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G.R. No.

107916 February 20, 1997


PERCIVAL
MODAY,
ZOTICO
MODAY
(deceased)
and
LEONORA
MODAY, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL
SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Facts:
On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 4389, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other
Government Sports Facilities." 2
In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. On September 11, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said
Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available
lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center." 3
Issue:
The main issue presented in this case is whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal
resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
HELD:
The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State
power that is inseparable from sovereignty. 14 It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to
the State, private property for public use or purpose. 15 Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of
eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. 16 For the taking of
private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. 17
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:
(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance, resolution or executive order
is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shall declare such ordinance,
resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in part, entering its actions upon the minutes and advising
the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of such an action shall be to annul the ordinance,
resolution or executive order in question in whole or in part. The action of the sangguniang panlalawigan
shall be final.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render
said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang
Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual milieu then obtaining, the
Court's pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas, 19 where we cited significant early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at
bar.
The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order
invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the powers conferred upon the council or
president making the same." Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question
is before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The
provincial (board's) disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon
the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by
law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative function of the municipal council or
president. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority. 20
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the
Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the
capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that

Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of
petitioners' property.
The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and due
process
of
law
must
be
22
observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the
taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, 23 has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent
domain must be genuine and of a public character. 24 Government may not capriciously choose what private property
should be taken.
After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary support for petitioners' allegations.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
the case of "Percival Moday." et al. v. Municipality of Bunawan, et al." (CA G.R. SP No. 26712) are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as
Presiding
Judge
of
RTC
Branch
33
at
Pili,
Camarines
Sur, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN,respondents.
The Provincial Attorney for petitioners.
Reynaldo L. Herrera for Ernesto San Joaquin.
QUIASON, J.:
Facts:
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129,
Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial
capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for
provincial government employees.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the
Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that
the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to
expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
Issue:
Whether or not the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to the prior approval of the
Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian reform program.
HELD:
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code,
which provides:
A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian
exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first secure the approval of the
Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute
the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department
of Agrarian Reform.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands
needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the
lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land
use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public
purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property
sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such
legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the
public use
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a)
nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property;
(b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to
obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from
agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the
amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138896


June 20, 2000
BARANGAY
SAN
ROQUE,
TALISAY,
CEBU, petitioner,
vs.
Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR namely: EUGENIO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO,
ISABEL SYLIANCO, EUGENIA S. ONG, LAWRENCE SYLIANCO, LAWSON SYLIANCO, LAWINA S. NOTARIO,
LEONARDO SYLIANCO JR. and LAWFORD SYLIANCO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.
The Facts
Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) 3 a Complaint to expropriate a property
of the respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after
payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of
such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain
is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court." 4
Issue
In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this sole issue for the consideration of this Court:
Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of
the subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos? 9
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
1
In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine
the just compensation for it.1avvphi1 This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit.
To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate private property under the
given set of circumstances. The government does not dispute respondents' title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is
not a question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It
merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the
public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand." 17
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Orders SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is
directed to HEAR the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127820 July 20, 1998


MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE, petitioner,
vs.
V.M. REALTY CORPORATION, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of private property
through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an
ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal
Council will not suffice. On the other hand, the principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the
expropriation of the same property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are complied with.
Factual Antecedents
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, 6 the Municipality of Paraaque filed on
September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation 7 against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a combined area of about 10,000 square
meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila, and covered by Torrens Certificate of Title No. 48700.
Allegedly, the complaint was filed "for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing
homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project." 8 Parenthetically, it was also for this stated purpose that
petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, 9 previously made an offer to enter into
a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. 10
On February 21, 1994, private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a counterclaim, 13alleging
in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to
an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a
prior judgment or res judicata.
The Issues
Before this Court, petitioner posits two issues, viz.:
1. A resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and
will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.

2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when public interest is
primarily involved. 21
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Resolution Different from an Ordinance
Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code, which provides. "If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare
through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief
executive to initiate expropriation proceedings." 24 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate
the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. 25 An LGU may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints, imposed
"through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." 26 In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to
LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of
the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and
other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 27
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the
municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an
ordinance. We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A
municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. 32 An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is
necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all
the Sanggunian members.33
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to
exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over
said rule which merely seeks to implement it. 37 It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be
amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is
a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in
exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU act pursuant to an ordinance.
Second Issue:
Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals 43 and the trial court, 44 all the requisites for the application of res judicata are
present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical
interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and
proceedings, 45 cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent
domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even
by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can "reach every form
of property which the State might need for public use." 46
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's proper exercise of its power of eminent
domain over subject property. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 109173 July 5, 1996


CITY
OF
CEBU, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTEENTH DIVISION), HON. JUDGE RODOLFO BELLAFLOR and MERLITA
CARDENO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, R., J.:p
Facts :

Private respondent Merlita Cardeno is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 2,019 square meters located at Sitio
Sto. Nino, Alaska-Mambaling and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 116692. On February 25, 1992, the
petitioner, City of Cebu, filed a complaint for eminent domain against private respondent with Branch II of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City seeking to expropriate the said parcel of land. The complaint was initiated pursuant to
Resolution No. 404 and Ordinance No. 1418, dated February 17, 1992, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City
authorizing the City Mayor to expropriate the said parcel of land for the purpose of providing a socialized housing project
for the landless and low-income city residents. 3
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action. She asseverated
that the allegations contained in paragraph VII of the complaint, to wit:
That repeated negotiations had been made with the defendant to have the aforementioned property
purchased by the plaintiff through negotiated sale without resorting to expropriation, but said negotiations
failed. 4
do not show compliance with one of the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power of eminent domain by a
local government unit as enunciated in Section 19 of R.A. 7160 5 which provides in part that:
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the
power of eminent domain . . . ; Provided however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted . . . . [Emphasis provided.]
Issue: Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action.
Held: Yes it does.
An offshoot of the foregoing is the instant petition for review on certiorari which has essentially become a battle of
semantics being waged before this Court. While petitioner reiterates that paragraph VII of the complaint sufficiently states
compliance with the requirement of "a valid and definite offer", private respondent insists that the term "negotiations" is too
broad to be equated with the said requirement. 12
The same liberality should be applied in the instant case where an examination of petitioner's "Comment and Opposition"
to private respondent's Motion to Dismiss leaves no room for doubt that petitioner had indeed made "a valid and definite
offer" to private respondent as required by law.
The foregoing should now put to rest the long drawn argument over the alleged failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action. There is no longer any room for doubt that as alleged in the complaint, and as admitted by private respondent, the
petitioner had in fact complied with the condition precedent of "a valid and definite offer" set forth in Sec. 19 of R.A. 7160.
And as a fitting finale to this controversy, the principle enunciated in both the Tan and Marcopper cases is here reiterated:
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used
only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their aim
would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in importance are made to override the ends of
justice; the technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a party, said
rigid application cannot be countenanced. 26
The aforequoted doctrine finds compelling application in the case at bench. For as correctly averred by petitioner, nothing
else was accomplished by the dismissal of the complaint for eminent domain but a considerable delay in the proceedings.
The dismissal of the complaint did not bar petitioner from filing another eminent domain case and from correcting its
alleged error by the mere expedient of changing paragraph VII thereof. Indeed, precious time has been wasted while the
salutary objectives of Ordinance No. 1418 of the City of Cebu have been put on hold by a quarrel over technical matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is ordered remanded to the RTC which shall proceed to the hearing and final determination thereof.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170432


March 24, 2008
AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., CECILIA P. FRANCIA, and HEIRS OF BENJAMIN P. FRANCIA, Petitioners,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Facts:
On February 6, 2003, respondent Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan filed a complaint for expropriation 1 against
petitioners Amos P. Francia, Jr., Cecilia P. Francia and Benjamin P. Francia 2 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 16. Respondent needed petitioners' 16,256 sq. m. idle property at the junction of the North Expressway,
Malhacan-Iba-Camalig main road artery and the MacArthur Highway.3 It planned to use it to establish a common public
terminal for all types of public utility vehicles with a weighing scale for heavy trucks.
In their answer,4 petitioners denied that the property sought to be expropriated was raw land. It was in fact developed 5 and
there were plans for further development. For this reason, respondents offer price of P2,333,500 (or P111.99 per square
meter) was too low.
Issue:

Whether or not prior determination of the existence of a public purpose was necessary for the issuance of a writ of
possession
Held:
Section 19 of Republic Act 71609 provides:
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing
of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated; Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to be expropriated, it
must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said
court at least 15% of the property's fair market value based on its current tax declaration. 11 The law does not make the
determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession. 12
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 October 26, 1983


HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA (represented by Gloria Ardona) ANASTACIO C. CABILAO, HEIRS OF CIPRIANO
CABILAO (represented by Jose Cabilao) MODESTA CABILAO, HEIRS OF ROMAN CABUENAS (represented by
Alberto Cabuenas), AGRIPINO GABISAY and PRUDENCIA MABINI, ANTONIO LABRADOR and LUCIA GABISAY,
GERONIMO MABINI and MARCELINA SABAL, INOCENCIO MABINI and ARSENIA REYES, PATRICIO MABINI and
GREGORIA BORRES, ANICETO GADAPAN and MAXIMA GABISAY, BARTOLOME MAGNO and CALINECA E.
MAGNO, ALBERTO CABUENAS, NARCISO CABUENAS and VICTORIA CABUENAS, EUTIQUIOSENO, HEIRS OF
ESPERIDION CABUENAS (represented by Alberto Cabuenas), MAXIMINA NAVARO, SULPICIO NAVARO,
EDUARDO NAVARO, MARTINIANO ROMA (in representation of Arcadio Mabini, deceased), MARTIN SENO,
FAUSTO ARDA, MAXIMA CABILAO, ESTRELLA SENO, EDUVEGIS S. CABILAO, ROSARIO CABILAO, MINORS
DANILO, SOCORRO, JOSEFINA and MARITES, all surnamed Cabilao, JUAN BORRES (represented by Francisca
Borres), RAMON JABADAN, JESUS ALIPAR and LEONILA KABAHAR, ANTONIO LABRADOR, HEIRS OF NICASIO
GABISAY (represented by Arsenio Gabisay), PACIFICO LABRADOR, DEMETRIO LABRADOR and FRUCTOSA
TABURA, VENANCIO DEL MAR, MARINO DEL MAR, HEIRS OF TEODORA ARCILLO (represented by Brigida
Arcillo) DIONISIA GABUNADA, HEIRS OF BUENAVENTURA FRANCISCO (represented by Felicidad Sadaya
Francisco), HEIRS OF VICTORIA C. CABUENAS (represented by Alberto Cabuenas) HEIRS OF CIPRIANO
GABUNADA
(represented
by
Claudio
Gabunada), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN Y. REYES, Executive Judge and Presiding Judge of Branch I, COURT OF FIRST instance OF CEBU,
and the PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, respondents.
George M. Baladjay, Mario G. dela Victoria, Olegario Sarmiento, Jr., and Democrito Barcenas for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent Judge.
F.A. Sugue & Elino B. Lingas for Philippine Tourism Authoirity
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction challenging the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 564,
the Revised Charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority, and Proclamation No. 2052 declaring the barangays of Sibugay,
Malubog, Babag and Sirao including the proposed Lusaran Dam in the City of Cebu and in the municipalities of Argao and
Dalaguete in the province of Cebu as tourist zones.
Facts:
The petitioners ask that we restrain respondent Court of First Instance of Cebu and the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA)
from enforcing and implementing the writs of possession issued in four (4) expropriation cases filed by PTA against the
petitioners: Civil Cases Nos. R-19562, R-19684, R-20701, and R-21608 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch 1).
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation
of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority
"to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist
zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the
development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value.
The defendants, now petitioners, had a common allegation in that the taking is allegedly not impressed with public use
under the Constitution.
In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that there is no specific
constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such
power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the
amount of compensation by Legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform
program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction over the expropriation
cases.

The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The Philippine National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount
equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533. the lower court issued separate
orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession.
Issue:
The issues raised by the petitioners revolve around the proposition that the actions to expropriate their properties are
constitutionally infirm because nowhere in the Constitution can a provision be found which allows the taking of private
property for the promotion of tourism.
Held: Petitioner is wrong.
In the leading case of Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus (supra), this Court emphasized that the power of eminent domain is
inseparable from sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most
primitive forms. The only purpose of the provision in the Bill of Rights is to provide some form of restraint on the sovereign
power.
The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.
The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not "public use" because private concessioners would be
allowed to maintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed with
even less merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private businesses using public streets
end highways do not diminish in the least bit the public character of expropriations for roads and streets.
The petitioners rely on the Land Reform Program of the government in raising their second argument. According to them,
assuming that PTA has the right to expropriate, the properties subject of expropriation may not be taken for the purposes
intended since they are within the coverage of "operation land transfer" under the land reform program.
The Petitioners, however, have failed to show that the area being developed is indeed a land reform area and that the
affected persons have emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer.
The records show that the area being developed into a tourism complex consists of more than 808 hectares, almost all of
which is not affected by the land reform program. The portion being expropriated is 282 hectares of hilly and unproductive
land where even subsistence farming of crops other than rice and corn can hardly survive.
The issue of prematurity is also raised by the petitioners. They claim that since the necessity for the taking has not been
previously established, the issuance of the orders authorizing the PTA to take immediate possession of the premises, as
well as the corresponding writs of possession was premature.
Under Presidential Decree No. 42, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1533, the government, its agency or
instrumentality, as plaintiff in an expropriation proceedings is authorized to take immediate possession, control and
disposition of the property and the improvements, with power of demolition, notwithstanding the pendency of the issues
before the court, upon deposit with the Philippine National Bank of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the
property expropriated.
The right of the PTA to proceed with the expropriation of the 282 hectares already Identified as fit for the establishment of
a resort complex to promote tourism is, therefore, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSE D for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125218 January 23, 1998


FILSTREAM
INTERNATIONAL
INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE FELIPE S. TONGCO and THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 128077 January 23, 1998
FILSTREAM
INTERNATIONAL
INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ORLANDO MALIT, ANTONIO CAGUIAT, ALICIA CABRERA, ARMANDO LACHICA, JACINTO
CAGUIAT, GLORIA ANTONIO, ELIZALDE NAVARRA, DOLORES FUENTES, SUSANA ROY, ANTONIO IBANEZ,
BENIGNO BASILIO, LUCERIA DEMATULAC, FLORENCIA GOMEZ, LAZARO GOMEZ, JOSE GOMEZ VENANCIO
MANALOTO, CRISTINO UMALI, DEMETRIA GATUS, PRISCILLA MALONG, DOMINGO AGUILA, RAMON SAN
AGUSTIN, JULIAN FERRER, JR., FRANCISCO GALANG, FLORENTINO MALIWAT, SEVERINA VILLAR, TRINIDAD
NAGUIT, JOSE NAGUIT, FORTUNATO AGUSTIN CABRERA, GAUDENCIO INTAL, DANILO DAVID, ENRIQUE DAVID,
VICENTE DE GUZMAN, POLICARPIO LUMBA, BELEN PALMA, ELEN SOMVILLO, LEONARDO MANICAD, OPRENG
MICLAT, BENITA MATA, GREGORIO LOPEZ, MARCELINA SAPNO, JESUS MERCADO and CALIXTO
GOMEZ, respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
In resolving the instant petitions, the Court is tasked to strike a balance between the contending interests when the state
exercises its power of eminent domain. On one side we have the owners of the property to be expropriated who must be
duly compensated for the loss of their property, while on the other is the State which must take the property for public use.
Facts:
Petitioner, Filstream International, Inc., is the registered owner of the properties subject of this dispute consisting of
adjacent parcels of land situated in Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila, with a total area of 3,571.10 square meters
and covered by T.C.T. Nos. 203937, 203936, 169198, 169199, 169200 and 169202 of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On January 7, 1993, petitioner filed an ejectment suit before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch 15) docketed
as Civil Case No. 140817-CV against the occupants of the abovementioned parcels of land (herein private respondents in

G. R. No. 128077) on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment was
rendered by the MTC on September 14, 1993 ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals
to petitioner. 1
However, it appeared that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private respondents filed on May 25, 1993, a
complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against petitioner Filstream which was docketed in Civil Case No. 9366059 before the RTC of Manila, Branch 43. It was at this stage that respondent City of Manila came into the picture when
the city government approved Ordinance No. 7813 3 on November 5, 1993, authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate the
acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal means certain parcels of land registered under T.C.T.
Nos. 169193, 169198, 169190, 169200, 169202 and 169192 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila which formed part of the
properties of petitioner then occupied by private respondents.
The issue raised in G.R. No. 125218 is purely a procedural and technical matter. Petitioner takes exception to the
resolutions of respondent CA dated March 18, 1996 and May 20, 1996 which ordered the dismissal of its Petition
for Certiorari for non-compliance with Sec. 2(a) of Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals by failing to
attach to its petition other pertinent documents and papers and for attaching copies of pleadings which are blurred and
unreadable. Petitioner argues that respondent appellate court seriously erred in giving more premium to form rather than
substance.
We agree with the petitioner. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural rules in this case would defeat rather than
meet the ends of justice as it would result in the violation of the substantial rights of petitioner. At stake in the appeal filed
by petitioner before the CA is the exercise of their property rights over the disputed premises which have been
expropriated and have in fact been ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila.
The judgment in the ejectment suit became final and executory after private respondents failed to interpose any appeal
from the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 25, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33714. Thus, petitioner has
every right to assert the execution of this decision as it had already become final and executory.
However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise its power of eminent
domain within its jurisdiction.
Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation
proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these
conditions must be deemed mandatory because these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private
property to due process when their property is expropriated for public use.
Issue: Did the City of Manila comply with the abovementioned conditions when it expropriated petitioner Filstream's
properties?
Held: No.
We have carefully scrutinized the records of this case and found nothing that would indicate that respondent City of Manila
complied with Sec. 9 and Sec. 10 of R.A. 7279. Petitioner Filstream's properties were expropriated and ordered
condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9
of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstream's right to due process which must
accordingly be rectified.
Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent domain for the
general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it is for public use always
takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the
individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of
this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be
expropriated. In this regard, vigilance over compliance with the due process requirements is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. In G.R. 125218, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R.
SP NO. 36904 dated March 18, 1996 and May 20, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In G.R. No. 128077,
the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43101 dated January 28, 1997 and February 18, 1997 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 137621


February 6, 2002
HAGONOY
MARKET
VENDOR
ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The facts:
On October 1, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan, enacted an ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28, 2 which
increased the stall rentals of the market vendors in Hagonoy.
On December 8, 1997, the petitioners President filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice assailing the
constitutionality of the tax ordinance. Petitioner claimed it was unaware of the posting of the ordinance.
.
Nonetheless, we hold that the petition should be dismissed as the appeal of the petitioner with the Secretary of
Justice is already time-barred. The applicable law is Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code which provides:

"SEC. 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public
Hearings. - The procedure for the approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the
provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment
thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue
measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of
Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such
appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and accrual and payment of the tax,
fee or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse
of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not Kautusan Blg. 28 is constitutional?
Held: Yes, constitutional.
The aforecited law requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the Secretary of
Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity of the ordinance and even during its pendency, the effectivity of the
assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance No. 28 took effect in October
1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in December 1997, more than a year after the effectivity of the ordinance in
1996. Clearly, the Secretary of Justice correctly dismissed it for being time-barred. At this point, it is apropos to
state that the timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is not a "mere
technicality" that can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are
mandatory.10 Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure adopted by the municipality of Hagonoy to fix and collect public
market stall rentals. Being its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is of paramount importance. The funds
for the operation of its agencies and provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and
collections. Thus, it is essential that the validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length
of time.11 Hence, the law provided a time limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures and tax
ordinances.
Petitioners bold assertion that there was no public hearing conducted prior to the passage of Kautusan Blg. 28 is
belied by its own evidence
On the issue of publication or posting, Section 188 of the Local Government Code provides:
"Section 188. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue Measures. Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true
copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3)
consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation; Provided, however, That in provinces, cities and
municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2)
conspicuous and publicly accessible places." (emphasis supplied)
The records is bereft of any evidence to prove petitioners negative allegation that the subject ordinance was not posted
as required by law. In contrast, the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan,
presented evidence which clearly shows that the procedure for the enactment of the assailed ordinance was
complied with. Municipal Ordinance No. 28 was enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy on October 1, 1996.
Then Acting Municipal Mayor Maria Garcia Santos approved the Ordinance on October 7, 1996. After its approval, copies
of the Ordinance were given to the Municipal Treasurer on the same day. On November 9, 1996, the Ordinance was
approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The Ordinance was posted during the period from November 4 - 25,
1996 in three (3) public places, viz: in front of the municipal building, at the bulletin board of the Sta. Ana Parish Church
and on the front door of the Office of the Market Master in the public market. 14 Posting was validly made in lieu of
publication as there was no newspaper of local circulation in the municipality of Hagonoy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146587


July 2, 2002
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the General Manager of the PHILIPPINE INFORMATION
AGENCY
(PIA), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS as herein represented by DR. SABINO
SANTOS and PURIFICACION SANTOS IMPERIAL, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Bulacan,
docketed Civil Cases No. 3839-M, No. 3840-M, No. 3841-M and No. 3842-M, covering a total of 544,980 square meters of
contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation
and use of radio transmitter facilities for the "Voice of the Philippines" project.
The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos,
predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area.

On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05,
issued a writ of execution served on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, for the implementation
thereof. In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, 2 transferring 20 hectares of the
expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used
exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA.
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any
property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. 7 Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it
requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and
as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its
scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the
State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a
tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property
whenever the public interest so requires it.8
In determining "public use," two approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or the actual use by the public,
and the second is public advantage or benefit.12 The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued
utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State
University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose.
Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its
present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not the nature of utilization of the condemned property at present which differs from the purpose
originally intended is lawful?
Held: Yes, lawful.
The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the
owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be
for public use, which, decidedly, it is.
In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the
expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might
perhaps apply. An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property.21
In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a
position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred. 27
.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 31 July 2000, of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
petition for certiorari, as well as its resolution of 04 January 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration, and the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, dated 01 March 2000, are SET ASIDE. Let the case be forthwith remanded to the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the proper execution of its decision promulgated on 26 February 1979 which is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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