Digest Author: F.

Falgui

Holiday Inn Manila and/or Hubert Liner and

Disquitado vs. NLRC and Elena Honasan (1993)

Time Uploaded: 00:00

Baby

Petitioner: Holiday Inn Manila and/or Hubert Liner and Baby Disquitado
Respondent: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second
Division) and ELENA HONASAN
DOCTRINE: Probation is the period during which the employer may

determine if the employee is qualified for possible inclusion in the regular

force.
FACTS:
1. Elena Honasan applied for employment with the Holiday Inn and was on
April 15, 1991, accepted for "on-the-job training" as a telephone operator
for a period of three weeks
2. On May 13, 1992, after completing her training, she was employed on a
"probationary basis" for a period of six months ending November 12.
3. Employment contract stipulated Hotel could terminate her probationary
employment at any time prior to the expiration of the six-month period in
the event of her failure (a) to learn or progress in her job; (b) to faithfully
observe and comply with the hotel rules and the instructions and orders
of her superiors; or (c) to perform her duties according to hotel standards
4. November 8, 1991, four days before the expiration of the stipulated
deadline, Holiday Inn notified her of her dismissal, on the ground that her
performance had not come up to the standards of the Hotel
5. Honasan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming that she was
already a regular employee at the time of her separation and so was
entitled to full security of tenure. Labor Arbiter, who held that her
separation was justified, dismissed the complaint.
6. NLRC reversed, Honasan had become a regular employee and so could
not be dismissed as a probationer
ISSUES:
1. WON the appeal was filed on time Y
2. WON she was a regular employee at the time of her dismissalY
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES. On the timeliness of the appeal, it is well-settled that all notices
which a party is entitled to receive must be coursed through his counsel

of record. Consequently, the running of the reglementary period is

reckoned from the date of receipt of the judgment by the counsel of the
appellant.
Counsel received the decision of the Labor Arbiter on May 18,
1992. Appeal had already been filed by Honasan herself, on May 8,
1992.
2. YES. Honasan was placed by the petitioner on probation twice, first
during her on-the-job training for three weeks, and next during another
period of six months, ostensibly in accordance with Article 281. Her
probation clearly exceeded the period of six months prescribed by this
article.
Probation is the period during which the employer may determine if
the employee is qualified for possible inclusion in the regular force. In the
case at bar, the period was for three weeks, during Honasan's on-the-job
training. When her services were continued after this training, the
petitioners in effect recognized that she had passed probation and was
qualified to be a regular employee.
Honasan was certainly under observation during her three-week onthe-job training. If her services proved unsatisfactory then, she could
have been dropped as early as during that period.
Even if it be supposed that the probation did not end with the threeweek period of on-the-job training, there is still no reason why that period
should not be included in the stipulated six-month period of probation.
Under this more lenient approach, she had become a regular employee
of Holiday Inn and acquired full security of tenure as of October 15, 1991.
We find in the Hotel's system of double probation a transparent
scheme to circumvent the plain mandate of the law and make it easier for
it to dismiss its employees even after they shall have already passed
probation. The petitioners had ample time to summarily terminate
Honasan's services during her period of probation if they were deemed
unsatisfactory. Not having done so, they may dismiss her now only upon
proof of any of the legal grounds for the separation of regular employees,
to be established according to the prescribed procedure.
DISPOSITION: the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against petitioners.
It is so ordered