Professional Documents
Culture Documents
June 2015
Figure 48: Size of the subsidy from the perspective of CTs (distribution per gender) ..........................................................................................................50
Figure 49: Size of the subsidy from the perspective of CTs (distribution per region) ...........................................................................................................50
Figure 50: Costs incurred in relation with the payment of the subsidy .................................................................................................................................50
Figure 51: Proportion of CTs dissatisfied with the amount of the subsidy ............................................................................................................................51
Figure 52: Proportion of CSTs dissatisfied with the amount of the subsidy..........................................................................................................................51
Figure 53: Subsidy amount desired by CTs and comparison with the actual compensation of CSTs .................................................................................51
Figure 54: Proportion of CTs exercising a complementary occupation according to sector ................................................................................................52
Figure 55: CT income from the parents' contribution (MGA/month) .....................................................................................................................................52
Figure 56: Estimation of the overall monthly income of CTs.................................................................................................................................................52
Figure 57: Proportion of CTs dissatisfied with the mode of payment of the subsidy ............................................................................................................53
Figure 58: Proportion of CTs wishing to change mode of payment ......................................................................................................................................54
Figure 59: Average delay of payment of the subsidy in 2013-14 ..........................................................................................................................................55
Figure 60: Average delay of payment of the subsidy in 2014-15 ..........................................................................................................................................55
Figure 61: Reasons mentioned to account for late payment ................................................................................................................................................55
Figure 62: Reasons mentioned by CTs to account for late payment: distribution per region, type of area, and mode of payment ....................................55
Figure 63: Late payment: Increases teacher absenteeism? .................................................................................................................................................56
Figure 64: Late payment: Increases parents' contributions? ................................................................................................................................................56
Figure 65: Strengths of the payment mechanism according to EPP principals ....................................................................................................................57
Figure 66: Weaknesses of the payment mechanism according to EPP principals...............................................................................................................58
Figure 67: Recommendations to improve the payment mechanism expressed by EPP principals .....................................................................................58
Figure 68: Parents' level of satisfaction with teacher performances (Proportion of extremely and moderately satisfied parents) ......................................61
Figure 69: Projections of the 2008 EFA Plan: Civil service teachers and CTs .....................................................................................................................62
Figure 70: Percentage of CTs subsidized in primary and junior high school: Objective of 2013-2015 IPE .........................................................................63
Figure 71: Population ages 5 to 10 years (2012-2020).........................................................................................................................................................65
Figure 72: Projection of student numbers and needs in teacher ..........................................................................................................................................66
Figure 73: Projection of teachers per status (H2) .................................................................................................................................................................66
Figure 74: Projection of the MoE wage bill required under A1 and resulting possibilities of assignment of the macroeconomic scoping scenarios .........67
Figure 75: Resource deficit derived from Assumption 1 in relation with the integration of CTs to public service ................................................................67
Figure 76: Projection of the MoE wage bill required under A2 and resulting possibilities of assignment of the macroeconomic scoping scenarios .........68
Figure 77: Resource deficit resulting from Assumption 2 in relation with the integration of CTs to public service ..............................................................68
FOREWORD
This report was prepared as part of the review of public expenditure in the education,
public health, and nutrition sectors in Madagascar.
The report presents a review of the payment of non-civil service teachers, commonly
called FRAM teachers.1 Its objective is to describe the existing payment mechanisms,
review their performance and weaknesses with regard to the award criteria as well as
operation, and to propose contextualized and practical recommendations to improve
the current mechanisms and their performance. The report also includes a prospective
analysis of possible scenarios for the integration of community teachers in the public
service.
The analysis in this study is largely based on a field survey conducted among principals,
teachers, and parents at a sample of schools in the regions of Analamanga, Atsinanana
and Melaky. Special thanks to ATR UNICEF in those regions for completing the data
collection work with great professionalism and in a very short time.
The report is organized in five parts:
1) the first part deals with the methodological aspects of the study;
2) the second part presents Community Teachers (CTs) as a fundamental component
of the education system and the situation of compensation of CTs at the primary
schools;
3) the third part analyzes the issue of CTs recruitment and access the status of
Subsidized Community Teachers (SCTs) , taking into account what the law says
and what is done in practice;
4) the fourth part provides an analysis of CTs payment across various sources of
funding (budget, technical and financial partners and contributions of parents) and
reviews the payment mechanism in terms of performance before ending with an
analysis of strengths, weaknesses and recommendations for improving the
situation;
5) the fifth and final part is prospective in nature. It explores the sustainability of the
various options for integrating CTs into the public service in reference to
macroeconomic developments scenarios.
The name FRAM teachers finds its origin in the way these teachers were recruited in the 1980s, namely by parents
associations (fikambanananny ray aman-dreny or FRAM), in a context where there was limited recruitment of
teachers in the civil service due to budget constraints.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
FRAM teachers, a fundamental component of the education system
FRAM teachers are a fundamental component of the Malagasy education system. Their role was
crucial both during the period when the system expanded as well as during the crisis period
experienced in recent years. Indeed, while the massive use of FRAM teachers or non-civil
service teachers (CTs) in the 2000s was dictated by limited public funding that could not keep
up with the fast growing demand (the proportion of CTs increased from 15% in 2000 to 58%
in 2010), during the last crisis, the public budget difficulties were such as to favor hiring CTs
though pressure from demand has softened. In 2014, the CTs at all levels of the education
system (pre-school to high school) numbered 82,850, representing 69% of all teachers (against
58% in 2010). At the primary level, CTs represent 78.4% of all teachers (against 61% in 2010).
CTs as a phenomenon have become the dominant feature of the education sector. They can be
credited for maintaining and expanding the system and have allowed for meeting the
conditions for the education sectors financial sustainability and improving the educational
support conditions: the ratio of students to teacher improved from over 55 in the 2000s to 44
in 2014.
The adoption of a CT compensation policy came as a natural consequence of the growing
importance of the CT phenomenon. The amount of subsidy to CTs has improved over the years.
It increased from MGA 30,000 per month for 9 months in the year in 2002 to MGA 110, 000
MGA per month for 12 months in the year starting in 2013. This development seems important:
the annual compensation increased almost fivefold in nominal terms from MGA 270,000 per
year in 2002 to MGA 1.320 million per year in 2014. However, the analysis shows that in real
terms the compensation of subsidized CTs was multiplied by a factor of 1.62 between 2002 and
2014, i.e. an average annual increase of 4.1%, which is not negligible or can even be regarded
as substantial given the changes that occurred as regards the GDP per capita, which increased
by 0.8% over the same period. However, the recent trends correspond to a decline of -4.2% in
the compensation of CTs in real terms since 2010. The increase in coverage of CTs with the
subsidy system has not kept pace with the increase in their number, leading to a drop in the
support rate, which shrank from 75% in 2007 (78.8% in 2008) to less than 67% in 2014.
The current distribution of CTs and subsidized CTs reflects some dysfunctions of the criteria and
principles adopted for the recruitment of CTs and the opening of subsidized positions. It should
be noted that most of the principles and rules applied in this matter are recent and have not
yet reached the stage of systematic application. Thus, it is recommended to officially
promulgate the rules and principles after wide consultation and to revise and update them at
a frequency to be set. The issue of recruitment, beyond the procedural aspects, is crucial. In
fact, wise choices made when selecting CTs determine the quality of education. The audits and
reviews conducted under some CTs subsidizing projects highlighted several deficiencies in the
recruitment procedures. This concerns especially rural areas where family networks and
influences are present and active. In urban areas, procedures are better complied with due to
the high number of applications received and the resulting implicit control of the proceedings.
Data from 2013-2014 show that CTs are not subsidized in 15.3% of schools. This proportion
exceeds 30% in some CISCOs. Moreover, there are only non-subsidized community teachers in
11.4% of schools, i.e. a total number 3,216 schools.
The survey conducted as part of this study showed that the recruitment procedure was not
complied with in one recruitment out of five. It also showed that CTs have on average a record
of over 8 years in the profession, of which 5.3 years at their current school. This confirms the
fact that CTs are rather stable in their position, contrary to the popular belief of high mobility
among them. It is also interesting to note that access to the subsidy does not necessarily require
proven seniority: over 55% of SCTs started receiving subsidies before the second year in their
position. The average "waiting time" to start receiving subsidy is 2.3 years, but paradoxically
the most educated SCTs are the ones who have the most difficulty to access to the subsidy,
which casts some doubts as to the soundness of the prioritization criteria for eligibility to
recruitment and subsidy. It is also interesting to note that the teachers attendance is inversely
proportional to the level of stability granted by their status: civil servant and on-contract
teachers have highest rates of absenteeism, followed by SCTs and finally CTs.
Situation of FRAM teachers payment
The State Budget earmarks over MGA 60 billion for subsidizing SCTs in the three educational
cycles. This budget line has increased at an annual rate of 8.7% between 2011 and 2014,
outpacing MoEs budget growth rate (6.4%). The budget contribution to the CTs subsidies
amounts on average to about 11% of the MoEs total expenditure, 14% of the MoEs payroll,
and 56% of current expenditure exclusive of payroll and 73% of transfer expenditures. SCTs
in public primary schools (EPP) account for nearly 90% of the budget allocated to school
education. The shares of SCTs in junior high school and high school are respectively of 9.6%
and 1.4%. Over the entire 2009-2015 period, the national budget paid for more than two thirds
(68.7%) of the primary school CTs subsidies with the remaining third being contributed by
Technical and Financial Partners (TFP). The MoEs share in the CTs compensation budget has
increased from 50% in 2009 to 72.3% in 20014 and is expected to grow nearly to 79% in 2015.
The commitment procedure for the payment of subsidies runs through 20 stages prior to the
commitment of payment transactions at the providers level (Treasury, Bank and MFI).2 The
procedure involves 11 actors at central, regional as well as local levels in addition to service
providers. The procedure estimated duration stands at 69 days in all, including 8 days for
payment procedures by providers and a maximum of up to 180 days of which 153 days prior
to providers involvement. In fact, two major steps may significantly delay the payment
process. This is step 12 (shipment by post parcel of the notices to the General Treasuries) due
to delays that may occur and step 18 which includes in particular the replenishment with funds
of the Main Revenue Offices at the district level because of blockages occurring at this level,
inherent to cash restrictions.
The SCTs surveyed feel that the subsidies received are low or extremely low. Indeed, three SCTs
out of four consider that the level of subsidy is very low. In general, teachers are not satisfied
with their level of compensation. This applies to civil servants (78% reporting being
dissatisfied and 43% very dissatisfied) and even more to the SCTs (92% reporting being
dissatisfied and 79% very dissatisfied). To meet the SCTs expectation, the current level of
subsidy would have to increase three fold. Indeed, the amount of subsidy they say would meet
their expectation is almost MGA 305,000, which is three-fourth of the wages of civil servant
teachers as noted by the survey.
Due to the low level of the subsidy, SCTs mobilize two sources of supplementary income: they have
additional waged activities and benefit from a portion of parents' contribution. The survey
showed that half of male SCTs and a quarter of female CTs resort to additional waged activities
that generated an average monthly income of about MGA 10,000. On the other hand, SCTs
collect about MGA 30,000 per month in parental contributions. This brings their total monthly
2013-2014 data show that more than 72% of CTs are paid by MFIs (38% by OTIF, and 34.4% by other MFIs such as
TIAVO, PAMF, and Vola Mahasoa). Payment by bank transfer and by post concerns respectively 14.2% and 10.9%
of CTs. Payment by the Treasurys accountants concerns only 2.5% of SCTs.
income to about MGA150,000 (73% from the MoE subsidy, 20% from parents contribution
and 7% from supplementary activities undertaken by the SCTs).
SCTs satisfaction level with the three payment methods, as reported in the survey (Treasury
with cash vouchers, banks transfers, and cash payment by MFIs) is quite mixed. Indeed, SCTs
in Melaky who are paid by cash vouchers are quite satisfied with this method of payment (with
a satisfaction rate of more than 90%) as opposed to payment by MFIs (satisfaction rate of only
18%) or to payment by bank transfer (30%). The main reasons SCTs are satisfied with the
different payment methods are as follows: i) the payment by MFIs, which are widely spread
throughout the country, is appreciated because local branches are close to where SCTs live; ii)
bank transfers are appreciated because there is no deduction, which is not the case for payment
via MFIs; ii) cash vouchers are appreciated especially because they remain valid for 3 months;
iv) thought it presents disadvantages, the payment frequency (every two months) is seen as an
advantage by some SCTs because it forces them to make savings; v) the different payment
methods are also appreciated because they present no risk and guarantee actual payment. As
for the reasons for dissatisfaction, late payment comes first as it puts CTs in a situation of
indebtedness and raises for some teachers a real issue of "personal dignity: they believe that
their situation of chronic indebtedness taints their social status especially in rural villages.
Second, SCTs mentioned the issue of fees and incidentals associated with the payment
transaction. About a third of SCTs want to change payment method, mostly migrating from the
MFI OTIV to bank transfer.
Late and erratic payment is the major recurring payment problem mentioned by SCTs. The delay
that occurred in the past school year (2013-2014) is estimated at 5 months, while in the
current school year it stands at 3.2 months. SCTs mentioned multiple reasons to explain late
payment: they relate in particular to red tape and liquidity issues at the MoE and the Ministry
of Finance and Budget. Worth to note, for more than 8% of SCTs, the delay is due to the
policymakers lack of consideration for CTs. This calls out for improvements in the MoEs
communication policy vis--vis CTs. Late payment has adverse impacts on SCTs employment
situation and private life. While the survey noted only limited impact in terms of increased
absenteeism and additional costs to households (in only 10% of cases, the long delay increased
absenteeism or parents' contribution), it highlighted the fact that CTs primary strategy to cope
with late payments is enter into debts.
Recommendations for improving the CTs subsidies
The survey conducted as part of this study identified several strengths in the payment of CTs as
pointed out by EPP principals and beneficiaries, namely: i) political will and commitment
expressed by the MoE for several years to improve the CTs subsidy level and expand the
subsidy system to become general, ii) the financial support for CTs reduces teacher
absenteeism and further motivates CTs to give the best of themselves and engage more
willingly in training programs, which certainly improves the quality of teaching, iii) though it
is not yet universal, the payment of subsidies to CTs benefits to two-thirds of CTs through the
injection of a budget of nearly MGA 60 billion. This should significantly help alleviate costs to
parents, of at least the same amount, and has contributed to expand access to education in
several parts of the country and reduce dropping out for economic reasons during periods of
crisis, iv) the method of payment agreed and involving several providers has allowed to
provide the most appropriate responses, taking into account regional and local characteristics,
and has helped improve the payment process, reduce costs and increase reliability.
Several shortcomings in the SCTs payment processes were highlighted during the survey. Two
key recurring issues need radical solutions, namely, the issue of late payment on one hand and
the periodicity of payments on the other hand. It should be noted that delays combined with
two-monthly and erratic payments cause STCs to be in a situation of financial instability and
unpredictability, with multiple consequences in terms of professional involvement and
disruption of their private and social lives. Furthermore, as confirmed by stakeholders in the
field, the payment of SCTs has not reduced parental contributions paradoxically. In principle,
the credit allocated to the CTs subsidies should reduce parental contributions of the same
amount. However, the process major shortcomings, namely long delays and long and erratic
intervals between payments, have largely mitigated the impact initially desired of alleviating
parents financial burden. Other weaknesses include remoteness of payment venues in many
areas, which implies traveling, absence from work and financial cost for CTs, as well as the
issue of the various commissions and costs incurred upon payment.
Recommendations for improving the CTs payment process pertain to four main aspects:
procedures, delay, tax status and frequency:
Procedures for the recruitment, management and payment of CTs are certainly clearer
though as complicated. Such complexity in procedures goes against efficiency and
transparency. The crucial point in the procedure consists in effecting payment once the
service is acknowledged as rendered. The famous ICSR (individual certificate of service
rendered) and CCSR (collective certificate of service rendered) act as bottlenecks on
one hand, but are necessary in this payment logic on the other hand. These procedures
were important, not to say fundamental, at the time the system was established, but
changes have occurred since then, bringing two stabilizing elements: the level of the
subsidies has increased, making the position of CT more attractive and reducing the
mobility of CTs, ii) the CTs databases at the central and regional levels are becoming
more and more reliable and the procedures for identifying and localizing CTs have
become more efficient. In this context of maturity of the system, it is recommended to
shift from the logic of prior control to post control. To this effect, it is recommended to
shift from Certificate of Service Rendered (whether individual or collective) to
Certificate of Service Non-Rendered. As such, the acknowledgement of services would
pertain to non-rendered service (which has become the exception) and not service
rendered (which has become the rule). During the transition period, control may be
limited to two periods of the year: at the beginning and the end of the school year. Two
things may further facilitate this shift, namely the possible increase in the level of
subsidy and its generalization to all CTs over the recruitment moratorium period.
Recruitments from then on should comply with much stricter procedures with active
involvement of the MoE who will be a real stakeholder in the recruitment contract.
The delay and frequency are the two fundamental elements that should be targeted in
the effort to improve procedures under the payment mechanism. The issue of delay
involves two essential components: procedure-related delay and sustained delay:
o
Procedure related delays occur particularly in the preparation of certificates and
forwarding of documents, exceeding one month or two months in some cases.
The implementation of the new system recommended (prior payment with post
control) solves much of this problem. However, in the present situation, a system
for real-time monitoring of the payment procedures progress can inform in time
on bottlenecks and allow for swiftly taking appropriate steps to accelerate the
procedure through permissions to grant or the provision of timely support or
assistance through facilitators to remedy the difficulties encountered both at
central and regional levels. This requires the establishment of a task force
equipped with an information system and skills and capacity to mobilize skills
and monitor implementation. It is proposed to support the UAT in developing
this task force.
o
Sustained delay is actually the most worrying form of delay. Indeed, the main
cause of delay lies with budget control decisions. Payment is often delayed for
several months due to unavailability of cash. This raises the issue of the status of
10
this payment which appears in the transfer section of the budget (6565: Transfer
to the private sector). As such, it is subject to the same regulation restrictions as
the other categories of operating expenses. Here again, a shift is needed. These
transfers officially called "subsidies for FRAM teachers salaries" should be
considered as quasi-wages and treated accordingly in terms of budgetary control
and thus benefit from the same prioritization as payroll costs. While payroll costs
guarantee the functioning of 20% of the system, the subsidies guarantee the
functioning of two-thirds of the system, and three-quarters of the system in a
very near future. A joint decision by the MFB/MoE should be taken to grant a
priority status to subsidies in budget execution.
The issue of payment every two months deserves a thorough analysis. This periodicity is,
firstly, not complied with in practice because, ultimately, the actual frequency is
dictated by budgetary regulations and, secondly, it is not necessarily a source of
savings. Indeed, the biggest costs associated with the payment process are actually
proportional to the amounts, thus monthly or semi-annual payments would generate
the same costs. Moreover, in our societies, spending follows a monthly cycle, and a bimonthly income, especially when it comes to low income that could be regular (which
is not the case) does not match the spending pattern and thus generates dysfunctions
and inconsistencies that result in chronic indebtedness, as observed. Thus, it is strongly
recommended to shift to monthly payments of the CTs subsidies. This system will be
all the more easy to establish as initiatives to facilitate procedures are adopted.
The tax status of the subsidies is not clear. The texts reviewed as part of this study do
not define their tax status. The subsidies actually consist in distributed income but they
are not subject to withholding. On the other hand, it is noted that this income is not
declared by beneficiaries and thus escapes taxation. To regularize this situation, on one
hand, and to better motivate CTs, on the other hand, it is advisable to enact tax
exemption for this compensation. The joint decision to approve the collectability of the
transfers in the budget process could include a specific definition of the subsidies tax
by granting exemption.
The 2008 EFA Plan opted for not recruiting additional civil servants for the primary
cycle but to meet needs through the use of CTs who will benefit from an active policy
of training and improvement of their compensation that would increase from the
equivalent of 22% of civil servant teachers salaries to 62% over the 2008-2015 period.
The Interim Plan for Education 2013-2015 (IPE) aims for the generalization of
subsidies for CTs at junior high school level and quasi-generalization for CTs at the
primary level in 2015-2016 while making no provision for improving the level of
subsidy (MGA 110,000 MGA/month). Moreover, the IPE provided for the recruitment
of civil servants at the average rate of 2,500 per year.
In 2014, it turned out that the objectives of generalizing subsidies were not achieved and that the
level of the subsidies did not substantially improve. Since 2013-2014, a new political
commitment to the effective introduction of free education has emerged. This also includes the
payment by the Government of CTs compensation with the option of integrating them into the
11
public service. What would be the impact and feasibility of this option in terms of public
finances?
The projections done referred to two scenarios as regards developments in the macroeconomic
framework, tapping into the findings of studies conducted by the IMF: i) a base scenario
building on rapid reform, ii) a low growth scenario in the case of slow reforms. As regards
changes in the amount of resources available to the MoE on one hand and assignable to primary
education and primary level teachers salaries on the other hand, the assumptions used are
extrapolations of the situation observed in 2014, as there is no prospective education policy
document available at the MoE. Projections for 2020 show that the number of teachers
required would reach 96,100 for an expected total enrollment of about 5.2 million. Compared
with the situation in 2014, this represents an increase of 600,000 students, requiring the
recruitment of 11,510 additional teachers.
Which hypotheses for the integration of CTs in the public service and what options should be
adopted for CTs given the possibilities for allocating resources for the payment of primary school
teachers in the two macroeconomic framework scenarios of macroeconomic framework? Two
hypotheses were tested:
1) Hypothesis 1: integration of all teachers in the public service in 2016 and filling additional
needs by recruiting civil servants.
2) Hypothesis 2: progressive recruitment of SCTs in the public service at the rate of 10,000
in 2016 and 2017, 15,000 in 2018 and the remaining in 2019 (16,000) and 2020 (16,960).
Projection results show that Hypothesis 1 is clearly not sustainable even under the most
favorable developments in the macroeconomic environment. Indeed, as early as in 2016,
payroll requirements for the primary education will amount to MGA 550 billion (exceeding the
total MoE budget in 2014 which was MGA 541 billion) while allocation possibilities are limited
to MGA 286 billion (Scenario 1) and MGA 322 billion (Scenario 2), which gives a gap between
41% and 48% that persists throughout the projection period. In 2019-2020, the gap remains
between 20% (Scenario 1) and 33% (Scenario 2). This definitely preclude the option under
Hypothesis 1 as a sustainable development of the MoEs budget.
Under Hypothesis 2, the projection results show that the integration of 10,000 CTs in 2016 and in
2017 is sustainable under favorable economic growth (Scenario 1). A gap occurs under this
Hypothesis if economic growth is slower (Scenario 2). However, from 2018 on, the integration
of 15,000 and then 16,000 in 2019 generates significant requirements that are not covered
under the current structure of budget arbitration, even under the macroeconomic framework
in Scenario 1. Two options are possible starting in 2018 under Hypothesis 2: i) bring the
integration rate down to lower levels (back to 10,000/year), which will delay the integration
of all teachers in the public service to 2023, ii) provide more resources to national education
beyond the current 19%. The option to be adopted will be a combination of both options with
possibly a feasible "political" solution in the short term: generalization of subsidization to all
CTs by 2017.
12
1. METHODOLOGY
The case study on the payment of community teachers (i.e. non civil servants) (CTs)
was based on a methodological approach that integrated three study approaches:
literature review: of studies, existing data and statistics;
a series of interviews with key officials and stakeholders involved in the issue
of CTs compensation;
a field survey with principals, teachers, civil servants, community teachers
and parents conducted at a sample of schools.
The objective of the survey was to provide arguments on the situation of CTs
compensation to complement the past reviews of documents or interviews with
stakeholders. The survey looked at the different aspects associated with the
management and compensation of FRAM teachers or CTs, especially the followings:
Recruitment of CTs: CTs recruitment procedures and process. Since June
2014, the MoE made the decision to put a moratorium on recruitment. What
is the actual situation? Has there been any new recruitment of CTs in
September at the beginning of the 2014-2015 school year? How is the
recruitment procedure adopted as described by teachers and school
principals? What are the roles played by the different actors (parents, school
principals, and heads of ZAP or CISCO)?
Teachers career: How to define the career pathway? How to secure the
status of subsidized CTs? What is the pathway? Under which conditions?
What are the in-service training possibilities for CTs? What are the
complementary activities performed by CTs in the various contexts?
Subsidies for CTs: What are the costs associated with the receipt of subsidies?
Are there any "indirect costs"? What are the impacts of late payment
(increased absenteeism)? How to deal with late payments? Are there
additional costs in case of late payment? Are parents asked to contribute
more? How satisfied are stakeholders with the amount of compensation and
the payment mechanism? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the
payment methods? What recommendations can be made to improve the
payment methods?
Contributions of parents: Trend and changes according to the contexts. What
are the uses of parental contributions and their distribution across the
various possible uses? How do parents feel about the level of FRAM
contribution and its use? Are there other categories of payment such as gifts
and food? How satisfied are parents with the performance of teachers?
13
Given the purpose of the survey as well as the time and resources allocated for its
implementation, it should be noted that there was no intent to carry out a financial
audit, let alone a representative statistical census. Rather, the goal was to illustrate the
current situation as regards the topics selected from a sample that was based on three
major criteria: regions: three areas are selected according to the presence of levels of
CTs;
Regions: three regions were selected in reference to the proportion of CTs in
their teaching staff;
Setting: urban and rural areas;
Method of payment of subsidized CTs.
The following figure illustrates the positioning of the 22 regions according to the
significance of CTs among the teaching staff and according to the students-to-teacher
ratio.
Figure 1: frame rate and proportion of CTs by region (2013-2014)
In each region, ten schools were selected, distributed equally between urban and rural
areas. Thus, the sample covered 3 regions, 5 CISCOs, 17 ZAPs and 30 schools. The
following table and figure show the distribution of the survey sample:
Table 1: Distribution of the survey sample by region, CISCO and ZAP
Number per setting
Region
CISCO
ZAP
Urban
Analamanga
Antananarivo Avaradrano
Rural
5
10
10
Ankadikely West
Antsinanantsena
Antsinanantsena Namehana
Brickaville
10
Ambinaninony
Brickaville
Vohitranivona
Toamasina 2
2
Ampasimbe Onibe
Antetezambaro
Fanandrana
Toamasina ambanivohitra
Melaky
Maintirano
1
1
10
Mafaijijo
4
Morafenobe
Total
3
1
Belitsaka
Maintirano
1
2
Manandriana
Atsinanana
Total
4
4
Andramy
Antsingilotoka
Morafenobe
16
thirty
14
15
16
There were 154 subsidized CTs in the 30 schools sampled, out of which one third were
paid by cash vouchers, half by bank transfer, and one sixth through OTIV.
Table 2: Distribution of schools surveyed by the method for the payment of subsidized CTs
Number of schools
Urban
Analamanga
Rural
Urban
Rural
Total
10
34
21
55
10
34
21
55
10
31
17
48
Transfer
11
11
22
OTIV
20
26
10
33
18
51
10
33
18
51
Cash voucher
Transfer
OTIV
Atsinanana
Cash voucher
Melaky
Cash voucher
Transfer
OTIV
Total
Number
14
16
thirty
98
56
154
Cash voucher
10
33
18
51
Transfer
15
45
32
77
OTIV
20
26
Cash voucher
28.6%
37.5%
33.3%
33.7%
32.1%
33.1%
Transfer
50.0%
50.0%
50.0%
45.9%
57.1%
50.0%
OTIV
21.4%
12.5%
16.7%
20.4%
10.7%
16.9%
Structure
At each school surveyed, interviews were conducted with the school principal, 4 to 6
teachers (1 civil servant, 4-5 CTs) and about 3 parents. Thus in total, 224 interviews
were conducted: 30 with school principals; 37 with civil service teachers, 79 with CTs
(72 subsidized CTs) and 78 parents. The following figure shows the distribution of
people surveyed by region:
Figure 3: Distribution of people surveyed by region
17
This development was driven mainly by a sustained commitment of the public sector
whose share in the education sector expanded over the past 15 years to exceed 80%
from 2004. The private sectors contribution has been limited to less than 20%.
18
Table 3: Distribution of teachers by category and level of education (2009-2010 and 2013-2014)
Teachers paid by the State
officials
2009-2010
Preschool
Primary
Junior High
High school
Total
2013-2014
Preschool
Primary
Junior High
High school
Total
contractual
FRAM teachers
subsidized
217
28,210
10,797
2,926
69
34,352
ND
ND
175
41
42,150
216
151
12,923
5,663
2,643
37
5,209
5,306
1,110
550
44,347
2,848
304
21,380
11,662
48,049
unsubsidized
223
10,918
ND
ND
Total
292
45,270
5,202
,576
Semispecialized
teachers
129
Total
Other
143
137
143
34
652
73,746
11,115
3,001
51,340
129
457
88,514
2407
21,989
8,439
1,966
2957
66,336
11,287
2,270
784
2,381
20
54
113
115
113
3,199
85,365
24,752
6,156
34,801
82,850
3,185
395
119,472
19
Thus, the period when the system expanded as well as the period of stagnation were
favorable to increasing recruitment of CTs. Data show that in the early 2000s, the 4,710
CTs identified in 1999-2000 represented less than 15% of the number of teachers.
Their number increased 9 fold within 10 years to reach almost 41,000 in 2009 and
account for 58.7% of primary school teachers. A similar upward trend in the number
and proportion of CTs in the system has continued over the last five years: CTs,
numbering 66,300 now account for 78.4% of primary school teachers, as illustrated in
the following figure:
Figure 8: Evolution of CTs Primary: number and weight in the faculty (2000-2014)
Source: according to data from MoE (Statistical Yearbooks from 2000 to 2014)
20
Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Monthly
subsidies
30,000
30,000
30,000
30,000
30,000
60,000
80,000
80,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
110,000
110,000
Number
of months
Annual
subsidies
9
9
9
9
9
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
270,000
270,000
270,000
270,000
270,000
720,000
960,000
960,000
1,200,000
1,200,000
1,200,000
1,320,000
1,320,000
GDP deflator
15.3%
2.8%
14.3%
18.3%
11.5%
9.6%
9.1%
8.4%
8.8%
8.2%
5.5%
5.0%
6.3%
(Amounts in MGA)
Compensation index base 100 =
2002
Nominal
Constant
100
100
100
115
100
118
100
135
100
160
267
179
356
196
356
214
444
231
444
252
444
272
489
287
489
302
21
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Civil servants
Contractual teachers
Subsidized CTs
Non-subsidized CTs
Other
Student-teachers
28,186
28,496
28,611
28,210
27,535
21,610
25,974
23,061
7,678
154
619
28,562
7,663
240
29,450
11,422
130
34,352
10,918
137
37,529
16,520
207
38,623
18,829
78
43,064
19,494
31
12,923
5,209
44,347
21,989
113
59079
64,961
69,613
73,617
81,791
79,140
88,563
84,581
2,636
129
700
1,543
1,122
784
22
In 2014, the total number of subsidized CTs reached 44,347 in primary education. This
represents 52.4% of teachers. The distribution of the SCTs by DREN is given in the
following graph:
Figure 14: Distribution of Subsidized CTs by region (2014)
23
24
The following table describes each of the steps and specifies actors involved at each
level:
Table 6: Process for selecting applicants to the position of FRAM teachers
Step
1
Identifying
assessing
teachers
Activity
needs
and
for
Convening
and
organizing a general
meeting of the FRAM
Receiving applications to
the position of FRAM
teachers
Selecting applicants to
the position of FRAM
teachers
Commissioning of the
new FRAM teachers
Actors involved
Convene and set the date of the FRAM general meeting and the
agenda (rehiring, selection and recruitment of new FRAM teachers)
FRAM
Write and post the call for applications for CTs. The positing should
last 7 to 15 days.
Keep a register for receipt of applications
Receive applications
Check and issue a receipt for each application received
Close receipt of applications with a statement of the final number
of applications received
Selection Committee
chaired by the Principal or
Head of ZAP
25
26
All CTs, without any exception, must teach a class at least in accordance with
the standards set by education policies; CTs in the position of school principals
are the only ones that can be exempted from teaching a class. The function to
be held by CTs must be expressly mentioned in their employment contracts.
CTs cannot be assigned to a position by a deed of an administrative authority.
Switching between two subsidized or unsubsidized CTs is permitted subject
to prior agreement of two concerned FRAMs.
The number and list of CTs per school must be displayed at the CISCO, the
Commune and the school.
The number and list of subsidized CTs must also be displayed in the same way
before each payment.
As for the prioritization of the allocation of CTs subsidies, it is noted that subsidies for
CTs that are already subsidized should be automatically renewed unless the incumbent
do not agree to follow their positions in case these are cancelled or transferred
elsewhere. In the case of new quota or subsidized positions becoming vacant, the most
senior (in terms of years of service) among the unsubsidized within a CISCO should be
prioritized. However, they must agree to serve where the subsidized positions are
allocated. In the case of transfer of subsidized positions, the positions should go in
priority to the incumbent CTs unless they withdraw or refuse the new position. CTs
who change workstation must enter a new contract with their new employer.
Prioritization criteria in recruitment take into level of education (highest diploma),
work experience, age (with the oldest given priority) and the proximity of the
applicants place of residence.
Concerning the management of subsidized CTs positions, the MoE strives to ensure the
balance of positions/enrollments. Thus, if a school is overstaffed or understaffed with
teachers, subsidized positions can be suppressed, created or transferred as
appropriate, taking into account students interest, the concerned teachers family and
social situation, as well as the schools functioning.
The decisions to create and the management of subsidized positions should be
discussed between managers at CISCO, the heads of and school principals based on
school mapping and the situation of the teacher workforce, taking into account the
following criteria:
EPPs newly created or expanded;
EPPs least staffed in consideration of enrollments and the number of
educational groups (the target in terms of teacher-to-students ratio is
currently 1 to 50);
EPP with a shortage of staff due to massive departure of civil servant teachers
(assignment elsewhere, retirement, death, resignation, dismissal, etc.);
Rural and vulnerable areas prioritized by remoteness and against urban areas.
27
Responsibilities
MoE at the
central level
DREN
Local
Assignment
Commission
(CLA)
CISCO
Head of ZAP
Principals
FRAM
28
CTs
Validation and signature of deeds related to the management of CTs (hiring or rehiring contract,
attendance sheet, various certificates, Minutes, request for registration at CNAPS.)
Monitoring and control of CTs attendance
Checking and signing of substitute certificates
Support to CTs as appropriate
Production and preparation of files
Signing of the hiring/rehiring contract
Signing of attendance register
Compliance with the discipline and internal rules of schools
Production and preparation of documents required by CNAPS
Regarding the method for setting quotas, the MoE uses educational statistics to define
the need for new subsidized positions. Two calculation methods are applied: i) the first
method is based on the needs to create new educational divisions based on a target of
50 students per pedagogical division and on the distribution of staff across the different
grades, ii) the second method refers to the number of educational divisions that can be
created in consideration of existing facilities. The objective is to stabilize the size of
educational divisions at 50 students in the schools.
The calculations of needs for the 2014-2015 school year gave an additional need of
more than 31 000 teachers, using the first method, and about 25 000 teachers, using
the second method. The following graph illustrates the results, giving the breakdown
of the number of schools overstaffed or understaffed according to the two methods:
Figure 15: Recruitment needs
Actually, it is not possible to think in terms of balance (needs for new positions minus
overstaffing to be removed), knowing that it is difficult to remove existing positions.
The goal is rather is to consider the practical feasibility of transfers within a same
CISCO.
29
This analysis is carried out first at the school level, but the quotas to be applied are the
calculated by the CISCO in reference to a target that takes into consideration possibility
for recruitment and the maximum ratio of teachers per educational division. Thus,
needs are pooled at the CISCO level and the final distribution among schools is
performed at this level, taking into account the local context. While this approach is
laudable and makes local structures more accountable, the lack of triangulation of the
positions created ultimately with the initial analysis conducted by school does not
allow for addressing the dysfunctions and inadequacies that occur locally and that can
substantially affect the equity objective initially desired. In fact, the overall ratio at the
CISCO level may mask major disparities across schools. Thus, it is recommended to
maintain the role of local structures, but on the other hand, to set the quota at the CISCO
level with an indicative breakdown by school and subsequently compare the allocation
planned with that proposed by schools, providing clear explanations for any difference.
This exercise could potentially help further refine the criteria when determining the
quota for the following school year.
3.3
The current situation of CTs and subsidized CTs distribution reflects some
dysfunctions of the criteria and principles adopted for the recruitment of CTs and the
opening of subsidized positions. It should be noted that most of the principles and rules
applied in this matter are recent or even at the preparatory stage and have not yet
reached the stage of systematic application. Thus, it is recommended to officially
promulgate the rules and principles after wide consultation and to revise and update
them at a frequency to be set (possibly every three years).
The issue of recruitment, beyond the procedural aspects, is crucial. In fact, wise choices
made when selecting CTs determine the quality of education. The audits and reviews
conducted under some CTs subsidizing projects highlighted several deficiencies in the
recruitment procedures. This concerns especially rural areas where the family
networks and influences are present and active. In urban areas, procedures are better
complied with due to the high number of applications received and the resulting
implicit control of the proceedings.
In many cases, compliance with the administrative procedure, as complicated as it
might be, does not guarantee efficiency and best choice in recruitment. The MoEs
decentralized structures could play a more active role in this matter, going beyond the
purely administrative aspects. Some initiatives are noteworthy and should be taken as
examples. For instance, as indicated in an audit report, a head of CISCO at the Bongolava
DREN introduced a list of abilities for applicant CTs in reference to a theoretical
training of eight days, an observation period of four weeks and an assessment period
of one week, allowing FRAM associations and principals to make use of the list to select
applicants.
30
Several indicators and statistical data point to dysfunctions in the distribution of CTs
and SCTs and to disparities among schools, CISCOs and DRENs. The following maps
illustrate regional disparities in the distribution of teachers on one hand: it refers to
the student-teacher ratio that exceeds 50 in three regions (Melaky, Haute Matsiatra
and Androy) but is below 40 in Analamanga and Amoron'i Mania. On the other hand, it
shows the significance of CTs whose proportion among the teaching staff exceeds 85%
in the regions of Melaky, Astsimo-Andrefana and Androy:
Map 1: Ratio Student/Teacher by region (2014)
The following two charts illustrate disparities in distributions at the CISCO and school
levels:
31
Figure 16: Number of students per classroom and number of students per teacher at the CISCO level
(2014)
1 Ambalavao 2 Ambanja, 3 Ambatoboeny, 4 Ambatofinandrahana, 5 Ambatolampy, 6 Ambatomainty, 7 Ambatondrazaka, 8 Ambilobe, 9 Amboasary South, 10 Ambohidratrimo, 11 Ambohimahasoa, 12
Ambositra 13 Ambovombe, 14 Ampanihy, 15 Amparafaravola 16 Analalava, 17 Andapa, Andilamena 18, 19 Andramasina, Anjozorobe 20, 21 Ankazoabo 22 Ankazobe 23 Anosibe An'Ala 24 Antalaha, 25Antanambao Manampotsy, Atsimondrano 26 Antananarivo, Antananarivo Avaradrano 27, 28 Antananarivo Renivohitra, Antanifotsy 29, 30 Antsalova, 31 Antsirabe I, 32 Antsirabe Ii, 33 Antsiranana I, 34
Antsiranana Ii, 35 Antsohihy, 36 Arivonimamo, 37 Bealanana, 38 Befandriana North, 39 Befotaka 40 Bekily, 41 Belo Sur Tsiribihina, 42 Beloha 43 Benenitra, 44 Beroroha, 45 Besalampy, 46 Betafo, 47
Betioky, 48 Betroka, 49 Brickaville 50 Fandriana, 51 Farafangana, 52 Faratsiho 53 Fenerive East, 54 Fenoarivobe 55 Fianarantsoa I, 56 Iakora 57 Ifanadiana, 58 Ihosy, 59 Ikalamavony 60 Ikongo 61
Isandra, 62 Ivohibe 63 Kandreho, 64 Lalangina 65 Maevatanana, 66 Mahabo 67 Mahajanga I, 68 Mahajanga Ii, 69 Mahanoro, 70 Maintirano 71 Mampikony, 72 Manakara, 73 Mananara North, 74
Manandriana 75 Mananjary Mandoto 76, 77 Mandritsara 78 Manja, 79 Manjakandriana 80 Maroantsetra Marolambo 81, 82 Marovoay, 83 Miandrivazo, 84 Miarinarivo 85 Midongy South, 86 Mitsinjo 87
Morafenobe, 88 Moramanga, 89 Morombe, Morondava 90, 91 Nosy- Be, 92 Nosy Varika, 93 Port-Berge, 94 Sainte-Marie, 95 Sakaraha 96 Sambava, 97 Soalala, 98 Soanierana Ivongo 99 Soavinandriana
100 Taolanaro, 101 Toamasina I, 102 Toamasina Ii, 103 Toliara I, 104 Toliara ii, 105 Tsaratanana, Tsihombe 106, 107 Tsiroanomandidy, Vagaindrano 108, 109 Vatomandry, Vavatenina 110, 111 Vohibato,
112 Vohimarina, Vohipeno 113, 114 Vondrozo
Figure 17: Number of students per classroom and number of students per teacher at the EPP level (2014)
Statistical dispersion indicators confirm the significance of disparities for the various
ratios presented, the standard deviation exceeding half of the average.
32
The distribution of CTs and SCTs is also affected by such disparities. The following
chart illustrates the distribution for the 23,470 EPPs inventoried in 2013-2014. It
shows that while the average proportion of CTs at the national average is 78% (out of
which 67% are subsidized), the situation largely varies across schools and across
school size categories.
Figure 18: Distribution of EPPs according to the proportion of CTs teachers and subsidized CTs (2014)
In fact, the data in 2013-2014 show that no CTs are subsidized in 15.3% of schools. This
proportion exceeds more than 30% in some CISCOs, namely Besalampy at 50.4%,
Beroroha at 37.1%, Ankazoabo at 36.8%, Morafenobe at 34.4%, Maevatanana at 32.5,
and Soalala at 32.0%.
Moreover, there are only non-subsidized contract teachers in 11.4% of schools, i.e. a
total number 3,216 schools. In other words, these public schools receive no public
funding for the teaching staff which is made up entirely of CTs (numbering 3,900) that
are paid exclusively by parents. In some CISCOs, the proportion of schools operating
exclusively through unsubsidized CTs is quite large, namely in Besalampy at 48.7%,
Beroroha at 33.3%, Ankazoabo at 32.2%, Morafenobe at 31.3%, and Maevatanana at
30.2%. The following graph illustrates this distribution:
33
Figure 19: Distribution of CISCOs according to the proportion of schools where the teaching staff is
made-up entirely of non-subsidized CTs (2014)
The survey conducted as part of this study showed that the recruitment procedure was
not complied with in one recruitment out of five, as reported by school principals. As
for access to subsidy, it occurs under the replacement of subsidized teachers or the
allocation of new quotas in half the cases.
Figure 20: CTs recruitment mode (as reported by
principals)
34
35
The survey noted a second paradox, namely the issue of teacher attendance. While
statistical representativeness could not be achieved with the scope of survey, the
findings are quite significant. Indeed, the situation in the 30 schools surveyed shows
that the level of attendance is inversely proportional to the level of stability granted by
the teachers status: civil servant and on-contract teachers are the ones to be most
frequently absent from work (with nearly 3 days of absence on average since the
beginning of the 2014-2015 school year, i.e. about 5 months). The duration of absences
decreases to 1.8 days when it comes to subsidized CTs (16 in number in the schools
surveyed) and no absence was recorded for non-subsidized CTs. It should be noted that
in rural areas, the absenteeism rate is higher than in urban areas and the situation
varies largely across regions: the average number of days of absence per teacher is 0.9
in Analamanga; 4.0 in Atsinanana and 1.4 in Melaky. Detailed results are appended, the
following chart provides a general overview:
Figure 25: Average number of days of absence per teacher according to their status and setting
(urban/rural)
Other findings in the field confirmed this phenomenon. For instance, in the ZAP of
Antehiroko in the CISCO of Ambohidratrimo, the average duration of absence of civil
service teachers was 2.83 days per teacher against 0.5 days for CTs, in the first quarter
of 2015. This confirms one of the few positive aspects of private funding for teachers,
namely accountability and close supervision. Thus, a thorough and detailed analysis of
the issue of teacher absenteeism and attendance should be conducted at the national
level to determine local and regional specificities and possibly develop appropriate
measures to effectively control the scourge of absenteeism beyond the traditional
administrative mechanisms that have proven little efficiency in most cases.3 _ftn3
The 2012 survey on knowledge acquired in school in fifth grade showed that teachers in this grade missed an average
of 29 days.
36
Regarding in-service training, the SCTs in the schools surveyed received on average
15.5 days of training during the 2013-2014 school year. For the first five months of the
2014-2015 school year, this duration was 4.1 days. The situation of SCTs in terms of
in-service training is comparable to that of civil service teachers as shown in the
following table, which also highlights the fact that in-service training concerns more
teachers in rural areas than those in urban areas:
Table 8: Number of in-service training days per SCTs
Subsidized CTs
Urban
Rural
Urban
Rural
Total
in 2013-2014
Analamanga
22.3
18.6
20.8
18.7
10.3
14.2
Atsinanana
6.0
27.7
18.9
15.8
28.7
23.5
Melaky
4.9
6.8
6.0
6.3
9.2
7.6
12.2
18.7
15.5
12.9
15.7
14.4
Analamanga
4.0
thirty
3.6
4.4
2.6
3.3
Atsinanana
4.9
3.1
3.9
thirty
3.2
3.1
Melaky
5.1
4.9
5.0
5.0
4.2
4.6
Total
4.6
3.7
4.1
4.3
3.3
3.7
Total
in 2014-2015
37
4. PAYMENT OF CTS
This section of the study addresses the payment of CTs in terms of financing effort, as
distributed between the government budget, partners, and households and provides
an analysis of the mechanism adopted, according to its performances and gaps.
4.1
BUDGETARY COST
The State budget dedicates over MGA 60 billion to subsidize CTs at the three school
cycles. To the exception of the special circumstances in year 2010, when it comes to
use (liquidated credits), the amount dedicated to subsidizing CTs increased at an
annual rate of 8.7% from 2011 to 2014, exceeding the growth rate of the MoE's budget
over the same period, i.e. 6.4%. The following figure illustrates the changes in the
transfers made to subsidize CTs over the 2010-2015 period:
Figure 26: Changes in the budget amounts allocated to CT subsidies
38
Initial
credit
Amended
credit
Amount
committed
Amount
paid out
Amount
expended
Execution
rate*
61 020
4 882
812
66 713
47 156
3 998
749
51 902
47 156
3 998
617
51 770
47 156
3 890
617
51 663
47 156
3 890
617
51 663
100.0%
97.3%
82.4%
99.5%
18 236
4 882
610
23 728
40 983
3 776
558
45 317
40 983
3 776
558
45 317
40 983
3 776
534
45 293
40 983
3 776
534
45 293
100.0%
100.0%
95.7%
99.9%
46 803
4 514
658
51 975
52 330
7 542
1 077
60 948
52 330
7 542
1 077
60 948
52 330
7 542
1 077
60 948
52 330
7 542
1 077
60 948
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
56 574
5 138
724
62 437
56 574
5 138
724
62 437
39
4.2
CONTRIBUTION OF PARTNERS
Initially, CT subsidiess were almost exclusively funded with external resources, as part
of the programs of technical and financial partners (TFPs). Gradual take-over by the
State budget contributed to the sustainability of the subsidy. The data collected on the
contributions of TFPs involved in subsidizing CTs over the 2009-2015 period are
compiled in the following table:
Table 10: Subsidies of EPP CTs: shares of the MoE's budget and partner funding (2009-2015)
(Amounts in million MGA)
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
MoE budget
21 671
30 868
31 668
47 156
40 983
52 330
56 574
Partners
21 671
15 434
15 834
20 057
20 057
20 057
15 091
9 527
4 966
5 564
0
4 966
5 564
9 527
5 564
9 527
61 041
72 387
71 666
FTI/UAT
FTI/UNICEF
EU/UNICEF
PASSOBA
PAUSENS
PAUET
Overall total
21 671
20 057
15 434
43 342
46 302
15 834
47 502
67 213
Over the 2009-2015 period as a whole, the budget funded more than two thirds
(68.7%) of the subsidies of EPP CTs and TFPs (PME, EU, UNICEF, and the World Bank)
provided nearly a third of these subsidies. The share of the MoE's budget in the
compensation of CTs is on the rise, increasing from 50% in 2009 to 72.3% in 2014 and
expected to reach nearly 79% in 2015. These changes are illustrated in the two
following figures:
Figure 29: Changes in the State budget's share in
the funding of CTs
40
4.3
41
The following figures and table describe the changes in the contribution per parent per
year and show that, in the regions of Analamanga and Atsinanana, the contribution
increased on average by more than 10% per year over the 2012-2015 period:
42
Analamanga
Atsinanana
Total 1
(exclusive of Melaky)
Melaky
Overall total
2011-2012
2012-2013
2013-2014
2014-2015
Urban
17,200
20,240
22,040
22,240
Rural
22,800
26,000
30,000
33,300
Total
20,000
23,120
26,020
27,770
Urban
13,750
14,250
14,750
15,000
Rural
10,000
10,750
11,600
14,400
Total
11,875
12,500
13,000
14,700
Urban
15,475
17,245
18,395
18,620
Rural
16,400
18,375
20,800
23,850
Total
15,938
17,810
19,510
21,235
Urban
5,500
5,500
6,000
6,000
Rural
2,000
2,000
2,000
5,500
Total
4,333
4,333
4,000
5,750
Urban
Rural
Total
13,818
15,600
14,667
15,382
17,500
16,390
16,473
17,667
17,096
16,517
20,792
18,654
Comparable results were obtained from the survey conducted by MoE, in thirty (30)
schools of the School District (CISCO) of Antananarivo Downtown, in 2013-2014. It
showed that the average contribution of students' parents to the school budget
amounts to MGA 18,410, ranging from MGA 5,000 to MGA 28,000. In other words,
parents' contributions are the prime source of funding of the school budget. In the
thirty (30) schools surveyed, the resources collected from such contributions reach an
overall amount of MGA 128 million, i.e. an average budget per school of MGA 5.3
million. The following figure shows the distribution of the survey schools per
contribution level and amount of revenue made from parents' contributions:
43
Figure 38: Parents' contributions and revenue made by schools: 30 schools from the CISCO of Urban
Antananarivo (2013-2014)
Source: Results of a survey conducted by MoE in 30 schools of the CISCO of Urban Antananarivo (2013-2014)
Survey schools essentially use the revenue made from parents' contributions to
compensate CTs, although they are also used to pay the watchman, purchase supplies,
fund the running of the school, make repairs, and finance school reports and physical
education.
The survey schools use the
parents' contributions to grant a
monthly subsidy to subsidized
and non-subsidized CTs. The
relating amounts are close to the
following: MGA 63,500/month
for
NSCTs
and
MGA 61,150/month for SCTs.
The following figure shows the
distribution of schools according
to the amount of the subsidy
provided
ranging
from
MGA 10,000/month
to
MGA 100,000/month - and in
consideration of the fact that in
over 70% of the schools, this
amount
ranges
between
MGA 50,000/month
and
MGA 80,000/month.
The results of the survey conducted under the present study show that over 70% of the
parents' contribution is used to pay CTs, whether subsidized or not. The overall
structure of the expenditures funded with the revenue from parents' contributions is
shown on the following Figure:
44
Figure 40: Distribution of the uses of the school budget made from parents' contributions
Surveyed parents consider that the requested contribution is expensive: nearly 72% of
the parents deem it expensive and beyond their means (52.6%) or rather expensive
(19.2%). The amount was considered average in less than 30% of cases and none of
the parents surveyed thought it was low. The following figure shows the answers
collected per region and type of area:
Figure 41: Parents' perception of the amount of the contribution required by EPPs
45
4.4
CT PAYMENT MECHANISM
CTs are paid through a complex mechanism derived from a large collection of
procedures enacted by Interministerial Order #29565/2011 MoE/MFB, dated October
14, 2011 on the terms of payment of subsidies to FRAM teachers' salaries and Circular
Note 2011-001-MoE/MFB/SG/DGT/DRH.MoE/DCP.MFB, dated December 7, 2011.
The relevant texts are provided in annex, a reminder of key terms is provided hereafter,
and the procedure is described on the following chart.
The key terms set are as follows:
Subsidies pass through the deposit accounts of DRENs before they are actually
paid to the teachers.
They are either paid in cash at the accounting desks of the Treasury or via
financial entities, by check on the Treasury made out to the relevant financial
entity.
Subsidy cash vouchers are issued on a two-monthly basis as a result of
"geofigureic constraints and of other natures".
They remain valid for a period of three months and any amount relating to
vouchers subject to stop payment or expired must be set aside at the relevant
deposit account.
Paying accountants shall send a summary payment statement to the Directorate
General of National Education or relevant School District.
The procedure for initiating
subsidy payment comprises
twenty (20) steps located
upstream the actual beginning of
payment transactions at the
provider level (national treasury,
bank, and MFI). The procedure
involves eleven (11) actors at the
central, as well as regional and
local levels, in addition to
providers. The number of steps
per actor is shown on the figure
opposite. The following figure
details the payment procedure.
46
Abbreviations: CCSR: Collective certificate of service rendered, ICSR: Individual certificate of service rendered, RTA: Regional
Technical Assistant (Unicef), CV: Cash Voucher, FC: Financial Controller, CISCO: School District, DGEFA: General Directorate of
Basic Education and Literacy, DREN: Regional Directorate of National Education, DHR: Directorate of Human Resources, DTIC:
Directorate of Information and Communication Technologies, CT: Community teacher, EPP: Public primary school, TO: Transfer
Order, SG: Secretary General, RGT: (Regional office of the) General Treasury, MTE: Ministerial Treasury for Education, TSU:
Technical Support Unit, ZAP: Administrative and Educational Zone
47
The procedure is estimated to last a minimum total of sixty-nine (69) days, including
eight (08) days for payment procedures by providers, and a maximum of 180 days, 153
of which occur prior to the providers' intervention. In fact, the payment procedure can
be significantly delayed by two key steps, namely Step 12 (Dispatching credit notes by
post to General Treasury offices), where slowness is liable to occur and Step 18, where
the Main Revenue Services at the district level need to be supplied with funds and
deadlocks inherent to cash flow restrictions may occur. The following figures illustrate
the distribution of minimum and maximum timeframes of the procedures per actor and
step:
Figure 44: Timeframes of CT payment procedures per
actor (in days)
48
The following table and figure set forth the distribution of CTs according to payment
provider per region and show that, in the different regions, MFIs are strongly involved
in the compensation of CTs:
Table 12: Number of CTs paid per provider and region (2013-2014 quota)
Treasury
Sava
Alaotra-Mangoro
Boeny
Betsiboka
Analamanga
Atsinanana
Bongolava
Itasy
Vakinankaratra
Menabe
Atsimo-Andrefana
Amoron'i Mania
Haute Matsiatra
Vatovavy-Fitovinany
Ihorombe
Atsimo-Atsinanana
Anosy
Androy
Melaky
Diana
Sofia
Analanjirofo
Total
Bank
Post
273
50
1 626
643
774
484
324
OTIV
Other
MFIs
3 190
1 949
936
634
1 413
2 036
1 400
2 234
822
1 079
2 647
542
67
638
916
100
668
796
1 924
380
432
354
2 149
4 329
504
1 058
1 262
89
3 754
3 109
1 129
6 459
4 950
17 344
15 703
Total
3 190
1 949
1 209
684
3 039
3 163
1 098
1 400
3 056
1 079
2 647
1 534
2 216
4 329
604
2 642
1 262
1 924
469
1 228
3 754
3 109
45 585
49
4.5
Surveyed CTs think that the subsidies received are small, or even extremely small.
Indeed, three quarters of the CTs think that the subsidy is extremely small. Their
proportion exceeds 83% among men and 86% in the Region of Melaky, as illustrated
on the following figures:
Figure 48: Size of the subsidy from the perspective
of CTs (distribution per gender)
To cash the subsidy, the CT has to incur costs. In some case, travelling is risky,
especially for women (who make up three quarters of CTs), in remote areas. CTs have
to travel an average of 13Km (ranging between 10Km in Analamanga and 17Km in
Melaky) to cash the subsidy. In some cases, the distance travelled exceeds 70Km in
Atsinanana and 90Km in Melaky.
The costs incurred are estimated
at MGA 9,600, half of which are
for transportation and one third
for "fees and other deductions
made or withheld at payment. It
is interesting to note that
teachers in Analamanga do not
have to incur any of this last type
of costs while those in Melaky
must very frequently do so. The
following figure shows the
distribution of costs per nature
and region:
50
Generally speaking, teachers are not satisfied of their level of compensation or subsidy
size. This hold true for civil servants (78% are dissatisfied and 43% highly dissatisfied)
and even more to CTs (92% are dissatisfied, including 79% highly dissatisfied). Unlike
CSTs, CTs show a higher level of dissatisfaction in rural rather than urban areas. The
following figures and table detail the results obtained regarding rates of satisfaction
with respect to the salary (CST) and subsidy (CT):
Figure 51: Proportion of CTs dissatisfied with the
amount of the subsidy
Table 13: Level of satisfaction of CTs with the amount of the subsidy
Region
Analamanga Atsinanana
Very satisfied
More or less satisfied
Dissatisfied
Strongly dissatisfied
Total
0.0%
8.7%
8.7%
82.6%
0.0%
0.0%
11.1%
88.9%
100.0%
100.0%
Type of area
Melaky
Urban
Rural
2.9%
8.6%
22.9%
65.7%
5.4%
0.0%
2.7%
91.9%
100.0% 100.0%
100.0%
13.6%
4.5%
18.2%
63.6%
Mode of payment
Cash
voucher
13.6%
4.5%
18.2%
63.6%
0.0%
0.0%
27.3%
72.7%
Bank
transfer
0.0%
5.1%
5.1%
89.7%
100.0% 100.0%
100.0%
OTIV
Total
4.2%
4.2%
12.5%
79.2%
100.0%
51
Due to the small size of the subsidy, CTs mobilize two other sources of income, i.e.
another waged activity and part of the parents' contribution.
Regarding the first component,
survey results showed that half of
male CTs and a quarter of female CTs
exercise supplementary waged
activities. Overall, 30% of the CTs
have another occupation, mainly in
agriculture
(15.5%),
livestock
farming (4.2%) or trade (9.9%). The
monthly average income generated
from these complementary activities
is in the region of MGA 10,000:
MGA 22,500 for men and MGA 7,000
for women.
Moreover, CTs receive a subsidy from parents' contribution. The survey showed that
this contribution is in the region of MGA 30,000 per month and has maintained itself at
nearly the same level as the previous year, with, however, a decrease in Melaky and an
increase in Atsinanana, as illustrated on the following figure. As such, overall, the
monthly income of a CT is estimated at approximately MGA 150,000: 73% from the
MoE subsidy, 20% from the parents' contribution, and the rest (approximately 7%)
from complementary occupations.
Figure 55: CT income from the parents'
contribution (MGA/month)
52
The survey sample pertained to three modes of payment of the subsidy: the Public
Treasury via cash vouchers, banks via transfers, and MFIs via cash payments.
Figure 57: Proportion of CTs dissatisfied with the mode of
payment of the subsidy
Table 14: Level of satisfaction of CTs with the mode of payment of the subsidy
Region
Analamanga Atsinanana
Very satisfied
More or less satisfied
Dissatisfied
Strongly dissatisfied
Total
0.0%
0.0%
8.7%
91.3%
29.6%
22.2%
29.6%
18.5%
100.0%
100.0%
Type of area
Melaky
68.2%
22.7%
0.0%
9.1%
Receipt
OTIV
68.2%
22.7%
0.0%
9.1%
0.0%
18.2%
54.5%
27.3%
Bank
transfer
20.5%
10.3%
10.3%
59.0%
100.0%
Urban
Rural
34.3%
2.9%
14.3%
48.6%
29.7%
27.0%
13.5%
29.7%
100.0% 100.0%
Mode of payment
Total
31.9%
15.3%
13.9%
38.9%
100.0%
The key reasons why CTs are satisfied with a mode of payment of the subsidy are as
follows:
payments via MFIs are appreciated for the proximity of local branches as they
cover a large part of the territory;
bank transfer is appreciated because there are no withholdings - which is not
the case of payments via MFIs;
cash vouchers are especially appreciated for their 3-month term of validity;
some CTs feel that although being paid on a two-monthly basis has multiple
drawbacks, it has the advantage of being a form of forced savings;
the different modes of payment are also appreciated for the absence of risk and
guarantee of actual payment.
As for the reasons of dissatisfaction, CTs mention the small amount of the subsidy and
its stagnation - which are unrelated to the mode of payment. Nevertheless two key
reasons relevant to the mode of payment were mentioned: i) the first one is late
payment. Late payments cause CTs to get indebted which, for some teachers, poses a
53
real issue of "dignity" as they feel their chronic debts do not speak well for them,
especially in rural villages; ii) then, CTs point out the issue of fees and incidentals that
go with the payment transaction. Fees refer to the sums required by OTIV to open and
keep accounts while incidentals refer to the "collector fees" due for the settlement of
each cash voucher.
When asked if they wished to change
mode of payment and switch to
another provider, approximately
one third (30.6%) of the CTs
reported that they wished to. This
proportion reaches nearly two
thirds among CTs paid by OTIVs. A
certain contradiction is noted among
CTs paid by cash voucher: over 90%
said they were satisfied, yet 32%
also reported they wanted to change
mode of payment. As for the mode of
payment most wanted in case of
change, bank transfer was the mode
most mentioned by CTs.
Late payment
Late and erratic payment is the main recurrent drawback in the payment of CTs. At the
time of the survey (February 2015), the majority of CTs reported receiving a payment
in January or February 2015, but, in 60% of cases, this payment is for the first two
months of 2014.
CTs estimate the average delay in subsidy payment over the past school year (20132014) to five (05) months and a half. Delays are a bit shorter (4.5 months) in the Region
of Melaky where payments are made by cash vouchers. As for the ongoing school year,
surveyed CTs estimate the delay to an average of 3.2 months, ranging from 2.3 months
in Melaky to 3.8 months in Analamanga, with bank transfers taking more time (3.6
months) as compared to payments through MFIs (3 months) and by cash voucher (2.3
months). The two following figures show the estimated delays of payment, as reported
by surveyed CTs in 2013-14 and 2014-15:
54
55
Late payment also has negative impacts on the professional situation and private life
of the CT. The EPP principal and CT survey attempted to assess the impact of late
payment in terms of potential increases in absenteeism and additional costs to
households (increased contributions required from parents?) and looked into the
strategies adopted by CTs to cope with late payment.
According to EPP principals, late payments do not affect CT attendance (or CST
attendance), as 90% of them keep on teaching regardless of the length of the delay
(proportion of 92% among CSTs). CTs were also asked this question and were even
more categorical in their answer, with 96% of them reporting that late payment does
not increase their absenteeism. As to whether late payment increases the parents'
contributions or not, only 10% of the school principals reported that it did. The
following figures compile the answers of EPP principals on the impacts of late payment:
Figure 63: Late payment: Increases teacher
absenteeism?
56
4.6
AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT
The present section sets forth a final summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the
modes of payment of CTs and proposes recommendations on how to improve them. It
comes just before the last chapter that deals with the forward-looking budget analysis
of the issue of CT compensation.
4.6.1 Strengths and weaknesses
The survey conducted as part of the present study allowed for identifying several
strengths in the current modes of payment, as reported by EPP principals and
beneficiaries.
Key strengths include the
following: i) for several years
now, MoE has expressed and
committed political will to
improve the amount of CT
subsidies and expand them
towards generalization, ii) the
financial compensation of CTs
allowed for reducing teacher
absenteeism
and
further
motivating them to do their best
and more readily attend inservice training programs
which has certainly improved the quality of teaching, iii) CT payment, although not
generalized, benefits to two thirds of them, owing to the injection of a budget up to
MGA 60 billion. This has significantly contributed to alleviating costs on parents - at
least by the same amount. In several regions of the country, it has contributed to
expanding access to education and mitigating the phenomenon of school dropout for
economic reasons during times of crisis, iv) the mode of payment adopted, which
involves several providers, has allowed for meeting needs in the most sensitive
possible way to regional and local contexts and improving the payment process, cutting
down costs, and increasing its reliability.
Alongside those strengths, several enduring inadequacies in the CT payment process
were highlighted during the survey. First of all, two basic and recurrent issues require
radical solutions. Late payment needs to be addressed and the periodicity of payment
revised. Recommendations on how to address these aspects are provided later on. It
must be noted that late payment, combined with an intended two-monthly payments
but erratic actual payments put CTs in an unstable and unpredictable financial
situation, which has multiple consequences in terms of professional involvement and
disrupts their private and social lives.
57
Other weaknesses of the mode of payment mentioned relate to the two following
aspects: i) although different modes of payment were adopted, the issue of the
remoteness of payment points remains a concern in several regions, along with the
implications of travel in terms of CT absenteeism and financial cost; ii) beneficiaries
consider that the various commissions and fees incurred at payment are a weakness,
as they decrease the income received and are required to clear one of the multiple
procedures of the payment mechanism.
4.6.2 Recommendations for improvement
Actors
in
the
field
interviewed as part of the
survey
expressed
the
recommendations compiled
in the following figure.
Following the strength and
weakness
analysis,
consensus exists on the
issues of late payment and
payment periodicity: all of
the
people
surveyed
recommend effecting the
payments on a monthly basis
and
more
than
90%
recommend
halting
the
delays.
58
increase equity: Consider degree and experience when setting the amount of the
subsidy;
respect recruitment procedures;
facilitate the management of ICSRs.
The seventy-eight (78) students' parents surveyed express the same types of
recommendations, prioritizing increase of the subsidy, or even integration of CTs to
public service, and ensuring regular payments. One parent says: "CTs remain
professional in spite of their tough situation. However, their financial problems have
impacts on their health, motivation, and ability to concentrate (sometimes, it is just
their body that is present, their mind is wandering off, wondering how they are going
to feed their children), which impacts on the quality of education, which already suffers
from the lack of training."
Advantage should be taken of the moratorium on CT recruitment instituted in 2014, to
thoroughly reorganize the CT management system and finalize the update and cleaning
of the CT database, in close collaboration with DHR, DEP, and DTI and with involvement
of deconcentrated structures where needed.
The CT recruitment, management, and payment procedures, although clearer, are also
more complex. A complex procedure is not necessarily effective or transparent. The
key point in the procedure is to effect payment after the service rendered has been
ascertained. The famous ICSRs and CCSRs are bottlenecks but are necessary in this
logic of payment. These procedures were important or even key to the setting up of the
system, however, changes are bringing two stabilizing elements: the amount of the
subsidy has improved, making the job more attractive and reducing the mobility of CTs,
ii) the CT database at the central, as well as regional level is increasingly reliable and
CT identification and location procedures are becoming more effective. Since the
system has achieved maturity, it is recommended to shift from a logic where everything
is assumed upstream to a logic involving downstream monitoring.
As such, it is recommended to shift from ICSRs to CCSRs to ICNRSs (Individual
Certificates of Non Rendered Services) and CCNRSs (Collective Certificates of Non
Rendered Services). This entails that non rendered services will be ascertained
(becoming the exception) instead of rendered services (becoming the standard).
During the transition, a priori control (i.e. development of CRSs whether I or C) can be
limited to two periods of the year: at the beginning of the school year and at its end.
Two elements can further facilitate this transition: potential increase of the subsidy
amount and its generalization to all CTs during the moratorium on recruitments and
ensuring that such recruitments follow much stricter procedures, with the active
involvement of MoE as a genuine stakeholder of the recruitment contract.
As regards the improvement of the payment mechanism procedures, the two key
elements, namely late payment and periodicity and regularity of payment, will be
addressed. The review of the payment mechanism and procedures described above
and conclusions derived from the interviews conducted with officers and actors, allow
for breaking the issue of late payments down into two key components: usual delays
due to procedures and sustained delays.
Delays due to procedures occur typically during the development of certificates and
sending of documents by post: the procedure described in Section 4.1.1 shows that it
can result in additional delays exceeding one, or even two months. The setting up of
59
the new system recommended earlier (a priori payment plus a posteriori follow-up)
would largely address this issue. However, considering the current situation, a system
allowing for real-time monitoring of the progress of the payment procedure would
provide timely information on any bottleneck and allow for rapidly taking adequate
action to accelerate the procedure through authorizations to be granted, pending
receipt of the dispatched amounts or one-off support from facilitators, or assistance to
remedy to the difficulties noted at the central, as well as regional levels. This entails
setting up a genuine task force equipped with an information system and skills
mobilization and performance monitoring capacities. Two options can be considered
for this task force: i) set up a new task force at the Secretariat General of MoE, ii)
provide specific support to TSU for the development of this task force. The second
option suits the current context better but requires institutionalization, i.e. the
definition of appropriate prerogatives and provision of adequate means for its rapid
development.
Sustained delays are, in fact, the most worrisome ones. Indeed, delays are mainly
caused by fiscal regulation decisions. Payment is frequently delayed by several months
because of the unavailability of cash. This raises the issue of the status of this payment
which appears under the transfer heading of the budget (6565: Transfer to the private
sector). It is subject to the same restrictions as other running cost items when it comes
to regulations. Another change should be performed here. These transfers, officially
called "subsidies to FRAM teacher salaries"4 should be considered almost as salaries
and processed as such in terms of fiscal regulation and be prioritized as much as
salaries. If salaries guarantee the operation of 20% of the system, these subsidies
guarantee the operation of two thirds of it and soon three quarters of it. MFB/MoE
should make a joint decision to grant special status to these transfers when it comes to
budget execution.
The tax status of the subsidy is unclear and it cannot be construed from the texts
consulted during the present study. In fact it is a distributed income that is not subject
to withholding tax. On the other hand, it is noted that this income is not declared by
beneficiaries and therefore is exempted from tax. To regularize the situation on one
hand, and on the other, better motivate CTs, promulgation of a tax exemption of this
income is recommended. The joint decision on the issue of payability of these transfers
in the budget process could include a clear definition of their tax status by granting
them exemption. In any case, such exemption will not create any loss of revenue for the
State budget.
The "two monthly payment" issue deserves thorough analysis and accurate definition
of the cost associated with a different payment frequency. The first subsidies adopted
two-monthly payments which was formalized by the 2011 Order stipulating: "Given
the geographical constraints and of other natures, cash vouchers for the subsidies to
teacher salaries will be issued on a two-monthly basis."5 This periodicity is, on one
hand, not complied with as, the payments' actual periodicity is dictated by fiscal
regulations, and, on the other, it does not necessarily entail savings. Indeed, the largest
actual costs of the payment process being proportional to the amounts, a monthly or
4
Cf. Interministerial Order #29 565/2011 MoE/MFB laying down the methods of payment of the subsidies to FRAM
teacher salaries
Article 5 of Interministerial Order #29 565/2011 MoE/MFB laying down the methods of payment of the subsidies
to FRAM teacher salaries
60
biannual payment would involve the same cost. Furthermore, in our societies, charges
are set to follow a monthly rhythm and therefore a two-monthly income, especially
when it is low, even if regular - which is not the case - does not match the rhythm of
expenditure and causes dysfunction and inconsistency, which translate themselves
into chronic debts, as observed. As such, it is strongly recommended to pay CT
subsidies on a monthly basis. This should be even more facilitated by the adoption of
the procedure facilitation initiatives (change of the control logic and setup of the task
force within TSU).
Lastly, it should be noted that the costs incurred at payment are frequently mentioned
by beneficiaries as a source of concern. It would be fairer to settle any cost upstream
so that the net compensation actually received by CTs is the one announced for all of
them, regardless of the payment mode. This also requires some degree of intransigence
towards incidentals and some practices noted in the payment procedure.
The principle of fairness would also dictate a subsidy amount varying according to the
service quality. Some propose differentiation according to degree, training, record, or
performances in the classroom. Even if this position is worthy of praise, it would result
in extreme complications in a process already complex that we are looking to simplify.
Still, equity can be considered as an objective to achieve in a second step.
Before exploring the outlooks and options available for bringing changes to CT
payment and the sustainability and feasibility of generalization and integration to
public service discussed in the next chapter, it is suggested to conclude the present
chapter with one result of the survey conducted with a sample of seventy-eight (78)
students' parents in the three selected regions (Analamanga, Atsinanana, and Melaky),
namely the parents' level of satisfaction with teacher performance according to their
status. It appeared that CTs hold the highest levels of satisfaction (92%), exceeding
even the level of satisfaction with civil service teachers (less than 86%), and beating by
far the level of satisfaction with the performance of (non subsidized) CTs which was
limited to 37%. Failing a comparative assessment of CT performances according to
their status, this result provides elements of satisfaction regarding the CT subsidy
initiative and advocates for its generalization.
Figure 68: Parents' level of satisfaction with teacher performances (Proportion of extremely and
moderately satisfied parents)
61
The sectoral policies adopted in the sector of education over the past decade were
guided by the principle of gradual generalization of CT subsidies and the possibility of
CT integration to public service.
In the 2008 EFA Plan, decision was
made to stop recruiting civil
servants for grades 1 to 5 of the
primary cycle. Relating needs
were to be met through CTs
benefitting from an active training
policy. As such, the number of CTs
was planned to reach nearly
47,000 in 2014, which is
equivalent to over 63% of the
primary
teachers.
The
achievements noted are close to
the figures targeted by the EFA
Plan, compiled in the figure
opposite:
The option selected by the EFA Plan was to generalize the subsidizing of CTs, combined
with gradual increase of their compensation to align them with that of civil service
teachers. The subsidy granted to CTs will therefore increase from 1.1% of the
GDP/capita in 2008, i.e. 22% of the salary of a civil service teacher, to 3% of the
GDP/capita in 2015, i.e. 62% of the salary of a civil service teacher.
Expansion of the access to the subsidy was not successful (the compensation rate
decreased from 79% in 2008 to 67% in 2014), generalization was not achieved, and
training curricula were not set up as initially planned.
62
Also, IPEs provided for keeping the amount of the subsidy unchanged
(MGA 110,000/month) and recruiting an average number of civil servants of 2,500 per
year. Achievements made in 2014 (respectively 67% and 25% of primary and junior
high school CTs subsidized) are well below IPE objectives for the same year (91% and
73% respectively).
Since 2013-2014, there has been new political will to effectively institute free
education. This also applies to the funding of CT compensation by the State, inclusive
of the possibility of their integration to public service. How would this option impact
public finances and how feasible is it? The last section of this report attempts to answer
this question.
5.2
The projections of the macroeconomic framework are developed on the basis of the
following assumptions:
The 2015-2019 projections of macroeconomic aggregates relating to growth,
GDP, and public finances are based on the results of works by IMF6 which use
two growth scenarios:
Republic of Madagascar, IMF service report on 2014 consultations under Article IV, IMF, December 2014
63
Projections for year 2020 use the same extrapolated assumptions from 2019.
The MoE budget project is based, on one hand, on the assumption that MoE's
share in the State budget remain constant at their 2014 level, i.e.: 19.1% of
current expenditures and 2.8% of investment expenditures, and on the other
hand, that the structure of the current expenditures of MoE remains unchanged,
i.e.:
Balance:
Goods and services:
Allowances:
Transfer:
o including CT subsidies:
o including EPP CT subsidies:
77.8%
4.2%
1.3%
16.7%
71.0%
85.9%
The two following tables provide the results of the projections reached under the two
selected scenarios, with a reminder of the 2012-2014 achievements and the 2015
budget on the GDP, State budget expenditures, and MoE:
Table 15: Macroeconomic outlooks and State and MoE budgets: achievements in 2012-2014, 2015
budget, and projections for 2016-2020 (Scenario 1: baseline scenario)
(Amounts in billion MGA)
Baseline scenario
(Rapid reforms)
Growth of the GDP at constant rate
GDP deflator
GDP
Nominal (billion MGA)
Constant prices 2014 (billion MGA)
Public expenditures
In % of the GDP
Total expenditures and loans
Current expenditures
Wages and salaries
Other current expenditures
Capital expenditures
Overall balance (cash basis)
Nominal (billion MGA)
Total expenditures and loans
Current expenditures
Wages and salaries
Other current expenditures
Capital expenditures
MoE budget
Current expenditures
Balance
Goods and services
Allowances
Transfer
including CT subsidiess
including EPP CT subsidiess
Investments
Total budget of MoE
Execution
Budget
Projections
2012
3.0%
5.5%
2013
2.4%
5.0%
2014
3.0%
6.3%
2015
5.0%
7.6%
2016
5.0%
7.2%
2017
5.0%
6.0%
2018
5.0%
5.5%
2019
5.0%
5.5%
2020
5.0%
5.5%
21 774
24 299
23 423
25 028
25 629 28 960
25 629 26 910
32 600
28 256
36 279
29 669
40 182
31 152
44 498
32 710
49 170
34 345
13.4%
10.7%
5.4%
5.3%
2.7%
-1.4%
14.9%
11.7%
5.7%
6.0%
3.1%
-2.0%
14.4%
10.5%
6.4%
4.1%
4.0%
-3.2%
15.6%
11.1%
6.1%
5.0%
4.5%
-2.7%
17.3%
11.0%
6.1%
4.9%
6.3%
-3.5%
17.9%
11.6%
6.1%
5.5%
6.3%
-3.4%
17.6%
11.4%
6.1%
5.3%
6.2%
-2.8%
17.6%
11.4%
6.0%
5.4%
6.2%
-2.6%
17.6%
11.4%
6.0%
5.4%
6.2%
-2.6%
2 918
2 330
1 176
1 154
588
3 490
2 740
1 335
1 405
726
3 691
2 691
1 640
1 051
1 025
4 518
3 215
1 767
1 448
1 303
5 640
3 586
1 989
1 597
2 054
6 494
4 208
2 213
1 995
2 286
7 072
4 581
2 451
2 130
2 491
7 832
5 073
2 670
2 403
2 759
8 654
5 605
2 950
2 655
3 049
412,5
319,3
18,5
4,0
70,8
51,7
47,2
12,9
425,5
473,0
403,5
12,4
4,4
52,7
45,3
41,0
7,1
480,1
512,7
399,0
21,4
6,5
85,8
60,9
52,3
28,6
541,3
596,7
486,6
14,4
8,5
87,1
62,4
56,6
122,4
719,1
683,1
531,6
28,5
8,7
114,4
81,2
69,7
57,3
740,4
801,7
623,9
33,4
10,2
134,2
95,3
81,8
63,8
865,5
872,7
966,4 1 067,9
679,1
752,1
831,0
36,4
40,3
44,5
11,1
12,3
13,6
146,1
161,8
178,8
103,7
114,9
127,0
89,1
98,6
109,0
69,5
77,0
85,0
942,2 1 043,3 1 152,9
64
Table 16: Macroeconomic outlooks and State and MoE budgets: implementation in 2012-2014, 2015
budget, and projections for 2016-2020 (Scenario 2: Slow reforms)
(Amounts in billion MGA)
Slower growth scenario
(Slow reforms)
Growth of the GDP at constant rate
GDP deflator
GDP
Nominal (billion MGA)
Constant prices 2014 (billion MGA)
Public expenditures
In % of the GDP
Total expenditures and loans
Current expenditures
Wages and salaries
Other current expenditures
Capital expenditures
Overall balance (cash basis)
Nominal (billion MGA)
Total expenditures and loans
Current expenditures
Wages and salaries
Other current expenditures
Capital expenditures
MoE budget
Current expenditures
Balance
Goods and services
Allowances
Transfer
including CT subsidiess
including EPP CT subsidiess
Investments
Total budget of MoE
Execution
Budget
Projections
2012
3.0%
5.5%
2013
2.4%
5.0%
2014
3.0%
6.3%
2015
3.0%
7.6%
2016
3.0%
7.2%
2017
3.0%
6.0%
2018
3.0%
5.5%
2019
3.0%
5.5%
2020
3.0%
5.5%
21 774
24 299
23 423
25 028
25 629 28 346
25 629 26 398
31 237
27 190
34 048
28 006
36 942
28 846
40 082
29 711
43 489
30 602
13.4%
10.7%
5.4%
5.3%
2.7%
-1.4%
14.9%
11.7%
5.7%
6.0%
3.1%
-2.0%
14.4%
10.5%
6.4%
4.1%
4.0%
-3.2%
13.7%
10.2%
6.2%
4.0%
3.5%
-2.4%
14.0%
10.2%
6.3%
3.9%
3.8%
-2.5%
14.1%
10.4%
6.5%
3.9%
3.7%
-2.5%
13.7%
10.5%
6.6%
4.0%
3.2%
-1.6%
13.7%
10.6%
6.6%
4.0%
3.0%
-1.9%
13.7%
10.6%
6.6%
4.0%
3.0%
-1.9%
2 918
2 330
1 176
1 154
588
3 490
2 740
1 335
1 405
726
3 691
2 691
1 640
1 051
1 025
3 883
2 891
1 757
1 134
992
4 373
3 186
1 968
1 218
1 187
4 801
3 541
2 213
1 328
1 260
5 061
3 879
2 438
1 478
1 182
5 491
4 249
2 645
1 603
1 202
5 958
4 610
2 870
1 740
1 305
412,5
319,3
18,5
4,0
70,8
51,7
47,2
12,9
425,5
473,0
403,5
12,4
4,4
52,7
45,3
41,0
7,1
480,1
512,7
399,0
21,4
6,5
85,8
60,9
52,3
28,6
541,3
596,7
486,6
14,4
8,5
87,1
62,4
56,6
122,4
719,1
607,0
472,4
25,3
7,7
101,6
72,2
62,0
33,1
640,1
674,6
525,0
28,1
8,6
112,9
80,2
68,9
35,1
709,7
739,0
575,1
30,8
9,4
123,7
87,9
75,4
33,0
771,9
809,4
629,9
33,7
10,3
135,5
96,2
82,6
33,5
842,9
878,2
683,4
36,6
11,1
147,0
104,4
89,6
36,4
914,6
The
demofigureic
data used come from
the
population
division of the UN
(UNPD). The trends
of the population
ages 6 to 10 years are
illustrated in the
figure
opposite
which also shows
that the population,
estimated
at
3.1 million in 2014,
will reach nearly
3.6 million in 2020.
65
Projections at the 2020 horizon show that 96,100 teachers will be needed to cater to
an expected number of primary school students in the region of 5.2 million. Compared
to the 2014 situation, this entails an increase by 600,000 of the number of students,
requiring the recruitment of 11,510 additional teachers. Which assumptions and
options for integration to public service should be considered for CTs, in relation with
the possibilities of assigning resources to the payment of primary school teachers
under the two scenarios of macroeconomic scoping? For the purpose of the present
projections, two assumptions are retained:
Assumption 1: integration
of all teachers to the public
service in 2016 and meeting
of additional needs through
CST recruitment.
Assumption 2: gradual
recruitment of CTs into
public service at the rate of
10,000 in 2016 and 2017,
15,000 in 2018, and any
remaining in 2019 and
2020, as illustrated on the
figure opposite:
66
The results of the projections blatantly highlight the lack of feasibility of Assumption 1,
even in the most favorable macroeconomic trends. Indeed, as soon as 2016, needs in
salaries for teachers in primary school will amount to MGA 550 billion (exceeding the
overall amount of MoE's budget in 2014, i.e. MGA 541 billion), when possibilities of
assignment are limited to a range of MGA 286 billion (Assumption 1) and
MGA 322 billion (Assumption 2), i.e. a deficit rate ranging between 41% and 48% and
equivalent to substantial amounts (between MGA 228 billion and MGA 264 billion).
This deficit endures throughout the period of projection, and although it does decrease,
it still is not feasible: the deficit rate for 2019-2020 still ranges between 20% (Scenario
1) and 33% (Scenario 2). This definitively eliminates the option relating to Assumption
1 as a potentially sustainable trend for the budget of the Ministry of National Education.
The following figures illustrate the results obtained in the case of Assumption 1 for the
integration of CTs to public service:
Figure 74: Projection of the MoE wage bill required under A1
and resulting possibilities of assignment of the
macroeconomic scoping scenarios
In the case of Assumption 2, projection results show that the integration of 10,000 CTs
in 2016 and 2017 each is feasible under Scenario 1, in case of favorable economic
growth. This Assumption is associated with a deficit in case of slower economic growth
(Scenario 2). However, as from 2018, with the integration of 15,000 CTs and another
16,000 in 2019, substantial needs emerge that remain uncovered by the current
budgetary arbitration structure and even under Scenario 1 of macroeconomic scoping.
The following figures illustrate the results obtained under Assumption 2, providing for
the gradual integration of CTs to public service:
67
Two options can still be contemplated as from 2018 for A2: i) reduce the speed of
integration (revert to 10,000/year), this will delay the integration of all teachers to
public service to the 2023 horizon, ii) assign more resources to national education,
beyond the current 19%. MoE is called on to refine mean term projections and
assumptions regarding the educational policy and especially human resource
management7. The selected alternative will consist in combining these two options
with a potential "policy" objective feasible on the short term: generalization of the
subsidy to all CTs by 2018.
It must be noted that the Financial Act setting the projections for the 2015-2017 program budget does not provide
for any recruitment in 2016 or 2017 (cf. Annex). For that matter, financial acts lay down the programming of the
financial year and forecasts for the next two following years. Review of the different documents of the financial acts
show that in all ministerial departments, the numbers forecasted for the two years remain constant. This raises the
issue of usefulness and relevance of this financial year which should tend in either one of the following directions:
either relevant forecasts based on precise needs assessments and scoping outlooks are established or mention is
just made of the numbers from the financial year covered by the Financial Act.
68
ANNEXES
Annex 1: Interministerial Order #29 565/2011 MoE/MFB laying down the methods of payment of the subsidies to FRAM teacher
salaries ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................70
Annex 2: Employment contract template (CT recruitment) ........................................................................................................................................71
Annex 3: Key results of the survey: distribution of the teachers from the surveyed schools, recruitment and absenteeism........................73
Annex 4: Parents' contribution and school revenue: results of a survey conducted by MoE with 30 schools of the CISCO of
Urban Antananarivo in 2013-2014.............................................................................................................................................................................74
Annex 5: Numbers of MoE according to the 2015 Financial Act ................................................................................................................................75
69
Annex 1: Interministerial Order #29 565/2011 MoE/MFB laying down the methods of payment of the
subsidies to FRAM teacher salaries
Deposit of the subsidy in the deposit accounts of the Regional Directorates of National
Education, opened at the relevant accounting desks of the Treasury;
or via financial entities, by check on the Treasury written out to the relevant financial entity.
Article 4. FRAM teachers collect the net amount of the subsidies to the salaries.
Article 5. Considering geofigureic constraints and of other natures, cash vouchers for the subsidies to
the teachers' salaries shall be issued on a two-monthly basis. Payments from the accounting desks of the
Treasury against a cash voucher shall normally be available from the 20th to the 30th of the month.
Article 6. The cash vouchers for subsidies to the salaries of FRAM teachers shall be valid for a period of
three (03) months from the date of their issuance, except in case of stop duly notified to the paying
accountant, death of the beneficiary or any other cause liable to alter the validity of the voucher.
Article 7. The amounts of the cash vouchers subject to stop payment or expired shall be set aside at the
relevant deposit account.
Article 8. Paying accountants shall send a summary payment statement to the Directorate General of
National Education or relevant School District.
Article 9. Circular Notes shall be established to specify the procedures and formalities relevant to the
provisions of the present order.
Article 10. The present order shall be registered on the Official Journal of the Republic of Madagascar
and communicated as needed.
Antananarivo, October 14, 2011
Signature: Jean Jacques RABENIRINA
Signature: Hery RAJAONARIMAMPIANINA
70
REPOBLIKANI MADAGASIKARA
Tanindrazana-Fahafahana-Fandrosoana
------------DREN:
CISCO:
ZAP:
EPP:
ZONE:
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT #/FRAM/EPP.
(Hiring or rehiring of a Community Teacher)
Compensation components may vary according to teacher status: i) CT exclusively compensated in kind; ii) CT
compensated in kind and in cash; iii) CT subsidized by the State; iv) CT subsidized by the State and receiving other
compensation(s) from the FRAM. Moreover, retentions may be mentioned in the article on compensation, depending
on whether the CT is a suscriber to a Social Security Organization or not (CNaPs, etc.)
71
The Employee shall be entitled to two (02) months of maternity leave during the School Year.
The Employee may take a leave of a maximum of three (03) days for family events, such as the birth of a
legitimately declared child, marriage of the Employee or his/her child, duly ascertained death or sickness of
his/her spouse, father, mother, or child.
The Employee shall be entitled to a maximum sick leave of three days (03) prescribed by his/her attending
physician.
Article 6: Employee protection
The EPP and FRAM shall protect the Employee from any threat, verbal assault, violence, slander or libel that
could occur to him/her in the performance of his/her duties.
Article 7: Termination of the Contract
The termination of the present contract by either one of the parties does not require any prior notice nor
entail any allowance.
However, the FRAM shall notify the Employee one (01) month in advance, whenever it intends to terminate
the contract, except in the following cases:
Theft from the School or faculty or students;
Public affront to common decency within the School;
Brawl started by the Employee;
Verbal abuse and assault towards a superior;
Blatant brutality towards students;
Abandonment of position exceeding fifteen (15) days.
Excessive absenteeism shall result in termination of the employment contract.
For any other misconduct on the part of the Employee, any contract termination shall follow the procedure
of respect of the right to defence (report by the School Principal, communication of the allegations against
the Employee, request for clarification, Employee's right to be defended by a legal counsel).
Any termination of the contract shall be expressly justified.
72
Annex 3: Key results of the survey: distribution of the teachers from the surveyed schools, recruitment
and absenteeism
Civil servants
Total number of teachers
Analamanga
Urban areas
Rural areas
Atsinanana
Urban areas
Rural areas
Melaky
Urban areas
Rural areas
Total
Urban areas
Rural areas
New recruitments in 2014-2015
Analamanga
Urban areas
Rural areas
Atsinanana
Urban areas
Rural areas
Melaky
Urban areas
Rural areas
Total
Urban areas
Rural areas
Contractual
teachers
31
22
9
44
29
15
35
23
12
110
74
36
5
3
2
13
11
2
6
2
4
24
16
8
1
1
1
1
Non
subsidized
CTs
Subsidized
CTs
55
34
21
48
31
17
51
33
18
154
98
56
Others
12
5
7
2
2
2
1
1
16
6
10
1
1
2
2
2
2
12
6
6
16
10
6
105
66
39
109
73
36
93
57
36
307
196
111
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
3
2
1
Total
10
4
6
11
5
6
Number of days missed since the beginning of the 2014-2015 school year
Analamanga
13
77
3
10
Urban areas
10
67
Rural areas
Atsinanana
240
60
133
155
34
88
Urban areas
85
26
45
Rural areas
Melaky
25
51
62
2
45
40
Urban areas
23
6
22
Rural areas
Total
278
111
272
160
79
138
Urban areas
118
32
134
Rural areas
1
1
1
2
2
3
3
2
2
12
7
5
17
12
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
90
13
77
433
277
156
131
88
43
654
378
276
73
Annex 4: Parents' contribution and school revenue: results of a survey conducted by MoE with 30
schools of the CISCO of Urban Antananarivo in 2013-2014
(Amount in MGA)
School
Contribution
per parent/year
Number of
contributors
Total revenue
Isotry Ampefiloha
10 000
520
5 200 000
Ambatobe
22 000
150
3 300 000
Amboditsiry
25 000
350
8 750 000
Ambohipo
14 000
488
6 832 000
Ampasanisadoda
20 000
141
2 820 000
Analamahitsy Village
15 000
400
6 000 000
Andavamamba
23 000
520
11 960 000
Andravoahangy I
23 000
260
5 980 000
Andravoahangy II
28 000
180
5 040 000
Andrefan'Ambohijanahary
18 000
480
8 640 000
Ankadifotsy I
20 000
225
4 500 000
Anosisoa
22 000
225
4 950 000
Anosivavaka
20 000
262
5 240 000
Antanimena I
20 000
676
13 520 000
Antanimena II
23 000
418
9 614 000
Antsahabe
18 000
110
1 980 000
Behoririka
20 000
116
2 320 000
Faliarivo Ambanidia
12 000
150
1 800 000
Faravohitra
23 000
73
1 679 000
Ifanantenantsoa Betafo
16 000
278
4 448 000
Imamba
17 000
77
1 309 000
Ivandry
18 000
430
7 740 000
Soarano
5 000
149
745 000
Volosarika
13 000
262
3 406 000
Overall total
18 411
6 940
5 323 875
74
00-00-81-A0-1C
00-00-81-A0-1D
00-00-81-A0-4C
00-00-81-A0-5B
00-00-81-A0-6A
00-00-81-A0-6C
00-00-81-A0-6E
00-00-81-A0-8A
00-00-81-A0-9B
00-00-81-A1-5A
00-00-81-A1-8A
00-00-81-A1-8B
00-00-81-A1-8C
00-00-81-A1-8D
00-00-81-A2-1C
00-00-81-A3-5B
00-00-81-A3-5D
00-00-81-A4-5C
00-00-81-A6-9A
00-00-81-A7-0A
00-00-81-A7-0B
00-00-81-A7-0C
00-00-81-A8-6C
00-00-81-A8-8A
00-00-81-A8-8B
00-00-81-A8-8C
00-00-81-A8-8D
00-00-81-A8-8E
00-00-81-A8-8F
00-00-81-A8-8H
00-00-81-A8-8J
00-00-81-A8-8K
00-00-81-A8-8L
00-00-81-A8-8S
00-00-81-A8-8T
00-00-81-A8-8U
00-00-81-A8-8V
00-00-81-A8-8W
00-00-81-A9-0B
00-00-81-A9-4A
00-00-81-A9-4I
00-00-81-B0-0A
00-00-81-B0-6B
00-00-81-B1-5A
00-00-81-B1-6A
00-00-81-B1-8A
00-00-81-B1-9A
00-00-81-B2-1A
00-00-81-B4-1A
00-00-81-B4-3A
00-00-81-B7-0A
00-00-81-B8-8A
00-00-81-B8-8B
00-00-81-B8-8C
00-00-81-B8-8D
00-00-81-B8-8E
00-00-81-B8-8G
00-00-81-B9-4B
00-00-81-B9-4D
00-00-81-C0-0A
00-00-81-C0-5A
00-00-81-C1-5A
00-00-81-C1-8A
2014
LFR
14
0
0
1
2
5
24
0
0
1
191
246
24
131
0
0
1
2
3
43
22
116
1
4
2
169
5
1 987
447
3
0
4
62
742
45
1 589
1
3
0
3
0
4
308
1
1
947
1
2
1
4
8 125
241
15
19
11
1
0
2
21
1
0
899
8
2015
2016
2017
LF
Forecasts Forecasts
13
13
13
2
2
2
3
3
3
1
1
1
0
0
0
25
25
25
35
35
35
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
230
230
230
178
178
178
53
53
53
370
370
370
5
5
5
1
1
1
0
0
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
49
49
49
22
22
22
135
135
135
1
1
1
4
4
4
2
2
2
158
158
158
7
7
7
1 882
1 882
1 882
436
436
436
3
3
3
1
1
1
2
2
2
61
61
61
865
865
865
40
40
40
1 572
1 572
1 572
89
89
89
3
3
3
1
1
1
12
12
12
2
2
2
4
4
4
311
311
311
2
2
2
0
0
0
2 208
2 208
2 208
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
8 338
8 338
8 338
226
226
226
13
13
13
15
15
15
37
37
37
0
0
0
1
1
1
2
2
2
19
19
19
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 590
1 590
1 590
7
7
7
75
00-00-81-C3-5A
00-00-81-C8-8A
00-00-81-C8-8B
00-00-81-C8-8C
00-00-81-C8-8D
00-00-81-C8-8E
00-00-81-D0-0A
00-00-81-D0-5B
00-00-81-D0-6A
00-00-81-D1-8A
00-00-81-D8-0A
00-00-81-D8-8A
00-00-81-D8-8B
00-00-81-D8-8D
00-00-81-E0-1G
00-00-81-E0-2G
00-00-81-E0-2K
00-00-81-E0-2M
00-00-81-E0-2P
00-00-81-E0-2U
00-00-81-J0-4A
00-00-81-J0-4B
00-00-81-J0-4R
00-00-81-J0-5A
00-00-81-J0-5B
00-00-81-J0-6A
00-00-81-J0-6B
00-00-81-J0-6E
00-00-81-J0-7A
00-00-81-J0-8A
00-00-81-J0-8B
00-00-81-J0-8C
00-00-81-J0-4A
00-00-81-K0-0A
00-00-81-L0-0A
00-00-81-M0-0B
00-00-81-NU-LL
00-00-81-U0-1C
00-00-81-U0-2C
00-00-81-U0-3B
00-00-81-U0-4A
00-00-81-U0-5A
00-00-81-U0-6A
00-00-81-U0-7A
00-00-81-U0-8A
00-00-81-U0-9A
00-00-81-U9-4A
00-00-81-32-25
00-00-81-38-1P
00-00-81-40-01
00-00-81-41-00
00-00-81-41-10
00-00-81-41-25
00-00-81-41-50
00-00-81-41-60
00-00-81-41-65
00-00-81-41-75
00-00-81-88-1P
Total
2014
LFR
27 426
15
8
11
1
399
1
274
17
1
28
235
1
1
1
2
1
36
13
141
12
1
644
27
4 417
30
1
18
434
19
3
1
2
6 912
1 428
178
0
132
6 131
4 706
145
593
263
3
199
3
6
1
2
4
2
2
111
10
2
8
15
6
2015
2016
2017
LF
Forecasts Forecasts
27 417
27 417
27 417
47
47
47
8
8
8
6
6
6
1
1
1
458
458
458
1
1
1
294
294
294
52
52
52
1
1
1
27
27
27
247
247
247
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
36
36
36
13
13
13
103
103
103
7
7
7
0
0
0
544
544
544
17
17
17
14 311
14 311
14 311
12
12
12
0
0
0
0
0
0
368
368
368
2
2
2
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
2 545
2 545
2 545
1 422
1 422
1 422
110
110
110
32
32
32
144
144
144
4 818
4 818
4 818
7 643
7 643
7 643
179
179
179
737
737
737
341
341
341
2
2
2
394
394
394
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
1
1
1
2
2
2
99
99
99
9
9
9
1
1
1
9
9
9
14
14
14
6
6
6
71 588
81 545
81 545
81 545
76