Bar Matter No.

553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of
the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel.
521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning
of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the
reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly

in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United
States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P.
Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion
International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be
the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present
hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms,i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate
that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document
search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly
opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's
legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The

Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the
effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes
lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present
case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is
being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of
the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as
claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room
for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers,
whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant
to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however,
emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there
is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and
woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is
that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our
law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves
to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of

legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst,
this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex
"A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its
bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution,"
which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and
inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above
impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can
be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary
newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of
acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering,
storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like
services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists
in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit
them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits
and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than
a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice
of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly,

for the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only
if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent
would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task
of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general and which
should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however,
may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to
include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain
course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering
a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to
take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible
sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the
Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform
legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and Bylaws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal
support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.,"
and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus
yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely
engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement
which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense.
From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look
after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is
the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and

solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when
the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely,
the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar
(Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the
Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act
for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to
engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to
persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also
all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral
advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal
support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose
Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged
in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations
Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence
and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the
Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles
and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent
fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to
the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or
entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a
four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only
then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these
paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to
establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not
exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public
in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under
the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that
legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly,
measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise
legal services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression
that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name The Legal
Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure
the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of
gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is
illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling
the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so
under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing
lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal
services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject
matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act
may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce
are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is
also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do
that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an
attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify
permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy
firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by
Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully
practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can
be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service
unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to
suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice
of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that
most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . .
Our knowledge of the law accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct not
only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers,
liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the
laws touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the
architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes,
factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is
required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board.
Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is
charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate
and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a
lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like,
then an architect who performed this function would probably be considered to
be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the

industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a

lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case.
The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and
business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the
larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate
special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal
thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the
same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for
which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court
should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established
method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men
who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the
technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in
their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for
any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being
engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client
along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law.
But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are
along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within
which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits
the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice
of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed
services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be
practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees'
wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the
adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator.
This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations
and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and
the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the
business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by
brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed
right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion,
then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I
need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by
the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative
agencies of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by
virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation

of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to
interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by
one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board
give to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31.
'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor
Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A.
2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the
problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon CunetaGabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law.
If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage
and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not
constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials
on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to
take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's
paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a
legal text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the
mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a
particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently
it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with
advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice
of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's

book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship

with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL
OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to
give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person in a particular situation in their publication and sale of the
kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of
law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit,
there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an
office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation,
annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the
judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house
publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact
with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the
finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal
advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which
might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in
the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to)
enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the
giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of
particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of
separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS
2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is
not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such
would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a
factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the
wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is
not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal
services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination
of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the
subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines
explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic

of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not
be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of
documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients
before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to
law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who
confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the
latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status
and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to
determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129
Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate
in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in
such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the
rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of

a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in

attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262,
263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject
to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It
is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed
by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all
times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments
on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass],
194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned
criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations
that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to
laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of
computers and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission
and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal research;
encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document
search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment
records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce,
marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country,
and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing
computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate
legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal
services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or
the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention
that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for
example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the

respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it
were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client
the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by
said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered
by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of
authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care
of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems,
labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they
take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too.
And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The
Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an
affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the
interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital,
out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a
rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the
right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with
the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need
a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to
support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it
is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the
ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that
the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client
may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of

these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of
law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted
as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if
he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject
to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his
thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and
have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a
lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the
rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired
through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal
science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with
respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the
practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons
over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals
as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits,
respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of
unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines.28 As
the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also
evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has
even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with
their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American
Paralegal Association.29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal
service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority,
a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot
be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That
policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek
legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or

statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he
pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to
attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such
as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the
interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious
Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding,39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares.
Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to
and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public.
As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the moneychangers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching
public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The
exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily
implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and
may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices;
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the
dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to
task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we
find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present
Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that
state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent,
can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands,
as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the
attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped
significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community
in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at
times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to
regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that
Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a
member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic,
Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on
that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely
administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different
proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be
organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support
services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor
General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That
spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the
circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar
tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this
resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the
Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
Quiason, JJ., concur

A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC

February 12, 2013

RE: REQUEST OF (RET.) CHIEF JUSTICE ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN FOR RECOMPUTATION OF HIS
CREDITABLE SERVICE FOR THE PURPOSE OF RECOMPUTING HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Court is asked to pass upon the request of former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban (CJ Panganiban) to
include as creditable government service the period from January 1962 to December 1965 when he served the

Department of Education (DepEd), its Secretary, and the Board of National Education (BNE) to enable him to meet
the present service requirement of fifteen (15) years for entitlement to retirement benefits.
When CJ Panganiban reached the compulsory age of retirement on
December 7, 2006, he was credited with eleven (11) years, one (1) month and twenty-seven (27) days or 11.15844
years of government service. The Office of Administrative Services (OAS) did not include in the computation his 4year service as Legal Counsel to the DepEd and its then Secretary, Alejandro R. Roces (Former Education Secretary
Roces), and as Consultant to the BNE in a concurrent capacity, from January 1962 to December 1965, on the ground
that consultancy "is not considered government service pursuant to Rule XI (Contract of Services/Job Orders) of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292."1Having failed to meet the twenty (20) years length
of service then required under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910,2the OAS considered him eligible to receive only the 5year lump sum payment under said law.
On January 10, 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approved R.A. 9946,3 which not only reduced the
requisite length of service under R.A. 910 from twenty (20) years to fifteen (15) years to be entitled to the retirement
benefits with lifetime annuity, but provided also for a survivorship clause, among others.
Thus, the instant letter-request of CJ Panganiban seeking a recomputation of his creditable government service to
include the previouslyexcluded 4-year government service to enable him to meet the reduced service requirement of
fifteen (15) years for entitlement to retirement benefits under R.A. 9946.
On December 14, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution4 directing CJ Panganiban to submit additional documentary
evidence to support his appointment as Legal Counsel to the DepEd and its Secretary and Consultant to the BNE. In
compliance, he submitted the January 19, 2011 Certifications5 of Former Education Secretary Roces and Retired
Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Retired Justice Pardo) attesting to the fact of his tenure as Legal Counsel to the DepEd
and its Secretary and Consultant to the BNE.
The Court finds merit in CJ Panganibans request.
A careful perusal of the actual functions and responsibilities of CJ Panganiban as outlined in his compliance with
attached Sworn Statements of Former Education Secretary Roces and Retired Justice Pardo reveal that he
performed actual works and was assigned multifarious tasks necessary and desirable to the main purpose of the
DepEd and the BNE.
Former Education Secretary Roces certified that:
[C]hief Justice Panganiban rendered actual services to the BNE and the Department [of Education] and to me in my
official capacity as Secretary of Education for said period [from January 1962 to December 1965], having been
officially appointed by me as then Secretary of Education and as Chairman of the Board of Education, he having
been paid officially by the government a monthly compensation for rendering such services to the government
specifically to the Department of Education and to the Board of National Education. He worked with the Office of the
Solicitor General on legal matters affecting the Department and the Board, collaborating closely with then Solicitor
Bernardo P. Pardo who was assigned by the Office of the Solicitor General to the Department of Education.
Apart from legal issues, he devoted time and attention to matters assigned to him by the Department or by the Board,
like the development of educational policies, the selection and distribution of textbooks and other educational
materials, the setting of school calendars, the procurement of equipment and supplies, management of state schools,
etc.6
His services both as Legal Counsel to the DepEd and its Secretary and as Consultant to the BNE during the period
1962-1965 was corroborated by Retired Justice Pardo who, in his affidavit, certified that in his "capacity as Solicitor

assigned by the Office of Solicitor General to the Department of Education and Board of National Education"7 he and
CJ Panganiban "collaborated in many cases representing both the Board of National Education and Department of
Education, particularly then Secretary of Education Alejandro R. Roces, as well as in rendering legal opinions to such
offices."8
CJ Panganiban performed work ranging from high level assignments involving policy development and
implementation to the more humble tasks of selection and distribution of educational materials and setting of school
calendars. He himself views his work, thus: "[u]nlike some present day consultants or counsels of government offices
and officials, I rendered full and actual service to the Philippine government, working daily at an assigned desk near
the Office of the Secretary of Education throughout the full term of Secretary Alejandro R. Roces, January 1962 to
December 1965."9
Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (Justice Brion) is not persuaded by the evidence. He holds the view that there must
be an appointment to a position that is part of a government organizational structure before any work rendered can
be considered government service.
Under the old Administrative Code (Act No. 2657),10 a government "employee" includes any person in the service of
the Government or any branch thereof of whatever grade or class. A government "officer," on the other hand, refers to
officials whose duties involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of government, whether
such duties are precisely defined or not. Clearly, the law, then and now, did not require a specific job description
and job specification. Thus, the absence of a specific position in a governmental structure is not a hindrance for the
Court to give weight to CJ Panganibans government service as legal counsel and consultant. It must be remembered
that retired Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasas (CJ Narvasa) stint in a non-plantilla position as Member of the Court
Studies Committee of the Supreme Court, created under Administrative Order No. 164 of then Chief Justice Querube
C. Makalintal, was considered sufficient for purposes of crediting him with an additional five (5) years of government
service, reckoned from September 2, 1974 to 1979.11
In any case, having previously ruled to include as creditable government service the post-retirement work of Justice
Abraham T. Sarmiento as Special Legal Counsel to the University of the Philippines System12 and to credit former
CJ Narvasa with the legal counselling work he did for the Agrava Fact-Finding Board to which he was
appointed General Counsel by then President Marcos,13 the Court sees no reason not to likewise credit in CJ
Panganibans favor the work he had performed as Legal Counsel to the DepEd and its Secretary, not to mention his
concurrent work as consultant to the BNE, and accordingly, qualify him for entitlement to retirement benefits.
In A.M. No. 07-6-10-SC,14 apart from his work as Member of the Court Studies Committee of the Supreme Court, CJ
Narvasa was credited his term as General Counsel to the Agrava Fact-Finding Board for one (1) year (from October
29, 1983 to October 24, 1984), as well as his 10-month post-retirement service as Chairperson of the Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reforms created under Executive Order No. 43, thus, entitling him to monthly pension
computed from December 1, 2003. In A.M. No. 03-12-08-SC,15 the Court favorably considered Justice Sarmiento's
post-retirement work as Special Legal Counsel to the University of the Philippines (from August 24, 2000 to January
15, 2002) as part of his creditable government service apart from his service as Member of the UP Board of Regents
(from January 16, 2002 to December 31, 2003) and Chairman of the UP Board of Regents (from January 1, 2004 to
December 31, 2005).
Justice Brion views the Courts favorable disposition of CJ Panganibans request for lifetime annuity as another case
of flip-flopping, believing that the Court already denied former Chief Justice Panganibans request for full
retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910 and would, thus, be making a complete turnabout even as CJ Panganiban
makes a request for the second time and for the same previously-denied services.16
Justice Brion, however, is mistaken in his belief that the Court is reversing itself in this case. There is no flip-flopping
situation to speak of since this is the first instance that the Court En Banc is being asked to pass upon a request
concerning the computation of CJ Panganibans creditable service for purposes of adjusting his retirement benefits. It
may be recalled that Deputy Clerk of Court and OAS Chief Atty. Eden T. Candelaria had simply responded to a query
made by CJ Panganiban when she wrote17 him, thus:

June 10, 2008

Hon. Artemio V. Panganiban
Retired Chief Justice
Your Honor:
This refers to your query through Ms. Vilma M. Tamoria on why your Honors service in the Board of National
Education was not included in the computation of retirement benefits.
In connection with his Honors Application for Compulsory Retirement, a Certification dated November 14, 2006
issued by former Secretary of Education, the Honorable Alejandro R. Roces, was submitted attesting that you had
served as consultant to the Board of National Education and concurrently Legal Counsel to the Secretary of
Education from January 1962 to December 1965.
Consultancy or Contract of Service is not considered government service pursuant to Rule XI (Contract of
Services/Job Orders) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. Hence, your Honors
service as consultant to the Board of National Education from January 1962 to December 1965 was not credited in
the computation of creditable government service.
Your Honor is therefore entitled only to the benefits under Section 2 of R.A. 910 as amended which provides for a
lump sum equivalent to five (5) years salary based on the last salary you were receiving at the time of retirement
considering that you did not attain the length of service as required in Section 1. Thus, you Honor only has a total of
11 years, 1 month and 27 days or 11.15844 government service.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
EDEN T. CANDELARIA
Deputy Clerk of Court and
Chief Administrative Officer
CJ Panganiban no longer pursued the matter with the OAS presumably because a converse ruling allowing credit for
his service with the BNE would still have left his total length of government service short of the 20-year requirement
as to entitle him to a lifetime annuity under Section 1 of R.A. 910. However, in view of the passage of R.A. 9946,
which reduced the requisite period of service from twenty (20) years to fifteen (15) years to benefit from a grant of
lifetime annuity, CJ Panganiban sought the Courts approval to include his 4-year service as Legal Counsel to the
DepEd and its Secretary, and as Consultant to the BNE as creditable government service.
Besides, nothing prevents the Court from taking a second look into the merits of a request and overturning a ruling
determined to be inconsistent with principles of fairness and equality. In particular, the grant of life annuity benefit to
Justice Sarmiento was a result of the Courts reversal of its earlier Resolution denying the request for re-computation.
Notably, the Court found merit in Justice Sarmientos plea for liberality and considered his post-retirement work
creditable government service to complete the 20- year length of service required for him to avail of full retirement
benefits under R.A. 910.
It bears emphasis that treatment must be without preference especially between persons similarly situated or in equal
footing. Just as CJ Narvasas work as General Counsel to the Agrava Board, and Justice Sarmientos service as
Special Legal Counsel to UP were considered creditable government service, so should the consideration be for CJ
Panganibans work, at least, as Legal Counsel to the DepEd and its Secretary.

Justice Brion asserts that CJ Panganibans own claim in his Bio-Data and Personal Data Sheet that he remained in
active private law practice at the same time that he acted as Legal Counsel to the DepEd and its Secretary and as
Consultant to the BNE prevents him from asserting any claim to the contrary. It should be stressed that CJ
Panganiban only filed his request for re-computation of his retirement benefits in the hope that the Court will credit in
his favor the work he rendered both as Legal Counsel to the DepEd and its Secretary and as Consultant to the BNE
in the same way that it credited retired Justice Sarmientos and retired CJ Narvasas services as Special Legal
Counsel to the UP and General Counsel to the Agrava Board, respectively.1wphi1 When CJ Panganiban submitted
his claims to the Courts sense of fairness and wisdom, it was the Court that directed him to present additional
evidence in support of the true nature of the services he rendered to these government agencies.
The alleged inconsistency between his earlier statements of being in private law practice in his Bio-Data and
Personal Data Sheet and his proffered evidence now showing the nature and extent of his services to the DepEd and
its Secretary and to the BNE is more apparent than real. The perception of continuous and uninterrupted exercise of
one's legal profession, despite periodic interruptions foisted by public service, is not uncommon among legal
practitioners. After all, legal counselling work, even if rendered to a government agency, is part of legal practice.
During the time that CJ Narvasa served as Member of the Court Studies Committee of the Supreme Court from 1974
to 1979, prior to his appointment as General Counsel to the Agrava Board, he likewise appeared to have regarded
himself in constant active law practice18 and yet this did not deter the Court from considering the weight of the work
he actually rendered to the government and, thus, credited him not only his one-year stint as General Counsel of the
Agrava Board but even the full term of his earlier involvement as Member of the Court Studies Committee of the
Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, Justice Brion insists that no substantial proof has been presented to support the inference that the work
rendered by CJ Panganiban constituted government service and, hence, the application of liberality in the
appreciation and interpretation of the law is unjustified. Admittedly, the only evidence presented to support CJ
Panganiban's claim that he worked as Legal Counsel to the DepEd and its Secretary and as Consultant to the BNE
are the Sworn Statements of Retired Justice Pardo and Former Education Secretary Roces and the submissions of
CJ Panganiban but this evidence can hardly be considered undeserving of weight and lacking in substance, coming
from a retired member of the Court, a former Cabinet Secretary and a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
whose credibility remains untarnished and is beyond question. Justice Brion himself does not dispute the veracity of
their claims that CJ Panganiban did, in fact, render actual service. Hence, notwithstanding the absence of any other
record of CJ Panganibans appointment to a position or item within the DepEd and the BNE, his actual service to
these government agencies must be regarded as no less than government service and should, therefore, be credited
in his favor consistent with the Court's liberal rulings in the cases of CJ Narvasa and Justice Sarmiento.
The Supreme Court has unquestionably followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing upon retirement claims of
judges and justices, thus: (1) waiving the lack of required length of service in cases of disability or death while in
actual service19 or distinctive service; (2) adding accumulated leave credits to the actual length of government service
in order to qualify one for retirement; (3) tacking post-retirement service in order to complete the years of government
service required; (4) extending the full benefits of retirement upon compassionate and humanitarian
considerations;20 and (5) considering legal counselling work for a government body or institution as creditable
government service.
The generous extent of the Courts liberality in granting retirement benefits is obvious in Re: Justice Efren I. Plana:21
It may also be stressed that under the beneficient provisions of Rep. Act 910, as amended, a Justice who reaches
age 70 is entitled to full retirement benefits with no length of service required. Thus, a 69 year old lawyer appointed to
the bench will get full retirement benefits for the rest of his life upon reaching age 70, even if he served in the
government for only one year. Justice Plana served the government with distinction for 33 years, 5 months, and 11
days, more than 5 years of which were served as a Justice of the Court of Appeals of this Court.
In the instant case, no liberal construction is even necessary to resolve the merits of CJ Panganiban's request. The
Court need only observe consistency in its rulings.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans request for a recomputation of his creditable government service to include the 4-year period from January 1962 to December 1965
that he served as Legal Counsel to the Department of Education and its then Secretary and Consultant to the Board
of National Education, as duly attested to by retired Justice Bernardo P. Pardo and then Secretary of Education
himself, Alejandro R. Roces.
ACCORDINGLY, the Office of Administrative Services is hereby DIRECTED to re-compute former Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban's creditable government service and his corresponding retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. M/SGT. REYNALDO LANDICHO, PAT. JOHNNY BUNYI,
C1C ERIC MANLUSOC, and C2C LEOVINO CANUEL, accused, C1C ERIC ANLUSOC, accusedappellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
As Juvenal once asked, "But who is to guard the guards themselves?"[1] This case deals not with a mere appeal
from a conviction in a murder case. It is a tale, rather, an expose, of the warped sense of camaraderie which binds
certain members of the law enforcement and penal systems in our country. This account of betrayal of the public trust
stands as yet another stain on the honor of the Philippine National Police (PNP), at a time when its reputation and
integrity are already in serious question.
On 8 January 1991, at 9:30 p.m., in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, four members of the PNP gunned down Isagani
Mazon in cold blood. Mazon died instantly, having suffered twenty-one (21) gunshot wounds, a number of which were
at his back. As a result, the accused were charged with murder,[2] but in the interim, the trial court endowed them the
privilege of being detained by their superiors, instead of customary incarceration at the provincial jail. And if only to
exacerbate matters, the accused then escaped through the connivance or inexcusable negligence of their
guardians. Of the accused, only the appellant was subsequently arrested.
On 30 August 1991, the accused were charged with murder in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 39, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, in Criminal Case No. C-3496, the accusatory portion reading:
That on or about January 8, 1991, at the Municipality of Calapan, Province of Mindoro Oriental, Philippines and within the
Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, all public officers, being members of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), conspiring with each other, with deliberate intent to kill and with the use of firearms, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously attack and shoot Isagani Mazon, a private person, hitting him at the vital parts of his
body and inflicting upon him mortal wounds, thereby causing his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
No bail was recommended for their temporary liberty.
On 17 October 1991, the trial court, through Judge Marciano T. Virola, issued a warrant for the arrest of the
accused.[4] On 24 October 1991, the accused allegedly surrendered at the PNP office in Oriental Mindoro. Then, in a
first endorsement dated 25 October 1991, Superintendent Jaime L. Lasar, PNP Provincial Director of Oriental
Mindoro, committed the accused to the trial court, but requested that they be detained at the PNP Stockade as they
were members of the PNP Mindoro Oriental Command.[5]
On 29 October 1991, the accused filed a petition for bail and motion to transfer their detention from the
Provincial Jail to the PNP Headquarters pending hearing of their petition.[6]Judge Virola immediately granted the
motion for transfer to the PNP Stockade at the PNP Mindoro Oriental Command Headquarters, on the condition that
the accused would not be allowed to leave the stockade or "be placed in the custody of any person without order
from [the] Court."[7] The trial court, however, denied the application for bail as the motion did not set the application for
hearing. Branch Clerk of Court Rolando Caguete then committed the accused to Supt. Lasar for detention at the PNP

Stockade.[8] Meanwhile, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Emmanuel S. Panaligan opposed the petition for bail
and prayed that it be denied for lack of merit. [9] On 30 October 1991, the accused filed a notice to set for hearing the
petition for bail.[10]
Upon arraignment on 5 November 1991, each of the accused entered a plea of not guilty.[11] The trial court then
set the hearing on the petition for bail on 11, 18, and 19 November 1991, and the per-trial on 18 November 1991.
[12]
On even date, the private prosecutor, Atty. Alvin T. Sarita, moved to suspend the accused from the service
pursuant to Section 47[13] of R.A. No. 6975 (Department of Interior and Local Government Act), which the trial court
granted on 6 November 1991.[14]
The 11 November 1991 hearing on the petition for bail was cancelled but reset to 18, 19, and 20 November
1991.
In a letter dated 13 November 1991, Pedro Mazon, father of the victim, sought Judge Virola's assistance
regarding information that all the accused were seen aboard the boat M.B. San Miguel bound for Batangas. [15] Judge
Virola ordered the Calapan RTC Clerk of Court as ex-officio sheriff and his Branch Clerk of Court to investigate the
matter[16] and directed Supt. Lasar to comment on Pedro Mazon's letter.[17]
In their report,[18] the aforementioned Clerks of Court informed Judge Virola that they went to the Oriental
Mindoro PNP Command on 13 November 1991 at around 12:00 p.m., only to discover that accused Landicho and
Bunyi were not there. According to the guard on duty, SP03 Fortunato Mendoza, the said accused, escorted by SP03
Julian Bilog, left the Mindoro Oriental PNP Command at about 11:50 a.m. and ate lunch outside the PNP
Command. Later, at around 1: 10 p.m., Landicho and Bunyi returned with their escort SP03 Bilog. Bilog then informed
the Clerks of Court that on 12 November 1991, at around 11:30 a.m., while he was the guard on duty, the four
accused left the stockade for lunch and talked to someone about their case, with Landicho and Bunyi escorted by
P02 Edilberto Santos, and accused Manlusoc and Canuel by SP02 Ernesto Javier. An hour later, only Bunyi returned;
further, when the Clerks of Court left at about 2:00 p.m., Manlusoc and Canuel had not yet returned.
In his comment, Supt. Lasar confirmed that the four accused "were present at the place as they were seen [but]
were guarded by escort.[19]
In his report[20] to the trial court, Senior Inspector Jesus T. Gatchalian, Commanding Officer of the 269th PNP
Mobile Force Company, declared that at 11:20 a.m. of 12 November 1991, all the. accused left for lunch with
escorts. While Landicho and Bunyi returned to the PNP Stockade at 1:00 p.m. that day, Manlusoc and Canuel
proceeded to Batangas, with escorts, to get financial support for their case. However, they returned to the PNP
Stockade at 3:00 p.m. on 14 November 1991.
At the scheduled pre-trial on 18 November 1991, the trial court granted the motion of the accused to terminate
the pre-trial and reset the hearing of the petition for bail on 23, 24, 27, and 30 January 1992.[21]
In his letter of 16 December 1991, Pedro Mazon informed Judge Virola that on 13 December 1991, he saw the
four accused watching a cockfight in Barangay Sta. Isabel, Calapan.[22]Judge Virola referred the matter to Supt. Lasar,
[23]
who replied that on 13 December 1991, the accused were at the PNP Stockade, as evidenced by the certification
issued by the Sgt. of the Guard and Guards on Duty at the time."[24]
The petition for bail was initially heard on 23 January 1992, with the prosecution presenting eyewitness Lilian
Francisco. The hearing continued the following day with the prosecution ready to present Dr. Arturo Alberto; however,
the defense and the prosecution agreed the dispense with Dr. Alberto's testimony and mark the following exhibits:
Exhs. "B" - Necropsy Report "B-1"
Dorsal Side of Exh. "B"
"B-2" - Signature of Dr. Alberto On Exh. "B-1"
"C" - Rough Illustration report
"C-1" - Signature of Dr. Alberto on Exh. "C"
"D" - Certificate of Death
"D-1" - Signature of Dr. Alberto on Exh. "D"[25]

Consequently, the trial court issued an order, the pertinent portions providing:
After the prosecutor announced that the text witness that he is presenting is Dr. Arturo Alberto as medico legal expert, whose
qualification as such was admitted by counsel for the accused, for the purposes to wit:
(a) to identify the Necropsy Report issued by him connection with the Post Mortem examination conducted on the body of
Isagani Mason;
(b) to testify on the character and nature of the wounds sustained by Isagani Mason as well as the cause of the wound sustained
by the victim which according to his opinion as stated in the Necropsy Report were all sustained by gunshot wound;
(c) to testify as to the number of wounds sustained which is 21 gunshot wounds;
(d) to testify to the effect that the victim sustained 7 gunshot wounds at the back;
(e) to testify that the victim sustained 14 gunshot wounds in front of his body, two of which were inflicted on the head;
(f) to identify the rough sketch showing the anterior and posterior position of a human body and to testify that the wounds
sustained by the deceased as indicated were in front and at the back of the body;
(g) to identify the certificate of death of Isagani Mason;
(h) to testify as to the cause of death which is multiple internal injuries, secondary to gunshot wounds.
Counsel for the accused manifested that he is admitting that if presented on the witness stand said witness will testify
according to the tenor and for the purposes as stated by the prosecutor in open court.
Forthwith, the prosecutor caused the marking of the Necropsy Report as Exhibits "B", "B-1", and"B-2", the
Sketch showing the anterior view and posterior view and the location of the wounds indicated therein as Exhibits "C"
and "C-1", the Certificate of Death of Isagani Mason as Exhibits "D" and "D-1" and thereafter dispensed with the
presentation of Dr. Arturo Alberto in view of the stipulation between the parties.[26]
On 16 March 1992, the prosecution presented Herman Mejico, Jr. as its third witness on the petition for bail and,
thereafter, rested its case for the purpose.[27]
At the hearing on 17 March 1992, as their evidence in connection with the petition for bail, the accused only
caused to be marked some documents and then rested their case. The documents marked were:
Exh. "1" - Alias Warrant of Arrest for Isagani Mazon in Criminal Case No. 3201, for violation of R.A. 6539 - Anti- Carnapping
Act of 1972 - dated 2 January 1990;
Exh. "2" - Warrant of Arrest for Herman Mejico in Crim. Case No. C-2675 for attempted murder dated 28 January 1988;
Exh. "3" - Order of 28 August 1988 in Crim. Case No.C-2675 archiving the case since Mejico has not been arrested;
Exh. "4" - Warrant of Arrest for Isagani Mazon dated 27 August 1990 in Crim. Case No. C-3201;
Exh. "5' - Order of 18 December 1990 in Crim. Case No. C-3201 archiving the case. [28]
The trial court then considered the petition for bail submitted for resolution and set the reception of the prosecution's
evidence on the merits of the case on 23 April and 24 April 1992.[29]
On the same date, 17 March 1992, the court granted Atty. Edgardo Aceron's withdrawal as defense counsel on
the ground that he would seek election as Governor of Mindoro Oriental. [30] Likewise, the private prosecutor moved to
transfer the detention of the accused to the Provincial Jail and cite the accused and the PNP Provincial Director in
contempt of court because of persistent violations of the court's order not to allow the accused to leave the PNP
Stockade nor to place them in the custody of any person without a court order. [31] The court deferred action on the
motion for transfer until the petition for bail was resolved and required Supt. Lasar to comment on the motion to cite

him in contempt.[32] Supt. Lasar responded that he had not received any information that the accused left the
stockade without escorts and the accused were never moved to any detention cell other than the PNP Stockade.[33]
On 24 March 1992, the trial court issued an order [34] denying the petition for bail on the ground that evidence of
guilt was strong, directing the transfer of the accused from the PNP Stockade to the Calapan Jail Center, and
reiterating its previous order that the accused would not be allowed to leave the Jail nor be placed in the custody of
any person, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
On 27 March 1992, the trial court denied the prosecution's motion to cite the accused and the PNP Provincial
Director in contempt of court due to "humanitarian reasons"; moreover, the prosecution failed to substantiate its
allegations in the said motion.[35]
The hearing on the merits of 23 April and 24 April 1992 were reset to 20 May and 21 May 1992.[36]
In a letter dated 5 May 1992, Pedro Mazon complained once more to Judge Virola that he saw the four accused
roaming the town of San Vicente, Calapan, and often staying in a house in Libis, another town in Calapan. [37] Judge
Virola asked the Provincial Jail Warden to comment [38] and the latter replied that the accused "are at present inside
the jail," although at one time "they requested to be escorted by Mr. Saure, Prison Guard, to consult their legal
counsel, hence it may have been possible that they were seen outside.[39]
On 10 May 1992, the prosecution moved for the issuance of a bench warrant for the arrest of the accused who
had been roaming around Calapan without police escorts. [40] Thus the trial court ordered the PNP Provincial Director
to cause the immediate arrest of all the accused and place them inside the Provincial Jail, and the Provincial Jail
Warden to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt of court for allowing the accused to roam around.[41]
On oral order of Judge Virola, Clerk of Court Armando E. Fortus went to the Provincial Jail on 12 May and 13
May 1992 to verify the private prosecutor's allegations that all the accused were seen "roaming around without any
escorts and carrying firearms." Fortus reported that on the said dates Bunyi, Manlusoc, and Canuel "were all out of
the Provincial Jail Center for the reasons that they were in the custody of the Provincial Governor, however, M/Sgt.
Reynaldo Landicho was there . . ."[42]
Since Supt. Lasar did not comply with the above order, the court issued on 14 May 1992 another bench warrant
for the arrest of all the accused, except Landicho, and redirected the Provincial Jail Warden not to allow the accused
to be placed in the custody of any person, including the Governor.[43]
Then, on 15 May 1992, the trial court received information from Provincial Jail Warden Menandro S. Abac that:
[T]he four (4) ... accused were reported in the Logbook as escaped prisoners as of May 9, 1992 while Guard-on-Duty was busy
attending in serving meals for lunch to our inmates. The four accused left unnoticed and might have used the exit way going to
the Provincial Capitol Compound.[44]
At the scheduled hearing on 20 May 1992, none of the accused appeared despite notice. Upon request of Atty.
Ligorio Turiano of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), who was appointed by the court as de officio counsel for the
accused, the hearing on that day was adjourned until the following day, as scheduled.
The accused did not appear on 21 May 1992. The prosecution rested its case by adopting as its evidence on
the merits the evidence it had presented on the petition for bail. The trial court then set the reception of the evidence
for the defense on 1, 4, 8, 9, and 10 June 1992.[45]
At the scheduled hearing on 1 June 1992, counsel for the accused asked for a postponement on the ground
that he had not been able to contact the accused who, according to the Provincial Jail Warden, had escaped. The
court, granted the motion but directed the hearing to proceed on the succeeding scheduled dates of 4, 8, 9, and 10
June 1992.[46]
The hearing on 4 June 1992 was also postponed on motion of counsel for the accused.[47] At the hearing on 8
June 1992, the defense presented Sgt. Rogelio M. Rogelio [48] who merely identified photocopies of certain
documents.[49] The defense then moved to reset the next scheduled hearings because the wife of accused Landicho
was still trying to convince the latter to return to the folds of the law. [50] The trial court, for humanitarian reasons, but
over the vehement objections of the prosecution, granted the motion and reset the trial on 16 June and 17 June
1992.[51]
On 16 June 1992, the accused, through their new counsel, Atty. Renato G. dela Cruz, moved to quash the
information on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. They claimed that
under P.D. No. 1486, crimes committed by public officers were within the original and exclusive Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, and although Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 provided that "criminal cases involving PNP members

shall be within the Jurisdiction of the regular courts," the term courts" referred to the Sandiganbayan. [52] The trial court
denied the motion to quash[53] and considered Atty. dela Cruz verbal motion for a grant of five days within which to file
a motion for reconsideration as dilatory.[54]
Since Atty. dela Cruz manifested that he was not ready to present evidence, the trial court issued on 16 June
1992 an order declaring the accused as having, waived the presentation of evidence since they had not been rearrested and repeatedly failed to present evidence despite the several occasions afforded them. Thus, the trial court
set the promulgation of judgment on 1 July 1992.[55]
On 29 June 1992, however, Atty. dela Cruz filed a motion praying that the scheduled promulgation be cancelled
and further proceedings suspended, citing Eternal Gardens Memorial Park vs. Court of Appeals,[56] because the
accused had filed a "25-page Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition With Writ of Preliminary Injunction & Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order" before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 28210. On 1 July
1992, the trial court denied the motion and promulgated its decision[57] as scheduled. The dispositive portion reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of Murder, defined
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized therein by reclusion temporal in its maximum period, to death, with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and with the ordinary aggravating circumstance of the crime having been committed by a
band and advantage having been taken of superior strength. Considering that there are two ordinary aggravating circumstances
and no mitigating circumstance present, the penalty that accused must suffer should be the maximum period of the penalty
provided by law. Considering, however, the abolition of the death penalty under the Constitution of 1987, the hands of the Court
are tied in imposing the supreme penalty of death.
Consequently, all the accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, together with all the accessory
penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
Accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the legal heirs of the victim Isagani Mazon the amount
of P50,000.00 by way of actual and compensatory damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Let warrants of arrest be issued for the arrest of the accused and the different police agencies be furnished with
copies thereof to effect the recapture of all the accused who had escaped from confinement during the progress of
the trial.[58]
The following disquisitions of the trial court support its judgment:
To substantiate the allegation of the Information, the prosecution presented Lilian Francisco and German Mejico, Jr. The
presentation of Dr. Arturo Alberto whose qualification as medico legal expert was admitted by counsel for the accused, was
dispensed with in view of the stipulation that, should said witness be presented on the witness stand, he would testify, among
others, that he was the one who conducted the post mortem examination on the body of deceased Isagani Mazon; that the victim
sustained 21 gunshot wounds, 7 of which were sustained at the back, 14 of which were in front, and 2 of which were on the head;
and that the cause of the death of the victim is multiple internal injuries secondary to gunshot wounds.
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it has been sufficiently established that sometime on January 8, 1991, at around
9:30 in the evening, while the victim Isagani Mazon was walking together with German Mejico, Jr. on J.P. Rizal St., Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro near the Main Deck which is opposite the building where the Pizza Galera Restaurant and Hotel Domini are
housed, accused Johnny Bunyi and Eric Manlusoc approached them. Isagani Mazon told German Mejico, Jr. to go away and after
German Mejico, Jr. had moved away around 10 arms length from Isagani Mazon, accused Johnny Bunyi and Eric Manlusoc fired
their short firearms at Isagani Mazon while accused Sgt. Reynaldo Landicho and Leovino Canuel rushed towards Isagani Mazon
and likewise fired their guns at Isagani Mazon. The shooting incident was also witnessed by Lilian Francisco who was then
ascending the stairs of the building where the Domini Hotel and Pizza Galera Restaurant are housed. Lilian Francisco recognized
all the accused because she knew all of them prior to the incident in question. She knew Johnny Bunyi for around one month
prior to the incident in question; Eric Manlusoc around a year prior to the incident in question; Leovino Canuel also around a year
prior to the incident in question; and Reynaldo Landicho even before the COSAC organized by the military was disbanded. She
recalled that accused Reynaldo Landicho formerly resided at the back of the Mindoro College and accused Johnny Bunyi, Eric
Manlusoc and Leovino Canuel used to visit and drink in the Mariwasa Restaurant where she formerly worked as floor manager of
the ladies working thereat.
xxx xxx xxx
After the cancellation of the scheduled dates of trial on June 1 and 4 at the instance of counsel for the accused, counsel for the
accused presented SP03 Rogelio Rogelio on June 8, 1992 who identified certain documents namely, xerox copy of the statement

of M/Sgt; Landicho, xerox copy of the statement of Johnny Bunyi, xerox copies of the joint statements of Leovino Canuel and
Eric Manlusoc, xerox copy of the Investigation Report of SP03 Rogelio, xerox copy of alias warrant of arrest against Isagani
Mazon in Criminal Case No. C - 3201 of this Court. Thereafter, counsel for the accused asked for continuance and for the
cancellation of the trial on June 9 and 10 and prayed that accused be given another opportunity to present further evidence on
June 16 and 17, 1992, all starting at 8:30 in the morning and the same was granted by the Court in view of the manifestation of
the counsel for the accused that the wife of one of the accused is trying her best to convince the accused to return to the fold of
the law in order to testify in this case.
xxx xxx xxx
For repeated failure of the accused to present their evidence despite the fact that they were given several opportunities to do so
although they had escaped from the Provincial Jail, the Court considered the accused to have waived the presentation of their
evidence and the case was considered submitted for decision.
Even admitting that there was a warrant issued by the Court for the arrest of Isagani Mazon in Crim. Case No. 3201 the accused
were ordered by their Commanding Officer to serve the same, the accused were not by that fact alone justified to shoot and kill
Isagani Mazon. They have to establish by clear and convincing evidence that they were justified in killing Isagani Mazon. Instead
of testifying in their favor to prove justifying or exempting circumstance accused escaped from the provincial jail after the
prosecution has rested its case.
The act of the accused in escaping from the custody of the law during the progress of the trial of the case against them is
indicative of their guilt (citations omitted).
Considering that in killing Isagani Mazon accused employed means, methods and forms in the execution
thereof which tended directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to themselves arising from the
defense which said Isagani Mazon might make, the commission of the crime is attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. The commission of the crime is likewise attended by the ordinary aggravating
circumstance of the crime having been committed by a band considering that all the four accused were all armed with
firearms and acted together in the commission of the offense. The commission of the offense is also attended by the
ordinary aggravating circumstance of advantage having been taken of superior strength considering that the victim
Isagani Mazon was unarmed while the four accused were armed with firearms.[59]
At the promulgation of judgment, the trial court was informed by the PNP Criminal Investigation Service
Command (PNP-CISC), Fourth Regional Office, that accused Manlusoc was arrested on 26 June 1992 at Barangay
Mendez Crossing, Tagaytay City.[60] With this information, the trial court, pursuant to its judgment, caused warrants of
arrest to issue against Landicho, Canuel, and Bunyi.[61]
On 3 July 1992, accused Manlusoc was surrendered to the court pursuant to its order for the purpose of
committing him to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa.[62] Manlusoc was then turned over to the custody of the
Provincial Jail Warden of Calapan.[63]
On 8 July 1992, accused Landicho, Bunyi, and Canuel, who remained at large, through Atty. dela Cruz, filed a
motion to quash the warrant of arrest issued against them on the ground that the Court of Appeals had given due
course to their petition questioning the trial court's jurisdiction. [64] In a supplemental manifestation filed the following
day, Atty. dela Cruz called the attention of the trial court to the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
28210 directing the trial court to answer the petition and to show cause why injunction should not issue. [65] Agreeing
with the prosecutor's opposition that the motion to quash was premature as giving due course to the accused's
petition did not automatically render void the proceedings before it,[66] the trial court denied the motion.[67]
On 15 July 1992, the trial court denied the Provincial Jail Warden's request to allow him to escort Manlusoc to
Tagaytay City for a hearing in a case of illegal possession of firearms filed against Manlusoc. Further, the trial court
directed the Provincial Jail Warden to commit Manlusoc to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa "under tight
security."[68]
On 16 July 1992, Atty. dela Cruz filed a Notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam[69] which the trial court denied due course
to as it was remotely contingent upon the Court of Appeals finding that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.[70]
Later, on 30 September 1992, the four accused filed a Supplemental Petition before the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 28210 asking the said court to declare the trial court to be without Jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. C3496 and as null and void the subsequent orders of the trial court, including its denial of their notice of Appeal Ad
Cautelam.[71] This supplemental petition was verified by the four accused who subscribed and swore to such

verification before their counsel, Atty. dela Cruz, in his capacity as a notary public and who entered such fact in his
notarial register as Doc. No. 320; Page No. 65; Book No. III, Series of 1992.[72]
In its decision of 22 September 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 28210, the Court of Appeals dismissed the accused's
petition for certiorari and prohibition, but partially granted the supplemental petition in favor of Eric Manlusoc, by
ordering the trial court to give due course to Manlusoc's appeal to this Court.[73]
Unsatisfied, the accused filed in this Court a petition for review, G.R. No. 110792, which we denied in our
resolution of 22 November 1993 as the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. We also denied the motion to
reconsider the resolution.[74] Meanwhile, the trial court to gave due course to the appeal of Manlusoc as directed by
the Court of Appeals.[75]
The only valid appeal then is that of accused C1C Eric Manlusoc who was re-arrested five days before the
promulgation.[76] On 29 May 1995, this Court accepted Manlusoc's appeal.[77]
In his Appellant's Brief, Manlusoc imputes to the trial court seventeen "errors." He contends that:
I. THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS A NULLITY IN THAT IT FAILED TO CONTAIN
SUFFICIENT FINDINGS OF FACT TO PRONOUNCE A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AS
MANDATED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION;
and that the trial court erred:
II. ...IN HAVING CONVICTED APPELLANT WITH MURDER DESPITE THE LACK OF PROOF OF THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION;
III. ...IN HAVING FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE MEDICOLEGAL, OFFICER TO TESTIFY ON THE FACT OF DEATH OF TTIE VICTIM; TTIE NATURE OF THE
INJURIES SUSTAINED AND THE CAUSE OF DEATH;
IV. ...IN HAVING FOUND THAT THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS PRESENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT NO LESS THAN PROSECUTION'S OWN EVIDENCE HAD
ESTABLISHED ITS ABSENCE;
V. ...IN NOT HAVING MADE ANY FINDING IN ITS DECISION THAT THE BULLET WHICH CAME FROM
THE GUN OF APPELLANT HIT THE VICTIM;
VI. ...IN HAVING MADE [THE] ASSUMPTION AND CONCLUSION THAT BECAUSE THE APPELLANT
AND HIS CO-ACCUSED FIRED THEIR GUNS, THE VICTIM'S DEATH RESULTED THEREFROM;
VII. ...IN HAVING MADE A GENERALIZED CONCLUSION OF THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM SIMPLY
BECAUSE HE WAS SHOT BY THE APPELLANT AND HIS CO-ACCUSED;
VIII ...IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER DESPITE LACK OF PROOF THAT THE
GUNSHOT COMING FROM APPELLANT'S FIREARM HIT THE VICTIM;
IX. ...IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE AS TO
WHO'S GUNSHOT WOUND WAS FATAL;
X. ...IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN AND AMONG THE APPELLANT AND HIS CO-ACCUSED;
XI. ...IN HAVING FOUND THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF BAND TO BE ATTENDANT IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF MURDER;
XII. ...IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT AND HIS CO-ACCUSED IN FACT ESCAPED;
XIII. ...IN HAVING RULED THAT THE ALLEGED ESCAPE OF THE APPELLANT AND HIS CO-ACCUSED
DURING THE TRIAL INDICATED AN ADMISSION OF GUILT;
XIV. ...IN NOT HAVING MADE A FINDING IN ITS; DECISION AS TO THAT PART OF THE TESTIMONY
OF THE WITNESSES WHICH IT CONSIDERED BELIEVABLE;
XV. ...IN NOT HAVING RULED THAT THE TESTIMONY OF BOTH PROSECUTION WITNESSES LILIAN
FRANCISCO AND HERMAN MEJICO, JR. WAS REPLETE WITH MATERIAL INCONSISTENCY
AFFECTING THEIR CREDIBILITY;
XVI. ...IN HAVING GIVEN CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF LILIAN FRANCISCO AND HERMAN
MEJICO, JR. NOTWITHSTANDING PRESENCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES INDUBITABLY SHOWING

THAT THEIR TALE OF THE ALLEGED SHOOTING WAS UNBELIEVABLE AND CONTRARY TO
HUMAN EXPERIENCE; and
XVII. ...IN NOT HAVING ACQUITTED APPELLANT CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD
FAILED TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[78]
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General refutes all errors assigned by the appellant, but
recommends, however, that the appellant should only be convicted of the crime of homicide because:
[I]t cannot be said that the killing of Mazon was attended by treachery. No evidence was presented to show that prior to the
killing, appellant and his co-accused had determined to commit the crime and consciously adopted the mode of attack. [79]
xxx xxx xxx
[W]here there is no evidence that the accused had, prior to the moment of the killing, resolved to commit the crime or there is no
proof that the death of the victim was the result of meditation, calculation, or reflection, treachery cannot be considered. [80]
If the decision to kill was sudden, there is no treachery, even if the position of the victim was vulnerable,
because it was not deliberately sought by the accused, but was purely accidental.[81]
It asserts, further, that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was duly proven by the
prosecution; nevertheless, since it was not alleged in the Information, it may only be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance.
We cannot proceed to resolve the assigned errors without first commenting on certain lapses of the trial court,
which only heighten a suspicion that the accused initially obtained generous concessions from it. It immediately
granted, ex-parte, their request to be detained at the PNP stockade but, at the same time, denied the accompanying
motion for bail solely on the ground that it did not set it for hearing, although both motions were contained in one
petition. It took no positive action against the accused, the PNP Provincial Director, and the Provincial Jail Warden,
despite admissions that the accused had been allowed to roam around unescorted and even go to Batangas without
leave of court in all instances. Then strangely, it rejected the motion for contempt on the flimsy ground of
"humanitarian" considerations. Worse, it did not pursue any disciplinary action against the Provincial Jail Warden
despite the latter's failure to comply with the "show cause" order of 10 May 1992.
Compounding the matter, although the trial court had been belatedly informed by the Provincial Jail Warden on
15 May 1992 that the accused had escaped from the Provincial Jail on 9 May 1992, and by Clerk of Court Fortus that
on 12 May and 13 May 1992 accused Bunyi, Manlusoc, and Canuel were in the custody of the Provincial Governor,
the trial court did not either order the Provincial Jail Warden to formally investigate the escape nor direct the
Provincial Governor to show cause why he kept the "escaped" prisoners.
What is more appalling is that although it validly tried the accused in absentia[82] because they escaped,
it conveniently forgot that by their escape, the accused waived their right to present evidence and cross-examine the
witnesses against them.[83] Accordingly, the testimony of Sgt. Rogelio M. Rogelio on 8 June 1992 and all documents
identified by him (Exhibits "1" to "5-A," inclusive) must be rejected.
Needless to say, the conduct of the trial court leaves much to be desired.
We now turn to the assigned errors.
The first assigned error is patently without merit. The challenged decision substantially complied with the
requirements of both Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution [84] and Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
[85]
The pertinent disquisitions therein, as well as its dispositive portion earlier quoted, readily show such
compliance. It sets out the facts which it believed were proved and the law upon which the judgment was based, and
states the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the
participation of the accused, the penalty imposed, and the civil liability.
The remaining assigned errors are interrelated and may be classified as follows:
That the trial court erred:
I. In holding that the crime of murder was committed despite absence of proof of its essential elements
(First and Fourth assigned errors);

II. In holding the appellant guilty despite lack of evidence against him (Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, Tenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth assigned errors);
III. In appreciating the aggravating circumstance of band (Eleventh assigned error);
IV. In holding that the appellant and his co-accused had escaped and such escape indicated an admission
of guilt (Twelfth and Thirteenth assigned errors);
V. In not making a finding as to what part of the testimony of the witnesses it considered believable
(Fourteenth assigned error).
We resolve them in seriatim.
I. The qualifying circumstance alleged in the Information was treachery and the trial court appreciated it as:
[I]n killing Isagani Mazon accused employed means, methods and forms in the execution thereof which tended directly and
especially to ensure its execution without risk to themselves arising from the defense which said Mazon might make ... [86]
While the above was a mere conclusion without an accompanying explanation, such a lamentable inadequacy
does not, per se, justify a reversal of the decision. Since the appellant's appeal opens the whole case for review,
[87]
we shall, on the basis of the evidence, determine for ourselves if the killing of Isagani Mazon was attended with
treachery.
For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (1) the means, method, and form of execution
employed giving the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means,
methods, or form of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused.[88]
In the case at bench, the victim seemed to have expected trouble, considering that upon seeing Manlusoc and
Bunyi approaching him, he told his companion, Mejico, to move away.Nevertheless, treachery may still be
appreciated for even when the victim was warned of danger to his person, what is decisive is that the execution of the
attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate [89]The evidence clearly bears this out. The
victim was unarmed and the accused gave no warning. The victim was then totally unprepared to even guess that the
appellant and his co-accused Canuel - who were the first two who appeared - would pepper him with bullets. It was
for this reason that the appellant asserted in his Brief:
[I]nstead of running away when he had the opportunity to do so, the victim went straight, continued to walk towards the appellant
and Canuel and faced them.[90]
This reaction only showed that the victim had no inkling whatever that he would be fired upon. The assault was
indisputably sudden and the victim's premonition of peril did not negate the treacherous nature of the attack.
That it was impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate is obvious from other circumstances of this
case. While the accused each had a gun, there is no proof that the victim was armed. The appellant's allegation that
"[t]ruly, after the shootout, the victim yielded a gun and a dagger," [91] does not even point to the source of such a
conclusion. If it were the testimony or report of defense witness Rogelio, the same, as already noted above, must be
rejected. If, indeed, the victim had a gun and dagger, the accused should have presented them at the hearing on the
application for bail.
A sudden attack against an unarmed victim shows treachery.[92] Furthermore, it was shown that the first shot,
towards the victim's head, came from behind the victim.[93] While it has been said that a dorsal attack alone does not
indicate treachery,[94] the assault in this case was also sudden, unexpected, and without warning, thus suggesting
treachery.[95]
As to the method of execution, we find that the accused, including the appellant, adopted it deliberately. We
disagree with the submission of the Office of the Solicitor General that treachery was absent because of lack of
evidence that prior to the killing, appellant and his co-accused had determined to commit the crime and consciously
adopted the mode of attack."[96] The number and location of the gunshot wounds, two in the head, and at both the
anterior and posterior portions of the body as shown in Exhibit "C", are enough to banish any motive of an accidental
shooting.[97] The severity of the accused's acts indicate a calculated pursuit of a decision to kill.
Treachery being present, it was then error for the trial court to consider the generic aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength as an independent aggravating circumstance. It is settled that treachery absorbs abuse of
superior strength.[98]

II. Under the second classification of his assigned errors, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in
holding him guilty of murder: (a) despite the failures of the medico-legal officer to testify to the fact of death of the
victim (Third assigned error) and of the trial court to make a finding that the bullet which came from his (appellant's)
gun hit the victim (Fifth assigned error); (b) despite absence of proof that the gunshot coming from his (appellant's)
firearm hit the victim (Eighth assigned error) and as to who caused the fatal gunshot wound (Ninth assigned error)
and of conspiracy (Tenth assigned error); (c) in having assumed that because he and his co-accused fired their guns,
the victim's death resulted therefrom (Sixth assigned error) and made a generalized conclusion of the death of the
victim simply because he was shot by him (appellant) and his co-accused (Seventh assigned error); and (d) in giving
credit to the testimony of prosecution witnesses Lilian Francisco and Herman Mejico although the same was replete
with material inconsistencies affecting their credibility (Fifteenth assigned error) and notwithstanding the presence of
circumstances indubitably showing that their tale of the alleged shooting was unbelievable and contrary to human
experience (Sixteenth assigned error).
These errors fail to impress.
It is untrue that the medico-legal officer failed to testify to the fact of death of the victim. As earlier shown, the
said officer, Dr. Arturo Alberto, was ready to testify on 24 January 1992 in connection with the petition for ball, but the
defense and the prosecution dispensed with his testimony on the basis of the stipulation as to the nature, tenor, and
extent of his testimony and admission by the former of the qualifications of Dr. Alberto. Further, the defense chose not
to cross-examine him. It probably intended to subject him to more searching questions during trial on the merits. But
they escaped before such time. Thus, when the prosecution rested its case for the trial on the merits by adopting the
evidence it introduced at the hearing of the petition for bail, which included that of Dr. Alberto and the documents
prepared by him, the appellant lost his opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Alberto, through no fault of the prosecution or
any other, but solely his own. The appellant cannot now be heard to complain.
There is equally no basis for the sixth and seventh assigned errors. The appellant admitted in his Brief that he,
Canuel, and Bunyi shot Isagani Mazon. [99] Dr. Alberto attributed the victim's death to multiple internal injuries
secondary to gunshot wounds,[100] which was undisputed.
The victim suffered no other injury aside from those inflicted by the accused. The unbroken chain of events from
the accused's wounding of the victim to the latter's death induces no other conclusion than that the accused's acts led
to the victim's death.
As to conspiracy among the four accused (Tenth assigned error), the challenged decision does not, indeed,
mention conspiracy. Nevertheless, one cannot infer the absence of conspiracy from such silence. Direct proof is not
essential to prove such a scheme, and its existence may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of intent. [101] It is sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to
the same objective.[102]
There was conspiracy in this case considering that the accused's synchronous presence at the crime scene was
not mere coincidence. The appellant admitted that he and his co-accused belonged to the same intelligence team
which was then purposely searching for Mazon.[103] Additionally, the evidence on record shows that Bunyi shot the
victim from behind,[104] after which Manlusoc, positioned in front of the victim, also shot the latter.[105] Canuel and
Landicho then rushed to the scene and shot the victim again while he was lying on the ground. [106] Afterwards, the
four accused dumped the victim in a Philippine Constabulary service vehicle and drove away in the said vehicle.
[107]
The accused's simultaneous movement towards and concerted attack on the victim, and their coordinated escape
from the crime scene clearly evince the existence of conspiracy.
There being conspiracy and it being proven that the victim died by the hands of the conspirators, the fifth,
eighth, and ninth errors need not detain us long. Manlusoc claims it was never proven that he shot the fatal bullet,
thus, he cannot be held liable for the victim's death. However, where conspiracy is proven, the act of one is the act of
all.[108] Consequently, it does not matter if Manlusoc did not fire the fatal shot, for all the accused are equally
responsible for the killing of the victim.[109]
The fifteenth and sixteenth assigned errors concern the credibility of the two prosecution witnesses, Lilian
Francisco and Herman Mejico. Often emphasized is the rule that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses,
appellate courts will generally not disturb the finding of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position
to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial, unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might
affect the result of the case.[110]
The appellant gives this Court no reason to overturn the trial court's assessment of the prosecution witnesses'
credibility, even though he claims the two witnesses:

[a]lmost jibed in their declarations in claiming that they both saw all the four (4) appellant and the co-accused
shot the victim, just to be sure they got convicted.
But inconsistency, not consistency, as to material facts is the mark of lack of credibility. Thus, among the tests of
integrity of evidence are whether the testimonies agree on the essential facts and whether the respective versions
corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to make a consistent and coherent whole. [111] The appellant,
however, points out the consistency of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and, in effect, endorses their
honesty.
The appellant also calls our attention to Francisco's former job as a procurer of flesh [112] to discourage this Court
from believing her testimony. Francisco revealed her trade through the following exchange:
CROSS-EXAMFNATION BY ATTY. ACERON:
Q You stated on direct examination that you are the floor manager of the ladies in the Mariwasa Restaurant on
or about January 8, 1991. Do you affirm that?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, do I understand ... that you are an employee and receiving salary from the proprietor or owner of the
Mariwasa Restaurant?
A No, sir.
Q Why? What is the nature of your work as floor manager of the ladies of the Mariwasa Restaurant on or about
that date?
A I only receive commissions from the ladies thereat.
Q What for is that commission?
A I receive a commission of P1.00 for every lady's drink.
Q And that is the source of your income as floor manager of the ladies?
A There is an additional amount I receive like for instance when ladies are brought out by customers and
whatever they receive they give me a certain percentage.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And these ladies are prostitutes?
A That is it, sir.
Q So you are the procurer or pimp, not-the floor manager of the ladies?
PROSECUTOR PANALIGAN:
Objection, Your Honor, misleading and assumes a fact.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
All right, inform the witness that the question tends to incriminate her because the question tends to insinuate
that she is a pimp or procurer and said act is penalized by law. Inform her that it is her right not to answer the
question if she so desires, but if she wants to answer the question she is at liberty to do so, but she cannot be forced
to answer the question.
A I may answer or I may not.
COURT:
Q Precisely, you are being asked. It is your right not to answer. Do you want to answer the question?
A I am willing to answer the question.
COURT:
All right, then answer the question.

A Yes, sir.[113]
Such admission given openly and after the witness was informed of her right not to disclose her line of work
emphasized her trustworthiness. The revelation enhanced, not impaired, Francisco's credibility.[114]
Still doubting her honesty, the appellant claims Francisco's varied reactions to the events she witnessed are
contrary to human experience. For instance, Francisco testified:
Q Now, from the time that you heard the first shot when you were then ascending the Domini Hotel, how many
minutes elapsed, more or less, up to the time that you heard again the bully of the second shot?
A A split while because the shot I heard is like a super lolo.[115]
The appellant then inquires, "If what she heard was a super lolo cracked, why did she have a peculiar interest to
find out what it was?" Obviously, the appellant misinterpreted Francisco; if he had read the rest of the testimony he
would not have missed the following explanation:
Q And when you heard the shot you thought it was [a] super lolo and not a report from a gun?
PROSECUTOR PANALIGAN:
Misleading, Your Honor.
ATTY. ACERON:
I am on cross-examination, Your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A The sounds of the shots were like the super lolo because
the shots were successive.[116]
As early on as the direct examination, Francisco made it clear that her attention was drawn to the incident
because she heard a shot, not an exploding firecracker:
Q Now, while you were ascending the stairs of the Domini Hotel towards the direction of Pizza Galera upstairs,
do you know of anything unusual which occurred?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that incident?
A While I was ascending and was on the third step I heard a shot.[117]
The appellant cites other incidents testified to by Francisco which he claims is contrary to human
experience. However, as with the super lolo example, each alleged contradiction was adequately clarified in
Francisco's testimony. Besides, among witnesses there can be no standard reaction to a crime.[118]
Persistent in his attempts to cast doubt on Francisco's credibility, the appellant argues then queries:
Incidentally, her testimony that she heard the victim dared the four (4) lawmen and said: "sige patayin ninyo
ako," is this credible? No sane person would utter such statement especially by the victim who was a former Marine
soldier. More incredibly, why should Landicho and Canuel under mission to serve a warrant of arrest call the
challenge and shoot simultaneously?[119]
This Court cannot be expected to delve into the state of mind of persons, especially deceased victims and
escaped detainees, hence, these queries have no bearing on Francisco's credibility.
The appellant also cites omissions in Francisco's sworn statement [120] taken at the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) office in Batangas City. Particularly, in relating the killing, Francisco failed to give the names of
Manlusoc and Bunyi. On the witness stand, she explained that the omission was due to the investigating officer's
failure to ask for the names of the said accused. [121] However, Francisco mentioned in her sworn statement the names
Landicho and "Bunso" without being asked for the same. Still, the omission is too trivial to dent Francisco's credibility,
especially since affidavits are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, [122] as they are usually not "prepared by
the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statements." [123] Moreover,
affidavits are generally considered to be inferior to testimonies given in open court, [124] hence, an omission in the

affidavit can not automatically discredit a witness. At any rate, the decisive factor is that the witness in fact identified
the accused,[125] which Francisco did, not only in her testimony but also in the later portion of her sworn statement
where she named one of the assassins as "Tenyente," an alias used by the appellant.[126]
The appellant then assaults Francisco's report to the NBI on 21 January 1991, when the killing occurred on 8
January 1991. We, however, take Judicial notice of the actuality that witnesses in this country are usually reluctant to
volunteer information about a criminal case or are unwilling to be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations.
[127]

Since the transcript of her testimony consumed 102 pages, Francisco's examination must have taken hours to
complete, interrupted only by a short recess[128] and a break at noon.[129] Yet, this witness weathered a grueling crossexamination bordering on harassment and remained coherent and unfeigned throughout. This Court can, therefore,
only lend credence to Francisco's testimony.
As regards Mejico, the appellant questions his "bravery" when he opted to witness what would happen to his
friend, Mazon, and did not move away as the victim ordered him to do.Bravery is not a cause for disbelieving a
witness, and his concern for the well-being of a friend was certainly understandable.
To discredit Mejico, the appellant cites this witness's admission that he had never seen any of the accused,
except Landicho, until the incident complained of.[130] The appellant's observation is of no moment, for a witness'
statement that he does not know the perpetrators does not mean he cannot identify them.[131]
Still hoping to dilute the witnesses' credibility, the appellant contends that they are under the protection of
Barangay Captain "Pae" Roxas, relative of the victim. [132] This fact is immaterial since Roxas was never shown to
have influenced the witnesses. On the contrary, that the witnesses needed Roxas's protection only highlighted the
banefulness of the accused.
Yet, there is one point of discrepancy between the prosecution witnesses' testimony: the position of the victim
when Landicho and Canuel shot him. Francisco claimed the victim was lying face downward [133] while Mejico said he
was lying on his back.[134] However, this disparity may be attributed to the different vantage points from which the
witnesses observed the event. Francisco observed the killing at an oblique angle[135] and about four or five arms
length away,[136] while Mejico viewed the crime some ten meters away and, it seems, not at an angle. [137] At any rate,
the discrepancy is not sufficient to cast doubt on the testimonies since the witnesses agree on the material point that
while the victim was lying on the ground, Canuel and Landicho shot him.
III. The trial court correctly appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of band. There is band whenever
more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of the offense. [138] In the present
case, the four accused, each armed with a gun, conspired in the killing of Isagani Mazon, hence this aggravating
circumstance was present.
However, the trial court erred in appreciating against the accused the generic aggravating circumstances of
abuse of superior strength. As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Appelle's Brief, this
circumstance is absorbed by treachery.
IV. We do not think that the appellant and his counsel are serious in the twelfth and thirteenth assigned
errors. As shown earlier, their escape on 9 May 1992 was registered in the logbook of the Provincial Jail and reported
to the court by the Provincial JailWarden. Their own counsel de oficio asked for the postponement of the 1 June 1992
hearing because he was unable to contact the accused who had escaped, and after the testify of Rogelio on 8 June
1992, the counsel asked for the cancellation of the next scheduled hearings because Landicho's wife was still trying
to convince the former to return to the folds of the law. And on 16 June 1992, their new counsel, Atty. dela Cruz, could
not produce them in court. It is also a fact that the appellant was re-arrested only on 26 June 1992 in Tagaytay City.
Finally, the appellant and his counsel are fully aware that the fact of such escape was confirmed by the Court of
Appeals in its 22 April 1993 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 28210, and by this Court in our 22 November 1993 resolution
in G.R. No. 110792, to which the Brief for the Appellant makes express reference.[139]
The confirmed escape of the accused is flight from justice. It is doctrinally settled that flight of an accused is an
indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind. [140] Indeed, the wicked man flees though no man pursueth, but the righteous
are as bold as a lion.[141]
V. The fourteenth assigned error is an exercise in futility, assigned more to annoy this Court than to see justice
done. A trial court is not bound to disclose which part of a witness' testimony it deems believable. Generally, a
witness' testimony is considered in its entirety,[142] partial credence being an exception as when the testimony of a
witness can be reasonably believed as to some facts but disbelieved as to others. [143] Further, it is presumed that a
person is innocent of a crime or wrong, [144] including giving false testimony. Hence, unless a court, for some reason,
finds a witnesses' testimony unworthy of belief, the court must lend it credence. Moreover, the defense failed to prove

that the prosecution witnesses had any ill motive to testify against the accused, and the rule on this matter is that
absent proof of ill motive, the testimonies are worthy of belief.[145]
Affirmance then of the appealed judgment is inevitable, which, however, does not write finis to this case. We are
compelled, in light of our preface to this decision, to decry the questionable conduct of the trial court, certain law
enforcement authorities, and the counsel for the accused appellant.
We earlier detailed the procedural lapses committed by the trial Judge, Honorable Marciano T. Virola, which
heighten a suspicion that the accused initially obtained generous concessions from his court. He should be
admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duty.
We are likewise convinced that PNP Provincial Director of Oriental Mindoro Superintendent Jaime L. Lasar
showed manifest bias by tolerating or allowing the accused to leave the PNP stockade without the permission of the
court and treating its orders in a cavalier fashion, which ultimately resulted in the highly suspicious "escape" of the
accused. The PNP leadership must perforce conduct a thorough investigation to determine his administrative liability.
The Jail Warden of the Provincial Jail of Oriental Mindoro, on his part, displayed gross negligence in the
performance of his duty. Worse, he even attempted to deceive the trial court.When asked to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt for allowing the accused to roam around, especially on 12 May and 13 May 1992, he
lamely explained that the said accused "were reported in the Logbook as escaped prisoners as of May 9, 1992."
Turning to the Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro, as of 12 May and 13 May 1992, he had yet to explain
why he had in his custody all of the accused, except Landicho, who, by then, were already fugitives from justice.
Finally, we note that while the accused were already fugitives from Justice, Atty. Renato dela Cruz nevertheless,
was in constant touch with them as he was able to procure their signatures for their supplemental petition before the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28210, and in their Magkaanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay.[146] In the latter, the four
accused subscribed to it and swore before Atty. dela Cruz as notary public in Makati, Metro Manila, on 20 August
1992, and he entered such act in his notarial register as Doc. No. 263; Page No. 54; Book No. III; Series of 1992. Yet,
despite full knowledge that his clients were fugitives from Justice and that bench warrants of arrest [147] and warrants of
arrest[148] had been issued against his clients, Atty. dela Cruz made no effort to persuade them to surrender. A lawyer
is absolutely prohibited from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence
in the legal system.[149] Hence, lest the general public venture the thought that lawyers approve of their clients'
degeneration into outlaws, Atty. dela Cruz must explain his action, or rather, inaction which, in effect, aided the
accused in making a mockery of our judicial and penal systems.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial
Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, in Criminal Case No. C-3496 finding accused-appellant ERIC MANLUSOC guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him and each of his co-accused to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay Jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Isagani Mazon the sum of P50,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
The Court further resolved to:
(a) ADMONISH Honorable Judge MARCIANO T. VIROLA to be more circumspect in his actuations in criminal
cases to strengthen the public's trust and confidence in the criminal justice system;
(b) FURNISH the Office of the President with a copy of this Decision that it be informed and take the appropriate
action regarding the alleged harboring by the Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro of the accused who were then
fugitives from justice as of 12 May and 13 May 1992;
(c) DIRECT the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through the Director
General of the Philippine National Police, to (1) use the full force of the law to effect the re-arrest of accused M/Sgt.
Reynaldo Landicho, Pat. Johnny Bunyi, and C2C Leovino Canuel and thereafter commit them to the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and (2) conduct appropriate administrative proceedings against Superintendent
JAIME L. LASAR for gross misconduct or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and to SUBMIT to this
Court, within sixty (60) days from notice of this Decision, status reports on such re-arrest and administrative
proceedings;
(d) REQUIRE Provincial Jail Warden MENANDRO S. ABAC to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from notice
of this Decision, why he should not be held in contempt of court for the escape of the four accused on 9 May 1992;
and
(e) DIRECT Atty. RENATO DELA CRUZ to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from notice of this Decision,
why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for violation of Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Let the Office of the President, Judge Marciano T. Virola, the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, Superintendent Jaime L. Lasar, Provincial Jail Warden Menandro S. Abac, and Atty. Renato dela Cruz
be furnished with copies of this Decision.
Cost against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J, (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ, concur.

Mauricio Ulep vs The Legal Clinic

223 SCRA 378 42 SCAD 287 Legal Ethics Advertisement in the Legal Profession Practice of Law

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to
move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms. Now,
Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latters advertisements which
contain the following:
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retirees Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal Problems in Star Week
of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can
take care of a clients problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are
specialists in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a
battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US which
now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely
making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is allowed;
whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not allowed. The
Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include various legal problems
wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are
exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the
services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals.
Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyers
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his
talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of
Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of
law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best advertising possible
for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal byproduct of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial
stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal byproduct of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also
enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement:
1.

Advertisement in a reputable law list

2.

Use of ordinary simple professional card

3.

Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization