RAMON S.

CHING AND PO WING

PROPERTIES, INC.,
Petitioners,
- versus HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6,
JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG,
MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA
SANTOS, substituted by her son,
EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 192828

Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
ARANAL-SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
November 28, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the December 14, 2009 Decision [2] and July 8, 2010
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99856. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DENYING the petition filed in this case
and AFFIRMING the assailed Orders dated March 15, 2007 and May
16, 2007 issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 6, in Manila in Civil Case No. 02-105251.[4]

The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The Factual Antecedents

Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002,[5] the
respondents filed a Complaint[6]against the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance
Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar,
Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon,
and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his
successors-in-interest.
The Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity
of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute
Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary
Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction," was docketed as Civil
Case No. 02-105251 and raffled to Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(RTC).
In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as causes of action:
First Cause of Action. They are the heirs of Lim San, also known as
Antonio Ching / Tiong Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy (Antonio). Respondents Joseph
Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children of Antonio
with his common-law wife, respondent Mercedes Igne (Mercedes). Respondent
Lucina Santos (Lucina) claimed that she was also a common-law wife of Antonio.
The respondents averred that Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonio's and
Lucina's son when in truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth certificate was
merely simulated. On July 18, 1996, Antonio died of a stab wound. Police
investigators identified Ramon as the prime suspect and he now stands as the lone
accused in a criminal case for murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest issued
against him have remained unserved as he is at large. From the foregoing
circumstances and upon the authority of Article 919 [7] of the New Civil Code
(NCC), the respondents concluded that Ramon can be legally disinherited, hence,
prohibited from receiving any share from the estate of Antonio.
Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the conclusion of the
police investigations tagging Ramon as the prime suspect in the murder of Antonio,

the former made an inventory of the latter's estate. Ramon misrepresented that
there were only six real estate properties left by Antonio. The respondents alleged
that Ramon had illegally transferred to his name the titles to the said properties.
Further, there are two other parcels of land, cash and jewelries, plus properties in
Hongkong, which were in Ramon's possession.
Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational attainment, was
sweet-talked by Ramon into surrendering to him a Global Business Bank, Inc.
(Global Bank) Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of
Antonio, and the certificates of title covering two condominium units in Binondo
which were purchased by Antonio using his own money but which were registered
in Ramon's name. Ramon also fraudulently misrepresented to Joseph, Jaime and
Mercedes that they will promptly receive their complete shares, exclusive of the
stocks in Po Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing), from the estate of Antonio. Exerting
undue influence, Ramon had convinced them to execute an Agreement [8] and a
Waiver[9] on August 20, 1996. The terms and conditions stipulated in the
Agreement and Waiver, specifically, on the payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime
and Mercedes of the amount of P22,000,000.00, were not complied with. Further,
Lucina was not informed of the execution of the said instruments and had not
received any amount from Ramon. Hence, the instruments are null and void.
Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which
constitute 60% of the latter's totalcapital stock, were illegally transferred by Ramon
to his own name through a forged document of sale executed after Antonio died.
Po Wing owns a ten-storey building in Binondo. Ramon's claim that he bought the
stocks from Antonio before the latter died is baseless. Further, Lucina's shares in
Po Wing had also banished into thin air through Ramon's machinations.
Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate[10] adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's
entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents. By virtue of the said instrument,
new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering eight real properties owned by
Antonio were issued in Ramon's name. Relative to the Po Wing shares, the
Register of Deeds of Manila had required Ramon to post a Surety Bond
conditioned to answer for whatever claims which may eventually surface in

connection with the said stocks. Co-defendant Stronghold Insurance Company

issued the bond in Ramon's behalf.
Sixth Cause of Action. Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in
Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of
land, which was part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena
Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price. By reason of Ramon's lack of authority
to dispose of any part of Antonio's estate, the conveyances are null and void ab
initio.
Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages
Antonio's estate. She has no intent to convey to the respondents their shares in the
estate of Antonio.
The respondents thus prayed for the following in their Complaint:
1. x x x a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the defendant
RAMON CHING and/or his attorney-in-fact Belen Dy Tan Ching from
disposing, selling or alienating any property that belongs to the estate of
the deceased ANTONIO CHING;
xxx
4. x x x
a.) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who
murdered his father ANTONIO CHING disqualified as heir
and from inheriting to (sic) the estate of his father;
b.) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING
transfer (sic) of the six [6] parcels of land from the name of
his father ANTONIO CHING to his name covered by TCT
No. x x x;
c.) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and
WAIVER executed by plaintiffs x x x in favor of x x x
RAMON CHING for being patently immoral, invalid,
illegal, simulated and (sic) sham;

d.) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of

stocks at (sic) PO WING from the names of ANTONIO
CHING and LUCINA SANTOS to the defendant
ANTONIO CHING's name for having been illegally
procured through the falsification of their signatures in the
document purporting the transfer thereof;
e.) Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect the
AFFIDAVIT OF SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE executed by
x x x RAMON CHING for being contrary to law and
existing jurisprudence;
f.) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic)
executed by x x x RAMON CHING (i) over two (2) parcels
of land x x x to defendant ASIA ATLANTIC BUSINESS
VENTURES, Inc.; and (ii) one (1) parcel of land x x x sold
to x x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR for having illegally
procured the ownership and titles of the above properties;
x x x.[11]

The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss [12] alleging forum
shopping, litis pendentia, res judicata and the respondents as not being the real
parties in interest.
On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order[13] denying the
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.
The respondents filed an Amended Complaint [14] dated April 7, 2005
impleading Metrobank as the successor-in-interest of co-defendant Global Bank.
The Amended Complaint also added a seventh cause of action relative to the
existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the amount
ofP4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The respondents prayed
that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately
released to them. Alternatively, the respondents prayed for the issuance of a hold
order relative to the CPPA to preserve it during the pendency of the case.

On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with
Counterclaim.[15]
On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order [16] admitting the respondents'
Amended Complaint. The RTC stressed that Metrobank had already filed
Manifestations admitting that as successor-in-interest of Global Bank, it now
possesses custody of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed willingness to abide
by any court order as regards the disposition of Antonio's deposits. The petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration filed to assail the aforecited Order was denied by the
RTC on May 3, 2006.
On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with
Counterclaim to the respondents' Amended Complaint.
On August 11, 2006, the RTC issued a pre-trial order.[17]
On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss[18] the respondents'
Amended Complaint on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the
Amended Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the respondents, the latter's
declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the
suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for
declaration of nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court
and not to the RTC acting as an ordinary court.
On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order[19] denying the petitioners' Motion to
Dismiss on grounds:
In the case at bar, an examination of the Complaint would
disclose that the action delves mainly on the question of ownership
of the properties described in the Complaint which can be properly
settled in an ordinary civil action. And as pointed out by the
defendants, the action seeks to declare the nullity of the Agreement,
Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale,
Transfer Certificates of Title, which were all allegedly executed by
defendant Ramon Ching to defraud the plaintiffs. The relief of
establishing the status of the plaintiffs which could have translated

this action into a special proceeding was nowhere stated in the

Amended Complaint. With regard [to] the prayer to declare the
plaintiffs as the rightful owner[s] of the CPPA and that the same be
immediately released to them, in itself poses an issue of ownership
which must be proved by plaintiffs by substantial evidence. And as
emphasized by the plaintiffs, the Amended Complaint was intended to
implead Metrobank as a co-defendant.
As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes that during the
Pre-trial of this case, one of the issues raised by the defendants Ramon
Ching and Po Wing Properties is: Whether or not there can be
disinheritance in intestate succession? Whether or not defendant Ramon
Ching can be legally disinherited from the estate of his father? To the
mind of the Court, the issue of disinheritance, which is one of the
causes of action in the Complaint, can be fully settled after a trial on
the merits. And at this stage, it has not been sufficiently established
whether or not there is a will.[20] (Emphasis supplied.)

The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007 denying the
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, became the subjects of a petition
for certiorari filed with the CA. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99856,
raised the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it
denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact that the Amended
Complaint sought to establish the status or rights of the respondents which subjects
are within the ambit of a special proceeding.
On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered
Decision[21] denying the petition forcertiorari on grounds:

the

now

assailed

Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations supporting the

causes of action of the amended complaint induced us to infer
that nothing in the said complaint shows that the action of the
private respondents should be threshed out in a special proceeding,
it appearing that their allegations were substantially for the
enforcement of their rights against the alleged fraudulent acts
committed by the petitioner Ramon Ching.The private respondents
also instituted the said amended complaint in order to protect them
from the consequence of the fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching by
seeking to disqualify Ramon Ching from inheriting from Antonio

Ching as well as to enjoin him from disposing or alienating the

subject properties, including the P4 Million deposit with
Metrobank. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such issues, which must be submitted to the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial
court.Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that the probate
court could not take cognizance of the prayer to disinherit Ramon
Ching, given the undisputed fact that there was no will to be
contested in a probate court.
The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended complaint
and complicates the issue of jurisdiction by reiterating the grounds or
defenses
set
up
in
the
petitioners'
earlier
pleadings.
Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter
is determined by the allegations of the complaint without regard to
whether or not the private respondents (plaintiffs) are entitled to
recover upon all or some of the causes of action asserted therein. In
this regard, the jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the
defenses pleaded in the answer or in the motion to dismiss, lest the
question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
petitioners (defendants).[22] Hence, we focus our resolution on the issue
of jurisdiction on the allegations in the amended complaint and not on
the defenses pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the subsequent
pleadings of the petitioners.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling
reason to still subject the action of the petitioners in a special
proceeding since the nullification of the subject documents could be
achieved in the civil case, the lower court should proceed to evaluate
the evidence of the parties and render a decision thereon upon the issues
that it defined during the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 02-105251.
[23]
(emphasis supplied)

The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA through a

Resolution[24] issued on July 8, 2010.
The Issue
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[25] is anchored on the issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE

MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS ON THE
ALLEGED GROUND OF THE RTC'S LACK OF JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, TO WIT, (A) FILIATIONS WITH ANTONIO OF
RAMON, JAIME AND JOSEPH; (B) RIGHTS OFCOMMON-LAW
WIVES, LUCINA AND MERCEDES, TO BE CONSIDERED AS
HEIRS OF ANTONIO; (C) DETERMINATION OF THE EXTENT
OF ANTONIO'S ESTATE; AND (D) OTHER MATTERS WHICH
CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED IN A SPECIAL PROCEEDING AND
NOT IN AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION.
The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to determine
(a) who are the heirs of a decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights;
(c) the status of each heir; and (d) whether the property in the inventory is conjugal
or the exclusive property of the deceased spouse.[26] Further, the extent of Antonio's
estate, the status of the contending parties and the respondents' alleged entitlement
as heirs to receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA now in Metrobank's custody are
matters which are more appropriately the subjects of a special proceeding and not
of an ordinary civil action.
The respondents opposed[27] the instant petition claiming that the petitioners
are engaged in forum shopping. Specifically, G.R. Nos. 175507[28] and 183840,
[29]
both involving the contending parties in the instant petition were filed by the
petitioners and are currently pending before this Court. Further, in Mendoza v.
Hon. Teh,[30] the SC declared that whether a particular matter should be resolved by
the RTC in the exercise ofits general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction,
is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. Besides, the
petitioners, having validly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC and
having actively participated in the trial of the case, are already estopped from
challenging the RTC's jurisdiction over the respondents' Complaint and Amended
Complaint.[31]
The Court's Ruling

We resolve to deny the instant petition.

The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this Court directing
them to file their reply to the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant
Petition. While the prescribed period to comply expired on March 15, 2011, the
petitioners filed their Manifestation that they will no longer file a reply only on
October 10, 2011 or after the lapse of almost seven months.
Further, no reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when
they both ruled that the denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss Civil
Case No. 02-105251 was proper.
Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the respondents that
the petitioners engaged in forum shopping and are already estopped from
questioning the RTC's jurisdiction after having validly submitted to it when the
latter participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant Petition is still in
order. Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought,
among others, the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the
respondents of the CPPA now under Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not a special proceeding
pertaining to a settlement court.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person
such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a
special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules
as provided for in the Rules of Court.[32] A special proceeding is a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. [33] It is distinguished
from an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. [34] To initiate a special
proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a
will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the
RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended
Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument

supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever

mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No.
02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call
for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint,
seeking the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA under Metrobank's
custody and the nullification of the instruments subject of the complaint,
necessarily require the determination of the respondents' status as Antonio's heirs.
It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be
declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which was in Mercedes' possession
prior to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver. The respondents also prayed
for the alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of a hold order
relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with Metrobank during the
pendency of the case. It can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to the
CPPA was premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged collective
ownership of the same, and not on the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs.
Further, it also has to be emphasized that the respondents were parties to the
execution of the Agreement[35] and Waiver[36] prayed to be nullified. Hence, even
without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have
the standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their
claims that there was no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon
exercised undue influence and committed fraud against them. Consequently, the
respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Antonios estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the
said affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the
issues raised shall first require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a
mere defense which is not determinative of which court shall properly exercise
jurisdiction.
In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo,[37] the Court
declared:
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint

irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all

or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set
up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the
question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of
the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint.
The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are
the matters to be consulted.

In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents
subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary civil action,
which in this specific case was instituted to protect the respondents from the
supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that the RTC will find grounds
to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence will be the
reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. Civil
Case No. 02-105251 was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating
to the administration, liquidation and distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not
the proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not
be strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still
follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been
illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of respondents'
Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated
therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners' (a)
Opposition to the respondents' Motion to Admit Substitution of Party; [38] and (b)
Manifestation[39] through counsel that they will no longer file a reply to the
respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED.

SO ORDERED.
LUISA
KHO
MONTAER,
ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR.,
LILLIBETH
MONTAERBARRIOS, AND RHODORA
ELEANOR
MONTAERDALUPAN,

G.R. No. 174975

Present:

Petitioners,

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

- versus -

CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
SHARIA DISTRICT COURT,
FOURTH SHARIA JUDICIAL
DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY,
LILING
DISANGCOPAN,
AND ALMAHLEEN LILING
S. MONTAER,
Respondents.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

Promulgated:

JANUARY 20, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside

the Orders of the Sharia District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial
District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 2006[1] and September 21,
2006.[2]
On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman
Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate
Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.[3] Petitioners Alejandro
Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor
Montaer-Dalupan are their children. [4] On May 26, 1995, Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. died.[5]
On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and
her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montaer, both Muslims, filed a
Complaint for the judicial partition of properties before the Sharia
District Court.[6] The said complaint was entitled Almahleen Liling
S. Montaer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and
Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montaer,
Lillibeth K. Montaer, Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and Rhodora
Eleanor K. Montaer, and docketed as Special Civil Action No. 7-05.
[7]
In the said complaint, private respondents made the following
allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the
late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first
family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the
decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the daughter of the
decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the
properties comprising the estate of the decedent. [8] Private
respondents prayed for the Sharia District Court to order, among

others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the

decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the
estate of the decedent.[9]
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the
following grounds: (1) the Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction
over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because he was
a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the
correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents
complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish
filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and the decedent,
pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. [10]
On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the
private respondents complaint. The district court held that
Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction
extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of
deceased Muslims.[11]
On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion
for Reconsideration.[12] On December 28, 2005, petitioners filed an
Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the
motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing. [13] On
January 17, 2006, the Sharia District Court denied petitioners
opposition.[14] Despite finding that the said motion for
reconsideration lacked notice of hearing, the district court held
that such defect was cured as petitioners were notified of the
existence of the pleading, and it took cognizance of the said
motion.[15] The Sharia District Court also reset the hearing for the
motion for reconsideration.[16]

In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Sharia
District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal dated November
22, 2005.[17] The district court allowed private respondents to
adduce further evidence.[18] In its second assailed order dated
September 21, 2006, the Sharia District Court ordered the
continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further
evidence, and pre-trial conference.[19]
Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the
following issues:
I.
RESPONDENT
SHARIA
DISTRICT
COURT MARAWI CITY LACKS
JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND
NON-MUSLIMS.

II.

RESPONDENT
SHARIA
DISTRICT
COURT MARAWI CITY DID
NOT
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE
LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR
JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED.

III.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE

JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND
DOCKETING FEES.
IV.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN
GRANTED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS
LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR
LACK OF A NOTICE OF HEARING.

V.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE
COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING
S. MONTAER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR.
WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF
ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.

In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private

respondents stress that the Sharia District Court must be given
the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the
decedent is a Muslim in order to determine whether it has
jurisdiction.[20]
Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased
Muslims
Petitioners first argument, regarding the Sharia District Courts jurisdiction,
is dependent on a question of fact, whether the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a
Muslim. Inherent in this argument is the premise that there has already been a
determination resolving such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that
the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent is a Muslim. The
assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue.

Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the

Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Sharia District
Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of
deceased Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the
estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of
administration or appointment of administrators or executors
regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property.

The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is

controlled by the averments and character of the relief sought in
the complaint or petition.[21] The designation given by parties to
their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it
according to the said designation. Rather than rely on a falsa
descriptio or defective caption, courts are guided by the
substantive averments of the pleadings.[22]
Although private respondents designated the pleading filed
before the Sharia District Court as a Complaint for judicial
partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the
decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim, [23] such as the fact
of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death as well as the allegation that he
is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the
names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private
respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the

decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled

before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal
that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of the decedent. [24] These include the
following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the
decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an
administrator of the said estate.
We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court
does not have jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer
with a motion to dismiss that Montaer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court
over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon the
defenses set forth in an answer[25] or a motion to dismiss.[26] Otherwise, jurisdiction
would depend almost entirely on the defendant[27] or result in having a case either
thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem.
[28]
Indeed, the defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of
fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction.[29]
The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss. [30] In the
case at bar, the Sharia District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because
petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The
Sharia District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine
whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the
deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Sharia District Court determines that the
deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction.
Special Proceedings
The underlying assumption in petitioners second argument,
that the proceeding before the Sharia District Court is an ordinary
civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous

understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of

the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the
Sharia District Court, where the parties were designated either as
plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a
special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the
court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which
is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules)
defines a special proceeding as a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. This Court has
applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings,
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. [31] In a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement,
and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact
of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as
among the decedents heirs, which would allow them to exercise
their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent.[32]Here, the respondents seek to establish
the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently, for
private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be recognized
as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.
Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent
or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil
action[33] applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of
the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action
which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no
definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a
special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this
difference. A civil action, in which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress

of a wrong[34] necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are

either the plaintiff or defendant. [35] On the other hand, a special
proceeding, by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or
a particular fact,[36] has one definite party, who petitions or applies
for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no
definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that
the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of
action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of
the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the
estate,[37] pay its liabilities,[38] and to distribute the residual to
those entitled to the same.[39]
Docket Fees
Petitioners third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for nonpayment of docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents
petition in the proceeding before the court a quo, which contains an allegation
estimating the decedents estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private
respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners argument essentially
involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket
fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the correct assessment of the docket
fees.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed
docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.[40] If the party
filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that
was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a
deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court. [41] In such a case, the lower
court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a partys
reliance on the clerk of courts insufficient assessment of the docket fees. [42] As
every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law

with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law, the
party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient
assessment.[43] However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.
[44]

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of courts assessment
of the docket fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can
be no determination of whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees
without the clerk of courts assessment.
Exception to Notice of Hearing
Petitioners fourth argument, that private respondents motion
for reconsideration before the Sharia District Court is defective for
lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances
in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement.
The Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing by
the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties
concerned.[45] The Rules also provide that no written motion set
for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of
service thereof.[46] However, the Rules allow a liberal construction
of its provisions in order to promote [the] objective of securing a
just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.[47] Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal
construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases
where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that
the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment
is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein.
[48]
In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that no party
can even claim a vested right in technicalities, and for this reason,

cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits

rather than on technicalities.[49]
The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Sharia
District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it has
jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a
decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent
power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with
the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of
a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a
miscarriage of justice.
In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the
rules on notice of hearing, because the rights of the petitioners
were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the
rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of
the adverse party were not affected. [50] The purpose for the notice
of hearing coincides with procedural due process, [51] for the court
to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the
motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a
reply or opposition.[52] In probate proceedings, what the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute
absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. [53] In the
case at bar, as evident from the Sharia District Courts order dated
January 17, 2006, petitioners counsel received a copy of the
motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly
not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said
motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Sharia
District Court reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration
in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to
object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these

circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of

hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.
Prescription and Filiation
Petitioners fifth argument is premature. Again, the Sharia District
Court has not yet determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle
the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending,
questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to
recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said
proceeding.[54] The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent. [55] In the
case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent
depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the
Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the
decedent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of
the Sharia District Court, dated August 22, 2006 and September
21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER,

G.R. No. 157912

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus -

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
ESTATE
SHEKER,

OF

ALICE

O.

REYES, JJ.

VICTORIA S. MEDINAAdministratrix,

Promulgated:

Respondent.

December 13, 2007

x-----------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the

reversal of the Order[1] of the Regional TrialCourt of Iligan City,
Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order
dated April 9, 2003.

The undisputed facts are as follows.

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice

O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to
file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim
for
agent's
commission
due
him
amounting
to
approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain
parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount
of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or
to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale
of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved

for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the
grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section
7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2)
petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum
shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation
why the money claim was not filed and served personally.

On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing
without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds
advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari,

raising the following questions:

(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate

proceeding contain a certification against non-forum
shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a

probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the
docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding

be dismissed because of its failure to contain a written
explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?[2]

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to

a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of nonforum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and
the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists
that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in
ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in
a suppletory manner.

The Court gave due course to the petition for review

on certiorari although directly filed with this Court, pursuant to
Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.[3]

The petition is imbued with merit.

However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary

actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely
correct.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of

special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as
far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court

govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be
applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable

of being put into practice, done or accomplished.[4] This means that in the absence
of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special
proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to
said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules
in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special
proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of nonforum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation
for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money
claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus,
they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person as in the present case.

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in
dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate for failure
of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping?

The Court rules in the affirmative.

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints

and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money
claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present
case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition
for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all
persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify
the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise,
they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.[5]

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for
creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper
disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[6] the
Court explained thus:

x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to

bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the
case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent
right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of
a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main
object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the
principal remedy.[7](Emphasis supplied)

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of
the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot
even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein

petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not
require a certification against non-forum shopping.

On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,[8] that
the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an
estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrixto assist her in
fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees
because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such
filing fees within a reasonable time.[9] After all, the trial court had already assumed
jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, nonpayment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the
grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.

With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De

Guzman Vda. de Macatangay[10] is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon

Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court has the
discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not
complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should
expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely,
minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail,
considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do
away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the
following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch
opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for
instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the
post office that the registered mail containing the pleading of or other paper from the
adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or,
worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such
pleading or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules
requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the
court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of
service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why
personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must,
necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins
with the clause whenever practicable.

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal serviceand filing is the
general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is
practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person,
personal service or filing ismandatory. Only when personal service or
filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must
then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal
service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the
plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the
importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved
therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of

personal service, exercised its discretion and liberally
applied Section 11 of Rule 13:
As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires,
service and filing of pleadings must be done personally
whenever practicable. The court notes that in the
present case, personal service would not be
practicable. Considering the distance between the
Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the
petition was posted, clearly, service by registered
mail [sic] would have entailed considerable time,
effort and expense. A written explanation why
service was not done personally might have been
superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded
with the use of may, signifying permissiveness, a

violation thereof gives the court discretion whether

or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is
true that procedural rules are necessary to secure
an
orderly
and
speedy
administration
of
justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may
be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial
justice. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is

Lopez, Quezon,
while
petitioner
Sonias counsels is LucenaCity. Lopez, Quezon is
83
kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes
personal service impracticable.As in Musa v. Amor, a
written explanation why service was not done personally
might have been superfluous.
As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal
construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed
where, among other cases, the injustice to the adverse
party is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.[11] (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while
counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both
in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great
distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve
and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals,
[12]
the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not
been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have
exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim
of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of
deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of
inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been
paid.[13] The ultimate purpose for the rule on money claims was further explained
inUnion Bank of the Phil. v. Santibaez,[14] thus:

The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate
court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v.
Herrera:

x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed.
The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The
law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against
the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible ,
pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[15]

(Emphasis supplied)

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the
requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest
of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the

Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15,
2003
and
April
9,
2003,
respectively,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional TrialCourt of Iligan
City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take
appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with
Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18799

March 31, 1964

HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental,
ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HERMINIO MARAVILLA, respondent.
Jose Gutierrez David, A. Aveto, A. Mirasol and P. C. Ramos for petitioners.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
Petitioners herein appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No.
27200-R) wherein, over their objection, raising the question of jurisdiction petition, the appellate
court took cognizance of the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Herminio Maravilla and, in
consequence thereof, set aside the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as a special coadministrator of the estate of the deceased Digna Maravilla. The pertinent antecedent facts are as
follows:
On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with he Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition for probate of the will (Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna
Maravilla who died on August 12 of that same year. In the will the surviving spouse was named as
the universal heir and executor.
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters of the
deceased Digna Maravilla) filed an opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground, inter alia, that
the will was not signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and
of one another.
On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was opposed by Pedro, Asuncion,
and Regina Maravilla, the court issued an order appointing him special administrator of the estate of
the deceased, for the reason that:
... all the properties subject of the will are conjugal properties of the petitioner and his late
wife, Digna Maravilla, and before any partition of the conjugal property is done, the Court
cannot pinpoint which of the property subject of the Will belongs to Digna Maravilla,
exclusively, that shall be administered by the special administrator. Hence, although it is true
that the petitioner Herminio Maravilla has an adverse interest in the property subject of the
Will, the Court finds it impossible for the present time to appoint any person other than the
petitioner as special administrator of the property until after the partition is ordered, for the
reason that the properties mentioned in the Will are in the name of the petitioner who is the
surviving spouse of the deceased.

On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of the will, as it was not duly
signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for
appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla) as special co-administrator to protect their
interests, on the ground that the will, having been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the
decedent. Said petition was heard on February 20, at which hearing, respondent's counsel orally
moved for postponement, because respondent's principal counsel (Salonga) had not been notified
and was not present. The court ordered presentation of oral evidence, consisting of the testimonies
of Eliezar Lopez, and Regina and Francisco Maravilla.
On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record
on appeal, from the decision denying probate of the will. Some devisees under the will, likewise,
appealed from said decision.
On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for the
removal of respondent as special administrator, as he failed to file an inventory within 3 months from
his appointment and qualification as special administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of
the Rules of Court. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that said provision
of the Rules of Court does not apply to a special administrator, and an inventory had already been
submitted by him, before said petition for his removal was filed.
1wph1.t

On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas filed with the court a
petition for appointment of Conchita as special co-administratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo, likewise,
filed a similar petition February 29.
On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint hearing the (1) petition to appoint Eliezar Lopez as special
administrator, (2) approval of respondent's record appeal and appeal bond, (3) petition to remove
respondent as special administrator, (4) petition to appoint Conchita Kohlhaas as special coadministratrix, and (5) petition to appoint Adelina Sajo as special co-administrator. At said hearing,
respondent objected to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez was special co-administratrix, on grounds
that (a) the law allows only one special co-administrator (b) the order of March 16, 1959 estops the
court from appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator (c) such appointment is unfair to
respondent, because owns at least 3/4 of the whole property, conjugal nature, which would be
subjected to the administrate of a stranger, and (d) a deadlock between two special administrators
would ruin the management of the property, including those of respondent. On cross-examination of
Eliezar Lopez, respondent's counsel elicited the facts that (1) Lopez was employed full time in the
PCAPE, with office in Manila. and could not discharge the functions of a co-administrator, and (2)
there was merely intention on Lopez part to resign from office.
After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator in an order
dictated open court, to protect the interests of Pedro, Asuncion and Regina Maravilla.
From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing
Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator, and to prohibit the probate court from further proceeding

with the petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator. The Court of Appeals issued
a writ of preliminary injunction on March 9, 1960 which was amended on March 11, 1960 to make it
more specific.
On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to
certify the case to the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the principal amount in controversy in this
case exceeds P200,000.00, and the writs (of certiorari and prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since the probate case is not on appeal before it. To
this petition, respondent filed an opposition. on the grounds that the amount in controversy is less
than P200,000.00 and the decision of the probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now on appeal
before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, and the present case does not involve title to or possession of real estate
exceeding in value P200,000.00.1
On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs (certiorari and
prohibition) prayed for by respondent, and declaring null and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez
as special co-administrator.
Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision, but it was
denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for by respondent, the same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, assumed jurisdiction
over the present case on the theory that "the amount in controversy relative to the appointment of
Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator to protect the interests of respondents (herein petitioners)
is only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e., one fourth of the conjugal property" (of respondent and the
deceased Digna Maravilla) which, is per inventory submitted by respondent as special administrator
is valued at P362,424.90. This theory is untenable. Note that the proceedings had on the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator are merely incidental to the probate or
testate proceedings of the deceased Digna Maravilla presently on appeal before the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where petitioners' motion to elevate the same to the Supreme
Court, on the ground that the amount herein involved is within the latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is still
pending, resolution. That the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over said testate
proceedings cannot be doubted, considering that the properties therein involved are valued at
P362,424,90, as per inventory of the special administrator.
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated in
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate
pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held that
even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse (Vda. de Roxas v. Pecson, et al., L-2211,
December 20, 1948; 82 Phil. 407; see also Vda. de Chantengco v. Chantengco, et al., L-10663,
October 31, 1958). In a number of cases where appeal was taken from an order of a probate court

disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized that the amount or value involved or in controversy
therein is that of the entire estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-3087, July 31, 1954, 50 O.G. 5321; Vano v.
Vda. de Garces, et al., L-6303, June 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3045). Not having appellate jurisdiction over
the proceedings in probate (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R), considering that the amount involved therein is
more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original jurisdiction to grant the writs
of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant case, which are merely incidental
thereto.
In the United States, the rule is that "proceedings in probate are appealable where the amount or
value involved is reducible to a pecuniary standard, the amount involved being either the appellant's
interest or the value of the entire estate according as the issues on appeal involve only the
appellant's rights or the entire administration of the estate. ... In a contest for administration of an
estate the amount or value of the assets of the estate is the amount in controversy for purposes of
appeal." (4 C.J.S. 204). In line with this ruling, it is to be observed that respondent's interest as
appellant in the probate proceedings (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) is, according to his theory, the whole
estate amounting to P362,424.90, or, at least more than 3/4 thereof, or approximately P270,000.00.
Such interest, reduced to a pecuniary standard on the basis of the inventory, is the amount or value
of the matter in controversy, and such amount being more than P200,000.00, it follows that the
appeal taken in said proceedings falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
should, therefore, be certified to it pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment of the appointment of
Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing
respondent as special administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the administration of the estate and,
consequently, the amount or value of the assets of the whole estate is the value in controversy (4
C.J.S. 204). It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the
Court of Appeals clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.
The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, arrived at the amount of "P90,000.00 more or
less", as the amount involved in the case, upon authority of the case of Vistan v. Archbishop (73 Phil.
20). But this case is inapplicable, as it does not refer to the question of administration of the estate,
nor to an order denying probate of a will, but only to the recovery of a particular legacy consisting of
the rentals of a fishpond belonging to the estate. In an analogous case involving the administration
of a trust fund, the United States Supreme Court held:
Where the trust fund administered and ordered to be distributed by the circuit court, in a suit
to compel the stockholders of a corporation to pay their subscriptions to stock to realize the
fund, amounts to more than $5,000.00, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal, which is not
affected by the fact that the amounts decreed to some of the creditors are less than that sum
(Handly et al. vs. Stutz, et al., 34 Law Ed. 706).
Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary civil
cases, are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not
enumerated in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting, arguendo, that a special
proceeding is not a civil action, it has never been decided that a special proceeding is not a "civil
case" (Carpenter v. Jones, 121 Cal. 362; 58 p. 842). On the other hand, it has been held that the

term "civil case" includes special proceedings (Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680, N.W. 178).
Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil actions
are applicable in special proceedings where they are not inconsistent with, or when they may serve
to supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings. Consequently, the procedure of appeal
is the same in civil actions as in special proceedings. (See Moran's Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.)
The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate total claim of the parties and
not the combined claims against each other determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are not
applicable to, the instant case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court is explicit that the
amount or value involved or in controversy in probate proceedings is that of the entire estate.
Assuming, arguendo, that the rule in the cases cited by respondent is here applicable, it should be
noted that respondent claims the whole estate of at least more than 3/4 thereof. Said claim, reduced
to a pecuniary standard, on the basis of the inventory, would amount to more than P200,000.00 and,
consequently, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115, May 10, 1954) cited by respondent in his brief, is also
inapplicable, because unlike the instant case, it did not involve a contest in the administration of the
estate.
While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate proceedings (Spec. Proc. No.
4977, CFI of Negros Occidental) which was appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, it
becomes immaterial, in view of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
providing that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which
the value in controversy exceeds two hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs",
and that "all cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court, or to the Court of
Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same as if it had originally been
brought before it".
On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, we agree
with respondent that there was no need for it. Note that the Rules of Court contain no provision on
special co-administrator, the reason being, that the appointment of such special administrator is
merely temporary and subsists only until a regular executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus,
it would not only be unnecessary but also impractical, if for the temporary duration of the need for a
special administrator, another one is appointed aside from the husband, in this case, upon whom the
duty to liquidate the community property devolves merely to protect the interests of petitioners who,
in the event that the disputed will is allowed to probate, would even have no right to participate in the
proceedings at all. (Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407.)
In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the amount involved in the controversy,
it is suggested that appropriate steps be taken on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals
involving the probate of the will (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) to comply with the provisions of the Judiciary
Act on the matter.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is set aside and another one
entered also setting aside the order of the trial court of March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar Lopez as
special co-administrator. Without costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 26751

January 31, 1969

JOSE S. MATUTE, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division) and MATIAS S. MATUTE, respondents.
--------------------------G.R. No. L-26085

January 31, 1969

JOSE S. MATUTE, in his personal capacity and as Judicial Co-Administrator of the Estate of
AMADEO MATUTE OLAVE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE P. BULLECER, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch
IV, and MARIANO NASSER, respondents.
--------------------------G.R. No. L-26106

January 31, 1969

JOSE S. MATUTE AND LUIS S. MATUTE, as Intervenors in their personal capacities in Civil
Case No. 4252 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE P. BULLECER, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV; ATTY.
PATERNO R. CANLAS, DANIEL RIVERA, SR., PABLO V. DEL ROSARIO and NICANOR D.
VERGARA, as Defendants in Civil Case No. 4252, of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, respondents.
Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Paterno R. Canlas for and in his own behalf as respondent.
CASTRO, J.:
The present three petitions for certiorari with preliminary injunction (L-26571, L-26085 and L-26106)
were separately interposed within the short span of five months by Jose S. Matute, one of the fifteen
heirs to the Amadeo Matute Olave estate. Because these petitions are intertwined in several material
aspects and arose from a common environmental setting the intra-fraternal strife among the
Matute heirs which has unduly delayed for more than a decade the settlement of the Matute estate
this Court has decided to embody in a single decision the independently discussed resolutions of
the issues raised in the said petitions.
L-26751

Although the petition in L-26751 was filed the latest (October 27, 1966), we shall dispose of it first
because our pronouncements and observations in this case have direct and concrete relevance to
the other two.
The antecedent events trace their origin to August 20, 1965 when Carlos S. Matute, one of the
Matute heirs and a full-blood brother of both the petitioner and the herein respondent Matias S.
Matute, filed in special proceeding 25876 (settlement of the Matute estate) a petition praying for the
removal of Matias as co-administrator and his (Carlos') appointment in such capacity. Carlos alleged
that "for a period of more than two years from the date of his appointment (on May 29, 1963), said
Matias S. Matute has neglected to render a true, just and complete account of his administration,"
and that he "is not only incompetent but also negligent in his management of the estate under his
charge consisting of five haciendas on account of a criminal charge for murder filed against him
which is occupying most of his time."
1awphil.t

The respondent Matias claims that he forthwith interposed an opposition to the aforesaid petition,
and the record discloses that he later filed an amended opposition dated August 25, 1965 wherein
he contended.
1. That the allegation ... that the herein co-administrator for the two years of his
administration, 1963 and 1964, did not render any accounting is completely without basis
and false, because the records show that under date of May 20,1964, he submitted to this
Honorable Court with copies furnished to all the parties concerned, including Carlos S.
Matute, his accounting for 1963, that on Feb. 8, 1965, he filed his accounting for 1964, which
accounts for 1963 and 1964 have been approved by majority of the heirs composing of 63%
interests in the estate as shown by the attached manifestation....
2. That his competence to act as administrator has been established to the satisfaction of
this Honorable Court as evidenced by his appointment by a fixed, final and executory order
dated May 29, 1963; and Carlos S. Matute is now estopped from denying his [Matias S.
Matute's] competence and qualification by reason of his failure to object to the appointment
of herein Judicial Administrator at the time the application was made therefor;
3. .... The records of the pertinent case in the Court of First Instance ofDavao will easily
discover that the "criminal charge" supported by perjuredtestimony is nothing but a trumpedup affair initiated by persons intent onintimidating the herein Judicial Administrator into
betraying his sworn dutyto protect and safeguard the interest of the Estate. The records of
the saidcase will also reveal that it has not occupied any time at all of the herein Judicial
Administrator, for aside from a single hearing last December 1964 onhis application for
bail ... no hearing has been held on the said case up tothe present.
Subsequently, Matias filed a memorandum dated September 12, 1965 in support of his foregoing
opposition.
On September 21, 1965 the heirs of Agustina Matute Candelario, Elena MatuteCandelario and
Amadeo Matute Candelario and their mother and legatee AnunciacionCandelario, moved for the
immediate appointment of Agustina Matute Candelario,Carlos S. Matute and Jose S. Matute, herein

petitioner, as joint co-administratorsor anyone of them in place of Matias S. Matute, whose removal
they also soughttogether with the ouster of the general administrator Carlos V. Matute, on
thefollowing additional grounds:
1. Despite the vast resources and income of the estate, the present administrators have
failed to pay even the annual real property tax for the years 1964 and 1965;
2. The financial statements of both administrators were not properly signed andauthenticated
by a certified public accountant, and do not contain the exactentries as filed by former
administrators containing the daily and monthly entriesof receipts and disbursements;
3. Both administrators have deliberately failed to file their inventories andstatements of
accounts of time, and did so only when ordered by the probatecourt;
4. Both administrators have made unauthorized disbursements as shown by theirfinancial
statements; and
5. The probate court has discretion to remove the administrator.
It appears that during the reception of evidence conducted on December 29, 1965by the probate
court (Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Manila withHonorable Emigdio Nietes as the then
presiding judge), Carlos S. Matute and theCandelario-Matute heirs submitted respective lists of
exhibits in support oftheir motion to oust Matias. On January 8, 1966 Matias filed a written
objectionto the admission of the movants' exhibits on the ground that the same were hearsay,selfserving, irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies of supposed originalswhich were never properly
identified nor shown in court. Four days later, or onJanuary 12, 1966, the counsel for Matias filed
with leave of court a "Motion toDismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence" which avers that "there is no
sufficientevidence on record to justify and support the motions for the removal of theherein coadministrator Matias S. Matute." In the same motion, said counselreserved the right to introduce
evidence in behalf of his client should theforegoing motion be denied.
On January 31, 1966 the probate court issued an order, the dispositive portionof which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby removes co-administrator, Matias S.Matute,
as such co-administrator of the estate and orders him to submit a finalaccounting of his
administration together with his past administration accountswhich have not been approved,
and, in his stead appoints Jose S. Matute, a brother by the same mother of Matias S. Matute,
as co-administrator, who ishereby required to put up a bond of P15,000.00, and thereafter
immediatelyqualify in his commission and assume the responsibility of co-administrator....
Forthwith, Matias interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with preliminary
mandatory injunction (CA-G.R. 37039-R) dated February 1, 1966, praying that the aforesaid order of
January 31, 1966 be set aside as a nullityfor having decreed his removal without due process and
the appointment of JoseS. Matute without the requisite hearing.

On March 4, 1966 the Court of Appeals gave due course to the aforesaid petitionand resolved to
grant a writ of preliminary injunction against Jose S. Matuteand the Honorable Judge Emigdio
Nietes, respondents in CA-G.R. 37039-R, conditioned on the filing of a P1,000 bond by the therein
petitioner Matias, the respondentherein. On March 22, 1966 Jose S. Matute moved for the dismissal
of the abovementionedpetition on the ground that the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction
totake cognizance of the same since the value of the estate involved is more thanP200,000. He
further contended that the value of the Amadeo Matute Olave estatefor purposes of jurisdiction had
already been resolved in CA-G.R. 35124-R wherethe Court of Appeals refused to take jurisdiction
over a petition for certiorari contesting the appointment of Matias Matute as co-administrator, on the
groundthat the value of the Matute estate was placed at P2,132,282.72 as evidenced by a
"Compromise Agreement" dated April 12, 1956 which was duly signed by all of the heirs.
Despite repeated urgent motions filed by Jose S. Matute praying that the Courtof Appeals resolve
with dispatch the issue of jurisdiction, the said appelatetribunal instead required then respondent
Jose S. Matute to answer, which he did.However, on October 27, 1966 herein petitioner Jose S.
Matute interposed theinstant petition forcertiorari with preliminary injunction against the Court of
Appeals and Matias Matute, challenging the jurisdiction of the respondentCourt of Appeals upon two
basic contentions:
The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to entertain, give due course, andmuch more to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction, against the petitioner, Jose S. Matute, and respondent
Judge Emigdio Nietes in CA-G.R. No. 37039-R ... because the estate of Amadeo Matute
Olave is worth more than P200,000.00; and
The same Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 35124-R, on January 27, 1965, specialfourth
division, has ruled that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction on theestate of Amadeo
Matute Olave in the matter of the appointment and removal ofits administrators.
The respondent Matias Matute does not controvert the petitioner's claim that thevalue of the estate
of their deceased father exceeds P200,000. He maintains,however, that the respondent Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction over CA-G.R.37039-R "because the subject matter involved is merely ... the
right to collectthe (monthly) rentals due the Estate in the sum of P5,000.00" pursuant to acontract of
lease which he executed in favor of one Mariano Nasser coveringfive haciendas of the estate under
his separate administration.
The foregoing assertion does not merit credence. A searching review of the record from the
initial petition filed by Carlos Matute to oust the respondentas co-administrator up to the latter's
petition for certiorari filed with theCourt of Appeals impugning the validity of the abovementioned
order of January31, 1966 which removed him as co-administrator and appointed the petitioner inhis
place reveals no single pleading, statement, contention, reference or eveninference which would
justify the respondent's pretension that the instantcontroversy is a mere contest over the right to
collect a P5,000 rental. In bold contrast, the record vividly chronicles the controversy as a bitter fight
for co-administration: the removal of the respondent as co-administrator and the appointment of
anyone of the movants and the herein petitioner as new co-administrator. Indeed, the principal
conflict gravitates over the right to co-administer the vast Amadeo Matute Olave estate. This is the
same issue underlying the respondent'sabovementioned petition in CA-G.R. 37039-R. The

respondent's prayer in said petition unmistakably indicates that the dispute pertains to the right
to co-administer in general, not the mere authority to collect a P5,000 monthly rental.The said prayer
reads:
1. That an ex parte writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued enjoiningand/or
prohibiting the respondent Judge from approving the administrator's bondthat will be filed by
respondent Jose S. Matute and in issuing the letters ofadministration of the latter, and from
issuing Orders incidental and/or connectedwith the exercise and performance of acts of
administration of said respondent Jose S. Matute; likewise enjoining and prohibiting
respondent Jose S. Matutehimself, and/or through his counsels, agents and representatives
from takingphysical possession of the different haciendas under the exclusive
administrationand management of herein petitioner and from performing and exercising acts
ofa duly and legally appointed administrator, upon filing a bond in such amountthat this
Honorable Tribunal may fix;
2. That the Order of the respondent Judge dated January 31, 1966, removing herein
petitioner as co-administrator of the Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave andappointing
respondent Jose S. Matute as co-administrator without presentationof evidence, be declared
null and void and of no force and effect....
In fine, the pith of the controversy is the right to co-administer the entire estate. In this regard, the
ruling inFernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla 1 is determinative of the jurisdictional issue posed here. In said
case, this Courtruled that in a contest for the administration of an estate, the amount incontroversy is
deemed to be the value of the whole estate, which total valueshould be the proper basis of the
jurisdictional amount. Consequently the Courtproceeded to conclude that the Court of Appeals does
not have jurisdiction toissue writs of certiorari and preliminary injunction prayed for in a petition
concerning a conflict over administration arising as an incident in the mainprobate or settlement
proceeding if in the first place the principal case or proceeding falls outside its appelate jurisdiction
considering the total value of the subject estate. This Court in the aforesaid Maravilla case
elaborated thus:
The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, assumed jurisdiction overthe present
case on the theory that "the amount in controversy relative to theappointment of Eliezar
Lopez as special co-administrator to protect the interestsof the respondents (herein
petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e.,one fourth of the conjugal property" (of
respondent and the deceased DignaMaravilla) which, as per inventory submitted by the
respondent as special administrator, is valued at P362,424.90. This theory is
untenable. Note that theproceedings had on the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special coadministrator are merely incidental to the probate or testate proceedings of the deceased
Digna Maravilla.

That the Court of Appeals have no appelate jurisdiction over the said testateproceedings
cannot be doubted, considering the properties therein involved arevalued at P362,424.00, as
per inventory of the special administrator.

... Not having appelate jurisdiction over the proceedings in probate (CA-G.R.No. 27478-R),
considering that the amount involved therein is more than P200,000.00,the Court of Appeals
cannot also have original jurisdiction to grant the writsof certiorari and prohibition prayed for
by respondent in the instant case, whichare merely incidental thereto....
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment ofthe
appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator and to restrain theprobate court
from removing respondent as special administrator. It is therefore,a contest for the
administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount orvalue of the assets of the
whole estate is the value in controversy. (4 C.J.S. 204.) It appearing that the value of the
estate in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no
original jurisdiction to issuethe writs in question. (emphasis supplied)
Like in the aforecited Maravilla case, the instant intra-fraternal controversy involves a contest over
administration, an incident in the settlement of the vast Matute estate. Considering that the value of
the said estate is more thanP200,000, and considering further that as enunciated in the Maravilla
case thetotal value of the subject estate determines the jurisdictional amount anentdisputes over
administration arising as incidents in a probate or settlementproceeding, like the case at bar, then it
is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over CA-G.R. 37039-R
nor the judicial authority to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed fortherein.
Herein respondent insists, however, that even granting that the actual controversy pertains to
administration, such contested administration does not encompassthe whole estate but is limited to
the collection of a P5,000 monthly rental,which sum should be the basis of the jurisdictional amount,
not the value ofthe whole estate. In support of his thesis, the respondent alleges that duringhis
incumbency as co-administrator, five haciendas in Davao belonging to theestate of his deceased
father were consigned to his separate administration; that in his capacity as co-administrator he
leased on February 10, 1965 said haciendas to one Mariano Nasser for P5,000 a month; that by
virtue of said leasecontract, the possession, management and administration of the said properties
were transferred to the lessee until the expiration of the contract; that consequently, only the
collection of the monthly rental of P5,000 remains asthe subject of the administration.
The foregoing contention of the respondent is patently untenable.
1. The averment of the respondent that the controversy centers on the collectionof the
alleged P5,000 monthly rental and that the contest over administrationis limited thereto, does
not find any support in the record.
2. The rule remains that the jurisdictional amount is determined by the totalvalue of the
estate, not by value of the particular property or portion of the estate subject to
administration, since the question of administration is merely incidental to the principal
proceeding for the settlement and distribution ofthe whole estate.
3. The respondent's impression that a co-administrator's trust and responsibilityare
circumscribed and delimited by the size and value of the particular propertyor portion of the
estate subject to his separate administration, is erroneous. Although a co-administrator is

designated to admininister a portion of theestate, he is no less an administrator of the whole

because his judiciousmanagement of a mere parcel enhances the value of the entire estate,
while hisinefficient or corrupt administration thereof necessarily diminishes the valueof the
whole estate. Moreover, when two or more administrators are appointed toadminister
separate parts of a large estate they are not to discharge theirfunctions in distant isolation
but in close cooperation so as to safeguard andpromote the general interests of the entire
estate. The teaching in Sison vs.Teodoro 2 is of positive relevance. In the said case, the
probate court chargedagainst the entire estate the compensation of an administrator who
was assignedas judicial administrator representing the interests of one of the two
heiresses.The other heiress whose interest was represented by the executor opposed
theaward on the ground that the said administrator had not rendered service to theestate but
only to his wife, the heiress whom he represented. On appeal, this Court upheld the award
and dismissed the opposition:
This argument erroneously assumes that because Carlos Moran Sison was "judicial
administrator representing the interests of Priscilla F. Sison" he was such administrator
"solely for the purpose of protecting Priscilla's interests," and not to protect those of the
estate. No words are needed to explain that in general,the interest of the heir coincides with
those of the estate the bigger theestate the better for the heir. Therefore to protect the
interest of heiressPriscilla usually meant to favor the interest of the estate (sic).... Again, the
argument presumes that an administrator appointed by the Court for thepurpose of giving
representation to designated heirs, is not deemed administratorof the estate. This
assumption has no legal foundation, because it is admitted practice, where the estate is
large, to appoint two or more administrators ofsuch estate to have different interests
represented and satisfied, and furthermore,to havesuch representatives work in harmony for
the best interests of such estate. (In re Drew's Estate, 236 N.W. 701, 2 C.J. p. 1183)
(emphasis supplied)
Verily, therefore, the scope of a co-administrator's trust encompasses the entireestate and is coextensive in effect with those of the other administrators; consequently, the value of the entire estate
should be the proper basis of the jurisdictional amount irrespective of the value of the particular
property orassets of the estate which are the objects of a separate administration pending the
settlement proceedings.
In view of all the foregoing, we are of the consensus that the respondent Courtof Appeals has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of CA-G.R. 37039-R, and consequently was without power to issue or
grant the writs of certiorariand prohibition prayed for in said case.
Notwithstanding that the herein petitioner delimited the issue, as set forth inhis petition of certiorari,
to one of jurisdiction of the respondent Court of Appeals over CA-G.R. 37039-R, in subsequent
pleadings and manifestations, however, the parties therein mutually expanded the issue to include
the question of the legality of the controverted order of January 31, 1966 in CA-G.R. 37039-R. As a
matter of fact, the respondent, in a "Petition to Resolve" dated July 18,1967, prayed "that a decision
on the merits in this case be now rendered." To this manifestation, the petitioner replied "that he
has no objection, as in fact, he also prays that this case be decided at the earliest by the Highest
Tribunal."

Since the respondent Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over CA-G.R. 37039-R, we are of
the considered opinion that this Court can forestall further delay in the already protracted
proceedings regarding the settlement of the Matute estate if it now proceeds to resolve the issue of
legality of the abovementioned disputed order, rather than wait for the parties to come anew on a
separate petition in quest for a verdict on the said issue. Moreover, both the petitioner and the
respondent private party have manifested and elaborated their respective views on this issue and
prayed and pressed for a decision thereon.
We shall now discuss separately the twin aspects of the foregoing controverted order, namely, (1)
the removal of the respondent as co-administrator of the Matute estate, and (2) the appointment of
the petitioner as the new co-administrator.
The respondent contends that the disputed order removing him as co-administrator is a patent
nullity for the following reasons:
(1) He was removed in wanton disregard of due process of law because the probatejudge
arbitrarily deprived him of his day in court;
(2) The evidence adduced by the movants is manifestly insufficient, if not devoid of probative
value, to warrant his removal; and
(3) He was removed not on the grounds specifically invoked by the movants but for causes
discoveredmotu propio by the probate judge in the records of specialproceeding 25876 and
without affording him the opportunity to rebut the findingsof the said judge.
Upon the other hand, the petitioner advances the following reasons in support of the order of
removal:
(1) The probate judge accorded the respondent all the opportunity to adduce hisevidence but
the latter resorted to dilatory tactics such as filing a "motion to dismiss or demurrer to
evidence";
(2) The evidences presented to sustain the removal of the respondent are incontrovertible
since aside from being documentary, they are parts of the record of special proceeding
25876; and
(3) The evidence on record conclusively supports the findings of the probate judge.
The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the
discretion of the court appointing him. As aptly expressed in one case, 3 "The sufficiency of any
ground for removal should thus be determined by the said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first
place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in
disregard of the rules or the orders of the court." Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to
interfere with the action taken by a probate court in the matter of the removal of an executor or
administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown. 4

In the case at bar, we are constrained, however to nullify the disputed order of removal because it
is indubitable that the probate judge ousted the respondent from his trust without affording him the
full benefit of a day in court, thus denying him his cardinal right to due process.
It appears that shortly after the reception of evidence for the movants Carlos Matute and the
Candelario-Matute heirs, the respondent filed on January 8, 1966a verified objection to the
admission in evidence of the movants' exhibits on the ground that the same were hearsay, selfserving, irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies of supposed originals which were never properly
identified nor produced in court. Four days later, or on January 12, 1966, the respondent filed with
leave of court a "Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence", the pertinent and material portion
of which reads:
... considering the specific objection to each exhibit contained in said Objections to
Admission of Movants' Exhibits and considering further the ruling of this Honorable Court in
open court that pleadings filed in this case are evidence only of the fact of their filing and not
of the truth of the statements contained therein and considering still further the fact that no
competent single witness was presented by movants in support of their respective
contentions, we submit that there is no sufficient evidence on record to justify and support
the motions for removal of the herein co-administrator Matias S. Matute and in the light of the
authorities hereinbelow cited, the motions to remove Matias S. Matute must be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.

... However, in the remote possibility that this instant motion be denied by this Honorable
Court, the herein co-administrator expressly reserves his right to present his own
evidence ... at least five (5) days from the receipt of said denial.... (emphasis supplied)
Instead of resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued the controverted order
removing the respondent as co-administrator without giving him the opportunity to adduce his own
evidence despite his explicit reservation that he be afforded the chance to introduce evidence in his
behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to evidence. We are of the
view that the above actuation of the probate judge constituted grave abuse of discretion which
dooms his improvident order as a nullity. In fact, even without the respondent's reservation, it was
the bounden duty of the probate judge to schedule the presentation and reception of the
respondent's evidence before disposing of the case on the merits because only the movants at that
time had presented their evidence. This duty is projected into bolder relief if we consider, which we
must, that the aforesaid motion is in form as well as in substance a demurrer to evidence allowed by
Rule 35, by virtue of which the defendant does not lose his right to offer evidence in the event that
his motion is denied. Said Rule states:
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant without
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
(emphasis supplied)

The application of the abovecited Rule in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is authorized by
section 2 of Rule 72 which direct that in the "absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in
ordinary civil actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings."
But what is patently censurable is the actuation of the probate judge in removing the respondent,
not on the strength of the evidence adduced by the movants (not a single exhibit or document
introduced by the movants was specifically cited in the disputed order as a justification of the
respondent's ouster), but on the basis of his (judge's) findings, which he motu propio gleaned from
the records of special proceeding 25876, without affording the respondent an opportunity to
controvert said findings or in the very least to explain why he should not be removed on the basis
thereof.
The probate judge did find, as essayed in his disputed order, that the respondent "has shown
indifference to his duties as such co-administrator of the estate" as evidenced by:
(1) the disapproval of his 1964 account by the probate court in an order dated January 5,
1966 due to his "non-appearance and non-submission of evidence to sustain his account on
the date set for the presentation of the same;"
(2) the considerable decrease in the income of the properties under his charge, as reflected
in said 1964 account, which circumstance "does not speak well of his diligence and attention
to the administration of said properties;" and
(3) the failure of said 1964 account to disclose the number of calves born during the
accounting period, "thereby indicating a palpable omission of fact which directly reduced the
value of the income or the increase of the assets of the estate."
But, significantly, the movants did not specifically invoke the aforesaid grounds in support of their
petition to oust the respondent. All of the said grounds, which in the mind of the probate judge
exposed the supposed indifference and incompetence of the respondent in the discharge of his trust,
are based on alleged defects of the respondent's 1964 account. Under these circumstances, it
behooved the probate judge to inform the respondent of his findings before ordering the latter's
removal. We concede that the probate judge enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in the matter of the
removal of executors and administrators and he can cause their ouster at his own instance.
However, before they are deprived of their office they must be given the full benefit of a day in court,
an opportunity not accorded to the respondent herein.
Without forgetting such patent denial of due process, which rendered the order of removal a nullity,
let us examine the merits of the probate judge's motu propio findings to determine whether they
warrant the ouster of the respondent.
As proof of the respondent's "indifference" in the discharge of his duties, the probate judge cited the
court's order of January 5, 1966 disapproving the respondent's 1964 account for his failure to
personally appear on the date set for the submission of evidence in support of the said account. It
must be emphasized, however, that the respondent, two days before the issuance of the aforesaid
order removing him as co-administrator, seasonably moved for the reconsideration of the aforecited

order of January 5, 1966 on the ground that his failure to personally attend the scheduled hearing
was due to illness on his part. Evidently, when the probate court decreed the removal of the
respondent, the order disapproving his 1964 account, which was used as one of the principal
justifications for his removal as co-admininistrator, was not yet final as it was still subject to possible
reconsideration. As a matter of fact, on February 19, 1966 the same probate judge set aside the
aforesaid order of January 5, 1966, thus:
Considering that it will be the benefit of all the parties concerned if former co-administrator
Matias S. Matute will be allowed to substantiate the accounting which he submitted to this
Court but which was disapproved on January 5, 1966 for his failure to personally appear at
the hearing held for the purpose of substantiating said accounting, his motion for
reconsideration filed on January 28, 1966 is hereby granted and the order dated January 5,
1966 disapproving the accounting submitted by Matias S. Matute is set aside. (emphasis
supplied)
With the order of January 5, 1966 thus revoked, the probate judge's conclusion that the respondent
was "indifferent" to his duties as co-administrator as evidenced by the disapproval of his 1964
account loses its principal basis.
Again using the 1964 account of the respondent as basis of his finding that the respondent was
guilty of disinterest in the discharge of his trust, the probate judge stressed that "a verification of said
accounting shows the income of the properties under his (respondent's) charge were very much
reduced which does not speak well of his diligence and attention to the administration of the said
properties," and that said account failed to report the number of "offspring of the cattle during the
period of accounting belonging to the estate, thereby indicating a palpable omission of fact which
directly reduced the value of the income or increase of the assets of the estate." It is pertinent to
emphasize here that the said 1964 account is still pending approval, hence it was premature to use
alleged defects in said account as grounds for the removal of the respondent. If it is now ruled that
the respondent is unfit to continue as co-administrator because of the alleged infirmities in his
account for 1964, the respondent will be greatly prejudiced in the event that said account is finally
approved and the said defects are found to be nonexistent or so trivial as not to affect the general
validity and veracity of the account. Assuming, however, that the probate judge correctly observed
that the said account reflects a big reduction in the income of the haciendas under the separate
administration of the respondent, this fact alone does not justify the conclusion that the latter did not
exercise due care and zeal. There is no proof that the decrease in income had been caused by the
respondent's willful negligence or dishonesty. Needless to stress, varied factors, some beyond the
control of an administrator, may cause the diminution of an estate's income.
Anent the failure to report the number of calves born during the accounting period, granting that the
same is true, there is however no evidence on record to prove that the said omission was deliberate
or designed to prejudice the estate. It could have been either an honest mistake or mere
inadvertence. In the absence of competent proof to the contrary, good faith must be presumed. The
probate judge should have required the respondent to explain the said omission instead of branding
outright said omission as "palpable."

In his excursion into the records of special proceeding 25876, the probate judge also found a copy
of a so-called "Compliance" submitted by the respondent which reported "a very staggering amount
of over One Million Pesos supposedly given to the heirs" as advances. The probate judge proceeded
to observe that the "record does not show that the said advances to the heirs were authorized by the
Court in the amounts made to appear in the 'Compliance.'" He added that a "verification of the
record will show that may be part of this amount supposedly paid by the co-administrator to the heirs
were authorized by the Court but a greater volume of the same was obviously not authorized." On
account of this particular finding, the probate court concluded, without equivocation, that the
respondent had been acting without previous authority from the probate court. Unfortunately again,
the respondent was not afforded the opportunity to present his side and if possible to controvert the
said finding or correct the impressions of the judge. Hearing the respondent on this point is
imperative because, like the other grounds upon which the probate judge anchored the order of
removal, it was not put in issue by the movants, neither was a copy of said "Compliance" submitted
in evidence. It bears emphasis that it there were unauthorized payments of advances to some heirs
or simulated grants as the probate judge appears to theorize, then it is most surprising why the
prejudiced Matute heirs, litigation-proned as they are, did not impugn the so-called "Compliance."
Furthermore, not one of the movants interested in the removal of the respondent specifically charged
the latter with unauthorized or fictitious payments of advances. It should also be noted that the said
"Compliance" was submitted by the respondent in response to the probate court's order for the
submission of "a list of the heirs who have personally received the advances from
the administration," not from the respondent alone. It stands to reason, therefore, that the said
"Compliance" could very well be a cumulative list of all the advances given and received by the
Matute heirs from the several administrators of the Matute estate since 1955. In the absence of
concrete evidence that the said "staggering amount" of over a million pesos advances was
disbursed by the respondent alone during his beleaguered term which commenced only in 1963, we
have no recourse but to jettison the adverse conclusion of the probate judge. What the probate
judge should have done was to afford Matias the chance to explain and substantiate the facts and
the figures appearing in the aforesaid "Compliance," which unfortunately does not form part of the
record before us. The respondent asserts that if only the probate judge "took pains to examine fully
the voluminous records of the Matute estate, and as reflected in the very 'Compliance' submitted to
the Court ... any disbursement given to the heirs by all the administrators of the Estate were by virtue
of the several Orders of the Probate Court issued upon joint motion of all the heirs for their monthly
maintenance and support."
It likewise appears that the respondent was removed partly due to his failure to pay the inheritance
and estate taxes. In this regard, it bears emphasis that the failure to pay the taxes due from the
estate is per se not a compelling reason for the removal of an administrator, for "it may be true that
the respondent administrator failed to pay all the taxes due from the estate, but said failure may be
due to lack of funds, and not to a willful omission."5 In the case at bar there is no evidence that the
non-payment of taxes was willful. On the contrary, the respondent alleged, and this was
unchallenged by the movants, that while the previous administrators left the taxes unpaid, he had
paid the real property taxes in Davao covering the years 1954 to 1966.
We now come to the second part of the controverted order the appointment of the petitioner as
co-administrator vice the respondent. Since the removal of Matias was done with inordinate haste
and without due process, aside from the fact that the grounds upon which he was removed have no

evidentiary justification, the same is void, and, consequently, there is no vacancy to which the
petitioner could be appointed.
Even granting arguendo that the removal of Matias is free from infirmity, this Court is not prepared
to sustain the validity of the appointment of the petitioner in place of the former. To start with, the
record does not disclose that any hearing was conducted, much less that notices were sent to the
other heirs and interested parties, anent the petition for the appointment of Jose S. Matute, among
others, as co-administrator vice Matias S. Matute. In this regard, it is pertinent to observe that any
hearing conducted by the probate court was confined solely to the primary prayers of the separate
petitions of Carlos S. Matute, and the Candelario-Matute heirs seeking the ouster of Matias S.
Matute. The corollary prayers contained in the same petitions for the appointment of Carlos S.
Matute, Jose S. Matute and Agustina Matute Candelario or anyone of them as co-administrator were
never even considered at any of the hearings. The requirement of a hearing and the notification to all
known heirs and other interested parties as to the date thereof is essential to the validity of the
proceeding for the appointment of and administrator "in order that no person may be deprived of his
right or property without due process of law." (Eusebio vs. Valmores, 97 Phil. 163) Moreover, a
hearing is necessary in order to fully determine the suitability of the applicant to the trust, by giving
him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors, if any, to contest the said
application.
The provision of Rule 83 that if "there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may
be granted to any suitable person," cannot be used to justify the institution of Jose S. Matute even
without a hearing, because such institution has no factual basis considering that there was a general
administrator (Carlos V. Matute) who remained in charge of the affairs of the Matute estate after the
removal of Matias S. Matute. The abovecited provision evidently envisions a situation when after the
removal of the incumbent administrator no one is left to administer the estate, thus empowering the
probate court, as a matter of necessity, to name a temporary administrator (or caretaker), pending
the appointment of a new administrator after due hearing. Such circumstance does not obtain in the
case at bar.
Upon the foregoing disquisition, we hold that the respondent Court of Appeals was without
jurisdiction over CA-G.R. 37039-R, and that the controverted order of January 31, 1966 is a nullity
and must therefore be set aside in its entirety.
L-26085
L-26085 is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction interposed on May 19, 1966 by the
same petitioner Jose S. Matute, praying that the controverted order of default dated April 16, 1966,
judgment by default dated April 23, 1966 and order of execution dated May 3, 1966, all issued by the
Court of First Instance of Davao, be set aside.
The sequence of events, like in L-26751, commenced with the issuance by the probate court (Court
of First Instance of Manila) of the order of January 31, 1966 removing Matias S. Matute as coadministrator and replacing him with Jose S. Matute. Armed with the letters of co-administration
awarded to him on February 3, 1966, Jose attempted to take possession of and exercise
administration over the five haciendas La Union, Sigaboy, Monserrat, Colatinan and Pundaguitan, all

belonging to the Matute estate and situated in Governor Generoso, Davao. Said five haciendas were
previously assigned to the separate administration of the deposed co-administrator, Matias S.
Matute.
Mariano Nasser, herein plaintiff-respondent, who was in actual possession of the said haciendas,
opposed the projected takeover by the defendant-petitioner Jose S. Matute in the latter's capacity as
co-administrator. Subsequently, on February 15, 1966, Nasser instituted civil case 4968 in the Court
of First Instance of Davao, a complain for injunction, alleging that the defendant-petitioner was
forcibly wresting possession of the saidhaciendas with the aid of hired goons, and praying that the
said defendant-petitioner be enjoined from taking physical possession, management and
administration of the aforesaid five haciendas. On February 16, 1966 the court a quo issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ex parte, prohibiting "Jose S. Matute and/or his counsels, agents,
representatives or employees from taking physical possession, management and administration" of
the abovementioned properties.
On February 23, 1966, seven days after he received on February 16, 1966, the summons in civil
case 4968, the defendant-petitioner moved to dismiss the aforesaid complaint for injunction and to
dissolve the ex parte writ of injunction. Said motion to dismiss was predicated mainly on the
contention that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the subject haciendas considering that
the same "are properties in custodia legis under the jurisdiction of the Probate Court of Manila, in Sp.
Proc. No. 25876 since 1955 up to the present time," and consequently the probate court has
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, like the one at bar, involving possession and administration of
the aforesaid haciendas. In the same motion to dismiss, the defendant-petitioner averred that the
alleged contract of lease is simulated and fictitious for which reason not even a copy of the said
contract was attached to the complaint, and that granting that such a contract was actually executed,
the same is invalid as it was never approved by the probate court. On February 28, 1966 the
defendant-petitioner was furnished a copy of the plaintiff-respondent's opposition to the
abovementioned motion to dismiss and to lift the ex parte writ of injunction.
Failing to receive any notice of a court resolution on his client's motion to dismiss during the period
of about 1- months after the filing of the said motion, the defendant-petitioner's counsel on April 11,
1966 wrote the clerk of court of the court a quo, requesting that any resolution or order of the trial
court be mailed to him by airmail at his expense, instead of by surface mail, in order to minimize
postal delay. Sometime between April 11 and 19, 1966, the said counsel also dispatched an
emissary to Davao to inquire about the status of civil case 4968. After personal verification of the
record, the said emissary reported to the defendant-petitioner's counsel that the abovementioned
motion to dismiss had been denied by the court a quo in an order dated March 31, 1966. It was also
discovered from the record that the plaintiff-respondent's counsel had been sent a copy of the order
of denial on the very day it was rendered (March 31, 1966) but the record was silent as to the
mailing of the corresponding copy for the defendant-petitioner's counsel, which copy until then had
not been received by the latter. Forthwith, on April 19, 1966, although he had not yet been furnished
his copy of the said order of denial, defendant-petitioner's counsel interposed the requisite answer
with counterclaim. Then on April 23, 1966 he filed a manifestation calling the attention of the court a
quo that as of the said date he had not received a copy of the order denying his client's motion to
dismiss. It was only two days later, or on April 25, 1966, that the said counsel claims, uncontroverted

by the respondent Judge and the plaintiff-respondent, that he received his copy of the aforesaid
order.
In a "Motion to Strike" dated April 26, 1966, the plaintiff-respondent urged that the aforementioned
answer with counterclaim be stricken from the record on the grounds that on April 16, 1966 the
court a quo had declared defendant-petitioner in default for failure to answer the complaint in civil
case 4928 and that subsequently, on April 23, 1966, a judgment by default had been entered against
the latter.
Immediately after receipt on May 5, 1966 of a copy of the said "Motion to Strike," the defendantpetitioner filed his opposition, asserting that it was legally impossible to declare him in default as of
April 16, 1966 for failure to file his responsive pleading, considering that it was only after the said
date, that is, on April 25, 1966, that he received, through his counsel, a copy of the order denying his
motion to dismiss. On the same day, May 5, 1966, the defendant-petitioner's counsel dispatched a
rush telegram to the clerk of court of the Court of First Instance of Davao inquiring whether the trial
court had really rendered the order of default dated April 16, 1966 and the subsequent judgment by
default dated April 23, 1966, copies of which had not been received by him. On the following day,
May 6, 1966, the defendant-petitioner filed an "Urgent Motion to Investigate the Office of the Clerk of
Court for Mailing Discrepancy."
The defendant-petitioner's counsel claims and this is not controverted by the respondent Judge
and the plaintiff-respondent that it was only May 17, 1966 that he received a copy of the judgment
by default and at the same time a copy of the order of execution dated May 3, 1966, and that a copy
of the order of default had never been furnished him.
Because of the impending execution of the judgment by default with the following dispositive
portion
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant confirming the right of the plaintiff to the
possession of the premises leased in his favor by the judicial administrator, Matias S. Matute
and the injunction against the defendant issued in this case is hereby declared permanent
and defendant is hereby permanently enjoined from interfering in the peaceful possession of
the plaintiff over the haciendas La Union, Sigaboy, Monserrrat, Golatinan and Pundaguitan of
the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, all situated in Governor Generoso, Davao and from
doing any act of taking any step against the peaceful possession of said properties by the
plaintiff. The defendant is likewise ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees due and payable to plaintiff's counsel for filing this action: P2,400.00 a month
beginning February, 1966, representing monthly salaries of security guards employed by the
plaintiff in the haciendas leased plus P7,000.00 representing transportation hotel and
representation expenses incurred by the plaintiff for plaintiff's counsel and another P700.00
representing the yearly premiums on the injunction bond filed by plaintiff.
the defendant-petitioner interposed the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to
annul the order of default, the judgment by default, and the order of execution, and to restrain the
execution of the aforesaid judgment pending the resolution of the instant petition.

On May 23, 1966 this Court granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, conditioned on the
petitioner's posting a bond of P5,000, which he did on June 4, 1966.
We are of the consensus that the herein petition should be granted.
Rule 11, section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court gives the defendant a period of fifteen (15) days
after service of summons within which to file his answer and serve a copy thereof upon the plaintiff,
unless a different period is fixed by the court. However, within the period of time for pleading, the
defendant is entitled to move for dismissal of the action on any of the ground enumerated in Rule 16.
If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his
answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the
denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period (Rule 16, section 4). In other words,
the period for filing a responsive pleading commence to run all over again from the time the
defendant received notice of the denial of his motion to dismiss. 6
Reverting to the case at bar, the defendant-petitioner was served with summons in connection with
civil case 4968 on February 16, 1966, hence he had until March 3, 1966 to file his responsive
pleading. Instead of filing an answer, he seasonably interposed a motion to dismiss on February 23,
1966. Although the aforesaid motion to dismiss was denied as early as March 31, 1966, he received
notice of the denial, through his counsel of record,only on April 25, 1966, a fact not traversed by
either the respondent Judge or the plaintiff-respondent. Consequently, the defendant-petitioner had
fifteen (15) days from April 25, 1966, or up to May 10, 1966, to file his answer.
The delay in the mailing of a copy of the order of denial to the defendant-petitioner's counsel
was confirmed by the court a quo in a report rendered after an investigation of the office of the clerk
of court upon urgent motion of the defendant-petitioner. The report reads in part:
From its investigation of the employee in charge of Civil Cases, the Court found out that,
indeed, there was a delay in the mailing of the Order of this Court dated March 31, 1966 to
counsel for the defendant, Atty. Antonio Enril Inton. This Court, however, is convinced of the
sincerity of the reasons given by the employee concerned, and that is: that her failure to
cause to be mailed the copy intended for Atty. Antonio Enrile Inton on the same date that she
caused to be mailed the copy for Atty. Paterno Canlas (plaintiff-respondent's counsel) was
purely a case of an honest mistake and inadvertene on her part owing to the volume of her
work; the affidavit of the employee in charge of Civil Cases being hereto attached.
The affidavit of the employee concerned mentioned in the above-quoted portion of the report clearly
admits the delay, thus:
That due to the fact that I am the only one handling matters relative to Civil Cases and,
because of the volume of my work in the office, I must have inadvertently misplaced the
envelop containing a copy of the Order intended for Atty. Antonio Enrile Inton, and only
discovered by (my) mistake on April 14, 1966, when I went over some papers contained in
the drawer of my table;

That upon discovery of the said envelope containing the copy of the order dated March 31,
1966, among the papers in my table drawer, I forthwith sent the same to the one in charge of
mailing and who mailed the same on April 16, 1966, by registered air mail special delivery,
as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 26897 now attached to the records of this case.
(emphasis supplied)
It is unmistakable from the foregoing exposition that when the defendant-petitioner was declared in
default on April 16, 1966 the time for filing his answer had not yet even commenced to run anew
because on the said date his counsel had not yet received notice of the denial of the motion to
dismiss. The order of denial was received only on April 25, 1966, or definitely after April 16, 1966,
the day when a copy of the said order was mailed to the defendant-petitioner's counsel and when
the defendant-petitioner was declared in default.
No further elaboration is needed to show that the trial judge acted in excess of jurisdiction when he
declared the defendant-petitioner in default. Consequently, the herein controverted order of default is
a patent nullity, an infirmity which likewise afflicts, necessarily, the subsequent judgment by default
and the order of execution.
It is not amiss to say that, at the very least, the defendant-petitioner's motion to dismiss should
have been considered as an answer, since it raised issues on the merits of the case, such as the
invalidity of the alleged contract of lease. Consequently, the defendant petitioner should have been
notified of the hearing, and failure to give him an opportunity to appear in the court below tainted the
subsequent proceedings not only with irregularity but also with illegality. It follows, therefore, that the
petitioner was incorrectly declared in default, and the holding of the trial of the case on the merits in
his absences, without due notice to him, was a denial of due process. 7
In opposing the instant petition, the plaintiff-respondent contends that the remedy of the defendantpetitioner is not a petition for certiorari but an ordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 41, section 2,
paragraph 3 which reads:
A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered
against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to set aside
the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38.
We do not agree. The remedy provided for in the abovequoted rule is properly, though not
exclusively, available to a defendant who has been validly declared in default. It does not preclude a
defendant who has been illegallydeclared in default from pursuing a more speedy and efficacious
remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the judgment by default set aside as a nullity.
It should be emphasized that a defendant who is properly declared in default is differently situated
from one who is improvidently declared in default. The former irreparably loses his right to participate
in the trial, while the latter rentals such right and may exercise the same after having the order of
default and the subsequent judgment be default annulled and the case remanded to the court of
origin. Moreover the former is limited to the remedy set forth in section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 41 by
virtue of which he can contest only the judgment by default on the designated ground that it is
contrary to the evidence or the law; the latter, however, has the option to avail of the same remedy or

to forthwith interpose a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the order of default even
before the promulgation of a judgment by default, or in the event that the latter has been rendered,
to have both court decrees the other of default and the judgment by default declared void. The
defendant-petitioner's choice of the latter course of action is correct for he controverts the judgment
by default not on the ground that it is not supported by evidence or it is contrary to law, but on the
ground that it is intrinsically void for having been rendered pursuant to a patently invalid order of
default.
Granting, however, that an appeal is open to the defendant-petitioner, the same is no longer an
adequate and speedy remedy considering that the court a quo had already ordered the issuance of
a writ of execution and the carrying out of such writ loomed as a great probability. This is in
consonance with the doctrine enunciated in Vda. de Saludes vs Pajarillo and Bautista 8 wherein this
Court held that an "appeal under the circumstances was not adequate remedy there being an order
of execution issued by the municipal court." Hence, the rule that certioraridoes not lie when there is
an appeal is relaxed where, as in the instant case, the trial court had already ordered the issuance of
a writ of execution. 9
The plaintiff-respondent also argues that the instant petition should be denied for failure of the
defendant-petitioner to move for a reconsideration of the challenged decrees so as to afford the
court a quo the chance to amend its errors. While as a matter of policy a motion for reconsideration
in the lower court has often been considered a condition sine qua non for the granting of a writ
of certiorari, this rule does not apply "where the proceeding in which the error occurred is a patent
nullity," 10 or where "the deprivation of petitioner's fundamental right to due process ... taints the
proceedings against him in the court below not only with irregularly but with nullity," 11 or when special
circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action. 12 The fact that the defendant-petitioner
had been deprived of due process, taken together with the circumstance that a writ of execution had
already been issued, perforce takes this case outside of the purview of the rule requiring a previous
motion for reconsideration.
The nullity of the challenged orders relieves the defendant-petitioner from paying the damages
assessed against him by the court a quo; however, it does not entitle him to pursue further his claim
of possession and administration over the abovementioned five haciendas, considering that we have
declared in L-26751 that his appointment as co-administrator is void.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, the controverted order of default, judgment by default and
order of execution should be annulled and set aside.
L-26106
L-26106 is another petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction instituted on May 25, 1966 by
Jose S. Matute (the same petitioner in L-26751 and L-26085) and his brother Luis S.
Matute, 13 praying for the nullification of the following orders of the Court of First Instance of Davao:
1. The order of February 15, 1966 dismissing with prejudice civil case 4252, a complaint filed
by Matias S. Matute in behalf of the Matute estate for the annulment of a compromise

agreement and for the reconveyance of certain properties, in which case Jose and Luis
Matute appeared as intervenors in alliance with the plaintiff estate;
2. The order of March 29, 1966 declaring in default the intervenors in civil case 4252 for
failure to answer the defendant Paterno Canlas' counterclaim, and adjudging them to jointly
and severally pay the sum of P100,000 in damages to the said Canlas; and
3. The order of April 12, 1966 directing the issuance of a writ of execution against the
intervenors to enforce the abovementioned judgment by default.
The factual milieu follows:
On February 5, 1966 Matias S. Matute, in his capacity as co-administrator, instituted in the name of
the Matute estate civil case 4252 praying for, among others, (1) the annulment of the compromise
agreement dated November 26, 1962 entered into between the co-administrator Julian V. Matute
and Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, one of the defendants-respondents herein, in full settlement of the
latter's claim for attorney's fees against the decedent Amadeo Matute Olave; (2) the nullification of
the compromise judgment of December 5, 1962 approving the aforesaid compromise agreement; (3)
the voiding of the deed of conveyance and assignment of rights dated December 20, 1962 by virtue
of which the said Julian Matute transferred to Canlas several parcels of land belonging to the Matute
estate pursuant to the compromise judgment; (4) the annulment of the deed of conveyance covering
the said parcels of land executed on February 20, 1963 by Canlas in favor of Daniel Rivera, Sr., also
one of the defendants-respondents; (5) the nullification of the unregistered deeds of mortgages, both
date July 19, 1963, over said properties executed by Rivera in favor of Pablo del Rosario and
Nicanor Vergara, also defendants-respondents herein; and (6) the reconveyance of the said
properties.
The aforesaid complaint was anchored on the grounds that (1) the compromise agreement was
entered into in fraud of the Matute estate; (2) Julian Matute, as a mere co-administrator, had no
authority to enter into the said compromise agreement without the consent of the then general
administrator, Don Celestino Alonzo; (3) the compromise agreement was approved by the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Branch X) without notice to the heirs and the general administrator; and (4)
the said agreement had neither prior nor subsequent approval of the probate court which has
custody of the parcels of land involved in the said agreement.
The defendant-respondent Canlas subsequently interposed a motion to dismiss dated February 24,
1964 predicated on the ground of res judicata, among others. Anent the issue of res judicata, said
motion to dismiss averred:
The records of Civil Case No. 14208, entitled "Rosario Matute, et al. v. Amadeo Matute
Olave", Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, will show that on December 5, 1962, the
Honorable Judge Jose L. Moya, Presiding Judge of Branch X, of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, rendered a Compromise Judgment ... pursuant to a Compromise Agreement ...
entered into between defendant Paterno R. Canlas and the Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave,
duly represented by the General Administrator of the Estate, the late Julian V. Matute and his
counsel of record in said Civil Case No. 14208, Atty. Marcelo Rafols Javier involving the

attorney's fees of defendant Paterno R. Canlas in said Civil Case No. 14208, secured with a
charging lien on the properties involves herein. Pursuant to said Compromise Judgment, the
said Julian V. Matute, as General Administrator of the Estate of his deceased father, Amadeo
Matute Olave, transferred and conveyed the properties involved herein which were ordered
to be sold by the Probate Court of Manila for only P144,000.00, in favor of defendant
Paterno R. Canlas as full payment of his attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 14208 in the
amount of P200,000.00 agreed upon in the Compromise Agreement. The said Compromise
Judgment of December 5, 1962 is immediately final and not appeallable and has the effect
and authority of Res Judicata in this case filed by co-administrator, Matias S. Matute, on
behalf of the Estate, without authority of his general administrator, Carlos V. Matute, who
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint in this case

That the records of Civil Case No. 14208 will show that after the Compromise Judgment
was rendered on December 5, 1962, a Petition for relief to set aside the said Compromise
Judgment was filed by two (2) of the heirs and full-blooded sisters of plaintiff coadministrator, Matias S. Matute, namely, Rosario and Trinidad Suazo Matute on June 6,
1963, on grounds of (a) fraud and (b) lack of the probate court's approval to the Compromise
Agreement, the very same grounds alleged in the present Complaint of plaintiff Estate, a
copy of the Petition for Relief is hereto attached as Annex "C" of this Motion to Dismiss. That
on June 13, 1963, herein defendant Paterno R. Canlas filed his Opposition to petition for
Relief, and, on June 26, 1963, a Supplementary Opposition to Petition for Relief and refuting
all the above issues raised in the Petition for Relief, copies of which are hereto attached as
Annexes "D" and "E". Rosario and Trinidad Suazo Matute filed Reply and defendant Paterno
R. Canlas filed his Rejoinder on July 8, 1963 attaching therewith the letter-conformity to the
Compromise Judgment of co-administrator, Matias S. Matute, copies of which are hereto
attached as Annexes "F" and "F-1" of this Motion to Dismiss. That on July 13, 1963, Branch
X of the Court of First Instance of Manila, taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 14208,
rightfully denied the Petition for Relief on all the grounds stated in our Opposition to the
Petition for Relief, Supplementary Opposition, etc., and Rejoinder, a copy of which order is
hereto attached as Annex "G" of this Motion to Dismiss.
In other words, it is the basic contention of Canlas that both the compromise judgment of
December 5, 1962rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch X) 14 and the order of the
same court dated July 13, 1963 denying the aforecited petition for relief from judgment which sought
the setting aside of the said compromise judgment, bar by virtue of res judicata the prosecution of
the abovementioned civil case 4252 which seeks anew the annulment of the said compromise
judgment on practically the same grounds invoked in the aforesaid petition for relief, which grounds
were justifiably denied by the competent court.
It appears that on the same day Canlas filed his motion to dismiss, the general administrator and
heir, Carlos V. Matute, filed his own motion to dismiss dated February 15, 1964, stating among other
things, that he had never authorized his co-administrator, Matias Matute, to file civil case 4252 in the
name of the estate and that said complaint was filed without legal authority and is prejudicial to the
interests of the estate as it would only entail unnecessary litigation expenses. He presented his

written conformity to the compromise judgment in his capacity as the succeeding general
administrator.
On February 27, 1964 the defendants-respondents Daniel Rivera, Sr., Pablo del Rosario and
Nicanor Vergara filed their own joint motion to dismiss, alleging among other things that they were
innocent transferees and mortgages for value of the properties subject matter of the complaint and
adopted as their own the motions to dismiss filed by Canlas and Carlos V. Matute.
On April 11, 1964 the Honorable Judge Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., executive judge of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, issued an order deferring to after the trial the final hearing and determination of
the motions to dismiss since the grounds alleged therein "do not appear to be indubitable." From this
order, the defendants moved for a reconsideration which was denied on January 16, 1965.
Meanwhile, on August 17, 1964 Jose and Luis Matute filed a motion to intervene, asking that they
be allowed to adopt the complaint of the plaintiff-estate. Said motion was granted on September 5,
1964.
After the aforesaid rejection of the defendants' motion for reconsideration of the order denying their
separate motions to dismiss, Canlas filed on February 15, 1965 his answer ad cautelam, traversing
the material allegations of the complaint in civil case 4252 and interposing the grounds stated in his
motion to dismiss as affirmative defenses. He also filed a counterclaim for damages in the amount of
P100,000 jointly against Matias Matute, for filing the "frivolous and unfounded" action in the name of
the estate, and Jose an Luis Matute, for intervening in the case. All there were charged in their
personal capacities. On the same date, the other defendants, Rivera, del Rosario and Vergara, filed
their own answer ad cautelam, denying the essential averments of the complaint having relevance to
them and adopting the affirmative defenses interposed by Canlas. Said defendants similarly
interposed a counterclaim of P50,000 for damages, directed against the plaintiff-estate.
On March 1, 1965 Matias Matute, representing the plaintiff-estate, filed the corresponding answers
to the foregoing counterclaims. The answer to Canlas' counterclaim specifically denied.
that the above-entitled case is patently frivolous and unfounded and was instituted in bad
faith and calculated to merely harass the defendant in order to satisfy the personal revenge,
hatred and vindictiveness of the co-administrator Matias S. Matute, representing the plaintiff
estate, and intervenors Jose S. Matute and Luis S. Matute, the truth being that the complaint
in the above-entitled case was instituted precisely to prevent defendants from illegally and
fraudulently transforming and conveying themselves valuable properties of plaintiff estate
worth more than P500,000.00;
and disclaimed any
knowledge of any actual, moral and consequential damage having been suffered by
defendant Paterno R. Canlas.
Meanwhile, upon motion of the counsels for the defendants, Judge Cusi ordered on August 28,
1965 the reshuffle of civil case 4252 in accordance with section 7, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.

Eventually, the case was transferred to the sala of Judge Vicente P. Bullecer, the respondent judge
herein.
On January 22, 1966 Canlas filed a "Motion to Resolve: I. Motion to Dismiss; II. Supplementary
and/or Second Motion to Dismiss."
On February 3, 1966 Jose Matute interposed an urgent ex parte motion for substitution as
representative of the plaintiff-estate in place of Matias Matute, citing the order of January 31, 1966 of
the probate court of Manila which appointed him as co-administrator in place of Matias Matute.
Subsequently, Matias Matute filed in behalf of the plaintiff-estate a motion to withdraw and/or
dismiss with prejudice the complaint in civil case 4252, which, it will be recalled, he himself instituted
in the name of the Matute estate. The following grounds were advanced to justify the said motion:
That after a thorough study of the documents presented by the parties in this case, the
undersigned Judicial Administrator realized that he has expressly ratified and confirmed any
and all contracts and compromise for attorney's fees that his co-administrator Julian V.
Matute has already entered into with the defendant Atty. Paterno R. Canlas in his capacity as
co-administrator of the said testacy;
That the causes of action of the above-entitled complaint against the defendants were
based and predicated from the compromise agreement entered into between
co-administrator Julian V. Matute and the defendant Paterno R. Canlas on December 2,
1962 and which compromise agreement was approved by Judge Jose Moya, presiding
Judge of Branch X of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in Civil Case No. 14208 entitled
Rosario S. Matute, et al. vs. Amadeo Matute Olave, etc., in the Compromise Judgment dated
December 5, 1962.
On February 15, 1966 the respondent Judge dismissed with prejudice the aforesaid complaint. The
order of dismissal reads:
The records show that this action was filed by Matias S. Matute in his capacity as coadministrator of the Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave appointed in Sp. Proc. No. 25876,
Probate Court of Manila, to annul a compromise judgment awarding attorney's fees to
defendant Atty. Paterno R. Canlas and rendered in Civil Case No. 14208, Court of First
Instance of Manila.
Pending incidents in this case, are the motion to dismiss and supplementary motion to
dismiss on the ground of res judicata filed by the defendants and adopted by the General
Administrator of the Estate, Carlos V. Matute, and the heirs Maria Luisa Matute, Conchita V.
Matute, Carlos S. Matute, Ramos S. Matute, Eduarda S. Matute and Mrs. Cecilia Villanueva
Matute.
It appears now that the co-administrator Matias S. Matute who filed this action in the name
of the Estate of Don Amadeo Matute Olave filed a motion to withdraw and/or dismiss dated
January 8, 1966 and verified before the acting Clerk of Court of Appeals stating that he is

withdrawing the complaint he filed in this case and prays this Court to dismiss it with
prejudice and further ratifying and expressing conformity to the compromise judgment
subject matter of the complaint rendered in the Civil Case 14208, Court of First Instance of
Manila.
As prayed for in defendants' motion to dismiss and supplementary action (motion) to
dismiss, the action filed in this case is hereby dismissed with prejudice without cost to
plaintiff . (emphasis supplied).
On March 12, 1966 the respondent Judge issued another order declaring that "all the other
incidents pending in this case are hereby terminated and closed." (Emphasis supplied) Said order
reads:
Considering the order of this Court dated February 15, 1966 dismissing this case with
prejudice on the ground of res judicata in view of the final order of July 31, 1963 issued by
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, in Civil Case No. 14208, as alleged in the
defendants' motion to dismiss and supplementary motion to dismiss: and considering further
that the co-administrator Matias S. Matute who filed the complaint in this case in the name of
the plaintiff Estate has withdrawn and/or prayed for the dismissal of this case with prejudice,
and considering furthermore, that the said Order of this Court of February 15, 1966 is now
fixed and final, all the other incidents pending in this case are hereby terminated and closed.
However, on March 29, 1966 the respondent Judge promulgated an order declaring in default both
the intervenors and the plaintiff estate, the former for failure to answer Canlas' counterclaim and the
latter for failure to respond to the other defendants' separate counterclaim. The same decree
included a judgment by default condemning the intervenors to jointly and severally pay the sum of
P100,000 as damages to Canlas and likewise sentencing the plaintiff estate to indemnify the other
defendants Rivera, del Rosario and Vergara in the sum of P50,000. Subsequently, on April 12, 1966
the respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the aforesaid judgment
by default.
Hence, the interposition by the intervenors of the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction.
Anent the order of February 15, 1966 dismissing with prejudice civil case 4252, the intervenorspetitioners (now Jose Matute alone, as the other petitioner, Luis Matute, has already withdrawn)
contend that the said order is a nullity as it was predicated on a void motion to dismiss and/or
withdraw filed by Matias Matute on February 14, 1966, two weeks after the latter had been removed
as co-administrator by the probate court in an order dated January 31, 1966. It is further maintained
that when Matias Matute interposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss and/or to withdraw, he had no
more authority to represent the Matute estate as a consequence of his ouster as co-administrator.
The foregoing argument is irredeemably foreclosed by our explicit ruling in L-26751 setting aside the
abovementioned order of January 31, 1966 and declaring as void the removal of Matias Matute and
the appointment of the herein intervenor-petitioner Jose S. Matute as the new co-administrator.
Granting, therefore, that the controverted order of dismissal was rendered on account of Matias
Matute's aforesaid motion which was filed in behalf of the plaintiff estate, the validity of such

dismissal order cannot be challenged on the ground that the movant (Matias Matute) lacked the
capacity to represent the plaintiff estate considering that his personality and authority as coadministrator remained unimpaired because the order of January 31, 1966 is a nullity.
However, the intervenor-petitioner is of the mistaken impression that the disputed order of dismissal
was based on Matias Matute's motion to dismiss and/or to withdraw. As correctly pointed out by the
defendants-respondents, the said order was anchored on their own motion to dismiss and
supplementary motion to dismiss. Although both the motions of the co-administrator in
representation of the plaintiff estate and of the defendants, either of which could justify the dismissal
of the complaint in civil case 4252, were prominently mentioned in the body of the said controverted
order, the unequivocal import of the dispositive portion of said decree, however, is that the dismissal
was predicated on the defendants' motion to dismiss and supplementary motion to dismiss, thus:
As prayed for in defendants' motion to dismiss and supplementary action to dismiss, the
action filed in this case is hereby dismissed with prejudice without cost to plaintiff. (emphasis
supplied)
Moreover, both the order of March 12, 1966 declaring the termination of all other incidents in civil
case 4252 and the order of April 11, 1966 denying the intervenors' motion for reconsideration,
categorically affirm that the disputed order of dismissal was anchored on the defendants' motion to
dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The order of April 11, 1966 specifically declares that the
dismissal of civil case 4252 was based
... on the ground of res judicata invoked by the defendants in their Motion to Dismiss and
Supplementary Motion to Dismiss for the reason that the Compromise Judgment rendered in
Civil Case No. 14208, Court of First Instance of Manila, sought to be annulled in this case,
and the Order of July 31, 1963 denying the Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 14208 and
settling all the issues raised in the Complaint, have both the force and effect of res judicata.
Undeniably, the aforesaid order of dismissal with prejudice adjudicated civil case 4252 upon the
merits. Since there is no showing that the respondent Judge issued the said order with grave abuse
of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction, an ordinary appeal, then, not a petition
for certiorari, was the proper remedy available to the intervenors Jose and Luis Matute who claim to
be aggrieved, by the dismissal. But having failed to seasonably appeal from the aforesaid order of
dismissal, the herein intervenor-petitioner cannot avail of a petition forcertiorari as a substitute
remedy 15 to challenge the said order, which in the meantime had already become final.
The pretention of the intervenor-petitioner that his inability to appeal on time was due to the failure
of the court a quo to furnish him a copy of the order of dismissal is a spurious, if not an utterly
perfidious, claim. To begin with, when the herein intervenor-petitioner and his brother Luis filed their
motion to intervene on August 17, 1964, they were not represented by counsel, but they failed to
disclose their respective addresses or at least the address of one of them, contrary to the
requirement of section 5 of Rule 7 that a "party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his
pleadings and state his address." (emphasis supplied) Consequently, if the pertinent orders and
notices were not sent to the intervenors, it was because of their failure to disclose their mailing
addresses. At all events, since the intervenors virtually allied with the plaintiff estate by adopting in

toto the latter's complaint without filing a separate complaint in intervention, it is not without
justification to rule, considering the particular circumstances obtaining, that notice to the plaintiff
estate should be deemed sufficient notice to the intervenors. Moreover, it is of record that both Attys.
Wenceslao Laureta and Robert Porter, who appeared on February 7, 1966 as counsels for the
intervenor Jose S. Matute in his capacity as alleged co-administrator by virtue of the abovecited
order of the probate court dated January 31, 1966, were duly furnished with copies of all orders of
the court a quo subsequent to their appearance. Anent the order of dismissal dated February 15,
1966, the lower court reported, after an investigation of the deputy clerk of court for alleged mailing
discrepancies upon motion of the intervenors, that copies of the said order were "each mailed to and
received by Attys. Wenceslao Laureta and Robert E. Porter on March 18 and 3, 1966, respectively,
per registry return cards duly attached to the records of this case." In other words, the intervenorpetitioner Jose S. Matute was furnished, through counsel, a copy of the order of dismissal at the
earliest on March 3, 1966 when Atty. Porter received a copy of the order. After a lapse oftwenty-three
(23) days from the receipt of the said copy, Attys. Laureta and Porter filed on March 26, 1966 a
motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. Hence, when the said motion was filed, the
intervenor-petitioner had still seven (7) days to perfect an appeal. Subsequently, on April 11, 1966,
the court a quo denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration. Separate copies of said denial were
received by Atty. Laureta on April 16, 1966 and by Atty. Porter on April 18, 1966, respectively, as per
registry receipts 25870 and 25872 and delivery No. 69785 and the reply-telegram dated July 2, 1966
from the Bureau of Posts addressed to the respondent Judge. From April 16, 1966, the intervenorpetitioner still had seven (7) days or up to April 23, 1966 to perfect an appeal. However, it was only
on April 25, 1966 that the requisite notice of appeal and appeal bond were filed while the record on
appeal was filed much later, on May 26, 1966, clearly way beyond the reglementary period.
The intervenor-petitioner contends, however, that it was only on April 25, 1966 that he received
notice of the dismissal of civil case 4252 and on the very same day he caused the filing of the
necessary notice of appeal and appeal bond. Conceding that the foregoing assertion is correct, the
intervenor-petitioner's projected appeal was still out of time since the requisite record on appeal was
filed only on May 26, 1966, or thirty-one days from April 25, 1966.
In passing, it is pertinent to note that the dismissal of the complaint in civil case 4252m, after the
issues were joined with the filing of the responsive pleadings, upon the defendants' motion to resolve
a pending motion to dismiss, the resolution of which had been previously deferred until after the trial
by virtue of an order of the same court under another judge, is a procedural deviation from the
standard sequence of trial in accordance with which the court a quo, after the requisite answers
were filed, should have proceeded with the trial on the merits, and only thereafter resolved the
motion to dismiss as was the import of the order of defendant. Nevertheless, it is relevant to
emphasize, on the other hand, that an order deferring the resolution of a motion to dismiss, being
aninterlocutory order, may be altered or revoked by the trial court during the pendency of the main
action. It is settled that an "interlocutory order or decree made in the progress of a case is always
under the control of the court until the final decision of the suit, and may be modified or rescinded
upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment...." 16 Of similar import is the ruling of
this Court declaring that "it is rudimentary that such (interlocutory) orders are subject to change in
the discretion of the court. 17 Moreover, one of the inherent powers of the court is "To amend and
control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice." 18 In the language
of Chief Justice Moran, paraphrasing the ruling in Veluz vs. Justice of the Peace of Sariaya, 19 "since

judges are human, susceptible to mistakes, and are bound to administer justice in accordance with
law, they are given the inherent power of amending their orders or judgments so as to make them
conformable to law and justice, and they can do so before they los their jurisdiction of the case that
is before the time to appeal has expired and no appeal has been perfected." 20 And in the
abovecited Veluz case, this Court held that "If the trial court should discover or be convinced that it
had committed an error in its judgment, or had done an injustice, before the same has become final,
it may, upon its own motion or upon a motion of the parties, correct such error in order to do justice
between the parties.... It would seem to be the very height of absurdity to prohibit a trial judge from
correcting an error, mistake, or injustice which is called to his attention before he has lost control of
his judgment." Corollarily, it has also been held "that a judge of first instance is not legally prevented
from revoking the interlocutory order of another judge in the very litigation subsequently assigned to
him for judicial action." 21
In view of the foregoing rulings, it is then enough to say that the abovementioned order of
deferment, issued by the Honorable Judge Vicente Cusi, Jr., to whose sala civil case 4252 was
originally assigned, is interlocutory in nature, and as such, the court a quo, through the now
respondent Judge Vicente Bullecer, had the power to set it aside, as it did by finally deciding the
pending motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. Moreover, as previously stated, there is no
evidence to show that the respondent Judge, in issuing the order of dismissal, acted with grave
abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction.
We now come to the challenged order of default and judgment by default, both contained in the
abovementioned order dated March 29, 1966. Attacking the validity of the said order of default, the
intervenor-petitioner claims that the respondent Judge failed to consider that Matias Matute,
representing the plaintiff estate, filed on time an answer dated March 1, 1965 traversing the
allegations of Canlas' counterclaim, which answer inured to the benefit of not only Matias Matute but
also to the intervenors who were jointly impleaded as defendants in the said counterclaim. The
defendant-respondent Canlas, on the other hand, while not denying receipt of the aforesaid answer
to his counterclaim, contends that the herein intervenor-petitioner's failure to personally answer said
counterclaim is fatal and that he could not take refuge under the answer interposed by Matias
Matute.
We are of the considered opinion that the herein disputed order of default is illegal and void, and,
consequently, the controverted judgment by default and order of execution were improvidently
issued.
1. The counterclaim interposed by Canlas raised a common cause of action for damages against
Matias Matute, as the representative of the plaintiff estate, and Jose and Luis Matute, as intervenors
in civil case 4252, all in their personal capacities. The counterclaim reads:
That for instituting this patently frivolous and unfounded action in bad faith calculated to
merely harass answering defendant Paterno R. Canlas in order to satisfy the personal
revenge, hatred and vindictiveness of the co-administrator, Matias S. Matute, representing
the plaintiff Estate, and the intervenors Jose S. Matute and Luis S. Matute, defendant
Paterno R. Canlas suffered actual, moral and consequential damages in the total amount of

P100,000.00, for which plaintiff Matias S. Matute and intervenors Jose S. Matute and Luis S.
Matute should be held personally liable. (emphasis supplied)
Having been this jointly charged to pay the abovestated damages, the brothers Matias, Jose and
Luis Matute could validly file a common responsive pleading, as in effect they did when Matias
Matute filed an answer to the aforesaid counterclaim, the receipt of which Canlas admits. It is
significant to note that the said answer does not only deny the charge against Matias Matute but as
well as negates the claim against the intervenors.
2. Moreover, having successfully prayed for the resolution of his pending motion to dismiss, even
after the issues had been joined with the filing of his answer, the defendant-respondent Canlas is
deemed to have abandoned his counterclaim and voluntarily reverted himself to the time when he
initially interposed his motion to dismiss prior to the filing of his answer with counterclaim. Thus,
when the complaint in civil case 4252 was dismissed on the basis of Canlas' motion, the entire
proceeding was inevitably terminated and there was nothing more to adjudge. In fact, the termination
of all the pending incidents in civil case 4252 was subsequently decreed by the respondent Judge
himself in the orders of March 12, 1966 and April 11, 1966. Consequently, the respondent Judge, to
say the least, acted in excess of jurisdiction when he issued, after having dismissed the principal
complaint, the herein controverted order of default and judgment by default for then there was
nothing left to be adjudicated. Said decrees having been rendered in excess of
jurisdiction, certiorari will lie to have then annulled.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the finality of the order of dismissal should be upheld, while the
disputed order of default, judgment by default and order of execution should be declared void and
set aside.
The motion interposed on June 14, 1966 by the herein intervenor-petitioner, in his alleged capacity
as co-administrator, in behalf of the Amadeo Matute Olave estate, praying that the said estate be
allowed to adopt the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and be admitted as copetitioner, the resolution of which we had previously deferred, should therefore be denied on the
ground that the intervenor-petitioner has no legal personality to represent the Matute estate
considering that his appointment as co-administrator has been voided. Nevertheless, it is our
considered view that the declaration of total nullity of the abovementioned judgment by default shall
perforce bar the execution against the Matute estate of that portion of the said void judgment which
condemns it to pay the sum of P50,000 in damages to the defendants-respondents Rivera, del
Rosario and Vergara.
ACCORDINGLY, (1) in L-26751 the petition for certiorari is hereby granted; the respondent Court of
Appeals is adjudged as without jurisdiction over CA-G.R. 37039-R; the probate court's controverted
order of January 31, 1966 is hereby set aside in its entirety, thereby maintaining the respondent
Matias S. Matute in his trust as co-administrator of the Amadeo Matute Olave estate; (2) in L26085 the petition for certiorari is hereby granted; the order of default dated April 16, 1966, the
judgment by default dated April 23, 1966, and the order of execution dated May 3, 1966, all issued in
excess of jurisdiction by the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, are set aside;
and (3) in L-26106 the petition for certiorari is hereby denied in so far as it seeks to nullify the final
order of dismissal dated February 15, 1966; the order of default and judgment by default dated

March 29, 1966 and the order of execution dated April 12, 1966, all similarly issued in excess of
jurisdiction by the same respondent Judge are set aside. No pronouncement as to costs.