What are we to make of Kants doctrine of spontaneity?

Is it in a coherent relationship with

time? What role does it play in the Critique of Pure Reason? These are some of the questions that
we will be pursuing in this paper. In what follows, we shall attempt to demonstrate that the doctrine
of spontaneity is, as it is postulated in the Critique, indeed incoherent. Although we suggest another
perspective from which to re-interpret spontaneity and time, such an interpretation is beyond the
scope of this paper.
We will begin this discussion on the concept of spontaneity in the Critique with an
investigation of what the thing-in-itself is. Already we find ourselves in an absurd situation, for it is
just the thing-in-itself that we cannot determine by the copula is. What is the thing-in-itself? The
thing-in-itself is nothing to us; we cannot even say this; we cannot know whether the thing-in-itself
is; we cannot affirm of the thing-in-itself is or is not. The thing-in-itself is the difference between
knowing and not knowing. It is the limit of knowing. Knowing ends with the thing-in-itself. The
thing-in-itself is defined negatively and in opposition to what we can and do know. The thing-initself is a concept that delimits the field of knowledge and the extent of knowing. Thus, we should
not be surprised then when the first thing Kant says about the thing-in-itself is that we "must leave
the thing in itself as indeed real per se, but not known by us."Bxx1
What is the concept of thing-in-itself? The concept of the thing-in-itself is also defined as the
noumenon.A249/B305 Noumenon comes from the Greek word nooumenon, which is the present
participle of the verb no-e: perceive by the mind, apprehend, think, consider, reflect, consider,
deem, presume to be so and so, think out, devise, conceive, purpose, intend, bear a certain sense,
mean.
However, for Kant, the concept of noumenon means intelligible entity, which is closer to the
meaning of Greek word no-sis: intelligence, understanding, opp. aesthesis. The meaning of the
word noumenon that Kant is interested in is intellectual, intelligible, intelligence, intellect, as
opposed to sensible, sensibility, sensuous, aesthetic, appearance, phenomenon, empirical, material,
temporal, spatial. Noumenality signifies intellectuality, though a certain kind or mode of
intelligence.
Through our faculties of knowledge, sensible intuition and discursive understanding, or
intellect, we can only know objects, as appearances, [which are] sensible entities
(phenomena)B306 Thus noumenon is the opposite of phenonmenon, which is what our sensible
intuition and discursive intelligence is limited to knowing. Here we come to an understanding of
what the thing-in-itself means when we asserted that it was the limit of our knowledge and
knowing. This characterises the negative sense of noumenon. Noumenon as a thing so far as it is
not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it.B307 This is
why Kant can say The doctrine of sensibility is likewise the doctrine of the noumenon in the
negative sense.B307 Our sensible intuition curbs the delusions of human understanding and
reason, calling out to them and telling them that whatever they claim to know must be verifiable in
experience.
Yet, Kant also argues that if we understand by [noumenon] an object of a non-sensible
intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, the intellectualThis would
be 'noumenon' in the positive sense of the term.B307 Included in this definition, of sorts, are
intelligible entities corresponding to sensible entities [for example, the human being, and]
intelligible entities to which our sensible faculty of intuition has no relation whatsoever [for
example God]B308-9
For a being to know noumenon it must possess an intellectual intuition or an intuitive
understanding. God is postulated to have such an intuition. In a number of places throughout the
Critique Kant speculates on the thing-in-itself, and the mode of knowing required in the
comprehension of the thing-in-itself. Here we will cite a number of passages where Kant discusses
an intuitive understanding or intellectual intuition. At B138-9 Kant writes An understanding which

through its self-consciousness could supply to itself the manifold of intuition -- an understanding,
that is to say, through whose representation the objects of the representation should at the same time
exist -- would not require, for the unity of consciousness, a special act of synthesis of the manifold.
The most important passage for our purposes is the fourth of the General Observations on
Transcendental Aesthetic where Kant writes In natural theology, in thinking an object [God], who
not only can never be an object of intuition to us but cannot be an object of sensible intuition even
to himself, we are careful to remove the conditions of time and space from his intuition -- for all his
knowledge must be intuition, and not thought, which always involves limitations.B71 Kant goes on
to argue that space and time are the subjective forms of our inner and outer intuition, which is
termed sensible, for the very reason that it is not original, that is, is not such as can itself give us the
existence of its object -- a mode of intuition which, so far as we can judge, can belong only to the
primordial being. Our mode of intuition is dependent upon the existence of the object, and is
therefore possible only if the subject's faculty of representation is affected by that object.B72
Human intuition is derivative (intuitus derivativus), not original (intuitus originarius), and
therefore not an intellectual intuition. For the reason stated above, such intellectual intuition seems
to belong solely to the primordial being, and can never be ascribed to a dependent being, dependent
in its existence as well as in its intuition, and which through that intuition determines its existence
solely in relation to given objects.B72
These two passages are important to our inquiry in several respects. At the moment however,
we are now in a position to comprehend the positive and negative senses of the concept of
noumenon. Positive and negative noumenon refers to the mode of intuiting. In sensible intuition we
are given that which we know through our discursive intellect, by the forms of our intuition, space
and time. Space and time is the giving of the world for the knowing by us through our
understanding. Only that which can be given to us in space and time is the legitimate entity that we
can know, the ob-ject; ob-: towards, against; -ject: from jicere, throw; ob-ject: thrown towards,
thrown against. This concept of the giving to our intuition is central to Kant doctrine of sensibility.
At the very beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant writes, our intuition takes place only in
so far as the object is given to us.A19/B33 Our intuition is The capacity (receptivity) for
receiving representations [sensations].A19/B33 Our mind is affected in a certain way.A19/B33
Our intuition is affected by objects A19/B33; and The effect of an object upon [one of] our
[faculties] of representation [sensible intuition], so far as we are affected by it, is sensation. It is by
virtue of the fact that our intuition is given its object, is receptive, is passive, and finally is nonspontaneous that it is entitled sensible. Following on from this Kant writes that By means of outer
sensewe represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all without exception in
space.A22/B37 That is, represent objects as outside us and along side one another I must
presuppose space, which thus means it is the for of outer sense. And, by means of inner sense,
which is temporal in form, I represent to myself things as coexisting or succeeding one another.
That is, time, as the form of inner sense, must be presupposed otherwise, "neither coexistence nor
succession would ever come within our perception."A30/B46 Thus, the negative sense of noumenon
is an indeterminate concept of a thing in so far as it is not an object of sensible intuition [its (the
things) unknowability for us].2 The doctrine of sensibility is the negative concept of noumenon.
Things that do not conform to our mode of spatio-temporal intuiting are not objects of our sensible
intuition.
Therefore the positive sense of noumenon is a determinate concept of a thing in so far as it is
an object of non-sensible (thus intellectual) intuition [its (the things) knowability for a species of
subject other than ourselves.]3 For example, God. Now for the passage that we cited earlier on
"[A]ll [God's] knowledge must be intuition, and not thought, which always involves
limitations.original intuitioncan belong only to the primordial being."B71 We can think of the
concept of an intuition that must produce or create what it knows, which does not contradict itself;
such an intuition must therefore be spontaneous, being the cause of itself and everything it creates.

In the case of God, God, heaven and earth. This, again, is mere speculation, for we as human beings
do not have intellectual intuition, and thus we cannot judge upon the status of what God is or Gods
cognition.
The difference between knowing things-in-themselves and knowing appearances, phenomena,
is the between having intellectual intuition, an intuitive understanding and having both an intuitive
sensibility and a discursive understanding. It is the difference between intuition, sensible [human]
or intellectual [God] and/or understanding/intellect, discursive [human] and intuitive [God].
Our human intuition is sensible, which means that the objects that we are capable of cognising
must conform to our mode of taking objects up into our cognitive faculty. Anything that is not an
object of our sensible intuition is a noumenon in the negative sense of the term. Our human intellect
or understanding is discursive, yet spontaneous. We think about what it means for us to have
knowledge from the perspective of the I think, a subject that for us to have knowledge is universal
and necessary. Kant writes, "I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of
combination."B158-9 In a footnote at the bottom of the page Kant makes a necessary connection
between a discursive intelligence or understanding and spontaneity. "I am conscious only of the
spontaneity [of the determining in me] all that I canrepresent to myself the spontaneity of my
thought, that is, of the determinationit is owing to this spontaneity that I entitle myself an
intelligence."B158n I cannot stress enough how important this concept of spontaneity is, it is the
sole characteristic that we entitles ourselves as intelligences.
Thus, Kant everywhere defines our human discursive understanding as the power of
knowing an object throughspontaneity [in the production] of concepts [discursivity.]A50/B74
Now the Critique is not a treatise on thinking but on knowledge and knowing, the sphere of
human knowledge and the extent of human knowing, which is delimited by the concept of the
noumenon, not an object of our sensible intuition. However, this is precisely what the power of
knowing an object throughspontaneity [in the production] of concepts [discursivity.]A50/B74 is.
Our discursive understanding is defined as "the faculty of thought."A69/B94 What is thinking for
Kant? Recall our speculating on God only a few moments ago? "[A]ll [God's] knowledge must be
intuition, and not thought, which always involves limitations.original intuitioncan belong only
to the primordial being."B71 The first thing we should note in regard to Kant's conception of
thinking is that "thoughtalways involves limitations"B71 which follows from the definition of us
as a "finite thinking being[s]."B72 Essentially, thinking in the Critique is characterised as being
discursive and logical. The currency of this thinking is, therefore, the concept, which arises
spontaneously out of the understanding. Kant argues that "concepts rest on functions. By 'function'
[Kant means] the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common
representation."A68/B93 This is only the first level of limitation, determination, combination or
unity, in the definition of thinking in the Critique. Concepts are the elements of thinking for which
"the only usethe understanding can make of [them]is to judge by means of them." A68/B93 For
example 'Kant is a mere transcendentalist', or All S are P, or A is B, or Some S are non-P. Similarly
the emphasis in judgement is on unity, synthesis, combination, determination, limitation and
abbreviation. In so far as concepts represent the things, or objects, that human beings can know, and
in so far as "no concept is ever related to an object immediately, but to some other representation of
it"A68/93 judgement is defined as "the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation
of a representation of [a object]."A68/B93 This means, "all judgements are functions of unity
among our representations."A69/B93-4 At this stage the unity and comprehension in judgement, for
Kant, is expressed by the predicate, or what he calls "a higher representation, [which] is used in
knowing the objectthereby [collecting] much possible knowledge intoone." A69/B94
According to Kant there are precisely twelve kinds of logical function in judgement, which he
enumerates at A70/B95.

The fundamental element in judgement, if it has not already become apparent is the copula is.
Of the twelve judgements, the one that plays a prominent role through out the Critique and in
Kants later writings is If P then Q, where we consider the relationship between two judgements.
The above discussion of thinking is unsurprisingly formalistic. The unity, combination, and
determination in concepts and the twelve kinds of judgement merely pertain to the pure a priori
forms of thinking in logic, that is, the universal and necessary forms of thought. They are barren
judgments such as A is A.
In our investigation of the intellectual faculty of the human being we have drifted quite far
from we started, that being the curious relationship between noumenon and spontaneity. So far we
have come to understand spontaneity as a characteristic of intellectuality. To differentiate the human
beings intellectuality from one that possibly is intuitive we had to interpret what Kant means by
discursivity. As it turns out, a discursive intellect acquires knowledge through thinking by means of
concepts.
If spontaneity is a characteristic of intellectuality, what does spontaneity mean, and is it a
coherent notion in the Critique? It seems strange that since the concept of spontaneity is so integral
to the Critique that Kant mentions it rarely and when he does, the passages are obscure and difficult
to understand. Even stranger is the fact that it has not been a major theme in English Kant
scholarship. Let us look again at all those passages we have seen, and those that we have not seen
yet, where Kant discusses spontaneity.
So an intuitive understanding, being spontaneous, would create or produce its own object of
cognition. Our discursive understanding, also being spontaneous, derives from itself (I do not think
we can say creates, although produces maybe applicable) twelve original pure concepts of
synthesis, the categories, under which it determines that which we take up in our sensible intuition.
We can now leave aside the discussion of the thing-in-itself, noumenon, intellectual intuition
and God, in favour of investigating spontaneity and its role for our cognition and action.
Although we have not made it clear to ourselves, the concept of spontaneity is of fundamental
importance in the positive part of the Critique. It enables us to know the kinds of things that are
given in our sensibility, objectively, make true statements about the objects and events in the world.
In fact, according to Kant it makes the laws of nature possible. It gives objectivity to mathematics
and science. Kant employs the concept of spontaneity in the transcendental unity of apperception,
which, if we want to take account of its spontaneous character, we should say the transcendental
unity of the consciousness of the spontaneity of thinking. The transcendental unity of apperception
enables Kant to demonstrate that the categories of the pure understanding do indeed stand in an
objective relation to sensible intuition, that is, that they have objective reality. This is accomplished
by varying levels of synthesis, which, more importantly, are based on varying degrees of
spontaneity. First, or fundamentally, there is the spontaneity of thinking, or apperception, which has
the I think as its sensible manifestation. The transcendental unity of apperception is supposed to
guarantee a logically identical subject in the comprehension of sensible intuition. This establishes
that an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united.B137 For
that to happen apperception must signify, or be the ground of, the copula is in judgement, which is
the objective unity of given [from sensible intuition] representations. Thus, through merely
empirical, subjective consciousness, through association, I could only say, If I support a body, I
feel an impression of weight, not It, the body, is heavy. Kant writes Thus to say 'The body is
heavy' is not merely to state that the two representations have always been conjoined in my
perception, however often that perception be repeated; what we are asserting is that they are
combined in the object, no matter what the state of the subject may be.B141-2 Upon apperception
is based the spontaneity of the imagination, the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, or,
again, the productive imagination. Next there is the reproductive imagination, whose synthesis is
entirely subject to empirical laws, the laws, namely, of association, and which therefore contributes
nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a priori knowledge.B152 Lastly there is the

synthesis of apprehension of which Kant writes, though empirical, must necessarily be in

conformity with the synthesis of apperception, which is intellectual and is contained in the category
completely a priori. It is one and the same spontaneity, which in the one case, under the title of
imagination, and in the other case, under the title of understanding, brings combination into the
manifold of intuition.B162n From this rather crude exposition of the transcendental deduction we
should be able to see how important the concept of spontaneity is to Kant. In the next section of the
Critique Kant outlines twelve synthetic a priori principles of cognition, specifically mathematical
and natural scientific principles of cognition, one of the most important of these being causality,
based on the judgement If P Then Q.
There are a number of disconcerting aspects to the concept of spontaneity, to which we shall
now turn. The first is introduced in the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason. Here Kant argues that
reason, syllogism, attempts to transcend the limits of experience, or space and time, by determining
the unconditioned of the various things we know about in the sensible world, that is, the absolute
unity of knowledge. Specifically, in the case of the Third Antinomy, reason seeks the Absolute
completeness in the Origination of an appearance. It is an illegitimate employment of the category
of causality, based on the judgement If P Then Q, which spontaneously arose out of the intellectual
representation I, by reason. There are two parties involved in the antinomies, each holding to a
doctrine about the world, and proving their respective assertions by assuming the opposite partys
position in a syllogistic argument. Thus, for the Third Antinomy we have the Thesis as:
Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of
the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that
there is also another causality, that of freedom.
And the Antithesis being:
There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature.
As we said earlier, each doctrine is proved by postulating as a major premise in their proof the
opposite parties doctrine. Thus the Thesis begins it proof with the following:
Let us assume that there is no other causality than that in accordance with laws of nature. This being
so, everything which takes place presupposes a preceding state upon which it inevitably follows
according to a rule.
And the Antithesis begins its proof with the following:
Assume that there is freedom in the transcendental sense, as a special kind of causality in
accordance with which the events in the world can have come about, namely, a power of absolutely
beginning a state, and therefore also of absolutely beginning a series of consequences of that state;
Let us jump ahead a little and try and comprehend what Kant means by freedom. Interestingly
enough, the concept of spontaneity plays a significant role in the both the Third Antinomy and
Kants concept of freedom. Again, the textual evidence for this is quite slim, probably because Kant
had suspected that the concept of spontaneity is problematic on two fronts. However, its role in
Kants concept of freedom is decipherable, and the difficulties it entails are laid bare in such a
decipherment.
In the section entitled Solution of the Cosmological Idea of Totality in the Derivation of
Cosmical Events from their Causes, Kant writes By freedom, in its cosmological meaning, I
understand the power of beginning a state spontaneously. Such causality will not, therefore, itself
stand under another cause determining it in time, as required by the law of nature. Freedom, in this

sense, is a pure transcendental idea, which, in the first place, contains nothing borrowed from
experience, and which, secondly, refers to an object that cannot be determined or given in any
experience.A533/B561 After one has read through the Critique up to this point, such a
proclamation on Kants behalf may strike one as incomprehensible and contradictory. Indeed, this is
what the Antinomy is supposed to elicit. However, what is even more intriguing is Kants solution
to the problem. He elides the paradox, or contradiction between nature and freedom, by appealing to
the concept of noumenon, by appealing to our intelligible character, by virtue of the fact that we
possess and understanding and reason. What, in our considered opinion, is the cause for the greatest
hostilities is the relationship between spontaneity, which is that which characterises us as
intelligences, and time. Indeed, no one has summed up this more eloquently than Martin Heidegger,
where in Being and Time he writes In Kantwhile time is indeed subjective [meaning that time
is intrinsic to the human subject, or that we Interpret Dasein as temporality], it stands beside the I
think and is not bound up with it. 4 Although, there is perhaps an exception to this, an attempt to
overcome this radical dichotomy. In his Kants Critical Philosophy, The Doctrine of the Faculties,
Gilles Deleuze expresses this strange relationship between apperception and inner sense in a poetic
formula I is another.5 Of course, these two thinkers were interested in the constitution of the
subject, what it knows about itself, how it comes to know itself in virtue of Kant conditions of
cognition, and other matters. Rather than Kants attempt to reconcile two different causalities, one
causality, freedom, explaining the origin of some of the appearances of the world, while the other
causality, nature, explains the origin other appearance of the world, or, finally, both freedom and
nature explaining the cause of the same appearance.
As Henry Allison points out, Kant employs the positive sense of the concept noumenon to
resolve the contradiction between natural causality, a concept that is fundamental to natural science,
and freedom.6 There are several passages from which we could cite Kants thesis that because the
human being considered from the perspective of his being an intelligible object is not subject to
time s/he could act in accordance with the law of freedom. First, Kant characterises the human
being as an intelligible entity, Manknows [or rather is conscious of the spontaneity of his
thinking and acting] himself through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner
determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himselfa purely
intelligible object. We entitle these faculties understanding and reason.A546-7/B574-4 Here is a
rather lengthy passage where Kant argues that the understanding, and especially reason, is not
subject to time. He writes Pure reason, as a purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the form of
time, nor consequently to the conditions of succession in time. The causality of reason in its
intelligible character does not, in producing an effect, arise or begin to be at a certain time. For in
that case it would itself be subject to the natural law of appearances, in accordance with which
causal series are determined in time; and its causality would then be nature, not freedom. Thus all
that we are justified in saying is that, if reason can have causality in respect of appearances, it is a
faculty through which the sensible condition of an empirical series of effects first begins. For the
condition which lies in reason is not sensible, and therefore does not itself begin to be. And thus
what we failed to find in any empirical series is disclosed as being possible, namely, that the
condition of a successive series of events may itself be empirically unconditioned. For here the
condition is outside the series of appearances (in the intelligible), and therefore is not subject to any
sensible condition, and to no time-determination through an antecedent cause.A551-2/B579-80
The name that Kant gives to the freedom discussed in the Third Antinomy is transcendental
freedom, pure spontaneity. However, transcendental freedom is only an idea, a transcendental idea.
Such transcendental ideas are also called regulative ideas. Meaning that, since these ideas are not a
reality for us, we must assume them to guarantee practical freedom, order and purposive unity in
nature, etc Thus Kant writes of transcendental freedom The denial of transcendental freedom must,
therefore, involve the elimination of all practical freedom. For practical freedom presupposes that
although something has not happened, it ought to have happened [it is] a causality which,

independently of those natural causescan produce something that is determined in the time-order
in accordance with empirical laws, and which can therefore begin a series of events entirely of
itself.A534/B562 Henry Allison puts it this way in order to save practical freedom. All that this
requires is the conceivability of transcendental freedom [by appealing to noumenon in the positive
sense], which makes it possible to use the transcendental Idea in a regulative fashion as a model
for the conception of agency and the imputation of actions to agents. 7
What sort of consequences does this have for the spontaneity of the understanding in the
positive part of the Critique? How are we to characterise the spontaneity of thinking, as a
transcendental Idea that we use to model cognition? How does the understanding, or reason, deduce
such an idea? Or does transcendental freedom presuppose the spontaneity of thinking? This sounds
preposterous! Surely in such a brief investigation of the Critique, we are not in a position to conflate
the spontaneity of the understanding with the spontaneity of reason! Allison makes just such an
admonition when he writes that By the mid 1770s[Kant affirmed] a sharp distinction between
logical freedom, which pertains to acts of thought, and transcendental freedom, which
supposedly pertains to acts of will.8 However, moments later Allison argues, Kants position is
that, just as we can act under the idea of freedom, so we can only think under the idea of
spontaneity.9 I do not know how many people could be convinced by this kind of reasoning,
however, from our perspective, it leaves a lot to be desired. At stake is the objectivity of
mathematics and natural science, and renders action impotent. Thus It makes me think of old Kant
who had obtained the thing-in-itself by stealthanother very ridiculous thing!and was punished
for this when the categorical imperative crept stealthily into his heart and led him astrayback to
God, soul, freedom and immortality, like a fox who loses his way and goes astray back into
his cage. Yet it had been his strength and cleverness that had broken open the cage!10 How can Kant
postulate something we cannot know as a basis for knowledge, let alone postulating something we
cannot know as a basis for action?
Perhaps the obscurity of the doctrine of spontaneity is a means of evading another influential
doctrine on knowledge, the scientific explanation of thinking, cognition and the refutation of
freedom? Kant is just as anxious about countering a doctrine like materialism as he is when
attempting to ground the spontaneity of thinking and the spontaneity of action. For Kant knowledge
is scientific, that is the way in which he defines knowledge according to sensible intuition and the
categories of the understanding, for example, If P Then Q, causality. Yet in this way he restricts
knowledge to science. Did Kant have a prescience of the prodigious power of explanation that
modern science has acquired to day? Of course he did. It is precisely this that he attempted to
ground in the Critique, along with sciences reconciliation with freedom and faith, although,
perhaps faith stood its ground in the advent of scientific explanation at the time Kant was writing
the Critique. In this way he fostered a scientific imperative, of which today we reap the benefits.
This, we submit, only accentuates the division of the world into a world of sense and a world of
understanding. Science becomes delusional, the spontaneity of thinking, freedom and agency
become articles of faith. We offer no solution here to overcoming the radical heteronomy of
temporality and the spontaneity of thinking. However, perhaps time could be reinterpreted such that
the barbarous If P then Q does not hold it hostage. That is, perhaps the spontaneity of thinking
could indeed be subject to time, only if we fundamentally rethink time.
Kants first Critique is a fundamental text in the history of philosophy. Revolutionary, yet an
extremely complex text to comprehend. It stands to reason that the Critique is not a work that is
easily dismissed, rather one that should be mastered, and that would take an eternity. One of the
most fundamental doctrines that we have been investigating is the doctrine of spontaneity. A
concept, no more than that, an act, an activity, that seems as real and as certain as the I think in
cogitio sum. However, as fundamental as it is, the spontaneity of thinking and the spontaneity of
action contradicts time, intrinsic and internal to the human subject. Kant, in an attempt to avoid this

paradox, in order that spontaneity does not contradict the If P Then Q of things succeeding one
another in time, he designates spontaneity as a mere Idea, depriving it of its dynamism and
vivaciousness. The challenges awaits anyone to attempt to retrieve spontaneity from the
inaccessible world of noumenon to plant it firmly back in the sensible world, the only world.

Notes
1. All references to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason will appear in the body of the essay as,
for
example, A69/B94: Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. (1929) MacMillan Press, London.
2. Gardner, Sebastian. Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason. (1999) Routledge, London, p 203-4
3. Ibid., p 203-4
4. Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time. (1962) trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson,
Blackwell, Oxford, p 480
5. Deleuze, Gilles. Kant's Critical Philosophy: the doctrine of the faculties. (1984) trans. Hugh
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, p viii
6. Allison, Henry E. Kant's Transcendental Idealism: an interpretation and defence. (1983) Yale
University Press, New Haven, p 370n20
7. Ibid., p 328
8. Allison, Henry E. Idealism and Freedom: essays on Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy.
(1996) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p92
9. Ibid., p 103
10. Nietzsche, Friedrich The Gay Science. (1974) trans. Walter Kaufmann, Random House, Inc,
New York, p 264

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