Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Introduction
© Equinox Publishing Ltd 2008, Unit 6, The Village, 101 Amies Street, London SW11 2JW.
130 Karen Bauer
really help the reader today to understand what the exegetes actually meant.
Thus, after exploring the ways in which method affects content in the first
section of the paper, the second section examines what the exegetes may have
meant by saying that women were deficient in rationality, a common claim in
pre-modern texts which is especially jarring to many modern readers. Rather
than offering up a straightforward reading of the term “rationality,” this section
shows that its pre-modern definition was contested.
Some pre-modern interpretations disappear in the modern age, but some,
such as the saying that women are deficient in rationality, are retained. Whole-
sale preservation of pre-modern interpretations seems to indicate that modern
interpretations are stagnant, or that they simply copy from the pre-modern heri-
tage. Yet such use of tradition may be more complex than it appears. Drawing
on fieldwork conducted in Syria, the third section of this paper explores differ-
ences in how pre-modern and modern exegetes use the term “rational defi-
ciency,” showing that when pre-modern interpretations appear in modern
works, they take on modern meanings. Modern exegetes’ selective quoting and
reinterpretation of the pre-modern tradition enables them to confirm modern
notions and values. Thus, pre-modern and modern exegetes have a common
method of selectively drawing on sources and precedent: they work with their
heritage in order to forge interpretations that, on the one hand, preserve conti-
nuity with the past, and on the other, are relevant to their particular milieu. But
just as there was not a single uniform view of this verse in the pre-modern
interpretations, nor is there in the modern interpretations. Exploring clerics’
differences and similarities can reveal the influences of their milieu on the
production of interpretation.
This section consists of a brief overview of some of the ways in which inter-
pretations of Q 4:34 developed in the pre-modern period. There were signifi-
cant changes in the interpretations’ content over time. One way of explaining
such changes would be to say that later exegetes had different ideas of women’s
natures and their roles than early exegetes did. But I argue that such a radical
change in attitudes between early and later exegetes is unlikely. Instead, some
of the developments in the content of exegesis can be attributed to exegetes’
changing methods. Because their ideas of the proper methods of interpreting
the verse changed through time, so did the substance of their interpretations.
The earliest exegeses of 4:34 tend to explain the meanings of the verse, with-
out explaining its logic further than quoting its “occasion of revelation” (the
description of when the verse was revealed). Thus, a typical early exegesis,
such as that of ‘Alī b. Abī $ala (d. 143/760) says that men are women’s
commanders [‘umarā’] and that women must obey in those matters that God
has legislated. What concerns Ibn Abī $ala are the practical implications of
the verse: men’s and women’s roles and specific actions. The woman’s
obedience seems to be limited to her behavior towards her husband’s family,
and to respecting his property:
God said that men are qawwāmūn over women, meaning commanders
[‘umarā’]. It is necessary for women to obey men in matters where God has
commanded their obedience. And obedience is that women must treat their
husband’s family well, and preserve his property.2
Ibn Abī Tala focuses on the practical applications of this verse: men are
women’s commanders, and women owe men obedience, which is well-defined.
This approach is typical of the earliest exegeses, which tend to describe specific
rules associated with this verse, and to explain how it applies to daily life.
Although this and other early works are fragmentary, it is still important to note
that neither women’s obedience, nor men’s command, is unlimited. No expla-
nation is provided as to why the verse says what it does. This particular inter-
pretation can be found in several early exegeses, including those of the Shī‘ī al-
Qummī (d. 308/920); and the Sunnī al-$abarī (d. 311/923).
The next part of 4:34 reads: with what God has given some more than others.
Al-$abarī explains this part of the verse by saying:
Meaning, with what God has made men superior to their wives: men give
[their wives] their dowries, and spend on them from their property, and
provide them with provisions. That is the superiority [tafīl] given by God
Almighty to men over women, and because of that they became their
maintainers [qawwām], executors of the command over them concerning
those matters that God gave to them to command.3
Like ‘Alī b. Abī $ala, al-$abarī specifically limits men’s authority: men are
the executors of command in certain matters legislated by God. In al-$abarī’s
exegesis, men’s advantage is defined as their monetary support of their wives,
because of which women must obey them in certain matters. He focuses on
actual rules, and does not explain why men have been given a monetary or legal
preference.
In the generation or two of exegetes after al-$abarī, there is a methodological
shift in the way tafsīr is written. In these slightly later exegeses, explaining the
reasons behind a verse becomes important to the exegetical enterprise. This
leads to a dramatic change in the types of interpretations given of this verse:
they now consist of explanations of why men and women occupy their respec-
tive roles. The exegesis of Abū ’l-Layth al-Samarqandī, who died 60 years after
al-$abarī, in 370/985, provides a good example of this new way of writing
tafsīr.
God gave men the right of being in charge of women, because men have
more rationality than women do. It is said that men have strength in their
souls and natures that women don’t have, because the nature of man is
dominated by heat and dryness, and in that there is strength and power, and
the nature of woman is dominated by moisture and coldness, and in that is
softness and weakness, and God gave men the right of being in charge of
women because of that.4
Whereas al-$abarī focuses on specific applications of male authority, such as
giving women the dowry, and supporting them financially, Abū ’l-Layth al-
Samarqandī cites mental and physical explanations for men’s authority: men
are more rational than women, and men’s natures are hot and dry, and thus full
of strength and power, whereas women’s are moist and cold, in other words
weak and soft. Only one of Abū ’l-Layth’s explanations was destined to endure.
First asserted by the ancient Greeks, the notion that women have moist, cold
natures did not gain much currency in classical Islamic exegeses.5 On the other
hand, the statement of women’s deficient rationality [nāqiÑāt al-‘aql]—only
rarely cited in Abū ’l-Layth’s time, and not cited by al-$abarī at all—eventu-
ally becomes extremely widespread.
Exegetes after Abū al-Layth’s generation almost invariably mention women’s
deficient rationality to explain why men are superior to them and thus have
been put in authority over them. For example, the Mālikī jurist Ibn al-‘Arabī,
who died in 543/1148, speaks of God having made men superior in two ways,
mentally and religiously:
The meaning [of the verse] is that the guardianship of woman was given to
men, because men possess two types of superiority [over women].
The first: perfection in rationality [kamāl al-‘aql] and discernment [tamyīz].
The second: perfection in religion and religious duties, in undertaking the
jihad, the commanding of right and forbidding of wrong in general [‘alā al-
‘umūm], and also other matters.
This is what the Prophet clarified when he said: “I haven’t seen people
more deficient in reason and religion, who can go straight to the hearts of
upright men, than you women.”6
Ibn al-‘Arabī’s citation of the mental and religious differences between men
and women is no accident: he explains that these interpretations have their basis
in a prophetic saying [hadith] appearing in the Saī collection of al-Bukhārī.
This hadith declares that though women are deficient in rationality [nāqiÑāt al-
‘aql] and in religion, they are still able to “go straight to the hearts of upright
men.” (This hadith is referred to hereafter as the “rational deficiency hadith.”)
These exegeses exemplify three wider trends in interpretations of 4:34. The
first two trends have to do with the nature of the development of exegesis:
certain early exegeses are left out of later works, and later exegesis develops in
ways that could not be predicted by reading early exegeses. ‘Alī b. Abī $ala’s
exegesis, that women’s obedience consists of good manners towards the hus-
band’s family, resurfaces only infrequently after al-$abarī’s citation; when it
does come up it sits amid a list of wives’ other, often stricter, duties, such as the
duty to remain inside the house. By the modern age, the interpretation had been
relegated to the dustbin of history. Modern exegetes usually do not cite it. It
seems that although al-$abarī’s compendium was a major source for later
authors, their choice of what to include in their own works is affected by con-
tent: it could be that Ibn Abī $ala’s exegesis limiting the scope of husbands’
control no longer rang true to later generations.
The second interpretive trend is that, although certain attitudes may have
been shared between early and later exegetes, the content of exegesis develops
in a way that is unpredictable given the early texts alone. For example, early
assertions of husbands’ authority do not predict later assertions that women are
less rational than men. Together, these two trends indicate that it is problematic
to attribute a causal relationship between the earliest and later exegeses, as is
done when authors speak of early exegesis as the basis for what comes after.
The third trend illustrated by the examples above has to do with content. The
earliest exegetes seem to be “fair” towards women, by limiting their obedience
and not commenting on the reasons for men’s position of authority, while later
ones seem to have suddenly and concurrently decided that men are inherently
better than women, thereby justifying men’s authority. But such a radical
transformation in attitudes is doubtful: it is more likely that the attitude towards
women’s deficiencies was shared by most pre-modern exegetes, only it was not
mentioned in the earlier works. The evidence demonstrates that at some point
after al-$abarī, the methodological shift described above, from a focus on
application to a focus on explanation, can account for the prevalence of inter-
pretations in later works which refer to women’s deficiencies as an explanation
for women’s roles. This is not to say that there was no variation in exegetes’
opinions: as I showed above, the exegeses which limited men’s authority seem
actually to disappear in later ages, indicating that exegetes’ ideas may have
been growing more restrictive through time. Yet not all developments should
be understood to indicate a radical change in the prevailing view of women’s
status or roles. In some cases, changes in content are due to changes in method,
and the exegetes’ decision to include different types of proof, such as ahadith
on the authority of the Prophet.
I will briefly explore these questions through exegetes’ citation of the rational
deficiency hadith in their explanations of 4:34. To many modern ears, the state-
ment that women are deficient in rationality sounds misogynistic, but it could
be that the pre-modern exegetes had a different view. Unfortunately, they do
not offer many explanations of the meaning of this hadith, and thus the question
of what they really meant remains largely unanswered. I therefore argue that,
rather than simply dismissing them as misogynistic, interpreting these pre-
modern texts requires further research into what the exegetes may have meant
by their seemingly straightforward words.
The nature of rationality was intensely debated in the pre-modern period.
However, that debate does not seem to be applicable to the sort of rationality
discussed by these exegetes. In his work Adab al-dunyā wa’l-dīn, the exegete,
philosopher, and jurist Abū ’l-Óasan al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058) describes his
view that rationality is an “understanding of necessary things,”7 which is gained
by apprehension of the world in two ways: the sensory faculties, and the
understanding of certain a priori knowledge, such as knowing that two is more
than one, and that a thing cannot be both itself and its opposite.8 This type of
knowledge, he says, enables discernment of right from wrong, good from
bad—it provides a moral compass to guide one through the world.9 As he
defines it, rationality is a human quality, not one possessed by men alone. Yet
al-Māwardī claims that women are rationally deficient in his work of exege-
sis.10 It is difficult to reconcile these views, and it can only be done if we accept
that there is one type of rationality which distinguishes humans from animals,
and another (which remains undefined) in which women are deficient.
Another way to understand women’s deficient rationality is to explore books
of law to see how this quality plays out in jurists’ discussions of women’s abil-
ity to perform the functions of judge and muftī.11 According to one school of
law, the Óanafīs, women could be judges, and according to all schools of law,
women could give valid opinions on the law: they could be muftīyas.12 Moham-
med Fadel has used this fact to argue that pre-modern jurists did not attribute a
“general intellectual inferiority” to women.13 But it seems that many pre-
modern scholars did believe women to be rationally deficient. Jurists of schools
other than the Óanafī school use women’s deficient rationality to justify their
rulings against women judging, without accounting for the fact that women can
be muftīyas.14 In the juridical texts that I have reviewed on women judging,
most Óanafī authors do not say that women are deficient in rationality.15 This
seems to make sense because the Óanafīs allow women to be judges. However,
authors of works of exegesis who adhere to the Óanafī school of law often say
that women are deficient in rationality, thereby explaining why men have been
put in authority.16 While women’s deficient rationality is not usually the only
rationale adduced by jurists and exegetes to explain why women should not be
maintain women is shared between pre-modern and modern texts, but, rather
than saying that men are women’s “commanders,” many modern authors will
say that men are in charge of the household, or that they have the final say in
disputes. Conservatives grapple with pre-modern texts and give these texts
modern interpretations. But the modern interpretations still serve to support the
“traditional” balance of power in the household: men’s status in the house as
final decision makers, in charge, or leaders is justified by their innate natures
differing from women’s in important ways, some of which were expressed by
the Prophet in the rational deficiency hadith.
Clerics who describe themselves as reformists, like Muammad al-Óabash,
take pains to explain the importance of women’s roles in the public sector, as
members of the government, judges, and in the workplace more generally. And
al-Óabash claims in his book on women that the rational deficiency hadith is
invalid—it could not have been said by the Prophet, because it simply doesn’t
make sense. The Prophet consulted women, and took their advice; how could
he have thought that their intellects were in any way deficient?
On the face of it, the differences between the reformist and the conservative
clerics seem to reside in their attitudes towards tradition: al-BūÓī seems to
accept wholesale the pre-modern past, as embodied by the women’s deficiency
hadith, whereas al-Óabash challenges the pre-modern past even down to this
widely accepted authenticated hadith. Indeed, in terms of their spoken intent,
these two clerics place themselves at opposite ends of the spectrum when deal-
ing with the pre-modern past; and their attitudes to tradition seem to be directly
correlated to their attitudes towards women: either medieval-minded, or mod-
ern. However, their actual responses to the pre-modern heritage are not divided
on such even lines, and neither is there an absolute divide between conserva-
tives and reformists in terms of women’s roles. Although women’s participation
in the public sphere is a platform for reformist action, women’s rights within
the household are not the subject of much overt disputation between reformists
and conservatives.26
I have shown how the conservatives refit pre-modern arguments to fit with
modern sensibilities: but what is the reformist attitude towards the pre-modern
heritage? Although he rejects an authenticated hadith, Muammad al-Óabash
does not reject the pre-modern heritage outright. It is true that some of his
opinions seem to have little relation to traditional discourses: most prominently
he advocates a doctrine of “universal salvation,” which states that other relig-
ions may offer valid paths to God.27 But other opinions of his have precedent,
and where that is the case, he advocates drawing on pre-modern sources
selectively in order to support his views. For example, in order to support the
doctrine that women have been prophets in Islam, he quotes pre-modern inter-
pretations. The process of quoting from opinions that have been rejected by
generations of subsequent scholars is a part of al-Óabash’s vision of renewing
Islam. And some initiatives of his are directly supported by the majority
opinion in pre-modern sources. This is the case with his recent initiative to
recognize women as muftiyas, which he is pursuing along with Syrian Grand
Mufti Amad Óassoun.
Yet, while the importance of women’s public role is emphasized by reformist
clerics, challenging women’s roles at home does not seem to be the source of
much activism. In fact, the majority interpretation of qawwāmūn as meaning
that men are in charge of the household and have the final say in disputes seems
to be shared between conservatives and reformists. In order to gain a clearer
insight into this branch of the Syrian reformist attitude towards women’s
household roles, I had extensive discussions on this topic with Muammad al-
Óabash’s sister Hudā al-Óabash, who teaches women’s lessons at the Zahra
mosque where Muammad preaches. She explained to me that, although there
should be consultation between the spouses, in the case of a real dispute the
husband’s word will prevail.28 Incidentally, her own husband is very supportive
of her role as a women’s mosque leader, and of all that that entails, including
her international travel while he remains at home.29 But whatever the egalitar-
ian nature of their personal relationship, the fact remains that in the rhetorical
realm she grants him the authority over final decision making, while expecting
him financially to support the household. They thus enact what they consider to
be the proper balance in the household. His right to the final say, plus his
financial maintenance, means that he is qawwām over her.
Although there are actual and important differences of opinion between the
clerics mentioned in this article, labeling them as “reformist” or “conservative,”
especially on the basis of their public advocacy for women’s issues, is more
problematic than it first appears. This is especially true in a society in which the
broad cultural understanding of women’s household roles may be shared even
across confessional lines. Furthermore, the public stances of Syrian reformist
and conservative clerics are influenced by a complex web of issues, including
response to the West, ties with the government, the changing conditions of
modern life (in which women work, travel, and attend university), their own
cultural milieu, and their quest for followers and support.
Conclusion
In both the pre-modern and the modern periods, the specific discourse on
women opens the door to the wider question of how sources are used and
appropriated in each age, by clerics of different schools of law and ideological
affiliations. While it may be tempting to view appropriation as a solely modern
phenomenon, it is, in fact, a method employed by both pre-modern and modern
scholars. Determining the sources for interpretation is not a simple matter of
Notes
1. This term is difficult to translate; it can mean either being a supporter of, or in
charge of, or both.
2. ‘Alī ibn Abī Talha, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-karīm (reconstructed from later sources);
ed. Rashid ‘Abd al-Mun‘aim (Cairo: Maktabat al-Sunna, 1991).
3. Ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī, Jāmi‘ al-bayān ‘ān tā’wīl āy al-Qur’ān, vol. 8, ed. Shākir and
Shākir (1950), 290.
4. Abū ’l-Layth al-Samarqandī, Bar al-‘ulūm (tafsīr al-Samarqandī), vol. 1, ed.
Al-Shaykh ‘Alī Muammad Mas‘ūd et al. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutūb al-‘Ilmīya,
1993), 351.
5. Scientific explanations based on physical evidence have often been used in
exegeses of this verse—this seems to be the earliest such explanation.
6. Abū Bakr Ibn al-‘Arabī, Akām al-Qur’ān, vol. 1, ed. Muammad Bajāwī
(Cairo: Īsā al-Bābī, 1967), 416.
7. Abū ’l-Hasan al-Māwardī, Adab al-dunyā wa’l-dīn, vol. 1, ed. ‘Abdallāh Amad
Abū Zayna (Cairo: Matba‘ Dār al-Sha‘b, n.d.), 22.
8. Al-Māwardī, Adab al-dunyā wa’l-dīn, 23.
9. Al-Māwardī, Adab al-dunyā wa’l-dīn, 23–24.
10. Al-Māwardī, al-Nukāt wa’l-‘uyūn, tafsīr al-Māwardī, vol. 1, ed. Sa‘īd b. ‘Abd
al-MaqÑūr b. ‘abd al-Raīm (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 1992), 480.
11. In this discussion, I am not attempting to ascertain the cause of these laws; rather
I am analyzing women’s deficient rationality as it is used to justify the laws in
post-formative jurisprudence. A strong case can be made that the cause of the
laws is entirely different from the rationales used to justify them. See Behnam
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