MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R.

187167
Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving
the drawing of baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and
classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty
and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands would weaken our claim over those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates
conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts,
serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the
scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international
law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in
lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no
modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased
the Phils. total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils. continues claim of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, well breach the rules: that it should
follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167

Facts:
RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago.
This is in consonance with UNCLOS I.
RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which the government reserved the drawing of
baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.
RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in compliance with UNCLOS III in which the
Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and
Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.
Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the territory of the
Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of other states to the
detriment of the economy, sovereignty, national security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the classification of Regime
of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.
1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the citizens who will be directly injured and
benefitted in affording relief over the remedy sought.
2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.
First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate the countrys maritime zone
and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided
under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use
rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from
the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said
distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the treatythe role played by
RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The
truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical
miles.
Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with the Philippines sovereignty. Had RA
9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the
length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country,
for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had to consider
that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in
accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and States responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS
III.
Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the
territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitutions delineation of internal waters. Petitioners
contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to the

right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court
emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space
over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar the
Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles of international
law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law
since the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated thereto.
This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their
right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive
economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime
delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the passing of a law and not the Court.
Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for
its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our
archipelago and it will weaken the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522,
allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is
therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our
national interest.

Laurel vs Misa
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947
Facts:
Petitioner Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus, asserting that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the
enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of
Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these
Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
Issue:
Whether or not enemy occupation has the effect of suspending the allegiance of a Filipino citizen during
the period of said occupation
Ruling:
NO. A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance,
which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign.
As decided by the court in cases, the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the
enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier.

Adoption of the petitioners theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for
small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of
public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the
occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being
prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the
resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive
them all of their own independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the action of invaders in
forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving
themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own
sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide.
Change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of
those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense
against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides
that The government established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known
as the Republic of the Philippines.

REAGAN VS. CIR

GR # L-26379, December 27, 1969

FACTS: William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical
assistance to the US Air Force (USAF). In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car
valued at $6,443.83. Two months later, he got permission to sell the same car provided that
he would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson, Jr.
for $6,600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place within Clark Air Base. As a result
of this transaction, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable income
of Reagan to be at17,912.34 and that his income tax would be 2,797.00. Reagan paid the
assessed tax but at the same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is
exempt. Reagan claims that the sale took place in foreign soil since Clark Air Base, in legal
contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also cited that under the Military
Bases Agreement, he, by nature of his employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation.
ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income tax?

HELD: No. The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over
its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its
decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial
and personal. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends
support to Reagans assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil or territory. This
countrys jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been
preserved, the Philippines merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases
this is just a matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted that he indeed is
employed by the USAF and his income is derived from US source but the income derived
from the sale is not of US source hence taxable.

Lee Hong Hok vs. David

G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972
Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUM
Only the government can question a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a government grant.
FACTS:
This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his
miscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an order of

award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds then issued an original
certificate of title to David.
During all this time, Lee Hong Hok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lee Hong Hok may question the government grant
HELD:
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. This
was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and
title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they
been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it as their private property.
The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity
with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government
and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the
grantee and the government.
IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:
The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced int eh concept of
sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire property under
dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in its proprietary
character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural
resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.

Lee Hong Hok vs. David

G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972
FACTS:

Aniano David acquired lawful title pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in accordance
with which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent (*similar to public auction) was made
by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892.

On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which
OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City on October 21, 1959.
Land in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources have always sustained the public character for having been formed by
reclamation (as opposed to peittioners contention that it is accretion)
The only remedy: action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud - But there was no fraud in this

case
ISSUES:
1.

W/N Lee Hong Kok can question the grant. - NO

2.

W/N David has original acquisition of title. - YES

HELD: Court of Appeals Affirmed. (no legal justification for nullifying the right of David to the disputed lot
arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials)
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void
patent. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government. Private
parties like the plaintiffs cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void
since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral
proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.
Well-settled Rule : no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or

implied, from the government

Cabacug v. Lao: holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that

of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens
Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase
within a period of 5 years.
Imperium v. Dominium

1.

Imperium - government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the
concept of sovereignty

2.

Dominium - capacity to own or acquire property. The use of this term is appropriate with reference
to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as
limited by the Constitution.

WILLIAM F. PERALTA v. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

75 Phil 285 | November 12, 1945

FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as defined
and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for
habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction
created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is
repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs
the constitutional rights of the accused.
ISSUE:
WON the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 is constitutional.
HELD:
Yes, it is constitutional. There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal
jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of
nations. It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it
was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments
of political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the
Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be
considered as having ceased to be valid.
PERALTA v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
75 PHIL 285
FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as defined
and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for
habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction
created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is
repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs
the constitutional rights of the accused.
ISSUE:
1. Is the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 valid?
2. Is the sentence of life imprisonment valid?
3. By principle of postliminy, did the punitive sentence cease to be valid from the time of the restoration
of the Commonwealth?
HELD:
There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction established by
the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a
governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within the power and
competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of political complexion of
the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the
sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having
ceased to be valid.