata Arellano ahas Inday Arellano, said Honorata
Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the above-questions embraced in
the numbers allegedly stated in the extrajudicial confession of accused, involving her
to such NPA personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true because on
the date referred on April 28, 1982, none of the persons mentioned came to her
house for treatment, neither did she meet the accused nor able to talk with him.
(TSN, pages 118- 121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez, and that she was
personally charged with subversion in the Office of the Provincial Commander,
Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, but said charge was dismissed

without reaching the Court. She likewise stated that her son, Rogelio Arellano, was
likewise charged for subversion filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao del
Sur, but was likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122, in relation to her cross-examination, Hearing-May
18, 1983)
To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay Captain of
Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Salvador qqqGalaraga was presented, who
declared, he was not personally aware of any subversive activities of accused, being
his neighbor and member of his barrio. On the contrary, he can personally attest to
his good character and reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio, being a
carpenter and farmer thereat. (TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot of arrests made by
the authorities in his barrio involving subversive activities but they were released and
were not formally charged in Court because they publicly took their oath of allegiance
with the government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation to page 136, Hearing-May 18,
1983)
Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his wife, Urbana Burgos,
was presented and who testified that the subject firearm was left in their house by
Cesar Masamlok and one Pedipol on May 10, 1982. It was night time, when the two
left the gun, alleging that it was not in order, and that they will leave it behind,
temporarily for them to claim it later. They were the ones who buried it. She said, her
husband, the accused, was not in their house at that time and that she did not inform
him about said firearm neither did she report the matter to the authorities, for fear of
the life of her husband. (TSN, page 24, November 22, 1983)
On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the recovery of the firearm,
was wearing a mask, she can still Identify him. (TSN, page 6, Hearing-November 22,
1983)
After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally rested his case in
support of accused's through counsel manifestation for the demurrer to evidence of
the prosecution, or in the alternative for violation merely of simple illegal possession
of firearm, 'under the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4, reflected in the manifestation of counsel for accused. (TSN, pages 113-114,
Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following assignments of error, to wit:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE ARREST OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE HOUSE OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR FIREARM WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE
LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION
TO GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7

Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his house and the subsequent
confiscation of a firearm and documents allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and valid
manner? Does the evidence sustaining the crime charged meet the test of proving guilt beyond
reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of Ruben Burgos
for the purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar Masamlok that the accused
allegedly recruited him to join the New People's Army (NPA), they did not have any warrant of arrest
or search warrant with them (TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61, November 15, 1982).
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy
and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. This Court explained in Villanueva vs.
Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be
also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's
home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293
[19661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is
allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert
itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of
objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such
have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life, (Cf. Schmerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616,
630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and
Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966], could fitly characterize this constitutional
right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no legs than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).
The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without any warrant as falling under one of
the instances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 6 * of the
Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence;

b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that "the
authorities received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable
source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is
lawfully within the ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and applicable
jurisprudence on the matter."
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive
documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Section 12, which
states:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing,
or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also
be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The
location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in
fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation
of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set
back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Section
6(b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that. the information given by Cesar Masamlok
was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact
or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the

commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led
the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for
evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis
of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful, If an arrest without
warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered
afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought
to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a
warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly
committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on
the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused
were unknown,
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who
was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state
truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982).
Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of
arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal.
The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be
deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be
searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda.
de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his
house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil.
770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia V. Locsin (supra)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56
C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."
(Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).
That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at the time of his
arrest is evident from the records:
A CALAMBA:

Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were not
armed with an arrest warrant?
A None Sir.
Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?
A No Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when you
went there?
A But he was twenty meters away from his house.
Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?
A Yes Sir.
Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?
A Yes Sir.
Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?
A No Sir.
Q What did you tell him?
A That we received information that you have a firearm, you
surrender that firearm, first he denied but when Sgt. Buncalan
interviewed his wife, his wife told him that it is buried, I dug the
firearm which was wrapped with a cellophane.
Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his rights
under the constitution considering that he was purposely under
arrest?
A I did not.
Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?
A Yes Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?
A It was buried down in his horse.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was buried?
A Yes Sir.

(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)

Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in
violation of the accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows
that they are inadmissible as evidence.
There is another aspect of this case.
In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, the prosecution
presented the two arresting officers who testified that the accused readily admitted ownership of the
gun after qqqs wife pointed to the place where it was buried. The officers stated that it was the
accused himself who voluntarily pointed to the place where the alleged subversive documents were
hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his
constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership
of the gun and pointed to the location of the subversive documents after questioning, the admissions
were obtained in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV
of the Bill of Rights winch provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.. . .
The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in
evidence. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions made by the
appellant cannot be used against him.
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as inadmissible in
evidence. The court stated that the appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical terror,
violence, and third degree measures may not have been supported by reliable evidence but the
failure to present the investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the "provocative
presumption" that indeed torture and physical violence may have been committed as stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the
custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty.
Anyog, to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office
was too late. It could have no palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of
the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.
With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents inadmissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge of Illegal
Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Subversion is the testimony of Cesar Masamlok.
We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. It is true
that the trial court found Masamlok's testimony credible and convincing. However, we are not
necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated
in People vs.. Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):
xxx xxx xxx

. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to question of credibility the
findings of the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious
reason th+at it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the
witnesses during the trial. But we have also said that this rule is not absolute for
otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must reject
the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and
substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court.
The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous to that found in People vs.
Capadocia (17 SCRA 98 1):
. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony, and the issue hinges
on how much credence can be accorded to him. The first consideration is that said
testimony stands uncorroborated. Ternura was the only witness who testified on the
mimeographing incident. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He knew his fate depended
upon how much he cooperated with the authorities, who were then engaged in a
vigorous anti-dissident campaign. As in the case of Rodrigo de Jesus, whose
testimony We discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura cannot be considered
as proceeding from a totally unbiased source. . . .
In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok
surrendered to the military certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the
authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. The trade-off appears to be his
membership in the Civil Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83, January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be
considered as an interested witness. It can not be said that his testimony is free from the opportunity
and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom.
Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar of April 19,
1982 i.e., Masamlok's father ,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74, January 4,
1983) who could have corroborated Cesar Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in
furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never
presented any other witness.
This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):
It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v. Dramayo (42 SCRA
59), where after stressing that accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt, it was made clear: 'Only if the judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by
the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of
conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly
taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must
be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What

is required then is moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81;
People v. Joven, 64 SCRA 126; People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People vs.
Godov 72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205; People v. Poblador, 76 SCRA
634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513; People v. Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484; People
vs. Gabilan 115 SCRA 1; People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and People vs. Ibanga
124 SCRA 697).
We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in Davao del Sur where there appears to
be a well-organized plan to overthrow the Government through armed struggle and replace it with an
alien system based on a foreign ideology. The open defiance against duly constituted authorities has
resulted in unfortunate levels of violence and human suffering publicized all over the country and
abroad. Even as we reiterate the need for all freedom loving citizens to assist the military authorities
in their legitimate efforts to maintain peace and national security, we must also remember the dictum
in Morales vs. Enrile (1 21 SCRA 538, 569) when this Court stated:
While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the
rebels, and the lawless with an the means at its command, it should always be
remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of
our Constitution and our laws.
Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude towards
constitutional liberties and protections will only fan the increase of subversive activities instead of
containing and suppressing them.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime
with which he has been charged.
The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with
Serial No. 8.69221) and the alleged subversive documents are ordered disposed of in accordance
with law.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.