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Facts:
Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts
committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash
alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants;
and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987
Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail
anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending
ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing,
among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of
the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now
granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to
the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed
a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow
it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused
will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that:
1.
The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from
detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2.
He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3.
He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4.
The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5.
He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose
identity and address were also found to be false;
6.
Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00
was offered and paid for his arrest.
Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital
offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital
offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the
amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua
to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.
Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements
were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz
and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit
themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the
security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We
hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a
right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.
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G.R. NO. 189122, March 17, 2010 Leviste v. CA, et al. Digest
Corono, J.:
FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day
of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and
health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the
bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail
during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong
reasons.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present.
Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six
years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail
should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
HELD:
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and
substantive rules.
Petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave
abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have
granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree.
Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly
declared to be discretionary.
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial
law, is of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On
the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years
then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied. (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that,
if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or
revoke bail pending appeal.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending
appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of
discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish
whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion
in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion
stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the
exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either
allow or disallow bail.
A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically
result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less
stringent sound discretion approach.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice. Choice occurs where,
between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options), there is
more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision
maker. On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the
end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate courts discretion and
relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending
appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the
provision that upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
Facts:
Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by
the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA
then he field an application for admission to bail pending appeal, due to his
advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or
possibility of flight on his part.
The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail
during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for
strong reasons. That bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a
prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility.
On this matter, Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for bail
considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3)
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. That when the penalty imposed by the
trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant
pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
application for bail of Leviste.
Ruling:
No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under
par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty impose is more than 6 years the accused shall
be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other circumstances:
that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be
said that CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court,