1NC plan circumvented

Reforms are not possiblethe plan will be circumvented

Greenwald 2014 (Glenn [Constitutional lawyer- patriot]; CONGRESS IS
IRRELEVANT ON MASS SURVEILLANCE. HERES WHAT MATTERS INSTEAD; Nov
19; https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/11/19/irrelevance-u-s-congressstopping-nsas-mass-surveillance/; kdf)

the last place one should look to

impose limits on the powers of the U.S. government is . . . the U.S. government .
Governments dont walk around trying to figure out how to limit their own power, and
thats particularly true of empires. The entire system in D.C. is designed at its core to prevent
real reform. This Congress is not going to enact anything resembling fundamental
limits on the NSAs powers of mass surveillance . Even if it somehow did, this White
House would never sign it. Even if all that miraculously happened, the fact that the
U.S. intelligence community and National Security State operates with no limits and
no oversight means theyd easily co-opt the entire reform process . Thats what happened after
All of that illustrates what is, to me, the most important point from all of this:

the eavesdropping scandals of the mid-1970s led to the establishment of congressional intelligence committees and a special FISA
oversight courtthe committees were instantly captured by putting in charge supreme servants of the intelligence community like
Senators Dianne Feinstein and Chambliss, and Congressmen Mike Rogers and Dutch Ruppersberger, while the court quickly
became a rubber stamp with subservient judges who operate in total secrecy. Ever since the Snowden reporting began and public

the White Houses strategy has been

obvious. Its vintage Obama: Enact something that is called reformso that he
can give a pretty speech telling the world that he heard and responded to their
concernsbut that in actuality changes almost nothing, thus strengthening the very system he can
pretend he changed. Thats the same tactic as Silicon Valley, which also supported this
bill: Be able to point to something called reform so they can trick hundreds of
millions of current and future users around the world into believing that their
communications are now safe if they use Facebook, Google, Skype and the rest . In
opinion (in both the U.S. and globally) began radically changing,

pretty much every interview Ive done over the last year, Ive been asked why there havent been significant changes from all the
disclosures.

I vehemently disagree with the premise of the question, which equates

U.S. legislative changes with meaningful changes. But it has been clear from the start that U.S.
legislation is not going to impose meaningful limitations on the NSAs powers of
mass surveillance, at least not fundamentally. Those limitations are going to come fromare now coming from very
different places: 1) Individuals refusing to use internet services that compromise their privacy. The FBI and other U.S. government
agencies, as well as the U.K. Government, are apoplectic over new products from Google and Apple that are embedded with strong
encryption, precisely because they know that such protections, while far from perfect, are serious impediments to their power of
mass surveillance. To make this observation does not mean, as some deeply confused people try to suggest, that one believes that
Silicon Valley companies care in the slightest about peoples privacy rights and civil liberties.

Yes Circumvention Drones

The plan will get circumvented, theyll find other aircraft
Stanley 2015 (Jay [Senior policy analyst, ACLU speech, privacy & tech
project]; What's spooky about the FBI's fleey of spy planes?;
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/whats-spooky-about-fbis-fleet-spyplanes; kdf)
Following up on a May story by the Washington Post about mysterious aircraft spotted circling over Baltimore, the
Associated Press reported today that the FBI maintains a secret air force with scores of small aircraft registered with
13 front companies under apparently false names, and that these planes fly over American cities frequently.
Obviously law enforcement has been using aircraft for many decades. So whats spooky about this story? Several
things:

These are not your grandparents surveillance aircraft. As I discussed when the

there are several very powerful mass-surveillance technologies that

utilize low-circling manned aircraft , including Dirtboxes and persistent wide-area
surveillance in which an entire 25-square mile area can be monitored, and vehicles
tracked, for extended periods of time by a single camera. We need more information about
Baltimore story broke,

the scope of surveillance these planes are being used for. The FBI told the AP that its fleet was not equipped,
designed or used for bulk collection activities or mass surveillance. We are glad to hear thatbut that statement
bears more interrogation. For example the AP reports that the FBI occasionally uses Dirtboxes (aka IMSI

Those certainly qualify as mass

surveillance devices. If the FBI is only using the aircraft when it has a specific
catchers or cell-site simulators) on the aircraft.

target rather than for broad fishing expeditions, that would be a good thingbut that is not
the same thing as saying that data on masses of people is not being swept up. The
FBI told the AP that under a new policy it has recently begun obtaining court orders to
use cell-site simulators. But we dont know what kind of court orders theyre getting to use the devices.
Rather than warrants, they may just be obtaining pen register orders, as we have seen
done by local police in Baltimore and elsewhere. The sheer scope of the program. A 2010 federal budget document
found by the AP mentions at least 115 planes in the FBIs fleet, and the FBI has flown over 100 flights over more

Surveillance turning inward. One trend

weve seen in the last 15 years or so is a great Turning Inward, as US surveillance
capabilities originally built to spy on the Soviet Union and other overseas targets
have swung inward on the American people. The FBI has a spy plane fleet, hidden behind shell
than 30 American cities in recent weeks, the AP found.

companies with three-letter names and headed by ghost CEOS with signatures that dont match over time its all
very CIA. Yet these are American cities that theyre flying over.

Cessnas today, drones tomorrow.

Another thing that makes these flights spooky is the prospect that manned aircraft
may soon be replaced with drones. And that will make it all the cheaper and easier to deploy these
flights all the more frequently over even more American cities and towns. And unlike manned aircraft, drones
may not be easy to track through web sites like flightradar24.com, which shows the manned aircraft

currently in the air around the world and played a key role in uncovering the FBIs air force. It is true that under
orders from President Obama the DOJ recently promulgated a privacy policy for its use of drones, but that policy is

DOJ agencies cant use the planes solely for the

purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment . That is good, but
when agencies want to do surveillance they always claim to have other reasons so
the monitoring is not solely for such monitoring. In the end, it doesnt make sense
not very airtightfor example, it says

for drones to be subject to privacy regulations, but not manned aircraft.

Manned aircraft can and do raise very real privacy concerns ; for example their use in
persistent wide-area surveillance, and in voyeurism incidents. But manned aircraft are not regulated
today, because historically they have been expensive and their use therefore
relatively rare, and their surveillance abilities well-understood and relatively limited.
What this story tells us is that their use is now more widespread than we thoughtand we know their
surveillance capabilities are growing by leaps and bounds. Drones, by raising the prospect
of endless free and easy aerial surveillance, have brought to the fore issues that already existed

with manned aircraft, and new regulations designed to protect against aerial
surveillance should not distinguish between manned and unmanned aircraft.

Law
enforcement has been using aircraft for many decades. So whats spooky about reports of FBI fleet of low-circling
planes?

Classic
The affirmative runs from the horror of existence they do not confront
suffering, and so mask it
Kain 7 (Philip J, Professor of philosophy at University of Santa Clara, "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of
Existence," the Journal of Nietzsche Studies, muse, AD: 7/2/09) jl

isn't it just obvious that we can change things, reduce

suffering, improve existence, and make progress? Isn't it just obvious that modern
science and technology have done so? Isn't it just absurd for Nietzsche to reject the
possibility of significant change? Hasn't such change already occurred? Well, perhaps not.
One might find all this unacceptable. After all,

Even modern environmentalists might resist all this obviousness. They might respond in a rather Nietzschean vein that technology

The advocate of the perfectible cosmos , on the other hand,

would no doubt counter such Nietzschean pessimism by arguing that even if technology
does cause some problems, the solution to those problems can only come from better
technology. Honesty requires us to admit, however, that this is merely a hope, not
something for which we already have evidence, not something that it is absurd to doubt
not at all something obvious. Further technology may or may not improve things . The widespread
use of antibiotics seems to have done a miraculous job of improving our health and
reducing suffering, but we are also discovering that such antibiotics give rise to even
more powerful bacteria that are immune to those antibiotics . We have largely eliminated
diseases like cholera, smallpox, malaria, and tuberculosis, but we have produced cancer
and heart disease. We can cure syphilis and gonorrhea, but we now have AIDS. Even if
we could show that it will be possible to continuously reduce suffering, it is very unlikely
that we will ever eliminate it. If that is so, then it remains a real question whether it is not
better to face suffering, use it as a discipline, perhaps even increase it, so as to toughen ourselves, rather
than let it weaken us, allow it to dominate us, by continually hoping to overcome it. But
may have caused as many problems as it has solved.

whatever we think about the possibility of reducing suffering, the question may well become moot. Nietzsche tells a story: "Once
upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a
star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but
nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to

Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering,

whatever change we think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more
than a brief and accidental moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance
will finally confirm the horror and meaninglessness of existence. The disagreement here
is not so much about the quantity of suffering that we can expect to find in the world but, rather, its
nature. For proponents of the designed cosmos, suffering is basically accidental. It is not fundamental or central to life. It is not a
die" (TL 1, 79).

necessary part of the nature of things. It does not make up the essence of existence. We must develop virtue, and then we can
basically expect to fit and be at home in the cosmos. For the proponents of a perfectible cosmos, suffering is neither essential nor

even
if we can change this or that , even if we can reduce suffering here and there, what
cannot be changed for human beings is that suffering is fundamental and central to life .
unessential. The cosmos is neutral. We must work on it to reduce suffering. We must bring about our own fit. For Nietzsche,

The very nature of things, the very essence of existence, means suffering. Moreover, it means meaningless sufferingsuffering for no

Nietzsche does not reject all forms of change .

What he rejects is the sort of change necessary for a perfectible cosmos . He rejects the notion that
science and technology can transform the essence of things he rejects the notion that human effort
can significantly reduce physical suffering. Instead, he only thinks it possible to build up the power
necessary to construct meaning in a meaningless world and thus to conceal the horror of
existence, which cannot be eliminated. We cannot prove the opposite view, and I do not think we can dismiss
reason at all. That cannot be changedit can only be concealed.

Nietzsche's view simply because it goes counter to the assumptions of [End Page 52] Christianity, science, liberalism, socialism, and

so forth. And we certainly cannot dismiss this view if we hope to understand Nietzsche. At any rate, for Nietzsche,

we cannot

eliminate suffering; we can only seek to mask it.

They spend their lives trying to create a perfect world, so that they can live
satisfied lives; it is in the product, and not the process that they find value.
This engenders hatred for life.
Paul Saurette, PhD in political theory at John Hopkins U, in 96 "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them': Nietzshce,
Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in INternational Relations Theory." Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25
no. 1 page 3-6
The Will to Order and Politics-as-Making The Philosophical Foundation of the Will to Truth/Order . I mistrust all systematizers
and avoid them. A will to a system is a lack .of ! integrity."
According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of
human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to , meaning fundamentally
influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.5 Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of
the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic
and natural. Nietzsche suggests, .therefore, that to

understand the development of our modem

conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the
Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its
philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and k
competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered
(Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and .affirmed as
inescapable aspects of human existence.6 However, this incarnation of the will to power as tragedy

weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that
had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. -Everywhere the : instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were.but five steps from
excess: the monstrum-in-animo was a universal danger. No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of preSocratic myth, Greek

thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation

which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought
became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the
idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old
Athens was coming to an endAnd Socrates understood that the world had need of him his expedient, his cure and his personal
art of self-preservation. Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread
yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An

alternate
foundation that promised mastery and control not through acceptance of the tragic life,
but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In
response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that
had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by
Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, '[rationality was divined as a saviour...it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with
which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice:
either to perish, or be absurdly rational....'9 Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework.

The

Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life
rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an
idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder
however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a
'Real World* of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World of
transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the
Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and^ ignored in relation to the ideal order of the
Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of
Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this
dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern'10 understanding of life
which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World .
This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements

of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something is to

blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment. and argues that
it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction,
however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to
Nietzsche,' ascetic

Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the

Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be
turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the
Truth, and the Real World, As Nietzsche wrote, I suffer: someone must be to blame for it thinks every sickly sheep. But his
shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: Quite so my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you
alone are to blame for yourself,-you alone are to blame for yourself '-This is brazen and.false enough: but one thing, is achieved by it,
the direction of ressentiment is altered." Faced, with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness,
once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational.... '12 The genius of the ascetic ideal
was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdiuin the Socratic division
through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through

this redirection, the Real World

was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model
towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory
experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of the relationship
between the dichotomised worlds creates the .Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to
accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment
desperately searches for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest. sleep,
in short absence of suffering According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only
when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The Will to Order, then,
is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts
of the moral-Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated
reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in
accordance with the dictates of the ideal Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve
this," however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the
Real World must be established creating an ever-increasing Will-to Truth. This selfperpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything
must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As
Nietzsche suggests, [t]he ascetic ideal has a goalthis goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when
compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no
other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.''1 The
very structure of the Will to Truth ensures that theoretical investigation must be increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True,
and closer to the perfection of the ideal. At the same time, this understanding of intellectual theory ensures that it creates practices
which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World. With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes .the
fundamental philosophical principle of modernity.

The alternative is the demonic question the ballot is an answer to the

question do you desire this innumerable times more do nothing in the
case of the plan and vote neg to say yes
Nietzsche, 87 (Friedrich Wilhelm, 1887, The Gay Science, The greatest weight, Aphorism 341)
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: " This life as you now
live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there
will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and
everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same
succession and sequenceeven this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The
eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it ,
speck of dust!" Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who
spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him:
"You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine." If this thought gained

possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The
question in each and every thing, "Do you desire this once more and
innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or
how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing
more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?

Security
The affs rejection of chaos constructs an unreal perfect world opposite
reality that they order themselves to this engenders ressentiment. They
blame the chaos that is a part of them on their neighbor, and try to
eradicated it.
Paul Saurette, PhD in political theory at John Hopkins U, in 96 "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them': Nietzshce,
Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in INternational Relations Theory." Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25
no. 1 page 3-6
The Will to Order and Politics-as-Making The Philosophical Foundation of the Will to Truth/Order . I mistrust all systematizers
and avoid them. A will to a system is a lack .of ! integrity."
According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of
human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to , meaning fundamentally
influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.5 Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of
the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic
and natural. Nietzsche suggests, .therefore, that to

understand the development of our modem

conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the
Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its
philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and k
competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered
(Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and .affirmed as
inescapable aspects of human existence.6 However, this incarnation of the will to power as tragedy
weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that
had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. -Everywhere the : instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were.but five steps from
excess: the monstrum-in-animo was a universal danger. No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of preSocratic myth, Greek

thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation

which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought

became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the
idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old
Athens was coming to an endAnd Socrates understood that the world had need of him his expedient, his cure and his personal
art of self-preservation. Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread
yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An

alternate
foundation that promised mastery and control not through acceptance of the tragic life,
but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In
response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that
had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by
Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, '[rationality was divined as a saviour...it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with

which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice:

The
Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life
rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an
idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder
however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a
'Real World* of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World of
transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the
Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and^ ignored in relation to the ideal order of the
Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of
Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this
dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern'10 understanding of life
which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World .
This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements
of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something is to
either to perish, or be absurdly rational....'9 Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework.

blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment. and argues that
it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction,
however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to
Nietzsche,' ascetic

Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the

Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be
turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the
Truth, and the Real World, As Nietzsche wrote, I suffer: someone must be to blame for it thinks every sickly sheep. But his
shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: Quite so my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you
alone are to blame for yourself,-you alone are to blame for yourself '-This is brazen and.false enough: but one thing, is achieved by it,
the direction of ressentiment is altered." Faced, with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness,
once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational.... '12 The genius of the ascetic ideal
was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdiuin the Socratic division
through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through

this redirection, the Real World

was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model
towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory
experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of the relationship
between the dichotomised worlds creates the .Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to
accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment
desperately searches for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest. sleep,
in short absence of suffering According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only
when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The Will to Order, then,
is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts
of the moral-Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated
reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in
accordance with the dictates of the ideal Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve
this," however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the
Real World must be established creating an ever-increasing Will-to Truth. This selfperpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything
must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As
Nietzsche suggests, [t]he ascetic ideal has a goalthis goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when
compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no
other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.''1 The
very structure of the Will to Truth ensures that theoretical investigation must be increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True,
and closer to the perfection of the ideal. At the same time, this understanding of intellectual theory ensures that it creates practices
which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World. With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes .the
fundamental philosophical principle of modernity.

Risk is inherent their fear of life robs them of everything worth living for.
This creates a negative Will to Power which rejects the bad parts of life.
James Der Derian, 93 professor of political science at the U Massachusetts-Amherst and prof of IR at Brown 93
"The political subject of violence" ed. David Campbell and Michael Dillon, p 101-105
Nietzsche and Interpretive Realism In the last analysis, "love

of the neighbor" is always something secondary, partly

conventional and arbitraryillusory in relation to fear of the neigh-bor. After the structure of
society is fixed on the whole and seems secure against external dangers, it is this fear of
the neighbor that again creates new perspectives of moral valuation. Friedrich Nietzsche,
Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbcss and Marx's interpretations of securi-ty through a genealogy of modes of
being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fiaional identities of
the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future.33
Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an
abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history

is one of individuals
seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death
which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities
seeking security from alien otherswho are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It

is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a
fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterprctation of security
will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he
clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security . In Beyond Good and Evil,
he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: " Physiologists should think before putting down
the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living
thing seeks above all to discharge its strengthlife itself is will to power; selfpreservation is only one of the most frequent results."34 The will to power, then, should
not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a
reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of
nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of
becoming, from which values and meaningsincluding self-preservationare produced
which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears
endemic to life, for "... life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of
what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of ones own forms,
incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitationbut why should one always use
those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche
establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to
war. But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this
suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of
differencethat which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative
will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown . Unlike the
positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search
for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the
causally sustainable. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche asks of the reader "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this
need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it
not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubi lation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?**37 The

fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to

produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign
of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate
assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In
short, the security imperative pro-duces, and is sustained by, the strategies of
knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight
of the Idols-. The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear.
The "why?*1 shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a
particular kind of causea cause (hat is comforting, liber-ating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has
not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of
explanation, to serve as a cause, but tor a particularly selected and preferred kind of
explanationthat which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the
strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations.38 A safe life
requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown
becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostilityrecycling the desire for security .
The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate
affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a

straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences."39 The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason
is relegated to the off-world. "Trust,"

the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial
strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and

composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god."40 For Nietzsche, of course,

only a false

sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error,
in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of
believing something 10 be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its 4l causes.
Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In
The Gencalo gy of Morals, Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to ones ancestors: The conviction
reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplish-ments of the ancestors that the tribe existsand that one has to pay them
back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never
cease, in their contin-ued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength/2 Sacrifices, honors,
obedience arc given but it is never enough, for The ancestors of the most powerful tribts are bound eventually to grow to monstrous
dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in
the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a god.4i As the ancestors debt becomes embedded in institutions, the
community takes on the role of creditor. Nietzsche mocks this originary, Hobbesian moment: One lives in a community, one enjoys
the advantages of communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them today), one

dwells protected, cared

for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man
outside, the "man without peace," is exposed . . . since one has bound and pledged oneself to
the community precisely with a view to injury and hostile acts.44 The establishment of
the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As
the castle wall is replaced by written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and
spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of
the individual will to power becomes the object of a collective resentment . The result? The
fear of the external other is transvalued into the "love of the neighbor " quoted in the opening of
this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured through the internalization and
legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago. This powerful nexus of fear, of
external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security
imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even individual rights, such as
freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security: - My rights - are that pan of my power
which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve . How do these
others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution : whether in that they expect
something similar from us in return (protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or
to no purpose; or in that they sec in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to
forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then:

by donation and cession.45 The

point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the
security imperativeand the western metaphysics that perpetuate ithave diminished
if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: "Our century denies this perilousncss, and docs so with a good
conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security. Christian enjoyment, recreation and
evaluation."46 Nietzsche's worry is that the collective

reaction against older, more primal fears has

created an even worse danger the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy
of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The
security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity,
uncertainty, paradoxall that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is
captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions: Of future virtuesHow comes it that the more comprehensible
the world has grown the more solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic clement of that
reverence which overcame us in the presence of everything unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the
incomprehensible and plead tor mercy? And has

the world not lost some of its charm for us because we

have grown less fearful? With the diminution of our fearrulness has our own dignity and
solemnity, our own fiarsomeness, not also diminished?47 It is of course in Nietzsche's lament, in his
deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more freespirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of Utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks
forward only so far as to sight the emergence of "new philosophers" (such as himself?) who would restore a reverence for fear and
reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche does, however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the exemplars for a
new kind of securi iv. In The Genealogy of Morals^ he holds up Pericles as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their
"rhatbymia"a term that incorporates the notion of "indifference to and contempt for security."48 It is perhaps too much to expect
Nietzsche's message to resonate in late modern times, to expect, at the very time when conditions seem most uncertain and

unpredictable, that people would treat fear as a stimulus for improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet Nietzsche

would clearly see these as opportune times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a
force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity
constructed from the calculation of risks and benefits.
The world is cold, and suffering is the only serious modality of existence
there is no escape from lifes horrors

Cioran, 10 (Emil Cioran, Romanian philosopher, The Book of Delusions, p. 62)

The desire to embrace the stars! Why

are truths so cold? When rationality was born, the sun was long since
shining. And rationality is not born out of the sun . To suffer is the supreme modality of taking the world
seriously. Thus is born the conflict between the feeling of suffering, which confers an absolute value on
the outside causes and the world, and theoretical perspective, arisen out of suffering, for which the world is
nothing. Out of this paradox of suffering there is no escape. There is a region of ultimate alternatives,
which ends in the simultaneous temptation of sainthood and of crime . Why is it that humanity produced more
criminals than saints? If man really looked for happiness as insistently as they say, why is it that he chooses with such violent
passion the downwards paths? Man

respects happiness and goodness more, but is even more attracted to

unhappiness and evil. Three quarters of humanity could have become sacred, if it wanted. But one cannot know, alas, who
revealed it to people that there is no other life than the one in hell Sainthood is the victorious struggle with
time. The way in which the saint manages to kill time within himself is mind-boggling and beyond
everything. To be in time means living in this everything . Time is the frame around this everything, and works as
everything. Sainthood: to be beyond everything, but in and with love. How monotonous the life of saints, because they can only be
saints. Sainthood: existence lived in one single absolute dimension.

Saints can also hear the voices of the world; but

they only speak of the pains that have become love; these are the voices of a single world. Let me turn to the music in
which the worlds speak, the other worlds Which solitude is the one in which the snake caresses us and licks our cheeks and
our lips? How far have we distanced ourselves from being, when only the snake can be with us? Two things that I dont
understand: nostalgia in a stupid man, and the death of a ridiculous man. All
to the way in which they do it they call themselves winners or losers.

men must destroy their lives. And according

Dicerolling
The affirmative posits themselves as masters of the theatre of policy, able to
create a new reality which more closely resembles the ideal form which
makes their plan defensible. This drive towards purification and
explanation, this will to truth, is an attempt to escape suffering and creative
potential which negates life.
Turanli 2k3 [aydan, nietzsche and the later wittgenstein, journal of nietzsche studies, issue 26, p. 61-2, muse]
The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of
how this craving arises. The

creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world,

conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the
ressentiment of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, to imagine another, more valuable
world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer : the ressentiment of
metaphysicians against actuality is here creative (WP III 579). Escaping from this world
because there is grief in it results in asceticism. Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is
longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for
a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of
metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way
for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, he
wants to escape from torture (GM III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, My kingdom is not
of this world (GM III 10). This is a longing

for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to

escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for
the truth of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy.
It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in
other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors;
therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as
it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the
world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because
it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the
will to truth is the impotence of the will to create (WP III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation
of the true world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true,
transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For

Nietzsche, on the other hand,

the transcendental world is the denaturalized world (WP III 586). The way out of the circle
created by the ressentiment of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to
truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to
existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgensteins terms aims to show the
fly the way out of the fly-bottle (PI 309).
And, the 1acs political statements are justification for their pathos of
reaction; the aff is a valorization of resistance to capture their boredom.
Activism gives them a feeling of revolution while keeping everything the
same.
Nietzsche 1887 [Fredrich, The Gay Science, pg. 117-8]
The craving for suffering - When I think of the craving to do something, which continually tickles and spurs those millions of young
Europeans who cannot endure their boredom and themselves, then I realize that they must have a craving to suffer and to find in
their suffering a probable reason for action, for deeds. Neediness

is needed! [Not ist ntig.] Hence the

politicians' clamor, hence the many false, fictitious, exaggerated "conditions of distress" of all sorts
of classes and the blind readiness to believe in them. These young people demand thatnot

unhappiness should approach from the outside and become visible; and their
imagination is busy in advance to turn it into a monster so that afterward they can fight a
monster. If these people who crave distress felt the strength inside themselves to benefit themselves and to do something for
themselves internally, then they fill the world with their clamor about distress and all too often
introduce it into the feeling of distress. They do not know what to do with themselves
and therefore paint the distress of others on the wall; they always need others! And
continually other others! Pardon me, my friends, I have ventured to paint my happiness on the wall.
happiness but

And, the affirmative attempts to extend this negative concept of mastery to

the whole event of existence to eradicate chaos. Against such an ordering,
you should affirm the free spirit as a toying with this slavish framework of
life. It is the only positive choice.
Nietzsche 1873 [On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, pg 7]
The free intellect copies human life, but it considers this life to be something good and seems to be
quite satisfied with it. That immense framework and planking of concepts to which the
needy man clings his whole life long in order to preserve himself is nothing but a
scaffolding and toy for the most audacious feats of the liberated intellect. And when it
smashes this framework to pieces, throws it into confusion, and puts it back together in an
ironic fashion, pairing the most alien things and separating the closest, it is demonstrating that it has no need of
these makeshifts of indigence and that it will now be guided by intuitions rather than by
concepts. There is no regular path which leads from these intuitions into the land of ghostly schemata, the land of abstractions.
There exists no word for these intuitions; when man sees them he grows dumb, or else he speaks only in forbidden metaphors and in

by shattering and mocking the old conceptual

barriers he may at least correspond creatively to the impression of the powerful present
intuition.
unheard-of combinations of concepts. He does this so that

And, the affirmative can always identify a particular threat to our existence.
The insecurities of the affirmative are a daily reality. Their desire for
mastery and control in response to these inherent conditions of life is a
domestication of the world which attempts to cleanse the unknown. This
isnt just about death given that we all die, but the parts of life that make it
valuable. Their act of pity negates our ability to affirm and create, making
us boring creatures without much value. Their framework for life makes
extinction desirable.
Nietzsche 1886 [fredrich, beyond good and evil, aph # 225, pg. 342]
Whether hedonism, or pessimism, or utilitarianism, or eudaimonianism (6)all these ways of thinking, which measure the value of
things according to pleasure and pain, that is, according to contingent circumstances and secondary issues, are ways of thinking in
the foreground and navet, which everyone who knows about creative forces and an artistic conscience will look down on, not
without ridicule and not without compassion. Compassion for yourselfthat is, of course, not

compassion the way you

mean the term: it's not pity for social "needs," for "society" and its sick and unlucky
people, with those depraved and broken down from the start, and with the way they lie on the ground all around us even
less is it compassion for the grumbling oppressed, the rebellious slave classes, who strive
for masterythey call it "Freedom." Our compassion is a higher compassion which sees
furtherwe see how man is making himself smaller, how you make him smallerand
there are moments when we look at your compassion with an indescribable anxiety,
where we defend ourselves against this compassionwhere we find your seriousness more dangerous than

any carelessness. You

want, if possibleand there is no wilder "if possible"to do away with suffering. What about
us? It does seem that we would prefer it to be higher and worse than it ever was! Well
being, the way you understand it, that's no goal. To us that looks like an end , a condition
which immediately makes human beings laughable and contemptible, something which
makes their destruction desirable! The culture of suffering, of great suffering, don't you realize that up to this point
it is only this suffering which has created all the things which raise man up ?
And, attempts to secure our experience of existence physically or
psychologically suppress and internalize paranoiac fear. This produces
life as a managerial project where we constantly struggle to prefect it
through security. This fuels a ressentiment that negates beauty and life.
Der Derian 95 [JAMES, ON SECURITY, PG. 29]
The will to power, then, should not be confused with a hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It
can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in
nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an
active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meaningsincluding selfpreservationare produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress
rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for "... Life itself is essentially
appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness,
imposition of ones own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation
but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been
imprinted for ages."35 elsewhere nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a
consequence of war, society itself a means to war. But the denial of this permanent
condition, the effort to disguise it with a con-sensual rationality or to hide from it with a
fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is
manifested as a collective resentment of differencethat which is not us, not certain, not
predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for
protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an
aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which
conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In the gay science, nietzsche asks of
the reader "look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual,
and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubi lation of
those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restora-tion of a sense of security?**37 the

fear of the unknown

and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life , in which causality
and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against
contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and
everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative pro-duces, and is
sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of
this generative relationship in the twilight of the idols-. The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and
excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?*1 shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for
its own sake so much as for a particular kind of causea cause (hat is comforting, liber-ating and
relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only
searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but tor a particularly selected
and preferred kind of explanationthat which most quickly and frequently abolished
the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual
explanations.38 a safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain
unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility

recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as nietzsche puts it, creates a people who
are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change,
transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences."39 the unknowable which cannot be contained
by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "trust ,"

the "good," and other common values come to rely

upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to
trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god."

And, the alternative is to affirm destiny and chance. You should take the
risk of exposing yourself to violent impacts, abandon the desire for
mastery, and embrace the unknown and unfamiliar aspects of life by
refusing to engage the 1ac. This risks danger but your mortality is
something that is certain anyway. The alternative is the only way to live life
eventfully and adventurously, through a rolling of the dice.
Deleuze 83 [GILLES, NIETZSCHE AND PHILOSOPHY, PG. 25-27]
The game has two moments which are those of a dicethrow the dice that is thrown
and the dice that falls back. Nietzsche presents the dicethrow as taking place on two
distinct tables, the earth and the sky. The earth where the dice are thrown and the sky
where the dice fall back: if ever I have played dice with the gods at their table, the earth, so that the earth trembled and
broke open and streams of fire snorted forth; for the earth is a table of the gods, and trembling with creative new words and the dice
throws of the gods (Z III The Seven Seals 3 p. 245). O sky above me, you pure and lofty sky! This is now your purity to me, that
there is no eternal reason-spider and spiders web in you; that you are to me a dance floor for divine chances, that you are to me a
gods table for divine dice and dicers (Z III Before Sunrise p. 186). But

these two tables are not two worlds.

They are the two hours of a single world, the two moments of a single world, midnight
and midday3 the hour when the dice are thrown, the hour when the dice fall back. Nietzsche insists on the two tables of life
which are also the two moments of the player or the artist; We temporarily abandon life, in order to then
temporarily fix our gaze upon it. The dicethrow affirms becoming and it affirms the
being of becoming. It is not a matter of several dicethrows which, because of their
number, finally reproduce the same combination. On the contrary, it is a matter of a single
dicethrow which, due to the number of the combination produced, comes to reproduce itself as such. It is
not that a large number of throws produce the repetition of a combination but rather the number of the combination which
produces the repetition of the dicethrow. The

dice which are thrown once are the affirmation of

chance, the combination which they form on falling is the affirmation of necessity.
Necessity is affirmed of chance in that being is affirmed of becoming and unity is
affirmed of multiplicity. It will be replied, in vain, that thrown to chance, the dice do not necessarily produce the winning
combination, the double six which brings back the dicethrow. This is true, but only insofar as the player did not know how to affirm
chance from the outset. For, just

as unity does not suppress or deny multiplicity, necessity does

not suppress or abolish chance. Nietzsche identifies chance with multiplicity, with
fragments, with parts, with chaos: the chaos of the dice that are shaken and then
thrown. Nietzsche turns chance into an affirmation. The sky itself is called chance-sky,
innocence-sky (Z III Before Sunrise); the reign of Zarathustra is called great chance (Z IV The Honey Offering and III Of Old
and New Law Tables; Zarathustra

calls himself the redeemer of chance). By chance, he is the worlds

I have released them from their servitude under
purpose . . . I have found this happy certainty in all things: that they prefer to dance on
the feet of chance (Z III Before Sunrise p. 186); My doctrine is Let chance come to me: it is as innocent as a little child!
(Z III On the Mount of Olives p. 194). What Nietzsche calls necessity (destiny) is thus never the
abolition but rather the combination of chance itself. Necessity is affirmed of chance in
as much as chance itself affirmed. For there is only a single combination of chance as
such, a single way of combining all the parts of chance, a way which is like the unity of
multiplicity, that is to say number or necessity. There are many numbers with increasing or decreasing probabilities, but only
oldest nobility, which I have given back to all things ;

one number of chance as such, one fatal number which reunites all the fragments of chance, like midday gathers together the
scattered parts of midnight. This is why it is sufficient for the player to affirm chance once in order to produce the number which
brings back the dice- throw.22 To know how to affirm chance is to know how to play. But we do not know how to play, Timid,
ashamed, awkward, like a tiger whose leap has failed. But what of that you dicethrowers! You have not learned to play and mock as a
man ought to play and mock! (Z IV Of the Higher Man 14 p. 303). The

bad player counts on several throws of the dice, on

a great number of throws. In this way he makes use of causality and probability to produce a
combination that he sees as desirable. He posits this combination itself as an end to be
obtained, hidden behind causality. This is what Nietzsche means when he speaks of the eternal spider, of the
spiders web of reason, A kind of spider of imperative and formality hidden behind the great web, the great net of causality we

To abolish chance by
holding it in the grip of causality and finality, to count on the repetition of throws rather
than affirming chance, to anticipate a result instead of affirming necessity these are
all the operations of a bad player. They have their root in reason, but what is the root of
reason? The spirit of revenge, nothing but the spirit of revenge, the spider (Z II Of the Tarantulas). Ressentiment in
the repetition of throws; bad conscience in the belief in a purpose. But, in this way, all
that will ever be obtained are more or less probable relative numbers. That the universe
has no purpose, that it has no end to hope for any more than it has causes to be known
this is the certainty necessary to play well (VP Ill 465). The dicethrow fails because chance
has not been affirmed enough in one throw. It has not been affirmed enough in order to
produce the fatal number which necessarily reunites all the fragments and brings back
the dicethrow. We must therefore attach the greatest importance to the following
conclusion: for the couple causality-finality, probability-finality, for the opposition and the synthesis
of these terms, for the web of these terms, Nietzsche substitutes the Dionysian correlation of chancenecessity, the Dionysian couple chance-destiny. Not a probability distributed over several throws but all chance at one not a
final, willed combination, but the fatal combination, fatal and loved, amor fati; not the return of a
combination by the number of throws, but the repetition of a dicethrow by the nature of the
fatally obtained number.
could say, with Charles the Bold when he opposed Louis XI, I fight the universal spider (GM III 9).

And, to affirm chance and the tragic in life is to learn to see the best in the
worst of what is necessary. This is liberation of the free intellect from the
joyless concept of life in the 1ac.
Deleuze 83 [GILLES, NIETZSCHE AND PHILOSOPHY, P 17-18]
Dionysus affirms all that appears, even the most bitter suffering, and appears in all that is
affirmed. Multiple and pluralist affirmation this is the essence of the tragic. This will become
clearer if we consider the difficulties of making everything an object of affirmation. Here the effort and the genius of pluralism are
necessary, the power of transformations, Dionysian laceration. When

anguish and disgust appear in

Nietzsche it is always at this point: can everything become an object of affirmation, that is
to say of joy? We must find, for each thing in turn, the special means by which it is affirmed, by which it ceases to be negative.2
The tragic is not to be found in this anguish or disgust, nor in a nostalgia for lost unity.
The tragic is only to be found in multiplicity, in the diversity of affirmation as such.
What defines the tragic is the joy of multiplicity, plural joy. This joy is not the result of a
sublimation, a purging, a compensation, a resignation or a reconciliation. Nietzsche can attack
all theories of the tragic for failing to recognize tragedy as an aesthetic phenomenon. The tragic is the aesthetic form
of joy, not a medical phrase or a moral solution to pain, fear or pity. 13 It is joy that is tragic. But
this means that tragedy is immediately joyful, that it only calls forth the fear and pity of the
obtuse spectator, the pathological and moralising listener who counts on it to ensure the
proper functioning of his moral sublimations and medical purgings. Thus the artistic
listener is also reborn with the rebirth of tragedy. In his place in the theatre a curious

quid pro quo used to sit with half moral, half scholarly pretensions the critic (BT 22 p.
133). And indeed, a true renaissance is needed in order to liberate the tragic from all the fear
or pity of the bad listeners who gave it a mediocre sense born of bad conscience . The antidialectical and anti-religious dream which runs through the whole of Nietzsches philosophy is a logic of multiple affirmation and
therefore a logic of pure affirmation and a corresponding ethic of joy .

The tragic is not founded on a relation of

life and the negative but on the essential relation of joy and multiplicity, of the positivity
and multiplicity, of affirmation and multiplicity. The hero is joyful, this is what has, up to now, escaped the
authors of tragedies (VP IV 50). Tragedy frank, dynamic, gaiety.