3.

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
G.R. No. L-38548 July 24, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PAULINO MABAG y LABADO alias "PAULING", defendant-appellant.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the death sentence imposed on Paulino Mabag y Labado by the Court of
First Instance of Samar, Branch IX in Criminal Case No. 497.
The facts as found by the trial court are:
That Engracia Baclas is the wife of Bartolome Baclas and Romulo Mendova is the
stepson of Bartolome. All of these three persons were arriving in a house located at Sitio
Biga, Bo. Mabag municipality of Basey, Samar. In the afternoon of November 7, 1973 at
about 5:00 o'clock, Engracia Logada went to the house of her sister-in-law, wife of one
Paran a brother of Bartolome, to visit her who had recently given birth. Returning home in
the same evening at about 8:00 o'clock she met on the way near their coconut plantation
five persons whom she did not recognize due to darkness. One of them asked her from
where she came and further asked her also if she had tuba for drink in the house. She
told him that there is none. When Engracia arrived home both her husband and her son
Romulo were already asleep. She woke up her husband and informed him that she met
on the way five persons whom she did not recognize.
A short while thereafter, these five persons arrived at their house. She recognized only
two of them namely, the accused herein Paulino Mabag who is known tip them as Pauline
and all his brother Enying. Pauline asked her for food but she answered that she did not
know if there is some food left by her husband as she did not eat her supper in the
house. Thereupon, Paulino Mabag asked instead for water to drink. The accused then
was carrying a pistol and his four companions had bolos and pistols. After giving them
water the accused herein demanded money for fare alleging that they were going to
Mindoro. She told him that they had no money but the accused herein insisted that they
had money as they are the only ones in the vicinity who are reputed to have money. Then
these three persons Paulino Mabag, his brother Enying and one whom she did not
recognize went upstairs. The other 2 persons stayed outside the house. Paulino Mabag
was carrying then a pistol while his brother was pointing a pistol at her, and the third
person whom she did not recognize also with a pistol was following her demanding
money.
Immediately, Bartolome and Romulo were hogtie y t se three persons and were pushed
to the door delivering them to the two companions who were outside the house. Then, the
three persons including the accused herein opened her trunk and found cash of P2.50.
After that, these three persons Paulino Mabag, Enying or Erning Mabag and the third
person whom she did not recognize dragged her inside the bedroom and once inside
each one of them alternated in having sexual intercourse with her. The first one to have
sexual intercourse with her was Enying Mabag followed by the accused Paulino Mabag

and lastly by the third person whom she did not recognize. Vainly, she struggled to free
herself from them.
After these dastardly acts, these three persons again demanded money threatening to kill
all of them if they fail to give them money. Hearing these threats Bartolome begged of the
two persons guarding him outside the house to allow him to go upstairs and talk to his
wife. Bartolome and Romulo still hogtied were allowed to go upstairs. Then Bartolome
said, 'Gracia (Engracia) give that money'. Which do you prefer our lives or money So,
Engracia got the money amounting to P789 in bills and coins wrapped in a cellophane
bag kept inside a rice bin This amount was their savings from their farm produce. After
receiving this amount the five persons divided the money among themselves. Aside from
this money they got also a bolo, 2 fighting roosters, clothes and pants and shirts, all in all
valued at P439. The total amount of the money and things robbed of them, therefore.
amounted to P1,228.
Engracia and Bartolome Baclas knows Paulino Mabag and his brother Enying or Erning
very well because they live in the same place. The accused used to go to their house.
After this the accused and his companions went away. For fear that these people will
come back the spouses went behind their house and stayed in the bushes until dawn.
In the morning following the robbery, Engracia reported the robbery and rape to the police
department and she submitted herself to a physical examination at the Basey Emergency
Hospital located at the poblacion of Basey and Dr. Erdulfo J. R. Canto who examined her
issued the following certificate:
PHYSICAL INJURIES REPORT
Living Case Report
No. _____
Nov. 8,
1973
NAME: Engracia Logada Baclas AGE: 59 SEX: F
STATUS: Married
Address: Sitio Vega, Bo. Mabini, Basey Occupation: Housekeeper
Alleged Case: allegedly robbed and raped.
Place of Alleged Commission: Sitio Vega, Bo. Mabini Basey, Samar.
(1) Date. Nov. 7, 1973 (2) Time: 8:30 PM
Place of Examination: Basey Emergency Hospital
(1) Date: Nov. 8, 1973 (2) Time: 9.- 30 AM
Purpose of Examination:

Requesting Officer: Chief of Police, Basey, Samar.

Husband: Bartolome Baclas
FINDINGS
1. Vaginal & Cervical smear Positive.
2. No appreciable laceration on Vulva.
3. Vagina easily admits 2 fingers.
xxx xxx xxx
CONCLUSION:
Healing time under normal conditions, barring complications both external and internal
not apparent during the period of examination, treatment and confinement will require
medical attention dance for a period of not more than___________________ DAYS
MONTHS.
(SGD.) ERDULFO J.R.
CANTO, M.D.
(Attending Physician)
Chief of
Hospita
l
(Title)
The accused Paulino Mabag after his arrest executed on November 22, 1973 an affidavit
marked in the trial as Exhibit "A" and is hereby reproduced:
STATEMENT TAKEN FROM ONE PAULINO LABADO MABAG, 22 YEARS OF AGE,
MARRIED, RESIDENT OF BO. VEGA, BASEY, SAMAR. IN THE OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF OF POLICE, ON THE 22ND DAY OF NOVEMBER 1973. AT ABOUT 2:00
O'CLOCK IN THE AFTERNOON MORE OR LESS, IN CONNECTION WITH A
ROBBERY IN BAND AND MULTIPLE RAPE INCIDENT.
X................................................................X
After having been appraised of your constitutional rights you are not compelled to answer
questions profounded in this investigation for your answers to questions in this
investigation might be used in any Court of Justice in the Philippines, for or against you.
QUESTION Do you fully understand?
ANSWER Yes I do.
Q Will you tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

A Yes I will.
Q What is your name, age, and other personal circumstances?
A PAULINO MABAG Y LABADO, 22 years of age, married, resident of
Bo. Vega, Basey, S mar, farmer by occupation.
Q On the 7th day of November 1973, at about 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon more or less, where were you?
A I was at the house of one EGOY TALISAY, dine in a drinking spree
together with ERNING MABAG, WILLY MABAG, EGOY TALISAY, and
three persons who were unknown to me.
Q How many gallons of tuba were consumed by you and what time did
you stop drinking?
A We were able to consume two gallons of tuba and we stop our drinking
spree at about past six o'clock in the evening more.
Q After consuming that two gallons of tuba where did you go then?
A After those two gallons of tuba was consumed by us I then decided to
go home and was about to leave when this two ERNING MABAG and
WILLY MABAG hold me by my hand and told me not to leave for
according to them we must have to buy more tuba, and while we were
already on the path, this man Erning Mabag told me to accompany them
while I was then at gunpoint, and further inquired from me the house of
this ENGRACIA Gasyang that fearing them I then told them where the
house of this woman was located arriving at the yard of this house they
commanded me to call the occupants, that I heeded them too, and when
the husband of this Gasyang opened the door I asked a cooked rice but
was just downstairs but the other one who was unknown to me got inside
the house, then grabbed the man and hogtied him and his son
downstairs then demanded money, and three persons ERNING MABAG,
WILLY MABAG and a companion of ours who was also unknown to me
took turns in having sexual intercourse with the old woman, and after
raping the said woman they told her that if she will not give them money
they will kill all of them, that this woman handed all her money, and on
the yard they shared the amount, handling me only five pesos and told
me not to ten anybody regarding the incident.
Q Do you mean to say that all who were dined on that g spree went into
the house of this Engracia alias Gasyang?
A Only Egoy Talisay, did not go with us.
Q While dined in a spree did this persons claimed what they had done
and submitted?

A No I did not hear any conversation regarding that matter.

Q So you were just forced, and threatened to go with them?
A Yes, I was.
Q How about your brother was he with you, this INYING LABADO?
A No he was not with us.
Q Do you personally know this men ERNING MABAG and WILLY
MABAG?
A I know them only by the given name, but their family name was only
known to me during our drinking spree when they inquire from me my
family name.
Q So you had just known that your family name and this two Erning and
Willy, were the same?
A Yes on that time only.
Q During this investigation were you fairly treated?
A Yes I was besides that this is my own free and voluntary will to expose
what I know.
Q Will you sign this affidavit to attest the truth?
A Yes will just affix my thumbprints for I do not know how to write.
IN WITNESS HEREOF I have hereunto affixed my signature this 22nd day of November
1973, at Basey, Samar, Philippines.
(Thumb
marked
)
PAULIN
O
LABAD
O
MABA
G
Affiant
Witness to Mark:
(SGD) MANUEL L. TARCE
(SGD.) TARCELA AGUILAS

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 22nd day of November 1973, at Basey,
Samar.
(SGD.)
FELIX
J.
DACUT
Municip
al
Judge
Judge Felix J. Dacut, Municipal Judge of Basey, Samar before whom this was sworn to
testified that he read the contents of this affidavit in the dialect to the accused herein who
understood the same and affirmed the truth of its contents. The defense admits this
Exhibit "A" and in fact the defense introduced the name in evidence and marked the
same as Exhibit "1". The accused himself on the witness stand admitted that the affidavit
marked Exhibit "A" is his own affidavit and that the Justice of the Peace Felix Dacut read
to him the contents of the same in the dialect and understanding the same affirmed the
truth of its contents in an oath taken before the Judge.
Although five persons are mentioned in the decision as the perpetrators of the crime, only Paulino Mabag
was apprehended and after he had waived his right to a pre investigation in the Municipal Court of Basey,
Samar, the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance where the following information was filed:
The undersigned, First Assistant Provincial Fiscal, accuses PAULINO MABAG y
LABADO, of the crime of Robbery in Band With Multiple Rape, defined an penalized
under Article 293 in relation to paragraph 2 of Article 294 and Article 296 of the Revised
Penal Code. committed as follows:
That on or about November 7, 1973, at about 8:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at
So. Biga, Bo. Mabini, Municipality of Basey, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and confabulating together with Inying Labado, Erning Mabag, Willie
Mabag Cajote John Doe and Peter Doe, who are still at large, while all six accused were
armed with guns and bolos which they provided themselves for the purpose, with
deliberate intent of gain aforethought and with violence against and intimidation of
person, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously enter the dwelling of one
ENGRACIA BACLAS, and once inside, demand, take, steal, and carry away personal
properties valued at FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE PESOS (P439.00) and cash in the
amount of SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE PESOS (P789.00), all in the total amount of
ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHT PESOS (P1,228.00), without and
against her consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said Engracia Baclas in the
amount last stated, and accused in pursuance to their criminal conspiracy and during or
on the occasion of the robbery, accused Erning Mabag, John Doe and Willy Mabag
Cajote by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with Engracia Baclas successively, one after the other,
without and against her consent.
That in the commission of the crime the following aggravating circumstances are present:

1. Dwelling
2. Use of an unlicensed firearm
3. Nocturnity
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Basey Samar, November 29, 1973.
After due trial where the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of Engracia and
Bartolome Baclas and Judge Felix J. Dacut plus Exhibits "A" and "B" (the medical certificate) abovequoted, while the evidence for the defense consisted of the sole testimony of the accused plus Exhibit "A"
which was also marked as exhibit "1" the court rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Paulino Mabag y Labado guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crane of Robbery with Rape defined under Art. 294, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code and penalized under Art. 335, par. 3 of the same code, and
considering the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and that the crime was committed
in band, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, hereby sentences said
accused to DEATH and to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law. The accused is
also sentenced to indemnify the spouses Bartolome Baclas and Engracia L. Baclas in the
amount of P1,228.00 and to pay the costs of this case. Atty. Felisberto Avestruz counsel
de oficio is hereby awarded P200.00 as his fees.
At this juncture we have to make certain observations concerning the extrajudicial confession of the
accused which has been marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution and Exhibit "1" for the defense. It was
executed on November 22, 1973, when Art. IV, Sec. 20 of the Constitution was already in effect and which
reads:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiates the free wig shall be used against hint Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shag be inadmissible in evidence. "
It is noted that although Paulino was informed of this constitutional right to remain silent, he did not clearly
and unequivocably waive it (see People vs. Caguioa, et al., G.R. No. L38975, Jan. 17, 1980), nor was he
informed of his right to counsel. Paulino's counsel has made passing statements in his brief that the
accused "gave his statement without benefit of counsel" (p. 2) and "gave his statement regarding a very
serious offense without the benefit of counsel" (p. 6) but does not urge its inadmissibility for the simple
reason that it has also been used as a defense exhibit. Moreover, the guilt of the accused can be
established independently of the extrajudicial confession. In fact, appellant's counsel does not seem to be
fully convinced of his client's innocence for his brief contains the following prayer: "that judgment be
rendered reversing the decision dated February 19, 1974 rendered by the Lower Court thereby acquitting
the accused-appellant and/or in the alternative that at least the said Decision be modified."
The appellant argues that the trial court erred (1) in not giving credence to the testimony of the accused;
and (2) in imposing the death penalty.

Anent the first assignment of error, the appellant asserts that being the only one of his companions known
to the offended parties and the only one apprehended by the authorities, the witnesses for the
prosecution, namely: Bartolome and Engracia Baclas, imputed to him all the acts alleged to constitute the
special complex crime charged. Moreover, the Court disregarded his disclaimer of participation despite
the fact that even without benefit of counsel he readily executed an affidavit in the police headquarters in
all candor and simplicity admitting his presence at the scene of the crime because he was compelled at
gunpoint to show the malefactors the residence of the offended parties.
We find the appellant's assignment of error devoid of merit. We have no reason to question the lower
court's appraisal of the testimony of the witnesses, both for the prosecution and the defense. We cannot
accept the appellant's suggestion that Bartolome and Engracia Baclas were influenced by the facts that
he was the only one known to them and the only one apprehended by the police. He was positively
Identified by Bartolome and Engracia as one of the robbers who entered their house on the night of
November 7, 1973. And there are a number of acts definitely and positively ascribed by the couple to
Paulino who was the spokesman of the group. It was Paulino who asked for food who asked for water
when Engracia said she did not know if there was food in the house; who asked for money allegedly to go
to Mindoro; who said (when Engracia denied having any money) "You don't have money. We have spied
you and we found out you are monied people here." Further it was Paulino, armed with a pistol, who
entered the house together with his brother Enying and another companion also armed with a pistol who
with the help of his brother Enying and their other companions hogtied Bartolome Baclas and Romulo
Mendova and brought them outside the house guarded by their other two companions in the yard who
was the second person to have sexual intercourse with Engracia and who helped pin down the shoulders
of Engracia when the other two robbers took their turns in raping her. It was Paulino who ordered the
robbers in the yard to kin Bartolome and Romulo Mendova; who took the money from Engracia; who took
the fighting cocks, wristwatch, bolos, and other personal belongings of the couple valued at P439.00; and
who gave the amount of P2.00 to Engracia when the latter complained that she had no more money to
buy petroleum. Taken in their totality, these acts indubitably show the degree of participation of the
appellant in the perpetration of the crime.
Bartolome and Engracia swore that they saw the faces of the three robbers who entered the house very
clearly as the place was well-lighted by two wick lamps, one placed at the stairs and the other in the sala
of the house. None of the robbers wore a mask or tried to hide his face to avoid recognition.
Furthermore, Bartolome and Engracia could not have been taken in their Identification of Paulino as one
of the robbers. They know him very well for Paulino married a woman from their Sitio Biga and took up his
residence there. His voice is familiar to the couple as he used to go to their place and strike up
conversations with them. Paulino himself admitted in court that he knows the spouses Bartolome and
Engracia personally and had known them for quite a long time In fact, according to Paulino his house is
only two kilometers away from the house of Bartolome and Engracia.
There is no motive on record that could have impelled the spouse to implicate Paulino who even testified
that before the incident he was in good terms with them.
The raping of Engracia is not a tall tale. The findings of the physician who examined Engracia at the
Basey Emergency Hospital in the morning of November 8, 1973, disclosed, 11 vaginal and cervical smear
positive. "That Engracia was in fact raped has come from the mouth of Paulino himself who claims to
have seen Erning Mabag, a person he did not recognize, and Willy Mabag raping her.
Paulino's defense may be described as one of "confession and avoidance." He admitted his presence at
the scene of the crime but disclaimed any participation in it for he claimed he was coerced into

accompanying the robbers-rapists. However, his disclaimer cannot prevail over the positive evidence for
the prosecution and necessarily his first assignment of error has to be rejected.
As to the second assignment of error, the appellant s that even assuming, without admitting, that he is
guilty of the offense charged, he cannot be meted the death penalty because Arts. 293, 294, par. 2 and
296 of the Revised Penal Code which are mentioned in the information probe only the period of reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua when the robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape, among other crimes. [Presidential Decree No. 767 which took effect on August 15, 1975 has
amended Art. 294, par. 2 of the Re Penal Code by adding the following: "PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT
WHEN THE ROBBERY AM ACCOMPANIED WITH RAPE IS COMMITTED WITH THE USE OF A
DEADLY WEAPON OR BY TWO OR MORE PEP SONS THE PENALTY SHALL BE RECLUSION
PERPETUA TO DEATH." This amendment cannot of course be given retroactive effect.]
But the applicable provision is Art. 335 of the Revised-Penal Code the relevant portion of which reads
"Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty isreclusion perpetua to death and this is the provision mentioned in the dispositive portion of
the lower court's decision quoted above. The fact that Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code is not
mentioned in the information is unimportant and did not deprive the appellant of his constitutional right to
be informed of the accusation against him. As former Chief Justice Moran said:
It has been held, however, that if the above requirement [Rule 110, Sec. 7, Rules of
Court] is not complied with and no name has been given to the offense alleged to have
been committed, the defect is merely of form which does not prejudice the substantial
rights of the defendant. This is especially so where the facts pleaded are clearly
constitutive of a specific offense. In such cases, the real nature of the crime charged is
determined not by the title of the complaint, nor by the specification of the provision of the
law alleged to have been violated but by the facts recited in the complaint or information.
This is so because from a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern
to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in
no way aids him in his defense on the merits ... The real question is not did he commit a
crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts
allegedly in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no
consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law
denominates the crime which those acts constitute ... In the designation of the crime, the
accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete
defense. he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever
for the protection of his substantial rights ... It is the province of the court alone to say
what the crime is and what it is named. Accordingly, the accused will not be permitted 'to
stand by and watch the fiscal while he guesses as to the name which ought to be a lied to
the crime with which he charges the accused and then take advantage of the guess if it
happens to be wrong, while the acts and omissions upon which that guess was made
and which are the only real foundation of the charges against him are clearly and fully
stated in the information,' Otherwise, it would 'change the battleground in criminal cases
from issues to guesses and from facts to fancy.' (IV Moral , Rules of Court, pp. 22-23,
1970 ed.)
That the lower court did not err in applying Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code is shown by the decision of
this Court in People vs. Obtinalia, G.R. No. L-30190, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 651, where we said:
The accused challenge the of the lower court's judgment sentencing each of them to the
penalty of death. It is claimed that having been accused of the crime of robbery in band

with rape, which is period by reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua by Article 294 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, they can not be sentenced to the
penalty provided under Article 335 of the same Code, as amended by Republic Act 4111.
There is no merit in the contention. As pointed out by the trial Court, if a rape alone, when
committed by two or more persons, is penalty with death, it would be highly illogical and
irrational to hold that when such rape is committed with the addition of a robbery, the
offense should only be punishable with life imprisonment. Thus the reclusion perpetua
Prescribed by Article 294 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, for robbery with rape, must be
understood as limited to cases where there is a single rapist, and that in those where the
rape on occasion of the robbery is committed by two or more persons, the death penalty
Provided by Republic Act No. 4111 must apply. All the more so because the crime was
committed with the aggravating circumstances of its being perpetrated in the dwelling of
the complainant victims, and with attendant ignominy, since the rapes were done in the
presence of the woman's husband. (At pp. 661-662.)
The commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and band
without any mitigating circumstance. There is no showing that nocturnity was purposely sought to
facilitate the commission of the crime.
The writer of this opinion together with Justices Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., Ramon C. Fernandez,
Juvenal K. Guerrero and Pacifica P. de Castro are for the affirmance in toto of the lower court's decision.
Justice A. Melencio-Herrera concurs with the aforementioned member of the Court and adds the
observation "that even in a prosecution for Robbery with Rape, which can be prosecuted de oficio, the
offended woman should still file complaint for Rape as a jurisdictional requirement (see 4, Rule 110; Art.
344, Revised Penal Code), and Out of consideration for her. But if the rape victim herself testifies in open
Court, as in this case, the propose behind the requirement should be deemed as having been met, it
being apparent that the victim as in a complaint filed by her, has decided to expose in a public trial the
outrage on her person." Justice Claudio Teehankee concurs in the imposition of the death penalty but
believes that not one but three death penalties should be meted to the accused. He has filed a separate
opinion to this effect. Justice Antonio P. Barredo's vote is "that appellant Paulino Mabag should be
sentenced to three death penalties because as I have already explained in previous opinions, it is absurd
to read Article 294 (2) of the Revised Penal Code without taking into account the latest amendment of
Article 335. The construction of laws must never result in absurdity." Justice Felix V. Ma Makasiar has
filed a dissenting opinion to the effect that the accused should be convicted and sentenced to death for
three separate crimes Of robbery with rape. However, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando following his
opinion in People vs. Carandang, L-31012, August 15, 1973, 52 SCRA 259, believes that the appropriate
penalty is reclusion perpetuaand so does Justice Ramon C. Aquino who has filed a dissenting opinion.
It thus appears that nine members of the Court are for the imposition of the death penalty in varying
numbers, while two members are for reclusion perpetua only.
WHEREFORE, for lack of the necessary votes the decision appealed from is hereby modified in that the
accused shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua but is affirmed in all other respects. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74145 June 17, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ZOSIMO CRISOLOGO, alias "AMANG", defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Marcelino G. Agana III for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur in Criminal Case No. 92 (76)
convicting the defendant of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to the death penalty, and ordering him
to indemnity the heirs of Martin Francisco the sums of P35,000.00 for loss of life, P25,000.00 for funeral
expenses, P30,000.00 for loss of earnings and P20,000.00 for moral damages.
On 5 May 1976, a criminal complaint was filed by the Station Commander with the Municipal Court of
Magsaysay, Davao del Sur against the accused Zosimo Crisologo alias "Amang," a deaf-mute, for
robbery and homicide alleged to have been committed on 1 May 1976 between ten to eleven o'clock in
the evening in Calamagoy, Poblacion Magsaysay, Davao del Sur.
The following information was subsequently filed by the Provincial Fiscal against the accused on 16
September 1977:
That on or about the 1st day of May, 1976, in the Municipality of Magsaysay, Province of
Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with a bladed weapon, with violence against and intimidation
upon persons, and with intent of gain, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rob Martin Francisco of one (1) "Seiko 5 Actus" wrist watch valued at Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos and a two battery flashlight valued at Thirty (P30.00) Pesos in
the total amount of Four Hundred Thirty (P430.00) Pesos, to the damage and prejudice of
the said owner in the amount aforesaid and on the same occasion, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack[ed] and stab[bed] the
said Martin Francisco with the same bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon him wounds
which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstance of:
(a) disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his age; and
(b) night time.
Digos, Davao del Sur, Philippines, September 15, 1977.
On 12 December 1977, arraignment was set. The accused was allegedly informed of the charge against
him through sign language by Special Policeman Alejandro Munoz a childhood acquaintance. Mr. Munoz
subsequently entered a plea of guilty on behalf of the accused. Upon objection of counsel, however, this
plea was disregarded and arraignment was rescheduled until such time as the Court could avail of the
services of an expert in the sign language from the school of the deaf and dumb.

On 26 June 1979 the Court through another presiding judge, upon insistent plea of defense counsel for a
sign language expert to assist the accused, again reset arraignment as no expert in sign language was
available. The School for the Deaf and Dumb in Pasay City was sent a copy of the court order to enable it
to furnish the court with an expert in sign language. No such expert was made available.
On 9 November 1982, or after five years from the date of filing of the information, and order through still
another presiding judge was entered directing that a representative of the School of the Deaf and Dumb
in Bago Gallera, Talomo District, Davao City be availed of to enable the accused to intelligently express
his understanding of a plea of guilty or not guilty.
Apparently no sign language expert or representative ever arrived.
On 6 April 1983, the accused through a counsel de oficio waived the reading of the information and
pleaded not guilty. Trial proceeded without any evidence being presented on his part. Finally, on 10
February 1986, without the services of an expert in sign language ever being utilized at any stage of the
proceedings, the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and
sentenced to die by electrocution. Executive clemency was recommended, however, in view of the
accused's infirmity and his nearly ten-year detention as a suspect.
Counsel for the accused and the Solicitor-General now ask for the reversal of the judgment of conviction
due to the failure of the trial court to safeguard the accused's right to due process of law and the
insufficiency of the purely circumstantial evidence presented to overcome the constitutional presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused.
We find their position to be well-taken.
The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute,
the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and who could also have communicated the
accused's own version of the circumstances which led to his implication in the crime, deprived the
accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accused's
final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust circumstances.
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or
otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to
due process of law.1 The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of
the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him2 in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.
In Terry v. State, 3 where a deaf-mute accused of manslaughter was not provided with an interpreter
despite repeated requests from counsel, it was held:
... The Constitution of this state expressly provides that an accused has a right to be
heard by himself and counsel, also, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation;
against him, and, further to be confronted by the witnesses, who are to testify against
him. In constructing this constitutional provision it needs no discussion in deciding that all
this must be done in a manner by which the accused can know, the nature and the cause
of the accusation he is called upon to answer, and all necessary means must be
provided, and the law so contemplates, that the accused must not only beconfronted by
the witnesses against him, but he must be accorded all necessary means to know and
understand the testimony given by said witnesses, and must be placed in a condition

where he can make his plea rebut such testimony, and give his own version of the
transaction upon which the accusation is based. This the fundamental law accords, and
for this the law must provide. These humane provisions must not, and cannot, be
dependent upon the ability, financial or otherwise, of the accused ... [This] constitutional
right ... would be meaningless and a vain and useless provision unless the testimony of
the witnesses against him could be understood by the accused. Mere confrontation of the
witnesses would be useless, bordering upon the farcical, if the accused could not hear or
understand their testimony. So, also, as to the nature and cause of the accusation. In the
absence of an interpreter it would be a physical impossibility for the accused, a deafmute, to know or to understand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and,
as here, he could only stand by helplessly, take his medicine, or whatever may be coming
to him, without knowing or understanding, and all this in the teeth of the mandatory
constitutional rights which apply to an unfortunate afflicted deafmute, just as it does to
every person accused of a violation of the criminal law. In other words the physical
infirmity of this appellant can in no sense lessen his rights under the Constitution, and, in
the proper administration of its laws, this great and sovereign state must and will accord
the means by which its citizens, humble and afflicted though they may be, shall receive
all the rights, benefits and privileges which the Constitution, laws, regulations, and rules
of practice provide.4
The basic constitutional infirmity alone in the conduct of the case against the accused is, in our candid
assessment, fatal to the judgment of conviction meted out against him.
Aside from the unfair setting and circumstance in which the accused was convicted, insufficiency of
evidence to warrant a finding of guilty beyond reasonable doubt also leads this Court to set aside the
conviction. The following events and circumstances are relevant in this regard:
On 1 May 1976, at past eight o'clock in the evening, the accused and the deceased were last seen
walking away together from a sari-sari store where they had been drinking tuba steadily in apparent
harmony. At around eleven thirty of the same evening, the accused suddenly appeared in the house of
Wilson Evangelists, who was then with relatives butchering a pig for the baptism of his child the following
day. The accused was panting and trembling, and told Wilson Evangelista in sign language that he had
come from Calamagoy, at the side of the canal, where there were persons fighting on the road.
Evangelista later testified that he noticed the accused wearing a fatigue shirt with a blood-stain on it, and
carrying a flashlight.
On 2 May 1976, Patrolman Reynaldo Pinto, Jr., was told to investigate a case of robbery with homicide
with the deceased Martin Francisco as victim, and to arrest the accused on the basis of Wilson
Evangelista's statement that he saw the accused with a bloodstained shirt the previous evening when the
crime could conceivably have occurred. Patrolman Pinto did so that very day. Several days later, he was
also able to recover the deceased's wristwatch and flashlight from the house of the accused's father
allegedly through the assistance of the accused himself.
Upon being asked who killed the deceased, the accused allegedly admitted to Pat. Pinto in sign language
that it was he by making gestures which Pat. Pinto interpreted to mean that the accused had been stoned
by the deceased, thus impelling the accused to stab the latter. This confession, however, was not
included in Pat. Pinto's affidavit as he allegedly forgot to tell the investigator. He also acknowledge his
failure to notify the accused of his right to counsel before interrogation and investigation due to difficulty in
conveying the matter by sign language.

Based on the above circumstances and evidence, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, reasoning as follows:
The prosecution proved and which this Court finds that the accused was the last person
to be seen with the deceased, and that he was drunk when he left the store of
prosecution witness Salome del Socorro together with the deceased. The Court also finds
that the accused's clothes had bloodstain on it when he went to the house of prosecution
witness Wilson Evangelista at 11:30 in the evening of May 1, 1976, the night when the
deceased was robbed and killed. The seiko 5 actus wrist watch and the flashlight colored
red and white both belonging to the deceased Martin Francisco were recovered from the
possession of the accused and which recovery was done with his help, The unexplained
possession by the accused of the properties belonging to the deceased proved that he
took these things unlawfully. The fifteen (15) stab wounds which were inflicted on the
deceased, many of which were fatal wounds proved that a much younger [man] than the
deceased could have inflicted the same. In the case at bar, the accused is very much
younger than the deceased who was 63 years old at the time of his death, ... frail and
without physical attributes, unlike the accused who looks healthy, robust and young ...
While it is true that Pat. Pinto and his companion were able to get a statement from the
accused without telling him in advance of his constitutional rights, due to difficulty in
explaining them in sign language, the accused's statement by sign language was coupled
with his voluntary help in recovering the things belonging to the deceased. Furthermore,
the court considered and took note of the plea of guilty which was entered into by the
accused on his first arraignment by sign language through Mr. Alejandro Munoz who is
an associate of the accused in their younger days. (Emphasis supplied.)
We find the trial court's decision essentially lacking in that degree of certainty in reason and conscience
which is necessary to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As held in U.S. v. Lasada, 5 "By
reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge
but moral certainty is required, and this. certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to
constitute the offense." 6 Facts must be presented methodically and meticulously, contradictions must be
clarified, and gaps and loopholes in the evidence must be adequately explained "to the end that the
court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, the innocent [not] suffer and the guilty [go] unpunished." 7
Such standards, we believe, have not been met in this case.
Patrolman Pinto, the interrogator to whom the accused allegedly confessed the details which led to a
presumption that lie killed the deceased, expressly admitted that he could have misinterpreted the
gestures made by the accused as he had only a slight knowledge of sign language. Furthermore, the
same witness did not give fully credible replies when questioned about the possibility that he was ordered
to proceed to the house of accused's father to get the incriminating watch and flashlight which were
delivered there earlier by a certain Nicolas.
The bloodstain on the accused's shirt could conceivably have come also from the fighting that the
accused told Wilson Evangelista he had witnessed. Considering that the deceased sustained fifteen (15)
stab wounds, twelve (12) of which could have separately caused death, according to the medical officer
who examined the body of the deceased, the presence of a single bloodstain on the front of accused's
shirt hardly supports the conclusion reached by the trial court, especially when related to the high degree
of intoxication appreciated against the accused. As testified to by the medical officer who, as stated,

examined the body of the deceased, the stab wounds could also have been inflicted by several assailants
using different weapons. That the accused looked much more robust than the deceased and thus could
have committed the crime does not by itself deserve the weight and consideration that the trial court gave
to it. Furthermore, the rubber slippers and eyeglasses found near the scene of the crime were never
Identified or explained.
The trial court's appreciation of the plea of guilty earlier entered for the accused by Special Policeman
Alejandro Munoz, which the first presiding judge earlier discarded, is regrettable, to say the least,
especially when considered with the admittedly limited knowledge in sign language on the part of Pat.
Munoz and in relation to the investigator's own admission that the accused was never informed of his
right to counsel. 8
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed. The accused is acquitted, on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Court hereby orders his immediate release
from confinement, unless he is legally detained for some other cause or offense.
SO ORDERED.

4. RIGHT TO HAVE A SPEEDY, PUBLIC, IMPARTIAL TRIAL

SPEEDY TRIAL
JOHN JOSEPH LUMANLAW y BULINAO, versus Hon. EDUARDO B. PERALTA JR., in His Capacity
as
Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
(Branch 13), Manila,
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

V
exatious, oppressive, unjustified and capricious delays in the arraignment violates the constitutional right
to speedy trial and speedy case disposition, particularly when the accused is detained. Under the
circumstances of the present case, mandamus is a proper remedy for relief from prolonged
detention. This Court safeguards liberty and will therefore always uphold the basic constitutional rights of
the people, especially the weak and the marginalized.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Mandamus [1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking (1) the
dismissal of the Information filed against Petitioner John Joseph Lumanlaw y Bulinao; and (2) his release
from the Manila City Jail.

The Facts

Culled from the parties pleadings are the following undisputed facts.

Petitioner Lumanlaw was apprehended by the Western Police District nearSan Diego
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, on the evening of November 26, 2002, for illegal possession of a dangerous
drug. He was charged in an Information[2] filed with Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, as follows:
That on or about November 24, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, custody
and control one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero
point zero oneone (0.011) grams of white crystalline substance known as
SHABUcontaining methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. [3]

A Commitment Order[4] was consequently issued by Presiding Judge Luis J.Arranz directing the
detention of petitioner in the Manila City Jail and setting the latters arraignment on January 8, 2003. On
even date, petitioners counsel manifested [5] his intention to file a motion for preliminary
investigation. Because of the Manifestation, the arraignment was deferred to February 21, 2003. The
aforesaid Motion[6] was filed together with a Petition to Reduce Bail[7] on January 17, 2003.

The resolution of these matters was overtaken by Judge Arranzs retirement from public service.
Thus, the arraignment scheduled for February 21, 2003, had to be postponed. This Court designated
herein respondent, Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., as acting presiding judge of Branch 13, Regional Trial
Court, Manila, in Administrative Order No. 27-2003 issued on February 18, 2003.[8]

On March 26, 2003, the newly designated acting presiding judge issued an Order [9] setting the
arraignment of petitioner on April 23, 2003. On the latter date, the arraignment was reset to June 25,
2003, due to the public prosecutors absence.[10]

On June
25,
2003,
petitioners
counsel
received
the
lower
courts
Order
granting Lumanlaws Petition to Reduce Bail and denying his Motion for Preliminary Investigation for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period. [11] In the same Order, the trial court set petitioners
arraignment on August 6, 2003.

The arraignment was postponed again, this time due to the absence of petitioners
counsel. According to him, he requested the court to proceed with the arraignment, with the public

defender assisting the accused, but that respondent judge denied the request on the ground that
petitioner was already represented by a counsel de parte.[12] The trial court then re-scheduled the
arraignment onSeptember 24, 2003.[13]

In what was beginning to be a pattern of laxity, the September 24 arraignment was likewise
postponed in view of the scheduled meeting of presiding judges with accredited newspaper publishers
and was thus reset to October 1, 2003.[14]

On the latter date, respondent judge issued the following Order: [15]

In view of the draft Order dated August 6, 2003 which impeded the Produce
Order for the arraignment and pre-trial conference this afternoon of defendant
John Joseph Lumanlaw in relation to Criminal Case No. 02-208426, the
arraignment and pre-trial conference are hereby reset on December 10, 2003 at
2:00 oclock in the afternoon, on the date amenable to Atty. Ernesto Delfin, as well
as the defendant.

Again, the arraignment did not occur on December 10, 2003, because petitioner had not been
brought to the court by the wardens of the Manila City Jail. According to the trial courts Order,[16] there
was no proof of service on the Manila City Jail. The arraignment was thus reset to March 1, 2004.

Notably, a year had passed since the filing of the Information, yet Lumanlaw remained
uninformed of the charges against him, while continuing to be in detention and despair all throughout that
period of limbo. Owing to this insufferable state of affairs, petitioners counsel manifested his intention to
file a motion to dismiss on account of the violation of his clients right to a speedy trial. [17] Accordingly, an
Urgent Motion to Dismiss[18] was filed on December 19, 2003. The Motion was heard on February 20,
2004, but was promptly denied by the trial court. The arraignment was reset yet again to March 17, 2004.
[19]

The arraignment did not take place, however, because the accused was not produced in court by
the jail wardens concerned. It turned out that the trial court had not issued a produce order to the
Manila City Jail. Another resetting was ordered for April 16, 2004.[20]

Now frustrated with the repeated postponements, petitioner filed a Second Urgent Motion to
Dismiss[21] on March 22, 2004. Relying on the provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
mandating that arraignment should be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquired
jurisdiction over the accused, petitioner argued that the protracted delay of his arraignment violated his
constitutional right to speedy trial.[22]

On April 16, 2004, the RTC could not proceed with the arraignment. What transpired on that date
is evident from its Order:[23]

Inasmuch as the Trial Prosecutor has just furnished a copy of her Comment
dated April 12, 2004 to the defense counsel, as prayed for by Atty. Ernesto Delfin,
counsel for accused John Joseph Lumanlaw in Criminal Case No. 02-208426, he
is GRANTED five (5) days from today to submit his Reply. After which, the
pending Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss dated March 21, 2004 filed on March
22, 2004 (page 33, Record in Criminal Case No. 02-208426) will be deemed
submitted for resolution.

Meanwhile, without prejudice to the resolution of the pending motion, the

arraignment and pre-trial conference of John Joseph Lumanlaw are
hereby tentatively scheduled on May 26, 2004 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.

On May 26, 2004, the arraignment could not be conducted, again because of the Manila City Jails
failure to bring petitioner to the court despite notice.[24] On the same day, his counsel received [25] the trial
courts Order[26] dated May 3, 2004, denying his Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss. The arraignment was
reset to June 16, 2004.[27]

On this date, it was respondent judges absence that caused the postponement of the arraignment,
which was reset to July 21, 2004.[28] But on that date, no hearing was conducted in Branch 13 because of
the ongoing semestralinventory of cases in respondent judges regular sala, Branch 17.[29]

Hence, the present Petition.[30]

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

Whether or not the failure of public respondent to conduct the arraignment of the
petitioner despite the delay of one (1) year, nine (9) months and four (4) days
constitute undue and unjustifiable delay in violation of his constitutional right to
speedy trial.
Whether or not such undue and unjustifiable delay would warrant the dismissal of
the Information filed against the petitioner.
That should the decision by the Honorable Supreme Court be one finding merit in
this Petition, whether or not the said decision is binding upon the newly appointed
presiding judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Manila, as successor of public
respondent.[31]

On the other hand, respondent asks whether the Petition for Mandamus should be given due
course. [32]

On the whole, the issues may be reduced to the following: 1) whether there was a violation of the
right to speedy trial, warranting a quashal of the Information against petitioner; and 2) whether mandamus
is the proper remedy.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue:
Right to Speedy Trial

Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in which the accused are formally informed of
the charges against them.[33] The proper conduct of the arraignment is provided in Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the provision shows that arraignment is not a mere
formality, but an integral part of due process. [34] Particularly, it implements the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them and their right to speedy
trial.
On this point, petitioner argues that, by respondents failure to act expeditiously on his
arraignment, his right to speedy trial was violated. He points out the fourteen postponements that
resulted in his intolerable detention for almost two years. Moreover, he cites Section 2 of Supreme Court
Circular No. 38-98 (implementing Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as The Speedy Trial Act of
1998), which provides that arraignment shall be held within thirty days from the date the court acquired
jurisdiction over the accused.

On the other hand, respondent counters that there were no capricious and oppressive delays that
would justify a dismissal of the Information. The Office of the Solicitor General points to the participation
of petitioner himself in the protracted proceedings, such as his filing of a Motion for Preliminary
Investigation and his counsels absence from one of the scheduled hearings. [35]

Speedy Trial Construed

The thirty-day period invoked by petitioner was construed in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v.
How.[36] It was held in that case that the period was not absolute. Certain delays were allowed by law and
excluded from the computation of the time within which trial must commence. The Court ruled that those
exclusions should reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of speedy trial is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. [37] It held further that courts must strive to
maintain a delicate balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial, on
the one hand; and, on the other, the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals.
Indeed, judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum. They must contend with the realities of
everyday life. Thus, a sensible assessment of their conduct must consider several factors, rather than a
mere mathematical calculation of periods that have elapsed between stages. Jurisprudence has set forth
the following guidelines:
x x x. [T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy
trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays;
or
when unjustifiedpostponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test
used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial,
or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the
delay, reason for the delay, the defendants assertion or non-assertion of his right,
and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered.[38]

Reasonable Postponements

It should be stressed that petitioner never acquiesced to the seemingly endless postponements of
the arraignment. He asserted his right to speedy trialtwice, but was denied by respondent in both
instances. Considering that petitioner has been under detention since December 2002, we need not
belabor the prejudice, distress, and anxiety he suffered as a result of the delayed arraignment.
We concede that the bases for some of the delays were completely sound, such as the retirement
of Judge Arranz[39] and the manifestation of petitioner that the latter would be filing a Motion for
Preliminary Investigation.[40] Those matters were manifestly not intended to delay the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 02-208426.
The delay caused by Judge Arranzs retirement may be deemed a normal part of the ordinary
conduct of court business and was not necessarily unreasonable. The second ground was the right of the
accused accorded by Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. [41] Verily,
petitioners request for a preliminary investigation before arraignment was well-advised, in view of the rule
that failure to do so would constitute a waiver of the right. [42] Thus, it has been held that though the
conduct of a preliminary investigation may hold back the progress of a case, such investigation is
necessary so that the defendants right will not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
[43]

Unjustified Delay
This Court reviewed the other reasons for the postponements in this case, but finds them far from
being reasonable. There were fourteen postponements in all. Going over the causes for the delays, we
see the lack of earnest effort on the part of respondent to conduct the arraignment as soon as the court
calendar would allow. Most of the postponements could have easily been avoided if he had been more
keen on respecting and upholding petitioners constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition.
Given the length and the unreasonableness of the majority of the delays, a violation of the right of
petitioner to speedy trial becomes manifest. Almost two years[44] elapsed from the filing of the Information
against him until the filing of this Petition; incredibly, he has not been arraigned. An arraignment takes, at
most, ten minutes of the courts business and does not normally entail legal gymnastics. It consists simply
of reading to the accused the charges leveled against them, ensuring their understanding of those
charges, and obtaining their plea to the charges. A prudent and resolute judge can conduct an
arraignment as soon as the accused are presented before the court.
In fact, by fixing a period of only thirty days from the filing of the information to the conduct of an
arraignment, RA 8493 recognizes that this fundamental right should and can be done with minimal
delay. For this reason alone, we are astonished that the court a quo could not complete such a simple
but fundamental stage in the proceedings. The protracted delay became all the more oppressive and
vexatious when viewed from the perspective that the liberty of the accused was being curtailed for the
entire duration.

Postponement Due to
Absence of Counsel
It will be recalled that the arraignment set for August 6, 2003, was postponed by the trial court
due to the absence of the counsel of petitioner. [45] The latter sought to proceed with the arraignment by
requesting the assistance of the public defender as counsel de oficio, but the request was denied on the
flimsy ground that the accused already had a counsel de parte. We find no legal basis for the trial courts
action.
The appointment of a counsel de oficio in the absence of the defendants counsel de parte is not
prohibited,[46] not even by the Constitution,[47] especially when the accused themselves request that
appointment. In fact, the court has a mandatory duty to appoint a counsel de oficio when the accused
have no counsel of choice at the time of their arraignment.[48] People v. Serzo[49] held thus:
x x x [A]n accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be
represented either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his
right to be represented by counsel is immutable, his option to secure the services of
counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance the privilege
to retain a counsel of choice against the state's and the offended party's equally
important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict
the accused's option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he
cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines
to represent the accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.[50]
Like other personal rights, the right to a counsel de parte is waivable, so long as 1) the waiver is not
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law; and 2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently made. [51]
Applying these principles, it would have been more prudent for respondent judge to have
appointed a counsel de oficio for purposes of arraignment only. This course of action became more
compelling in the instant case when petitioner himself requested the appointment. [52] To be sure, he
would not have been prejudiced by that action, provided there was a proper observance of Rule 116 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 8 of this rule, before proceeding with the
arraignment, the court is mandated to give the appointed counsel de oficio reasonable time to consult with
the accused as to the latters plea.[53]
Clearly, respondent judges postponement of the arraignment on August 6, 2003, had no
substantial basis. Thus, the postponement, initially caused by the absence of petitioners counsel,
became unreasonable and ultimately attributable to respondents inflexibility as regards contingencies.
Responsibility of Judges
in Minimizing Delay
The foremost cause for the lengthy delay in this case was the repeated failure of the jail wardens
to bring the accused to court. No less than four court settings, [54] spanning seven months, were
postponed on this ground alone. To be sure, this recurring circumstance was caused, in different
instances, by the failure of the court personnel to issue the produce order on time and by the dereliction of
the jail wardens. Remarkably, although respondent judge was justified in deferring the arraignment until
the accused was presented,[55] the problem could have been easily averted by efficient court
management.

In his role as administrator, respondent should have supervised his clerk of court to ensure a
timely service of the produce order on the wardens of the Manila City Jail. Judges must keep a watchful
eye on the level of performance and conduct of the court personnel under their immediate supervision,
who are primarily employed to aid in the administration of justice. Judges who set the pace for greater
efficiency, diligence and dedication, could prompt their personnel to be more diligent and efficient in the
performance of official duties. For certain, leniency in the administrative supervision of court personnel
must be avoided.[56]
We stress the need to remind judges to exhibit more diligence and efficiency in the performance
of their judicial duties to avoid loss of faith and confidence in the administration of justice. Rule 3.09 of
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires them to organize and supervise the court personnel to
ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business x x x. Additionally, Section 5(d) of Rule 135 confers
upon every court the power to control the conduct of its ministerial officers and of all other persons who in
any manner are connected with a case before it.
Respondent did not exercise his prerogatives in administering speedy justice. Instead, he was
content with issuing reminders[57] that miserably failed to resolve the problem expeditiously. We can only
conclude from the distinct circumstances of the case that he failed to assert actively his authority to
expedite the proceedings.
Instead of being proactive and steering the course of the proceedings with deliberate dispatch,
respondent tended to be passive and reactive by allowing the pace of the proceedings to be dictated by
the listlessness of the parties, his staff, and the jail wardens. Judges should be more deliberate in their
actions and, within the bounds of law, make full use of their authority to expedite proceedings while
continuing to respect the rights of parties to ventilate their respective causes fully.
Indeed, judges are required to dispose of the courts business expeditiously, in accordance with
Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which we quote:
A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases
within the required period.
This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to act promptly on their cases. Delay
in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it into disrepute.[58]
In the light of the numerous and unreasonable delays in the arraignment of petitioner, the sought
for dismissal of the Information filed against him is in order.

Second Issue:
Propriety of a Petition for Mandamus

Respondent maintains that mandamus is not the proper remedy, because hedid not neglect his
duties. Considering the above findings of inordinate delay, respondents contention evidently has no leg to
stand on.

It is established that a writ of mandamus may be issued to control the exercise of

discretion[59] when, in the performance of duty, there is undue delay that can be characterized as a grave
abuse of discretion resulting in manifest injustice. [60] In view of our finding of unwarranted delays in the
conduct of the arraignment of petitioner, he has indeed the right to demand -- through a writ of mandamus
-- expeditious action from all officials tasked with the administration of justice. Thus, he may not only
demand that his arraignment be held but, ultimately, that the information against him be dismissed on the
ground of the violation of his right to speedy trial.

Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the
Constitution.[61] Besides, it has long been established in this jurisdiction that the writ of mandamus is
available to the accused to compel a dismissal of the case. [62]

Respondent argues for the dismissal of the instant Petition on the ground that petitioner did not
move for a reconsideration of the trial courts Order datedMay 3, 2004. Respondent insists that a motion
for reconsideration is a prerequisite to a mandamus petition, because the former remedy is plain, speedy,
and adequate in the ordinary course of law.[63] Indeed, his contention expresses the general rule, but is
not impervious to exceptions.

In the face of extraordinary and compelling reasons, it has been held that the availability of
another remedy does not preclude a resort to a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
These reasons arise when, among others, the assailed order issued with grave abuse of discretion is null,
[64]
when the available remedy will not afford expeditious relief, [65] and when a motion for reconsideration
will be useless.[66]

The instant case falls under these exceptional cases. To begin with, the numerous and
unreasonable postponements displayed an abusive exercise of discretion. The delays were ordered in
total disregard of the constitutional right of petitioner. In fact, the Orders denying his motions to dismiss
did not even bother to explain the reasonableness of the bases for the postponements. The Order
dated February 20, 2004, contains only this general statement:
Pending resolution of certain incidents as chronicled by the Court in open court,
and given the Trial Prosecutors objections thereto lifted from the record as to why the
arraignment and pre-trial conference of the [petitioner] John Joseph Lumanlaw y Bolinao
were not scheduled forwith (sic) as expected by counsel for the defense, the Court opted
to DENY the Urgent Motion to Dismiss dated December 17, 2003 in Criminal Case No.
02-208426.[67]

After enumerating all the causes for the postponements, the Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss
was denied by respondent in the Order dated May 3, 2004, in words that were just as vague, as shown
below:

Based on the foregoing chronological backdrop, there were causes that justified
the suspension of the arraignment that shall be excluded in computing the period for
arraignment per Section 1 (g), Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, thusly:

Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme

Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from
the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill of
particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall
be excluded in computing the period.

Accordingly, the Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss dated March 21, 2004 from
defense counsel in Criminal Case No. 02-208426 must be and is hereby
DENIED. x x x.[68]

The Orders did not even discuss why the postponements were justified, or which of them could
be excluded from the computation of the prescribed period. Absent any discussion of these matters,
baseless was the court a quos conclusion that there was no violation of petitioners right to speedy
trial. A veritable display of capriciousness cannot be countenanced when weighed against an immutable
right protected by the Constitution.

As further aggravation, respondent did not exert any effort to expedite the arraignment even after
petitioner had filed two urgent motions to dismiss. Indeed, there was basis for the latters belief that filing
a motion for reconsideration would have been only an exercise in futility.[69]

Respondent also contends that the instant Petition should be dismissed for disregarding the
hierarchy of courts. This Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly
with it.[70] In the interest of speedy justice, the Court deemed it best to take cognizance of the present
Petition, notwithstanding the hierarchy of courts. Remanding the legal issues to the Court of Appeals
would have only exacerbated the violation of petitioners rights.
It is the policy of this Court not to deny a writ of mandamus on purely technical matters, if a party
would be deprived of substantive rights. Procedural rules should not be strictly enforced when their
enforcement would result in a miscarriage of justice. This principle holds, especially when a petition is
meritorious and the trial judge clearly violated petitioners constitutional right. The protection of our
peoples civil liberties overwhelms all rules of procedure. These rules are mere tools for facilitating the
attainment of justice. As explicitly provided in the Rules of Court itself, they shall be liberally construed in

order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.[71]

Let it be known that this Court will not shirk from the responsibility -- nay, the duty -- to set aside
all obstacles to the fortification of every citizens constitutionally enshrined rights. We will not condone or
give our imprimatur to the sluggish pace of the proceedings below. The Court has the duty to safeguard
liberty; hence, it will always uphold the basic constitutional rights of our people, especially the weak and
the marginalized.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Criminal Case No.

02-208425-26 pending

before Branch 13 of the Manila Regional Trial Court isDISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby
ordered RELEASED from the Manila City Jail, where he is currently detained, unless he is being held for
any other lawful cause.

PUBLIC & IMPARTIAL TRIAL

G.R. No. L-30104 July 25, 1973

HON. GREGORIO. N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manila, and FRANCISCO
LORENZANA,petitioners,
vs.
HON. FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, EDGARDO CALO and
SIMEON CARBONNEL, respondents.
Andres R. Narvasa, Manuel V. Chico and Felipe B. Pagkanlungan for petitioners.
Rafael S. Consengco for respondent Calo, et al.
Respondent Judge in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:
The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition, one which thus far has remained
unresolved, is the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to public trial. 1 More specifically, did
respondent Judge commit a grave abuse of discretion in stigmatizing as violative of such a guarantee the
holding of the trial of the other respondents 2inside the chambers of city court Judge Gregorio Garcia
named as the petitioner. 3 That was done in the order now impugned in this suit, although such a
procedure had been agreed to beforehand by the other respondents as defendants, the hearings have
been thus conducted on fourteen separate occasions without objection on their part, and without an iota
of evidence to substantiate any claim as to any other person so minded being excluded from the
premises. It is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of
haste or intentional secrecy. For reasons to be more fully explained in the light of the facts ascertained

the unique aspect of this case having arisen from what turned out to be an unseemly altercation, force
likewise being employed, due to the mode in which the arrest of private petitioner for a traffic violation was
sought to be effected by the two respondent policemen thus resulting in charges and counter-charges
with eight criminal cases being tried jointly by city court Judge in the above manner we rule that there
was no transgression of the right to a public trial, and grant the petition.
It was alleged and admitted in the petition: "In Branch I the City Court of Manila presided over by
petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by appropriate informations all dated January 16, 1968, eight
(8) criminal actions against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco
Lorenzana, as follows: a. Against Edgardo Calo (on complaint of Francisco Lorenzana) (1) Criminal Case
No. F-109192, also for slight physical injuries; (2) Criminal Case No. F-109192, alsofor slight physical
injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F-109193, for maltreatment; b. Against Simeon Carbonnel (id.)
(1)Criminal Case No. F-109197, for maltreatment; (2) Criminal Case No. F-109196, for slight physical
injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F-109198, for light threats; (c) Against Francisco Lorenzana (on
complaint of Calo and Carbonnel) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109201, for violation of Sec. 887 of the
Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer); and (2) Criminal Case No. F-109200, for
slander."4 The above was followed by this recital: "The trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly held
on March 4, 1968, March 18, 1968, March 23, 1968, March 30, 1968, April 17, 1968, April 20, 1968, May
4,1968, May 11, 1968, June 1, 1968, June 15, 1968, June 22, 1968, June 29, 1968, August 3, 1968 and
August 10, 1968. All the fourteen (14) trial dates except March 4 and 18, and April 17, 1968 fell on a
Saturday. This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and
Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be
terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal
trial days (Monday, Wednesday and Friday), Saturday was agreed upon as the invariable trial day for said
eight (8) criminal cases." 5Also this: "The trial of the cases in question was held, with the conformity of the
accused and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia." 6 Then came these allegations in the
petition: "During all the fourteen (14) days of trial, spanning a period of several months (from March to
August, 1968), the accused were at all times represented by their respective counsel, who acted not only
in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was
only one (1) day when Atty. Consengco, representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. This
was on April 20, 1968. But at the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, and said respondent
cross-examined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. In any case, no pretense has been
made by the respondents that this constituted an irregularity correctible on certiorari. At the conclusion of
the hearings the accused, thru counsel, asked for and were granted time to submit memoranda.
Respondents Calo and Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael Consengco, submitted a 14-page
memorandum with not less than 35 citations of relevant portions of the transcript of stenographic notes in
support of their prayer for exoneration, and conviction of petitioner Lorenzana in respect of their
countercharges against the latter. It is worthy of note that up to this late date, said respondents Calo and
Carbonnel had not objected to or pointed out any supposed irregularity in the proceedings thus far;
the memorandum submitted in their behalf is confined to a discussion of the evidence adduced in, and the
merits of the cases." 7 It was stated in the next petition:
"The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on September 23, 1968. This was postponed to
September 28, 1968 at the instance of Atty. Rafael Consengco, as counsel respondents Calo and
Carbonnel, and again to October 1, 1968 at 11 o'clock in the morning, this time at the instance of Atty.
Consengco and Atty. Francisco Koh who had, in the meantime, also entered his appearance as counsel
for respondents Calo and Carbonnel. The applications for postponement were not grounded upon any
supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings." 8
Mention was then made of when a petition for certiorari was filed with respondent Judge: "Early in the
morning of October 1, 1968, Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel, thru their counsel, Atty. Rafael S.

Consengco, filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application
for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction ... [alleging jurisdictional defects]." 9 Respondent
Judge acting on such petition forthwith issued a restraining order thus causing the deferment of the
promulgation of the judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was an order from him "declaring that
'the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated, adversely affecting their 'right to
a free and impartial trial' [noting] 'that the trial of these cases lasting several weeks held exclusively in
chambers and not in the court room open the public';" and ordering the city court Judge, now petitioner,
"to desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated the decisions he may have rendered already
in the criminal cases (in question) ... pending in his Court, until further orders of this Court.'" 10
A motion for reconsideration proving unavailing, petition on January 28, 1969, elevated the matter to this
Tribunal by means of the present suit for certiorari and prohibition. In its resolution of February 3, 1969,
respondents were required to answer, with a preliminary injunction likewise being issued. As was to be
expected the answer filed by respondent Judge on March 11, 1969 and that by the other respondents on
March 19, 1969 did attempt to justify the validity of the finding that there was a failure to respect the right
to a public trial of accused persons. Neither in such pleadings nor in the memorandum filed, although the
diligence displayed by counsel was quite evident, was there any persuasive showing of a violation of
constitutional guarantee of a public trial, the basic issue to be resolved. Rather it was the mode of
approach followed by counsel Andres R. Narvasa for petitioners that did manifest a deeper understanding
of its implications and ramifications. Accordingly, as previously stated, it is for us to grant the merits
prayed for.
1. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this petition, as set forth at
the outset, explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. So it is, as
likewise made clear, under present dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one constitutional provision
that needed only a single, terse summation from the Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights,
Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed by him: "Trial should also be
public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner." 11 It would have been
surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any discussion, much less a debate.
It was merely a reiteration what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as the
Jones Law. 12 Earlier, such a right found expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act
of the then government of this country as an unincorporated territory of the United States. 13Historically as
was pointed out by Justice Black, speaking for the United States Supreme Court in the leading case of In
re Oliver: 14 "This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in
[the] English common law heritage. 15 He then observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure, "but it
likely evolved long before the settlement of the [United States] as an accompaniment of the ancient
institution of jury trial." 16 It was then noted by him that there, "the guarantee to an accused of the right to
a public trial appeared in a state constitution in 1776." 17 Later it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791. 18 He could conclude his historical survey "Today almost without
exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open
to the public." 19 Such is the venerable, historical lineage of the right to a public trial.
2. The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains. The Constitution guarantees
an accused the right to a public trial. What does it signify? Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is
an instance where language is to be given a literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words
employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the
manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such
attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be
shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded
further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any
impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation the importance of this

right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is
deemed embraced in procedural due process. 20 Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the
courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It the usual course
of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There is the well recognized
exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as
"offensive to decency or public morals."21
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and of the city court
Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held. Did that suffice to investigate
the proceedings as violative of this right? The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that
the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would
reduce the number of those who could be our present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any
transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others.
Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the
requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no
matter with what offense he may be charged." 22
Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in
chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent policemen. What was said
by former Chief Justice Moran should erase any doubt as to the weight to be accorded, more
appropriately the lack of weight, to any such objection raised. Thus: "In one case, the trial of the accused
was held in Bilibid prison. The accused, invoking his right to a public trial, assigned the procedure thus
taken as error. The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record that the accused
offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was held, his right is deemed
waived." 23 The decision referred to, United States v. Mercado, 24 was handed down sixty-eight years ago
in 1905.
It does seem that the challenged order of respondent is far from being invulnerable.
3. That is all that need be said as to the obvious merit of this petition. One other objection to the conduct
of the proceedings by the city court Judge may be briefly disposed of. Respondent Judge would seek to
lend support to an order at war with obvious meaning of a constitutional provision by harping on the
alleged abdication by an assistant fiscal of his control over the prosecution. Again here there was a failure
to abide by settled law. If any party could complain at all, it is the People of the Philippines for whom the
fiscal speaks and acts. The accused cannot in law be termed an offended party for such an alleged failure
to comply with official duty. Moreover, even assuming that respondent policemen could be heard to raise
such a grievance, respondent Judge ought to have been aware that thereby no jurisdictional defect was
incurred by the city court Judge. As was so emphatically declared by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cariaga v.
Justo-Guerrero: 25 "The case below was commenced and prosecuted without the intervention, mediation
or participation of the fiscal or any of his deputies. This, notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court was
not affected ... but the court should have cited the public prosecutor to intervene ... ." 26
4. There is much to be said of course for the concern displayed by respondent Judge to assure the reality
as against the mere possibility of a trial being truly public. If it were otherwise, such a right could be
reduced to a barren form of words. To the extent then that the conclusion reached by him was motivated
by an apprehension that there was an evasion of a constitutional command, he certainly lived up to what
is expected of a man of the robe. Further reflection ought to have convinced him though that such a fear
was unjustified. An objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city courts would have gone far in
dispelling such misgivings. The crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as
criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense
atmosphere. As a result the attendance of the general public is much more in evidence; nor is its

presence unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the occupants of such courts are not chosen
primarily for their legal acumen, but taken from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the
pulse of public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would be denied whatever solace
and comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of the alert court alert to his
demeanor and his rulings, would run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change
matters, just because, as did happen here, it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a city court judge
rather than in the usual place that the trial took place.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted nullifying, setting aside, and declaring bereft of
any legal force or effect the order of respondent Judge Felix Domingo November 29, 1968 for being
issued with grave abuse of discretion. The writ of prohibition sought by petitioner is likewise granted,
commanding respondent Judge or any one acting in his place to desist from any further action in Criminal
Case No. 74830 of the Court of First Instance of Manila other than that of dismissing the same. The
preliminary writ of injunction issued by this Court in its resolution of February 3, 1969 against the
actuation of respondent Judge is made permanent. With costs against respondent policemen Edgardo
Calo and Simeon Carbonnel.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ,
GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZIOLO AMA, BALDWIN BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO
CORCOLON, and PEPITO KAWIT, accused-appellants.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
. . . a plot seemingly hatched in hell . . .
This was how Judge Harriet O. Demetriou [1] of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, in her
132-page Decision dated March 11, 1995 now before us on review, emphatically described the Allan
Gomez-Eileen Sarmenta rape-slay that drew strong condemnation from an outraged populace in the
middle of 1993. After a protracted and grueling 16-month trial, she found all those charged therewith,
namely: Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez (hereafter the Mayor), George Medialdea, Luis and Rogelio
Corcolon, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit (appellants herein), guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape with homicide on seven counts and sentenced each one of them:
. . . to suffer the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the seven offenses or a total of
seven reclusion perpetua for each accused. In addition, the Court hereby orders all the accused to jointly
and severally pay the victims respective families the following sums by way of civil indemnity:
1.

the sum of P3,432,650.00 representing the actual damages sustained by the

Sarmenta family;

2.

the sum of P3,484,000.00 representing the actual damages sustained by the Gomez
family;

3.

the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages sustained by the Sarmenta family;

4.

the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages sustained by the Gomez family;

5.

the sum of P191,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses incurred by the
Gomez family; and

6.

the sum of P164,250.00 for litigation expenses incurred by the Sarmenta family.

As to the antecedents, appellants all appear to agree that the trial court, in the very words of
counsel[2]who prepared the consolidated brief for the Mayor and Medialdea, made a very detailed

summary of both the prosecution and defense evidence. [3] This Court can thus conveniently provide a
briefer but fairly accurate account of the respective versions of the State and the defense on the basis of
the trial courts summary, rather than combing the heap of evidence presented by both sides.
The prosecutions version of the events on that horrible night of June 28, 1993 was based mainly on
the recollections of its star witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan (a member of appellant
Sanchez security team) co-conspirators turned state witnesses. Both admitted having taken part in the
abduction of Eileen and Allan, but denied any personal involvement in the rape of Eileen and the twin
killings that followed. Heres their story.
Medialdea (then the Deputy Chief of the PNP Calauan), together with Centeno who was driving an
ambulance, fetched witness Malabanan at his residence in the early morning of June 28, 1993 on the
pretext that they will apprehend one Rodolfo Calva alias Tisoy a notorious gun runner and drug pusher
in the locality. Next to be picked up was Ama in Barangay Masiit, then Luis Corcolon (hereafter, Luis) in
Barangay Mabacan. On board the ambulance, the five (5) men made stopovers in Barangays Imok and
Wawa until they headed back for Calauan at past 7:00 oclock in the evening, upon orders of Luis.
At the Shell gas station in the poblacion of Calauan, the five (5) men met and picked up Rogelio
Corcolon (hereafter, Boy), Kawit and Brion, then they proceeded to Los Baos. Along the way, Luis
announced to the group that the real purpose behind the Los Baos trip is to take a pretty young lass long
desired by the Mayor and offer her to him as a gift. Luis, to satisfy his companions curiosity, even
guaranteed that her beauty will make their saliva drip.
Not for long, the ambulance arrived at the U.P. Los Baos grounds. Witness Centeno drove the
ambulance around the campus at a snails pace while Luis scoured the area with watchful eyes. As the
search inside the campus proved fruitless, Luis then ordered Centeno to slowly drive out of the university
compound and to stop upon reaching the vicinity of the Agrix complex. Luis, Boy, Ama, Brion and Kawit
alighted from the ambulance and went inside the Agrix complex. Witness Centeno overheard Medialdea
informing the Boss, via the radio, that they were already in the area. The Boss was the Mayor.
Inside the Agrix complex is a restaurant called Caf Amalia. Parked in front of that establishment
was a Tamaraw van. Eileen and Allan were its passengers, both occupying the front seats. She was
wearing a T-shirt, white shorts and rubber shoes. Armed with guns, Luis and Boy approached Eileen and
Allan, forcibly took the two and loaded them at the back of the van. All the appellants boarded the van
while Centeno and Malabanan stayed in the ambulance. Both vehicles then headed for Erais Farm
situated in Barangay Curba, owned by the Mayor.
As soon as the group arrived at the farm, the two (2) captives were brought down the van. Eileen
was gagged by a handkerchief and her hands, like Allan, were tied. A white towel was wound around
Allans mouth. The Mayor, then wearing a jogging attire, emerged from the resthouse and asked the
group: My children, whats the problem? To this Luis respondent: Mayor, this is our gift to you, the girl
youve been longing for. Shes really beautiful. But whos that man? asked the Mayor. Eileens
companion, boss. Medialdea replied. We brought him along to avoid complications, he continued.
The two youngsters were then brought inside the resthouse where Eileen was taken to the Mayors
room. Allan was badly beaten up by Luis, Boy, Ama and Medialdea and thereafter thrown out of the
resthouse. Kawit followed-up by striking Allans diaphragm with the butt of an armalite, causing Allan to
fall against a cement box. Brion thought Allan was already dead, but Kawit said: :His death will come
later.
Meanwhile, Centeno, while waiting for further orders, joined the Mayors personal aides Edwin
Cosico and Raul Alorico watch television at the adjacent resthouse. Alorico told Centeno that the Mayor
had been eagerly waiting for the group and worried that they will not arrive.
At around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, a crying Eileen was dragged out of the resthouse by Luis and
Medialdea her hair disheveled, mouth covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied and stripped of her
shorts. The Mayor, clad merely in white polo, appeared and thanked Luis and Medialdea for the gift. I
am through with her. Shes all yours, the Mayor uttered in contentment. When asked what will happen
to Allan, Medialdea assured the Mayor that they will also kill him for full measure. Eileen and Allan were

then loaded in the Tamaraw van by the appellants and headed for Calauan, followed closely by the
ambulance.
En route to Calauan, Centeno, who was driving the ambulance, noticed the van swaying from side to
side. Then he heard gunfire coming therefrom. The van pulled over whereupon Kawit dragged Allan,
whose head was already drenched in blood, out of the vehicle onto the road and finished him off with a
single gunshot from his armalite. The ambulance and van then sped away.
The next destination was a sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74 of Barangay Mabacan. It
was here that Luis announced that its tiime for the group to feast on Eileen (the exact words of Luis were
Turbohin na rin natin ang tinurbo ni Boss). She was laid at the back of the van, with her hands and legs
being held by the appellants while waiting for their turn. Then the gang-rape began. The first to ravish
Eileen was Luis, then Medialdea, Boy, Ama, Brion and finally, Kawit. Bewailing the helplessness of her
situation, Eileen pleaded, in between sobs and whimpers, for the torture to stop. However, her tears for
compassion fell, weak and ineffective, upon the insensitive brutes. Kawit invited Centeno to join the
sexual fiasco but the latter refused as he cannot, in conscience, bear the bestiality being committed on
Eileen who appeared to be dead. After Kawits turn, Eileen knelt on the seat of the van and begged for
her life. Unmoved, Luis muted Eileens cried by forcing an object into her mouth and then fired his baby
armalite at her. Centeno was thereafter ordered to get rid of Eileens dead body. Moments later, all eight
(8) men boarded the ambulance and proceeded to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileens
remains behind. Along the way, Centeno and Malabanan watched in dismay as Luis, Boy, Medialdea,
Ama, Brion and Kawit savored the nights escapade, to their sickening delight. Appellants and
Malabanan were then brought to their respective homes by Centeno.
June 29, 1993 and the day following were tense moments for the group. In the morning of June 29,
Medialdea and Centeno fetched Malabanan, Luis and Ama. They were going to Barangay Imok to make
it appear that they were conducting some police operations in that area. Upon reaching Barangay Imok,
the group saw Allans body which they dumped a few hours earlier. Luis, Medialdea and Malabanan
alighted from the ambulance, whereupon Luis ordered Centeno to drive back to the municipal hall.
Boy Corcolon, who was at the municipal hall, informed Ama that a dead female loaded inside a
Tamaraw van was found in Barangay Mabacan. Ama then radioed the PNP Chief of Calauan, Major
Cao, who at that time was summoned by the Mayor. Major Cano thereafter arrived and ordered one
SPO2 Melencio Nuez to investigate the matter. Meanwhile, Centeno received word that he was to fetch
Malabanan, Luis and Medialdea in Barangay Imok. After picking up the three (3), Centeno drove the
ambulance to Barangay Mabacan where the dead Eileen was found.
Eileens body lying inside the Tamaraw van was a pitiful sight. Her face bore a gunshot wound; a
handkerchief was stuffed in her mouth; her T-shirt was rolled up revealing her breasts; and her panty was
rolled down on one of her feet still with rubber shoes on. Medialdea covered Eileens exposed private
parts by fixing her T-shirt and underwear and by placing a sackcloth over her lower body. The group then
escorted the van with Eileens body in it, to the UP Los Baos police station where student milled around
and identified the cadaver to be Eileen indeed. Later on, the van carrying Eileen, as well as Allans body,
was brought to the Calauan municipal hall. There, Centeno saw a prisoner named Arnold cleaning the
van.
Meanwhile, Malabanan, Ama and Medialdea, on June 29, went to the site (Bgy. Imok) where Allans
body was found, started asking residents about the incident and were able to retrieve an empty armalite
shell. Malabanan thereafter handed the empty shell to Major Cao at the police station. The three (3)
men and one SPO3 Rizaldy Belen, sometime in the afternoon of the same day, visited the Mayor at his
house in Bay, Laguna. Medialdea informed the Mayor of the presence of people from the CIS, NBI and
press in the locality. The Mayor flared up and blamed them for not using their heads. But he later on
assured them that he could fix the problem in less the amount of a brand new car.
The following day, June 30, Medialdea, upon the Mayors directive, handed a pair of white walking
shorts to Major Cao. When Malabanan asked Medialdea whose pair of shorts was that, the latter replied
that it was the short of Eileen which the Mayor wanted to be delivered to Major Cao.

That same day of June 30, Centeno went to see the Mayor at his house in Calauan about his worries
over reports that the driver of the ambulance involved in the rape-slay was being hunted down. The
Mayor gave Centeno P2,000.00 and advised him to keep silent or better yet, to go into hiding. Centeno
did hide himself until CIS agents accosted him at the Divisoria market on August 10, 1993. As to
Malabanan, he, Medialdea and Ama were brought to the PNP Sta. Cruz Command to shed light on the
cleaning of the Tamaraw van.
Coming now to the defense, each of the appellants had an alibi to tell and sought to put the blame on
Kit Alqueza, the son of a feared general (Dictador Alqueza) who earned the monicker Barako from the
local residents.
The Mayor claimed that he was at the residence of his mistress Elvira in Bay, Laguna in the morning
of June 28, 1993. They left for Makati City at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon thereafter proceeded to
San Pablo City at around 4:00 p.m., left that city at 7:30 p.m. and then returned to Elviras house in Bay at
around 10:00 p.m. He and Elvira retired at around 12:30 in the morning. He woke up at 5:00 a.m.
Jogging was his favorite form of exercise, but foul whether prevented him from running that morning. His
three (3) children with Elvira greeted him at around 6:30 a.m. before heading for school. He took his
breakfast and lunch at Elviras house.
Medialdea, Ama and Malabanan arrived between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. and informed the Mayor of
the rape-slay in which Kit Alqueza was the prime suspect. This made the Mayor very angry, for which he
ordered a thorough investigation of the incident to avoid any whitewash. "I will not hesitate to have the
perpetrators of this crime killed (by electric chair), whether a generals son in involved or not, son of a
bitch!, he blurted. The Mayor then advised appellants not to worry if they were really innocent and that
the primordial concern is that a full investigation be conducted.
The Mayor then went to his residence in Calauan. At around 4:00 p.m. of that same day (June 29),
he sent his driver Mario Puyales to Barangays Masiit and Balayhangin to inquire from the residents about
the crime. Puyales returned at around 7:00 p.m. and informed the Mayor that a card gambler was able to
retrieve a pair of white shorts lying near the national highway in Barangay Balayhangin. Puyales was
sent back to that barangay to advise the residents thereof to keep the shorts at their fence near the
highway as it may later on aid the on-going investigation.
In the morning of June 30, 1993, the Mayor, with some companions, jogged towards the direction of
Barangay Mabacan and at the same time inquired from residents whether they noticed anything unusual
on the night of June 28, 1993. A certain Mang Torio told the Mayor that he found a pair of maong
pants lying at the side of the road but left if there. After inspecting the dirty maong pants, the Mayor
instructed Mang Torio to keep the pants as the former will send someone back to pick it up.
Eventually, the Mayor got hold of the pairs of white shorts and maong pants. The shorts was clean,
with complete beltloops and without any tear. He then ordered his driver Puyales to send the articles to
Medialdea for safekeeping. But during the trial, the Mayor, when shown the shorts and pants, claimed
that they are quite different from the articles he got hold of previously. The maong pants shown to him
by Mang Torio was of a darker shade of blue. As to the white shorts, it was the same pair he gave to
Medialdea, but now it is torn and has some missing beltloops.
Based on his own investigation, the Mayor came to know that Kit Alqueza is a feared and dangerous
student of the university, being a member of an elite fraternity in the campus and a generals son at
that. The Mayor later informed Congressman Tingzon of Kits probable involvement in the
crime. Congressman Tingzon, in turn, disclosed that Kit, his nephew-in-law (the congressmans wife is the
sister of Gen. Alquezas wife), was hiding in his house and that the legislator will call Gen. Alqueza in
Davao City to discuss the matter.
The Mayor also testified that he closely coordinated with Major Cao in investigating the case. This
included frequent evening conferences with Malabanan, medialdea and Ama who were members of Major
Caos investigation team.
Subsequently, the Mayor was requested to facilitate the surrender of Luis and Boy Corcolon to Camp
Crame since the CIS suspected them of being involved in the crime together with Kit. The Corcolon

brothers, accompanied by the Mayor, peacefully surrendered to CIS operatives in the afternoon of July
12, 1993.
On August 10, 1993, the Mayor received an anonymous phone call advising him that he would better
leave the country because he was to be arrested in three (3) days time. He refused to heed the advice
because he had nothing to do with the crime. And so he was apprehended on August 13, 1993 at his
Calauan residence and brought to Camp Vicente Lim where he was presented to the media. There he
saw Centeno and Malabanan who did not greet him. General Salimbangon ordered the two (2) witnesses
to implicate the Mayor. The general then ordered that the Mayor be handcuffed as he is the rapist. You
son of a bitch, Salibangon. You framed me up, the Mayor cursed.
The Mayor denied having given Centeno advice and P2,000.00 pocket money on June 30, 1993. It
was only in the courtroom that he saw Centeno, although he knows the latter. The Mayor also denied
Malabanans testimony implicating him in the crime. In fact, Malabanan wrote him letters asking for his
help. The trial court noted, however, that the letter adverted to by the Mayor were all addressed to Judge
Baldo.
Appellant Medialdea was Calauan policeman until his summary dismissal on September 10,
1993. He claimed that he, being a member of a crack team formed by Major Cao and composed of
Malabanan, Luis and Ama, was preoccupied the whole day of June 28, 1993 conducting police operations
on board an ambulance in different barangays of the town in search of Tisoy. The fruitless operations
ended at about 9:00 p.m. of June 28. Driving the ambulance, he got home at around 10:30 p.m. where
he saw his wife playing mahjong with some friends. Medialdea joined the players for about an hour,
then he slept until 5:00 a.m. of the next day (June 29).
The crack team met again in the morning of June 29, 1993 to continue the manhunt for Tisoy. At
around 7:15 a.m. in Barangay Imok, they saw Tisoy speed by in a motorcycle. Medialdea and Luis fired
shots in the air but Tisoy managed to escape. Centeno was not present when this event transpired
because he was instructed to go to the municipal hall with the ambulance.
Upon hearing news over the radio that a dead body was found at Sitio Paputok, Km. 74, Barangay
Mabacan, Medialdea radioed Centeno to fetch the group at the fishpond of one Gani. As soon as
Centeno arrived at around 8:00 a.m., they proceeded to Km. 74 where they saw Eileens body inside the
van parked in the sugarcane field. Major Cao and several policemen were already there. Medialdea
had to pull down Eileens T-shirt and roll up her underwear to spare her from numerous kibitzers staring at
her naked body. He recovered several scattered items inside the van like cigarette packs, a paddle, spike
shoes, and 5 bottles of beer. The van was then driven by a certain Gener to the UP Los Baos escorted
by the ambulance and Major Caos police car.
Thereafter, at around 9:30 a.m., Medialdea, on Major Caos directive, went to the Gomez residence
and asked for Allan. The maid told him that Allan has not come home since the night before and that she
last saw him at around 6:30 p.m. with one Jet Tejada. As there was no other person inside the house
except the maid, Medialdea, with her permission, searched for Allan inside but to no avail. Before
leaving, he instructed the maid to tell Allan that he better make good his hiding because Allan is a suspect
in the crime. At the Tejada residence, Jet was neither there. So Medialdea proceeded to the boarding
house of Eileen and instructed the landlady to inform calmly Eileens parents on what had happened to
their daughter.
Medialdea then returned to the UP Los Baos security force where he told Major Cao that Allan had
escaped. Before leaving UP campus to bring Eileens body to Calauan, Major Cao ordered Medialdea
to still look for Allan. When his efforts to find Allan inside the campus proved futile, Medialdea sought the
aid of Barangay Captain Cesar Ruiz who brought him to the barangay hall where Jet Tejada was. Tejada
strongly objected to Medialdeas insinuation of his and Allans participation in the crime, saying that they
can never do anything as dastardly as that.
Afterwards, a certain Allan, a barangay tanod, volunteered that he knew Allan. This Allan opines
that if Allan was dead then Kit had a hand on it since Allan had earned Kits ire when the former began
dating the latters girlfriend named Rose. Medialdea informed Major Cao that Allan perhaps has gone to
Manila with his father. The Major replied that Allan is here, but is likewise dead.

Ama then informed Major Cao that they have a suspect named Kit who had an axe to grind against
Allan. Then someone in the crowd uttered Ako iyon. Kit approached and told Ama that he and Allan
had patched up their differences three (3) months ago. Medialdea noticed a drop of blood on the middle
of Kits right thigh. Kit explained that the blood oozed after punching a wall with his right knuckle.
At the municipal hall, Ama handed an empty armalite shell recovered from the site where Allans
body was found. Thereafter, Arnold (the prisoner who was cleaning the van) was seen carrying the
rubber matting of the Tamaraw van to hang it over the municipal fence to dry. Ama could not help but
curse Arnold and ordered the latter to bring it back. Ama explained to Major Cao that they could be
dragged to the case just like what happened to the policeman in the Paraaque massacre who burned a
mosquito net and was thereafter sacked.
Medialdea also testified that it was Major Cao who ordered the cleaning of the van to diffuse the
stench caused by the blood stains therein.
Then on July 6, 1993, Medialdea, together with Ama and Malabanan, went to the PNP Sta. Cruz
Command to answer queries about the cleaning of the van. They were then brought to Canlubang where
they executed their respective sworn statements. Medialdea also recalled that Major Cao instructed
them not to say anything about the cleaning of the van. Afterwards, they were brought back to the PNP
Sta. Cruz and detained therein pending the filing of formal charges against them.
Major Cao visited Medialdea the next day, July 7. The major advised him that they should just point
to Malabanan as the one who cleaned the van. Medialdea did not heed his advice for he pitied
Malabanan and besides, it was Major Cao who really ordered its cleaning. The major then reiterated the
reason why he caused its cleaning (the unbearable stench of blood).
Days later, on July 16, 1993, Medialdea and Ama, together with Malabanan, were brought to the
Department of Justice where Fiscal Abesamis asked them to sign a waiver of their detention. On July 24,
1993, the three (3) men were led back to PNP Canlubang where Colonels Gualberto and Tiangco began
investigating then on July 27, 1993. During the investigation, Medialdea was being enticed by Col.
Gualberto to cooperate with the government by testifying against the Mayor, as there is an order from the
higher echelon to bring the Mayor down. He refused, saying that the Mayor is completely innocent
because he is pro-poor and the Mayor even walks the church aisle on his knees. Col. Gualberto
threatened that he will be dragged all the more to the case if he will not cooperate. Medialdea begged for
mercy and suggested that they should investigate Kit instead. The colonel said that messing up with Kit
is like ramming into a wall. Medialdea was then asked to sign a statement that contained inaccurate
answers. The inaccuracies were supplied by Col. Gualberto.
Medialdea also professed his ignorance before Col. Tiangco. This colonel was less diplomatic. He
splashed coffee on Medialdeas face, cursed him and whipped his face. So was Malabanan. The
investigators would hit then when they try to reason. Back to his cell, Medialdea heard Col. Tiangco order
somebody to have him killed in the evening.
On August 13, 1993, one Colonel Versoza advised Medialdea to follow Malabanan in testifying
against the Mayor. They will be placed under the Witness Protection Program where they would be
entitled to allowances, free housing facilities and the chance to go abroad with their families where they
can live peacefully, Col. Versoza assured them. Medialdea refused once again. Malabanan therafter
informed him that he and Centeno had already given false statements for they can no longer stand the
torture inflicted on them. But Medialdea stood pat with his refusal, for he cannot testify falsely against his
companions just to free himself. It is still better to live than to die a martyr, Malabanan answered.
We now to go appellant Luis Corcolons story which painted the Kit Alqueza angle in
greater detail. In the morning of June 25, 1993, three (3) men went to Luis residence in Barangay
Mabacan. They told Luis that their boss, Edgardo Lavadia alias Uod, wanted to see him the next
day. Lavadia is a very generous friend of Luis for so many years who, as a professional forger of checks,
is being protected by General Alqueza.
Luis arrived at Lavadias house at around 2:00 p.m. of June 26. There he saw Kit and Lavadias
men. Lavadia requested him to abduct and kill Allan because the latter has done something wrong to

Kit. Luis asked what Allans fault was and then suggested that if its just a small squabble, they better
forgive Allan. Lavadia insisted, but Luis appeared hesitant since it might put him in big trouble. Lavadia
tempered his request by asking Luis to merely help in getting rid of the body. Luis agreed. He and
Lavadia were to meet again on June 28, 1993 in the Bay cockpit. After this, Luis left.
Luis was also a member of the team formed by Major Cao to hunt down Tisoy. At around 8:30 in
the morning of June 28, 1993, he was fetched by Medialdea, Ama, Malabanan and proceeded to
Barangay Imok on board the ambulance driven by Centeno to apprehend Tisoy. At around 1:00 p.m.,
Luis left the group and went to Bay cockpit to meet Lavadia, as agreed upon the previous day. When he
arrived at the cockpit, only Lavadias men were there. Luis then asked one of the men to tell Lavadia that
he is backing out of the agreement. He first attended the derby being held at the cockpit before returning
to Barangay Imok at around 5:00 p.m. and re-joined the team. They left Barangay Imok at around 7:30
p.m. and proceeded to Barangay Wawa, San Pablo City where they stayed for about two (2) hours
waiting for Tisoy. Sensing that Tisoy would not be passing by, the team headed back for Calauan. Luis
was driven home first and reached his house at around 9:30 p.m. A certain Ernesto Bustillo was waiting
for him to borrow his passenger jeepney. Thereafter, Luis slept at around 10:30 p.m.
At around 4:45 a.m. of the next day (June 29) while Luis was preparing the breakfast of his children,
a Tamaraw van, driven by Kit, stopped in front of his house honking its horn continuously. Four (4)
motorcycle-riding men, each wearing bonnet masks and maong jackets, escorted the van. Kit sought
his help in burying at once the dead female body inside the van. Luis inspected the van and saw a naked
corpse of a woman. He refused Kits summons after which Luis immediately returned to his house,
turned off the lights and closed door for fear that Kits escorts would shoot him. The convoy then headed
towards the direction of Sitio Paputok, Km. 74.
At about 6:30 a.m., Luis, Centeno, Medialdea and Malabanan met and continued their surveillance of
Tisoy at Barangay Imok. They saw Tisoy pass by at around 7:10 a.m. but were not able to apprehend
him. The group thereafter went to Ganis fishpond at about 8:30 a.m. then proceeded to Km. 74 to verify
reports of a females death. There they saw the Tamaraw van with a dead woman inside. Luis
recognized the vehicle as that driven by Kit hours earlier, but he kept silent. The group then brought the
van to the UP Los Baos campus.
In the morning if June 30, 1993, Luis met the Mayor. The latter instructed him to investigate on who
dumped Eileens body at Km. 74. Luis obliged and said that he will make a report within a week. He,
however, did not tell the Mayor about Kits involvement in the crime.
On July 7, 1993, CIS agents of Canlubang raided his house during his absence thereat. The agents,
his wife said, planted a gun inside. The next day, Luis read in the papers that a P100,000.00 reward has
been offered for his and brother Boys capture. He rushed to the Mayor who advised him to remain quiet.
In the afternoon of July 12, 1993, Luis went to Boys house upon being summoned by the Mayor who
was with General Quizon and Colonel Hilario. He and Boy were brought to Camp Crame for
interview. After the interview, the CIS took their sworn statements. The answers therein, Luis said, were
furnished by the agents. He signed the statement out to fear without the assistance of a lawyer of his
own choice. For several days, he was investigated by PACC agents. Then on or July 20, 1993, he and
Boy were transferred to CIS Canlubang and were interrogated by Col. Tiangco who repeatedly
manhandled and cursed him. Luis insisted on his innocence and suggested that it is Kit who they should
investigate. After the interview, Luis was tortured by way of water treatment, denied of food and was not
allowed to receive visitors. In the afternoon of June 28, 1993, Luis was brought before the PACC where
he was again manhandled during the 2-hour interrogation. He answered yes to all the questions hurled
at him because he was already dizzy. He was also informed that Lavadia had already executed a
statement saying that the latter paid him.
On August 1, 1993 at the PACC-TFH office, General Quizon was forcing him to testify against the
Mayor. He was also interviewed by media afterwhich, he was brought back to his cell where he met
Lavadia. He cursed and strangled Lavadia. Luis suggested that they should now tell the truth about Kits
involvement, but Lavadia advised him to remain silent because reprisal from General Alqueza would be

far worse. Luis was detained at the PACC until the start of the trial. He also filed a complaint for torture
before the Commission on Human Rights.
Boy Corcolon testified that he never left house on the night of June 28, 1993. He woke up at
around 7:00 a.m. of the next day and proceeded to the Calauan police station on his motorcycle upon
being informed of the discovery of a dead female in sitio Paputok, Km. 74. After going to the municipal
building where he saw Ama, Major Cao and Judge Baldo, Boy followed Major Cao and his men in
going to Km. 74. There he saw the naked body of the dead woman inside the van. Boy thereafter
followed the van to the UP compound. Moments later, the van was brought to Calauan municipal hall
compound. He did not stay in the municipal hall, but went straight home instead.
The CIS agents raided his house on July 7, 1993. The next day, Boy read in the papers that he and
his brother Luis were being haunted down by the authorities and a P100,000.00 bounty is at stake for
their capture. He rushed to the house of the Mayor to inform the latter of the raid. The Mayor advised
him to remain calm and to avoid being visible.
In the afternoon of July 12, 1993, he and Luis were fetched by General Quizon and Colonel Hilario at
Luis residence and thereafter brought to Camp Crame. At the camp, press people interviewed them after
which they were led to a room for taking of their respective sworn statements. Boy claimed that he was
forced to give his statement after being kicked, slapped and cursed by the investigators. He tried to
correct portions of his statement but the investigating officer did not allow him. Boy and Luis were
detained at the camp until charges have been filed against them, for their refusal to cooperate with the
CIS.
On July 20, 1993, the two (2) brother were brought to an uninhabited place near a hill in Barangay
Paliparan where they were made to stand in front of the military group consisting of Generals Quizon and
Salimbangon, Colonel Gualberto and his men. Boy and Luis were each asked to hold an armalite rifle,
and then pictures were taken of them handing the rifles over to the generals.
The next day (June 21), they were brought to CIS Canlubang and stayed there until the start of the
trial in September, 1993. Boy claimed he was subjected to electric shock and water treatment to make
him confess his guilt.
Ama, also a member of the team involved in the Tisoy manhunt, related a similar story on the
groups sorties in different barangays on June 28, 1993. After the failed mission, Centeno dropped him
off at his residence in Barangay Masiit at about 10:00 p.m. of the same day and did not leave the house
until the next morning.
At around 6:15 a.m. of the next day (June 29), he was at Barangay Balayhangin to wait for Tisoy per
Medialdeas instruction. Minutes later, he saw Tisoy pass by on a motorcycle and thereafter reported the
matter to Medialdea. Ama learned of Eileens death at around 8:00 a.m. when he was at the Calauan
police station. Centeno thereafter picked him up and they, together with Medialdea, Malabanan and Luis
proceeded to Sitio Paputok where Eileens body was found.
From the university compound, he, Medialdea, Malabanan and a UP student named Butch went to
Allans house but the latter was not there. They also went to Jet Tejadas and Eileens boarding houses.
At Barangay Batong Malaki, Los Baos, barangay tanod Allan revealed to Medialdea that the dead
Allans enemy was Kit. Allan was fond of girls and there was a time when Kit got angry at and threatened
Allan when the latter dated Kits girlfriend Rose, the tanod narrated.
Ama and the rest of the group were able to talk to Jet Tejada who denied any involvement in the
crime. After Major Cao informed him that Allan is already dead, Ama told the major about the friction
between Allan and Kit. Then someone tapped Major Caos shoulder and identified himself as Kit who
clarified that he had patched up with Allan about three (3) months ago. Kit angrily pointed his finger at
Ama, then Major Cao pacified them. Ama asked Kit about the drops of blood on his right thigh. Kit
explained that the blood came from his right knuckle. He is our suspect Ama blurted. Major Cao,
however, reprimanded him for making such a loud comment.
*(On the cleaning of the van, Amas story is similar to Medialdeas account heretofore discussed).

Thereafter, Ama, Medialdea and Malabanan found their way to the Mayors residence in bay. Ama
revealed to the Mayor that Kit is the suspect. The Mayor said that Kit comes from a very powerful and
influential family, and that his father, General Alqueza, is a tough man. The Mayor nonetheless assured
them of his support.
On July 1, 1993, Ama accompanied some CIS personnel at the site where Allans body was
found. They found drops of blood, cigarette butts and wrappers in the area. Later in the afternoon, Ama
went to Canlubang as he was asked by Colonel Roxas to make a written report on the Kit Alqueza
angle. He completed his statement in about five (5) hours. The officer before whom he was sworn, Ama
noticed, was drunk.
On July 3, 1993, he received word that he was to undergo counter-insurgency training effective that
same day. Two (2) days after (July 5), he asked a certain Colonel Toco why he was being required to
undergo training again. The colonel promised to look into the matter. On that same day, Malabanan
informed him that Luis appeared panicky and was acting suspiciously, as the latter seemed to go back
and forth to the municipal hall and kept asking Malabanan for the names of people investigating the
case. Also on that day, Ama gave the NBI Regional Director some information about Kit and Luis which
started the NBI investigation.
On July 6, 1993, Ama, together with Medialdea and Malabanan, executed his statement in CIS
Canlubang assisted by one Atty. Exconde who asked him to sign the same even before Ama can read
it. At PHQ Sta. Cruz, the Deputy Provincial Commander for Operations fumed when he declared in his
statement that he was absent during the cleaning of the van. He declared so because Major Cao
instructed him to keep silent on that matter. Subsequently (July 7), he learned of Malabanans escape.
On July 24, 1993, Ama, Malabanan and Medialdea were brought to CIS Canlubang. They ate
drugged food which gave him chest pain and made him very weak and talkative. He saw Medialdea
being whipped on the head with a newspaper by one official.
Five days later (July 29), they were brought to the PACC where Luis pointed to them before the
media. The next day (July 30), he and General Alqueza met at the Department of Justice. The general
cursed him for dragging Kit in the case and even challenged him to a fistfight outside the building.
On August 7, 1993, at General Salimbangons office, the general informed him that his summary
dismissal is on hand unless he testifies against the Mayor. When he refused, the general cursed
him. Colonel Gualberto also tried to convince him by offering promotion, house and lot, monthly
allowance, or a chance to leave the country with his family. But Ama insisted on his innocence.
On August 13, 1993, a sobbing Malabanan embraced Ama and asked for his forgiveness because
the former has already implicated him falsely in the crime. Malabanan said he could no longer bear the
torture being inflicted on him and the threats on his life and family. He was also advised by Malabanan to
follow suit, but he refused once again.
Brion is the Mayors nephew. He denied being in the company of any of the appellants on the
evening of June 28, 1993 as he stayed at their house on J. del Valle St., Calauan the whole night. In the
morning of July 29, 1993, he was arrested at his father-in-laws house without any warrant. The arresting
officer told him that Colonel Navarro (PNP Director of Laguna) wanted to interview him. Brion was
brought to the Calamba police station from where he was taken to Canlubang. There, Col. Navarro
cursed him for being so elusive. Brion answered that he never went into hiding. Col. Navarro informed
him that Luis Corcolon has revealed that he was the third man to rape Eileen. Brion then heard
Malabanan shouting that he is taking all the blame for the crime if they would just spare the two students
(Brion and Kawit) who are totally innocent.
Brion, together with Malabanan, Ama and Luis, was brought to the office of the then Vice-President
Estrada who asked Ama and Malabanan whether they raped Eileen. Ama belied the
accusation. Malabanan, too, professed innocence and said that in the nine (9) years he stayed in
Mindanao, it is his first time to cry this way. This convinced the vice-president of Malabanans
innocence. Kawit also cried at this point. Brion saw Luis being held up by two men towards the room as

Luis appeared to be on the brink of collapse. One of the escorts then raised Luis hand so as to point at
Brion.
On July 30, 1993, Brion, Ama, Malabanan, Kawit, Luis and Boy were brought to the Department of
Justice where Fiscal Zuo asked them to sign some papers. Luis was instructed to re-affirm his sworn
statement before the PACC while Brion and Kawit were asked to sign a waiver of detention. The three
(3), however, refused. Fiscal Zuo offered them a lawyer from the Public Assistance Office (PAO) to
assist them but Brion rejected the offer.
On August 6, 1993, General Quizon asked Brion to sign a confession but he refused. When a
second statement was prepared, he cried because he was allowed to read only that portion relating to his
personal circumstances before being forced to sign it without the assistance of a lawyer. Thereafter, he
was brought back to PHQ Sta. Cruz at around 5:00 p.m.
Brion related having executed a sworn statement detailing the methods of torture he underwent to
force him into implicating the Mayor, Ama, Medialdea and Malabanan, viz:
1) he would be placed in a doghouse-like cell fitted with loudspeakers;
2) his hands would be tied behind his back and he would be tied to a bench. A towel would be
placed over his mouth and nostrils, then 7-up is poured on his face;
3) his body would be whipped with guns.
No medical examination was ever conducted on him. More, his captors would padlock his cell whenever
Atty. Arias paid him a visit.
Kawit was a houseboy of the Mayor in his Calauan residence. He claimed he slept at around 9:00
p.m. of June 28, 1993 and woke up at 6:00 a.m. the following day to water the plants.
On July 16, 1993, he was interrogated in connection with the deaths of Eileen and Allan. Later in the
day, Medialdea and some policemen fetched him at his house in Barangay Bagong Pook and brought him
to PHQ Sta. Cruz. Kawit was led into a room where Medialdea, in the presence of Centeno and
Malabanan, asked him the name of the girl who was reportedly shouting while Kawit was dragging her at
CPAMMS. Kawit answered that there were two (2) bar girls, whose names are Carla and Ninja Joyce,
who were shouting at Barangay Bagong Pook. Ama then entered the room and requested Malabanan
and Medialdea not to hurt Kawit. When Malabanan and Medialdea left the room, Kawit explained to Ama
that the two (2) bar girls complained of one Melvin Pajadan not paying them for their services.
Thereafter, Kawit was asked by one Major Uyami to make a statement. After signing the statement,
Kawit was told by investigator Cansanay that the major wanted him to include in his statement the
Mayors involvement in the Gomez-Sarmenta slaying, but Kawit refused. He was thus detained for the
night. A policeman in civilian clothes thereafter asked him to sign a paper bearing his name and the
handwritten words: Pauuwiin ka na bukas ng umaga. Kawit signed the paper, but he was not released
the next day.
Before this Court, Mayor Sanchez and Medialdea filed their consolidated Appellants Brief, and so
did Ama, Brion and Kawit. Brothers Luis and Boy Corcolon, on the other hand, filed separate appeal
briefs. Briefly, the pith of the assigned errors and the focus of the appellants arguments is the issue of
witnesses Centeno and Malabanans credibility, whose open-court narrations served as principal basis for
the trial courts rendition of a guilty verdict.
So oftenly repeated by this Court is that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness
stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge [4] who had the unmatched opportunity to
observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected in
the record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact and
fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered
look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch these can reveal if the witness is telling
the truth or lying in his teeth.[5]

Judge Demetriou who presided over the entire trial until its very conclusion expressed her
satisfaction with the way witnesses Centeno and Malabanan survived the hot seat with flying colors, so
to speak. With respect to Centeno, the honorable Judge had this to say:
In thus passing upon the credibility of Centeno, this Court kept his alleged dubious reputation for veracity
in mind. But, after carefully reviewing the testimony of Centeno in his direct examination and gruelling
(sic) cross-examination for almost 3 months, this Court, even with a jaundiced eye, could not help but be
impressed about the myriad of details in his testimony and his frank, spontaneous and straightforward
manner of testifying. The lengthy and punishing cross-examination by seven lawyers to which he was
subjected failed to bring out any serious flaw or infirmity in his perception or recollection of events or
destroy the coherence of his narration. That Centeno merely wove such a yarn from his fertile
imagination, conflict with a multitude of details, is highly improbable considering that his highest
educational attainment was sixth grade in the elementary school. [6]
Similarly, Malabanan displayed a frank, straightforward manner of answering questions and a desire to
state all the facts within his knowledge, and his credibility was never shaken on cross-examination; there
was no indication of prevarication or evasiveness. Consequently, (his) testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit, the honorable Judge observed.[7] Her impressions of these star witnesses for the State bind
this Court, for we accord great respect if not finality, to the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses.[8] They, therefore, ought not to be disturbed. [9] And once the prosecution witnesses are afforded
full faith and credit, the defenses version necessarily stands discredited. [10]
To recall, all the appellants relied on the defense of denial/alibi, i.e., they were at their respective
homes on the night of the rape-slay. But Centeno and Malabanan confirmed the presence of all the
appellants on the night of June 28, 1993 till the early morning of the following day and detailed the exact
participation of each in the crime. Positive identification by credible witnesses of the accused as the
perpetrators of the crime, as we have consistently held, demolishes the alibi [11] - the much abused
sanctuary of felons.[12] Moreover, except for the Mayor who presented Ave Marie Tonee Jimenez Sanchez
(his daughter with his mistress Elvira) and Medialdea who presented his neighbor Anastacia Gulay, the
other appellants failed to present corroborating testimonial evidence to butress their respective
alibis. The defense of alibi is inherently weak especially when wanting in material
corroboration. Categorical declarations of witnesses for the prosecution of the details of the crime are
more credible than the uncorroborated alibi interposed by the accused. [13] Ave Maries testimony is of no
help to the Mayor, since alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is invoked and sought to be
crafted mainly by the accused himself and his immediate relatives. [14] Anastacia Gulays testimony is
likewise worthless since the trial court found her testimony rehearsed. We will not disturb this finding
because it touches on credibility.
In fine, the defense of alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility of witnesses, and the
assessment of the trial court, unless patently and clearly inconsistent, must be accepted. [15]
In an attempt to discredit Centeno, appellants principally harp on the contradictions in four (4) Sworn
Statements executed by Centeno on August 13, 1993, August 15, 1993, August 17, 1993 and August 30,
1993. The Solicitor Generals Office summarizes appellants asseverations on this point, viz:
Appellants point out that while in his Sworn Statement dated August 13, 1993, Centeno stated that after
the victims were seized, they were brought to CPAMMS, in his Sworn Statement dated August 15, 1993,
he claimed that the two were brought to Erais Farm (p. 86-96, Sanchez and Medialdea; p. 11-12, Luis
Corcolon; p. 38, Ama, Brion and Kawit; p. 10, Rogelio Corcolon). Appellant also point out that in the
August 13, 1993 Sworn Statement, Centeno merely referred to a person named Edwin (without stating his
family name) and another person he did not know who was in the place where the victims were
brought. In his Sworn Statement dated August 17, 1993, Centeno supplied the family name of Edwin as
Cosico and the name of the other person whom he did not know as Lito Angeles (pp. 96-97, Sanchez and
Medialdea).

Another major contradiction pointed out is that in his August 13, 1993 Sworn Statement, Centeno
mentioned that he drove the Corcolon brothers to the house of Edgardo Uod Lavadia in Bangkal Street,
Los Baos, Laguna. Upon arriving at the house of Lavadia, Centeno saw Lavadia and Teofilo Kit Alqueza
talking. Later Lavadia handed an envelop to Luis Corcolon. In the latest Sworn Statement dated August
30, 1993, Centeno stated that they did not go to the house of Lavadia and that during the whole day of
June 26, 1993, Centeno was with Malabanan (pp. 99-102, Sanchez and Medialdea; pp. 37-40, Ama,
Brion and Kawit; p. 8, Rogelio Corcolon).[16]
The trial judge found Centenos explanation on these inconsistencies satisfactory, justifying such
finding with pertinent jurisprudence. The Court, therefore, affirms and adopts her disquisition on the
matter, viz:
With respect to the portion of his sworn statement dated August 13, 1993 which implicated Kit Alqueza,
Centeno explained that it was dictated by a CIS agent named Rommel. He feared Rommel because the
latter threatened him that he would be hurt if he did not cooperate. Even when his family was already
under the custody of the CIS on August 15, 1993, he did not ask for the deletion of the said portion
because he was still under the CIS custody. It was only on August 30, 1993 when he was placed under
the Witness Protection Program that he found the courage to execute another sworn statement for the
specific purpose of deleting the reference to Kit Alqueza. Although he was placed under the Witness
Protection Program on August 17, 1993, there was a delay in his retraction of Kit Alquezas involvement
due to his inability to reach Fiscal Arellano.
Centenos explanation is quite believable because he had already implicated the accused Sanchez in his
sworn statement of August 13, 1993. Thus, the portion implicating Kit Alqueza does not jibe with the main
story of Centeno that Eileen Sarmenta was abducted by Medialdea, Ama, the Corcolon brothers, Brion
and Kawit to be given as a gift to their boss, Mayor Sanchez.
As to his sworn statement of August 15, 1993 where he stated that the victims were taken to Erais Farm
instead of CPAMMS as originally indicated in his August 13, 1993 sworn statement, Centeno explained
that when he gave his first statement he was still hoping that Mayor Sanchez would help
him. Furthermore, he feared the power and influence of the Mayor. Thus, according to him, he gave the
wrong place to mislead his investigators. It was only on August 15, 1993 when the accused Sanchez was
already in prison that Centeno decided to correct his previous statements.
This Court is inclined to accept the explanation of Centeno that his earlier attempt to mislead the
investigators by saying that the victims were taken to CPAMMS was out of fear of the Mayor. Our
Supreme Court has recognized that the inherent fear of reprisal by witnesses who refuse initially to
disclose what they know about a crime is quite understandable, especially when the accused is a man of
power and influence in the community (People v. Catao, 107 Phil. 861 [1960]).
In a recent case, People v. Pascua (206 SCRA 628 [1992]), the Supreme Court observed that Fear for
ones life explains the failure on the part of a witness to immediately notify the authorities of what exactly
transpired. And, [o]nce such fear is overcome by a more compelling need to narrate the truth, the
Supreme Court went on to say, then the witness must be welcomed by the courts to help dispense
justice.
Consequently, this Court will not reject the testimony of Centeno on the basis of inconsistencies in his
sworn statements taken by police authorities which have been sufficiently explained. What is more
important is that Centeno testified on the witness stand in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination. This Court, therefore, finds Centeno a
credible witness.[17]
To further fortify this observation, we advert to that all-too familiar rule that discrepancies between sworn
statements and testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witnesses.

[18]

Sworn statements/affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations

because the former are often executed when an affiants mental faculties are not in such a state as to
afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. [19] Testimonies given
during trials are mush more exact and elaborate. [20] Thus, testimonial evidence carries more weight than
sworn statements/affidavits.
Appellants would also quibble on the following portions of Centenos testimony, to wit:
1) he could not give exactly where the appellants went after sexually abusing Eileen;]
2) he was unsure whether it was Eileens left or right foot that hit the chair of the van when she
was struggling;
3) he was unsure of their speed while on their way to the UP compound;
4) he could not give the exact distance between the ambulance he was driving and the van;
5) he said he could see the protruding end of the roof of a kubo when he parked the
ambulance in front of the Big J restaurant. Appellants claim that from where Centeno was
allegedly standing, there was no way he could see the roof of that kubo;
6) he was able to recall what appellants were wearing on that night of June 28, 1993;
7) he saw Kawit hit Allan at his diaphragm with the butt of an armalite, but the medico-legal
finding of Dr. Escueta revealed no injury in the abdominal region of Allan;
8) his testimony that the appellants raped Eileen inside the van which was very limited space,
while appellants could have chosen a far more comfortable or remote place to do the crime. With
respect to the Mayor, it was very unbelievable for him to commit rape inside his room filled with
religious adornments and in the process risk his reputation as mayor and an established man in the
community;
9) his testimony to the effect that appellants rolled their pants down to their knees and then
climbed the van to rape Eileen. Appellants would consider such testimony impossible, claiming that
the narrow circumference of the waistline will impede and obstruct the upward movement of the
legs.
10) his admission that he can lie for money, or out fear.
It may be conceded that these inconsistencies marred Centenos testimony, but they refer to trivial
details which do not, in actuality, touch upon the whys and wherefores of the crime committed.
[21]
Equally settled is the rule that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when referring only to
minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or
the weight of their testimony. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not
impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and
positive identification of the assailants,[22] as in this case. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to
strengthen the sincerity of a witness and prove that his testimony is not rehearsed. [23] They are fail-safes
against memorized perjury.[24] Besides, errorless testimonies cannot be expected especially when a
witness is recounting details of a harrowing experience. [25] Even the most truthful witnesses can make
mistakes but such innocent lapses do not necessarily affect their credibility. [26] Consequently, Centenos
and Malabanans credibility still remains intact notwithstanding these inconsistencies.
Other pieces of evidence further enhance the damaging testimonies of Centeno and
Malabanan. For one, a missing belt loop from the pair of white shorts worn by Eileen on the night of the
crime was recovered from Erais Farm by prosecution witness Major Lulita Chambers who, together with
Col. Gualberto and other officers, went there on August 19, 1993 to effect service of the search warrant
issued by RTC Judge Geraldez. Major Chambers, a forensic chemist, conducted a series of laboratory
examinations and later concluded that the retrieved beltloop matched in color, size and fiber composition
with a beltloop she detached from the white shorts of Eileen which she (Major Chambers) used as a
standard.

Another corroborating evidence is the M16 empty bullet shell recovered at the site where Allans
body was found. The ballistic examination on the empty shell conducted by FID-PNP Chief Ballistician
Vicente de Vera revealed that the striations of the empty shell were the same as those registered by the
cartridges from M16 rifle bearing Serial No. 773159 surrendered by Luis Corcolon. Mr. De Vera also
found the metallic fragments recovered from Eileens body, after conducting microscopic examinations
thereof, to bear the same characteristics as those from a bullet fired from an M16 rifle.
The autopsy and vaginal examination conducted by prosecution witness Dr. Vladimir V. Villaseor,
medico-legal officer of the PNP-CIS, on Eileens cadaver buttresses all the more the gang-rape story of
the prosecution. Dr. Villaseors findings, in a nutshell, disclosed the presence of multiple contusions on
Eileens body, fresh shallow lacerations on her hymen, a congested cervix, a gaping labia majora and
oozing whitish fluid (tested positive for spermatozoa) from the vaginal opening. Oozing spermatozoa, Dr.
Villaseor explained, means that the amount of semen was much more than the vaginal canal could
contain and that there were several seminal ejaculations that occurred therein. He also noted that a great
quantity of whitish fluid continued to ooze from Eileens vaginal opening despite her death for several
hours. Taking into account all these findings, Dr. Villaseor ruled out the possibility of any consented
sexual intercourse. In this connection, appellants would belittle Dr. Villaseors findings by insisting as the
more convincing opinion the defenses medical expert witness, Dr. Ernesto Brion who testified to the
effect that there can be no multiple rape if there is only one laceration on Eileens hymen as testified to by
Dr. Villaseor. We dismiss appellants argument by reiterating anew that the absence of extensive
abrasions or contusions on the vaginal wall does not rule out rape because the slightest penetrations
enough.[27] It is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of said crime. [28] Moreover, Dr.
Brion is an uncle by consanguinity and erstwhile counsel of record of the Mayor, thus making his
objectivity highly questionable.
Appellants Ama, Kawit and Brion would assail the trial courts finding that they were part of the
conspiracy to commit the rape-slay. Their concurrency of sentiment with the other appellants, however,
was evident from the time they abducted Eileen and Allan, brought the two to Erais Farm where Eileen
was raped by the Mayor and Allan beaten up black and blue, headed for a sugarcane field killing Allan
along the way, sexually abused Eileen in rapid succession and finally killed her. In not an instance did
any of the three appellants (Ama, Kawit and Brion) desist from that common design. [29] Likewise, the
complicity of the Mayor in the crime can be deduced from the following conversations he had with some
of the appellants at the Erais Farm (per Centenos testimony), viz.:
LUIS CORCOLON:
MAYOR:
MEDIALDEA:

Mayor, ito po yung regalo namin sa inyo. Ito po yung babae na matagal na
po ninyong kursunada.
Aba, and ganda talaga ng babaeng yan. Pero sino yung kasama
ninyong lalake?
Boss, kasama ho yan ng babae yung lalake. Isinama na rin ho namin para
wala pong bulilyaso.

After raping Eileen, the Mayor had this short exchange with Medialdea:
MAYOR:

MEDIALDEA:

O sige mga anak, salamat sa regalo ninyo. Salamat sa regalo

ninyo sa akin. Tapos na ako, sa inyo na iyan. Bahala na kayo
diyan. Ano naman ang gagawin ninyo diyan sa lalake?
Boss, papatayin na rin po namin ito para wala pong bulilyaso.

Finally, on appellants claim that the publicity given to this case impaired their right to a fair trial, we
need only to revisit this Courts pronouncements in People v. Teehankee, Jr. (249 SCRA 54), viz:
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all
high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial
is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a
fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of

effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the
trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverages does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to
seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal
cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to out
breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and
fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch
with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity
lest they lose their impartiality. Criticisms against the jury system are mounting and Mark Twains wit and
wisdom put them all in better perspective when he observed: When a gentleman of high social standing,
intelligence, and probity swears that testimony given under the same oath will outweigh with him, street
talk and newspaper reports based upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to
their own ignorance and stupidity x x x. Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men of brains
and honesty an equal chance with fools and miscreants? Our judges are learned in the law and trained
to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere
exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility or prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage
of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejsndro, et
al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we
ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar,
the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of
the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the
case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
And so we come to hear another tale of woe, of an infamous public figure and his minions indicted
for having raped and killed a young lady and a budding lad, of these victims who had led short obscure
lives that earned an equally ignominous end, and of a criminal enterprise so despicable only the
unthinking beasts can orchestrate. It was, indeed, a plot seemingly hatched in hell. And let it not be said
that the full protection of the law had been deprived appellants. Even a beast cannot deny this.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. In addition, each of the
appellants having been found guilty of seven (7) counts of rape with homicide and considering that
existing jurisprudence pegs the amount of indemnity for the death of the victim at Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos, this Court hereby orders each of the appellants to pay the respective heirs of Eileen
Sarmenta and Allan Gomez the amount of Seven Hundred Thousand (P700,000.00) Pesos as additional
indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON
GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES
FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B.
FRANCISCO, JR., respondents.

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and Omnibus
Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the Courts Decision of March 2, 2001.
In G.R. Nos. 146710-15, petitioner raises the following grounds:
I. IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR AND EXPLICIT PROVISIONS OF ART. XI, SECTION 3 (7)
OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THEREON.
II. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER CAN BE PROSECUTED NOW, FOR THIS RULING WOULD
VIOLATE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, CONSIDERING
THAT PETITIONER WAS ACQUITTED IN THE IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS.
III. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER IS NO LONGER ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM
SUIT.
IV. IT HELD THAT PETITIONERS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL HAVE NOT
BEEN PREJUDICED BY PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY.
V. IT HELD THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE COURT TO
ENJOIN THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE INCUMBENT OMBUDSMAN,
PETITIONER HAVING FAILED TO PROVE THE IMPAIRED CAPACITY OF THE
OMBUDSMAN TO RENDER A BIASED FREE DECISION.
In G.R. No. 146738, petitioner raises and argues the following issues:
1. WHETHER PETITIONER RESIGNED OR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED RESIGNED AS OF
JANUARY 20, 2001;
2. WHETHER THE ANGARA DIARY IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE
FOLLOWING RULES ON EVIDENCE: HEARSAY, BEST EVIDENCE, AUTHENTICATION,
ADMISSIONS AND RES INTER ALIOS ACTA;
3. WHETHER RELIANCE ON NEWSPAPER ACOUNTS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE HEARSAY
RULE;
4. WHETHER CONGRESS POST FACTO CAN DECIDE PETITIONERS INABILITY TO
GOVERN CONSIDERING SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION; and
5. WHETHER PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY HAS AFFECTED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO FAIR
TRIAL.
We find the contentions of petitioner bereft of merit.
I

Prejudicial Publicity on the Court

Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he assails the Decision for
adverting to newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has
resigned. In our Decision, we used the totality test to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has
resigned. We referred to and analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneous and posterior to the
oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. All these events are facts which are well-established
and cannot be refuted. Thus, we adverted to prior events that built up the irresistible pressure for the
petitioner to resign. These are: (1) the expose of Governor Luis Chavit Singson on October 4, 2000; (2)
the I accuse speech of then Senator Teofisto Guingona in the Senate; (3) the joint investigation of the
speech of Senator Guingona by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice; (4) the
investigation of the Singson expose by the House Committee on Public Order and Security; (5) the move
to impeach the petitioner in the House of Representatives; (6) the Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Jaime
Cardinal Sin demanding petitioners resignation; (7) a similar demand by the Catholic Bishops

conference; (8) the similar demands for petitioners resignation by former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino
and Fidel V. Ramos; (9) the resignation of respondent Arroyo as Secretary of the DSWD and her call for
petitioner to resign; (10) the resignation of the members of petitioners Council of Senior Economic
Advisers and of Secretary Mar Roxas III from the Department of Trade and Industry; (11) the defection of
then Senate President Franklin Drilon and then Speaker of the House of Representatives Manuel Villar
and forty seven (47) representatives from petitioners Lapiang Masang Pilipino; (12) the transmission of
the Articles of Impeachment by Speaker Villar to the Senate; (13) the unseating of Senator Drilon as
Senate President and of Representative Villar as Speaker of the House; (14) the impeachment trial of the
petitioner; (15) the testimonies of Clarissa Ocampo and former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu in the
impeachment trial; (16) the 11-10 vote of the senator-judges denying the prosecutors motion to open the
2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held a P3.3 billion deposit in a
secret bank account under the name of Jose Velarde; (17) the prosecutors walkout and resignation;
(18) the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings to give a chance to the House of
Representatives to resolve the issue of resignation of their prosecutors; (19) the rally in the EDSA Shrine
and its intensification in various parts of the country; (20) the withdrawal of support of then Secretary of
National Defense Orlando Mercado and the then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, together with the
chiefs of all the armed services; (21) the same withdrawal of support made by the then Director General
of the PNP, General Panfilo Lacson, and the major service commanders; (22) the stream of resignations
by Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs; (23) petitioners
agreement to hold a snap election and opening of the controversial second envelope. All these prior
events are facts which are within judicial notice by this Court. There was no need to cite their
news accounts. The reference by the Court to certain newspapers reporting them as they
happened does not make them inadmissible evidence for being hearsay. The news account only
buttressed these facts as facts. For all his loud protestations, petitioner has not singled out any
of these facts as false.
We now come to some events of January 20, 2001 contemporaneous to the oath taking of
respondent Arroyo. We used the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the
petitioner. Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to distill a persons subjective intent from
the evidence before them. Everyday, courts ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil law cases involving
last wills and testaments, in commercial cases involving contracts and in other similar cases. As will be
discussed below, the use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay rule. Petitioner may
disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by the Court from the facts narrated in the Diary but that
does not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence.
We did not stop with the contemporaneous events but proceeded to examine some events posterior
to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Specifically, we analyzed the all important press release of the
petitioner containing his final statement which was issued after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as
president. After analyzing its content, we ruled that petitioners issuance of the press release and his
abandonemnt of Malacaang Palace confirmed his resignation. [1] These are overt acts which leave no
doubt to the Court that the petitioner has resigned.
In light of this finding that petitioner has resigned before 12 oclock noon of Janaury 20, 2001,
the claim that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath of
office at half past noon of the same day has no leg to stand on.
We also reject the contention that petitioners resignation was due to duress and an involuntary
resignation is no resignation at all.
x x x [I]t has been said that, in determining whether a given resignation is voluntarily tendered, the
element of voluntariness is vitiated only when the resignation is submitted under duress brought on by
government action. The three-part test for such duress has been stated as involving the following
elements: (1) whether one side involuntarily accepted the others terms; (2) whether circumstances
permitted no other alternative; and (3) whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the
opposite side. The view has also been expressed that a resignation may be found involuntary if on
thetotality of the circumstances it appears that the employers conduct in requesting
resignation effectively deprived the employer of free choice in the matter. Factors to be considered,

under this test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some alternative to resignation; (2) whether the
employee understood the nature of the choice he or she was given; (3) whether the employewe was
given a reasonable time in which to choose; and (4) whether he or she was permitted to select the
effective date of resignation. In applying this totality of the circumstances test, the assessment whether
real alternatives were offered must be gauged by an objective standard rather than by the employees
purely subjective evaluation; that the employee may perceive his or her only option to be resignation
for example, because of concerns about his or her reputation is irrelevant. Similarly, the mere
fact that the choice is between comparably unpleasant alternatives for example, resignation or
facing disciplinary charges does not of itself establish that a resignation was induced by duress
or coercion, and was therefore involuntary. This is so even where the only alternative to resignation is
facing possible termination for cause, unless the employer actually lacked good cause to believe that
grounds for termination existed. In this regard it has also been said that a resignation resulting from a
choice between resigning or facing proceedings for dismissal is not tantamount to discharge by coercion
without procedural view if the employee is given sufficient time and opportunity for deliberation of the
choice posed. Futhermore, a resignation by an officer charged with misconduct is not given under
duress, though the appropriate authority has already determined that the officers alternative is
termination, where such authority has the legal authority to terminate the officers employment under the
particular circumstances, since it is not duress to threaten to do what one has the legal right to do, or to
threaten to take any measure authorized by law and the circumstances of the case. [2]
In the cases at bar, petitioner had several options available to him other than resignation. He
proposed to the holding of snap elections. He transmitted to the Congress a written declaration of
temporary inability. He could not claim he was forced to resign because immediately before he left
Malacaang, he asked Secretary Angara: Ed, aalis na ba ako? which implies that he still had a choice of
whether or not to leave.
To be sure, pressure was exerted for the petitioner to resign. But it is difficult to believe that
the pressure completely vitiated the voluntariness of the petitioners resignation. The Malacaang
ground was then fully protected by the Presidential Security Guard armed with tanks and high-powered
weapons. The then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, and other military officers were in Malacaang
to assure that no harm would befall the petitioner as he left the Palace. Indeed, no harm, not even a
scratch, was suffered by the petitioner, the members of his family and his Cabinet who stuck it out with
him in his last hours. Petitioners entourage was even able to detour safely to the Municipal Hall of San
Juan and bade goodbye to his followers before finally going to his residence in Polk Street,
Greenhills. The only incident before the petitioner left the Palace was the stone throwing between a small
group of pro and anti Erap rallyists which resulted in minor injuries to a few of them. Certainly, there were
no tanks that rumbled through the Palace, no attack planes that flew over the presidential residence, no
shooting, no large scale violence, except verbal violence, to justify the conclusion that petitioner was
coerced to resign.
II

Evidentiary Issues

Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use by this Court of
theAngara Diary. It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the
petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.
We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court
statement. TheAngara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain
he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the
said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. [3] The three parts of the Diary
published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of the
Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T. Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001. The second

and third parts of the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment of private
respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12, 2001. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second
Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second part of the diary, published on February 5, 2001,
[4]
and the third part, published on February 6, 2001. [5] It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the
Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not
covered bythe hearsay rule.[6] Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in
part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to
produce it.[7] There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross examination;
(2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. [8] Not at all hearsay evidence, however,
is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by
courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity.[9] The emergence of these exceptions and
their wide spread acceptance is well-explained by Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams and Berger as follows:
x x x
On the other hand, we all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis of other persons accounts of
what happened, and verdicts are usually sustained and affirmed even if they are based on hearsay
erroneously admitted, or admitted because no objection was made. See Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F 2d
452, 454-455 (1st Cir. 1985) (hearsay evidence alone can support a verdict). Although volumes have
been written suggesting ways to revise the hearsay rule, no one advocates a rule that would bar all
hearsay evidence. Indeed, the decided historical trend has been to exclude categories of highly
probative statements from the definition of hearsay (sections 2 and 3, infra), and to develop more
class exceptions to the hearsay rule (sections 4-11, infra). Furthermore, many states have added
to their rules the residual, or catch-all, exceptions first pioneered by the Federal Rules which
authorize the admission of hearsay that does not satisfy a class exception, provided it is
adequately trustworthy and probative (section 12, infra).
Moreover, some commentators believe that the hearsay rule should be abolished altogether
instead of being loosened. See, e.g., Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93
Harv.L.Rev. 1786, 1804-1805, 1815 (1980) (footnotes omitted):
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Under this structure, exclusion is
justified by fears of how the jury will be influenced by the evidence. However, it is not traditional to think
of hearsay as merely a subdivision of this structure, and the Federal Rules do not conceive of hearsay in
that manner. Prejudice refers to the jurys use of evidence for inferences other than those for which the
evidence is legally relevant; by contrast, the rule against hearsay questions the jurys ability to evaluate
the strength of a legitimate inference to be drawn from the evidence. For example, were a judge to
exclude testimony because a witness was particularly smooth or convincing, there would be no doubt as
to the usurpation of the jurys function. Thus, unlike prejudices recognized by the evidence rules, such as
those stemming from racial or religious biases or from the introduction of photographs of a victims final
state, the exclusion of hearsay on the basis of misperception strikes at the root of the jurys function by
usurping its power to process quite ordinary evidence, the type of information routinely encountered by
jurors in their everyday lives.

Since virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good and bad hearsay are either incoherent,
inconsistent, or indeterminate, the only altenative to a general rule of admission would be an absolute rule
of exclusion, which is surely inferior. More important, the assumptions necessary to justify a rule against
hearsay seem insupportable and, in any event, are inconsistent with accepted notions of the function
of the jury. Therefore, the hearsay rules should be abolished.

Some support for this view can be found in the limited empirical research now available which is,
however, derived from simulations that suggests that admitting hearsay has little effect on trial
outcomes because jurors discount the value of hearsay evidence. See Rakos & Landsman,
Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76
Minn.L.Rev. 655 (1992); Miene, Park, & Borgidas, Jury Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay
Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 683 (1992); Kovera, Park, & Penrod, Jurors Perceptions of Eyewitness and
Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992); Landsman & Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary
Empirical Enquiry Concerning the prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 Law & Psychol.
Rev. 65 (1991).
Others, even if they concede that restrictions on hearsay have some utility, question whether
the benefits outweigh the cost:
The cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its contribution to justice. It also includes the time
spent on litigating the rule. And of course this is not just a cost voluntarily borne by the parties, for in our
system virtually all the cost of the court salaries, administrative costs, and capital costs are borne by
the public. As expensive as litigation is for the parties, it is supported by an enormous public
subsidy. Each time a hearsay question is litigated, the public pays. The rule imposes other costs as
well. Enormous time is spent teaching and writing about the hearsay rule, which are both costly
enterprises. In some law schools, students spend over half their time in evidence classes learning the
intricacies of the hearsay rule, and enormous academic resources are expended on the rule.
Allen, Commentary on Professor Friendmans Article: The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of
Admission, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 797, 800 [1992] (but would abolish rule only in civil cases). See also
Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723
(1992).[10]
A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether the
hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect examination of
our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary
belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. [11] It has long been settled that these
admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. Retired Justice Oscar Herrera of the Court of
Appeals cites the various authorities who explain why admissions are not covered by the hearsay
rule:[12]
Wigmore, after pointing out that the partys declaration has generally the probative value of any other
persons asssertion, argued that it had a special value when offered against the party. In that
circumstance, the admission discredits the partys statement with the present claim asserted in pleadings
and testimony, much like a witness impeached by contradictory statements. Moreover, he
continued,admissions pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial
assertions be excluded if there was no opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine because it is the
opponents own declaration, and he does not need to cross examine himself. Wigmore then added
that the Hearsay Rule is satisfied since the party now as opponent has the full opportunity to put himself
on the stand and explain his former assertion. (Wigmore on evidence, Sec. 1048 (Chadbourn Rev.
1972), cited in Sec. 154, McCormick)
According to Morgan: The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself rests not upon any
notion that the circumstances in which it was made furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon
the adversary theory of litigation. A party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to crossexamine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of an
oath.

A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the
reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. (U.S.
vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583).
The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a
party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his statement that
he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would
leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and Pagod na pagod na
ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very
tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the
intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will go. We noted that days before, petitioner had
repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason
for the meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted.
It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, nonbinding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission
is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys
reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person.[13] Jones explains that
the basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or
adoption by the party of the statements which the other person had made. [14] To use the blunt language
of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, this process of attribution is not mumbo jumbo but common sense.[15] In
the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its
support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask
Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or
resignation. Petitioner did not object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the
country. Petitioners silence on this and other related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.
[16]

Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him violated the rule on res
inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: The rights of
a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter
provided.
Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One
of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little
President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days
before he abandoned Malacaang Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told
Secretary Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang
sa huli, ikaw pa rin. (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the only one Ive listened
to. And now at the end, you still are.)[17] This statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after
Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress of the first negotiation. True to this trust, the
petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave Malacaang after taking their final lunch
on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. TheAngara Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to Secretary
Angara: ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do I have to leave now?) [18] Secretary Angara told him to go
and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with
the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his
relinquishment of the powers of the presidency. The Diaryshows that petitioner was always briefed
by Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of
the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as
President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the
principal (petitioner).[19] Jones very well explains the reasons for the rule, viz: What is done, by agent,
is done by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent,
either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of any act
within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the particular

contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the language of the old writers, dum fervet
opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and admissible in evidence against such principal. [20]
Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant
statements. These are statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true or
not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2)
those statements which arecircumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class includes
the following:[21]
a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge,
belief, intention, ill will and other emotions;
b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like;
c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of
another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter;
d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and
e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.
Again, Jones tells us why these independently relevant statements are not covered by the
prohibition against hearsay evidence:[22]
1088. Mental State or Condition Proof of Knowledge.- There are a number of comon issues, forming
a general class, in proof of which hearsay is so obviously necessary that it is not customary to refer to its
admissibility as by virtue of any exception to the general exclusionary rule. Admissibility, in such cases, is
as of course. For example, where any mental state or condition is in issue, such as motive, malice,
knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless direct testimony of the particular person is to be taken as
conclusive of his state of mind, the only method of proof available is testimony of others to the acts
or statements of such person. Where his acts or statements are against his interest, they are plainly
admissible within the rules hereinabove announced as to admissions against interest. And even where
not against interest, if they are so closely connected with the event or transaction in issue as to constitute
one of the very facts in controversy, they become admissible of necessity.
As aforediscussed, The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of mind
and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara
from which we can reasonably deduce petitioners intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not
covered by the rule on hearsay. This has long been a quiet area of our law on evidence and petitioners
attempt to foment a belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur.
Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings and best
evidencewere violated in our Decision, viz:
The use of the Angara diary palpably breached several hornbook rules of evidence, such as the rule on
authentication of private writings
xxx
A. Rule on Proof of Private Writings Violated
The rule governing private documents as evidence was violated. The law provides that before any private
writing offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either: a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or b) by evidence of the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of the maker.
xxx

B. Best Evidence Rule Infringed

Clearly, the newspaper reproduction is not the best evidence of the Angara diary. It is secondary
evidence, of dubious authenticity. It was however used by this Honorable Court without proof of the
unavailability of the original or duplicate original of the diary. The Best Evidence Rule should have been
applied since the contents of the diary are the subject of inquiry.
The rule is that, except in four (4) specific instances, [w]hen the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. [23]
Petitioners contention is without merit. In regard to the Best Evidence rule, the Rules of Court
provides in sections 2 to 4 of Rule 130, as follows:
Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material containing
letters, words, numbers, figures or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their contents.
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Sec. 4. Original of document. (a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject
of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near
the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as published in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate
the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:
Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever in the case in
hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful
purpose will be served by requiring production.[24]
x x x

In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain documents
in which ordinarily no real dispute arised. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves
universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if
the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it. (empahsis supplied)
Franciscos opinion is of the same tenor, viz:
Generally speaking, an objection by the party against whom secondary evidence is sought to be
introduced is essential to bring the best evidence rule into application; and frequently, where secondary
evidence has been admitted, the rule of exclusion might have successfully been invoked if proper and
timely objection had been taken. No general rule as to the form or mode of objecting to the admission of
secondary evidence is set forth. Suffice it to say here that the objection should be made in proper
season that is, whenever it appears that there is better evidence than that which is offered and
before the secondary evidence has been admitted. The objection itself should be sufficiently definite
to present a tangible question for the courts consideration. [25]
He adds:
Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be received in evidence if no objection is made to its
reception.[26]
In regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules of Court provides in section 20 of Rule
132, viz:
Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
On the rule of authentication of private writings, Francisco states that:
A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the identity and
authenticity of the document must be reasonably established as a pre-requisite to its admission. (Rouw v.
Arts, 174 Ark. 79, 294 S.W. 993, 52 A.L.R. 1263, and others) However, a party who does not deny the
genuineness of a proffered instrument may not object that it was not properly identified before it
was admitted in evidence. (Strand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266, 103 A.L.R. 835). [27]
Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v. Muro,[28] which frowned on reliance by courts on
newspaper accounts. In that case, Judge Muro was dismissed from the service for relying on a
newspaper account in dismissing eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos. There is
a significant difference, however, between the Muro case and the cases at bar. In the Muro case,
Judge Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the basis of a newspaper account without
affording the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment
or on oral argument. . .(this is) not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but
is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality. In the instant cases, however, the petitioner had an
opportunity to object to the admissibility of theAngara Diary when he filed his Memorandum dated
February 20, 2001, Reply Memorandum dated February 22, 2001, Supplemental Memorandum dated
February 23, 2001, and Second Supplemental memorandum dated February 24, 2001. He was therefore
not denied due process. In the words of Wigmore, supra, petitioner had been given an opportunity to

inspect the Angara Diary but did not object to its admissibility. It is already too late in the day to raise his
objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a decision
rendered partly on the basis thereof.
III

Temporary Inability

Petitioner argues that the Court misinterpreted the meaning of section 11, Article VII, of the
Constitution in that congress can only decide the issue of inability when there is a variance of opinion
between a majority of the Cabinet and the President. The situation presents itself when majority of the
Cabinet determines that the President is unable to govern; later, the President informs Congress that his
inability has ceased but is contradicted by a majority of the members of the Cabinet. It is also urged that
the presidents judgment that he is unable to govern temporarily which is thereafter communicated to the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate is the political question which this Court cannot
review.
We cannot sustain the petitioner. Lest petitioner forgets, he himself made the submission in
G.R. No. 146738 that Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine
whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in
section 11 of Article VII.[29] We sustained this submission and held that by its many acts, Congress
has already determined and dismissed the claim of alleged temporary inability to govern proffered by
petitioner. If petitioner now feels aggrieved by the manner Congress exercised its power, it is incumbent
upon him to seek redress from Congress itself. The power is conceded by the petitioner to be with
Congress and its alleged erroneous exercise cannot be corrected by this Court. The recognition of
respondent Arroyo as our de jure president made by Congress is unquestionably a political
judgment. It is significant that House Resolution No. 176 cited as the bases of its judgment such factors
as the peoples loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to
effectively govern and the members of the international community had extended their recognition of
Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and it has a
constitutional duty of fealty to the supreme will of the people x x x. This political judgment may be
right or wrong but Congress is answerable only to the people for its judgment. Its wisdom is fit to
be debated before the tribunal of the people and not before a court of justice. Needles to state, the
doctrine of separation of power constitutes an inseparable bar against this courts interposition of its
power of judicial review to review the judgment of Congress rejecting petitioners claim that he is still the
President, albeit on leave and that respondent Arroyo is merely an acting President.
Petitioner attempts to extricate himself from his submission that Congress has the ultimate authority
to determine his inability to govern, and whose determination is a political question by now arguing
thatwhether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial question. Petitioners change of
theory, ill disguised as it is, does not at all impress. The cases at bar do not present the general issue of
whether the respondent Arroyo is the de jure or a de facto President. Specific issues were raised to the
Court for resolution and we ruled on an issue by issue basis. On the issue of resignation under section
8, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the issue is legal and ruled that petitioner has resigned from
office before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. On the issue of inability to govern under
section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the Congress has the ultimate authority to
determine the question as opined by the petitioner himself and that the determination of Congress is a
political judgment which this Court cannot review. Petitioner cannot blur these specific rulings by the
generalization that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial question.
Petitioner now appears to fault Congress for its various acts expressed thru resolutions
which brushed off his temporary inability to govern and President-on-leave argument. He asserts
that these acts of Congress should not be accorded any legal significance because: (1) they are post
facto and (2) a declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be implied.

We disagree. There is nothing in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution which states that the
declaration by Congress of the Presidents inability must always be a priori or before the Vice-President
assumes the presidency. In the cases at bar, special consideration should be given to the fact that the
events which led to the resignation of the petitioner happened at express speed and culminated on a
Saturday. Congress was then not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori on
petitioners letter claiming inability to govern. To be sure, however, the petitioner cannot strictly maintain
that the President of the Senate, the Honorable Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and the then Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Honorable Arnulfo P. Fuentebella, recognized respondent Arroyo as the
constitutional successor to the presidency post facto. Petitioner himself states that his letter alleging
his inability to govern was received by the Office of the Speaker on January 20, 2001 at 8:30 A.M. and
the Office of the Senate at 9 P.M. of the same day. [30] Respondent took her oath of office a few minutes
past 12 oclock in the afternoon of January 20. Before the oath-taking, Senate President Pimentel, Jr. and
Speaker Fuentebella had prepared a Joint Statement which states: [31]
Joint Statement of Support
and Recognition from the
Senate President and the Speaker
Of the House of Representatives
We, the elected leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives, are called upon to address the
constitutional crisis affecting the authority of the President to effectively govern our distressed nation. We
understand that the Supreme Court at that time is issuing an en banc resolution recognizing this political
reality. While we may differ on the means to effect a change of leadership, we however, cannot be
indifferent and must act resolutely. Thus, in line with our sworn duty to represent our people and in
pursuit of our goals for peace and prosperity to all, we, the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, hereby declare our support and recognition to the constitutional
successor to the Presidency. We similarly call on all sectors to close ranks despite our political
differences. May God bless our nation in this period of new beginnings.
Mabuhay and Pilipinas at ang mamamayang Pilipino.
(Sgd.) AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR.
Senate President
(Sgd.) ARNULFO P. FUENTEBELLA
Speaker of the House of Representatives
This a priori recognition by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of respondent Arroyo as the constitutional successor to the presidency was followed
post facto by various resolutions of the Senate and the House, in effect, confirming this
recognition. Thus, Resolution No. 176 expressed x x x the support of the House of Representatives to
the assumption into office by Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in
the attainment of the nations goal under the Constitution. [32] Resolution No. 82 of the Senate and
Resolution No. 178 of the House of Representatives both confirmed the nomination of then Senator
Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as Vice-President. [33] It also passed Resolution No. 83 declaring the impeachment
court functus officio.[34] Both Houses sent bills to respondent Arroyo to be signed by her into law as
President of the Philippines.[35]These acts of Congress, a priori and post facto, cannot be dismissed
as merely implied recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the President of the Republic. Petitioners
insistence that respondent Arroyo is just a de facto President because said acts of Congress x x x are
mere circumstances of acquiescence calculated to induce people to submit to respondents exercise of
the powers of the presidency[36] is a guesswork far divorced from reality to deserve further discussion.
Similarly way off the mark is petitioners point that while the Constitution has made Congress the
national board of canvassers for presidential and vice-presidential elections, this Honorable Court
nonetheless remains the sole judge in presidential and vice presidential contests. [37] He thus postulates
that such constitutional provision[38] is indicative of the desire of the sovereign people to keep out of the

hands of Congress questions as to the legality of a persons claim to the presidential office. [39] Suffice to
state that the inference is illogical. Indeed, there is no room to resort to inference. The Constitution
clearly sets out the structure on how vacancies and election contest in the office of the President shall be
decided. Thus, section 7 of Article VII covers the instance when (a) the President-elect fails to qualify,
(b) if a President shall not have been chosen and (c) if at the beginning of the term of the President, the
President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled. Section 8 of Article
VIIcovers the situation of the death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the
President. Section 11 of Article VII covers the case where the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. In each case, the Constitution specifies the body that
will resolve the issues that may arise from the contingency. In case of election contest, section 4,
Article VII provides that the contests shall be resolved by this Court sitting en banc. In case of resignation
of the President, it is not disputed that this Court has jurisdiction to decide the issue. In case of inability to
govern, section 11 of Article VII gives the Congress the power to adjudge the issue and petitioner himself
submitted this thesis which was shared by this Court. In light of these clear provisions of the Constitution,
it is inappropriate, to say the least, for petitioner to make inferences that simply distort their meanings.

IV

Impeachment and Absolute Immunity

Petitioner contends that this Court disregarded section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution which
provides:
(7)
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted should
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
Petitioner reiterates the argument that he must be first convicted in the impeachment proceedings
before he could be criminally prosecuted. A plain reading of the provision will not yield this
conclusion. The provision conveys two uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells us that judgment in
impeachment cases has alimited reach. . .i.e., it cannot extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, and second, it tells us
the consequence of the limited reach of a judgment in impeachment proceedings considering its
nature, i.e., that the party convicted shall still be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment
according to law. No amount of manipulation will justify petitioners non sequitur submission that the
provision requires that his conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition sine qua non to his
prosecution, trial and punishment for the offenses he is now facing before the respondent Ombudsman.
Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors walk out from the impeachment
proceedings should be considered failure to prosecute on the part of the public and private
prosecutors, and the termination of the case by the Senate is equivalent to acquittal.[40] He explains
failure to prosecute as the failure of the prosecution to prove the case, hence dismissal on such
grounds is a dismissal on the merits. [41] He then concludes that dismissal of a case for failure to
prosecute amounts to an acquittal for purposes of applying the rule against double jeopardy. [42]
Without ruling on the nature of impeachment proceedings, we reject petitioners submission.
The records will show that the prosecutors walked out in the January 16, 2001 hearing of the
impeachment cases when by a vote of 11-10, the Senator-judges refused to open the second envelope
allegedly containing the P3.3 billion deposit of the petitioner in a secret bank account under the name
Jose Velarde. The next day, January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to the Speaker of the
House tendering their resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of

Appearancewith the impeachment tribunal. Senator Raul Roco immediately moved for the indefinite
suspension of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved
the resignation of the public prosecutors. The Roco motion was then granted by Chief Justice
Davide, Jr. Before the House could resolve the issue of resignation of its prosecutors or on January
20, 2001, petitioner relinquished the presidency and respondent Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic. Thus, onFebruary 7, 2001, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the
impeachment court is functus officio.
Prescinding from these facts, petitioner cannot invoke double jeopardy. Double jeopardy
attaches only: (1) upon a valid complaint; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
[43]
Assuming arguendo that the first four requisites of double jeopardy were complied with, petitioner
failed to satisfy the fifth requisite for he was not acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding
dismissed without his express consent. Petitioners claim of double jeopardy cannot be predicated on
prior conviction for he was not convicted by the impeachment court. At best, his claim of previous
acquittal may be scrutinized in light of a violation of his right to speedy trial, which amounts to a failure to
prosecute. As Bernas points out, a failure to prosecute, which is what happens when the accused is not
given a speedy trial, means failure of the prosecution to prove the case. Hence, dismissal on such
grounds is a dismissal on the merits.[44]
This Court held in Esmea v. Pogoy[45], viz:
If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the
dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the prosecutions motion for postponement of the trial is
denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently
fails to prove the defendants guilt, the court upon defendants motion shall dismiss the case, such
dismissall amounting to an acquittal of the defendant.
In a more recent case, this Court held:
It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of
failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the
same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of
the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the
right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private
respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. [46]
Petitioner did not move for the dismissal of the impeachment case against him. Even
assumingarguendo that there was a move for its dismissal, not every invocation of an accuseds right to
speedy trial is meritorious. While the Court accords due importance to an accuseds right to a speedy trial
and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, this right cannot be invoked
loosely. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what
offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. [47] The following provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are apropos:
Rule 115, Section 1(h). Rights of accused at the trial. -- In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
entitled to the following rights:
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
Rule 119, Section 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.-- Trial once commenced shall
continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable
length of time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous
trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy
trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of
trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.
Petitioner therefore failed to show that the postponement of the impeachment proceedings
was unjustified, much less that it was for an unreasonable length of time. Recalling the facts, on
January 17, 2001, the impeachment proceeding was suspended until the House of Representatives shall
have resolved the issue on the resignation of the public prosecutors. This was justified and
understandable for an impeachment proceeding without a panel of prosecutors is a mockery of the
impeachment process. However, three (3) days from the suspension or January 20, 2001, petitioners
resignation supervened. With the sudden turn of events, the impeachment court became functus
officio and the proceedings were therefore terminated. By no stretch of the imagination can the four-day
period from the time the impeachment proceeding was suspended to the day petitioner resigned,
constitute an unreasonable period of delay violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial.
Nor can the claim of double jeopardy be grounded on the dismissal or termination of the case
without the express consent of the accused. We reiterate that the impeachment proceeding was
closed only after the petitioner had resigned from the presidency, thereby rendering the impeachment
courtfunctus officio. By resigning from the presidency, petitioner more than consented to the termination
of the impeachmment case against him, for he brought about the termination of the impeachment
proceedings. We have consistently ruled that when the dismissal or termination of the case is made at the
instance of the accused, there is no double jeopardy.[48]
Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. His
arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In
our Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and
turns up to the present time. We held that given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the
policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim
executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioners
rehashed arguments including their thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that
he is still President, albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire term of
office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the presidency and there is
now a newde jure President.
Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit
during his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, viz:
Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committees omitting in the draft proposal the immunity
provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in
striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under
the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first
sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not
provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the Presidentin-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas: The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that
during histenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez: So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas: There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973
Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.

Mr. Suarez; On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.[49]
Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time
during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the
several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond
the power of the incumbent. [50] From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the
immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.
Indeed, petitioners stubborn stance cannot but bolster the belief that the cases at bar were filed not
really for petitioner to reclaim the presidency but just to take advantage of the immunity attached to the
presidency and thus, derail the investigation of the criminal cases pending against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Prejudicial Publicity on the Ombudsman

Petitioner hangs tough on his submission that his due process rights to a fair trial have been
prejudiced by pre-trial publicity. In our Decision, we held that there is not enough evidence to sustain
petitioners claim of prejudicial publicity. Unconvinced, petitioner alleges that the vivid narration of events
in our Decision itself proves the pervasiveness of the prejudicial publicity. He then posits the thesis that
doubtless, the national fixation with the probable guilt of petitioner fueled by the hate campaign launched
by some high circulation newspaper and by the bully pulpit of priests and bishops left indelible impression
on all sectors of the citizenry and all regions, so harsh and so pervasive that the prosecution and the
judiciary can no longer assure petitioner a sporting chance. [51] To be sure, petitioner engages
inexageration when he alleges that all sectors of the citizenry and all regions have been irrevocably
influenced by this barrage of prejudicial publicity. This exaggeration collides with petitioners claim
that he still enjoys the support of the majority of our people, especially the masses.
Petitioner pleads that we apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or the transaction speaks
for itself) to support his argument. Under the res ipsa loquitur rule in its broad sense, the fact of the
occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation.[52] It is not a rule of substantive law but more a procedural rule. Its
mere invocation does not exempt the plaintiff with the requirement of proof to prove negligence. It merely
allows the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances
to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence and to thereby place on the
defendant the burden of going forward with the proof.[53]
We hold that it is inappropriate to apply the rule on res ipsa loquitur, a rule usually applied only in
tort cases, to the cases at bar. Indeed, there is no court in the whole world that has applied the res
ipsa loquitur rule to resolve the issue of prejudicial publicity. We again stress that the issue before
us is whether the alleged pervasive publicity of the cases against the petitioner has prejudiced the minds
of the members of the panel of investigators. We reiterate the test we laid down in People v. Teehankee,
[54]
to resolve this issue, viz:
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all
high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial

is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a
fair trial for, as well pointed out , a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the
trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to
seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal
cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as hey happen straight to our
breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and
fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch
with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity
lest they lost their impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure
to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage
of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et
al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we
ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar,
the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of
the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the
casedoes not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
Petitioner keeps on pounding on the adverse publicity against him but fails to prove how the
impartiality of the panel of investigators from the Office of the Ombudsman has been infected by
it. As we held before and we hold it again, petitioner has completely failed to adduce any proof
of actual prejudice developed by the members of the Panel of Investigators. This fact must be
established by clear and convincing evidence and cannot be left to loose surmises and conjectures. In
fact, petitioner did not even identify the members of the Panel of Investigators. We cannot replace this
test of actual prejudicewith the rule of res ipsa loquitur as suggested by the petitioner. The latter rule
assumes that an injury (i.e., prejudicial publicity) has been suffered and then shifts the burden to the
panel of investigators to prove that the impartiality of its members has been affected by said
publicity. Such a rule will overturn our case law that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the
right of an accused to fair trial. The cases are not wanting where an accused has been acquitted despite
pervasive publicity.[55] For this reason, we continue to hold that it is not enough for petitioner to conjure
possibility of prejudice but must prove actual prejudice on the part of his investigators for the Court to
sustain his plea. It is plain that petitioner has failed to do so.
Petitioner agains suggests that the Court should order a 2-month cooling off period to allow
passions to subside and hopefully the alleged prejudicial publicity against him would die down. We regret
not to acquiesce to the proposal. There is no assurance that the so called 2-month cooling off period will
achieve its purpose. The investigation of the petitioner is a natural media event. It is the first time in our
history that a President will be investigated by the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged commission of
heinous crimes while a sitting President. His investigation will even be monitored by the foreign press all
over the world in view of its legal and historic significance. In other words, petitioner cannot avoid the
kleiglight of publicity. But what is important for the petitioner is that his constitutional rights are not
violated in the process of investigation. For this reason, we have warned the respondent Ombudsman
in our Decision to conduct petitioners preliminary investigation in a circus-free atmosphere. Petitioner is
represented by brilliant legal minds who can protect his right as an accused.

VI

Recusation

Finally, petitioner prays that the members of this Honorable Court who went to EDSA put on record
who they were and consider recusing or inhibiting themselves, particularly those who had ex-parte
contacts with those exerting pressure on this Honorable Court, as mentioned in our Motion of March 9,
2001, given the need for the cold neutrality of impartial judges. [56]
We hold that the prayer lacks merit. There is no ground to inhibit the twelve (12) members of the
Court who merely accepted the invitation of the respondent Arroyo to attend her oath taking. As mere
spectators of a historic event, said members of the Court did not prejudge the legal basis of the claim of
respondent Arroyo to the presidency at the time she took her oath. Indeed, the Court in its en banc
resolution on January 22, 2001, the first working day after respondent Arroyo took her oath as President,
held in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05 SC, to wit:
A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request for Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take Her Oath of
Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent
request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20,
2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm
the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January
20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper
party.
The above resolution was unanimously passed by the 15 members of the Court. It should be clear
from the resolution that the Court did not treat the letter of respondent Arroyo to be administered the oath
by Chief Justice Davide, Jr., as a case but as an administrative matter. If it were considered as a case,
then petitioner has reason to fear that the Court has predetermined the legitimacy of the claim of
respondent Arroyo to the presidency. To dispel the erroneous notion, the Court precisely treated
the letter as an administrative matter and emphasized that it was without prejudice to the
disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party. In further clarification, the
Court on February 20, 2001 issued another resolution to inform the parties and the public that it xxx did
not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither
did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution. Thus, there is no reason
for petitioner to request for the said twelve (12) justices to recuse themselves. To be sure, a
motion to inhibit filed by a party after losing his case is suspect and is regarded with general
disfavor.
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing
short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental
law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one
designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of
this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power
of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. [57] The proposed mass disqualification,
if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot
lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices. [58]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and his
Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 are DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

2001: RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG
PILIPINAS,
CESAR
SARINO,
RENATO
CAYETANO
and
ATTY.
RICARDO
ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to start hearing the criminal
charges against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to cover the event via live television and live radio
broadcast and endeavors this Court to allow it that kind of access to the proceedings.
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association
representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a
letter[1]requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other
criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to
assure the public of full ransparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." [2] The
request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still
later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the instant
petition,[3] submitting the following exegesis:
"3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest official of the land,
members of his family, his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the prosecution
thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire
citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of.
" 4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern, as in the instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the live radio
and television coverage of the concomitant court proceedings.
"5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of
ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the
supporters of the past regime of any and all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived attempts on the part of the
present dispensation, to 'railroad' the instant criminal cases against the Former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada."[4]
Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the public to vital
information affecting the nation.
In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991 resolution of this Court in a
case for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino. The resolution read:

"The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras
in the courtroom. Similarly, Philippine courts have not had the opportunity to rule on the question
squarely.
While we take notice of the September 1990 report of the United States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc
Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, still the current rule obtaining in the Federal Courts of the
United States prohibit the presence of television cameras in criminal trials. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or
radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. A trial of any kind or in any court is a matter
of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment. To so
treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest
for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated.
"Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by forbidding the broadcasting or televising
of a trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a television or news
reporter has the same privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing
press into the courtroom.
"In Estes vs. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial
proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a criminal defendant. Voting 5-4, the
Court through 'Mr. Justice Clark, identified four (4) areas of potential prejudice which might arise from the
impact of the cameras on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the defendant. The decision in part
pertinently stated:
"'Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might
be frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of-court
influences which might affect their testimony. Also, telecasting not only increases the trial judge's
responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant, it may as well affect his own
performance. Judges are human beings also and are subject to the same psychologjcal reactions as
laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive
public exposure and distracts him from the effective presentation of his defense.
'The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused
and his case in the eyes of the public.'
"Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of mandate to compel a court to
permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom, a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater
than those of any other member of the public. Massive intrusion of representatives of the news media
into the trial itself can so alter or destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and decorum
that the requirements of impartiality imposed by due process of law are denied the defendant and a
defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and photographers
each time he enters or leaves the courtroom.
"Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and
orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the
people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means,
live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court
hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers,
the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or
photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.

"Accordingly, in order to protect the parties right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved
to PROHIBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footages of court hearings
for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated."
Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and it has become an
important instrument in the quest for truth. [5] Recent history exemplifies media's invigorating presence,
and its contribution to society is quite impressive. The Court, just recently, has taken judicial notice of the
enormous effect of media in stirring public sentience during the impeachment trial, a partly judicial and
partly political exercise, indeed the most-watched program in the boob-tubes during those times, that
would soon culminate in EDSA II.
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to
control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. [6]
When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence [7] tells us that the right of the accused
must be preferred to win.
With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it
behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just
and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence
testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in
proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free
from improper influence,[8] and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running
emotions or passions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a
trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention [9] and where the
conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence [10] but only by evidence and
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.
Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate,
with every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it must also be conceded that
"television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on." [11] Even while it may
be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them directly and through
the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in
varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the testimony of
witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all
unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. [12] It might be farcical to build around them an
impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion. [13]
To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to
justice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate dispensation of justice
can create.[14] The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of proof, but it is not far-fetched for
it to gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as we know it now.[15]
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else,
where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt
with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves

of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must
be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and
observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness
negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then
be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings. [16]
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive
means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process in
action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the
accused to due process[17] which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced, "while a maximum freedom must be allowed the press in
carrying out the important function of informing the public in a democratic society, its exercise must
necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process." [18]
This Court, in the instance[19] already mentioned, citing Estes vs. Texas, [20] the United States
Supreme Court holding the television coverage of judicial proceedings as an inherent denial of due
process rights of an accused, also identified the following as being likely prejudices:
"1. The potential impact of television x x x is perhaps of the greatest significance. x x x. From the moment
the trial judge announces that a case will be televised it becomes a cause celebre. The whole
community, x x x becomes interested in all the morbid details surrounding it. The approaching trial
immediately assumes an important status in the public press and the accused is highly publicized along
with the offense with which he is charged. Every juror carries with him into the jury box these solemn
facts and thus increases the chance of prejudice that is present in every criminal case. x x x
"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired. The impact upon a witness of the
knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is simply incalculable. Some may be demoralized
and frightened, some cocky and given to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone speaking
publicly, and accuracy of statement may be severely undermined. x x x. Indeed, the mere fact that the
trial is to be televised might render witnesses reluctant to appear and thereby impede the trial as well as
the discovery of the truth.
"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional responsibilities the presence of television places on the
trial judge. His job is to make certain that the accused receives a fair trial. This most difficult task
requires his undivided attention. x x x
4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the defendant. Its presence is a form of
mental - if not physical-harassment, resembling a police line-up or the third degree. The inevitable closeup of his gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his trial might well transgress his personal
sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate on the proceedings before him - sometimes the
difference between life and death - dispassionately, freely and without the distraction of wide public
surveillance. A defendant on trial for a specific crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a
city or nationwide arena. The heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television coverage will
inevitably result in prejudice."
In his concurring opinion in Estes, Mr. Justice Harlan opined that live television and radio coverage
could have mischievous potentialities for intruding upon the detached atmosphere that should always
surround the judicial process.[21]

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 April 2001, expressed its own concern
on the live television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television
and radio coverage can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure
a fair trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the accused but the very credibility
of the Philippine criminal justice system, and live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow the
"hooting throng" to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such that the
verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular; and live television and radio coverage of the trial will
not subserve the ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding
lawyers.
It may not be unlikely, if the minority position were to be adopted, to see protracted delays in the
prosecution of cases before trial courts brought about by petitions seeking a declaration of mistrial on
account of undue publicity and assailing a court a quo's action either allowing or disallowing live media
coverage of the court proceedings because of supposed abuse of discretion on the part of the judge.
En passant, the minority would view the ponencia as having modified the case law on the
matter. Just to the contrary, the Court effectively reiterated its standing resolution of 23 October
1991. Until 1991, the Court had yet to establish the case law on the matter, and when it did in its
23rd October resolution, it confirmed, in disallowing live television and radio coverage of court
proceedings, that "the records of the Constitutional Commission (were) bereft of discussion regarding the
subject of cameras in the courtroom" and that "Philippine courts (had) not (theretofore) had the
opportunity to rule on the question squarely."
But were the cases decided by the U.S. courts and cited in the minority opinion really in point?
In Nebraska Press Association vs. Stewart,[22] the Nebraska State trial judge issued an order
restraining news media from publishing accounts of confession or admissions made by the accused or
facts strongly implicating him. The order was struck down. In Richmond Newspaper, Inc., vs. Virginia,
[23]
the trial judge closed the courtroom to the public and all participants except witnesses when they
testify. The judge was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court which ruled that criminal trials were
historically open. In Globe Newspaper vs. Superior Court,[24] the US Supreme Court voided a
Massachusetts law that required trial judges to exclude the press and the public from the courtroom
during the testimony of a minor victim of certain sexual offenses.
Justice Stewart, in Chandler vs. Florida,[25] where two police officers charged with burglary sought
to overturn their conviction before the US Supreme Court upon the ground that the television coverage
had infringed their right to fair trial, explained that "the constitutional violation perceived by the Estes
Court did not stem from the physical disruption that might one day disappear with technological advances
in the television equipment but inhered, rather, in the hypothesis that the mere presence of cameras and
recording devices might have an effect on the trial participants prejudicial to the accused." [26]
Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts do not allow live television
and radio coverage of their proceedings.
The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions so involving as
they do a former President of the Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have twice become the
nation's focal points in the two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of
the events has left a still divided nation. Must these events be invited anew and risk the relative stability
that has thus far been achieved? The transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to, turn a blind
eye to yet another possible extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now creep into even the

business of the courts in the dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in the
standing rule of the court contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be propitious.
Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will of the people in any sense
which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate justiciable controversies on the basis of what alone is
submitted before them.[27] A trial is not a free trade of ideas. Nor is a competing market of thoughts the
known test truth in a courtroom.[28]
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance
forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty to bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety
nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

September 2001: RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG
PILIPINAS,
CESAR
SARINO,
RENATO
CAYETANO,
and
ATTY.
RICARDO
ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners request for permission to
televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion
was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict
between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and,
on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be
resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository of
sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by
any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and
radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based
on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called
"expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan
to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information
may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio
coverage.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due
deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time

broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its
members,[1] the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, [2] has
resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes. Seven (7)
Justices[3]vote against the audio-visual recording of the trial.
What follows is the opinion of the majority.
Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and
the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual
recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for
documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall
have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be
deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical
preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.[4]
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be inconspicuously installed in the
courtroom and the movement of TV crews will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and solemnity of
the proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its entirety, except such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may decide should not be held public pursuant to Rule 119, 21 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be included in the documentary except annotations which may be
necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The audio-visual recordings shall be made
under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case may be.
There are several reasons for such televised recording. First, the hearings are of historic
significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he
is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the
Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how
their government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio-visual presentation. Third, audiovisual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary
purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way that the
cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events. They will be
primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of
the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic
notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking
part in the proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper
performance of their roles whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges will be
allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may
jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be minimized. The possibility that
judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be
avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial - which, it may be assumed,
is the concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials - will be addressed
since the tapes will not be released for public showing until after the decision of the cases by the

Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV and
radio broadcast will be avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trials can be served by audio-visual
recordings without impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, [5] this Court set aside a lower court's injunction restraining the filming of
"Four Day Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of
National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This Court held: "A limited
intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public
figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters
of a public character."[6]
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary record
is made of the proceedings, any movie that may later be produced can be checked for its accuracy
against such documentary and any attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases or causes
clbreswas made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay friends found similarly moving. An
educational television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of resisting
arrest, and broadcast the document in full, in four installments, several months after the case was
concluded - concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the painstaking way in which
the truth was searched for, for the ways whereby law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities through
presumptions and burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with which judge and jury carried out their
responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the familiar good
reasons. And yet the use of television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of live
news, and with the safeguards of completeness and consent, is an educational experiment that I would
be prepared to welcome. Properly safeguarded and with suitable commentary, the depiction of an actual
trial is an agency of enlightenment that could have few equals in its impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our educational system, is now a
desperate need.[7]
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years ago. It is
perceptive for its recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV and
radio broadcasts, especially when emotions are running high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the
same time acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of the proceedings of
celebrated cases, for public information and exhibition, after passions have subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following
conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV

crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual
recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except
such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast
of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the
former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of
violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of
the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division
concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release
of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National
Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance
with law.
SO ORDERED.