TAYAG VS YUSECO 97 PHIL 712

Facts:

Yuseco had been rendering professional services without

compensation to Lim.
Lim offered to Yuseco, to build a house within their lot.
Yuseco accepted the offer (believing that the same was a
donation or was compensation for the services rendered)
Yuseco built a house thereon.
Lim sold to her daughter(Tayag) the lots where Yusecos house
stood.
Tayag asked Yuseco to remove their house from the lots or pay a
monthly rental.Yuseco refused.
Tayag filed an action of ejection for restitution of the lots.
The case reached the SC and remanded the case to the Trial
court to give an opportunity to Tayag to exercise their choice and
option whether they would appropriate the buildings and pay
Yuseco for the value thereof OR compel Yuseco to pay for the
value of the lots.
In a manifestation, Tayag chose to appropriate the buildings.
TC issued a writ of execution to collect from Tayag the sum for
the building.
Tayag question said writ, contending that she still retain the right
of option and even if she already had made her choice, she
cannot be compelled to pay the price fixed by the court because
of her financial inability.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT TAYAG MAY STILL REPUDIATE HIS ELECTION TO
APPROPRIATE THE BUILDINGS.
Law Applicable:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown
or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided
for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to
pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its
value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The

parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
Ruling:
NO.
Once a choice is made by the landowner, it is generally
irrevocable.Thus, if the landowner has opted/elected to appropriate the
building but he is unable to pay for the indemnity or amount, the
landowner CANNOT afterwards opt/elect to sell the land. Since Tayags
first choice had already been communicated to the court and she had
already been ordered to pay, her duty has been converted into a
monetary obligation which can be enforced by a writ of execution.
Opinion:
I agree with the decision of the SC. Yuseco is a possessor in good faith,
as she believed the land given was a donation or was compensation for
the services rendered.
GALLAR VS HUSSAIN L-20954
MAY 24, 1967
Facts:
Husains in this case are the heirs of Teodoro Husain. Teodoro Husain
sold the land under dispute for 30 pesos to Serapio Chichirita with the
right to repurchase within 6 years. Teodoro transferred his right to his
sister, Graciana Husain. Graciana paid the redemption price and later
sold the land to Elias Gallar for a cattle. Possession of the land,
together with the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of Teodoro
Husain, was delivered on the same occasion to Gallar, who since then
has been in possession of the land. A couple of years after, Gallar filed
this suit in the Court of Instance of Iloilo on October 10, 1960 to compel
Hermenegilda and Bonifacio Husain, as heirs of Teodoro Husain, to
execute a deed of conveyance in his favor so that he could get a
transfer certificate of title. He also asked for damages. The Husains
countered by saying that Graciana already paid the redemption price
thus their father had already reacquired ownership over the same.
They also claim that the action of Elias has already PRESCRIBED.
Issue:
1) WHETHER OR NOT OWNERSHIP WAS TRANSFERRED TO GALLAR.
2) WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

Law Applicable:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any
interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is
in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon
title to real property or any interest therein.
Ruling:
1) YES, ownership has been transferred to Gallar. The right of
repurchase may be exercised only by the vendor in whom the right is
recognized by contract or by any person to whom the right may have
been transferred. Graciana Husain must, therefore, be deemed to have
acquired the land in her own right, subject only to Teodoro Husain's
right of redemption. As the new owner she had a perfect right to
dispose of the land as she in fact did when she exchanged it for a
cattle with Gallar.
2) NO, the action is imprescriptible. This action is not for specific
performance; all it seeks is to quiet title, to remove the cloud cast on
appellee's ownership as a result of appellant's refusal to recognize the
sale made by their predecessor. And, as plaintiff-appellee is in
possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible. Appellant's
argument that the action has prescribed would be correct if they were
in possession as the action to quiet title would then be an action for
recovery of real property which must be brought within the statutory
period of limitation governing such actions.
Opinion:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The owner has the
right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law. An action to quiet title to property in ones
possession is imprescriptible. The rationale for this rule has been aptly
stated thus: The owner of real property who is in possession thereof
may wait until his possession is invaded or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right. A person claiming title to real

property, but not in possession thereof, must act affirmatively and

within the time provided by the statute.

SKYWORLD CONDOMINIUM OWNERS ASSO. VS SEC 211 SCRA

565 1992
Facts:
Two petitions were filed against the petitioner SCOAI, one of them
contesting the existence of the petitioner as an entity, and the other,
for a writ of preliminary injunction praying that the petitioner be
stopped from exercising the prerogatives of a condominium
corporation. The first petition was filed on August 8, 1986 by CBC
before the SEC docketed as SEC No. 3035. The second was filed on
October 9, 1986 before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch V
(Civil Case No. 915-R) by the respondent Baguio Skyworld
Condominium Corporation (BSCC) which was organized at the instance
of CBC and registered with the SEC on September 19, 1986.
A hearing was conducted on September 11, 1989 by the PED with Mr.
Norberto Ruiz as the hearing officer. The counsels of the two parties
were present. On December 12, 1989, the PED issued a resolution
ordering the revocation of the certificate of registration of the SCOAI.
The resolution was prepared by Mr. Norberto Ruiz after studying the
substantial evidence he received and the arguments of the parties in
the memoranda submitted by the parties to him. On the same date,
the resolution was presented by PED Director Elnora Adviento before
the Commission en banc which approved the same.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE REVOCATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
REGISTRATION WAS VALID.
Law applicable:
RA 4726
Section 10. Whenever the common areas in a condominium project
are held by a condominium corporation, such corporation shall
constitute the management body of the project. The corporate
purposes of such a corporation shall be limited to the holding of the
common areas, either in ownership or any other interest in real
property recognized by law, to the management of the project, and to

such other purposes as may be necessary, incidental or convenient to

the accomplishment of said purposes. The articles of incorporation or
by-laws of the corporation shall not contain any provision contrary to or
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the enabling or master
deed, or the declaration of restrictions of the project. Membership in a
condominium corporation, regardless of whether it is a stock or nonstock corporation, shall not be transferable separately from the
condominium unit of which it is an appurtenance. When a member or
stockholder ceases to own a unit in the project in which the
condominium corporation owns or holds the common areas, he shall
automatically cease to be a member or stockholder of the
condominium corporation.

Ruling:
Yes. The revocation was valid.The Court, thus, upholds the finding of
the Commission that the indispensable requirement that all
incorporators of a condominium corporation must be shareholders
thereof was not satisfactorily complied with by the petitioner at the
time a certificate of registration was applied for. (Section 5,
Corporation Code of the Philippines [Batas Pambansa Blg. 68]; Section
10, Condominium Act [Rep. Act. 4726]. To be a shareholder, one must
necessarily be an owner of a condominium unit. (Sunset View
Condominium Corporation v. Campos, Jr., 104 SCRA 295 [1981]). In the
case at bar, it was found by the SEC that only one, Angel Bautista, was
considered to be an owner of a unit in the Skyworld Condominium at
the time of incorporation.
Opinion:
I agree with the SC, when the language of the law is plain and clear,
there is no room for interpretation.

PUNZALAN VS BOON LIAT 44 PHIL 320

Facts:
Plaintiffs (21 men) and one of the defendants named Ahamad, found a
whale and quartered it. They found a great quantity of ambergris in its
abdomen and placed it in three sacks (2 sacks were full and the third is
only half-full). The sacks were taken to the house of Maharaja Butu and
left it to the care of Ahamad. All 22 persons made an agreement that
they were to be the sole owners of the ambergris and that none of

them could sell it without the consent of the rest. Some went to
Zamboanga to sell the ambergris and eventually sold a half sack.
Meanwhile, Mr. Henry Teck offered to purchase the ambergris
remaining with Ahamad, who refused to sell. Mr. Teck insisted telling
Ahamad not to be afraid of his companions and that he would answer
for whatever might happen. With this promise of protection, Ahamad
agreed to sell the amber.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE WAS VALID HAVING ENTERED INTO
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER CO-OWNERS.
Law Applicable:
Article 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the
charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a
contract to the contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co- ownership shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proved.
Ruling:
The sale was valid. Defendants should deliver to the plaintiffs the
amber in question or in default thereof, to pay them the value of the
amber or P 60,000. There was an agreement between the co-owners
not to sell the amber without the consent of all. Both sales having been
made without the consent of all owners, the same have no effect,
except as to the portion pertaining to those who made them.
Opinion:
I agree with the decision of the SC. The sale will affect only his own
share but not those of the other coowners who did not consent to the
sale. A sale of the entire property by one coowner without the consent
of the other coowners is not null and void but affects only his
undivided share.