BARFEL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS.

CA
223 SCRA 268
FACTS: The defendants, as sellers, and plaintif
corporation as buyer by its President plaintif
Zaragoza entered into an agreement to Buy and
Sell two parcels of land with two houses erected
thereon. Said agreement bears a stipulation that
the seller will apply the payment of the cash
portion of the purchase price to the removal of
any and all liens on the properties; plaintif paid a
downpayment upon signing of the aforesaid
agreement; during the negotiation and conclusion
of the agreement, the defendant repeatedly
warranted that except for a mortgage in favor of
BPI and the deeds of restriction annotated at the
back of the title.

defendants (herein petitioner) presentation of

evidence, private respondent filed a motion for a
leave to file an amended complaint and motion to
admit the same impleading PISO bank as
additional party. Despite petitioners opposition,
the trial court issued an order admitting the
amended complaint. Petitioner then proceeded to
the CA for a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
CAs ruled in favor of private respondent and
denied the motion for reconsideration.

Sometime on June 1987, plaintifs found

out
that
defendants
made
a
blatant
misrepresentation, it was discovered that the
subject properties have a second mortgage with
the PISO/Central Bank; having informed of this
discovery defendant Barrios advised plaintif that
the second mortgage obligation is reduced and
gave assurance that he will submit the necessary
documents to support the same so that a valid
and acceptable arrangement could be worked out
by the Central Bank for the released of the
second mortgage; the Phil Savings Bank gave
notice that it has approved plaintif corporations
application for the loan with which to pay subject
properties under the agreement; the PSB sent a
separate letter whereby new titles to the subject
properties would be transferred to the plaintif
corporation and the mortgage in favor of PSB to
be annotated thereon and the defendants
expressed their conformity to the aforesaid
agreement.

RULING: A real interest has been defined as a

present substantial interest, as distinguished from
a mere expectancy or a future, contigent,
subordinate or consequential interest. Therefore,
a party who has not taken part in it cannot sue or
be sued for performance or for cancellation
thereof, unless he shows that he has a real
interest afected thereby.

Plaintif sent a letter to the defendant to

further ensure the consummation of the
transaction; however, the former received
information that the latter had been negotiating
to other parties; subsequently defendant failed
and refused to comply with their contractual
transaction of securing the release of the second
mortgage. The malice, fraud and the gross and
evident bad faith of the defendant is futher
demonstrated by the fact that, BPI advised that it
was disauthorized by the defendant to
consumnate the transaction. Petitioner (as
defendsants) filed an answer and averred that it
was aware of the liens on the property including
the mortgage to PISO, if full payment could not
be afectual, of if the PISO mortgage is not
released within 10 days each have the option to
terminate the agreement.
Plaintif (herein private respondents)
presented evidence and rested its case. During

ISSUE: Whether an amendment to the complaint

pleading a cause of action against a new or
additional party can be allowed after the private
respondents (as plaintif) had rested its case and
petitioner (as defecndants) had commenced the
presentation of their evidence.

Complete relief by private respondents

against petitioners may be had even if
PISO/Central Bank were not impleaded as party
defendant in the original case. PISO is not an
indispensable or necessary party without whom
no final determination can be had of the action
for specific performance with damages.
Moreover, the amendment sought by
private respondents, which is to include a new
party defendant at a late stage in the proceeding,
is not a formal but a substantial one. Private
respondents will have to present additional
evidence on the PISO second mortgage. The
efect would be to start trial anew with the parties
recasting their theories of the case. The correct
amount of the second mortgage owed by
petitioners to PISO bank, would have to be
litigated and this could be time consuming
SWAGMAN HOTEL, INC. VS COURT OF
APPEALS
GR 161135 Apr 8 2005
Facts: Swagman Hotel, Inc., through its
representatives, obtained from Neal a loan which
is payable after 3 years and with interest per
annum payable every 3 months. After a year,
Swagman sufered business reverses prompting it
to renegotiate the terms of the loan with Neal. It
was agreed that Neal waives the payment of
interests and that the principal loan shall be paid
every month instead of quarterly. After the
renegotiation, the cash vouchers or receipts
acknowledged by the parties state that the

payments therein represent Capital Investment

and Capital Repayment.
Barely 2 years after however, Neal sent a letter
informing the corporation that he is terminating
the loans and demanding that the total amount of
the loan and unpaid interests be paid.
Subsequently, Neal filed a complaint for sum of
money and damages. Swagman answered that
the complaint is dismissible for lack of cause of
action since the loan is not yet due and
demandable and that there was novation in the
contract. But the RTC held in favor of Neal,
rationating that although there was no cause of
action at the filing of the complaint, the debt has
already matured during the days the hearings
were held, thus making it due as of date.
Issue 1: W/N a complaint that lacks a cause of
action at the time it was filed be cured by the
accrual of a cause of action during the pendency
of the case
HELD: No. Jurisprudence states that unless the
plaintif has a valid and subsisting cause of action
at the time his action is commenced, the defect
cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or
accrual of one while the action is pending, and a
supplemental complaint or an amendment setting
up such after-accrued cause of action is not
permissible. (Surigao Mines vs Harris, 1935)
Issue 2: W/N there was novation in the terms of
the promissory notes
HELD: Yes. Under Article 1253 of the Civil Code,
it is presumed that if the debt produces interest,
payments were applied first to the interest before
the principal.
But in this case, the receipts
describing the payments as capital repayment
show that obligation to pay the interest was no
longer subsisting. The receipts prove that the
payments were for the principal loans and that
the interests were waived by Neal. There was
therefore a novation of the terms of the loan.
The resulting novation in this case was of the
modificatory type, not the extinctive type, since
the obligation to pay a sum of money remains in
force. Thus, since Swagman did not renege on its
obligation to pay the monthly installments
conformably with their new agreement and even
continued paying during the pendency of the
case, Neal had no cause of action to file the
complaint. It is only upon debtors default in the
payment of the monthly amortizations that a
cause of action would arise and give the creditor
a right to maintain an action against the
petitioner. ##
VIRATA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
(sorry! Long case)

FACTS: Cesar Virata is one of the defendants in

the case of Republic vs Romualdez which was
filed by the PCGG. The case involves the recovery
of ill-gotten wealth allegedly amassed by the
defendants in that case during the marcos years.
The complaint was amended 3times. The last
amended complaint filed with the sandiganbayan
states the following relevant allegations against
virata:
[summarized version]
Par.14:
defendants...engaged
in
devises,
schemes and strategems to unjustly enrich
themselves by... (b) giving meralco undue
advantage (increasing power rates while reducing
electric franchise tax); (g) justify meralcos
anomalous acquisition of electric cooperatives;
(m) manipulated the formation of Erecton
Holdings for the purpose of assuming the
obligation of Erecton Inc with Philguarantee
(Virata is an official of philguarantee) so that
Erecton Inc can borrow more capital its obligation
with philguarantee amounting to more than P2B.
Par.17: acting as dummies, nominees...to
conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally
obtained.
Par.18: Acts of defendant... constitute gross
abuse of official position... to the grave and
irreparable damage of the Filipino people.
Virata filed a bill of particulars asserting that
these allegations are vague and not averred with
sufficient definiteness to enable him to efectively
prepare his responsive pleadings. Sandiganbayan
partially granted the motion. Only with regard to
par.17 and 18 was the republic required to file a
bill
of
particulars.
As
to
the
others,
Sandiganbayan declared them to be clear and
specific enough to allow Virata to file an
intelligent responsive pleading.
OSG submitted the bill of particulars relating to
par17 and 18. Virata filed a motion to strike out
this bill of particular and to defer the filing of his
answer. It is alleged that the bill of particulars
aver for the first time new actionable wrongs
allegedly committed by him in various official
capacities and that the allegations do not indicate
that he was a dummy, nominee or agent (which
was the allegation in the complaint) but rather a
government officer acting in his own name.
Meanwhile, Virata filed a petition for certiorari
with the SC with regard to the denial of his bill of
particulars with regard to par.14 and sections b,g
and m. SC granted the petition. OSG filed a
manifestation
that
since
PCGG
is
the
investigating body with the complete records of
the case, it is in a better position to supply the bill
of particulars. Thus, PCGG submitted a bill of
particulars (no.2) in relation to par.14 and
subparagraphs b,g and m.
Virata filed a comment with a motion to dismiss.
According to him, bill of particulars no.2 is merely

a rehash of the assertions made in the last

amended complaint hence, it is not the bill of
particulars required by the court. As to the 1st bill
of particulars, it allegedly shows that new
imputations are being made which are diferent
from the charge in the complaint. Sandiganbayan
found the bill of particulars to be sufficient,
hence, this recourse to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the bill of particulars should be
admitted or not? NO!
HELD: The rule is that a complaint must contain
the ultimate facts constituting plaintif's cause of
action. A cause of action has the following
elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintif; (2)
an obligation on the part of the named defendant
to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant
violating the plaintifs right. As long as the
complaint contains these three elements, a cause
of action exists. Even though the allegations are
vague, dismissal is not the proper remedy. Thus,
the rules of court provide that a party may move
for more definite statement or for a bill of
particulars of any matter which is not averred
with sufficient definiteness or particularity to
enable him properly to prepare his responsive
pleading or to prepare for trial. Such motion shall
point out the defects complained of and the
details desired. An order directing the submission
of such statement or bill is proper where it
enables the party asking for it to intelligently
prepare a responsive pleading, or adequately to
prepare for trial.
It is the office of the bill of particulars to inform
the opposite party and the court of the precise
nature and character of the cause of action or
defense which the pleader has attempted to set
forth and thereby to guide his adversary in his
preparations for trial, and reasonably to protect
him against surprise at the trial.
It gives
information of the specific proposition for which
the pleader contends, in respect to any material
and issuable fact in the case, and it becomes a
part of the pleading which it supplements. It has
been held that a bill of particulars must inform
the opposite party of the nature of the pleader's
cause of action or defense, and it must furnish
the required items of the claim with reasonable
fullness and precision. Generally, it will be held
sufficient if it fairly and substantially gives the
opposite party the information to which he is
entitled. It should be definite and specific and not
contain general allegations and conclusions. It
should be reasonably certain and as specific as
the circumstances will allow.
Bill of particular for Par14 (b): Complaint alleges
viratas alleged active collaboration in reducing
taxes. Yet, there is nothing in the bill of particular
about this active collaboration. It is silent as to

what acts of Virat that establish that he

collaborated in reducing the taxes.
Par14(g): BOP (bill of particular) on this also failed
to set forth particularly or specifically the charges
against virata. It is full of generalizations and
indefinite statements. So many questions about
the alleged acts which were not answered (ie.
What were these electric coops? Why were their
acquisition anomalous? Etc)
Par14(m): BOP is merely a restatement of the
charge in the complaint. Clearly, republic failed to
amplify the charges against Virata. The important
question as to what particular acts of Virata that
constituted support and assistance in the
formation of Erectors Holdings is left unanswered.
With regard to the 1st bill of particular, basically
SC had the same findings. That is, BOP failed to
supply Virata with material matters which he
needs in order to file a responsive pleading.
Further, the 1st BOP contains new matters which
are not covered by the charges in the complaint.
The complaint alleges that he was acting as a
dummy but the BOP state that he acted in his
official capacity. Therefore, under the BOP he
acted as agent of the government whereas in the
complaint he allegedly acted as agent of his codefendants.
The two bills of particulars filed by the Republic
failed to properly amplify the charges leveled
against Virata because, not only are they mere
reiteration or repetition of the allegations set
forth in the expanded Second Amended
Complaint, but, to the large extent, they contain
vague, immaterial and generalized assertions
which are inadmissible under our procedural
rules.
As a result, SC orders the dismissal of the
complaint in so far as the charges against Virata
are concerned. This is justified under the rules of
court (failure to prosecute plaintif... fails to
comply with these rules or any order of the court)
Side issues: Whether PCGG can file the
BOP in behalf of the republic (contention is that
only OSG can act in behalf of republic)? YES.
Admin code gives power to the OSG to deputize
legal officers and to call on any dept...etc., as
may be necessary to fulfil its functions. Here,
OSG called PCGG for assistance and authorized it
to file the BOP.

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. V. CA

(1995)
G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995
Lessons
Applicable:
Territoriality
Principle
(conflicts of law)
FACTS:
Northwest Airlines (Northwest) and C.F. Sharp &
Company (C.F.), through its Japan branch, entered

into an International Passenger Sales Agency

Agreement, whereby the Northwest authorized
the C.F. to sell its air transportation tickets
March 25, 1980: Unable to remit the proceeds
of the ticket sales, Northwest sued C.F. in
Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted
proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for
damages
April 11, 1980: writ of summons was issued
by the 36th Civil Department, Tokyo District
Court of Japan
The attempt to serve the summons was
unsuccessful because Mr. Dinozo was in
Manila and would be back on April 24, 1980
April 24, 1980: Mr. Dinozo returned to C.F.
Office to serve the summons but he refused
to receive claiming that he no longer an
employee
After the 2 attempts of service were
unsuccessful, Supreme Court of Japan sent
the summons together with the other legal
documents to the Ministry of Foreign Afairs of
Japan> Japanese Embassy in Manila>Ministry
(now Department) of Foreign Afairs of the
Philippines>Executive Judge of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Manila who ordered Deputy Sherif Rolando
Balingit>C.F. Main Office
August 28, 1980: C.F. received from Deputy
Sherif Rolando Balingit the writ of summons
but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.
January 29, 1981: Tokyo Court rendered
judgment ordering the C.F. to pay 83,158,195
Yen and damages for delay at the rate of 6%
per annum from August 28, 1980 up to and
until payment is completed
March 24, 1981: C.F. received from Deputy
Sherif Balingit copy of the judgment. C.F. did
not appeal so it became final and executory
May 20, 1983: Northwest filed a suit for
enforcement of the judgment a RTC
July 16, 1983: C.F. averred that the Japanese
Court sought to be enforced is null and void
and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having
been rendered without due and proper notice
and/or with collusion or fraud and/or upon a
clear mistake of law and fact. The foreign
judgment in the Japanese Court sought in this
action is null and void for want of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant considering
that this is an action in personam.
The
process of the Court in Japan sent to the
Philippines
which
is
outside
Japanese
jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction over the
defendant in the case before the Japanese
Court of the case at bar
CA sustained RTC: Court agrees that if the C.F. in
a foreign court is a resident in the court of that
foreign court such court could acquire jurisdiction

over the person of C.F. but it must be served in

the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign court
ISSUE: W/N the Japanese Court has jurisdiction
over C.F.
HELD: YES. instant petition is partly GRANTED,
and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED insofar
as it denied NORTHWEST's claims for attorneys
fees,
litigation
expenses,
and
exemplary
damages
Consequently, the party attacking (C.F.) a foreign
judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity
Accordingly, the presumption of validity and
regularity of the service of summons and the
decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese
court must stand.
Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is
presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on
service of summons on a private foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines.
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides
that if the defendant is a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines, service may be
made:
(1) on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or,
(2) if there is no such resident agent, on the
government official designated by law to that
efect; or
(3) on any of its officers or agents within the
Philippines.
If the foreign corporation has designated an
agent to receive summons, the designation is
exclusive, and service of summons is without
force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless
made upon him.
Where the corporation has no such agent, service
shall be made on the government official
designated by law, to wit:
(a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a
foreign insurance company
(b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a
foreign banking corporation
(c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in
the case of other foreign corporations duly
licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Whenever service of process is so made, the
government office or official served shall transmit
by mail a copy of the summons or other legal
proccess to the corporation at its home or
principal office. The sending of such copy is a
necessary part of the service.
The service on the proper government official
under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code
Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to
assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed to
do business here, to the status of domestic
corporations

We think it would be entirely out of line with this

policy should we make a discrimination against a
foreign corporation, like the petitioner, and
subject its property to the harsh writ of seizure by
attachment when it has complied not only with
every requirement of law made specially of
foreign corporations, but in addition with every
requirement
of
law
made
of
domestic
corporations
In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing
business in Japan through its four duly registered
branches at the time the collection suit against it
was filed, then in the light of the processual
presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident
of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the
jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be
deemed to have assented to the said courts'
lawful methods of serving process.
Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of
summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid
not only under the processual presumption but
also because of the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty.
ROBINSON VS. MIRALLES
Post under Remedial Law Case Digests ,
Summons
The statutory requirements of substituted service
must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and
any substituted service other than that
authorized by the Rules is considered inefective.
However, we frown upon an overly strict
application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather
than the letter of the procedural rules, that
governs.
Facts: On 2000, Celita Miralles filed with RTC
Paranaque City a complaint for sum of money
against Remelita Robinson. The sherif went to
efect the summons. However, the security guard,
assigned at the gate of the subdivision where
Robinson lived, refuse to let the sherif go inside
the subdivision. The security guard alleged that
he was instructed by Robinson not to let anybody
proceed to her house if she is not around. Despite
the sherif's explanation, the guard still refused
admittance. The sherif returned the second time
to serve the summons. The same thing
happened. So, the sherif served the summons by
leaving a copy thereof together with the copy of
the complaint to the security guard by the name
of A.H. Geroche, who refused to affix his signature
on the original copy thereof, so he will be the one
to give the same to the defendant.
Eventually, Robinson was declared in default and
judgment was rendered ordering her to pay
US$20,054.00. A copy of the decision was sent to
her by registered mail. On 2003, she filed a
petition for relief from the judgment by default.
She claimed that summons was improperly

served upon her, thus, the trial court never

acquired jurisdiction over her and that all its
proceedings are void. She contends that the
service of summons upon the subdivision security
guard is not in compliance with Section 7, Rule 14
since he is not related to her or staying at her
residence. Moreover, he is not duly authorized to
receive summons for the residents of the village.
Hence, the substituted service of summons is not
valid and that the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over her person.

Sherif Pontente, who was to serve the summons

interposed that he was stopped by the Security
Guard of Alabang Hills Village because they were
allegedly told by Robinson not to let anyone
proceed to her house if she is not around. Despite
the explanations of the Sherif, the guards didnt
let him in. Thereafter, the Sherif just left a copy
of the complaint to a guard, who refused to affix
his signature on the original copy, so he will be
the one to give the summons to petitioner
Robinson.

On 2004, the trial court issued a Resolution

denying the petition for relief. The Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the
appeal.

Eventually, petitioner Robinson was declared in

default for her failure to file an answer
seasonably despite service of summons. The trial
court rendered its decision in favor of Miralles
ordering Robinson to pay her obligations plus cost
of damages. A copy of the court Order was sent
to petitioner by registered mail at her new
address and a writ of execution was also issued.
Robinson filed a petition for relief from the
judgment by default. She claimed that summons
was improperly served upon her, thus, the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over her and
that all its proceedings are void. Petitioner
Robinson contends that the service of the
summons upon the subdivision guard is not in
compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is not
related to her or staying at her residence, as
required by the rule.
ISSUE: Whether the substituted service of
summons efected is valid.
RULING: YES. Although the SC have ruled that the
statutory requirements of substituted service
must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and
any substituted service other than that
authorized by the Rules is considered inefective,
the Court frowns upon an overly strict application
of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter
of the procedural rules, that governs. Obviously,
it was impossible for the sherif to efect personal
or substituted service of summons upon
petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert
the sherifs declaration. Nor did she deny having
received the summons through the security
guard. Considering her strict instruction to the
security guard, she must bear its consequences.
Thus, we agree with the trial court that summons
has been properly served upon petitioner and
that it has acquired jurisdiction over her. Where
the action is in personam and the defendant is in
the Philippines, the service of summons may be
made through personal or substituted service in
the manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule
14 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended.
Under our procedural rules, personal service is
generally preferred over substituted service, the
latter mode of service being a method
extraordinary in character. For substituted service
to be justified, the following circumstances must
be clearly established: (a) personal service of

Issue: Whether or not the summons was properly

served.
Held. Yes. We have ruled that the statutory
requirements of substituted service must be
followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any
substituted service other than that authorized by
the Rules is considered inefective. However, we
frown upon an overly strict application of the
Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the
procedural rules, that governs.
In his Return, Sherif Potente declared that he was
refused entry by the security guard in Alabang
Hills twice. The latter informed him that petitioner
prohibits him from allowing anybody to proceed
to her residence whenever she is out. Obviously,
it was impossible for the sherif to efect personal
or substituted service of summons upon
petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert
the sherifs declaration. Nor did she deny having
received the summons through the security
guard. Considering her strict instruction to the
security guard, she must bear its consequences.
Thus, we agree with the trial court that summons
has been properly served upon petitioner and
that it has acquired jurisdiction over her.
(Remelita Robinson vs. Celita Miralles, G.R. No.
163584, December 12, 2006)
ROBINSON v. MIRALLES (510 SCRA 678,
2006)
FACTS: Respondent Celita Miralles filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money against
petitioner Remelita Robinson, alleging that
$20,054 was borrowed by Robinson, as shown in
the MOA they both executed. Summons was
served on Robinson at her given address.
However, per return of service of the Sheriif,
petitioner no longer resides there. Thus, the trial
court issued an alias summons to be served at
Muntinlupa City, petitioners new address. Again,
the Sherif reported twice thereafter that the
summons could not be served on petitioner.

summons within a reasonable time was

impossible; (b) eforts were exerted to locate the
party; and (c) the summons was served upon a
person of sufficient age and discretion residing at
the partys residence or upon a competent
person in charge of the partys office or place of
business. Failure to do so would invalidate all
subsequent
proceedings
on
jurisdictional
grounds.
VALMONTE V. CA Digest G.R. No. 108538
January 22, 1996
Ponente: Mendoza, J.:
Service of Summons
Facts: Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign
resident. Petitioners Lourdes and Alfredo are
husband and wife both residents of 90222
Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member
of the Philippine bar, however, practices his
profession in the Philippines, commuting for this
purpose between his residence in the state of
Washington and Manila, where he holds office at
S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita,
Manila.
Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the
sister of petitioner filed an action for partition
against former and her husband. She alleged
that, the plaintif is of legal age, a widow and is at
present a resident of 14823 Conway Road,
Chesterfield,
Missouri,
U.S.A.,
while
the
defendants are spouses but, for purposes of this
complaint may be served with summons at
Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St.,
Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D.
Valmonte
as
defendant
Lourdes
Arreola
Valmontes spouse holds office and where he can
be found.He husband was also her counsel, who
has a law office in the Philippines. The summons
were served on her husband.
Petitioner
in
a
letter,
referred
private
respondents counsel to her husband as the party
to whom all communications intended for her
should be sent. Service of summons was then
made upon petitioner Alfredo at his office in
Manila.
Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted his
summons, but not the one for Lourdes, on the
ground that he was not authorized to accept the
process on her behalf. Accordingly the process
server left without leaving a copy of the
summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his
Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For
this reason private respondent moved to declare

her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte

entered a special appearance in behalf of his wife
and opposed the private respondents motion.
RTC denied the MR of respondents. CA declared
petitioner Lourdes in default. Said decision was
received by Alfredo hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte was validly served with summons.
NO.
There was no valid service of summons
on
Lourdes.
1.
The action herein is in the nature of an
action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially
for the purpose of afecting the defendants
interest in a specific property and not to render a
judgment against him. As petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the
Philippines, service of summons on her must be
in accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such service, to
be efective outside the Philippines, must be
made either (1) by personal service; (2) by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation
in such places and for such time as the court may
order, in which case a copy of the summons and
order of the court should be sent by registered
mail to the last known address of the defendant;
or (3) in any other manner which the court may
deem sufficient.
2.
In the case at bar, the service of summons
upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not
done by means of any of the first two modes.
This mode of service, like the first two, must be
made outside the Philippines, such as through the
Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where
the defendant resides. The service of summons
on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made
upon the order of the court as required by Rule
14, 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed
sufficient by the court which in fact refused to
consider the service to be valid and on that basis
declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default
for her failure to file an answer.
3.
Secondly, the service in the attempted
manner on petitioner was not made upon prior
leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14,
17. As provided in 19, such leave must be
applied for by motion in writing, supported by
affidavit of the plaintif or some person on his
behalf and setting forth the grounds for the
application.
4.
Finally, and most importantly, because
there was no order granting such leave, petitioner
Lourdes was not given ample time to file her
Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not
less than sixty (60) days after notice.