People v.

Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo

Facts:
Jonathan Cerbo allegedly shot Rosalinda Dy in the presence of his father, Billy Cerbo. An information for murder
was filed against Jonathan Cerbo. The daughter of Rosalinda Dy, as private complainant, executed a complaintaffidavit charging Billy Cerbo with conspiracy. The prosecutor then filed a motion to amend the information,
which was granted by the court. The information was then amended to include Billy Cerbo as one of the accused,
and a warrant of arrest was issued against him.
Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant arguing that it was issued without probable cause. The trial court
granted this motion, recalled the warrant, and dismissed the case against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed this
dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that no probable cause exists to merit the filing of
charges.
Ruling:
Yes. SC reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered the reinstatement of the amended information against Billy
Cerbo, stating that:
In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case or the guilt or innocence of Private Respondent
Billy Cerbo. We are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no
showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts
should not dismiss it for want of evidence, because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during
the trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in the proper scheme of
things in our criminal justice system should be clearly understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an oppressive exercise of government prosecutorial
powers do need to be protected when circumstances so require. But just as we recognize this need, we also
acknowledge that the State must likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious
irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a public prosecutors duties, courts ought to refrain from
interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the public prosecutors finding of probable
cause, the accused can appeal such finding to the justice secretary and move for the deferment or suspension of
the proceedings until such appeal is resolved.

It is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and
examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records
of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused. What is required, rather, is that the
judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements
of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very
least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot
rely solely and entirely on the prosecutors recommendation, as the Respondent Court did in this case. Although the
prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties and functions which in turn gives his
report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable
cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he
relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.

Paul G. Roberts, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996
I.

THE FACTS

Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board of Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. were
prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi Number Fever promotion by handlers of the supposedly winning 349 Pepsi
crowns. Of the four cases filed against the petitioners, probable cause was found by the investigating prosecutor only for
the crime of estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses.
On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with the trial court without anything accompanying it. A copy of the
investigating prosecutors Joint Resolution was forwarded to and received by the trial court only on 22 April 1993.
However, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary
investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in the records of the case as of 19 May
1993.
On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the Department of Justice seeking the
reversal of the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. They also moved for the suspension of the
proceedings and the holding in abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, the public
prosecutor also moved to defer the arraignment of the accused-appellants pending the final disposition of the appeal to
the Department of Justice.
On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1) denying, on the basis
of Crespovs. Mogul, the foregoing motions respectively filed by the petitioners and the public prosecutor, and directing
the issuance of the warrants of arrest after June 1993 and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent judge had not the slightest basis at all
for determining probable cause when he ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest which t he CA denied petitioners
application for writ of preliminary injunction but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition for mootness.
II.

THE ISSUE:

Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest without
examining the records of the preliminary investigation?
III. THE RULING
[The Court, in a 7-5-2 vote, GRANTED the petition. It SET ASIDE the decision and resolution of the CA, the
resolutions of the DOJ 349 Committee, and the order of respondent judge.]
1. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo vs.
Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer
arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved.
The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing of the aforementioned
motions [to suspend proceedings and issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment] at that stage but the filing
of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for review reversing the
Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor.
Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest
without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.
The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that the investigating
prosecutors certification in an information or his resolution which is made the basis for the filing of the information, or
both, would suffice in the judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing, among other
things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as
bases thereof. He did not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And
strangely enough, he made no specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest
after June 21, 1993. It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. But
then compliance with a constitutional requirement for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition,
conjecture, or even convincing logic.
The Supreme Court MAY NOT determine in this [sic] proceedings the existence of probable cause either
for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa.
The Court refused to reevaluate the evidence to determine if indeed there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants
of arrest in this case. For the respondent judge did not, in fact, find that probable cause exists, and if he did he did not
have the basis therefor. Moreover, the records of the preliminary investigation in this case are not with the Court. They
were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the DOJ in compliance with the latter's 1st
Indorsement of 21 April 1993. The trial court and the DOJ must be required to perform their duty.

G.R. No. 120330 November 18, 1997 Mendoza, J.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WENCESLAO

JAYSON
NATURE: Automatic review of CA's sentence of reclusion perpetua in accordance with Rule 124, 13
FACTS: In March 1991, Wenceslao Jayson was a bouncer at the Ihaw-Ihaw nightclub in Davao City. He was arrested
without a warrant after being pointed by eyewitnesses as the gunman in the killing of Nelson Jordan. Recovered from him
was a .38 caliber revolver with 4 live bullets and an empty shell. The gun and ammo were covered by a memorandum
receipt and mission order issued by Major Arquillano, Deputy Commander of the Civil-Military Operation and CAFGU
Affairs of Davao Metropolitan District Command. Said order authorized the Jayson to carry the gun and 12 rounds of
ammo for 3 months following certain restrictions: o Carrying of firearms is prohibited in places where people gather for
political, religious, social, educational, and recreational purposes, such as churches or chapels, carnival grounds or fairs,
nightclubs, cabarets (...) except when the personnel concerned is on official mission in such places for which he was
authorized to carry firearms. He was initially charged with murder but was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide after plea-bargaining. He was sentenced to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 12 years and 1 day of
reclusion temporal). He was subsequently charged with illegal possession of firearm (violation of PD 1866). Finding him
in good faith (believing that the mission order and memorandum receipt issued to him were valid), RTC sentenced him to
20 years imprisonment. CA increased the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:
W/N the warrantless arrest, search, and seizure were valid

Held:
YES. Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an warrantless arrest shall be
lawful when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it. In the case at bar there was a shooting. The policemen summoned to the scene of the
crime found the victim. Jayson was pointed to them as the assailant only moments after the shooting. In fact Jayson had
not gone very far. The arresting officers thus acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of
facts indicating that Jayson was the assailant. The search and seizure were hence incident to a lawful arrest as allowed
under Rule 126, Section 12.
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

Terry vs Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 88

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause,
when the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and dangerous.
Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street corner while repeatedly walking up and
down the same street. The men would periodically peer into a store window and then talk some more. The men also
spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the street. The officer believed that the Petitioner and the other
men were casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the men for questioning, and given the
nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of the men before questioning. A quick frisking of the
Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution (Constitution)?

Held. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that it is a reasonable search when an officer
performs a quick seizure and a limited search for weapons on a person that the officer reasonably believes could be
armed. A typical beat officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited from searching individuals that the officer
suspects to be armed.
Dissent. Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) dissented, reasoning that the majoritys holding would grant powers to
officers to authorize a search and seizure that even a magistrate would not possess.
Concurrence.
Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized an additional necessity of the
reasonableness of the stop to investigate the crime.
Justice Byron White (J. White) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized that the particular facts of the case, that
there was suspicion of a violent act, merit the forcible stop and frisk.

Discussion. The facts of the case are important to understand the Supreme Courts willingness to allow the search. The
suspicious activity was a violent crime, armed robbery, and if the officers suspicions were correct then he would be in a

dangerous position to approach the men for questioning without searching them. The officer also did not detain the men
for a long period of time to constitute an arrest without probable cause.