Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U.

Bautista |1

G.R. No. 140079, March 31, 2005

AUGUSTO R. SAMALIO, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
and BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Augusto R. Samalio, former Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation was convicted of the crime of Robbery by the
Sandiganbayan for extorting money from Ms. Weng Sai Qin, Chinese, in exchange for
her passport. An administrative case was also filed against him for Violation of CSMC
No. 46, Rule 2, Section 1, for dishonesty, oppression, misconduct, disgraceful and
immoral conduct, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties,
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) Acting
Commissioner, the Secretary of Justice, and the Civil Service Commission, on appeal,
found Samalio guilty of the charges and ordered his dismissal. The Court of Appeals
also dismissed Samalio's Petition for Review and Motion for Reconsideration. Samalio
claims that he was denied due process because no witness or evidence was presented
against him and no hearing was conducted on his case.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was accorded due process
HELD: Yes. There was ample evidence which satisfied the burden of proof required in
administrative proceedings substantial evidence or that quantum of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion3 to
support the decision of the CSC.
The CSC and the Secretary of Justice did not err in applying Section 47, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the "rule on former testimony,"
in deciding petitioners administrative case. The provisions of the Rules of Court may be
applied suppletorily to the rules of procedure of administrative bodies exercising quasijudicial powers, unless otherwise provided by law or the rules of procedure of the
administrative agency concerned.
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a)
the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that
in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by
the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case and (e) the
adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.
In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in the administrative
proceedings before the BID because she left the country on February 6, 1993, or even
before the administrative complaint against petitioner was instituted. Petitioner does not
deny that the testimony of Weng Sai Qin was given in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case
No. 18679, a case which sprang from the information filed pursuant to Resolution No. 093-0224 dated February 4, 1993 of the City Prosecutors Office of Pasay City, the very
same resolution used by Commissioner Respicio as basis for filing the administrative
complaint. Hence, the issue testified to by Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal
Case No. 18679 was the same issue in the administrative case, that is, whether
petitioner extorted money from Weng Sai Qin. Petitioner also had the opportunity to
face and cross-examine his accuser Weng Sai Qin, and to defend and vindicate his
cause before the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, all the requisites for the proper application of
the rule on former testimony, as embodied in Section 47, Rule 130, were satisfied. Thus,
the CSC and the Secretary of Justice committed no error when they applied it and took
cognizance of the former testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case
No. 18679 where petitioner was convicted.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |2

G.R. No. 12724, March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner, 66 years old, filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino
citizen. He was born in China but has stayed in the Philippines since he was nine years
old. Petitioner testified and presented three witnesses. The prosecutor was impressed
so he did not present any evidence or witness against the petitioner. Thus, the petition
was granted. However, the Office of the Solicitor General appealed claiming that he
failed to state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA
ONG,"; that he failed to disclose in his petition that he formerly resided in "J.M. Basa
St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo."; that he failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines because he lived-in with his
wife for several years and had four children out of wedlock; and that he failed to file an
income tax return because his income is low. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases,
the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and
brought up for the first time on appeal. The petitioner contended that documents not
presented and formally offered as evidence are mere scraps of paper devoid of any
evidentiary value under Rule 132 34 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court should consider evidence which has not been formally
offered
HELD: Yes. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which provides
that These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for,
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient.
The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by
petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or
suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case
here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on
appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action
considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on
res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from
later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally
offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object
against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural
due process. We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the
admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite
party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was
deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the
appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in
the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |3

G.R. No. 153660, June 10, 2003

PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO ESPINA, EDDIE LADICA,
ARMAN QUELING, ROLANDO NIETO, RICARDO BARTOLOME, ELUVER GARCIA,
EDUARDO GARCIA and NELSON MANALASTAS, petitioners,
vs.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., respondent.
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint against Coca-Cola for illegal dismissal.
Clarificatory hearings were held for the complaints. The respondent moved for the
dismissal of the complaints there being no employer-employee relationship. The Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC, on appeal, ordered the reinstatement of the complainants.
However, the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise. The CA noted that affidavits of
complainants Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero, Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome,
Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas should not have been given
probative value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo crossexamination. The petitioners contend that the Rules of Court should not be strictly
applied in this case because the NLRC has its own rules of procedure. The respondent
commented that their affidavits should be stricken off the records for being self-serving,
hearsay and inadmissible in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not an affidavit not testified to in a trial has evidentiary value
HELD: Yes. The argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not
presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are
not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where
decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.
It was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined
by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale
and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to
make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.
Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of
law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of
Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by
analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. Under the Rules of the Commission, the
Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or
hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided
based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.
The Court ordered the respondent to reinstate the petitioners to their former
positions as regular employees, and to pay them their full back wages, with the
exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages are yet to be computed upon proof
of his dismissal.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |4

G.R. No. 123546, July 2, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOERAL GALLENO, accused-appellant.
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court of Roxas City convicted Galleno for the crime of
statutory rape. The five-year old victim, Evelyn, sustained a laceration in her vagina
which resulted in profuse bleeding due to her tender age. Galleno denied the
accusation. He claimed that his left ring finger with long fingernail was accidentally
inserted into the vagina of the child while they were playing, and that he applied the sap
from the leaves of a madre de cacao tree on her vagina to stop the bleeding. The case
was elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review. Galleno claimed that the
testimonies of the three expert witnesses, medical doctors who examined Evelyn, failed
to conclusively and sufficiently establish the cause of the laceration of Evelyn's vagina.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the
testimonies of the medical doctors
HELD: No. As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or
give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form
opinions upon the facts proved. However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are
received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the
principle that either because of the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or
because of the nature of the subject matter under observation, or for other reasons, the
testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment.
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of
the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the
victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, especially
the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of
the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise
of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various
possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean that the trial court's inference
is wrong.
The Supreme Court, in People vs. Fulgencio Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451, (held that)
evidence, to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness,
but it must be credible in itself. Human perception can be warped by the impact of
events and testimony colored by the unconscious workings of the mind. No better test
has yet been found to measure the value of a witness' testimony than its conformity to
the knowledge and common experience of mankind.
Sec. 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "(e)vidence must have such
a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence." This
simply means that relevancy is determinable by the rules of logic and human
experience. There is no precise and universal test of relevancy provided by law.
However, the determination of whether particular evidence is relevant rests largely at
the discretion of the court, which must be exercised according to the teachings of logic
and everyday experience.
The proverb "the wicked fleeth even when no man pursueth, but the innocent are
as bold as a lion" was correctly adopted by the trial court in drawing its conclusions. The
loopholes are palpable and manifest, and clearly work against the credibility of accusedappellant's story on which his defense is based.
Besides, the trial court's conclusions find support in the testimony of accusedappellant's own witness, Dr. Lourdes Laada (who was earlier presented during the trial
as a prosecution witness), who testified that a laceration is caused by a blunt instrument
and that a fingernail is not a blunt but a sharp instrument.
The conviction of accused-appellant is affirmed.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |5

G.R. No. 158203, March 31, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL OMATANG, appellants.
FACTS: Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang were convicted of two counts of
murder. The victims Alicia Catipay and Santiago Catipay were killed with the use of
bolos. The prosecution presented Magno Gomez as its lone eyewitness who testified
that after he and the spouses left the store where they drank, Calumpang and Omatang
followed them and killed the spouses. However, the defense presented witnesses who
testified that the appellants did not follow the victims after they left the store and that
Santiago and Magno were arguing when they left.
ISSUE: Whether the appellants guilt for double murder has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
HELD: No. After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that the trial court
overlooked pertinent pieces of evidence favorable to the accused and disregarded
several significant facts and circumstances that cast doubt on the veracity of the
testimony of the prosecutions lone eyewitness, Magno Gomez, justifying a departure
from the settled rule that factual findings of the trial court bind this Court.
While Magno claimed to have witnessed the gruesome killings, the records show
that serious discrepancies attended Magnos testimony in court and his sworn
statement, executed during the preliminary examination.
Generally, an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is considered almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate or lacking in details and is deemed inferior to the
testimony given in open court. Jurisprudence, however, forewarns that when serious
and inexplicable discrepancies exist between a previously executed sworn statement of
a witness and his testimonial declarations, with respect to a persons participation in a
serious imputation such as murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of the
witness account.
Well settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itselfsuch as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.
Appellants' defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were corroborated
only by their relatives and friends, and it was not shown that it was impossible for them
to be at the place of the incident. However, the rule that an accused must satisfactorily
prove his alibi was never intended to change or shift the burden of proof in criminal
cases. It is basic that the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Unless the prosecution
overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused by competent and
credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains.
There being no sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to appellants as
the perpetrators of the crime, appellants presumed innocence stands.
The appellants were acquitted on reasonable doubt.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |6

G.R. No. 152807, August 12, 2003

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN: BERNARDO S. SABANPAN, RENE S.
SABANPAN, DANILO S. SABANPAN and THELMA S. CHU; HEIRS OF ADOLFO
SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ TAPIZ, MA. VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN, MA. BELEN SAEZ
and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS OF CRISTINA SAEZ GUTIERREZ: ROY SAEZ
GUTIERREZ and LUIS SAEZ JR., petitioners,
vs.
ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA, HERDIN C. COMORPOSA, OFELIA C. ARIEGO,
REMEDIOS COMORPOSA, VIRGILIO A. LARIEGO, BELINDA M. COMORPOSA and
ISABELITA H. COMORPOSA, respondents.
FACTS: In 1965, Adolfo Saez, out of pity and for humanitarian consideration, allowed
Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of his father, Marcos Saez, without any rent.
Thus, Francisco's nipa hut was carried to a portion of Marcos' land. Francisco's heirs
succeeded in his posession for free and occupied the premises through petitioners'
tolerance. In 1998, petitioners made a formal demand to the respondents to vacate the
premises. The respondents refused and claimed that they have acquired just and valid
ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription and
that the Regional Director of the DENR, Region XI has already upheld their possession
over the land in question, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title. Thus, petitioners
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against them. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors. Petitioners filed a petition
for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of petitioners
witnesses; Whether or not the admissibility of evidence is similar with its probative value
HELD: No. Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the
admission of evidence that has not been formally offered during the trial. But this
evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on
summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.
The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted
evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the
rules of evidence.
While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses'
respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto
render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of
proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.
The testimony of petitioners' witnesses alone cannot prevail over respondents'
continued and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot for a considerable length of
time.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |7

G.R. No. 142856-57, August 25, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO NEGOSA alias "JOVIN," Appellant.
FACTS: The appellant is the live-in partner of the victim's mother, Cenilda. Gretchen, 12
years old, claimed that she was sexually abused by the appellant on two separate
occassions. Gretchen did not inform her mother about the incidents because of fear but
she told some of her female friends about these events. She also kept a record on her
notebook which her Auntie, Josilyn, discovered and read. Josilyn informed her parents
and siblings, except Cenilda, about Gretchens revelation. They took Gretchen to the
doctor for physical examination on September 14, 1998, and filed two criminal
complaints for rape. The appellant interposed the defense of alibi. Cenilda testified for
the appellant and claimed that he admitted that he only attempted to rape Gretchen.
The court found the appellant guilty of rape and of acts of lasciviousness.
ISSUE: Whether or not the late entries on Gretchens diary affects her credibility and
the probative weight of her testimony
HELD: No. The fact that Gretchen started making entries in her "diary" only on
September 2, 1998, more than a year after the first rape incident occurred (June 28,
1997), does not lessen the probative weight of the said entries.
It bears stressing that Gretchen was only in Grade V, barely eleven years old
when the appellant raped her on June 28, 1997. At such a tender age, still
inexperienced in the vagaries of life, she could not be expected to act and react like an
adult. Being subjected to a vicious sexual assault was an emotional and psychological
experience on the part of the young victim. In People v. Aquino, this Court held that "the
range of emotions shown by rape victims is yet to be captured even by calculus. It is
thus unrealistic to expect information from rape victims."
The trial court disbelieved Gretchens testimony that on September 4, 1998, the
appellant managed to insert a small portion of his penis through the side of his short
pants and the side of the victims loose short pants and convicted the appellant only of
acts of lasciviousness. This, however, does not impair Gretchens credibility and the
probative weight of her testimony that she was raped by the appellant on June 28,
1997. In People vs. Lucena, we ruled that the testimony of a witness may be partly
believed or disbelieved, depending on the corroborative evidence and intent on the part
of the witness to pervert the truth. The principle FALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN
OMNIBUS is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction.
The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus deals only with the weight of
evidence and is not a positive rule of law; the rule is not an inflexible one of universal
application. Modern trend in jurisprudence favors more flexibility when the testimony of
a witness may be partly believed and partly disbelieved depending on the corroborative
evidence presented at the trial. Thus, where the challenged testimony is sufficiently
corroborated in its material points, or where the mistakes arise from innocent lapses
and not from an apparent desire to pervert the truth, the rule may be relaxed. It is a rule
that is neither absolute nor mandatory and binding upon the court, which may accept or
reject portions of the witness testimony based on its inherent credibility or on the
corroborative evidence in the case.
There is no evidence that Gretchen intended to pervert the truth as to the extent
of the sexual abuse done to her on September 4, 1998. Neither can it be claimed that
she prevaricated when she testified that the appellant raped her on June 28, 1997.
The appellant is found guilty of statutory rape.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |8

G.R. No. 14440, February 24, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
FERDINAND MATITO y TORRES, a.k.a. "FREDDIE," appellant.
FACTS: Filomena Raymundo heard gunshot wounds so she rushed to her husbands
direction. She saw that he was bleeding. Mariano told her that Freddie shot him. Matito
interposed defenses of denial and alibi, but the Trial Court found him guilty based on
Filomena's testimony and other pieces of circumstantial evidence, such as the presence
of nitrate powder on the cast taken from the right hand of appellant; the bitter quarrel
that ensued between him and the victim after the latter had cut off the formers water
supply; the denial by appellant of the request of his neighbors (including the victim) to
widen the right of way along the premises of his house; and hours before the victim was
killed, the threatening remarks of appellant to the formers daughter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the witness as a dying declaration should be
given credence
HELD: Yes. A dying declaration, also known as a statement in articulo mortis, may be
received in evidence under Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which we
quote: "SEC. 37. Dying Declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under a
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death
is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of
such death."
To be admissible, the following requisites should be met: (a) the declaration must
concern the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) at
the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of impending
death; (c) he or she is competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a
case in which the declarants death is the subject of the inquiry.
In addition, the fact that he was still able to enter the house after being shot three
times, as well as the significant lapse of time before he died in the hospital, showed that
he had ample time to communicate to his wife the assailants identity. That there was no
way the victim could have told his wife before he died that it was appellant who had shot
him cannot be accorded absolute credence and faith, as such testimony was given by
Dr. Aves who was not a speech therapist or a neurologist.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that "indirectly proves a fact
in issue through an inference which the fact finder draws from the evidence established.
Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a
felon free." It is not a weaker form of evidence vis--vis direct evidence. Cases have
recognized that in its effect upon the courts, the former may surpass the latter in weight
and probative force. To warrant a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The totality of
the evidence must constitute an unbroken chain showing the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
On the strength of the circumstantial evidence proven in the current case, we
hold that the court a quo did not err in convicting appellant of the crime charged. The
combination of the circumstances comprising such evidence forms an unbroken chain
that points to appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime.
Alibi and denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative and self-serving, undeserving of any weight in law. Alibi is an inherently weak
defense, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. Appellant must prove that he
was not only at some other place when the crime was committed, but that it was
impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time the crime was perpetrated. This
he failed to do.
The appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.

Eugenice Ivy Gwynn U. Bautista |9

G.R. No. 152954, March 10, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
PAULINO SEVILLENO y VILLANUEVA, a.k.a. "Tamayo Sevilleno", appellant.
FACTS: The appellant was charged with rape with homicide. The victim was Virginia
Bakia, nine years old. The appellant pleaded guilty and was found guilty as charged. On
automatic review, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court and set aside
its decision as the appellant was not properly apprised of his fundamental right to be
informed of the nature of the accusation leveled against him. The appellant then
pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented witness who testified that appellant and
Virginia passed by together but only the appellant emerged from the sugarcane fields
with scratches on his face and neck. The examining physician also testified and
concluded that Virginia must have been raped and strangled to death. Appellant
interposed the defense of denial and alibi, but no other witness was presented for the
defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial confession of the accused is valid and binding
HELD: Yes. The rule is that once the prosecution has shown compliance with the
constitutional requirements on custodial investigations, a confession is presumed
voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of destroying this presumption. The
confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a
result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency. Appellant failed
to show that his confession in this case was given under any of the above
circumstances.
Significantly, appellants conviction was not based solely on his extra-judicial
confession but on other pieces of evidence established by the prosecution to the
satisfaction of the court. To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the
mind as to the criminal liability of the appellant. Jurisprudence requires that the
circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of events leading to one
fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the
author of the crime. These, the prosecution were able to establish.
While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is
required for a conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to
circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a
condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in
the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial
evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under
conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under
all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in
secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.
On the other hand, an alibi, to be believed, must receive credible corroboration
from disinterested witnesses. Appellant failed to present his employer or any co-worker
to corroborate his alibi or a logbook that would prove his presence at his workplace at
the time of the commission of the crime. Neither was there any evidence to show that it
was impossible for the appellant to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
In the end, the rule is settled that where the culpability or innocence of the
accused hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies,
the findings of trial courts are given the highest degree of respect. Hence, their findings
on such matters are binding and conclusive on appellate courts, unless some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance has been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted. We find no circumstance of weight or substance that was overlooked by
the trial court.
The appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide.

E u g e n i c e I v y G w y n n U . B a u t i s t a | 10

G.R. Nos. 139751-52, January 26, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
NOEL DARILAY, appellant.
FACTS: Marilyn and Ailyn Arganda were on their way home from a store after buying
tinapa when appellant emerged and struck Ailyn twice at the back with a piece of wood.
The appellant also struck Marilyn. When Ailyn regained consciousness, she looked for
her sister and the appellant. Ailyn told their mother what happened. Their father looked
for Marilyn and the appellant while their uncle reported the incident to the police. They
found torn pieces of clothing and a slipper bearing the Marilyn's name. The appellant
pointed where Marilyn was. Marilyns body was in a grassy area near bushes and trees
along the river. She was lying face down, her legs spread apart and was completely
naked. There was blood on her nose, her mouth, and her vagina. The appellant was
arrested. The appellant was charged of attempted murder and with rape with homicide.
The appellant denied the charges and claimed that Hercules Bon and Jose Delfino
raped and killed Marilyn and he did nothing to prevent them. The Trial Court found him
guilty as charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not circumstantial evidence may prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt
HELD: Yes. The testimony of children of sound mind is likely to be more correct and
truthful than that of older persons, so that once established that they have fully
understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimony should be given full
credence.
We agree with the appellant that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence
to prove that he raped and killed Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the said crime.
However, direct evidence is not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused for the
crime charged; it may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances
from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and
common experience. What was once a rule of ancient practicability is now entombed in
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial
evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as
anchor for a judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur: "x x x if (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have
been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant
a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt."
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a
compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the
proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one
conclusion: the guilt of the accused for the offense charged. For circumstantial evidence
to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial
evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of
evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution.
We are convinced that the appellant raped Marilyn about 15 meters from where
he had earlier waylaid Ailyn. He then carried Marilyn across the river where he killed her
to prevent her from revealing to the authorities that she was raped. The appellant hid
her body under the bushes and trees to thus prevent police authorities from discovering
that he killed Marilyn. Irrefragably, Marilyn was killed by reason of the rape. The killing of
a child, barely 9 years old, is murder. Nonetheless, the appellant is guilty of rape with
homicide because the latter crime is used in its generic sense.
The appellant is found guilty of rape with homicide and of attempted murder.

E u g e n i c e I v y G w y n n U . B a u t i s t a | 11

G.R. No. L-3544. March 27, 1907

CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS, Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
EDWIN CASE, Respondent-Appellant.
FACTS: Edwin Case claims a right of way through a passage along the side of Carmen
Ayala de Roxas' property. The appellant claims that the right of way exists by
prescription, and not founded on any written instrument but on immemorial use alone.
The appellant anchors his claim on the law stating that discontinuous servitudes have
no fixed periods, but must be proved by usage or a term so long that men cannot
remember its commencement (Tanto tiempo de que non se pueden accordar los omes,
quanto ha que lo commencaron a usar). However, the supreme court of Spain held that
the court should consider the testimony and number of witnesses over 60 years of age
who were acquainted with the servitude during their lives and who also had heard it
spoken of in the same way by their elders. The appellant failed to comply with the
second requirement. Thus, appellant filed an appeal from the Court of Land
Registration.
ISSUE: Whether or not a right or prescription may be proved by the memory of living
witnesses alone
HELD: No. There is not vested right in a mere rule of evidence. The law establishes a
disputable presumption "that a person is the owner of property from exercising acts of
ownership over it or from common reputation of his ownership." The use of the passage
proved in this case cannot be held to constitute acts of ownership for the reason that it
is quite consistent with a mere license to pass, informal in its origin and revocable in its
nature. It seems, however, that under the clause quoted, common reputation of
ownership of the right of way was open to proof and on this theory of the case such
testimony, if available, should have been offered.
In order to establish a right or prescription something more is required than the
memory of living witnesses.
A right of way claimed to have been established by use prior to the Civil Code,
without written evidence, cannot be proved by the memory of living witnesses alone.

E u g e n i c e I v y G w y n n U . B a u t i s t a | 12

G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
MIGUELA C. DAILO, Respondents.
FACTS: Respondent spouses Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. bought a house
and lot but the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Marcelino's name. In a
Special Power of Attorney(SPA), he authorized Lilibeth Gesmundo to obtain a loan from
petitioner secured by the property. The loan was foreclosed, and the petitioner instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure. A Certificate of Sale was issued in petitioner's favor and the
property was not redeemed so the petitioner consolidated the ownership. Miguela
claims that she was not aware of mortgage and that the property is conjugal. She filed
complaint for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Damages against petitioner. Petitioner claimed that the property was the
exclusive property of Marcelino. The Trial Court, by preponderance of evidence, found
that the property was conjugal in nature and ordered the reconveyance of the property
to the spouses. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property was the exclusive property of Marcelino
HELD: No. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and
her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal
partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have
already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be
governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code
and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict,
the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when
the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge
and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision
of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent
of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be
void.
Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable
for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . ."
Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the
benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.
Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to
compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be
held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted
to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the
other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process. A party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases
thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in
order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.

E u g e n i c e I v y G w y n n U . B a u t i s t a | 13

G.R. No. 144773, May 16, 2005

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
LAURENCIO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS
OF EMILIANO AYING, PAULINO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF
THE OTHER HEIRS OF SIMEON AYING, AND WENCESLAO SUMALINOG, IN HIS
OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF ROBERTA AYING,
respondents.
FACTS: A cadastral decree over Lot No. 4399 in Lapu-Lapu City was issued in favor of
the Aying siblings, but the certificate of title was lost during the war. All the heirs of the
siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of petitioner who filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title which
was granted. The Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of the Aying
siblings. Claiming to be the rightful owner, the petitioners notified the occupants to
vacate the property. The respondents filed a complaint for cancellation of the ExtraJudicial Partition with Absolute Sale, recovery of ownership, injunction and damages
and alleged that their ascendants are the registered owners of the property. The Trial
Court concluded that the document is valid since the respondents failed to provide
evidence that it was a totally simulated or fictitious contract and that the action had
prescribed. The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the action had not yet prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action had prescribed
HELD: In view of the lack of unambiguous evidence of when the heirs of Emiliano Aying
and Simeon Aying discovered the existence of the document of sale, it must be
determined which party had the burden of proof to establish such fact.
The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an
action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the
basis for the relief he seeks to obtain. Moreover, one alleging a fact that is denied has
the burden of proving it and unless the party asserting the affirmative of an issue
sustains the burden of proof of that issue by a preponderance of the evidence, his
cause will not succeed. Thus, the defendant bears the burden of proof as to all
affirmative defenses which he sets up in answer to the plaintiffs claim or cause of
action; he being the party who asserts the truth of the matter he has alleged, the burden
is upon him to establish the facts on which that matter is predicated and if he fails to do
so, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict or decision in his favor.
In the case at bar, it was petitioner, which set up in its Answer the affirmative
defense of prescription. It was, therefore, incumbent upon petitioner to prove the date
from which the prescriptive period began to run. Evidence as to the date when the tenyear prescriptive period began exists only as to the heirs of Roberta Aying, as
Wenceslao Sumalinog admitted that they learned of the existence of the document of
sale in the year 1967. As to the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying, there is no
clear evidence of the date when they discovered the document conveying the subject
land to petitioner. Petitioner miserably failed to adduce proof of when the heirs of
Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying were notified of the subject document. Hence, with
regard to said heirs, the Court may consider the admission in the amended complaint
that they learned of the conveyance of the disputed land only in 1991 when petitioner
sent notices to vacate to the occupants of the subject land, as the date from which the
ten-year prescriptive period should be reckoned.
The amended complaint of the heirs of Roberta Aying is dismissed on the ground
of prescription. However, the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying, having
instituted the action for reconveyance within the prescriptive period, are hereby declared
as the lawful owners of a 2/8 portion of the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. RO-2856.