THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV.

BISHOP
VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY,
Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD
CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728

January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6)
by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA RH Law referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the
present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either
(Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.
10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted against it form
Team Buhay.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Courts power of review.

2.
3.

Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative

remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.

4.

Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners fundamental right to freedom of expression.

5.

Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral

regulation.

6.

Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.

7.

Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded
jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the
tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny
and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech.
Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely
into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the
controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government
before a court may come into the picture.
Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs letter threatening the
filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this
right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC
suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position
that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these
provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do
they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this
case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizens expression with political consequences enjoys a
high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who
voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda.
The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for consideration by any candidate, political
party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue, fostering informed and civic minded deliberation. On the other
hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does no more than propose a
commercial transaction. The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however,
definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the subject matter
of the utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on
the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin
content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has
used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Only when the challenged
act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as
to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The
size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise
protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private
property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the
laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property.
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding
upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law
does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech
solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

Adiong vs. Comelec,

G.R. NO. 103956; 31 MAR 1992; 207 SCRA 713
FACTS: Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and
stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the
authorized posting areas that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial candidate assails said
resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and
other moving vehicles, wherein it is his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a
senatorial candidate, due to the ban on radio, tv and print political advertisements.
ISSUE: WON a resolution prohibiting posting of decals and stickers is constitutional.
HELD: No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public
or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship
which is unconstitutional. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the
prohibition.

AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988]
Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer
Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and
international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed
motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other
government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film
production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama"
style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual
documentary footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and
Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a
script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of
his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production,
film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this
demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to
film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to
plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.

Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce
motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through
television. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a
commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of
freedom of speech and of expression.

The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience.
Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would
precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of
any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates
to

highly

critical

stage

in

the

history

of

the

country.

At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that
petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures
were

held

to

have

lost,

to

some

extent

at

least,

their

right

to

privacy.

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional
freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a
requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events.

TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TPCWA) vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.
G.R. Nos 158798-99
19 October 2007

FACTS:

The Union is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees.
After the holding of a certification election, and the issuance of an Order certifying the Union as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the Toyota rank and file employees, Toyota
challenged said Order via appeal to the DOLE Secretary. Thus, Toyota refused to negotiate
CBAs with the Union pending said appeal. The Unions subsequent notice to strike was
converted into a preventive mediation case.

The 21 February 2001 hearing on the exclusion of the votes of alleged supervisory employees
from the votes cast during the certification election was cancelled and reset to the next day The
Union requested that its members be absent on 22 February, but the same was denied. Despite
said denal, more than 200 employees staged mass actions on 22 and 23 February in front of the
BLR and DOLE offices, to protest the partisan and anti-union stance of Toyota. Due to the loss
of the said number of employees, Toyota experienced losses due to inability to meet production
goals. Soon thereafter, Toyota sent individual letters to some 360 employees requiring them to
explain within 24 hours why they should not be dismissed for their obstinate defiance of the
companys directives. The letters specifically cited the Companys Code of Conduct wherein
inciting or participating in riots, disorders, alleged strikes, or concerted actions detrimental to
Toyotas interest wherein the first offense would amount to dismissal.

In response to the letters, the Union circulated a Manifesto which urged its members to
participate in a strike/picket and to abandon their posts. The Union members explained that their
refusal to work on their scheduled work time for two consecutive days was simply an exercise of

their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. On 16 March 2001, Toyota terminated 227 employees for participation in concerted
actions in violation of its Code of Conduct and for misconduct under Article 282 of the Labor
Code. In reaction to the dismissal of its union members and officers, the Union went on strike on
17 March, 28 March ad 12 April. In the latter dates, the Union intensified its strike by
barricading the gates of Toyotas Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants. The strikers prevented workers
who reported for work from entering the plants.

ISSUE(S):

1.
Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal
strikes; and
2.
Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated in the
illegal strikes.

HELD:
1.

Yes. The alleged protest rallies in front of the offices of BLR and DOLE Secretary and
at the Toyota plants constituted illegal strikes. Even if the Union claims that the said acts
were not strikes, there was a lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold rallies, nor
were there any filing of a notice in the two-day walk-out. Shrouded by demonstrations,
they were in reality temporary stoppages of work perpetrated through the converted
action of the employees who deliberately failed to report for work on the convenient
excuse that they will hold a rally at the BLR and DOLE offices in Intramuros, Manila. It
is obvious that the real and ultimate goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally
acknowledge the Union as the sole bargaining agent of the company. This is not a legal
and valid exercise of the right of assembly and to demand redress of grievance. A valid
strike should comply with the prerequisites under Article 263 of the Labor Code. These
requisites were not complied with by the Union. Furthermore, the February 2001 strikes
are in blatant violation of Toyotas Code of Conduct to which the Union and its members
are bound to. To make matters worse, the barricade done during the March and April
strikes are in palpable violation of Article 264(e) of the Labor Code, which proscribes
acts of violence, coercion, or intimidation, or which obstruct the free ingress to and
egress from the company premises.

2. No. There can be no good faith in intentionally incurring absences in a collective fashion
from work just to attend DOLE hearings. The Union members should know from
common sense that the company will incur substantial amounts of losses. In a slew of

cases, the Court refrained from awarding separation pay or financial assistance to union
officers and members who were separated from service due to their participation in or
commission of illegal acts during strikes.

SSS Employee Association v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions demands
concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court
issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary
injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance
on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations
Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the
petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to
strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the
petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides
guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities
such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular
No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that prior to the enactment by
Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in the absence of any legislation
allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as
government employees and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with

an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the
Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of
injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court
for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987 VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, respondent.
Legaspi
Vs
Civil
Serv.
Comm.
FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is
invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi
against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the
Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the
civil service examinations for sanitarians.
ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service
eligibilities of the Health Department employees
HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not
absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access
to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The law
may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting
national security It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public
record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public
concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the
information sought is of public interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the
government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed,
this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial
of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not
of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the
operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly
observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret
arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the
consatitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to

review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus
Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government
positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public
officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective
positions. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the
respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the
petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial
notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public.
Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed.
Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any
citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The
civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express
limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position,
the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any
person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies

Galman Vs. Sandiganbayan

144 SCRA 43
G.R. No.72670
September 12, 1986
Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his
plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet
fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported
within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to
be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired
gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of
people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and
freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version
stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive
affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's
assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference
between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents
above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's
minority report would exclude nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in
the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the
restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to
respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy
of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss
the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day

period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution
(which apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate
the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits
that the people are entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime
charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents
submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot
and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging
that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in
miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the
sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.

Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said
cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the
requirements of due process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no
longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed
that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to
whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a
prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a
scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by
categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice
Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner
room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were
with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the
meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see
the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told
them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres.
Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and
from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the
Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the

Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which
proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of
total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres.
Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not
by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder
that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his
announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration
of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better
arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may
claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if
some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance
of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was
looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to
Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a
regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of
the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring
of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The partiality
of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the twentysix accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan
overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused
was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and
disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government
and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the
Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal
Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial
authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the
handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference
(and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified
respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to
exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert
and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to
know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having
been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in
legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All
acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion
for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had
required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining
order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its
decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the
acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the
crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due
process.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of
government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no
constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in
accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and
honor.

Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board

December 30, 2011

FACTS: In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the
May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a
candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification
for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and
(2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for
one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial
aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there

is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the

qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional.
It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws
must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to
the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
The provision [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has undergone mandatory drug test is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications.
COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating
rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such
power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.