Reading Raphael Lataster, A Review From A Bayesian Perspective

Reading Raphael Lataster
A Review From a Bayesian Perspective

Tim Hendrix
August 7, 2016
Contents
1 Introduction
2 Bayesian reasoning: Criticising the criteria of authenticity and

calling for a review of biblical criticism
3
2.1 The case study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
2.2 Objections to Bayes theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
3 Play it again, Sam
11
4 Questioning the Plausibility of Jesus Ahistoricity Theories: A

Brief Pseudo-Bayesian Metacritique of the Sources
14
5 There was no Jesus, there is no God
6 Jesus Did Not Exist: A Debate Among Atheists
6.1 He admits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.2 Uncharitable reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3 Possible does not mean probable (...) it is possible that
6.4 Hyperbole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.5 Leaving out the argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.6 Time for applause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.7 Casey, Carrier, self awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.8 It all fits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 Conclusion
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Tim
Hendrix is not my real name. For family reasons I prefer not to have my name
associated with my religious views online. All questions or comments are welcome and can be
directed to timhendrix@gmx.com. This is the second revision of this manuscript.
Introduction
Raphael Lataster is a graduate student in Religious Studies at the university of

Sydney. He is the author of two books and several articles in which he defends
the position Jesus (possibly) did not exist as well as the general applicability
of Bayes theorem to answer historical questions 1 . His position is influenced
by two recent works by Richard Carrier, Proving History [Carrier, 2012] and
On the Historicity of Jesus [Carrier, 2014] which he recently reviewed favorably [Lataster, 2016]. I have a hobby interest in the applicability of Bayes
theorem to history and have elsewhere published reviews of Carriers works. My
overall conclusion is that these are both ambitious and entertaining books containing a wealth of historical information, however I have reservations as to how
Bayes theorem is applied. 2
I was therefore excited to see Carriers project being furthered by Lataster,
a well-published graduate student who describes his research interests to include Philosophical logic and Bayesian reasoning, and who has published two
journal articles with the word Bayes in the title. The following review will
focus on the two journal articles by Lataster which will be reviewed primarily
for what they have to say about Bayes theorem, however I also found it useful
to comment on his two books because they touch on related issues. The review
will therefore be in four parts focusing on the two journal articles and the two
books. The abbreviations used are:
(Article) Bayesian Reasoning [Lataster, 2013] In Bayesian reasoning: Criticising the criteria of authenticity and calling for a review of biblical criticism Lataster critisize the criteria of authenticity and presents Bayes
theorem as an alternative
(Article) Plausibility of Jesus [Lataster, 2015b] In Questioning the Plausibility of Jesus Ahistoricity Theories: A Brief Pseudo-Bayesian Metacritique of the Sources Lataster discuss theories for Jesus ahistoricity from a
Bayesian perspective
(Article) WLC resurrection [Lataster, 2015a] In A philosophical and historical analysis of William Lane Craigs resurrection of Jesus argument
Lataster criticize the resurrection argument by William Lane Craig
(Book) No Jesus No God [Lataster, 2014] In There was no Jesus, there
is no God Lataster presents arguments against the existence of God and
Jesus
(Book) Jesus did not exist [Lataster and Carrier, 2015] In Jesus Did Not
Exist: A Debate Among Atheists Lataster presents arguments for and
against the historicity of Jesus
1 http://sydney.edu.au/arts/religion/staff/profiles/raphael.lataster.php
2 See https://www.scribd.com/document/271358647/Richard-Carrier-Proving-History-Review
and https://www.scribd.com/doc/305750452/Richard-Carrier-s-On-the-Historicity-of-Jesus
Bayesian reasoning: Criticising the criteria

of authenticity and calling for a review of
biblical criticism
Lataster introduces this article as a critique of existing historical methods and a

case study which illustrates how Bayes theorem can overcome their deficiencies:
After examining many reasons why the Criteria (or their use by
Biblical scholars) are unreliable, a review of Scholars methodology
is called for. One alternative is briefly considered: Bayes Theorem.
Already used in mathematics, science, philosophy, and arguably, history, the use of Bayesian thinking in Biblical studies has been elusive.
A case study is presented, which gives examples of how the Criteria
and Bayesian methodology deals with stories of the death of Herod
Agrippa, and objections to Bayesian methods are analysed and discussed
(Bayesian Reasoning )
in the following Lataster reviews the various criteria and their flaws which concludes:
If scholarly views on Jesus historicity, authentic sayings, and deeds,
are derived from such tenuous methodology, it seems reasonable that
they ought to be reviewed. Not with the same methodology, but with
tools that are logical, mathematical, and critical. One such alternative, which incorporates (such as the criterion of natural probability)
and supersedes all the Criteria of Authenticity, utilises Bayes Theorem.
There then follows a brief discussion of Bayes theorem, somewhat unfortunately
titled Bayes Therem, which very briefly mentions that Bayes theorem is of
use to historians citing [Carrier, 2012]. Contrary to Carrier, the section does
not discuss how probabilities should be obtained or any potential difficulties
in applying Bayes theorem (for instance numerical stability, the reference class
problem), nor does it actually introduce Bayes theorem except as a sketch taken
from [Carrier, 2012]. To review, Bayes theorem is the formula:
P (h|E) =
P (E|h)P (h)
P (E|h)P (h) + P (E|h)P (h)
where h is the hypothesis in question, E is the historical evidence and h is

the negation of h (h is false). To mention one difficulty of applying Bayes theorem to history, the formulate naturally requires us to obtain the probabilities
P (E|h), P (h), P (h) and P (E|h) as well as formulate h exactly. Lataster does
not discuss how we should do this but appears to assume these numbers should
be guessed; the issue is simply not brought up. Lataster then claims Bayes
theorem will help historians:
When employing Bayes Theorem, the historian will no longer be

allowed to pass off a merely possible theory as one that is probable,
or almost certain; the numbers cannot lie.
Those who are sceptical of applying a mathematical approach to the
humanities are easily answered by Carrier who asserts that history
relies on probabilities, which are mathematical, even when numbers are not explicitly used. Even odds means 50% for example,
improbable might mean 20%, very probable could mean 95%, while
more than likely would mean greater than 50%. Bayes Theorem just
makes the process more transparent; what was once said intuitively
can now be asserted mathematically
It is true in a trivial sense that numbers cannot lie, however they can certainly
be guessed falsely. What Bayes theorem does is that it allows us to express one
probability in terms of others and thus it depends on the underlying assumption
that these other probabilities can be guessed accurately. This does not guard us
against passing of a possible theory as probable because this, if Bayes theorem
is used or not, is just a matter of falsely guessing probabilities. It may be that
the use of Bayes theorem will help historians, perhaps by making the underlying
structure of the argument more clear, but this cant be said to be shown here.
Regarding the second half of the paragraph the translation from words to
numbers (something Lataster will revisit several times) is simply restricting the
possible set of probabilities to fixed values and it does not address any issues
to how Bayes theorem is used. It is similar to how it may be easier to guess
a persons weight by limiting oneself to specific possible values: 50kg is very
light, 60kg is light, etc. This may feel easier than using the entire range
of possible values, however it is not more accurate and in fact one is nearly
guaranteed to exclude the right value.
2.1
The case study
This brings us to the case study where Bayes theorem is applied to answer the
question if Herod of Agrippa was killed by an angel. The case study attempts
to establish the truth of the following passage from acts:
21 On the appointed day Herod, wearing his royal robes, sat on
his throne and delivered a public address to the people. 22 They
shouted, This is the voice of a god, not of a man. 23 Immediately,
because Herod did not give praise to God, an angel of the Lord
struck him down, and he was eaten by worms and died .
(Acts 12:21-23)
Lataster begins his disucssion by noting the story is unlikely to have happened:
Given that angels are mythical creatures, this story is inherently unlikely to be
historical. Nevertheless, the Criteria of Authenticity could support this passages
authenticity. and follows up with how other criteria could nevertheless be
interpreted to support these events haven taken place:
4
John P. Meier reveals a potential flaw in the Criteria in arguing

that they could support miracle traditions(Meier, 1994: 630-631),
demonstrating the uncritical nature of certain Biblical scholars, and
the willingness to accept implausible explanations.
It is unfortunate that Lataster use some where obviously citations are needed.
Lataster goes on to mention scholars who argue against regarding the events as
having taken place (Bart Ehrman, Robert Price and even Thomas Paine); the
gist of this discussion is the events can be regarded not to have taken place
because they involve supernatural events. Lataster then gets to the point of the
case study:
These are all good reasons to reject the Lukan account of Herods
death, but the unlikelihood of this version of the story being authentic can be demonstrated more formally, through Bayesian methodology.
There then follows about 1 page of additional discussing Bayes theorem which,
curiously, reproduce one of the graphics from the Bayes therem section. It is
claimed that
Bayes Theorem allows the historian to compare various theories, and
helps decide which is more probable. As Bayes Theorem forces the
historian to consider how alternative theories also fit the evidence, it
avoids the effects of confirmation bias, which Carrier suspects many
Biblical scholars are guilty of, and which opposes the much-trusted
scientific method.
Of course the historical method, as any intellectual endeavour, requires us to
consider alternative explanations. Regarding confirmation bias, no argument is
provided as to why Bayes theorem avoids confirmation bias. Confirmation bias
in a Bayesian setting would simply involve over or under-estimating some of the
probabilities that has to be guessed, and since we have no way to determine if
these probabilities are guessed correctly there is ample room for bias. A strong
argument can be made that Bayes theorem is in fact very susceptible to bias
as the combination of multiple probabilities will act as to increase the bias 3 .
Without further considerations Lataster applies Bayes theorem to determine
if Herod was killed by an angel. To recap Bayes theorem is
p(h|E) =
p(E|h)p(h)
p(E|h)p(h) + p(E|h)p(h)
where h is the hypothesis Herod was killed by an angel. Lataster writes:

The inherent probability of the theory (without yet considering the
available evidence, such as the reference in Acts), P (h), is infinitely
small.
3I
provide illustrations of this in my review of OHJ
p(E|h)0
= 0.
Thus, plugging this in we indeed obtain p(h|E) = p(E|h)0+p(E|h)(10)
But what did we really learn? We learned that if we rule out supernatural
explanations a-priori, then we will arrive at the conclusion the supernatural
event did not take place. Lataster explains why we can rule out supernatural
explanations:
Explaining further, P (h) is so small as no account of angels killing

nobles has ever been confirmed. Such acts are also are not analogous to our understandings of biology and physics, while they are
analogous to fiction and mythology
So when we rule out supernatural explanations we do so by relying on a principle,
one could also say Criteria, that supernatural explanations are inherently wildly
implausible. Lataster concludes:
As this case study demonstrates, Bayesian reasoning is formally and
mathematically valid, even if accurate calculations are not done
I am puzzled about what the case study accomplishes. Reading the sentence
strictly it is false as obviously a case study cant demonstrate that Bayesian
reasoning (as an inferential procedure) is mathematically valid. On the other
hand, suppose the result of the case study is to demonstrate more formally the
unlikelihood of this particular story as mentioned in the introduction. However
the bit that is actually demonstrated formally is that assuming supernatural
events are a-priori virtually impossible, then a particular supernatural event
is unlikely to have taken place. Notice this conclusion, due to the way the
hypothesis h is defined, says absolutely nothing of an underlying natural event
that was later embellished, for instance that Herod was assassinated. However
did anyone doubt the conclusion Herod was not killed by an angel historically?
For this argument to persuade someone who thinks the story is accurate, he
or she will have to agree that the prior probability of the story is virtually zero
as Lataster simply states. As described above, in arriving at this conclusion
Lataster relies on a principle or criteria (we can call it what we want) that
supernatural events are inherently implausible and so their prior probability is
virtually zero. This may be true, however I would think this is exactly the
assumption that the Christian scholar would disagree with and so we have not
moved away from criteria based reasoning.
It is thus very difficult to see which lessons can be taken away from the
case study. More generally, what the case study illustrates is only that if we
know a-priori with virtual certainty that and event did/did not take place then,
we can conclude that the event did/did not take place and we can do a small
computation that agrees with this intuition. This is however not a conclusion
anyone would disagree with. Where history is interesting is when the conclusion is not given and contradictory or vague evidence must be evaluated and
obviously the case study says nothing about how applicable Bayes theorem is
to that situation.
One lesson Lataster draws from the case study is this:
6
I would argue that employing Bayesian reasoning without calculations is potentially more useful and reliable, given that a multitude
of errors can be made when assigning quantitative values.
Lataster will return to this no calculations use of Bayes theorem many times
in his other works and so it is worth mentioning it. Since the above quote is
mentioned in relationship the case study it, presumably, refers to how we can
greatly simplify our calculations by assuming terms in the computation are zero
(or virtually zero) as we did above. However this use is naturally only accurate
when the probabilities are virtually zero in which case we are considering trivial
applications like the case study. Put in another way, Lataster appears to agree
that assigning (guessing) quantitative probabilities is hard, but suggests we
overcome this difficulty by assigning trivial values is just ignoring the problem,
in fact it will guarantee the wrong result unless the probabilities are trivial. The
sections closes:
Bayesian reasoning is in this case proven superior; while the Criteria can support the supernatural account, Bayesian thinking leads
historians and other scholars towards far more plausible theories.
But why has Bayesian reasoning been proven superior? Bayesian reasoning
has been used to verify that an Angel did not kill Herod if we assume Angelstories are virtually impossible a-priori, a trivial conclusion given the premises.
Moreover, Lataster ruled out Angel-stories based on criteria-based reasoning
and thus it is easy to imagine a similar (wrong) application of Criteria-based
reasoning could be used to say a particular story is (falsely) a-priori plausible or
implausible (in a moment, Lataster himself will bring up such applications he
himself considers faulty). I simply dont think there is any argument in the text
to support the conclusion that Bayesian reasoning (in general no less!) leads
historians towards more plausible theories.
2.2
Objections to Bayes theorem
After the case study Latester moves into the objections to the use of Bayes
theorem. It opens thus:
Given that the core principles of Carriers historical adaptation of
Bayes Theorem perfectly align with good historical methodology,
objections to the use of Bayesian reasoning in Biblical studies and
similar fields could be irrational.
One might ask what Carriers historical adaptation of Bayes theorem actually
is (i.e. if this differs from plugging probabilities into Bayes theorem), however
the conclusion of the sentence is that objections to the use of Bayes theorem
could be irrational. Does that mean that sometimes the objections are rational
(when?) or is it a case of unintended hedging?
7
Moving on, Lataster discuss several other scholars opinion on and use of
Bayes theorem. First he discuss the article An Exhibition of Incompetence:
Trickery Dickery Bayes 4 by Dr. Stephanie Louise Fisher where she criticises
Carrier:
Fisher seems to have not read Carriers Proven History, which includes a natural language version of the theorem (with no accurate
calculations necessary), and seems to overlook the simple fact that
all historical claims are probabilistic. In the same article, she herself
makes a probabilistic historical claim ...
It is in my opinion very poor form to make this type of accusations (that Fisher
has not read Carrier or that she overlooks facts), especially when they are
hedged with so many seems. Fisher might reasonably object, as I did above,
that the so-called natural language version of Bayes theorem is just Bayes
theorem with probabilities artificially fixed to a limited set of possible values
and this limiting more likely than not guarantees we wont get the right answer.
It is disingenuous to say Fisher believes past events are either true/false and
not sometimes probable, especially as the very next quote Lataster cites from
Fisher clearly shows that she believes exactly the opposite. Having erected this
strawman argument, appropriately hedged with a seems, Lataster heroically
knocks it down. However if we actually read Fishers objections the crux is:
Bayes theorem was devised to ascertain mathematical probability.
It is completely inappropriate for, and unrelated to historical occurrence and therefore irrelevant for application to historical texts.
Carrier doesnt have a structured method of application, but worse,
he is dealing with mixed material, some of which is primary, much
of which is secondary, legendary, myth mixed accretion. He has no
method, and offers none, of distinguishing the difference and this
renders his argument a complete muddle. Effectively in the end,
he can conveniently dispose of inconvenient tradition, with a regrettable illusion that Bayes provides a veneer of scientific certainty to
prior conclusions he is determined to prove unarguable.
(Trickery Dickery Bayes)
As I read Fisher, she points out that using Bayes theorem requires us to
guess probabilities and Carrier offers no structured way of doing so (as we
saw above, neither has Lataster). This is contrary to how Bayes theorem is
used in other sciences (where there are more rigorous ways to obtain these
probabilities) and this renders the argument muddled with a veneer of certainty.
I happen to think this is a serious objection and certainly nothing in Latasters
discussion disproves or even addresses it. In fact, I find it quite ironic that
Latasters own case study exactly relied on a prior probabilities which were
asserted to be virtually zero (prove unarguably) and the result was described
as mathematically true. Lataster goes on:
4 see
https://rjosephhoffmann.wordpress.com/2012/05/22/
the-jesus-process-stephanie-louise-fisher/
Another objection could be the difficulty in assigning quantitative

values. Firstly, there are challenges to all quests for truth. Secondly,
this is an issue that this articles brand of Bayesian reasoning (where
accurate probabilities are unnecessary) addresses.
This articles brand of Baysian reasoning is the previously discussed restriction of the possible values the probabilities can take to certain values (50%, 95%,
etc.) and so fails to actually solve the problem of obtaining quantitative values
of probabilities which Fisher mentions. This is a case of writing a conclusion
without providing an argument for that conclusion.
Lataster goes on to mention studies (Swinbourne, McGrew, Collins) where
Bayes theorem is used to prove supernatural claims and dismisses each of these
as faulty. To take the dismissal of Collins argument for fine-tuning 5 :
Robin Collins utilises Bayes Theorem to justify the teleological or
fine-tuning of the Universe argument. There are numerous issues
with such arguments, though one specifically relevant to Bayesian
reasoning would be the identity of the Creator involved. Assuming design, the inherently unlikelihood (prior probability) that it is
Collins God that is the designer (out of thousands of imagined gods
and infinite amounts of gods not yet imagined) is not addressed by
Collins, despite his claim to be utilising Bayes Theorem. Strong empirical evidence would be required, though Collins offers none, meaning that this crippling prior (im)probability is not overcome. Perhaps realising these problems, Collins admits to diminishing the significance of prior probabilities, though they are so crucial to Bayesian
methodology
However one needs only to read the introductory section of Collins to see that
he carefully defines his theistic hypothesis and attempts to support the truth
of that hypothesis using a Bayesian argument. It is not fair to criticize Collins
argument by saying the argument does not support a different conclusion than
that which Collins sets out to argue for. This is akin to saying someone cant
argue that Big-Bang happened without also arguing that some specific theory
for the early universe is true, a basic logical mistake. Lataster offers no reason
why this supposed objection is specifically relevant to Bayesian reasoning (it
is not) and to say his claim to be utilising Bayes Theorem (as if Collins only
made that claim!) is just absurd. If one simply reads Collins article it is evident
Collins use Bayesian reasoning to support exactly the conclusion he claims to
support throughout the article.
As Fisher, Collins is also thrown a hedged slap: Perhaps realising these
problems, Collins admits to.... However simply reading Collins article we dont
have to speculate about his motives or what he admits. Collins is open about
how he treats the prior probability and how that will affect his conclusions.
5 Available
here: http://www.discovery.org/a/91
Specifically, he is interested in whether the evidence of fine tuning offers evidence

for his theistic explanation relative to a prior probability which is unknown. This
is very clearly stated amongst other places in the beginning of section 1.3. The
limitations of this approach, and why Collins choose it, is discussed in section
1.3 and 3.2 and this type of argument is not in any way in contradiction to
Bayesian methology. Latasters objection is even more odd when one considers
that Lataster himself elsewhere argues for exactly what Collins is here criticized
for doing:
And when prior probabilities simply cannot be produced (...) the
relative likelihood of a particular theory (...) can at least be determined.
(No Jesus No God , Interlude)
Reading Latesters blanket dismissal of these other uses of Bayes theorem to
(religious) questions by top scholars, I think a reader who agrees with Latasters
objection could easily get the impression that Bayes theorem is in fact difficult
to apply and easily misused to support false conclusions. Lataster does not
worry about this but rather concludes the discussion with this statement:
Scholars can debate endlessly over whether Bayes Theorem or mathematics in general has any place in the humanities and social sciences. Noting that Bayesian thinking conforms to good historiography (...) and remembering that historical claims are probabilistic,
opposing the usefulness of Bayesian thinking would seem to be an
exercise in foolishness.
The hedging (always the hedging!) asides, scholars who disagree with the use
of Bayes Theorem are now engaged in foolishness(?). This type of sweeping
statements are not recommendable, especially since the article has not offered
reasons for why Bayes theorem is so useful for historians asides the many assertions that it is, a reference to Carriers works and a case study which deals not
with what is probable but with virtual certainties obtained by applying criteria
or intuitions. The conclusion repeats the supposed utility of Bayes theorem as
several discoveries:
It was discovered that the Criteria of Authenticity used in Biblical
studies are in themselves inappropriate (...) Conversely, Bayes Theorem was discovered to be a useful, reliable, and transparent tool in
historical methodology
However which of these things have really been discovered, i.e. argued convincingly to be true or just argued at all as opposed to claimed? How do we
support the conclusion that Bayes theorem is reliable given we saw one trivial
example of its use (where no historian would doubt the conclusion) and three
uses of Bayes theorem where it lead top scholars to (in Latasters view) false
conclusions?
10
Employing correct Bayesian methods could move Biblical scholarship away from unjustified explanations and could drastically change
how scholars utilise the Gospels.
Once again, did we actually learn how this should be done?
Play it again, Sam
Reading Latasters works I could not help feeling a sense of dejavu. Regrettably, Lataster has chosen to re-use large sections of text across his published
material. To take Bayesian reasoning: Criticising the criteria of authenticity
and calling for a review of biblical criticism, 9 pages (about half the text) was
used to discuss the various Criteria of history. To take the first criteria, Multiple attestations, the following passages can be found in four of Latasters works:
No Jesus No God
Multiple attestation:
The more independent references to
an event, the more
likely it happened.
While generally a
logical
principle,
its use by Biblical
scholars in establishing Jesus historicity
could be invalid,
due to the scarcity
of sources and the
timelines involved.
Few individual units
of the Jesus tradition are multiply
attested, and even
then,
establishing
independence
is
incredibly difficult.
[14] The Gospels are
reliant on each other
(particularly
on
Mark) so may not
actually be independent, hypothetical
and
non-existing
sources such as Q,
M and L
Jesus did not exist

The more independent references
to an event, the
more likely it happened.[446] While
generally a logical
principle, its use by
Biblical scholars in
establishing
Jesus
historicity
seems
invalid, due to the
scarcity of sources
and the timelines
involved.
Few individual units of
the Jesus tradition are multiply
attested, and even
then,
establishing
independence is extremely difficult, if
not impossible.[447]
The Gospels are
reliant on each other
(particularly
on
Mark) so arent actually independent;
hypothetical
and
non-extant sources
such as Q, M and L
Bayesian Reasoning
The more independent references
to an event, the
more likely it happened(Charlesworth,
2008: 23). While
generally a logical
principle, its use
by Biblical scholars
could be invalid,
due to the scarcity
of sources and the
timelines involved.
Few
individual
units of the Jesus
tradition, for example, are multiply
attested, and even
then,
establishing
independence
is
difficult(Eve, 2005:
23-45). The Gospels
are reliant on each
other (particularly
on Mark) so may not
actually be independent, hypothetical
and
non-extant
sources such as Q,
M and L,
WLC resurrection
It seems obvious
that
the
more
independent references to an event,
the more likely it
happened.
While
generally a logical
principle, its use
by historical Jesus
scholars could be
invalid, due to the
scarcity of sources
and the timelines involved. The Gospels
are reliant on each
other (particularly
on Mark) so may
not
actually
be
independent, hypothetical sources such
as Q, M and L,
This is not a single case. Each of the discussed criteria appears to be re-used
with minimal re-working across four of his works. To take the criteria of Vividness:
11
No Jesus No God
A
storys
vivid
details could supposedly indicate it
to be an authentic
eyewitness
report
at least thats what
Biblical scholars like
to believe. This is
very
speculative,
with New Testament scholar Craig
A. Evans calling
it dubious.[23] A
genuine report could
be very brief, and it
could be unnecessarily long, depending
on the eyewitness;
and there is a big
issue here,
with
the Gospels having
anonymous authors.
A fictitious report
could also be brief,
or
exhaustively
detailed.
Tolkiens
decades long work
on his Middle-Earth
saga
Jesus did not exist

A
storys
vivid
details could supposedly offer the
Gospels
some
verisimilitude; that
is, they may indicate them to be,
or be based on,
authentic eyewitness
reports.[469]
This
is very speculative,
with Biblical New
Testament scholar
Craig
A.
Evans
calling it dubious.
[470] A genuine
report could be very
brief, and it could
be
unnecessarily
long,
depending
on the eyewitness;
there is a potential
issue here,
with
the gospels having
anonymous
authors.[471] A fictitious report could
also be brief, or exhaustively detailed.
J. R. R. Tolkiens
decades long work
on his Middle-Earth
saga
Bayesian Reasoning
A
storys
vivid
details could supposedly
indicate
it to be an authentic eyewitness
report(Evans, 1996:
128). This is very
speculative,
with
Biblical New Testament scholar Craig
A. Evans (Acadia
Divinity
College)
calling it dubious
(1996: 128).
A
genuine report could
be very brief, and it
could be unnecessarily long, depending
on the eyewitness;
there is a potential
issue here,
with
the Gospels having
anonymous authors.
A fictitious report
or
exhaustively
detailed. J. R. R.
Tolkiens
decades
long work on his
Middle-Earth saga
WLC resurrection
A
storys
vivid
details could supposedly indicate it
to be an authentic
eyewitness report.
This is very speculative, with Biblical
New
Testament
scholar Craig A.
Evans calling it
dubious. A genuine
report could be very
brief, and it could
be
unnecessarily
long, depending on
the eyewitness; and
we must remember,
the Gospel authors
are unknown to us.
A fictitious report
or
exhaustively
detailed. J. R. R.
Tolkiens
decades
long work on his
Middle-Earth saga
The re-use is not limited to the criteria, to take just a single other example there
is the description of Bayes Theorem:
12
No Jesus No God
Using Bayesian reasoning
encourages historians to consider other theories that fit
the evidence just as well (or
better), and can force them
to be transparent with their
claims by assigning quantitative values. For example,
a certain scholar might be
a major supporter of theory x, which has a 72%
chance of explaining the evidence.
When employing
Bayes Theorem however, the
same scholar realises that
theory y has an 87% chance
of explaining the evidence;
there can be no hiding from
this inescapable conclusion.
When using Bayes Theorem, the historian will no
longer be allowed to pass off
a merely possible theory as
one that is probable, or almost certain; the numbers
simply cannot lie. Those
who are sceptical of applying
a mathematical approach to
the arts are easily answered.
History relies on probabilities, which are mathematical, even when numbers are
not explicitly used. Even
odds means 50% for example, improbable might mean
20%, very probable could
mean 95%, while more than
likely would mean greater
than 50%.
Jesus did not exist

Using Bayes Theorem then
better), and can force them
claims by assigning quantitative values. For example,
a certain scholar might be a
major proponent for theory
x, which has a 72% chance
of explaining some of the evidence.[539] When employing
the unpopular theory y has
an 87% chance of explaining
the evidence; there can be no
hiding from this inescapable
conclusion. When employing Bayes Theorem, the historian will no longer be allowed to pass off a merely
possible theory as one that
is probable, or almost certain; while people can, the
consequences of their numbers cannot lie. Those who
are sceptical of applying a
mathematical approach to
the humanities are easily
answered by Carrier who
asserts that history relies
on probabilities, which are
mathematical, even when
numbers are not explicitly
used.[540] Even odds means
50%, for example, improbable might mean 20%, very
probable could mean 95%,
while more than likely would
mean greater than 50%.
Bayesian Reasoning
Using Bayes Theorem then
better), and can allow them
claims by assigning quantitative values.
For example, a certain scholar might
be a major proponent for
theory x, which has a 72%
chance of explaining the evidence.
When employing
theory y has an 87% chance
of explaining the evidence;
there can be no hiding from
this inescapable conclusion.
When employing Bayes Theorem, the historian will no
longer be allowed to pass off
a merely possible theory as
one that is probable, or almost certain; the numbers
cannot lie. Those who are
sceptical of applying a mathematical approach to the humanities are easily answered
by Carrier who asserts that
history relies on probabilities, which are mathematical, even when numbers
are not explicitly used (63,
286).
Even odds means
50% for example, improbable might mean 20%, very
probable could mean 95%,
while more than likely would
mean greater than 50%.
These examples are numerous, affect the main arguments, discussion and even
conclusions(!) of Latasters work and are not restricted to the sections quoted
here.
The exact ethics of copying oneself (or copying with minimal reworking) is a
bit murky. Generally speaking, when writing to an audience the reader expects
that the text is original unless otherwise stated. When the text is copied from
13
an academic publication to a popular book this expectation is less pronounced,

however in that case it is the norm to rewrite the text or at least acknowledge
when the text is based on an existing publication (chapter 3 is based on my
article ...). It must be disappointing to buy two different books from the same
author and only later learn one has essentially bought the same chapters twice
and they are available for free online.
Even more questionable is publishing the same text twice in different journals. Even if this is not considered as a violation of the editorial practice of the
journals Lataster publishes to I hope he is aware some academics will consider
it bad form (salami slicing or outright self-plagiarism). Speaking for my own
university, if I discovered a student had copied sections between two of his own
written works without attribution I would be contractually obligated to report
him for plagiarism and be certain it would have consequences.
Questioning the Plausibility of Jesus Ahistoricity Theories: A Brief Pseudo-Bayesian

Metacritique of the Sources
This impressive title belongs to the second of the journal articles by Lataster
this review will consider and actually this title was in part what motivated me
to review Lataster; after all, what is a pseudo-Bayesian metacritique?. Reading
this title you expect to first learn what it means for a critique of sources to
be (i) Pseudo, (ii) Bayesian, and (iii) meta. Unfortunately, and surprisingly,
this is not mentioned with a single word. The article opens up by mentioning
that various scholars (Richard Swinburne, Robin Collins, William Lane Craig,
Richard Carrier and Lataster himself) has argued for the use of Bayes theorem
in the humanities. Lataster then goes on to cite Bayesian Reasoning [Lataster,
2013], which was reviewed above, as support for the wide adaptation of Bayesian
reasoning in biblical studies. However, as evidences by the preceding discussion,
the application of Bayes theorem to biblical studies Lataster actually examines
in Bayesian Reasoning is limited to debunking claims one considers a-priori false
such as the Angel-example. Is that really very relevant?
Where a reader might expects to find a description of Latasters methods
(pseudo-Bayesian), there is instead this sentence:
This paper intends generally to steer clear of this debate [historicity
of Jesus; but why then the title?], and focuses on soberly critiquing
the sources used to establish information about the historical Jesus
at a very high level, employing the skepticism and privileged status
quo that Bayesian reasoning encourages
(Plausibility of Jesus )
This might be taken to imply that meta means at a high level, however
the last part of the sentence does not address what relationship Bayesian, much
less pseudo(?)-Bayesian, thinking has to do with the paper. The sentence would
14
appear to say that Bayesian thinking encourages scepticism which is then applied in the critique, however why not simply employ skepticism and what does
privileged status quo refer to?
Nevertheless lets press on and simply examine when Bayes is used. Lataster
points out we lack (verified) primary eye-witness sources for Jesus, then concludes with the first mentioning of Bayes:
Considering that the non-extant sources are hypothetical and their
contents are either unknown or derived from later, extant sources,
they could not be submitted as evidence in a Bayesian analysis.
It is not clear this is true. After all, if we could argue there plausible were early
sources (that are now lost), and furthermore that the existence of these sources
are easier explained on historicity than on mythicism, then they obviously could
be submitted for evidence similar to how speculative interpretations of evidence
is submitted for a Bayesian analysis as done by Carrier [2014] and Lataster and
Carrier [2015]. Lataster might wish to say the problems he brings up regarding
the sources are so severe nothing can be known, however is he really thinking
such a claim can be supported with a few paragraphs? Consider the rigor by
which Lataster argues the point:
It must be considered, however, that the sources scholars do have access to are not primary sources and cannot be compared to primary
sources, and so ought to be analyzed with caution and skepticism.
Another problem with the extant sources is the lack of autographs.
With no access to the originals of these documents, historians cannot rule out that important changes were made, nor can they state
composition dates with absolute certainty
this argument says that we cant state the composition date with absolute certainty or rule out that changes are made, but that would seem to affect many
early sources which can be submitted for historical analysis and would ignore
the many times where Lataster himself rightly point out historians work (and
has to work) with probabilistic data.
Lets skip to the next time where Bayes play a role in Latasters argument.
Regarding the epistles:
Paul did not have a pleasant relationship with Peter, presumably
one of the most credible and sought-after eyewitnesses, as he opposed him to his face (Galatians 2:11). As Bayesian methodologies
greatly oppose supernatural explanations, Pauls admission in Galatians chapter 1 is enough, if genuine and truthful, to cause scholars
to express reservations on all his (few) comments on the historical
Jesus
What Galatheans 1 says is that Paul says that his Gospel is not of human
origin, however elsewhere Paul mentions how he interacts with leaders of the
15
church. Presumably, what Lataster refers to by Baysian methologies is his

previously stated belief that supernatural events has low prior probabilities and
therefore that when Paul says he received the Gospel from non-human origins
this is not true. Most historians agree with that conclusion as a historical fact
and express reservations about Paul. However the word reservations is very
ambiguous. At the very least we should entertain that with some probability
Paul did have sources who knew a historical Jesus, in which case this probability
would place a lower bound on the probability Jesus existed. The next mention
of Bayes is with regard to the Gospel writer
The Gospel writers do not claim to be using trustworthy primary
sources (...) neither do they (...) demonstrate critical methodology
(Bayesian or otherwise)
I think the Gospel writers are excused for not demonstrating critical Bayesian
methodology on account that Bayes theorem will not be discovered for another
thousand years. The other mentions of Bayes theorem are more assertions that
Bayes theorem implies various things. To list them:
A Bayesian framework (...) heavily discounting supernatural and other
implausible claims and the sources asserting them.
Other early Christian apologists, such as Justin Martyr, also fail to quote
this passage, which does considerable damage to its reliability when viewed
through a Bayesian lens
From a Bayesian perspective, the earliest sources portrayal of Jesus in an
entirely supernatural manner, and the complete lack of contemporary and
secular accounts of Jesus, do considerable damage to any hypothesis that
asserts the existence of a historical Jesus
Presumably, Lataster in the above refers to his intuition that supernatural explanations are implausible which, strictly speaking, has nothing to do with Bayes
theorem. This so called damaging effect is not explained but repeated in the
two last quotes. While I think everyone can agree that a source for Jesus that
displayed him in a purely mundane manner would be preferable, it is difficult
to see what the Bayesian perspective is actually doing in that conclusion and
a term like considerable damage is very vague. Furthermore, if Lataster was
serious about taking a probabilistic (Bayesian) perspective on the sources, he
would at least acknowledge that for instance Paul with some probability is an
early source of Jesus who described Jesus in an earthly way. If so it is not very
Bayesian (if one will) to assert the early sources describe Jesus in an entirely
supernatural manner as if this was a given fact.
The piece concludes by calling for the use of Bayes in history:
Given the problematic sources that historical Jesus scholars have
access to, and the failings of many of their methods, it seems appropriate to call for a thorough, and Bayesian, analysis of the evidence
16
in order to determine if Jesus historicity or ahistoricity is more probable. Indeed, just such a task has been completed by independent
historian Richard Carrier, whose recent book on the matter is currently being analyzed by scholars.
It is very difficult to see why the above piece lends creditability to the conclusion
scholars should take a Bayesian approach to the evidence, much less what that
approach would entail. If Lataster believes his piece has been such a Bayesian
approach (or pseudo-Bayesian, whatever the difference might be), what has
this actually consisted of asides introducing the intuition miracle stories can be
discounted straight away as not historically factual?. If Lataster believes such
an investigation is something else, for instance more in line with what Carrier
does by plugging probabilities into Bayes theorem, what in his piece actually
lead us to conclude this seems (again with the hedging!) appropriate?
It can reasonably be stated that if this piece is actually intended as an example of a pseudo-Bayesian analysis, any writing can be converted to a pseudoBayesian analysis by citing Carrier [2014] and Lataster and Carrier [2015] at the
beginning and inserting the occasional from a Bayesian perspective, Bayesian
lens or Bayesian framework where it makes grammatical sense. These words
simply do not appear to do anything in the article.
There was no Jesus, there is no God
Due to the extensive copying between Latasters books and articles I will only
provide brief remarks on the books. The title of this book might suggest it
argues Jesus and God does not exist but, surprisingly, it is very hard to tell if
it does. It open up:
Is is not my job, intention, or desire to prove atheism true, whatever
that means.
(No Jesus No God )
Then follows the first of many mentions that Lataster is a person with considerably scholarly credentials:
As a scholar working in the academic field of Studies in Religion who
specializes in the arguments for Gods existence (...) it is my job to
examine the evidence / arguments presented by various religious
apologists and to share my analysis with all who will hear it
(No Jesus No God )
At the time of writing Lataster was just beginning on his graduate studies but
nevertheless feel in a position to indite the entire field of biblical scholarship
and most of his fellow scholars:
Before we begin our sober and scholarly investigations on Jesus,
we shall consider the scholars, their methods, and why their claims
are based on foundations of sand (...) The minority non-Christian
17
Biblical scholars (generally taken more seriously by secular ie real

scholarship) rejects the Biblical Jesus, and tend to champion the
historical Jesus. (...) Believing Bible scholars who are often seen as
lay people with a few letters after their name, by real scholars.
(No Jesus No God )
The ambiguous structuring of Latasters sentences leaves them open to many
interpretations but here is one: Lataster, a graduate student, first dismisses the
entire field of biblical scholarship. Then there is the rather distasteful idea that
there are real scholars which stand in opposition to believing scholars who
are seen (often! always the hedging!) as just lay people with a few letters
after their name. These letters are presumably what Lataster calls PhDs and
professorships at top universities and coming from a person who so insistently
points to his own credentials this is rather ironic.
To put this in perspective, Dale Martin, a leading Yale biblical scholar, is
also a Christian. One wonders if he is one of those scholars who is seen as a lay
persons with a few letters after their name by the real scholars or if Martin
gets saved by the hedging?. How, by the way, did Lataster learn of the opinion
of the real scholars?
Warming up we now get to the conclusion that Jesus did not exist.. or not
Actually, considering the lack of primary sources, the late and questionable secondary sources, and the existence of early Christians
who believed in more mystical versions of Jesus, as well as the rise
of many other religions that the Christian finds obviously wrong, it
is obvious that the one thing we dont need to explain the rise of
Christianity is a historical Jesus Christ. (...) If it could be proven
(which it cannot) that the Historical Jesus did not exist (...)
If we cant even be sure that a mundane, non-miraculous Historical
Jesus existed, how can we possibly be certain that the far less plausible Biblical Jesus must have existed? A highly positive implication
of this discovered uncertainty could be that the focus of studies on
Jesus moves from unnecessarily and unsuccessfully authenticating
various sayings and deeds to the intended messages of the teachings
(many of which I hold dear to my heart), whether they stem from a
historical Jesus or not
(No Jesus No God )
If we cant know Jesus did not exist, would it not be odd to write a book with
that title?
With this out of the way, Lataster copies most of the section about Bayes
theorem from Bayesian Reasoning and then goes on to the next discovery of
the book:
It is time to put Bayesian methods and also the Bible to the test.
What follows is a short, but ridiculously important, case study which
highlights the superiority of Bayesian reasoning, while also justifying
a sceptics rejection of the Christian faith.
(No Jesus No God )
18
What is this ridiculously important case study? Well, it is actually the case
study with Herod and the Angel with a few words replaced, but rest assured,
if one wish for a reprise of the Herod and the Angel case study one can consult
Jesus did not exist where it is also copy-pasted:
Bayesian Reasoning
Since Herod was killed by an
angel (h) or died by way of
natural causes ( h), P(h) and
P( h) must add up to 1, making for a relatively simple set
of calculations. But there
is one aspect of this formula that renders accurate
calculations unnecessary. In
fact, I would argue that employing Bayesian reasoning
without calculations is potentially more useful and reliable, given that a multitude of errors can be made
when assigning quantitative
values. The inherent probability of the theory (without
yet considering the available
evidence, such as the reference in Acts), P(hb), is
infinitely small. Conversely,
P( hb), is very large, rendering the possibility of h,
virtually 0%.
Explaining further, P(hb)
is so small as no account of
angels killing nobles has ever
been confirmed. Such acts
are also are not analogous to
our understandings of biology and physics,
No Jesus No God
Since Jesus either was resurrected from the dead by God
(h), or was not ( h), P(h)
and P( h) must add up to 1,
which makes for a relatively
simple set of calculations.
But there is one aspect of
this formula that renders
precise calculations unnecessary. In fact, I would argue that employing Bayesian
reasoning without calculations is potentially more useful and reliable, given that
a multitude of errors can be
made when assigning quantitative values. The inherent probability of the resurrection theory (without yet
considering the current evidence, namely the Gospel
accounts), P(hb), is extraordinarily small.
Conversely, P( hb), is very
large, as it includes naturalistic (and therefore more
probable) explanations, such
as outright fabrication, rendering the probability of h
being true virtually 0%.
Explaining further, P(hb)
is so small partly because
no account of people being
raised from the dead, with
the involvement of an unproven god or not, has ever
been confirmed. Such acts
are also not analogous to
our understandings of biology and physics,
Jesus did not exist

Since Herod was killed by
an angel (h, our hypothesis) or died by way of other
(natural) causes, we basically have two mutually exclusive hypotheses, making
for a relatively simple set
of calculations. But there
is one aspect of this formula that renders accurate
calculations unnecessary. In
fact, I would argue that employing Bayesian reasoning
without calculations is potentially more useful and reliable, given that a multitude of errors can be made
when assigning quantitative
values. The inherent probability of the theory (without
yet considering the available
evidence, such as the reference in Acts) is extremely
small. Conversely, the inherent plausibility of the alternative is very large, so
that the probability of h being true will likely also be
very small.[551] Explaining
further, the inherent plausibility of h is so small as
no account of angels killing
nobles has ever been confirmed. Such acts are also
are not analogous to our understandings of biology and
physics,
Thus, what this ridiculously important case study amount to is that Lataster
first assumes supernatural events are virtually impossible and then conclude
Jesus was not raised from the dead supernaturally. After performing the intellectually equivalent of slaying a gerbil (or is that three gerbils?) Lataster
19
proceeds on a multi-page victory lab which concludes in the following copypaste from Bayesian Reasoning (for completeness sake, the same conclusion is
reproduced in Jesus did not exist as well, as is much of the surrounding text)
As this case study and interlude demonstrates, the resurrection theory can be easily dismissed, and Bayesian reasoning is shown to be
formally and mathematically valid, even if precise calculations are
not done.
(Bayesian Reasoning,Jesus did not exist,No Jesus No God )
See above for my opinion on this conclusion.
This concludes the first part of the book about Jesus and we can move on
to disproving God. Lataster begins by explaining the scientific method spiced
up with sexualized language and stereotyping:
A posteriori (from the later) arguments are generally arguments that
have been confirmed empirically. This is how you really prove things,
if thats even possible but lets not get too philosophical just yet (keep
in mind that such extreme scepticism aids the non-believer, not the
believer who relies on certainty and absolutist claims). They rely on
empirical evidence. Science. Actual evidence, which hard-working
and honest people strove for. They rolled up their sleeves, got off
their couches, pimped themselves out to desperate and ridiculously
wealthy widows to secure funding, did the bloody research, and actually found some stuff out.
Thats how its done. Empirically. Experimentation and observation.
Observed; by our five senses. Such evidence would actually prove
Gods existence, and quite easily. If God showed up tomorrow, and
we could all see him, hear him, smell him, touch him, taste h Okay,
you get the picture, seeing him is fine. There would be no question.
There would be no doubt. There would be no need to believe. It
would just be. Empirical, a posteriori, or scientific evidence for
Gods existence would be the most convincing and accepted form
of evidence imaginable. It should also be the easiest, if God did
actually exist.
Mere mortal: Yo God, where you at, foo?
God: Sup bra? I be chillin up here in mah crib, dawg!
(No Jesus No God )
After this summary of the scientific method we are on to the main argument:
Over the last 10,000 years of human civilisation, this is all the empirical evidence monotheists have presented:
*insert frog croaking noises here*
I originally intended 10 blank pages while encouraging the reader to
hum Entrance of the Gladiators (that music often associated with
20
circuses), but my editor wisely instructed me to tone it down.

(No Jesus No God )
and so it goes for the remainder of the last section of the book. The book
concludes with a long list of even if we accept... we can still not conclude
Christianity is true-like statements. This list provides some interesting insights
into what Lataster would accept as an argument for Gods existence:
Even if... we charitably accept that Jesus being raised from the dead
by God indicates that the god in question is of the Judeo-Christian
tradition which is certainly not necessitated by these arguments
there are still numerous gods that could have done the deed! (...)
Game over.
(No Jesus No God )
This type of argument echoes Latasters objection to Collins argument discussed
in the earlier section on Bayesian Reasoning, namely that even if we could
prove theism (or in this case, that God raised Jesus(!) from the dead), then
this should not affect our beliefs because we have not proven a hyper-specific
version of that statement (that the God that raised Jesus which is in the JudeoChristian tradition is specifically Yahweh). It is interesting how Lataster is so
keen to point out the probable, therefore possible fallacy when discussing the
advantage of Bayes theorem or criticizing those he disagrees with, but fails to
notice the exact same type of fallacy in the above thinking (it is possible it was
not Yahweh). Lataster then summarizes the books findings as follows:
So have we proven atheism true? No, and as an atheist, I find such
questions to be ignorant and a little offensive. Atheism makes no
claims and need not be proven true. Have we proven that God does
not exist? Again, no.
(No Jesus No God )
So in conclusion, Lataster has not proven Jesus did not exist or that God does
not exist in a book titled There was no Jesus there is no God. The book ends
with a kind of warning:
Raphael is currently working on a ridiculously thorough refutation of
the common arguments of philosophy of religion or natural theology
(No Jesus No God )
Jesus Did Not Exist: A Debate Among Atheists
Jesus did not exist attempts to summarize various cases for or against the existence of Jesus, namely by Bart Ehrman (for), Maurice Casey (for), Raphael
Lataster himself (agnostic) and Richard Carrier (against). Each case is summarized by Lataster and the book has foreword and afterword by Richard Carrier.
In the foreword, Richard Carrier states:
21
Another way critics will respond to the weak and irrelevant as an excuse to not address the relevant and the strong, is to attack Latasters
tone, or his dialect in English, or their feeling insulted by his opinions or assertiveness, or some such triviality.
(Jesus did not exist )
Coming from Richard Carrier, who is certainly not shy of being assertive, this
type of endorsement indicates something special is in store. What Carrier refers
to is the special style Jesus did not exist is written in which is like no other
book I have read and which frequently gets in the way for what Lataster has
to say. To provide an impression of the books didactic style I will spend some
time on the introduction and then on the chapter on Ehrman which critique
Ehrmans Did Jesus exist? [Ehrman, 2012]. The introduction opens up with a
ringing endorsement:
If an overly long defense of my credentials does not interest you, feel
free to skip ahead. (...)
Despite drawing my more sceptical conclusions from my own logical
theorising and the research of more mainstream scholars (a fascinating part of this discussion, as we shall see throughout), such as with
the dates assigned to the sources, I have been accused of not being
a real scholar. After all a real scholar should have a PhD and should
also publish in the academic channels, rather than the popular (and
self-published!) realm. This is also technically irrelevant as it should
be my arguments that are scrutinised, not my academic credentials
or moral character. Nevertheless, this is also untrue to an extent. I
am actually finalising my PhD, am rather prolific in publishing in
peer- reviewed scholarly journals, I already tutor, lecture, and mark
undergraduate students, edit journals, edit manuscripts, assist with
research, referee articles written by other scholars, review academic
books, arrange academic conferences, present at such conferences,
and partake in many other projects that serve the academic community. I teach Religious Studies at a top university that outranks
(concerning the Humanities, and overall) the teaching institutions of
many of my critics, and have already won an award there for excellence in teaching. Unlike some other Jesus sceptics, I am certainly
no outsider to the Academy
Next we get to the more mainstream scholars (who they are we do not
learn). Latasters inexperience in historical Jesus studies and the many related
fields might be seen as a disadvantage by some, however according to Lataster
quite the opposite is the case. This is explained by an analogy:
For one, consider that Historical Jesus researchers are experts on
lower level questions such as whether a particular saying of Jesus is
likely to have been spoken by the real Jesus, or whether it was a
later fabrication.
22
They are experts, and they are very smart. Nevertheless, such scholars are generally not suitably equipped to investigate or argue for
the higher level issue of Jesus very existence. Similarly, screwdrivers
are very, very good tools, but it would be pointless to use one to
hammer a nail.
It is perhaps difficult to understand how someone can determine if Jesus said
something and at the same time be unsuitable to tell if Jesus existed. Nevertheless, we are left with the mental image that professors with long research careers
in historical Jesus and new testament studies are only suitable for the menial
nitty-gritty low level work whereas Lataster, a graduate student in religious
studies, is the one who should take care of the big-picture stuff of figuring out if
Jesus existed. Realizing the screwdriver analogy might not convince everyone,
Lataster provides additional reasons in the form of two new illustrations:
For a crude comparison, these mainstream experts of the Historical
Jesus might be as useful as experts on what the real Iron Man really
said and did. The appeal to what experts on the Historical Jesus
think on the matter of the Historical Jesus very existence seems very
specious indeed; consider also what conclusion we would get if we
asked presenters at a UFO convention if they believed in alien visitations. Ironically, given the fact that many historicist scholars like
to compare us more sceptical folk with Christian fundamentalists,
(...)
I am not sure it will convince the historians who believe Jesus existed that they
should leave the stage for the more sceptical to do the high-level thinking
because they are a bit like ufologists. The choice of examples (aliens and ironman) are also not very persuasive as there is no respected community of experts
at top universities who argue for the existence of either and has for a hundred
years. There follows another illustration:
Rare is the scholar who is truly disinterested regarding the paradigms
of their field, and who actively works to destroy their own career,
and academic discipline. A comparison can be drawn with a frustrated sufferer of a skin condition consulting with the most respected
experts, dermatologists. Frustrations can arise by the ignorance over
the causes for such conditions, and the eventual prescribing of products that manage rather than cure, and can cause adverse effects,
and possibly even worsen the condition. What is interesting is that
it is the gastroenterologist that may be more suited to the role, with
doctors as early as the 1930s proposing a link between the skin and
the intestinal biome; a link that is now becoming increasingly established.
(This is not a misquote, the paragraph opens with Rare is the...). Obviously,
outsiders can advance an area. However the problem of relying on these illustrations (the screwdriver, iron man, etc.) is that they equally well could be used
23
to dismiss the opinion of experts in any other field. More pointedly, if Lataster
wish for a disinterested discussion of the merits of the arguments as he often
states, why spend this much time pointing out the (supposed) special status his
own area of research, philosophy of religion, should occupy in the question of
the existence of Jesus? Next, Lataster describes some recent vindication:
A paper I had written on a disturbing, ridiculous, and idiosyncratic
method used by historicists was rejected by a prominent society
of Biblical literature, but was later accepted by a general historical
research organisation forgive me if I feel a smug sense of vindication.
This paper dealt with what I call Ehrmans law, which shall be explained later and discussed throughout this book. My presentation
of the paper was very successful, with almost everybody (a room
full of proper historians) agreeing with me that this method used by
Biblical historians is ridiculous and not typical of historians proper.
The paper in question is titled The Gospel According to Bart: The Folly of
Ehrmans Hypothetical Sources. I was unfortunately unable to find a copy of
this critically acclaimed paper which, as Lataster goes on to describe, convinced
a Christian that Mark was an allegory of Paul. Despite this recent success,
Lataster remains humble and describes how he is growing vary of the battle and
now pine for a more peaceful career:
I am simply an honest empiricist who leaves his preferences at home
and follows the evidence where it leads, and one that just needed a
topic so that I could finally complete my postgraduate studies and
become an educator on religion. I have even been somewhat reluctant about being a prominent figure in this new wave of scepticism
over the Historical Jesus it is after all a very unpopular niche. This
is a far cry from the portrayal of Jesus agnostics and mythicists as
being the mirror image of fundamentalists, who want to prove Jesus
ahistoricity so as to attack Christianity.
Nay, this book may well be my last significant contribution to the debate, as I grow a little weary of being an academic pariah constantly
subjected to intellectual bullying, and move on to pursue the tastier,
fatter, and lower-hanging fruit that is the miraculous and supernatural claims made by theists/Christians. Whatever my intentions,
my work has now reached over a million people and counting
While the above sections are no doubt amusing, I find it alarming how keen
Lataster is to paint an us versus them picture in his book and deride those
he see as being on the other side due to their views or religion. It would
be interesting to learn what Lataster refers to when he talks about constant
intellectual bullying in the above and how that differs from what he has to say
about his critics.
24
On the more amusing side, and because they become relevant later, I cannot
help mentioning the endnotes of which there are no less than 1450, and which
contains an enormous variety of historical and biographical facts on all kinds of
subjects. Only considering a few of the noteworthy endnotes to the introduction:
I make it very clear, throughout, that prominent historicists seem completely
unable to argue logically. If they cant even make good arguments for Jesus
existence, I struggle to comprehend why they should be considered experts on
this particular issue. and footnote 37 and 38: It is our arguments that are
relevant. and See the previous footnote. Continue to re-read as required.
as well as If you are of the opinion that evidence doesnt matter, you may as
well stop reading. Whether evidence is important or not, which is a whole other
discussion, this book tries to describe what we can reasonably infer from the
evidence..
So much for the introduction. The main matter of the book is organized as
Latasters discussion of the four cases for and against Jesus. Latasters chapter
is mainly a copy-paste of existing material and need not be covered and the
discussion of Richard Carriers case for mythicism follows his case in [Carrier,
2014] closely (down to the naming of subsections) but with less detail. I am not
qualified to review the historical material presented by Lataster at any depth,
however even if this was not the case I doubt I would be a simple task because
of how Jesus did not exist is written. In the following I will try to give some
of my thoughts on the chapter on Ehrmans Did Jesus exist? [Ehrman, 2012].
Chronologically, I read Jesus did not exist first and arrived at the conclusion that
Ehrmans book must be full of unsubstantiated claims. Then I read Ehrmans
book and wondered if I had misunderstood everything and therefore re-read
Jesus did not exist. Needless to say I am persuaded by Latasters argument,
however more importantly I think he fails to fairly critique Ehrman. I will here
discuss a few of the difficulties in Latasters critique of Ehrman.
Firstly, what is Ehrmans book about? It will come as no surprise to a
reader familiar with Ehrman that he tries to summarize main-stream views of
the relevant evidence, argue which view (usually the most common) he believe
is true and then discuss the implication of this view on historical Jesus studies.
His book also contains parts on various mythicist ideas (and why he finds them
to be at odds with the evidence) and finally a few things Ehrman believes we can
know historically about Jesus. I will not be concerned with the later two parts.
A few points that are worth emphasizing: Ehrman accepts (as do all historians
insofar as I know) that we cant know history with certainty but must deal
with what probably happened and he rejects the sausage-factory view of the
criteria of authenticity (rather, he suggests they lend credence to given textual
passages, making them more probably true). What is particularly pertinent to
the following discussion is that Ehrman spends time to explain why (even if
Jesus existed) we should not expect very good sources, as very little survives
for even the best attested figures at the time.
25
6.1
He admits
Admits, as in the phrase He admits that..., should be used to refer to the act
of conceding a point which one has otherwise tried to ignore or keep out of the
discussion. Lataster, however, has the habit of using admits in connection to
clearly stated views. To provide a few examples:
He [Ehrman] then explains that the historians task is to establish
what probably happened in the past, and admits that we cannot
prove a single thing historically. Without resorting to mathematical
models favoured by Carrier and myself, Ehrman does inadvertently
admit that history is probabilistic.
Ah! He admits!. In fact, Ehrman states clearly as a preliminary remark all
history is probabilistic:
BEFORE I SHOW THE evidence for the existence of Jesus, I need
to make a few preliminary remarks about historians and how they
go about establishing what probably happened in the past. The first
thing to stress is that this is, in fact, what historians do. (...) Unlike
scientists, who can with almost certain reliability predict what will
happen based on their knowledge of what does happen, historians
postdict, that is, they indicate what probably did happen based on
their knowledge of the evidence.
(Did Jesus Exist?)
Or another example:
Ehrman then admits that there is no physical evidence for Jesus,
In fact, Ehrman dedicates an entire section to clearly stating what we dont
have as evidence for Jesus. It opens:
To begin with, there is no hard, physical evidence for Jesus (...)
(Did Jesus Exist?)
and list all the things we dont have (physical evidence, first-hand eye-witness
accounts, etc.). The word admits gives the reader the impression Ehrman
states these things as side points (he does not; they are stated carefully and
explicitly at the beginning of sections) and falsely gives the reader the impression
Ehrman is suppressing truths that makes him uncomfortable and which his main
argument might therefore not take into account. This, and other ways of biasing
the writing Lataster makes use of, is distracting and makes it appear as if those
Lataster disagree with are much more inconsistent than what plainly turns out
to be the case.
6.2
Uncharitable reading
Ehrman is interpreted in a highly suspect manner. For instance, Ehrman discuss the roman historian Tacitus (who writes a small passage about Jesus) and
26
concludes he is not of much use because he relied on second-hand information.

As Ehrman writes (and Lataster quotes): It should be clear in any event that
Tacitus is basing his comment about Jesus on hearsay rather than, say, detailed
historical research. Lataster then offers this view of what Ehrman says:
Bizarrely, while he admits that the Tacitus reference is unhelpful,
he inexplicably concludes that his reference shows that high-ranking
Roman officials of the early second century knew that Jesus had
lived and had been executed by the governor of Judea. You will simply have to get used to Ehrmans brand of illogical and inconsistent
thinking, as it is evident throughout Did Jesus Exist?
Lataster does not explain why Ehrmans is being illogical or inconsistent in the
above. What would be inconsistent would be to say the reference in Tacitus is
unhelpful and at the same time say Tacitus knew (as in, having direct knowledge
of) Jesus. But thats plainly not Ehrmans point. Read in context Ehrman is
making the point that, contrary to the claims of some mythicists, we have at
least one historian 80 years after Jesus supposedly lived who reports about
Jesus:
Some mythicists argue that this reference in Tacitus was not actually
written by him (...) I dont know of any trained classicists or scholars
of ancient Rome who think this, and it seems highly unlikely. The
mythicists certainly have a reason for arguing this: they do not
want to think there are any references to Jesus in our early sources
outside the New Testament, (...) But surely the best way to deal
with evidence is not simply to dismiss it when it happens to be
inconvenient. Tacitus evidently did know some things about Jesus.
At the same time, the information is not particularly helpful in establishing that there really lived a man named Jesus. How would
Tacitus know what he knew? It is pretty obvious that he had heard
of Jesus, but he was writing some eighty-five years after Jesus would
have died, and by that time Christians were certainly telling stories of Jesus (the Gospels had been written already, for example),
whether the mythicists are wrong or right. It should be clear in any
event that Tacitus is basing his comment about Jesus on hearsay
rather than, say, detailed historical research
(Did Jesus Exist?)
Ehrman plainly use know similar to how I know about black holes: I have
no direct knowledge of them but I feel convinced they exist. This is plainly not
illogical or inconsistent as Lataster alleges, it is simply a fair survey of relevant
information and where Ehrman fairly (notice again the use of admits) makes
the reader aware Tacitus likely has his information from other Christian sources.
27
6.3
Possible does not mean probable (...) it is possible

that
Moving on to the more substantial reasons to think Jesus existed Ehrman discuss
the Gospels. According to Ehrman, modern scholarship believes the Gospels
(Mark, Luke, Matthew, John) depend on each other to larger or lesser degree.
For instance, it is very plausible (Ehrman believes this to be the case) that both
Matthew and Luke derived their Gospels from Mark and an unknown source
Q. The main points (as I see it) in these sections is to establish two claims:
(i) Multiple authors in the first century, writing with different intentions and in
different geographical regions, wrote accounts about a historical Jesus (for whatever reason) and (ii) these today unknown accounts (such as Q) must logically
predate the Gospels and according to modern scholarship likely with several
years. Obviously these two claims has to be explained on either historicity and
mythicism (and all things equal would lend creditability to historicity) and, as
Ehrman explains, is at odds with the belief we only have to explain the Gospel
of Mark.
Lataster does not endorse this idea at all and goes against it with a scattergun approach which highlights another inconsistency. Lataster often, and very
vocally, highlights that possible does not mean probable (with the connotation
that historicists make this error). For instance:
Now Carrier did not know how his Bayesian analysis, a decade in the
making, would turn out, and my more benign masters thesis conclusions
were initially unexpected. In any case, scholars should not interpret the
possible as probable, nor the probable as certain.
When employing Bayes Theorem, the historian will no longer be allowed
to pass off a merely possible
Bayes Theorem also sidesteps any sort of prove the negative argument,
hindering proponents of a theory from touting their possible views as
probable
No doubt good advice, but is it being consistently applied? for instance:
Another possibility is that Q is really a longer version of Mark.
we might wonder why such important and obviously respected sources
were not preserved
We must accept the possibility that these alleged foundational sources
could be works of fiction
Ehrman thinks the material comes from Q, though it could just as easily
come from M, some other hypothetical source, or Matthew.
it is simpler to suppose that Matthew simply added her own original material to Mark, and Luke added his own original material to Marks and
28
Matthews writings. There is simply no need to posit a Q source to explain

material common to Matthew and Luke, or M and L sources to explain
material in Matthew and Luke that is not found elsewhere
The reason this is worth highlighting is that Ehrman, when discussing these
sources, is simply relaying the conclusions of established scholarship. Sure,
Lataster can speculate that Q possibly is a longer version of Mark, but Ehrman
provides citations for this claim which again (if we can trust Ehrman at all) is
simply relaying the conclusions of most experts. Lataster therefore is not only
making use of a possibility, it is a possibility that goes against the opinion of
most experts. Even if we accept Latasters idea of high level and low level
experts, we should still hold the so-called low level experts in regard unless
we have good reasons not to.
Another issue worth highlighting (though this is by no means an isolated
case) is that Lataster will state as matter of fact something which is not. An
example: it is simpler to suppose that Matthew simply added her own original
material to Mark. Really? If this is so obvious as to require no argument, why
has it not become the dominant view?
A third point worth stressing is that Lataster takes a scattergun approach
where various points, ideas and criticisms of Erhman are thrown around. Reading both Ehrman and Lataster, it is often difficult to see (despite the many assertions that Ehrman is wrong) what alternative view of the material Lataster
has argued for that radically overturns Ehrmans conclusions. For instance, even
if we remove Q from the equation, we still have several different authors who
wrote of a historical Jesus.
6.4
Hyperbole
Having presented a version of Ehrmans argument which is both silly and very
difficult to recognize Lataster often resorts to the lazy habit of hyperbole to
drive home the point of how wrong Ehrman is. A single example:
None of this seems to interest this Biblical historian, perhaps due to
the sheer number of non-existent sources. After all, No one knows
how many there actually were. There could be millions of them,
known through the admittedly scant literary remains that survive,
truly making the Historical Jesus the best-attested figure of history!
Zing!
6.5
Leaving out the argument
Ehrman next presents the view, which according to him is the predominant one,
that the various Gospel sources relied on an earlier oral tradition which, logically,
must date earlier than the Gospel sources. Lataster has a strong reaction to
this idea:
29
As I earlier hyperbolically imagined, Ehrman, unsatisfied with his

first-order non-existing sources, creates second-order non-existing
sources. He truly takes this farce to the next level. Rather than
(again) acknowledging that the content of the hypothetical written
sources could be material unique to those authors, he actually does
suppose that these innumerable hypothetical written sources must
also stem from yet earlier oral traditions. Ehrman even bizarrely
solves a problem of (literally) his own making, when he maintains
that these oral traditions must have existed, Otherwise it is impossible to explain all the written sources that emerged in the middle
and end of the first century.
To re-iterate the previous point about accurately representing Ehrmans view,
Ehrman idea the Gospels build on earlier oral sources is here passed of as both
a farce and as a problem of his own making; but if we simply read Ehrman we
see this to not be the case because he specifically states he is simply relying on
the mainstream view of form criticism according to which there existed earlier
sources. This is not Erhmans idea but a mainstream idea argued for by the
low level experts Lataster himself claimed we could mostly trust! Lataster
goes on (italics not mine):
I simply cannot find enough negative superlatives in all the thesauruses in all the libraries in all the world to describe the complete
and utter ridiculousness and bankruptcy of Ehrmans approach: The
generally unreliable, untrustworthy, and fiction-filled Gospels can occasionally be considered excellent sources of objective and accurate
historical information because of their foundational written sources,
which do not exist, which contained many fictions if they did, and
which cannot now be scrutinised for authorship, age, genre, intent,
and so forth. These hypothetical written sources are themselves based
on oral traditions, that also cannot be scrutinised, that changed over
time, and that may well have been made up whole cloth. Therefore
we have conclusive proof that Jesus definitely existed. This is enough
to make supremely logical analytic philosophers suffer aneurisms. In
what universe can this be considered good history, and good scholarship? (...)
What Ehrman has offered thus far has been nothing but pure speculation. He simply stated that these sources existed, without a
smidgen of evidence, and bizarrely assumed them to be reliable,
and supportive of his views, without any analysis whatsoever.
Nevermind that Ehrman never states that he believes Q, M or L to be excellent,
objective or generally accurate (quite the opposite, but this kind of hyperbolic
strawmanning is endemic), what Lataster conveniently leaves out of this passage
are the several pages where Ehrman discuss the reasons why form criticism has
30
concluded there likely are oral sources behind the Gospels. To give a single example, Ehrman points out that the Gospel appears to contain word-plays which
make no sense in Greek (the language the Gospels are written in), but make
good sense in Aramaic (the language the oral traditions supposedly originated
in). This, Ehrman points out, indicates the text was translated from Aramaic
to Greek. Such arguments are plausibly not airtight, however the point is that
Ehrman does provide arguments and Lataster conveniently leaves them out in a
section shock-full of hyperbolic language and accusations against Ehrman. This
kind of intellectual laziness (dishonesty assuming Lataster actually read the
chapter) should not pass in highschool and is shocking in a graduate student.
Much later Lataster kind of sort of makes a mention of Ehrmans arguments,
except they are not presented as arguments for the existence of oral traditions
but as additional claims about the oral tradition:
Ehrman continues his not pure speculation by making the claim that
some of the oral traditions had Aramaic origins. Even if correct, it is
unclear how this is supposed to aid Ehrmans case, unless he expects
that competent historians and laypeople alike will uncritically accept
that Jesus and his earliest followers were somehow the only Aramaicspeakers of the time. Perhaps he hoped that readers would overlook
the fact that Aramaic was a/the common language of the Palestinian
Jews, Syrians, and others of the era. It is as if Ehrman and his fellow
historicists do not feel beholden to the laws of logic.
Lets consider this passage. Lataster writes that it is unclear how the Arameic
origin of certain passages in the Gospels would help Ehrmans case. It is possible
that form criticism has nothing to say on this issue, however to this lay person,
if a passage did have Arameic origins, it would indicate that the Greek writer
had either read or heard that Arameic passage before writing it and logically,
that would imply the existence of one of those earlier source Lataster has so up
in arms about. Now where did he learn of this Arameic passage? It is possible
it happened in Syria, but is it not more plausible it happened in Palestine?
6.6
Time for applause
While Lataster may not find room for Ehrmans actual argument, he certainly
finds room for what might be jokes about how silly they are. After his discussion of the hypothetical sources, Lataster appears to believe he has so severely
rebuked Ehrman it is time for a kind of joke, namely Ehrmans law, a strawman which stem from the paper mentioned earlier which was so well received
at the history conference:
As this appeal to, and uncritical use, of imaginary sources is obviously so rare in scholarship, it does not even have a label; so allow me.
For brevitys sake, I shall dub this monstrosity of method, Ehrmans
law. The law states that if your preferred theory is not well aligned
31
to the available evidence, you may simply invent as much evidence

as is required, and you may further proclaim the unquestionable reliability of your imagined sources. The law also requires you to make
grand claims about how this new evidence supports your and only
your theories and to ridicule others who try to do likewise.
Zing again! Never has a man been mauled so ferociously by a chihuahua. It is
marginally funny that what Lataster describes is not a law (perhaps less funny
to the head of Sydney universities graduate school), but I suppose one becomes
too jaded to get much milage out of such a minor inaccuracy. What is even
more baffling is footnote 194 to Ehrmans law:
It could have also been called Bultmanns law. Note that Ehrman is
apparently working on an entire book about Jesus imaginary sources,
with a focus on oral traditions. The very name (and chapter headings) suggest that he is well aware of false memories and the need to
rework information to suit ones community, so it will be interesting
to see him explain why we can trust any of his imaginary sources.
He seems to be writing at an extraordinary pace, which may explain why his latest books are illogical and ignorant of much of the
contradicting evidence. They also are supported by few references.
Contrast this with the likes of Carrier and myself, who spent years
writing our books on this topic, and include copious and at times
overwhelming amounts of scholarly references and wordy footnotes,
like this one. It is as if Ehrman simply relies on his (self-serving)
presuppositions and his (self-proclaimed) status as an expert...
Nevermind Lataster continues to ignore that Ehrman provides reasons to believe
there are oral traditions, but implying Ehrmans books are illogical and ignorant
because they are written fast while he himself chucks two books in two years
which are full of copy-paste in which he compares himself favorably to Ehrman
because of wordy references simply boggles the mind. To top it up, Lataster
spends paragraphs proclaiming his own academic accomplishments in the introduction and then describe Ehrman, who by all accounts must be considered a
leading expert, as a self proclaimed expert.
6.7
Casey, Carrier, self awareness
Then we get to Casey. One sections is titled Even Worse than Ehrman: Offensive and Facetious and in it Lataster exhibits a degree of self-awareness that
would embarrass Donald Trump:
It should be highlighted particularly in light of Caseys negative portrayals of mythicists and their work that his own book is a rather
unpleasant and distasteful read. Typographical errors abound, rudimentary errors are frequent, self-citation is common, the structure
32
is disjointed, and some sections are wholly unscholarly and unnecessarily offensive, as well as vulgar (...)
I find it astounding that such comments are in a scholarly book,
which has been subject to some form of peer-review, and has been
edited. It is as if one needs only a big name and to toe the party line
to get published, while the quality of research is only of secondary
importance.
one wonders if Lataster would have preferred that Casey had simply copied the
relevant blocks of text without attribution.
This section is already far longer than intended and so I will not summarize
the other sections. Needless to say, I remain surprised by the hostility towards
his more accomplished peers and the book gives the impression it was simply jotted down one chapter at a time with no thoughts given to editing, and without
Lataster reading (and considering) what impression his remarks on the credentials and integrity of Ehrman and other scholars will leave the reader with. For
instance, in introducing Carrier, Lataster plugs into his stream of consciousness
and offers the following thoughts about Carrier, his own character and whatever
else seemed to pop into his mind at the time:
It is worth noting that I have no great inherent desire to promote
Carrier or his work he is certainly no friend of mine. Some of what
he says and does is annoying, seemingly egotistical, and even offensive to me, and we are otherwise quite different. For example, I am
generally far more positive towards religion and the religious, which
admittedly may have something to do with our insider/outsider status regarding the academic world. I also find him quite brazen and
harsh with his opinions on others, scholars in particular; for instance,
his penchant for calling many of his scholarly critics insane. Though
I am the one with a Dutch background, I see in him the typical
Dutch stereotype of someone who is arrogant and vocal and annoyingly right. He enjoys the freedoms of an independent scholar, not
beholden to scholarly courtesies, and he clearly delights in exercising those freedoms. Carrier is also what the typical Christian may
expect an atheist to be. A person who drinks freely, cheats on his
wife, seemingly enjoys getting in peoples faces, and indulges in many
(to them) questionable sexual practices.
By contrast, I am significantly more wholesome, and, well, Christian.
Not to brag (is it even worth bragging about?), but I often seem
more Christian than many Christians. I abstain from alcohol, and
have always been faithful to my life partners. My more boring life is
no doubt influenced by my Christian upbringing, right down to my
Protestant work ethic, and I do not claim it to be appropriate for all.
(As an aside, for those non-Christians that are a little put off by my
clean image, I genuinely think that this is one of my many attributes
that makes me even more dangerous to Christian evidentialists. I am
33
moral, pro-religious, have numerously opened up my heart to Jesus,

and would be quite happy for God to exist and for Christianity to
be exclusively true. It is strictly the lack of evidence that prevents
this.)
6.8
It all fits
No doubt I am partly fulfilling Carriers prediction that many would dismiss the
book because of Latasters tone. However Lataster does get in the way of his
own argument, both because of the books particular tone but more importantly
Latasters failure to fairly represent the authors he disagree with. But even if we
put these issues aside I do find the case in Jesus did not exist far less convincing
than that presented by Carrier.
Reading Lataster, I was left with the impression the cards were stacked
against historicity to begin with. Oversimplifying, when Lataster encounters
sources that clearly describe a historical Jesus (such as the Gospels), these
are seen as an allegory and attacked by a barrage of questions regarding their
veracity (we dont know who the authors were, we dont know their intend,
etc.). Then, when we encounter someone like Paul where these questions can
perhaps be answered and who also appears to be speaking of a historical Jesus a
different strategy is applied: Paul, we learn, really wrote about a celestial Jesus,
and so when Paul writes Jesus died (which otherwise indicates he lived on
earth) that really took place in the celestial realm and if Paul says something
too inconvenient, well, perhaps it is a later interpolation, allegory, or mean
something else and asides, Paul writes about supernatural things. I stress that
perhaps both of these claims are true. However, it is difficult to see how any
source we could realistically hope to have could survive this type criticism and
still be seen as unambiguous support for historicity. Someone who wish to argue
along these lines must carefully motivate why these strategies are particularly
applicable in the case of the Gospels and Paul.
A similar critique could be brought against Carriers case against the historical Jesus as made out in On the Historicity of Jesus, however it applies to a
much lesser extend. In Carriers writings, his conclusions are much better supported by well-stated arguments and insofar as I can see always acknowledge
the principal objections and thereby tries to not only show how these views
explains the evidence, but more importantly why they are particularly applicable to the Gospels and Paul. In Latasters writing, one has the impression of a
scattergun approach where ideas are thrown out to see if it sticks, i.e. explains
the evidence or answers some critique, with little regard of internal plausibility.
With an explanatory framework this flexible (mass allegorization, interpolation
and Paul writing about a supernatural real without ever stating it clearly) the
realization something can be explained is not worth much if anything. After all,
no conspiracy theory has ever failed because it could not explain the evidence.
This is aggravated by a feeling of bias in Latasters writings. Keep the many
things Lataster had to say about hypothetical sources in mind when reading the
following:
34
The Ascension of Isaiah, oft-seen as a first century text (the relevant

section could possibly pre-date all other Christian texts, or at least
the Gospels), also seems to describe a Celestial Jesus death, at the
hands of demons who did not know his true identity, and triumphant
return, in some upper realm, whilst also specifying that there are
heavenly counterparts to Earthly objects/events
If this passage was written by Ehrman, would Lataster object that possibly does not mean probable? That the section (compare to sections of e.g.
Matthew and Luke that are believed to come from Q) is a hypothetical source
and we all know what to think about that folly? That we dont know the authorial intend and, by the way, who was the author? That seems to describe is
a case of unwanted eisegises and once more a possibility is not a probability?
Perhaps Lataster is truly objective when he is thinking about these subjects
(According to him, he is), however it is certainly the case that much more is
made of these points when they are directed against Ehrman in his writings. In
conclusion, the overall impression I was left with reading Jesus did not exist was
a mix of the Davinci code, an interesting historical argument, a 3AM drunken
blog post and 5 years of academic envy, it is simply not a convincing book.
Conclusion
Despite two journal articles with Bayes in the title and two books promoting
the use of Bayes theorem to history Lataster has in reality very little to say on
the subject. He supports the use of Bayes theorem, however this promotion
is not based on an argument, but by reference to other scholars who has used
Bayes theorem, primarily Carrier in Proving History. Latasters contributions
in Bayesian Reasoning, or discovery as he prefers, is firstly that when we
are guessing the probabilities that goes into Bayes theorem, one can choose to
select them from a limited set of possible values (5%, 20%, 50% and so on).
This suggestion is equivalent to how one can simplify the process of guessing
someones height by limiting oneself to fixed standard heights (very low is
4 feet, low is 5 feet, medium is 6 feet, etc.). Secondly, he provides a case
study that demonstrates that when one restricts oneself to reasoning about
propositions that can be known to be true or false a-priori with virtual certainty
then evidence is of little importance. No doubt a useful fact, but of little use
for things that cant be known a-priori with virtual certainty which must surely
be the case for all interesting propositions. The findings in Plausibility of Jesus
related to Bayes theorem is limited to mentioning Bayes in the title.
Lataster style of writing often gets into the way of what he wish to say.
As seen above, both Fisher and Collins were not accurately represented and as
evidenced by the many things the case studies and paragraphs should show,
compared to what they did show, Lataster often overstates his conclusions.
These issues are even more pronounced in the popular books.
35
Lataster often points out faults in others his own writing also exhibits.
Ehrman is accused again and again of being illogical, meanwhile Lataster makes
assertions that are at best logically questionable. For instance, in discussion of
the supposed raising of Jesus from the dead, William Lane Craig argues the
following four points [Lataster, 2015a]:
1. There are three established facts about Jesus: the discovery of his empty
tomb, his post- mortem appearances, and the origin of his disciples belief
in his resurrection.
2. The hypothesis God raised Jesus from the dead is the best explanation of
these facts.
3. The hypothesis God raised Jesus from the dead entails that God exists.
4. Therefore, God exists.
Lataster describes this argument as [Lataster, 2015a]:
this argument is historical and inductive. As it is inductive, this
argument is not formally valid and the conclusion is not guaranteed
to be true (...)
One striking problem with this argument, (...) is its obviously circular nature. (...) Being charitable, we can concede that Craigs god
finds his way into Premise 2, rendering the argument both questionbegging and circular.
(WLC resurrection )
The argument is inductive, however it is inductive in the sense all Bayesian
arguments are inductive, including those which Lataster himself supports, so
why does that make it formally invalid? And why is it circular? Dr. Craig
use this argument to demonstrate that the God of theism, which Dr. Craig
believes to have shown to exist through other arguments, is Jesus. This is not
at all circular and it is surprising Lataster accuse others of logical fallacies while
making so obviously fallacious and contradictory statements.
This type of contradictions are endemic in Latasters works. He claims we
should not put too much emphasis on scholarly credentials but includes long
descriptions of his own credentials. He accuses Casey of citing himself too
much, however not only does he cite himself a lot, but a significant fraction
of his work is copy-paste. He says established scholarship is unfairly excluding
mythicism and at the same time talks about Christian scholars as lay people
with a few letters after their name and as opposed to real scholars. Casey is
accused of being crass while Latasters website featured an article with the title
Is William Lane Craig Really a Pedophile? 6 . Scholars Lataster disagrees
with are again and again accused of mistaking possibly with probably and
to be more probabilistic, meanwhile Lataster himself makes strong assertions of
6 http://web.archive.org/web/20111220030324/http://www.pantheismunites.org/
Articles/Debates%20-%20Is%20William%20Lane%20Craig%20Really%20a%20Pedophile.htm
36
certainty that to my mind are simply not warranted by the arguments. Ehrman
is accused of hasty editing and, well, see above. Ehrman is criticized for not
addressing contrary views sufficiently, meanwhile Lataster tears into Ehrman
for accepting the existence of oral sources while ignoring the arguments for the
existence of oral sources Ehrman provides. Hypothetical sources are criticized
as being unreliable, meanwhile a hypothetical source behind The Ascension of
Isaiah is being used to (partly) support mythicist arguments.
Perhaps many of these contradictions can be excused as the result of poor
editing or changes in his thinking but they are very distracting. However when
we look beyond these issues I was surprised at the simplicity of Latasters arguments when the trimming is removed. As seen above, Latasters reasons for
rejecting the various arguments for God came down to the assumption that
the supernatural is a-priori virtually impossible and thus evidence cant (or
shouldnt) move us. But if Christians believed that assumption they would not
be Christians. The argument should then proceed exclusively on establishing
this premise, however Lataster does not give it more than a passing thought.
As such his arguments against God becomes virtually tautological at their core
and with a lot of irrelevant dressing. This type of tautological thinking is not
similarly present in his defence of mythical agnosticism, however the deck seems
to me to be heavily stacked in his favor due to the three explanation of (i) allegorization of the gospels (ii) proposal Paul considers a supernatural realm (iii)
interpolations and very strong skepticism for the ability of the source material
to tell us anything due to its origin.
The historical information and arguments presented by Lataster on the existence of Jesus appears to directly parallel information and argument presented
by Carrier in On the Historicity of Jesus, but this is where the similarity ends.
While Carriers prose is not faultless, Carrier is simply much more well-organized
than Lataster in terms of logically structuring his thoughts and arguments. Carrier provides a much better overview of counter arguments and is more aware
his specific (mythical) explanatory framework should be externally motivated.
I disagree with Carrier on many points, however Carrier can be relied upon to
identify what claims require and argument and then provide a logically sound
argument where the premises are substantiated. As far as offering a comprehensive (and possibly convincing!) case for mythicism Carrierss On the Historicity
of Jesus simply stands heads and shoulders above Jesus did not exist and, insofar as I can tell, the historical information in On the Historicity of Jesus is a
superset of Jesus did not exist both in terms of breath and depth.
References
R. Carrier. Proving History: Bayess Theorem and the Quest for the Historical
Jesus. Prometheus Books, 2012. ISBN 9781616145590. URL https://books.
google.dk/books?id=6eWZpwAACAAJ.
R. Carrier. On the Historicity of Jesus: Why We Might Have Reason for Doubt.
37
Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2014. ISBN 9781909697492. URL https://books.

google.dk/books?id=UJX5oAEACAAJ.
D. Ehrman. Did Jesus Exist?: The Historical Argument for Jesus of Nazareth.
eBook Original. HarperCollins, 2012. ISBN 9780062089946. URL https:
//books.google.com/books?id=hf5Rj8EtsPkC.
R. Lataster. There was no Jesus, there is no God: A Scholarly Examination
of the Scientific, Historical, and Philosophical Evidence and Arguments for
Monotheism. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014. ISBN
1492234419.
R. Lataster and R. Carrier. Jesus Did Not Exist: A Debate Among Atheists.
CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015. ISBN 9781514814420.
URL https://books.google.dk/books?id=Oj78jgEACAAJ.
Raphael Lataster. Bayesian reasoning: Criticising the criteria of authenticityand calling for a review of biblical criticism. Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, 5(2):271293, 2013.
Raphael Lataster. A philosophical and historical analysis of william lane craigs
resurrection of jesus argument. Think, 14(39):5971, 2015a.
Raphael Lataster. Questioning the plausibility of jesus ahistoricity theories
a brief pseudo-bayesian metacritique of the sources. Intermountain West
Journal of Religious Studies, 6(1):5, 2015b.
Raphael Lataster. Its official: We can now doubt jesushistorical existence.
Think, 15(43):6579, 2016.
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Reading Raphael Lataster

A Review From a Bayesian Perspective

2 Bayesian reasoning: Criticising the criteria of authenticity and

4 Questioning the Plausibility of Jesus Ahistoricity Theories: A

Raphael Lataster is a graduate student in Religious Studies at the university of

Bayesian reasoning: Criticising the criteria

Lataster introduces this article as a critique of existing historical methods and a

where h is the hypothesis in question, E is the historical evidence and h is

When employing Bayes Theorem, the historian will no longer be

The case study

John P. Meier reveals a potential flaw in the Criteria in arguing

where h is the hypothesis Herod was killed by an angel. Lataster writes:

provide illustrations of this in my review of OHJ

Explaining further, P (h) is so small as no account of angels killing

Objections to Bayes theorem

Another objection could be the difficulty in assigning quantitative

Specifically, he is interested in whether the evidence of fine tuning offers evidence

Play it again, Sam

Jesus did not exist

Jesus did not exist

Jesus did not exist

an academic publication to a popular book this expectation is less pronounced,

Questioning the Plausibility of Jesus Ahistoricity Theories: A Brief Pseudo-Bayesian

church. Presumably, what Lataster refers to by Baysian methologies is his

There was no Jesus, there is no God

Biblical scholars (generally taken more seriously by secular ie real

Jesus did not exist

circuses), but my editor wisely instructed me to tone it down.

Jesus Did Not Exist: A Debate Among Atheists

concludes he is not of much use because he relied on second-hand information.

Possible does not mean probable (...) it is possible

Matthews writings. There is simply no need to posit a Q source to explain

Leaving out the argument

As I earlier hyperbolically imagined, Ehrman, unsatisfied with his

Time for applause

to the available evidence, you may simply invent as much evidence

Casey, Carrier, self awareness

moral, pro-religious, have numerously opened up my heart to Jesus,

The Ascension of Isaiah, oft-seen as a first century text (the relevant

Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2014. ISBN 9781909697492. URL https://books.

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