EN BANC

[G.R. No. 177523 : November 27, 2007]

EDGAR A. BAGAS V. SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
JACINTO G. ANG, CITY PROSECUTOR, AMERHASSAN C. PAUDAC, 1ST ASST. CITY
PROSECUTOR, AND ERNESTO M. SULAR, JR., ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR II, ET AL.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated November 27,
2007
"G.R. No. 177523 (Edgar A. Bagas v. Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, Department of Justice, Jacinto
G. Ang, City Prosecutor, Amerhassan C. Paudac, 1st Asst. City Prosecutor, and Ernesto M. Sular,
Jr., Asst. City Prosecutor II, et al).This resolves the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order filed under Sections
1 and 2, Rule 65 in relation to Section 1, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court by petitioner Edgar A.
Bagas, seeking the nullification of Department Circular No. 29 dated 15 July 2005 issued by the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
Petitioner, together with Samuel Balandra, Ismael Bongar and Crispin del Carmen, was charged
before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City with the crime of qualified theft[1] in a
Complaint[2] filed by respondent Pedro Garrido, in representation of Precision Crestec, Inc.
(Precision). The charge was in relation to pilferage of imported clay-coated news boards owned by
Precision allegedly perpetrated in conspiracy with one another by petitioner as well as Balandra,
Bongar and Del Carmenall employees of Precisionwho had unbridled access to the said raw
materials.
On 22 February 2007, Investigating Prosecutor Ernesto M. Sulat, Jr., finding probable cause to
bring the accused to trial, issued a Resolution[3] to that effect, and recommended no bail pursuant
to Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 29.[4] Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said
resolution challenging in the main the legality of the prosecutor's recommendation. On even date,
an Information[5] was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 154, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
On or about or prior to April 4, 2006, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, Ismael Bongar and Crispin Del Carmen, being then warehouse . clerks of
complainant. Precision Crestec, Inc., Samuel Balandra being then warehouse supervisor and
Edgardo Bargas being then warehouse dispatcher of TJ Logistics, a rister company of complainant,
conspiring and confederating together, and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another,
and who have access to the property of the latter, with grave abuse of confidence, with intent to
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away for their own benefits the following items, to
wit:
a) Two (2) skids consisting of 2,500 sheets measuring 585mm x 825mm of grey back CCNB. with
a value of P11,825.00 at P4.73/sheet;
b) Sixteen (16) skids consisting of 32,000 sheets (2.000 sheets/skid) measuring 706mm x 574mm
of grey back CCNB, with a value of P128,640.00 at P4.02/ sheet;
c) Two (2) skids consisting of 2,400 sheets measuring 662mm x 885mm of grey back CCNB, with
a value of P1 3,848.00 at P5.77/sheet;
d) Six (6) skids consisting of 13.800 sheets (2,300 sheets/skid) measuring 688mm x 792mm of grey
back CCNB with a value of 62,652.00 at P4.54/sheet; and

e) Eight (8) skids consisting of 27,240 sheets of white back CCNB. with a value of P119,952.00 at
P4.41 /sheet
all in the total amount of P336,917.00 belonging to Precision Crestec. Inc. represented by Pedro A.
Garrido to the damage of (sic) prejudice of the letter in the aforecited amount.
Contrary to law.[6]
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Motion to Mold in Abeyance the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest[7] in view of the pendency of his motion for reconsideration of the
prosecutor's resolution. On 2 April 2007, the trial court motu proprio issued an order setting the
case for presentation of additional evidence on the existence of probable cause for the issuance of
the arrest warrant.[8] At the hearing, petitioner orally manifested his intention to question before
the Supreme Court the legality of DOJ Circular No. 29. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner asserts that DOJ Circular No. 29 is unconstitutional for being contrary to Article III,
Section 13 of the Constitution[9] and that it violates Articles 50[10] and 51[11] in relation to Article
71[12] of the Revised Penal Code as well as Rule 114, Section 7[13] of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. For quick reference, the circular is reproduced below:
DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 29
TO: ALL PROSECUTORS IN THE NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE
SUBJECT: AMENDING DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 74 DATED 06 NOVEMBER 2001
INVOLVING QUALIFIED THEFT WHEN THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY STOLEN IS
P222,000.00 OR MORE
DATE: 15 JULY 2005
WHEREAS, Section 7. Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, insofar as pertinent,
provides that no person charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong;
WHEREAS, said provision notwithstanding, DOJ Circular No. 74 dated 06 November 2001
provides for the grant of bail for the offense of qualified theft where the value of the property stolen
is P222.000.00 or more despite the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua therefor;
WHEREAS, this policy of leniency is accorded the accused under DOJ Circular No. 74 has been
recognized and applied in recent decisions of the Supreme Court;
WHEREAS, there is a need to prevent this policy from shielding those charged with large-scale
thievery;
WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, no bail shall be recommended for the
offense of qualified theft, whether consummated, frustrated or attempted, where the value of the
property stolen is P222,000.00 or more, xxx[14]
Petitioner believes that DOJ Circular No. 29's directive to prosecutors to recommend no bail for the
offense of qualified theft where the property stolen is P222,000.00 or more in effect denies bail to
all those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death regardless of whether the
evidence of guilt is strong or not. He argues that under Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution
and Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is only when the evidence of guilt is
strong that an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua becomes non-bailable.
The petition must fail.
The assailed circular operates merely as an internal guideline for prosecutors in making
recommendations to courts relative to bail applications. This is evident in the circular itself as it is

addressed to "all prosecutors in the national prosecution service"[15] and not to the judges of courts
over whom respondent Secretary of Justice exercises no control or supervision. Thus, such
recommendation although persuasive is just thati.e., recommendatory and not necessarilybinding on the court.[16]
In other words, it is still the trial court judge, in the exercise of his discretion, who ultimately
decides whether a person charged with a capital offense or of an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, may be granted provisional liberty on bail. Notwithstanding DOJ
Circular No. 29, this discretion still remains to be within the exclusive domain of the trial judge and
has never been
reposed in the prosecutor.[17] Clearly then, petitioner, even given the no-bail recommendation of
the prosecutor, is not barred from seeking provisional liberty by filing his bail application with the
trial court.[18]
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the petition
for lack of merit."
Puno, C.J., and Quisumbing, J., on official leave.
Very truly yours.
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, p. 37
[2] ld. at 38-44.
[3] ld. at 32-36.
[4] ld. at 31.
[5] Id. at 71-73.
[6] Id at 71-72.
[7] Id. at 76-78.
[8] Id. at 80.
[9] Section 13. Ml persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by redusion perpelua
when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law xxx.
[10] Art. 50. Penally to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. The penalty next lower
in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the
principal in a frustrated felony.
[11] Art. 5 1. Penally lo be imposed upon principals of attempted crimes A penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the
principals in an attempt to commit a felony,
[12] Art. 71. Graduated scales. In the case in which the law prescribed a penalty lower or higher
by one or more degrees than another given penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be

observed in graduating such penalty.

[13] Capital offense punishable by redusion perpelua or life imprisonment, not bailable. - No
person charged with a capital offense punishable by redusion perpelua or life imprisonment shall be
admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the proceedings.
[14] Rollo, p. 3
[15] Id.
[16] Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores, A.M. No. RTJ-99-.48S, 20 June 2000. 334 SCRA 1, 9, citingAmaya
v. Ordonez. G.R. No. 80906, 5 September 1988.
[17] Narciso v.Sta. Romana-Cruz, G.R. No. 34504, 17 March 2000, 328 SCRA 505, 515.
[18] People , Hu Ruey Chun, G.R. No. 158064, 30 June 2005, 462 SCRA 498. 511.
[G.R. No. 157943. September 12, 2006]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILBERT REYES WAGAS
En Banc
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated SEPT. 12, 2006
G.R. No. 157943 (The People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas)
X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X
This is regarding the action of Judge Gabriel T. Ingles in granting bail pending appeal to the
accused inPeople v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas, which appeal is docketed as G.R. No. 157945 before this
Court. The case involves a prosecution for large scale estafa through the issuance of bouncing
checks punishable under Presidential Decree No. 818.
Judge Ingles convicted the accused and sentenced him to an Indeterminate penalty of twelve years
of prision mayor as minimum to thirty years of reclusion perpetua as maximum, on the basis of his
finding that the accused was guilty of the charge for having issued a check for P200,000 in payment
of 200 sacks of rice, which check bounced upon presentment for payment.
The order granting bail is dated December 3, 2002 and states, as follows:
This resolves the Petition for Admission to Bail filed by the accused and opposed by the public
prosecutor.
In People vs. Reyes [,] 212 SCRA 402, the Supreme Court held that in large scale estafa thru the
issuance of bouncing checks punishable under Presidential Decree No. 818 where the amount
involved exceeds P22,000.00 the penalty is reclusion perpetua, and where evidence of guilt is
strong, the accused is not entitled to bail.
However in People vs. Hernando, 317 SCRA 617, the Supreme Court ruled that the imposition
upon the accused of a straight penalty of thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua is an error for the
penalty imposable should not be thirty (30) years but an indeterminate penalty. The Court declared,
to wit:

"Hence, if the amount of the fraud exceeds twenty two thousand pesos (P22,000.00), the penalty of
reclusion temporal is imposed in its maximum, adding one (1) year for each additional ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years, which shall be termed
reclusion perpetua. As used herein, reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty of the offense.
It merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved,
which exceeds twenty two thousand pesos (P22,000.00)" (underscoring supplied)
Following this later ruling, this Court imposed an indeterminate penalty upon the accused and not a
straight penalty.
Further, this ruling in People vs. Hernando means that large scale estafa is not really a capital
offense because it is not punishable by reclusion perpetua considering that "reclusion perpetua is
not the prescribed penalty for the offense. It merely describes the penalty actually imposed on
account of the amount of fraud involved."
Consequently, it renders the People vs. Reyes ruling of doubtful application and bail a matter of
discretion on appeal though there is a judgment of conviction, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In today's hearing on this Petition for Admission to Bail while the defense expressed willingness to
put up a cash bond to show that accused has no intention to evade liability, the prosecution however
did not present any evidence that would establish any of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 5, Rule
114 for the denial of the right to bail.
Accordingly, the petition for bail is granted. Bail is fixed in the sum of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) cash, which the accused may deposit with the nearest collector of internal revenue or
provincial city or municipal treasurer.
SO ORDERED.[1] cralaw
On November 17, 2003, the Court required Judge Ingles to explain why the accused is out on bail.
In his Manifestation and Compliance, dated January 13, 2004, Judge Ingles stated that in issuing
the Order, he "took into consideration the discussion of Retired Justice Oscar M. Herrera of the
Court of Appeals in his book Remedial Law Volume IV, 2001 Edition, pp. 388-390."
Retired Justice Oscar M. Herrera's book states:
REMEDIAL LAW
Volume IV
4. No absolute Right to Bail for Offenses Punishable by Reclusion Perpetua
In People vs. Reyes, 212 SCRA 402, the Court en banc speaking thru Justice Regalado held that in
large scale, estafa the issuance of bouncing checks punishable under Presidential Decree No. 818
where the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 the penalty is reclusion perpetua, and where
evidence of guilt is strong, the accused is not entitled to bail.
According to Justice Regalado "* * * under the rule of contemporanea exposion perpetua and since
the felony of estafa was not expressly or impliedly excluded from the aforestated provisions on
non-bailability, we see no reason why an accused charged with estafa punishable by reclusion
perpetuashould now be given the exceptional and favored treatment of being admitted to bail. The
same may be said of any accused charged with any offense so punished, whether the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is by direct statutory prescription or is imposed as a consequence of the
interplay of related provisions of the Code.

It will further be observed that Presidential Decree No. 818 does not apply to all forms of staff but
only to estafa by means of deceit under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315, that is, estafa through the use
of so-called bouncing checks. (People v. Villaraza, et al., 81 SCRA 95 [1978]; People v. Reyes, 212
SCRA 410).
In People vs. Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, Oct. 28, 1999, 317 SCRA 617
Accused spouses were charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818. (Amending Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by
increasing the penalties for estafa committed by means of bouncing checks), which increased the
penalty for estafa committed by means of bouncing checks. The trial court convicted accused
spouses and sentenced them "to each suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) years of reclusion
perpetua." The Court held: This is an error. The proper penalty imposable should not be thirty (30)
years (straight) but an indeterminate penalty.(People vs. Viente, 225 SCRA 361, 373 [1993];
Argoncillo vs. Court of Appeals, 96 SCAD 41, 292 SCRA 313, 330 [1998]) The requirement of
imposing an Indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses, whether punishable by the Revised
Penal Code or by special laws, with definite maximum and maximum terms, as the Court deems
proper within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law is mandatory. (Bacar vs. de
Guzman, 81 SCAD 708, 271 SCRA 328, 340 [1997]; People vs. Lee, Jr., 132 SCRA 66 [1984];
Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals, supra).
Hence, if the amount of the fraud exceeds twenty-two thousand pesos, the penalty of reclusion
temporalis imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional ten thousand
(P10,000.00) pesos but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years, which shall be
termed reclusion perpetua. As used herein, reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the
offense. It merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud
involved, which exceeds twenty two thousand (P22,000.00) pesos. (People vs. Elpidio Hernando
and Elena Aban Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, October 28, 1999, J., Pardo) Thus, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is applicable to large scale estafa. The rule was reiterated in People vs. Panganiban,
G.R. No. 133028, July 10, 2000.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted of offenses punished with
death penalty or life imprisonment.
Under the Constitution: "All persons except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law."
Before conviction by the Regional Trial Court bail is a matter of right for an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. (Sec. 4, Rule 114).
It would, thus, seem that the pronouncement in Crecencia vs. Reyes that "an accused charged with
estafa punishable by "reclusion perpetua" should not be given the exceptional and favored
treatment of being admitted to bail," may not stand on solid grounds since according to Hernando
and Panganibanreclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense for large scale
estafa committed by bouncing check (P.D. No. 818) but merely describes the penalty actually
imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved, which exceeds twenty two thousand
(P22,000.00) pesos. If it is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, it is mandatory for the court to
apply the indeterminate sentence law, the minimum of which shall be in the range of the penalty
next lower in that prescribed by the Code for the offense. For offenses charging violation of large
scale estafa thru bouncing checks such penalty isprision mayor, with a range of six years and one
(1) day to twelve years (People v. Elpidio Hernando and Elena Aban Hernando, G.R. No. 125214,
October 28, 1999; People v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 133028, July 10, 2000) Under this formulation,
the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion temporal. Any person charge with such offense should
before conviction be therefore entitled to bail as a matter of right.[2] cralaw

The Court referred the matter to Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,[3] cralaw who
recommended that Judge Ingles be administratively charged with simple ignorance of the law.
Court Administrator Velasco stated that People v. Reyes still prevails, namely, that those sentenced
to reclusion perpetuaunder Presidential Decree No. 818 are not entitled to bail. People v.
Hernando, he stressed, merely held that the Indeterminate Sentence Law can be applied to such a
sentence, because it is really a penalty of thirty years although described as reclusion perpetua, but
it did not hold that the accused would be entitled to bail.[4] cralaw
The Court, upon such recommendation, resolved on July 5, 2005, to direct the Court Administrator
to file administrative charges against Judge Ingles for simple ignorance of the law.
On August 7, 2006, however, new Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock wrote the Chief Justice
a letter which recommended that the resolution of July 5, 2005 be reconsidered, stating in part as
follows:
xxx
For purposes of complying with the resolution dated July 5, 2005 this Office has finalized the draft
of the complaint against Judge Ingles a copy of which is hereto attached. This notwithstanding, this
Office is of the opinion that, after a closer study of the jurisprudence on this matter, Judge Ingles
may not be administratively liable.
In People vs. Cortez (G.R. No. 92560, October 15, 1991) Court laid down certain policies on the
matter of whether or not an accused may be admitted to bail after conviction. One of those policies
is:
"3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time
of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and
is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charge, his bond shall be
cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal." (p. 405)
As a result of this decision this Court issued Administrative Circular No. 2-92 (January 20, 1992)
reiterating the aforementioned policies.
In People vs. Reyes (212 SCRA 402) this Court ruled that the afore-quoted policy covers cases of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code where the accused was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for more than twenty (20) years. First, this Court noted that by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 818, the Penalty for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) has
been increased as follows:
"SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts
as defined in paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885,
shall be punished by:
1st . The penalty pf reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no cases exceed thirty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which maybe imposed under the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua.
Second, this Court held that a penalty higher than reclusion temporal (above twenty years) imposed
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 818 may be properly categorized and considered as embraced
within the penalty of reclusion perpetua (p. 407) so much so that pursuant to the policy laid down
in People vs. Cortez and Administrative Circular No. 2-92, the accused is no longer entitled to bail
pending his appeal.

Then came the case of People vs. Hernando (317 SCRA 617) Although in this case, the Supreme
Court discussed the penalty imposed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 818 in connection with
the failure of the trial courts to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it was nevertheless
categorically stated therein that as used in Presidential Decree No. 818, reclusion perpetua is not
the prescribed penalty for the offense, but merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account
of the amount of the fraud involved which exceeds twenty two thousand (P22,000.00) pesos.
(p.629) This was reiterated in People vs. Panganiban. (335 SCRA 354, 368-369).
Judge Ingles was aware of the decision in People vs. Reyes and People vs. Hernando, having cited
these cases in his order dated December 3, 2002. Judge Ingles did not apply the ruling in People vs.
Reyes but in so doing he was not swayed by personal preference but because of the pronouncement
in People vs. Hernando. In this sense his order was not totally baseless since he relied on a decision
of this Court. This is why this Office believes that Judge Ingles should not be held administratively
liable. The error, if it may be called one, of Judge Ingles arose out of an honest difference of
opinion brought about by what seems to be conflicting decisions of this Court.
It may not amiss to point out that Judge Ingles is not the only one who believes that the ruling in
People vs. Hernando should prevail over that of People vs. Reyes. An eminent jurist, whose book
has been considered as a "scholarly reference in the field of law," has the same opinion as Judge
Ingles. In his book, the said jurist, after discussing the rulings in People vs. Reyes, People vs.
Hernando and People vs. Panganiban, offered this opinion.
"It would, thus, seem that the pronouncement in Crecencia vs. Reyes (sic) that "an accused charged
with estafa punishable by "reclusion perpetua" should not be given the exceptional and favored
treatment of being admitted to bail, "may not stand on solid grounds since according to Hernando
and Panganiban reclusion perpetua is not prescribed penalty for the offense for large scale estafa
committed by bouncing check (P.D. No. 818) but merely described the penalty actually imposed on
account of the amount of the fraud involved, which exceeds twenty two thousand (P22,000.00)..."
(Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. Vol. IV, Rules 110 to 127, Rev. Rules of Criminal
Procedures, 2001 Ed., pp. 389-390)
In asking for a reconsideration of the resolution dated July 5, 2005, this Office is guided by the
spirit behind the ruling in Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo (214 SCRA 405, 464-465) wherein this Court
held that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in
good faith. We certainly do not find any proof of malice, bad faith or corrupt motive behind the act
of Judge Ingles in issuing the order dated December 3, 2002. Furthermore, in Dela Cruz vs.
Concepcion (235 SCRA 597, 607) it was held that judicial discretion involves the exercise of
judgment on the part of the judge. The judge must be allowed reasonable latitude for the operation
of his own individual view of the case, his appreciation of the facts, and his understanding of the
applicable law on the matter. If the judge committed any error at all, it was an error of judgment
and it is firmly established principle that a judge may not be administratively charged for mere
error of judgment in the absence of a showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose.
In Vda. De Zaala vs. Pamaran (39 SCRA 430) this Court held that no one, called upon to try facts
or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. All that
is expected of him is that he follow the rules prescribed to ensure a fair and impartial hearing. He
then assesses the different facts that emerge therefrom and the issues presented by the parties, and
on the basis thereof make his conclusions, with only his conscience and knowledge of the law to
guide him and decided the case accordingly.
In view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully recommended that the resolution dated July 5, 2002
of this Court directing this Office to file administrative charge for simple ignorance against Judge
Gabriel T. Ingles be reconsidered and set aside, and that the explanation of Judge Ingles as to the
reason why the accused is out on bail be considered satisfactory.[5] cralaw
The Court finds that the matters raised by the new Court Administrator are best raised by way of
defense by the Judge himself.

WHEREFORE, the Court Administrator is hereby DIRECTED to forthwith COMPLY with the
Resolution of this Court of July 5, 2005 and cause the filing of the administrative charges against
Judge Ingles for simple ignorance of the law.
Furthermore, appellant, GILBERT REYES WAGAS, is required to EXPLAIN, in ten (10) days
from receipt of this Resolution, why his bail should not be cancelled for having been erroneously
granted.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court