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Why be Quantitative?
H. Lasswell

he point of view of this book is that the study of politics can be advanced by the quantitative analysis of political discourse. Why be
quantitative? In reply, it is perhaps appropriate to bring out the limitations of qualitative analysis in terms of the work of the present writer.
At the end of World War I, research on politically significant communication was almost entirely qualitative, consisting in the discovery and
illustration of propaganda themes and their use. When the present writer
described the propaganda of World War I in Propaganda Technique in the
World War (1927)1 he took note of certain common themes running
through the propaganda of all belligerent powers. The themes were:

The enemy is a menace.


(German militarism threatens us all.)
We are protective.
(We protect ourselves and others.)
The enemy is obstructive.
(They block our future aims.)
We are helpful.
(We aid in the achievement of positive goals.)
The enemy is immoral and insolent.
(They violate legal and moral standards and they hold
everyone else in contempt.)
We are moral and appreciative.
(We conform to moral and legal standards and we respect others.)
Source: H. Lasswell and N. Leites and Associates (eds), Language of Politics: Studies in
Quantitative Semantics, 1949; pp. 4052, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

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The enemy will be defeated.


We will win.
The book was organized to show the form taken by these themes
when domestic, allied or enemy audiences were addressed. The chapter
on The Illusion of Victory showed what was told the home audience on
the themes, The enemy will be defeated, We will win. The chapter on
Satanism described how the self was presented as moral and appreciative while the enemy was immoral and insolent. The menacing
and obstructive rle of the enemy and our own protective and helpful activity were illustrated in the chapter on War Guilt and War Aims.
Special attention was paid to preserving friendship (of allies and neutrals)
and demoralizing the enemy. Each chapter was composed of excerpts
selected chiefly from the propaganda of the United States, Great Britain,
Germany and France.
Although none of the criteria which guided the choice it quotations is
stated in the book, it is obvious that some slections were made because
they clearly stated a theme or developed a theme in detail. No doubt these
criteria justified the citation of the extended account of alleged Entente viotations of international law which had been compiled by Dr. **nst MllerMeiningen (pp. 8586). In some cases, the wide **assemination of the
material was no doubt a selective factor, **ptably in the case of Jaccuse!,
an expos of Germany by Richard Grelling (p. 54). Sometimes the eminence of the Speaker appears to have been the deciding factor, as with the
**ryce report on alleged atrocities perpetrated by the Germans in Belgium
(p. 19). In certain instances, the excerpt was sample of what was distributed
by (or to) a professional, locational, educational or other special group
(pp. 70 ff.). No evidence is given in the book that all the material studied
by the author was examined with the same degree of care. We are not
informed whether the author actually read or glanced through all the
copies of the principal mass-circulation newspapers, periodicals, books
and pamphlets of Germany and other countries; or whether he read
British, French and American material as fully as German.
Of course, the study did not purport to be an exhaustive history of
propaganda during the war. It was called an essay in technique, and the
hope was expressed that it would have some influence in directing professional historians toward the study of propaganda, and that the scheme
of classification would prove helpful in the organization of future research.
The book was to some extent successful in both objectives. Research on
war propaganda, as indeed on every phase of propaganda, went forward
with vigor, many monographs growing out of the original essay or
attributing some degree of influence to it.2
Among the most comprehensive books on the propaganda of World
War 1 were those of Hans Thimme, Weltkrieg ohne Waffen (1932) 3, and George

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G. Bruntz, Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918
(1938)4. Both historians explored archives of newspaper, magazine and
other source material, the first relying chiefly upon the Reich archives
and the second utilizing the Hoover War Library at Stanford University.
Whenever the propaganda message was described, the method adopted
by these writers was similar to that of Propaganda Technique in the World War.
Excerpts were chosen to illustrate what was circulated to different publics
and what themes were used. The authors left unspecified their criteria of
choice, although these were obviously similar to those of the earlier work.
In many respects these monographs are more satisfactory than the first
book, since the authors made use of new source material, and employed
to advantage the accumulated results of historical scholarship on the relative importance of persons, channels and symbols in the war.
The results, however, can not be accepted as in all respects satisfactory;
many relevant questions remain unanswered. Can we assume that a scholar
read his sources with the same degree of care throughout his research? Did
he allow his eye to travel over the thousands upon thousands of pages of
parliamentary debates, newspapers, magazines and other sources listed in
his bibliography or notes? Or did he use a sampling system, scanning some
pages superficially, though concentrating upon certain periods? Was the
sampling system for the Frankfurter Zeitung, if one was employed, comparable with the one for the Manchester Guardian? Were the leaflets chosen simply because they were conveniently available to the scholar, or were they
genuinely representative of the most widely circulated propaganda leaflets?
The very fact that such questions can be raised at all points to a certain
lack of method in presenting and conducting research on the history of war
propaganda. In all of the books to which reference has been made no
explicit justification was given of most of the excerpts chosen to illustrate a
specific theme, to characterize the content of any particular channel, or to
describe the propaganda directed toward or reaching any given audience.
It is impossible to determine from the final report whether the same number or a comparable number of mass circulation media were read for
France as for England or Germany, or whether publications were explored
with the same degree of intensity at all dates, or whether certain dates
were singled out for intensive note-taking.
The limitations of these monographs are apparent when anyone undertakes to follow a particular theme through various periods, channels and
audiences. We know that very belligerent used war aim propaganda.
But suppose we want to find the degree of emphasis laid upon war aims
from period to period. Or assume that we ask how they differred when
presented to the upper, middle or lower classes if the home population,
or to neutral, ally or enemy. Was the war aim propaganda more prominent in the magazines than in the pamphlets, or the reverse? The same
questions apply to every theme.

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To some extent, historians of war propaganda have bought to reduce


ambiguity by multiplying the number of subperiods described within the
whole period. Walter Zimmerman studied the English press from the time
of Sarajevo to the entry of England into the war, selecting thirty daily newspapers, eight Sunday papers, nine weeklies, four monthlies and two quarterlies, intending to cover all the important regional and social groups in
Great Britain.5 Even in this period, however, we can not be certain of the
criteria used in selecting quotations. It is obvious that Zimmerman does not
summarize all thirty daily papers every day, but we are left in the dark
about why he quotes one paper one day or week and omits it the next
time. Even if we assume that his judgment is good, it is permissible to ask
if such arbitrary selection procedures create a properly balanced picture,
or whether they result in special pleading based, if not on deliberate
deception, then on unconscious bias.
The same problem remains in the detailed monograph by Friederike
Recktenwald, in which she restricts herself to a single set of themes having
to do with British war aims.6 Miss Recktenwald divides the course of the
war into subperiods, and reproduces or summarizes material from the
British press having to do with war aims. Although this procedure gives us
a plausible indication of the relative amount of attention paid to war aims
at different times, not all reasonable doubts are allayed. She follows no consistent scheme of reporting. During any given subperiod only a few quotations may be reproduced; yet this may not invariably mean that there was
less war-aim news or diminished editorial prominence. It may signify no
more than that what was said is less interesting to the historian because the
style is less vivid and quotable. We can not rely upon Miss Recktenwalds
excerpts to be true samples of the total stream of news and comment reaching the British public, or even of any particular newspaper, or group of
newspapers. The moment we ask clear questions that call for reliable
bases of comparison, the arbitrary and dubious character of the monograph is apparent.
It is possible, however, to find studies of great technical excellence.
In matters of systematic definition and historic detail, we can go back half
a century to A Study of Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield, 18751880, by
George Cars lake Thompson (1886).7 At the beginning of that remarkable
work, a series of terms for the analysis of public opinion is carefully defined.
These terms are consistently applied throughout the two fact-stuffed volumes. One part of the analytical scheme names the standards applied by
the British public on foreign policy questions. Among the standards were
international law, interest, morality, and taste. Thompson pointed
out that such standards were applied according to the publics conception
of Englands rle in relation to other nations, and that these ranged all the
way from England as an island to England as a European or Asiatic
great power.

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In applying these standards and conceptions, Thompson distinguished certain broad motives sentimental or diplomatic that were
operating among the members of the British public in their basic orientation toward foreign policy. At any given time for instance, at the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey these standards, conceptions
and motivations (public notions) were fused into public views. The
views of the British public in 1876 were classified as Anti-Turkism, Antiwar, Order, Legalism, Anti-Russianism and Philo-Turkism. Such
views in turn were related to corresponding policies. In this way, AntiTurkism was bracketed with emancipation, Anti-war with isolation.
The book described each successive phase of Englands reaction to the
war between Russia and Turkey, and copiously illustrated every move by
excerpts from a list of publications.
Thompsons treatise is noteworthy for the unification of carefully
defined abstractions with exhaustive data from the sources. Nevertheless,
the outcome of all the admirable intelligence and industry that went into this
treatise does not yield maximum results, because of a basic failure: the problem of sampling, recording and summarizing sources was not resolved.
Hence, the entire foundation of the work rests on chaky ground. Thompson
divides the five years with which he deals into subperiods, according to
some predominant characteristic. One such subperiod is the incubation
period, third phase, from the opening of the Parliamentary Session of
1876 to the Servian declaration of war. This is followed by the atrocity
period, which in turn is divided into several parts. For each subperiod,
Thompson narrates the stream of events and selects from the sources the
quotations that impress him as important not only because they are conspicious, but because they bear some relationship to his systematic scheme
of analysis (standards, conceptions, motivations, views and policies).
However, the critical reader is still justified in remaining skeptical of the
representativeness of the quotations. He can not be sure why they impressed the author when he was reading and making notes on the sources,
or organizing his chapters. An excerpt may be the only one that appeared
in a given newspaper or magazine on the same subject during the period;
or, on the contrary, it may be only one among a tremendous gush of
news and editorial items. Thompson does not tell us. The fundamental
operation of source handling remained highly arbitrary.
If the excellence of the Thompson study lies in system and rich detail,
a few recent publications rank above it in the sampling of sources.
D. F. Willcox (1900) 8 classified the contents of a single issue of 240 newspapers according to topic (by column inches). Later A. A. Tenney, Jr., at
Columbia University, interested a number of students in space measurement and initiated investigations of immediate value to world politics.
Julian L. Woodward examined the foreign news published in 40 American
morning newspapers and improved the technical state of the subject by

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showing the effect of different sampling methods upon the result. In general, he found that a small number of issues distributed throughout the
year were enough to give a reliable picture of the amount of attention
usually given by an American morning newspaper to foreign news (at
least during a non-crisis period).9
In general, these investigations were not expressly related to political science. They were made by statisticians interested in having something to
count, or sociologists who were exploring the general social process. The
senior author of the present work undertook to direct research toward the
use of objective procedures in gathering the data pertinent to political
hypotheses. Schuyler Foster, for example, examined the treatment given
European war news in the New York Times during definite periods before
our participation in the war of 191418. He summarized his results in tabular and graphical form, and showed that the crisis that led immediately to
our entry into the war was the final one in a series of crises of everincreasing intensity. He measured these fluctuations by recording the frequency with which different kinds of news or editorial comment were made
about the war or Americas relation to it. The use of quantitative methods
gave precision to part of the history of Americas mobilization for war, and
opened up a series of questions about the relation between the ups and
downs in the New York Times and corresponding fluctuations in New York
newspapers reaching different social groups, and in newspapers published
in cities of different sizes throughout the country.10
More exact methods give us a means of clarifying certain categories that
have been at the root of many past evils in the work of historians and social
scientists. For a century, controversy has raged over the relative weight of
material and ideological factors in the social and political process. This
controversy has been sterile of scientific results, though the propaganda
resonance of dialectical materialism has been enormous.
Insofar as sterility can be attributed to technical factors in the domain of
scholarship, the significant factor is failure to deal adequately with ideological elements. The usual account of how material and ideological factors interact upon one another leaves the process in a cloud of mystery. It
is as though you put people in an environment called material and
presto! their ideas change in a predictable way; and if they do not, the
failure is ascribed to an ideological lag of some kind. But the relations,
though assumed, are not demonstrated. So far as the material dimensions
are concerned, operational methods have been worked out to describe
them; not so with the ideological. We are amply equipped to describe such
material changes as fluctuations in output or amount of machinery
employed in production; but we can not match this part of the description
with equally precise ways of describing the ideological. The result is that
the historical and social sciences have been making comparisons between

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patterns, only a few features of which are handled with precision. The other
dimensions remain wholly qualitative, impressionistic and conjectural.11
We have undertaken to clear up some of the confusion hat has long beset
the analysis of environment by introducing basic distinctions: the first
between the attention frame and surroundings, and the second between
the media frame and the non-media frame. The attention frame or
milieu is the part of an environment reaching the focus of attention of a
person or group; the surroundings do not reach the focus. The media frame
is composed of the signs coming to the focus of attention (the press which is
actually read, for instance). The non-media frame includes the features of an
environment that, although not signs, reach attention, such as conspicuous
buildings, or persons. Whether any given set of surrounding does affect the
structure of attention is to be settled by observing the phenomena, not by
assumption.
The fundamental nature of these relations is evident when we reflect
upon the requirements for a scientific explanation of response. Two sets of
factors are involved: the environment and predispositions. R (response) is a
function, in the mathematical sense, of E (environment), and P (predisposition); and we have shown that the part of the environment immediately
affecting response is what comes to the focus of attention (the attention
frame).* Information about surroundings is pertinent only to the degree
to which it can be shown that the surroundings determine attention. In
deciding whether any feature of the environment comes to the focus, it is
necessary to demonstrate that a minimum (the threshold level) has been
elicited. We do not consider that radio programs which are blacked out
by static have come to the attention of an audience. A threshold level has
not been reached. (The threshold is not part of the R in the formula of
explanation used above; only changes above the threshold are called
effects response to what is brought into the attention field.)
The procedures of content analysis of communication are appropriate
to the problem of describing the structure of attention in quantitative
terms.12 Before entering upon technicalities, it may be pointed out that
quantitative ways of describing attention serve many practical, as well as scientific, purposes. Anticipating the enemy is one of the most crucial and tantalizing problems in the conduct of war. The intelligence branch of every
staff or operations agency is matching wits with the enemy. The job is to
out-guess the enemy, to foretell his military, diplomatic, economic and
propaganda moves before he makes them, and to estimate where attack
would do him the most harm. A principal source of information is what
the enemy disseminates in his media of communication.
The Global War introduced a new source of information about the
enemy radio broadcasts under his supervision. When the enemy speaks to
his home population, it is possible to listen in. We overhear what the enemy

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says to his allies, to neutrals and to his enemies. At the outbreak of the Global
War, belligerent governments set monitors to work, listening, recording and
summarizing the output of enemy and enemy- controlled stations. In Great
Britain a group connected with the British Broadcasting Corporation subjected this enormous body of material to systematic examination and began
forecasting Nazi policy. These estimates have since been restudied.13 The
same procedures have also been applied to the press and to every other
channel of communication. The full plan of the enemy often appears only
when the entire sream of communication is interpreted as a whole.
As we improve our methods of describing public attention and response,
our results become more useful for another practical purpose the detecting
of political propaganda. During World War II, the U. S. Department of Justice
employed objective propaganda analysis to expose and prosecute enemy
agents, like the Transocean Information Service (Nazi-controlleded) and
native Fascists. The Federal Communications Commission described in
Court the Axis themes recognazied by experts who monitored and analyzed short-wave broad casts emanating from Germany, Japan and Italy.
Objective procedures had been applied in discovering these themes
Objective procedures were also used to analyze the periodicals published
by the defendants, and to reveal the parallels between them and the
themes disseminated by Axis propagandists.14
Quite apart from the use of legal action, it is important that members
of the public be informed of the behavior of those with access to the channels of communication. In deciding how much we can rely upon a given
newspaper, it is important to know if that newspaper ceases to attack
Russia then Germany and Russia sign a non-aggression pact, and then
returns to the attack as soon as Germany and Russia fall apart. Under
these conditions, we have grounds for inferring a pro-German propaganda policy. By studying the news, editorial and feature material in a
medium of communication under known German control, we can check
on this inference. We may find that the two media distribute praise and
blame in the same way among public leaders and the political parties; and
that they take the same stand on domestic and foreign issues. If so, our
inference is strengthened that the channel is dominated by pro-German
policies.15
In the preceding paragraphs, we have said that policy may be served
by objective procedures used to anticipate the enemy and to detect propaganda. Also, as scientific knowledge increases, the possibility of control
improves; hence, a third contribution of objective research to policy is
skill.16 Skill is the most economical utilization of available means to attain
a goal. Appraisals of skill are among the most difficult judgments to establish on a convincing basis, since they depend upon exhaustive knowledge
of concrete circumstances and of scientific relations. To say that A is more
skilful than B in a given situation is to allow for all factors being equal.

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It is not easy to demonstrate that the two sets of environing and predisposing factors are strictly comparable. The simple fact that the Nazis won out
in Germany against the Socialists and other parties does not necessarily
warrant the conclusion that the Nazis were more skillful propagandists than
their antagonists. Or the failure of the French to hold out against the
Germans longer in 1940 was not necessarily because French propagandists
were lacking in skill. The skill factor can be separated from the others
only when a very comprehensive view can be gained of the context. Did
the responsible heads of state choose the most suitable personnel to conduct propaganda operations? Were the most effective symbols chosen?
The most useful media? In each case, the question must be answered with
reference to alternatives available in the original situation.
That content analysis has a direct bearing on the evaluation of skill is evident, since such methods introduce a degree of precise description at many
points in the propaganda process. Directives can be described in detail; so,
too, can material released through the propaganda agencies and disseminated through various media controlled by, or beyond the control of, the
propagandist. Indeed, as we pointed out in our analysis of the attention
factor in world politics,17 every link in the chain of communication can
be described when suitable methods are used; quantitative procedures
reduce the margin of uncertainty in the basic data.*
A fourth contribution relates not to policy as a whole, but to the special
objectives of humane politics. The aim of humane politics is a commonwealth in which the dignity of man is accepted in theory and fact. Whatever
improves our understanding of attitude is a potential instrument of humane politics. Up to the present, physical science has not provided us with means of
penetrating the skull of a human being and directly reading off his experiences. Hence, we are compelled to rely upon indirect means of piercing the
wall that separates us from him. Words provide us with clues, but we hesitate to take all phrases at their face value. Apart from deliberate duplicity,
language has shortcomings as a vehicle for the transmission of thought and
feeling. It is important to recognize that we obtain insight into the world
of the other person when we are fully acquainted with what has come to his
attention. Certainly the world of the country boy is full of the sights and
smells and sounds of nature. The city boy, on the other hand, lives in a
labyrinth of streets, buildings, vehicles and crowds. A Chinese youth of good
family has his ancestors continually thrust upon his notice; an American
youth may vaguely recall his grandparents. The son of an English ruling
family may be reared on the anecdotes of centuries of imperial history,
while the son of an American businessman recalls that there was a Revolution and that Bunker Hill had something to do with it.
The dominant political symbols of an epoch provide part of the common experience of millions of men. There is some fascination in the
thought of how many human beings are bound together by a thread no

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more substantial than the resonance of a name or the clang of a slogan.


In war, men suffer pain, hunger, sorrow; the specific source of pain, the
specific sensation of ones specific object of sorrow, may be very private.
In contrast, the key symbol enters directly into the focus of all men and
provides an element of common experience.18
It is obvious that a complete survey of mass attention will go far
beyond the press, the broadcast or the film. It will cover every medium
of mass communication. Further, a complete survey would concentrate
upon the most active decision-makers, disclosing the milieu of the heads
of states, the chiefs of staff, diplomats and all other groups. An exhaustive
inventory would describe the entire intelligence process.19
Why, then, be quantitative about communication? Because of the scientific and policy gains that can come of it. The social process is one of
collaboration and communication; and quantitative methods have already
demonstrated their usefulness in dealing with the former. Further understanding and control depend upon equalizing our skill in relation to both.

Notes
1. Or, synonymously, the milieu, which is divisible into media and non-media
frames.
2. There is, of course, no implication that non-quantitative methods should be
dropped. On the contrary, there is need of more systematic theory and of there luminous hunches if the full potentialities of precision are to be realized a practice. As
the history of quantification shows (in economics, for instance), there is never-ending,
fruitful interplay between theory, hunch, impression and **precision.

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