Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
G.R.No.135830.September30,2005.*
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
VOL.471,SEPTEMBER30,2005
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PETITIONSforreviewoncertiorariofaresolutionofthe
CourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Jaime S. LinsanganforJuandeDiosCarlos.
Ligon, Solis, Pizarro, Santos & De Borjaforpetitioner
SIDDCOR.
Manuel B. ImbongforFelicidadSandoval.
TINGA,J.:
Theseconsolidatedpetitionsemanatedfromacivilcasefiled
by Juan de Dios Carlos (Carlos) against respondents
Felicidad Sandoval (Sandoval) and Teofilo Carlos II
(TeofiloII)docketedwiththeRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)of
MuntinlupaCityasCivilCaseNo.95135.
InhisComplaintbeforetheRTC,Carlosassertedthathe
wasthesolesurvivingcompulsoryheirofhisparents,Felix
1
B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia, who had acquired during
their marriage, six parcels of land (subject properties). His
brother, Teofilo (Teofilo), died intestate in 1992. At the
time of his death, Teofilo was apparently married to
Sandoval, and cohabiting with her and their child,
respondent Teofilo II. Nonetheless, Carlos alleged in his
Complaint that Teofilo and Sandoval were not validly2
married as they had not obtained any marriage license.
Furthermore,CarlosalsoassertedthatTeofiloIIcouldnot
be considered as Teofilos child. As a result, Carlos
concludedthathewasalsothesoleheirofhis
_______________
1
parents, but they had waived all their claims, rights and participations
inthepropertiesintheestate.SeeG.R.No.136035,Rollo,p.83.
2Id.,atp.87.
270
270
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
PacificInsuranceCorporation.
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
summaryjudgmentinfavorofCarlos.Carlossvictorywas
wholesale, with the RTC making the following
pronouncements:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant
FelicidadSandovalandTeofiloCarlossolemnizedat
Silang, Cavite, on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the
MarriageContractsubmittedinthiscase,nulland
void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage
license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S.
CarlosII,isnotthenatural,illegitimate,orlegally
adoptedchildofthelateTeofiloE.Carlos;
3. OrderingdefendantSandovaltopayandrestituteto
plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00, together with
the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of
filingoftheinstantcomplaintuntilfullypaid;
4. Declaringplaintiffasthesoleandexclusiveownerof
theparcelofland,lesstheportionadjudicatedtothe
plaintiffsinCivil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT
No.139061oftheRegisterofDeedsofMakatiCity,
and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said
title and to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiffherein;
5. DeclaringtheContract,AnnexKoftheComplaint,
between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and
void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati
City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of
TeofiloCarlos,andtoissueanothertitleinthesole
nameoftheplaintiffherein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the
Complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandovalnullandvoid;
7. OrderingthecancellationofTCTNo.210877inthe
namesofdefendantSandovalanddefendantminor
Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of
Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
exclusivenameofplaintiffherein.
8. OrderingthecancellationofTCTNo.210878inthe
namesofdefendantSandovalanddefendantminor
Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of
Deeds of Manila to issue
another title in the sole
9
nameofplaintiffherein.
_______________
9G.R.No.136035,Rollo,pp.137138.
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
12
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275
O.AminandR.Barcelona.
17 Particularly the cases of Raymundo
276
276
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
satisfactionoftheabovementionedwritofattachment(AnnexE,
18
MotionforJudgmentontheAttachmentBond,pp.78)
....
The contention of [Carlos] that the writ of attachment was not
implementedfallsflatonthefaceofthemanifestationofPNBthat
the delivery of the garnished P15,384,509.98 to him was effected
19
throughthesheriff.
BothCarlosandSIDDCORfiledtheirrespectivemotionsfor
reconsideration of the Resolution. For their part,
respondentsfiledaMotion for Immediate Executiondated7
August 1998 in regard to the Resolution of 26 June 1998
awardingthemdamages.
21
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278
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
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26
beforetheexpirationoftheperiodtoappeal. Respondents
had argued in their Motion for Immediate Execution that
thejudgmentsoughttobeexecuted(thatontheattachment
bond) was interlocutory and not appealable, yet cited
rulingsonexecutionpendingappealunderSection2,Rule
39 in support of their position. SIDDCOR cites this
inconsistency as proof of a change of theory on the part of
respondents which could not be done for the theories are
incompatible. Such being the case, SIDDCOR argues, the
Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in granting
immediateexecutionsincerespondentshadfileditsmotion
on the premise that the award on the judgment bond was
interlocutory and not appealable. SIDDCOR also claims
that the judgment on the attachment bond is not
interlocutory,citingStronghold
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court
27
of Appeals wherein it was ruled that such indeed
constitutesafinalandappealableorder.
SIDDCORpointsoutthatnohearingwasconductedon
the Motion for Immediate Execution despite the
requirement in Section 2, Rule 39 that discretionary
executionmayonlyissueupongoodreasonstobestatedin
aspecialorderafterduehearing.SIDDCORlikewisenotes
thatthemotiongrantingimmediateexecutionwasgranted
intheverysameresolutionwhichhaddeniedthemotionfor
reconsideration of the resolution sought to be immediately
executed. For SIDDCOR, such constituted a denial of
proceduraldueprocessinsofaras
_______________
26 See Section 2, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Records, p.
1114.
27G.R.No.84979,6November1989,179SCRA117.
280
280
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
itsstatutoryrighttoappealwasconcerned,astheresolution
that it intended to appeal from was already the subject of
immediateexecution.
Finally, SIDDCOR contests the special reasons cited by
theCourtofAppealsingrantingtheMotion for Immediate
Execution.
Facts Arising Subsequent to the Filing of Instant
Petitions
On 7 May 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of
Executiondirectingtheenforcementofthejudgmentonthe
28
attachmentbond. However,inaResolution dated 9 June
1999, this Court through the First Division issued a
Temporary Restraining Order,enjoiningtheenforcementof
thesaidWrit of Execution.
On15October2002,theCourtofAppealsFirstDivision
29
rendered a Decision on the merits of CAG.R. CV No.
53229,settingasidetheSummary Judgmentandordering
30
the remand of the case for further proceedings. Both
31
parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
Inaddition,Carlosfiledamotiontoinhibittheauthorofthe
32
assailed decision, Justice Rebecca de33GuiaSalvador, who
thereafter agreed to inhibit herself. Then on 7 August
2003, the Court of Appeals Former First Division issued a
Resolution deferring action on the motions for
reconsiderationinlightofthetemporaryrestrainingorder
issued by this Court until the resolution of the present
petitions.
_______________
28G.R.No.136035Rollo,pp.228231.
29PennedbyJusticeR.deGuiaSalvador,concurredinbyJusticesC.
Garcia(nowAssociateJusticeofthisCourt)andB.Abesamis.
30Records,p.1565.
31 Respondents argued that the Court of Appeals should decide the
case itself rather than remand the matter to the trial court. Records,
pp.18681870.
32SeeRecords,pp.19301936.
33InaResolutiondated11February2003.
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281
improper,irregularorexcessiveattachmentmustbefiledbeforethe
trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes
executory,withduenoticetotheattachingobligeeorhissuretyor
sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and
theamountthereof.Such damages may be awarded
282
282
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
310SCRA377(1999).
35 A necessary conclusion following our pronouncement in Rivera
v.
Talavera, 112 Phil. 209; 2 SCRA 272 (1961). Upon the other hand, it
was improper for the plaintiffs to ask the Court of First Instance to
assess damages against the sureties while the appeal was pending,
unless the Court of Appeals had granted permission to do so. The
reason is plain: It was the Court of Appeals that had jurisdiction over
the case. The trial court had lost jurisdiction upon perfection of the
appeal,andcouldnolongeractexcepttoadoptconservatorymeasures.
It follows then . . . that the Court of First Instance could not validly
entertain the supplemental complaint seeking to hold the sureties
liable,unlesstheCourtofAppealsreferredthemattertoit.
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Carlos vs. Sandoval
283
whilethejudgmentisstillunderthecontrolofthecourt,the
36
claimantloseshisrighttodamages.
There is no question in this case that the Motion for
Judgment on the Attachment Bondfiledbyrespondentson
10December1996wasproperlyfiledsinceitwasfiledwith
theCourtofAppealsduringthependencyoftheappealin
the main case and also as an incident thereto. The core
questions though lie in the proper interpretation of the
condition under Section 20, Rule 57 that reads: Such
damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and
shall be included in the judgment on the main case.
Petitionersassertthattherewasnoproperhearingonthe
applicationfordamagesandthattheCourtofAppealshad
wrongfully acted on the application in that it resolved it
priortotherenditionofthemainjudgment.
Such Damages May Be Awarded
Only After Proper Hearing. . . .
Wefirstdiscusswhethertheproperhearingrequirement
under Section 20, Rule 57 had been satisfied prior to the
award by the Court of Appeals of damages on the
attachmentbond.
Section 20 of Rule 57 requires that there be a proper
hearing before the application for damages on the
attachmentbondmaybegranted.Thehearingrequirement
ties with the indispensable demand of procedural due
process. Due notice to the adverse party and its surety
setting forth the facts supporting the applicants right to
damages and the amount thereof under the bond is
essential. No judgment for damages may be entered and
executed against the surety without giving it an
opportunitytobeheardastotherealityorreason
_______________
36 See Heirs
7355962, 26 March 1990, 183 SCRA 691 citing Cantos v. Mair, 36 Phil.
350 (1970); Japco v. The City of Manila, 48 Phil. 851 (1926); Cruz v.
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., et al.,92Phil.699(1953).
284
284
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
41
G.R.No.90530,7October1992,214SCRA456.
38369Phil.641;310SCRA377(1999).
39Id.,atp.652;p.389.
40Ibid.
41Records,p.69.
42SeeRecords,pp.5359,6466.
43 Paramount
652;p.389.
285
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285
Fromthispronouncement,wecandiscernthattheproper
hearing contemplated would not merely encompass the
rightofthepartiestosubmittheirrespectivepositions,but
also to present evidence in support of their claims, and to
rebut the submissions and evidence of the adverse party.
This is especially crucial considering that the necessary
elementstobeestablishedinanapplicationfordamagesare
essentially factual: namely, the fact of damage or injury,
and the quantifiable amount of damages sustained. Such
matters cannot be established on the mere sayso of the
286
286
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
However,adifferentsituationappliesifitistheCourtof
AppealsortheSupremeCourtbeforewhichtheapplication
for damages is filed. Both these courts, which are
capacitated
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287
determinehisguiltorinnocencemustbeaccordedanaccused,and
nocareintheevaluationofthefactscaneverbeoverdone.People
v. Mateo,G.R.Nos.14767887,433SCRA640(2004).
288
288
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
premeCourttocalldeathpenaltycasesforhearingororal
argument.Ifnosuchmandatoryruleforhearingisimposed
ontheappellatecourtswhenthesupremepenaltyofdeath
isinvolved,whythenshouldanexceptionalrulebeimposed
in the case for the relatively insignificant application for
damagesontheattachmentbond?
If open court hearings are ever resorted to by appellate
courts, such result from the exercise of discretion rather
than by imposition by statute or procedural rule. Indeed,
there is no existing statute, procedural rule, or
jurisprudentialfiatthatmakesitmandatoryontheCourtof
Appeals or the Supreme Court to conduct an opencourt
hearing on any matter for resolution. There is nothing
demonstrablyurgentwithanapplicationfordamagesunder
Section 20, Rule 57 that would necessitate this Court to
adoptanunprecedentedrulemandatingitselfortheCourt
of Appeals to conduct fullblown open court hearings on a
particulartypeofaction.
This pronouncement does
not contradict our ruling in
46
Hanil Development v. IAC, which Carlos interprets as
requiringtheCourtofAppealstoconductaproperhearing
on an application for damages on the attachment bond.
HanilconcernedtherefusalbytheIntermediateAppellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) to take cognizance of the
application for damages on the attachment bond, such
refusal being reversed by the Court, which ruled that the
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) had jurisdiction to
accept and rule on such application. While the Court
thereinrecognizedthattheIACwasempoweredtotrycases
and conduct hearings, or otherwise
perform acts necessary
47
to resolve factual issues in cases, it did not require the
appellate court to conduct a hearing in open court, but
merelytoreinstatetheapplicationfordamages.
Admittedly,thedispositiveportionofHanilrequiredthe
CourtofAppealstoconducthearingsontheapplicationfor
_______________
46 Supranote17.
47 Id.,atp.567.
289
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289
damages, butnowhereinthedecisionwasageneralrule
laid down mandating the appellate court to conduct such
hearings in open court. The ascertainment of the need to
conduct fullblown hearings is best left to the discretion of
theappellatecourtwhichchoosestoheartheapplication.At
the same time, the Court cautions the appellate courts to
carefully exercise their discretion in determining the need
for opencourt hearings on the application for damages on
the attachment bond. The Court does not sanction the
indolentawardofdamagesontheattachmentbondbythe
appellatecourtwithoutaffordingtheadversepartyandthe
bonding company concerned the opportunity to present
their sides and adduce evidence in their behalf, or on the
basisofunsubstantiatedevidence.
Courtreads:
SECTION20.Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive
attachment.If the judgment on the action be in favor of the party against
whom attachment was issued, he may recover, upon the bond given or
de
290
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
VOL.471,SEPTEMBER30,2005
291
_______________
52G.R.No.88379,179SCRA468(1989).
292
292
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
293
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293
thatsucherrorisnotmortaltotheawardofdamages.
Asnotedearlier,theawardofdamageswasmadeaftera
proper hearing had occurred wherein all the concerned
parties had been given the opportunity to present their
arguments and evidence in support and in rebuttal of the
applicationfordamages.Theprematureawardofdamages
doesnotnegatethefactthatthepartieswereaccordeddue
process,andindeedavailedoftheirrighttobeheard.
Moreover,wearecompelledtoappreciatetheparticular
circumstance in this case that the right of private
respondentstoacquirereliefthroughtheawardofdamages
on account of the wrongful preliminary attachment has
beenconclusivelyaffirmedbythehighestcourtoftheland.
This differs from the normal situation under Section 20,
Rule57whereinthecourthavingjurisdictionoverthemain
action is still required to ascertain whether the applicant
actually has a right to damages. To mandatorily require
thattheawardofdamagesbeincludedinthejudgmentin
the main case makes all the sense if the right to damages
wouldbeascertainedatthesametimethemainjudgmentis
made.However,whenthesaidrightisalreadymadeviable
byreasonofafinaljudgmentwhichisnolongersubjectto
review,thereshouldbenounnecessaryimpedimentstoits
immediateimplementation.
Andfinally,anyrulingonourpartvoidingtheawardof
damagessolelyforthereasonthatitwasnotincludedinthe
judgment on the main case, and remanding the motion to
theCourtofAppealsforproperadjudicationtogetherwith
the main case may exhibit fealty to the letter of the
proceduralrule,butnotitsavowedaimsofpromotingajust
andspeedydispositionofeveryactionandproceeding.After
all,ifweweretocompeltheCourtofAppealstodecideagain
ontheapplicationfordamagesandincorporateitsrulingin
thejudgmentonthemainaction,theappellatecourtwillbe
examiningexactlythesameevidenceandapplyingexactly
the
294
294
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
295
VOL.471,SEPTEMBER30,2005
295
August1993,225SCRA486.
59G.R.No.136035,Rollo,p.42,citingSantos
v. Court of Appeals, 95
Phil.360(1954).
296
296
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
Properly Awardable
Next,weexaminetheparticularawardofdamagesmadein
thiscase,consistingofP15,384,509.98,plusinterest,aswell
as P1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees. There seems to be no
dispute that the former amount constituted the amount
drawnagainsttheaccountofSandovalbyreasonofthewrit
ofexecutionissuedbythetrialcourton27May1996.This
fact was confirmed by the PNB, in its Manifestation dated
19July1996,confirmingthegarnishment.
Respondentsburdeninprovingdamagesinthiscasewas
considerably lessened by the fact that there was already a
final judgment, no longer subject to review, that the
preliminary attachment allowed by the trial court was
indeedwrongful.Hence,allthatwasnecessarytobeproved
was the amount of damage actually sustained by
respondents by reason of the wrongful attachment. It is
unquestioned that by virtue of the writ of preliminary
attachment,aNotice of Garnishment was served upon the
PNBoverdepositaccountsmaintainedbyrespondents.Said
Notice of GarnishmentplacedunderthecontroloftheRTC
alltheaccountsmaintainedbyrespondents,andprevented
60
the transfer or disposition of these accounts. Then the
subsequentWrit of Execution dated 27 May 1996 ordered
thedeliverytoCarlosoftheseaccountsearliersubjectedto
61
garnishment.
Clearly,theamountofactualpecuniarylosssustainedby
respondents has been well established. The Manifestation
submittedbythePNBfurtheraffirmedtheactualamount
seized by Carlos, an amount which could not have been
acquired had it not been for the writ of preliminary
attachmentwhichwaswrongfullyissued.
Carlos lamely argues in his petition that there was no
concrete or supporting evidence to justify the amount of
actual damages, a claim that is belied by the official case
records.
_______________
60Records,p.33.
61Id.,atp.34.
297
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297
389390.
298
298
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
299
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300
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
neysfeesmaybeawardedundertheCivilCodewherethe
court deems it just and equitable that attorneys
fees and
70
expenses of litigation should be recovered,
even if moral
71
andexemplarydamagesareunavailing.
Particularly, the Court has recognized as just and
equitable that attorneys fees be awarded when a party is
compelledtoincurexpensestoliftawrongfullyissuedwrit
72
ofattachment. The amount of money garnished, and the
lengthoftimerespondentshavebeendeprivedfromuseof
their money by reason of the wrongful attachment, all
militatetowardsafindingthatattorneysfeesarejustand
equitable under the circumstances. However, we deem the
amountofP1,000,000.00asexcessive,andmodifytheaward
of attorneys fees to P500,000.00 which represents merely
approximatelythreepercentoftheactualdamagessuffered
by and awarded to respondents. We also delete the
impositionoflegalinterestmadebytheCourtofAppealson
theawardedattorneysfees.
Other Issues Raised in G.R. No. 135830
The issues raised in G.R. No. 136035 have been
dispensed with, and the remaining issues in G.R. No.
135830 are relatively minor. There is no need to dwell at
lengthonthem.
Carlosinsiststhatrespondentswereliabletohavepaid
docket fees upon filing of their Motion for Judgment on
Attachment Bond,onthetheorythattheyclaimedtherein
forthefirsttimetheallegeddamagesresultingfromthedis
_______________
SCRA88(1999);Cathay Pacific v. Spouses Vazquez,447Phil.306;399
SCRA207(2003).
70SeeArticle2208(11),CivilCode.
71
973; 289 SCRA 48 (1998); People v. Torpio, G.R. No. 138984, 4 June
2004,342SCRA213;Wildvalley Shipping Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No.119602,6October2000,342SCRA213.
72 MC
SCRA 116, 144 (2002); Lazatin v. Twao, 112 Phil. 733; 2 SCRA 842
(1961).
301
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301
302
302
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
ItisclearthatunderSection20,Rule57,theapplicationfor
damagesontheattachmentbondcannotbeindependently
set up, but must be filed in the main case, before the
judgment therein becomes final and executory. Santo
Tomassquarelyappliesindeterminingthatnocertification
against forum shopping was required in the Motion for
Judgment on the Attachment Bond. The same reasoning
alsosustainsarulingthatneitherlegalfeeswererequired
forthefilingofthesaidmotion.Section1,Rule141ofthe
RulesofCourtprovidesthatlegalfeesareprescribedupon
thefilingofthepleadingorotherapplicationwhichinitiates
76
an action or proceeding. Since the said application for
judgmentontheattachmentbondcannotbeconsideredas
aninitiatorypleading,asitcannotbeindependentlysetup
fromthemainaction,itisnotlikewisechargeablewithlegal
fees.
AstotheissuerelatingtotheotherResolutiondated26
June 1998 denying the motion to dismiss appeal on the
ground of forum shopping, we find Carloss arguments as
unmeritorious. Forum shopping allegedly existed because
petitionershadfiledtwocasesbeforetheCourtofAppeals,
CAG.R.CVNo.53229,andthePetition for Certiorari with
Temporary Restraining Orderdated2June1996attacking
the allowance of execution pending appeal. Evidently, the
twocausesofactioninthesetwopetitionsaredifferent,CA
G.R. CV No. 53229 being an appeal from the Summary
Judgment rendered by the RTC, and the second petition
assailingthesubsequentallowancebytheRTCofexecution
pending appeal. There is no identity between these two
causes of action that would warrant a finding of forum
shopping.
_______________
75 Santo
815;pp.391393.
76SeeSection1,Rule141,RulesofCourt.
303
VOL.471,SEPTEMBER30,2005
303
specificallyassailedbySIDDCORinG.R.No.137743.
In their Motion for Immediate Execution, respondents
theoryinseekingtheimmediateexecutionoftheawardof
damageswasthatsaidawardwasnotsubjecttoappeal,the
77
ruling thereupon being an interlocutory order. This
positionwasnotadoptedbytheCourtofAppealsinits16
October 1998 Resolution, which was otherwise favorably
disposed to respondents. Instead, the Court of Appeals
predicated the immediate execution on the following
grounds: (1) that the judicial finding that the writ of
preliminaryattachmentwaswrongfulwasalreadyfinaland
beyond review; (2) there were no material and substantial
defenses against the motion for the issuance of the
judgmentbond;(3)Sandovalwaselderlyandsickly,without
meansoflivelihoodandmaynotbeabletoenjoythefruits
ofthejudgmentontheattachmentbond;(4)thatimmediate
execution would end her suffering caused by the arbitrary
garnishmentofherPNBaccount.
There is no doubt that a judgment on the attachment
bondisafinalandappealableorder.Asstatedearlier,itis,
undernormalcourse,includedinthemainjudgment,which
in turn is final and appealable. Respondents admit that
theyhaderredinearliercharacterizingthesaidjudgment
asaninterlocutoryorder.Still,SIDDCORarguesthatsuch
earliererrorisfatal,andthattheCourtofAppealsabused
itsdiscretioninrulingonthemotiononatheorydifferent
fromthaturgedonbyrespondents.
_______________
77G.R.No.137743,Rollo,pp.8990.
304
304
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Carlos vs. Sandoval
Bynomeanscouldrespondentsbedeemedasestoppedfrom
changing their legal theory, since the rule on estoppel
78
applies to questions of fact and not questions of law.
Moreover,courtsareempoweredtodecidecasesevenifthe
parties raise legal rationales other than that which would
actuallyapplyinthecase.Thebasisofwhetherrespondents
are entitled to immediate execution arises from law,
particularlySection2(a),Rule39oftheRulesofCourt,and
not solely on whatever allegations may be raised by the
movant.
Thus,wefindnograveabuseofdiscretiononthepartof
the Court of Appeals, even though it allowed execution
pending appeal on a legal basis different from that
originallyadducedbyrespondents.Afterall,thereasoning
ultimatelyemployedbytheappellatecourtiscorrect,andit
hardly would be judicious to require the lower court to
adheretothemovantserroneousratiocinationandpreclude
theproperapplicationofthelaw.
We need not review in length the justification of the
CourtofAppealsinallowingexecutionpendingappeal.The
standard set under Section 2(a), Rule 39 merely requires
79SeeBorja
v. Court of Appeals,G.R.No.L37944,30June1988,163
VOL.471,SEPTEMBER30,2005
305