Case Assignment 0705

HANNAH
162059
EUNICE
D.
SERANA,
G.R.
No.
Petitioner,
VS
SANDIGANBAYAN and Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to

materialize.[5] The succeeding student regent,
Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De
Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa
U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils
within the state university, consequently filed a
complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and
Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.[6]
Respondents. January 22, 2008

x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government
scholar** accused, along with her brother, of
swindling government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang

iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na
kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng
bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition

for certiorari assailing the Resolutions[1] of the
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners
motion to quash the information and her motion
for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior

student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu.
A student of a state university is known as a
government scholar. She was appointed by then
President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999
as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year
term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on
December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed

with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons
Hall Annex in UP Diliman.[2] On September 4,
2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives,
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).[3]
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the

renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.[4]
President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial
assistance for the proposed renovation. The
source of the funds, according to the information,
was the Office of the President.
Case Assignment | Criminal Procedure July 5-8, 2016
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On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due

investigation, found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for
estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of
the Sandiganbayan.[7] The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III,

Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D.
SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and
penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as
follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or

subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH
EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer,
being then the Student Regent of the University
of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in
the performance of her official functions,
committing the offense in relation to her office
and taking advantage of her position, with intent
to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D.
SERANA, a private individual, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government
by
falsely
and
fraudulently
representing to former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of
the University of the Philippines will be renovated
and renamed as President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Student Hall, and for which purpose accused
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the
amount
of
FIFTEEN
MILLION
PESOS
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the
Office of the President, and the latter relying and
believing
on
said
false
pretenses
and
misrepresentation gave and delivered to said
accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated
October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN
MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check
was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian
D.
Serana
on
October
25,
2000
and
misappropriated for their personal use and
benefit, and despite repeated demands made
upon the accused for them to return aforesaid
amount, the said accused failed and refused to do
so to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.
Page 1
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She

claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have
any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over
her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No.

3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates
the crimes or offenses over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.[8] It has no
jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.[9] It only has
jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII,
Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public
Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes
Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not

the government, that was duped. Even assuming
that she received the P15,000,000.00, that
amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers
of the government.[10]
Petitioner
likewise
posited
that
the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her
person. As a student regent, she was not a public
officer since she merely represented her peers, in
contrast to the other regents who held their
positions in an ex officio capacity. She added that
she was a simple student and did not receive any
salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or

authority to receive monies or funds. Such power
was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a
whole. Since it was not alleged in the information
that it was among her functions or duties to
receive funds, or that the crime was committed in
connection with her official functions, the same is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.[11]
member of the BOR, she had the general powers

of administration and exercised the corporate
powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a
public office, petitioners stance that she was not
compensated, hence, not a public officer, is
erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part
of public office. Parenthetically, compensation
has been interpreted to include allowances. By
this definition, petitioner was compensated.[14]
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the

Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack
of merit.[15] It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of

the Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only
criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are
within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly
pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of
R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also
has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by
public officials and employees in relation to their
office. From this provision, there is no single
doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the
offense of estafa committed by a public official in
relation to his office.
Accused-movants claim that being merely a
member in representation of the student body,
she was never a public officer since she never
received any compensation nor does she fall
under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view
of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
(A) x x x
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.[12] It
disputed petitioners interpretation of the law.
Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606
clearly contains the catch-all phrase in relation to
office, thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the charges against petitioner. In the same
breath, the prosecution countered that the source
of the money is a matter of defense. It should be
threshed out during a full-blown trial.[13]
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying

the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
xxxx
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite
her protestations, was a public officer. As a
of 37
Page 2
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers

of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. (Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision

that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive
jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials
enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of
their salary grades, because the primordial
consideration in the inclusion of these officials is
the nature of their responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated

provision of law?
27 or higher under the Compensation

Position Classification Act of 1989.
and
Finally, this court finds that accused-movants

contention that the same of P15 Million was
received from former President Estrada and not
from the coffers of the government, is a matter a
defense that should be properly ventilated during
the trial on the merits of this case.[16]
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion

for reconsideration.[17] The motion was denied
with finality in a Resolution dated February 4,
2004.[18]
Issue
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the
University of the Philippines reveals that the
Board of Regents, to which accused-movant
belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers
of administration and corporate powers in the
university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate
to the ends specified by law such sums as may be
provided by law for the support of the university;
2) To prescribe rules for its own government and
to enact for the government of the university
such general ordinances and regulations, not
contrary to law, as are consistent with the
purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on
recommendation of the President of the
University, professors, instructors, lecturers and
other employees of the University; to fix their
compensation, hours of service, and such other
duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to
grant to them in its discretion leave of absence
under such regulations as it may promulgate, any
other provisions of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause
after an investigation and hearing shall have
been had.
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending

that THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT
QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING
THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN
THE INFORMATION.[19]
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold

argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is
not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she
paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was
not committed in relation to her office; (d) the
funds in question personally came from President
Estrada, not from the government.
Our Ruling
It is well-established in corporation law that the

corporation can act only through its board of
directors, or board of trustees in the case of nonstock corporations. The board of directors or
trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the
corporation.
The petition cannot be granted.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of

Regents of the University of the Philippines is
performing functions similar to those of the Board
of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws
to fore the conclusion that being a member of
such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls
within the category of public officials upon whom
this Court is vested with original exclusive
jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does
not occupy a position classified as Salary Grade
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for

certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Wellestablished is the rule that when a motion to
quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is
not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to
go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the
special defenses invoked in their motion to
quash.[20] Remedial measures as regards
interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash,
are frowned upon and often dismissed.[21] The

of 37
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to

quash is not correctible by certiorari.
Page 3
evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity

of appeals in a single action.[22]
from taking cognizance of the case except to

dismiss the same.
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate

Court,[23] the Court clearly explained and
illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the

denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by
prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for
certiorari and directed the respondent judge to
dismiss the case.
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to

dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be
subject of appeal until final judgment or order is
rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary
procedure to be followed in such a case is to file
an answer, go to trial and if the decision is
adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the
final judgment. The same rule applies to an order
denying a motion to quash, except that instead of
filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal
lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions.

If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or
motion to quash, acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is
that it would be unfair to require the defendant or
accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a
trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or offense, or is not the court of
proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave
abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary
remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate.
The following are a few examples of the
exceptions to the general rule.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon

the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the
Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and dismissed the amended
complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court

granted the petition for certiorari after the motion
to quash based on double jeopardy was denied
by respondent judge and ordered him to desist
from further action in the criminal case except to
dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order

denying the motion to quash based on
prescription was set aside on certiorari and the
criminal case was dismissed by this Court.[24]
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have
committed a grave abuse of discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the

denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court
granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the City Court of Manila and directed the
respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the

denial of a motion to quash based on lack of
jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted
the petition for prohibition and enjoined the
respondent court from further proceeding in the
case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the

denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper
venue, this Court granted the petition for
prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge
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We first address petitioners contention that the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined
by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that
petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet
quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in
her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.
[25] She repeats the reference in the instant
petition
for
certiorari[26]
and
in
her
memorandum of authorities.[27]
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a

mere clerical or typographical error. It bears
stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice
despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.
[28]
Page 4
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606,

as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the
statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order.
The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No.
1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated
to attain the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and employees, based
on the concept that public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and
shall remain at all times accountable to the
people.[29]
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No.

1606 which was promulgated on December 10,
1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.[30]
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861

on March 23, 1983, further altering the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975
approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again
amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now
stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as

amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying

the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a)
Provincial
governors,
vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
of 37
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and

other city department heads;
(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the

sangguniang
panlungsod,
city
treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying

the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval

captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while

occupying the position of provincial director and
those holding the rank of senior superintended or
higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their

assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers

of government-owned or controlled corporations,
foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof

classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to

the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional

Commission, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified

as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or

complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
Page 5
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in

connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are

occupying positions corresponding to Salary
Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive

appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or order of regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original

jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and
over petitions of similar nature, including quo
warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed
or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That
the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg.

129, as well as the implementing rules that the
Supreme Court has promulgated and may
thereafter
promulgate,
relative
to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for
review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases
elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office
of the Ombudsman, through its special
prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.
In case private individuals are charged as coprincipals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper
of 37
courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction

over them.
Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the

contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and
the corresponding civil action for the recovery of
civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in, the
same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal
action being deemed to necessarily carry with it
the filing of the civil action, and no right to
reserve the filing such civil action separately from
the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided,
however, That where the civil action had
heretofore been filed separately but judgment
therein has not yet been rendered, and the
criminal case is hereafter filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil
action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan
or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil
action shall be deemed abandoned.
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal

statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said
law represses certain acts of public officers and
private persons alike which constitute graft or
corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.[31]
Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all
prosecutions for violation of the said law should
be filed with the Sandiganbayan.[32]
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of

the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019
erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with
prohibition on private individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It

shall be unlawful for any person having family or
close personal relation with any public official to
capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such
family or close personal relation by directly or
indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift
or material or pecuniary advantage from any
other person having some business, transaction,
application, request or contract with the
government, in which such public official has to
intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse
or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the
third civil degree. The word close personal
relation shall include close personal friendship,
social and fraternal connections, and professional
employment all giving rise to intimacy which
assures free access to such public officer.
Page 6
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly

to induce or cause any public official to commit
any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No.

1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
defines graft and corrupt practices and provides
for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner

contends that estafa is not among those crimes
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that
in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the
first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606,
without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of
the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that

statutes should receive a sensible construction so
as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.[33]
Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est,
ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where
there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang
pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap
at katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute

must be expounded by reference to each other in
order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature.[34] The intention of the legislator
must be ascertained from the whole text of the
law and every part of the act is to be taken into
view.[35]
In
other
words,
petitioners
interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule
that a statute must be interpreted as a whole
under the principle that the best interpreter of a
statute is the statute itself.[36] Optima statuti
interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang
batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa
kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang
pinakamainam
na
interpretasyon
ay
ang
mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or

complexed with other crimes committed by the
of 37
subsection a of this section in relation to their

office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction

over other felonies committed by public officials
in relation to their office. We see no plausible or
sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the
offenses included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by
Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and
that (b) the offense is committed in relation to
their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,[37] the Court had occasion

to explain that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a
director of the National Parks Development
Committee, a government instrumentality. The
Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was

created originally as an Executive Committee on
January 14, 1963, for the development of the
Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national
parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later
designated as the National Parks Development
Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No.
69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos
and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated
Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O.
No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the
Bureau of Forest Development, Department of
Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter
of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD
No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC
has remained under the Office of the President
(E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations

decrees listed NPDC as a regular government
agency under the Office of the President and
allotments for its maintenance and operating
expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A,
Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was

reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v.
Sandiganbayan.[38] Pertinent parts of the Courts
ruling in Bondoc read:
Page 7
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer

Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the
simple reason that the latter would not have
jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above
intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to
hold a joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of
the government employees separately charged
for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of
the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
punishable by penalties higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a
fine of P6,000.00, committed by government
employees in conspiracy with private persons,
including Bondoc. These crimes are within the
exclusive,
original
jurisdiction
of
the
Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken
cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from
the fact that even if the cases could be so
transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be
possible.
Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public

officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not
the first or likely the last time that We will be
called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr.
v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is
difficult to pin down the definition of a public
officer.[39] The 1987 Constitution does not define
who are public officers.
Rather, the varied
definitions and concepts are found in different
statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court held

that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty

created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual
is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by
him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public
Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a
public office under our political system is
therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it
exists at all only because and by virtue of some
law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring
it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing
as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or
even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one
can be said to have any vested right in an office
or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

of 37
In Laurel v. Desierto,[41] the Court adopted the

definition of Mechem of a public office:
A public office is the right, authority and duty,

created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual
is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public. The individual
so invested is a public officer.[42]
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer

with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular
tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft
of merit. It is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over
other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In
Geduspan v. People,[43] We held that while the
first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by
express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is
placed there by express provision of law.[44]
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly

vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations,
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR
performs functions similar to those of a board of
trustees of a non-stock corporation.[45] By
express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a
public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover,
it
is
well
established
that
compensation is not an essential element of
public office.[46] At most, it is merely incidental
to the public office.[47]
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in

the public office. An investment in an individual of
some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public makes one a public officer.
[48]
The administration of the UP is a sovereign

function in line with Article XIV of the
Constitution.
UP
performs
a
legitimate
Page 8
governmental function by providing advanced

instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences,
and arts, and giving professional and technical
training.[49] Moreover, UP is maintained by the
Government and it declares no dividends and is
not a corporation created for profit.[50]
The offense charged was committed

in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming

that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan
would still not have jurisdiction over the offense
because it was not committed in relation to her
office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or

authority to act without the approval of the BOR.
She adds there was no Board Resolution issued
by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then
President Estrada; and that her acts were not
ratified by the governing body of the state
university. Resultantly, her act was done in a
private capacity and not in relation to public
office.
It is contended anew that the amount came from

President Estradas private funds and not from the
government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge
has no leg to stand on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that

the funds came from the Office of the President
and not its then occupant, President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is
averred that petitioner requested the amount of
Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine
Currency, from the Office of the President, and
the latter relying and believing on said false
pretenses and misrepresentation gave and
delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No.
91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of
Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00).
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan

observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is
a matter of defense that should be ventilated
during the trial on the merits of the instant case.
[54]
A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by

the averments in the information.[51] More than
that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or
the theories set up by defendant or respondent in
an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to
quash.[52] Otherwise, jurisdiction would become
dependent almost entirely upon the whims of
defendant or respondent.[53]
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in

no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a
student regent of U.P., while in the performance
of her official functions, committing the offense in
relation to her office and taking advantage of her
position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her
brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government x x x.
(Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on

the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not
quash the information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits.
of 37
As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G.

dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from
Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion
to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his
memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge
petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically
Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that a lawyer shall
not misquote or misrepresent.
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in

Pangan v. Ramos,[55] where Atty Dionisio D.
Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in
connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled
that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a
name different from that with which he was
authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos
and warned that a repetition may warrant
suspension or disbarment.[56]
We admonish petitioners counsel to be more

careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyers
conduct before the court should be characterized
by candor and fairness.[57] The administration of
justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act
with complete candor and honesty before the
courts.[58]
Page 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit.
SO ORDERED.
since she merely represents her peers, in

contrast to the other regents who held their
positions in an ex officio capacity.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for

lack of merit.
DIGEST:
Serana vs Sandiganbayan (Remedial Law)
ISSUE:
Hannah Serana
WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the offense charged and over Serana
v.
Sandiganbayan
HELD:
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
FACTS:
Serana was a senior student of UP-Cebu
who was also appointed by Pres. Estrada as
student regent of UP to serve a one-year
term from Jan.1, 2000 to Dec. 31, 2000. On
Sept. 2000, petitioner together with her
siblings and relatives, registered with the
SEC the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc (OSFRI). On of the projects
of the OSFRI was the renovation of Vinzons
Hall in UP Diliman, and Pres. Estrada gave
P15M as financial assistance for the said
project. The source of funds, according to
the information, was the Office of the
President.
However,
the
renovation
failed
to
materialize. The succeeding student regent
and system-wide alliances of students
conseguently
filed
a
complaint
for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property
with
the
Ombudsman.
After
due
investigation, the Ombudsman instituted a
criminal case against Serana and her
brother, charging them of Estafa.
Serana moved to quash the Information,

contending that the Sandiganbayan does
not have jurisdiction over the offense
charged nor over her person in her capacity
as UP student regent. She contends that
Estafa falls under Crimes Against Property
and not on the chapter on Crimes
Committed by Public Officers, only over
which, she argues, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction. Furthermore, she argues that it
was not the governement that was duped,
but Pres. Estrada, because the money came
from the Office of the President and not
from government funds. As to jurisdiction
over her person, she contends that as a UP
student regent, she is not a public officer
10 of 37
YES. Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan; Crime

of Estafa. Plainly, estafa is one of those
felonies within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan,
subject
to
the
twin
requirements that: 1) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD No. 1606,
as amended, and that; 2) The offense is
committed in relation to their office.
It is well-established that compensation is

not an essential element of public office. At
most, it is merely incidental to the public
office. Delegation of sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercised by him for
the benefit of the public makes one a public
officer.
A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. A

public office is the right, authority, and duty
created and conferred by law, by which for
a given period, either fixed or enduring at
the pleasure of the power, an individual is
interested with some portion of sovereign
functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the
public.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers

Board of Regents. The Sandiganbayan, also
has jurisdiction over the other officers
enumerated in PD No. 1606. In Geduspan v.
People, the SC held that while the first part
of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary
grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provisions of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is
placed there by express provisions of law.
Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly
vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
over Presidents, directors and trustees, or
manager
of
government-owned
or
controlled corporations, state universities,
Page
or educational foundations. Petitioner falls

under this category. As the Sandiganbayan
pointed out, the Board of Regents performs
functions similar to those of a board of
trustee of a non-stock corporation. By
express mandate of law, petitioner is,
indeed, a public officer as contemplated by
PD No. 1606.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXX
G.R. No. 168539
March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on

certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Third
Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June
2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed
against herein respondent for alleged violation of
Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A.
3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an

offshoot of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
which nullified the various contracts awarded by
the Government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to
Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the
construction, operation and maintenance of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport International
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent
to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L.
Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several individuals for
alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those
charged was herein respondent, who was then
the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having
supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary
Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a
contract which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy

Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict, among others, herein respondent for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there
was likewise a finding of probable cause against
11 of 37
Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted

because he died prior to the issuance of the
resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005,

respondent was charged before the SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or

subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then
Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), committing the
offense in relation to his office and taking
advantage of the same, in conspiracy with
accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of
the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and
criminally
enter
into
a
Concession
Agreement, after the project for the construction
of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III)
was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO,
which
Concession
Agreement
substantially
amended the draft Concession Agreement
covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under
Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act
7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on
Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption
by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in
the event of the latter's default under Article IV,
Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06
of the Concession Agreement, which terms are
more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government of
the Republic of the Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.

28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to

wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days

from today within which to show cause why this
case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused
considering that the accused is a private person
and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged
co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an
accused in this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order

contending that the SB has already acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent by
reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed
a motion for consolidation and when he posted
bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has
Page
exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case,

even if he is a private person, because he was
alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to

Quash7 the Information filed against him on the
ground that the operative facts adduced therein
do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause
order of the SB, also contended that,
independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile,
the public officer with whom he was alleged to
have conspired, respondent, who is not a public
officer nor was capacitated by any official
authority as a government agent, may not be
prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed

Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused

Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it
appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in
this case is a private person and his alleged coconspirator-public official was already deceased
long before this case was filed in court, for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the
Court grants the Motion to Quash and the
Information filed in this case is hereby ordered
quashed and dismissed.9
THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

OF RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE
FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR
HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY

ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE
EQUAL
PROTECTION
CLAUSE
OF
THE
CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION
AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In

addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into

any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or
not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following

issues, to wit:
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;

ERRED
AND
DECIDED
A
QUESTION
OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW
OR
APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE
IN
GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN
DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE
GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction

on behalf of the government; and
II

ERRED
AND
DECIDED
A
QUESTION
OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING
12 of 37
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly

and
manifestly
disadvantageous
to
the
government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule

that private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if found
guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under
Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the
avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress
certain acts of public officers and private persons
alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or
Page
which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling

doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous
cases, among which is a case involving herein
private respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the

present petition is whether herein respondent, a
private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in
violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the
public officer, with whom he was alleged to have
conspired, has died prior to the filing of the
Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death

of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who
was charged in the Information and, as such,
prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
therefor.16 This means that everything said,

written or done by any of the conspirators in
execution or furtherance of the common purpose
is deemed to have been said, done, or written by
each of them and it makes no difference whether
the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at
the time of trial.17 The death of one of two or
more conspirators does not prevent the
conviction of the survivor or survivors.18 Thus,
this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense.

One person cannot conspire alone. The crime
depends upon the joint act or intent of two or
more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one
person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long
as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does
not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy,
one defendant may be found guilty of the
offense.19
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's

death, there is no longer any public officer with
whom respondent can be charged for violation of
R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the
allegation of conspiracy between them can no
longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy
is already expunged. The only thing extinguished
by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal
liability. His death did not extinguish the crime
nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent.
Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile
does not mean that there was no public officer
who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019.
In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary
Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of
R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should
have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be

indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must
be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a
public officer. The law, however, does not require
that such person must, in all instances, be
indicted together with the public officer. If
circumstances exist where the public officer may
no longer be charged in court, as in the present
case where the public officer has already died,
the private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged coconspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If
two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any
act done by any of them pursuant to the
agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of
each of them and they are jointly responsible
13 of 37
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention

that, as alleged in the Information filed against
respondent, which is deemed hypothetically
admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he
(respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in
violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence,
the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator
is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that

the avowed policy of the State and the legislative
intent to repress "acts of public officers and
private persons alike, which constitute graft or
corrupt practices,"20 would be frustrated if the
death of a public officer would bar the
prosecution of a private person who conspired
with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft
Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early

case of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of
and the principles governing conspiracy, as
construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is
instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more

persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when
the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as
in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of
conspiracy known to the common law is not an
indictable offense in the Philippines. An
agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible
act from the view-point of morality, but as long as
the conspirators do not perform overt acts in
furtherance of their malevolent design, the
Page
sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the

tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a

common scheme, a felony is committed by two or
more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy
assumes pivotal importance in the determination
of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the
significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this
Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be

imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit
a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes
a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of
a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases
a fact of vital importance, when considered
together with the other evidence of record, in
establishing the existence, of the consummated
crime and its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved,

all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their
respective active participation in the commission
of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance
of the conspiracy because in contemplation of
law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing
rule is anchored on the sound principle that
"when two or more persons unite to accomplish a
criminal object, whether through the physical
volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or
collectively, each individual whose evil will
actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law
responsible for the whole, the same as though
performed by himself alone." Although it is
axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than
his own, "when two or more persons agree or
conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible
for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance
of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition
of collective liability upon the conspirators is
clearly explained in one case where this Court
held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the
separate liability of each (conspirator) without
taking into consideration the close and
inseparable relation of each of them with the
criminal act, for the commission of which they all
acted by common agreement x x x. The crime
must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act
and intent which existed between the x x x
accused, be regarded as the act of the band or
party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the

malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective
liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not
speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
14 of 37
degree of participation of each of the

perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of
course, as to any conspirator who was remote
from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn
within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it
be proved that through his moral ascendancy
over the rest of the conspirators the latter were
moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the

conspirators in the scheming and execution of the
crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them
the act of any one of them. It is in this light that
conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate
indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing
criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our

jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved,
all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of
the common design are liable as co-principals.
This rule of collective criminal liability emanates
from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The
concerted action of the conspirators in
consummating their common purpose is a patent
display of their evil partnership, and for the
consequences of such criminal enterprise they
must be held solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private

respondent should be found guilty of conspiring
with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the
absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in
nature and involves evidentiary matters.23
Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against
respondent is better left ventilated before the
trial court during trial, where respondent can
adduce evidence to prove or disprove its
presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and

Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to
Resolve25 that in a different case, he was
likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy
with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the
same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly
entering
into
another
agreement
(Side
Agreement) which is separate from the
Concession Agreement subject of the present
case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a Resolution,
granted respondent's motion to quash the
Information on the ground that the SB has no
jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The
prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution
before this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No.
Page
168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31,

2005, this Court denied the petition finding no
reversible error on the part of the SB. This
Resolution became final and executory on January
11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this
Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be
applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be

reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R.
No. 168919, he already posted bail for his
provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion
for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091.
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that
private respondent's act of posting bail and filing
his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with
jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well
settled that the act of an accused in posting bail
or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is
tantamount to submission of his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.27
purpose, the defendant is deemed to have

submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction
over the person."
Verily,
petitioners
participation
in
the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not
confined to his opposition to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest but also covered other matters
which called for respondent courts exercise of its
jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to
deny said courts jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any

special appearance to question the jurisdiction of
the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail
and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his
Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case
No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order
requiring the prosecution to show cause why the
case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over his person.
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought

before a competent court by virtue of a warrant
of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the
submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the
court he must raise the question of the courts
jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the
complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to
the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction
over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs.
Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78,

86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the

defendant may be waived either expressly or
impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears,
he is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to
waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be
deemed to have submitted himself to that
jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion

for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person, it must be for the sole
and separate purpose of objecting to said
jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other
15 of 37
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point

out that the instant case involves a contract
entered into by public officers representing the
government. More importantly, the SB is a special
criminal court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A.
3019 committed by certain public officers, as
enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A.
8249. This includes private individuals who are
charged
as
co-principals,
accomplices
or
accessories with the said public officers. In the
instant case, respondent is being charged for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in
conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally,
under the law, both respondent and Secretary
Enrile should have been charged before and tried
jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by
reason of the death of the latter, this can no
longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already
discussed, it does not follow that the SB is
already divested of its jurisdiction over the person
of and the case involving herein respondent. To
rule otherwise would mean that the power of a
court to decide a case would no longer be based
on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other
factors, such as the death of one of the alleged
offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition

involve matters which are mere incidents in the
main case and the main case has already been
pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of
the case to the Regional Trial Court would further
delay the resolution of the main case and it
would, by no means, promote respondent's right
to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his
case.
Page
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2,
2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed
with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of
Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
G.R. No. 158763
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are

hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of
active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional
Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad

is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest
for the apprehension of private respondents Jose
"Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3
Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in
said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
March 31, 2006

The factual and procedural antecedents of the
case are as follows:
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and

ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18
December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June
2003 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the
assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge

Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the
instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE
COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17,

2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint
Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order
dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2)
Informations for Murder, all issued by public
respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another
entered
UPHOLDING,
AFFIRMING[,]
and
REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and
Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then
acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
16 of 37
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were

discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela,
which were later identified as the dead bodies of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the
witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against

SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan,
SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu,
SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22

April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the
accused and sentenced them to two counts of
reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was
yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large.
The case was appealed to this Court on automatic
review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted
the accused therein on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was

arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto
P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado
Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for

murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and
Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession
of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued
warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.
Page
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent

motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the
warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July

2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said
urgent motion on the ground that, since the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the
motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In
the
meantime,
petitioners
appealed
the
resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the
Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge

Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and
issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of
Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the
cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued
against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied
this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an
Order dated 21 September 2001. State
Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao
moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint
Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge
Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001
and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint
Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a

petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge
Anghad from further proceeding with the case,
and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders
of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21
September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22
October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a

Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a
temporary restraining order against Judge
Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal
cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution,
Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the two Informations
for murder against petitioners. On 19 November
2001, this Court took note of respondents cash
bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15
November 2001, and issued the temporary
restraining order while referring the petition to
the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the
merits.
committed contempt of court when he issued on

15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November
2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On
21 November 2001, we referred said motion to
the Court of Appeals in view of the previous
referral to it of respondents petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals

rendered the assailed decision granting the
petition and ordering the reinstatement of the
criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well
as the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved
for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the
same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June
2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed,

petitioners bring forth to this Court the following
assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of

Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting
aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D.
Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21,
2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001
issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and
36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and
reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by
then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan,
on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek
any judicial relief if he does not submit his person
to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of

Appeals
gravely
erred
in
directing
the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and
36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of
Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago
City, Philippines, and in ordering the public
respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest
against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion
to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging
that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully
17 of 37
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of

Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering
Page
the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523

and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal
cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of
Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the
public respondent to issue warrants of arrest
against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal
issued therein having become final and
executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of

arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, nor custody of law over
the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the

petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals ruling
that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he

does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of
the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the
accused may be acquired either through
compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or
through his voluntary appearance, such as when
he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is
only when the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over his person that an accused may
invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs.
Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764,
November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first
be placed in the custody of the law before the
court may validly act on his petition for judicial
reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of

Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and
Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since
they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived
of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent
Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to
reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of
arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of

Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is required only in
applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners
argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their
person is required before the court can act on
their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest,
such jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by the court by their filing of the above
Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is

required only in the adjudication of applications
for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of
Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
18 of 37
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary

for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the accused to dismiss the case or
grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the
case even before the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is authorized
under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs.
Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed
on motion of the accused for lack of probable
cause without the accused having been arrested.
In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA
307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance
of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review
by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs.
Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court
ordered
the
case
transferred
from
the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually
ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of
probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction

over their person was already acquired by their
filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners
invoke our pronouncement, through Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused,

whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to
the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or
other pleadings requiring the exercise of the
courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On
the matter of bail, since the same is intended to
obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a
rule the same cannot be posted before custody of
the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a

distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is
required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8
Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is acquired upon
his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can
be under the custody of the law but not yet
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue
of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to
quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be
Page
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his

person, and yet not be in the custody of the law,
such as when an accused escapes custody after
his trial has commenced. 11 Being in the custody
of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby deprived of his own will and liberty,
binding him to become obedient to the will of the
law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over
the body of the accused. It includes, but is not
limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13

cited by the Court of Appeals should not have
been separated from the issue in that case, which
is the application for admission to bail of
someone not yet in the custody of the law. The
entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico
reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in

the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of
his liberty. A person who has not submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no
right to invoke the processes of that court.
Respondent
Judge
should
have
diligently
ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and
that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of
the accused before considering the application
for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in

Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as
a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief
is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of
Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings,
constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where

there is the special requirement of the applicant
being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v.
Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail
is to secure ones release and it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.
Thus, bail is the security required and given for
the release of a person who is in the custody of
law." The rationale behind this special rule on
bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to
the former pernicious practice wherein the
accused could just send another in his stead to
post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction
of the court by his personal appearance therein
and compliance with the requirements therefor.
17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that

filing
pleadings
seeking
affirmative
relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the
19 of 37
consequent submission of ones person to the

jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of
pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which
only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, whether or not other
grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in
criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a
warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences
of the fact that failure to file them would
constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person. The third is a
consequence of the fact that it is the very legality
of the court process forcing the submission of the
person of the accused that is the very issue in a
motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in

criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived by the accused when
he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief,
except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow
cases involving special appearances, an accused
can invoke the processes of the court even
though there is neither jurisdiction over the
person nor custody of the law. However, if a
person invoking the special jurisdiction of the
court applies for bail, he must first submit himself
to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special

appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the
accused is deemed to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking
affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no
requirement for him to be in the custody of the
law. The following cases best illustrate this point,
where we granted various reliefs to accused who
were not in the custody of the law, but were
deemed to have placed their persons under the
jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these
cases involve the application for bail, nor a
motion to quash an information due to lack of
jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to
quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the

accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground
of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing
the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge
therein from further proceeding with the case
and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
Page
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the

accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to
Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest
on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review
with the Department of Justice, we directed
respondent judge therein to cease and desist
from further proceeding with the criminal case
and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests
against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the

prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the
Sandiganbayan,
we
directed
the
Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to
the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance
of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to

require custody of the law in applications for bail
are not present in motions to quash the warrant
of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to
persons not in the custody of the law, it is
foreseeable that many persons who can afford
the bail will remain at large, and could elude
being held to answer for the commission of the
offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other
hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest
to persons not in the custody of the law, it would
be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled
to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because
it is the same judge who issued the warrant of
arrest who will decide whether or not he followed
the Constitution in his determination of probable
cause, and he can easily deny the motion to
quash if he really did find probable cause after
personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of

regularity of official functions, the warrant
continues in force and effect until it is quashed
and therefore can still be enforced on any day
and at any time of the day and night.22
Furthermore, the continued absence of the
accused can be taken against him in the
determination of probable cause, since flight is
indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail

to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to
require one to surrender his freedom before
asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher
preference in the hierarchy of rights than
property rights,23 demanding that due process in
the deprivation of liberty must come before its
taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a

subsequently filed petition for review with the
20 of 37
Secretary of Justice and based on doubts

engendered by the political climate constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in

the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge
Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing
the criminal cases against the petitioners. First,
he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued
by his predecessor because of a subsequently
filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and
because of his doubts on the existence of
probable cause due to the political climate in the
city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice
affirmed the prosecutors resolution, he dismissed
the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of
this Court in another case with different accused,
doing so two days after this Court resolved to
issue a temporary restraining order against
further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the

arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed
the assistant prosecutors resolution before the
Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after
assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on
the basis of said appeal. According to Judge
Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and
because of comity, a deferment of the
proceedings is but proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion.

It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as
lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when
he issued the warrants of arrest against
petitioners just because the petitioners might, in
the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors
resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if
the petition for review was filed before the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact
remains that the pendency of a petition for the
review of the prosecutors resolution is not a
ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the

petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the
filing of the information in court against them on
the ground that they still have the right to appeal
the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the
Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners herein
should not have been quashed as premature on
the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for

the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if
true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge
Anghad asked and resolved the question:
Page
In these double murder cases, did this Court

comply or adhere to the above-quoted
constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article
III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of
Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited
decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a
deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court,
through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit
in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose
"Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following

provision of the Constitution as having been
violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be
seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of

the case, including the supporting evidence to
the resolution of the prosecutor in his
determination of probable cause, we find that
Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
The records of the case show that the

prosecutors certification was accompanied by
supporting documents, following the requirement
under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31
The supporting documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State

Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto

Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of

Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto

Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional

Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case
No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel

Maderal;
According to petitioners:
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge

Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is
apparent from the face of the order itself, which
clearly stated that the determination of probable
cause was based on the certification, under oath,
of the fiscal and not on a separate determination
personally made by the Judge. No presumption of
regularity could be drawn from the order since it
expressly and clearly showed that it was based
only on the fiscals certification.28
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans

Joint Order contains no such indication that he
relied solely on the prosecutors certification. The
Joint Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of

the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine
the existence of a probable cause by personally
evaluating the records x x x.[29]
21 of 37
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer

Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there

was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge
Anghad, however, focused on the substantive
part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable
cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge
Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2
Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1)
it was given after almost two years in the custody
of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was
given by someone who rendered himself
untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years;
(3) it was given in exchange for an obvious
reward of discharge from the information; and (4)
it was given during the election period amidst a
"politically charged scenario where "Santiago City
Page
voters were pitted against each other along the

lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former
City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that
of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the
other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the

case and found no reason to disturb the findings
of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate

on the credibility of a witness is not within the
province of the determination of probable cause.
As we held in Webb33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on

evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and was committed
by the suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well
put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable
cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it
requires "less than evidence which would justify x
x x conviction." A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is
not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of

guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of
trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a

decision of this Court in another case with
different accused constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest

on the ground, among other things, that there
was a petition for review of the assistant
prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of
Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice
affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge
Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal
cases against the petitioners on the basis of the
following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People

vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila,
and based from his sworn statements, he
pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and
with him and the other police officers as the
direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision
of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of
22 of 37
murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a

"narration of falsehood and lies" and that
because of the decision acquitting said officers
"who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel
Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now
beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made
untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements
and therefore the same is without probable
value." This Court agrees with the defenses
views. Indeed, of what use is Maderals
statements when the Supreme Court rejected the
prosecutions evidence presented and adduced in
Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is
supposed to turn state witness in these two (2)
cases but with the Supreme Court decision
adverted to, the probative value of his
statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the

accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001,
praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2)
murder charges in view of the latest decision of
the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs.
Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting
the accused therein and in effect disregarding all
the evidence presented by the prosecution in that
case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for]
murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered
dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge

Anghad had no right to twist our decision and
interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who
was still at large when the evidence of the
prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A
decision, even of this Court, acquitting the
accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of
the dismissal of criminal case against different
accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge
Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that
our decision in Leao was based on reasonable
doubt. We never ruled in Leao that the crime did
not happen; we just found that there was
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused
therein, since the prosecution in that case relied
on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is
not even the situation in the criminal cases of the
petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an
eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leao
furthermore had no motive to kill respondent
Tuliaos son, whereas petitioners herein had been
implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our

finding of reasonable doubt in Leao, "it is now
beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made
untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements
and therefore the same is without probable
Page
value."35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the

use of our decision in Leao, an acquittal on the
ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the
probability of the prosecutions version of the
facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly
meets the criteria of probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads

dismissal of the informations two days after we
resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a
temporary restraining order prohibiting him from
further proceeding with the case. The bond was
filed the day after the informations were
dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was
able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary
restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the
informations (days after this Courts resolve to
issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild
suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries

with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside
by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners

claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or
reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge
Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to
issue apparently new warrants of arrest.36
According to the petitioners, it was an error for
the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a
personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals

ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or
merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants
of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a
matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight
inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to
affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in
this case where the other dispositions of the
Court of Appeals point to the other direction.
Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25
June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which
issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court
of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings
conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the
declaration of nullity of proceedings should be
deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the
orders set aside by the nullified proceedings.
Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of
arrest had been nullified; therefore those
warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed
unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had

directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest
based on a determination of probable cause, it
would have been legally permissible for them to
23 of 37
do so. The records of the preliminary

investigation had been available to the Court of
Appeals, and are also available to this Court,
allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court
to personally examine the records of the case and
not merely rely on the certification of the
prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno
and Roberts
v. Court of Appeals, the
determination of probable cause does not rest on
a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those
cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of
the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion, in the same vein, we can also
overrule the decision of a judge reversing a
finding of probable cause, also on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement

of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners

claim that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524,
alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein
had become final and executory. According to
petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that

the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November
14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were
assailed in the private respondent Tuliaos
Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition
filed by the private respondent before the Court
of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first
page of the assailed Decision, only the following
Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned
by private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14,

2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 363524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed
Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals
should not have passed upon the validity or
nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38
Page
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent

Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus was filed not with the Court of
Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals
decided the case because we referred the same
to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution.
Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001,
around three weeks before the 14 November
2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November
2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no
time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite
Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that
Judge
Anghad
"deliberately
and
willfully
committed contempt of court when he issued on
15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November
2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On
21 November 2001, we referred said motion to
the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous
referral of respondent Tuliaos petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion

to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places the
14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the
case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming
that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this
Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order,
respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad
an act much more serious than grave abuse of
discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad

issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15
November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the
effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In
said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved
to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliaos filing
of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00.
Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15
November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge

Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to
lawful orders of a court and abuse of court
processes are cases of indirect contempt which
require the granting of opportunity to be heard on
the part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite
public respondent in contempt and for other
reliefs just and equitable under the premises
should be construed to include a prayer for the
nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case

dismissed before arraignment does not constitute
double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be
invoked where the accused has not been
arraigned and it was upon his express motion
that the case was dismissed.40
24 of 37
As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the

original petition for certiorari as well as in his
motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge
Anghad from further proceeding with the case,
we hold that the number of instances of abuse of
discretion in this case are enough to convince us
of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad.
We further resolve to follow the case of People v.
SPO1 Leao,41 by transferring the venue of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to
the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section
4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision

dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution
dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be
transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the

Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of
Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the
transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after
receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of

Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to report to
this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days
from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall

proceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten
(10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is

likewise directed to report to this Court
compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10)
days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are

raffled is directed to act on said cases with
reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed

to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the
apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda,
Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused
Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
Page
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this

Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED.
Costs against Petitioners.
and circulated in the aforesaid newspaper, in its

issue of July 13, 1996 an article which reads as
follows:
SO ORDERED.
Humarap sa ilang reporters si Jordan Castillo hindi

para magkaroon ng writeups kundi para ituwid
lang ang ilang bagay na baluktot at binaluktot
pang lalo ng isang Toto Trinidad.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
[G. R. No. 156747. February 23, 2005]
ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR.,

and ALFIE LORENZO, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSELITO TRINIDAD,
respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the
Decision[1] dated 22 March 2002 and Resolution
dated 6 January 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 22067 entitled, People of the
Philippines v. Alfie Lorenzo, et al.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie

Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and
Roger Parajes, columnist, publisher, managing
editor, and editor, respectively of the newspaper
Abante were charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, with the crime of
libel. The information, which was raffled off to
Branch 93 of said court, reads:
The undersigned accuses ALFIE LORENZO, ALLEN

MACASAET, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., ROGER B.
PARAJES and JORDAN CASTILLO, of the crime of
LIBEL, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1996 in

Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused ALFIE
LORENZO,
columnist,
ALLEN
MACASAET,
publisher, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., managing editor,
ROGER B. PARAJES, editor, respectively of Abante
a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, and JORDAN CASTILLO, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one
another, with evident intent of exposing JOSELITO
MAGALLANES TRINIDAD, a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD
a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD to public hatred, dishonor,
discredit and contempt and ridicule, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
maliciously write, publish, exhibit and circulate
and/or cause to be written, published, exhibited
25 of 37
Hindi namin naging barkada si Joey Trinidad. Bah,

Toto na pala siya ngayon. Anong palagay niya sa
sarili niya, si Direk Toto Natividad siya?
Nakikibuhat lang talaga yang taong yan sa amin
sa Liberty Ave. noon. Ni hindi nga pinapansin ni
Tito Alfie yan dahil nga sa amoy-pawis siya
pagkatapos mag-barbell. Kami naka-shower na, si
Joey punas lang nang punas sa katawan niya ng
T-shirt niyang siya ring isusuot niya pagkatapos
na gawing pamunas!
Madalas ngang makikain sa amin yan noon. Galit

na galit nga ang mayordoma naming si Manang
Hilda noon dahil nagkukulang ang rasyon namin
dahil dagdag pakainin nga yang si Joey. Tamangtama nga lang sa amin ang kanin at ulam, pero
sinusugod pa niya ang kaldero para magkayod ng
natitirang tutong sa kaldero. Naaawa nga ako
madalas diyan kaya sineshare ko na lang ang
pagkain ko sa kanya.
Ewan ko kung anong naisipan ng taong yan at

pagsasalitaan pa niya ng masama si Tito Alfie.
Hindi man lang siya tumanaw ng utang na loob
na kahit konti at kahit na sandali ay naitawid ng
gutom niya. Hindi ko alam kung may kunsenya pa
ang gangyang klaseng tao, pero sana naman ay
makunsensya ka, Pare!
Madalas nga itinatago ka na nga namin ni Tito

Alfie para hindi mahighblood sa iyo, ganyan pa
ang gagawin mo. Napupuyat nga si Manang Hilda
sa pagbabantay sa iyo at hindi makatulog ang
matanda hanggat hindi ka pa umuuwi,
magsasalita ka pa ng mga inimbento mo. Pati nga
si Eruel ay madalas mabanas sa iyo, natatandaan
mo pa ba, dahil sa kakulitan mo! Pilit mo kaming
binubuyo na sabihin kay Tito Alfie na tulungan ka
rin tulad ng tulong na ibinibigay ni Tito Alfie na
pag-aalaga sa amin. Pero hate na hate ka nga ni
Tito Alfie dahil sa masamang ugali, natatandaan
mo pa ba yun? Kaya tiyak ko na imbento mo lang
ang lahat ng pinagsasabi mo para makaganti ka
kay Tito Alfie, ani Jordan sa mga nag-interbyu sa
kanyang legitimate writers.
Hindi na siguro namin kailangan pang dagdagan

ang mga sinabi ng sinasabi ni Toto Trinidad na
Page
mga barkada niya at kapwa niya kuno Liberty

Boys!
thereby publicly imputing a crime, vice or defect,

real or imaginary or an act, omission, condition,
status or circumstance and causing in view of
their publication, discredit and contempt upon
the person of said JOSELITO MAGALLANES
TRINIDAD a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO
TRINIDAD, to his damage and prejudice.[2]
In an Order dated 16 July 1997, Judge Apolinario

D. Bruselas, Jr., presiding judge of RTC, Branch 93,
Quezon City, set the arraignment of the
petitioners on 27 August 1997.[3]
On 22 August 1997, petitioners filed before the

court a quo an Urgent Motion to Suspend
Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings dated 21
August 1997 claiming that they intended to
elevate the adverse Resolution of the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for review. Despite
this motion, the scheduled arraignment of
petitioners pushed through on 27 August 1997.
During said proceeding, petitioners Lorenzo and
Quijano, Jr., together with their co-accused
Parajes and Castillo, refused to enter any plea
and so the trial court ordered that a plea of not
guilty be entered into the records on their behalf.
[4] As for petitioner Macasaet, his arraignment
was rescheduled to 20 October 1997 due to his
failure to attend the previously calendared
arraignment.
On 12 September 1997, petitioners filed a Motion

to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction over the
offense charged. According to petitioners, as the
information discloses that the residence of
private respondent was in Marikina, the RTC of
Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the
case pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases

of written defamations as provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense[5] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Subsequently, on 23 September 1997, the trial

court received by way of registered mail,
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and to
26 of 37
Withdraw Plea dated 3 September 1997.[6]

Petitioners argued therein that the trial court
committed grave error when it denied the
petitioners
Urgent
Motion
to
Suspend
Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings and
continued with the scheduled arraignment on 27
August 1997. According to petitioners and their
co-accused, by the trial judges denial of their
Urgent Motion to Defer Arraignment and/or Defer
Proceedings, he had effectively denied them their
right to obtain relief from the Department of
Justice. Moreover, banking on the case of Roberts,
et al. v. Court of Appeals,[7] the petitioners and
their fellow accused contended that since they
had already manifested their intention to file a
petition for review of the Resolution of the city
prosecutor of Quezon City before the DOJ, it was
premature for the trial court to deny their urgent
motion of 21 August 1997. Finally, petitioners and
their co-accused claimed that regardless of the
outcome of their petition for review before the
DOJ, the withdrawal of their not guilty pleas is in
order as they planned to move for the quashal of
the information against them.
In an Order dated 26 September 1997,[8] Judge

Bruselas, Jr., ruled that with the filing of the
Motion to Dismiss, the court considers the
accused to have abandoned their Motion for
Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea and sees
no further need to act on the same.
In his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated

23 September 1997,[9] the public prosecutor
argued that the RTC, Quezon City, had jurisdiction
over the case. He maintained that during the
time material to this case, private respondent
(private complainant below) was a resident of
both 28-D Matino St. corner Malumanay St.,
Sikatuna Village, Quezon City and Karen St.,
Paliparan, Sto. Nio, Marikina, Metro Manila, as
shown in his Reply-Affidavit of 11 October 1996
filed during the preliminary investigation of the
case.
For their part, the petitioners and their coaccused countered that it was incorrect for the
public prosecutor to refer to the affidavit
purportedly executed by private respondent as it
is axiomatic that the resolution of a motion to
quash is limited to a consideration of the
information as filed with the court, and no other.
Further, as both the complaint-affidavit executed
by private respondent and the information filed
before the court state that private respondents
residence is in Marikina City, the dismissal of the
case is warranted for the rule is that jurisdiction is
determined solely by the allegations contained in
the complaint or information.[10]
Page
On 16 October 1997, petitioners and their fellow

accused filed a Supplemental Reply[11] attaching
thereto certifications issued by Jimmy Ong and
Pablito C. Antonio, barangay captains of Barangay
Malaya, Quezon City and Barangay Sto. Nio,
Marikina City, respectively. The pertinent portion
of the barangay certification[12] issued by
Barangay Captain Ong states:
This is to certify that this office has no record on

file nor with the list of registered voters of this
barangay regarding a certain person by the name
of one MR. JOSELITO TRINIDAD.
This further certifies that our BSDOs (have) been

looking for said person seeking information
regarding his whereabouts but to no avail.
On the other hand, the certification[13] issued by

Barangay Captain Antonio, reads in part:
This is to certify that JOSELITO TRINIDAD of legal

age, single/married/separate/widow/widower, a
resident of Karen Street, Sto. Nio, Marikina City is
a bonafide member of this barangay.
...
This is being issued upon request of the abovenamed person for IDENTIFICATION.
During the hearing on 20 October 1997, the trial

court received and marked in evidence the two
barangay certifications. Also marked for evidence
were page 4 of the information stating the
address of private respondent to be in Marikina
City and the editorial box appearing in page 18 of
Abante indicating that the tabloid maintains its
editorial and business offices at Rm. 301/305, 3/F
BF Condominium Bldg., Solana cor. A. Soriano
Sts., Intramuros, Manila. The prosecution was
then given five (5) days within which to submit its
comment to the evidence submitted by the
petitioners and their fellow accused.
In his Rejoinder to Supplemental Reply,[14]

private
respondent
contended
that
the
certification issued by the barangay captain of
Barangay Malaya was issued after he had already
moved out of the apartment unit he was renting
in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City; that owners of
residential houses do not usually declare they
rent out rooms to boarders in order to avoid
payment of local taxes; and that there is no
showing that a census was conducted among the
27 of 37
residents of Barangay Malaya during the time he

resided therein.
As regards the certification issued by the

barangay chairman of Sto. Nio, Marikina City,
private respondent argued that it is of judicial
notice that barangay and city records are not
regularly updated to reflect the transfer of
residence of their constituents and that a perusal
of said certification reveals that the barangay
captain did not personally know him (private
respondent). Finally, private respondent claimed
that his receipt of the copy of petitioners Appeal
to the DOJ, which was sent to his alleged address
in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, proved that he
did, in fact, reside at said place.
On 24 November 1997, the trial court rendered

an Order dismissing the case due to lack of
jurisdiction.[15] The court a quo noted that
although the information alleged the venue of
this case falls within the jurisdiction of Quezon
City, the evidence submitted for its consideration
indicated otherwise. First, the editorial box of
Abante clearly indicated that the purported
libelous article was printed and first published in
the City of Manila. In addition, the trial court
relied on the following matters to support its
conclusion
that,
indeed,
jurisdiction
was
improperly laid in this case: a) on page 4 of the
information, the address of private respondent
appeared to be the one in Marikina City although
right below it was a handwritten notation stating
131 Sct. Lozano St., Barangay Sacred Heart, QC;
b) the two barangay certifications submitted by
the petitioners; and c) the Memorandum for
Preliminary Investigation and Affidavit-Complaint
attached to the information wherein the given
address of private respondent was Marikina City.
On 03 December 1997, private respondent filed a

motion for reconsideration[16] insisting that at
the time the alleged libelous article was
published, he was actually residing in Quezon
City. According to him, he mistakenly stated that
he was a resident of Marikina City at the time of
publication of the claimed defamatory article
because he understood the term address to mean
the place where he originally came from.
Nevertheless, the error was rectified by his
supplemental affidavit which indicated Quezon
City as his actual residence at the time of
publication of the 13 July 1996 issue of Abante.
On 22 January 1998, private respondent filed a

supplemental motion for reconsideration to which
he attached an affidavit executed by a certain
Cristina B. Del Rosario, allegedly the owner of the
house and lot in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City,
where private respondent supposedly lived from
July 1996 until May 1997. She also stated in her
Page
affidavit that she was not aware of any inquiry

conducted by the barangay officials of Barangay
Malaya regarding the residency of private
respondent in their locality.
Through an Order dated 12 February 1998, the

trial court denied private respondents motion for
reconsideration, ruling thus:
[Del Rosarios] affidavit appears to have been

executed only on 19 January 1998 to which fact
the court can only chuckle and observe that
evidently said affidavit is in the nature of a
curative evidence, the weight and sufficiency of
which is highly suspect.[17]
Undaunted,
the
public
and
the
private
prosecutors filed a notice of appeal before the
court a quo.[18] In the Decision now assailed
before us, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the trial courts conclusion and ordered the
remand of the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings. The dispositive portion of the
appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order

dated November 24, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, in Criminal Case
No. Q-97-71903, dismissing the case filed against
herein accused-appellees on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and a new one entered remanding the case to the
court a quo for further proceedings.[19]
The Court of Appeals held that jurisprudentially, it

is settled that the residence of a person must be
his personal, actual or physical habitation or his
actual residence or abode and for the purpose of
determining venue, actual residence is a persons
place of abode and not necessarily his legal
residence or domicile.[20] In this case, the defect
appearing on the original complaint wherein the
residence of private respondent was indicated to
be Marikina City was subsequently cured by his
supplemental-affidavit submitted during the
preliminary investigation of the case. Moreover,
as the amendment was made during the
preliminary investigation phase of this case, the
same could be done as a matter of right pursuant
to the Revised Rules of Court.[21]
As for the barangay certifications issued by the

barangay chairmen of Barangay Malaya and
Barangay Sto. Nio, the Court of Appeals ruled that
they had no probative value ratiocinating in the
following manner:

28 of 37
. . . With respect to the requirement of residence

in the place where one is to vote, residence can
mean either domicile or temporary residence
(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution A Primer, 3rd Ed.,
p. 209). Therefore, one who is a resident of
Quezon City can be a voter of Marikina if the
latter is his domicile. Conversely, a person
domiciled in Marikina can vote in Quezon City if
he resides in the latter. It is just a matter of
choice on the part of the voter. Thus, logic does
not support the supposition that one who is not a
registered voter of a place is also not a resident
theref. Furthermore, the right to vote has the
corollary right of not exercising it. Therefore, one
need not even be a registered voter at all. The
same principle applies to the certification issued
by the barangay in Marikina.[22]
The appellate court likewise gave weight to the

affidavit executed by Del Rosario and observed
that petitioners failed to controvert the same.
The petitioners thereafter filed a motion for

reconsideration which was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution promulgated on 6 January
2003.[23]
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME
CHARGED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN ADMITTING THE AFFIDAVIT OF CRISTINA
B. DEL ROSARIO.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING

RESPONDENT
TRINIDADS
PERSONALITY
TO
APPEAL A CRIMINAL CASE.[24]
Petitioners insist that the evidence presented

before the trial court irrefutably established the
fact that private respondent was not a resident of
Quezon City at the time the alleged libelous
Page
publication saw print. According to them, the

information dated 10 July 1997 filed before the
RTC of Quezon City indicated private respondents
address to be in Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. Nio,
Marikina City. Further supporting this claim were
the affidavit-complaint[25] and the memorandum
for
preliminary
investigation[26]
where
references were explicitly made to said address.
Thus, petitioners are of the view that the Court of
Appeals erred in relying on the supplemental
affidavit executed by private respondent claiming
that its execution amounted to nothing more than
a mere afterthought.
In addition, petitioners argue that the appellate

court erred when it took into account the affidavit
executed by Del Rosario. They insist that its
belated submission before the trial court and the
prosecutions failure to present the affiant to
testify as regards the veracity of her statements
undermined the evidentiary value of her affidavit.
More, as the affidavit was not formally offered as
evidence, it was only proper that the trial court
disregarded the same in dismissing the case.
Finally,
petitioners
contend
that
private
respondent did not have the requisite personality
to appeal from the decision of the trial court as it
is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
which is authorized by law to institute appeal of
criminal cases. Thus, the Court of Appeals made a
mistake in holding that -
While it is true that only the OSG can file an

appeal representing the government in a criminal
proceeding, the private complainant nevertheless
may appeal the civil aspect of the criminal case.
The case at bar was dismissed due to the alleged
improper laying of venue resulting in the alleged
lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and not based
on the merits of the case. It cannot therefore be
argued that private complainants appeal pertains
to the merits of the criminal case as what
happened in accused-appellees cited case in the
motion to strike, VicentePalu-ay vs. Court of
Appeals (GR No. 112995, July 30, 1998). Needless
to say, the private complainant has an interest in
the civil aspect of the dismissed criminal case
which he had the right to protect. In the interest
of justice and fair play, therefore, the Brief filed
by private complainant in the present case should
be treated as pertaining only to the civil aspect of
the case.[27]
In his Comment/Opposition dated 25 April 2003,

[28] private respondent reiterated his position
that the RTC of Quezon City had jurisdiction over
this libel case. According to him, the affidavit
executed by Del Rosario, the alleged owner of the
house he leased in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City,
established, beyond doubt, that he resided in said
29 of 37
place during the time the claimed defamatory

article appeared on the pages of Abante. In
addition, he draws attention to the fact that
petitioners and their co-accused furnished him a
copy of the petition for review, filed before the
DOJ, at the aforementioned address in Quezon
City.
Anent the affidavit of Del Rosario, private

respondent maintains that the prosecution
exerted efforts to present the affiant before the
trial court. Unfortunately, Del Rosario was out of
town when she was supposed to be presented
and so the public and the private prosecutors
decided to submit for resolution their motion for
reconsideration sans the affiants testimony. Citing
the case of Joseph Helmuth, Jr. v. People of the
Philippines, et al.,[29] private respondent avers
that this Court had previously admitted the
affidavits of witnesses who were not presented
during the trial phase of a case.
As regards the petitioners contention that he

(private respondent) did not have the personality
to bring this case to the appellate level, private
respondent contends that the proper party to file
the Notice of Appeal before the trial court is the
public prosecutor as what happened in this case.
On its part, the OSG filed its Comment dated 07

July 2003[30] wherein it prayed for the dismissal
of this petition based on the following: First, as
the petition is concerned with the determination
of the residence of private respondent at the time
of the publication of the alleged libelous article,
Rule 45 should be unavailing to the petitioners
because this remedy only deals with questions of
law.
Second, venue was properly laid in this case as

private respondents residency in Quezon City
during the time material to this case was
sufficiently established. The OSG claims that the
errors appearing in the memorandum for
preliminary investigation and in the affidavit
complaint with regard to private respondents
residence
were
corrected
through
the
supplemental
affidavit
private
respondent
executed during the preliminary investigation
before the Quezon City prosecutors office.
Third, the OSG takes the view that the public

prosecutor was the proper party to file the notice
of appeal before the trial court since its (OSGs)
office is only authorized to bring or defend
actions on appeal on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is
brought before this Honorable Court of the Court
of Appeals.
Page
We find merit in the petition and therefore grant

the same.
Jurisdiction has been defined as the power

conferred by law upon a judge or court to try a
case the cognizance of which belongs to them
exclusively[31] and it constitutes the basic
foundation of judicial proceedings.[32] The term
derives its origin from two Latin words jus
meaning law and the other, dicere meaning to
declare.[33] The term has also been variably
explained to be the power of a court to hear and
determine a cause of action presented to it, the
power of a court to adjudicate the kind of case
before it, the power of a court to adjudicate a
case when the proper parties are before it, and
the power of a court to make the particular
decision it is asked to render.[34]
In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that

venue is jurisdictional. Thus, the place where the
crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction.[35] In the case of Uy v. Court of
Appeals and People of the Philippines,[36] this
Court had the occasion to expound on this
principle, thus:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be

acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense
should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to
try the offense allegedly committed therein by
the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over
a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of
the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.[37]
The law, however, is more particular in libel

cases. The possible venues for the institution of
the criminal and the civil aspects of said case are
concisely outlined in Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4363. It provides:
Art. 360. Persons responsible. - . . .

30 of 37
The criminal action and civil action for damages

in cases of written defamations as provided for in
this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense: Provided,
however, That where one of the offended parties
is a public officer whose office is in the City of
Manila at the time of the commission of the
offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or
province where the libelous article is printed and
first published, and in case such public officer
does not hold office in the City of Manila, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where he held office at the
time of the commission of the offense or where
the libelous article is printed and first published
and in case one of the offended parties is a
private individual, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published.
In Agbayani v. Sayo,[38] we summarized the

foregoing rule in the following manner:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official

or a private person, the criminal action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the

criminal action may also be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province where he actually
resided at the time of the commission of the
offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose

office is in Manila at the time of the commission
of the offense, the action may be filed in the
Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding

office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense.[39]
In the case at bar, private respondent was a

private citizen at the time of the publication of
the alleged libelous article, hence, he could only
file his libel suit in the City of Manila where
Abante was first published or in the province or
Page
city where he actually resided at the time the

purported libelous article was printed.
A perusal, however, of the information involved in

this case easily reveals that the allegations
contained therein are utterly insufficient to vest
jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City. Other than
perfunctorily stating Quezon City at the beginning
of the information, the assistant city prosecutor
who prepared the information did not bother to
indicate whether the jurisdiction of RTC Quezon
City was invoked either because Abante was
printed in that place or private respondent was a
resident of said city at the time the claimed
libelous article came out. As these matters deal
with the fundamental issue of the courts
jurisdiction, Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, mandates that either one of
these statements must be alleged in the
information itself and the absence of both from
the very face of the information renders the latter
fatally defective. Sadly for private respondent,
the information filed before the trial court falls
way short of this requirement. The assistant city
prosecutors failure to properly lay the basis for
invoking the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City,
effectively denied said court of the power to take
cognizance of this case.
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench

and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to
reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the case of
Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue

of the criminal action for written defamation, the
complaint
or
information
should
contain
allegations as to whether, at the time the offense
was committed, the offended party was a public
officer or a private individual and where he was
actually residing at that time. Whenever possible,
the place where the written defamation was
printed and first published should likewise be
alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non
if the circumstance as to where the libel was
printed and first published is used as the basis of
the venue of the action.[40]
Anent private respondent and OSGs contention

that the supplemental affidavit submitted during
the preliminary investigation of this libel suit
cured the defect of the information, we find the
same to be without merit. It is jurisprudentially
settled that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal
case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information.[41] In resolving a
motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction,
the general rule is that the facts contained in the
complaint or information should be taken as they
are.[42] The exception to this rule is where the
Rules of Court allow the investigation of facts
31 of 37
alleged in a motion to quash[43] such as when

the ground invoked is the extinction of criminal
liability, prescriptions, double jeopardy, or
insanity of the accused.[44] In these instances, it
is incumbent upon the trial court to conduct a
preliminary trial to determine the merit of the
motion to dismiss. As the present case obviously
does not fall within any of the recognized
exceptions, the trial court correctly dismissed this
action.
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals

likewise put premium on the affidavit executed by
Del Rosario which was attached to private
respondents
supplemental
motion
for
reconsideration. According to the appellate court,
said document supports private (respondents)
claim that indeed, he was a resident of Quezon
City at the time the alleged libelous article was
published.[45] The pertinent provision of the
Rules of Court, under Rule 10, Section 6 thereof,
states:
Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of

a party the court may, upon reasonable notice
and upon such terms as are just, permit him to
serve a supplemental pleading setting forth
transactions, occurrences or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sought
to be supplemented. The adverse party may
plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of
the order admitting the supplemental pleading.
By the very nature of a supplemental pleading, it

only seeks to reinforce and augment the
allegations contained in the principal pleading. It
does not serve to supplant that which it merely
supplements; rather, it ought to co-exist with the
latter. Further, the admission of a supplemental
pleading is not something that parties may
impose upon the court for we have consistently
held that its admittance is something which is
addressed to the discretion of the court.[46]
Explicit in the aforequoted provision of the Rules

of Court is the requirement that the contents of a
supplemental
pleading
should
deal
with
transactions, occurrences or events which took
place after the date of the pleading it seeks to
supplement. A reading of the supplemental
motion for reconsideration filed by private
respondent discloses no additional or new
matters which transpired after he filed his original
motion for reconsideration. The fact that he
attached thereto the affidavit of his alleged lessor
fails to persuade us into giving to said
supplemental motion the same evidentiary value
as did the Court of Appeals. For one, private
respondent did not even bother to explain the
reason behind the belated submission of Del
Rosarios affidavit nor did he claim that he exerted
Page
earnest efforts to file it much earlier in the

proceedings. He must, therefore, bear the
consequences of his own lethargy.
Finally, we come to the issue of whether the

private prosecutor and the public prosecutor had
the personality to file the notice of appeal before
the trial court. Petitioners insist that the OSG
should have been the one to file said notice in its
capacity as the sole representative of the
[g]overnment in the Court of Appeals in criminal
cases.[47]
Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the

specific powers and functions of the OSG was to
represent the government in the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings. This provision has been carried over
to the Revised Administrative Code particularly in
Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without
doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. In
such capacity, it only takes over a criminal case
after the same has reached the appellate courts.
[48]
The next question should then be: when does the

jurisdiction of the trial court end and that of the
Court of Appeals commence? Happily, the
Revised Rules of Court is clear on this point. Rule
41, Section 9 of the Rules states that (i)n appeals
by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case upon the perfection of the appeals
filed in due time and the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties.[49] When a party
files a notice of appeal, the trial courts jurisdiction
over the case does not cease as a matter of
course; its only effect is that the appeal is
deemed perfected as to him.[50] As explained by
our former colleague, Justice Florenz Regalado
. . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains

jurisdiction over the case. However, where all the
parties have either thus perfected their appeals,
by filing their notices of appeal in due time and
the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed
for those who did not do so, then the trial court
loses jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of
the last notice of appeal or the expiration of the
period to do so for all the parties.[51]
Applied to the case at bar, we deem it proper that

the notice of appeal was filed by the private and
the public prosecutors before the trial court. The
Rules cannot be any clearer: until the filing of the
last notice of appeal and the expiration of the
period to perfect an appeal by all the parties, the
lower court still has jurisdiction over the case. It is
only after the occurrence of these two incidents
32 of 37
when the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals

begins and at which time the OSG is supposed to
take charge of the case on behalf of the
government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision dated 22 March 2002 and Resolution
dated 6 January 2003 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the 24
November 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, dismissing
Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903 is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
G.R. No. L-53373
June 30, 1987
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge,
CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th
Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL,
RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial

court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal
case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom
the case was elevated for review, may refuse to
grant the motion and insist on the arraignment
and trial on the merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de

Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl.
Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set for
arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer
arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the
information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the
presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul,
denied the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration
of the order was denied in the order of August 5,
Page
1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August

18, 1977 to afford nine for petitioner to elevate
the matter to the appellate court. 3
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is

hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock
in the moming.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with

prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was
filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an
order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals
restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused until further orders of
the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the
Solicitor General he recommended that the
petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978
a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals
granting the writ and perpetually restraining the
judge from enforcing his threat to compel the
arraignment of the accused in the case until the
Department of Justice shall have finally resolved
the petition for review. 7
SO ORDERED. 11
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of

Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the
fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused. 8 A motion
to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed
by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with
the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the
letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order
of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was
given time to file an opposition thereto. 10 On
November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion
and set the arraigniment stating:
ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed

by the procuting fiscal premised on insufficiency
of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary
of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion
wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged
to move for dismissal for the reason that the
check involved having been issued for the
payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability
of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to

resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence
not before it but on that adduced before the
Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only
disregards the requirements of due process but
also erodes the Court's independence and
integrity, the motion is considered as without
merit and therefore hereby DENIED.
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or
temporary restraining order in the Court of
Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining
order was issued by the Court of Appeals against
the threatened act of arraignment of the accused
until further orders from the Court. 13 In a
decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining
order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for
reconsideration of said decision filed by the
accused was denied in a resolution of February
19, 1980. 15
Hence this petition for review of said decision was

filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that
said decision be reversed and set aside,
respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from
enforcing his threat to proceed with the
arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal
case, declaring the information filed not valid and
of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent
Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the
obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second

Division of this Court without giving due course to
the petition required the respondents to comment
to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss,
within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment
filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that
the petition be given due course, it being
meritorious. Private respondent through counsel
filed his reply to the comment and a separate
conunent to the petition asking that the petition
be dismissed. In the resolution of February 5,
1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved
to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the
resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En
Banc resolved to give due course to the petition.
Petitioner and private respondent filed their

respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed
a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be
reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to
dismiss the information.
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions

either
commenced
by
complaint
or
by
33 of 37
Page
information shall be prosecuted under the

direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The
institution of a criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not
file the complaint or information, follow or not
fonow that presented by the offended party,
according to whether the evidence in his opinion,
is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The reason
for placing the criminal prosecution under the
direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent
malicious or unfounded prosecution by private
persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the
complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the
power vested in them by law, not only have the
authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons
who, according to the evidence received from the
complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime
committed within the jurisdiction of their office.
21 They have equally the legal duty not to
prosecute when after an investigation they
become convinced that the evidence adduced is
not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22
It is through the conduct of a preliminary

investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the
existence of a puma facie case that would
warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts
cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and
control of the criminal prosecution. It is not
prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel
the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally
initiated by him on an information, if he finds that
the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for
conviction. 24 Neither has the Court any power to
order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information
within a certain period of time, since this would
interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of
criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks
for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of
evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that
grant the same commit no error. 26 The fiscal
may re-investigate a case and subsequently
move for the dismissal should the re-investigation
show either that the defendant is innocent or that
his guilt may not be established beyond
reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between
the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal
who did, or between the fiscal and the offended
party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's
should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand,
neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a
writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to
restrain a criminal prosecution 29 except in the
extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts
to do so for the orderly administration of justice
or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law
in an op pressive and vindictive manner. 30
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is

not without any limitation or control. The same is
subject to the approval of the provincial or city
fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case
34 of 37
maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the

Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm,
modify or reverse the action or opinion of the
fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may
direct that a motion to dismiss the rase be filed in
Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in
Court. 31
The filing of a complaint or information in Court

initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the
authority to hear and determine the case. 32
When after the filing of the complaint or
information a warrant for the arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial court and the
accused either voluntarily submited himself to
the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. 33
The preliminary investigation conducted by the

fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a
prima
facie
case
exists
warranting
the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon
the filing of the information in the proper court. In
turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal action
against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal
find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case, at such stage, the permission of the Court
must be secured. After such reinvestigation the
finding and recommendations of the fiscal should
be submitted to the Court for appropriate action.
34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in court or not, once
the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be
proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed
for the consideration of the Court, 35 The only
qualification is that the action of the Court must
not impair the substantial rights of the accused.
36 or the right of the People to due process of
law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not

and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by
the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice
whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to
the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
discretion may grant the motion or deny it and
require that the trial on the merits proceed for the
proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to

grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal
upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will
there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state
prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be
designated by the Secretary of Justice who does
not believe that there is a basis for prosecution
Page
nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the

prosecution of the case thereby defying the
superior order of the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or

prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is
done and not necessarily to secure the conviction
of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in
spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty
of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of
evidence of the prosecution to the Court to
enable the Court to arrive at its own independent
judgment as to whether the accused should be
convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk
from the responsibility of appearing for the
People of the Philippines even under such
circumstances much less should he abandon the
prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of
a private prosecutor for then the entire
proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least
that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear
for the prosecution although he may turn over
the presentation of the evidence to the private
prosecutor but still under his direction and
control. 38
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once

a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case
is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to
the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation

whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of
Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of

merit without pronouncement as to costs.

35 of 37
SO ORDERED.
Is the trial court bound by the Resolution of
the Secretary of Justice withdrawing the
Information filed against the accused? May
the judge insist on the arraignment and
trial on the merits of the accused even after
the motion to dismiss was filed by the
prosecutor?
This is the core issue for resolution in the

case of Mario. An information for Estafa was
filed against him by the prosecutor in the
lower court in Lucena City.
During the
scheduled arraignment, he moved to defer
his arraignment on the ground that there
was a pending Petition for Review before
the Secretary of Justice of his case. The
lower court denied the motion, as well as
the
motion
for
reconsideration,
but
deferred the arraignment so the accused
can elevate his quandary to the appellate
court.
He elevated the matter to the Court of

Appeals, to which the Office of the Solicitor
General sided with him.
The Court of
Appeals restrained the lower court from
proceeding with the arraignment of the
accused until such time that the Secretary
of Justice acted on the accuseds petition.
The then Undersecretaty of Justice reversed

the Resolution filed by the Provincial
Prosecutor, thus the provincial fiscal filed a
motion to dismiss the information attaching
thereto the letter of the Undersecretary of
Justice. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss the information, citing among
others that the motion seeks to dismiss the
case based on evidence not before it, and
the motion erodes the independence and
integrity of the court.
The Court of Appeals initially restrained the

lower court from proceeding with the
arraignment
but
later
dismissed
the
petition of Mario and lifted the restraining
order.
Mario appealed the decision of the Court of

Appeals to the Supreme Court.
Is the trial court bound by the Resolution of

the Secretary of Justice withdrawing the
Information filed against the accused? May
the judge insist on the arraignment and
trial on the merits of the accused even after
Page
the motion to dismiss was filed by the

prosecutor?
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is

that once a complaint or information is filed
in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of
the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the
best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case
filed by the fiscal should be addressed to
the Court who has the option to grant or
deny the same. It does not matter if this is
done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation.

whereby the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal
may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a
petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court.
The matter should be left entirely for the
The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a
complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case
is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to
the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of
Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
36 of 37
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from

the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the
X
WHAT IS A PRIVATE CRIME?

> Private offense which cannot be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved
party
> Only to give deference to the offended party
who may prefer not to file the case instead of
going through a scandal of a public trial
ART. 344. PROSECUTION OF PRIVATE CRIMES
I. Necessity of a complaint i.e a formal
denunciation indicating that the victim and
her family opt not to keep the incident a
private matter but to bring it out in the
open in order to prosecute the offender
A. In Adultery and Concubinage: the

complaint can only be initiated by the
offended spouse who must still be married
to the guilty spouse at the time of the
bringing of the complaint, and not when the
marriage has already been annulled or
voided at the time when the action was
brought.
1. against both guilty parties if both are alive
2. provided there was no prior consent or pardon
B. In Acts of Lasciviousness and abduction,

the complaint must be initiated by the
following enumerated persons.
NOTE: The enumeration is both exclusive
(no other person has the personality to file
except those in the enumeration) and
successive (the order of preference must be
followed) :
1. Victim or offended party unless the

victim is incapacitated by reasons other
than minority. If she is of legal age, she
alone can bring the action.
2. By either of the parents if the victim is a
minor
who
refuses
to
file,
or
is
incapacitated as when she is demented or
insane
Page
3. By either of the Grandparents

4. By the legal or the court appointed
guardian
5. By the state as parens patriae when the
victim dies or becomes incapacitated before
she can file the complaint and has no known
parent, grandparents or guardian
nto
co-principals
by
direct
accomplices and accessories
participation),
ART. 345. CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS

GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
I. They include:
II. Defenses in Acts of Lasciviousness and

Abduction
A. Indemnification of the offended party.

Moral damages is recoverable in acts of
lasciviousness by the victim as well by the
parents
A. Pardon by the Offended Party
B. Acknowledgement of the offspring,

unless the law should prevent him from so
doing
1. The pardon must be express
C. To support the offspring
2. If the offended party is of legal age and is not

otherwise incapacitated, she alone can extend a
valid pardon
3. If a minor but of sufficient discretion, the victim
can extend a valid pardon if she has no parent,
otherwise the pardon must be concurred by the
parent, grandparent or guardian
B. A valid Marriage between the Offended

and the Offender i.e contracted in good
faith
1. extinguishes the criminal liability ( case will be
dismissed) or remits the penalty ( accused will
not suffer the penalty anymore).
2.
This
benefits
the
co-principals
(by
indespensable cooperation and inducement but

37 of 37
1. In the following
acknowledgement :
there
can
be
no
(a). in cases of adultery and concubinage

(b). where the offended party is married,
provided that paternity is not that of the
husband
(c). when paternity can not be determined.
Note that DNA testing is accepted to
determine paternity
2. Where there are several accused and

paternity can not be determined, all must
give support.
Page

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HANNAH

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to

Respondents. January 22, 2008

MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III,

That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not

She further contended that she had no power or

member of the BOR, she had the general powers

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated

27 or higher under the Compensation

Finally, this court finds that accused-movants

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending

In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold

It is well-established in corporation law that the

The petition cannot be granted.

It is unmistakably evident that the Board of

We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for

Case Assignment | Criminal Procedure July 5-8, 2016

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to

evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity

from taking cognizance of the case except to

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate

In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the

As a general rule, an order denying a motion to

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions.

In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon

In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the

In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the

We first address petitioners contention that the

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606,

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No.

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and

(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof