1. Title: People v. Genosa, GR No.

135981
Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 11(1) and Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code
Facts:
Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband which ultimately led to
his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night and it was her
husband who began the provocation. The appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she
wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely.
The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but that Ben
would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and
abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant,
after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The
appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the crime of
parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.
Issues:
(1)

Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.

(2)

Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

Held:
For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising from
battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimated partner; (b) The final acute
battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual
fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life,
and; (c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable not necessarily immediate and actual
grave harm to the accused based on the history of violence perpetuated by the former against the latter.
For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or argument that
preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailants aggression.

2. Case of People of the R.P. vs. Delim

G.R. No. 142773 28January2003
FACTS OF THE CASE:
It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding the appellants, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of Modesto Bantas.
Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are related for modesto is an adopted son of
their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into the house and poked a gun at
modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both armed stayed put and made sure that randy
and rita stayed put.
Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial and alibi as
their evidence against the charge.
*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime?
Yes there is:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit
a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united
in its executed. appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and
executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto
There is no:
TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity
to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted
in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and killed and this in
fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that modesto was defenseless during the
time that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants.
Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the three took advantage
of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.

HELD:
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF HOMICIDE (THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO
HOMICIDE)
3. People vs Narvaez
People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano
Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The
defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they
could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running
towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and
other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and
Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant
received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant
claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay
for moral damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a
form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts
did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil
code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.
Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his ownership of the
land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted
that the victim was the original aggressor.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence of his rights.
Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements
are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:

Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's property rights.
Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of
chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession
may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the
right to be respected in his possession

Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing was
disproportionate to the attack.

Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all
since he was asleep

Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense,
pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation
(read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on account of
provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted
instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered
three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.
3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the
offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions
of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential
damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction, considering that RA 5465 is
favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the
RPC.
Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance of
incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral damages. Appellant has already
been detained 14 years so his immediate release is ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of attack on person
defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor.
However, since he has served more than that, he should be released.
4. People vs Alconga
Facts: On May 27, deceased Silverio Barion, the banker of the card game, was playing black jack against Maria De
Raposo. De Raposo and Alconga were partners in the game, they had one money. Alconga was seated behind Barion
and he gave signs to De Raposo. Barion, who was suffering losses in the game, found this out and he expressed his
anger at Alconga. The two almost fought outright this was stopped.
The two met again on May 29. when Alconga was doing his job as ahome guard. While the said accused was seated
on a bench in the guardhouse, Barion came along and said Coroy, this is your breakfast followed by a swing of his
pingahan, a bamboo stick. Alconga avoided the blow by falling to the ground under the bench with the intention to

crawl out of the guardhouse. A second blow was given by Barion but failed to hit the accused, hitting the bench
instead. Alconga managed to go out of the guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen. While Barion was about to
deliver the 3rd blow, Alconga fired at him with his revolver, causing him to stagger and hit the ground. The deceased
stood up, drew forth his dagger and directed a blow to the accused who was able to parry the attack using his bolo. A
hand to handfight ensued. The deceased, looking already beaten and having sustained several wounds ran away. He
was followed by the accused and was overtaken after 200 meters.
A second fight took place and the deceased received a mortal bolo blow, the one which slasehde the cranium. The
deceased fell face downward besides many other blows delivered. Alconga surrendered.
Issue: Whether or not self-defense can be used as a defense by Alconga
Held: No. Self-defense cannot be sustained. Alconga guilty of Homicide
The deceased ran and fled w/o having to inflicted so much a scratch to Alconga, but after, upon the other hand,
having been wounded with one revolver shot and several bolo slashes the right of Alconga to inflict injury upon him
has ceased absolutely/ Alconga had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure. He could have only attacked if there
was reason to believe that he is still not safe. In the case at bar, it is apparent that it is Alconga who is the superior
fighter and his safety was already secured after the first fight ended. There was no more reason for him to further
chase Barion. The second fight will be treated differently and independently. Under the first fight, self-defense
would have been valid, but that is not the case in the second fight. In the second fight, there was illegal aggression
on the part of Alconga and as a result, he is found guilty of Homicide with no mitigating circumstance (MC) of
Provocation
Note Provocation in order to be an MC must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act. It should be
proportionate to the act committed and adequate to stir one to its commission
5. US VS BUMANGLAG
FACTS: Herein defendant Rafael Bumanglag noticed that he lost 40 bundles of Palay which were kept in his
granary. Upon his search of the articles on the following morning, he found them on an inclosed field 100 meters
from his granary. He waited near the said field along with 2 other companions to know the person who got hold of
his Palay. A man, Guillermo Ribis arrived and approached the palay and attempted to carry it but at that instant he
was approached by Bumanglag and his companions who assaulted the presumed thief with sticks and stabbing
weapons and as the result of the struggle, Ribis died.
ISSUE: Whether or not the justifying circumstance of Defense of Property is present in this case
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that there is no unlawful aggression present in this case and there is an
absence of other requisites which would fully or partially exempt the accused from criminal responsibility. However,
the court took into consideration the presence of the mitigating circumstance No. 7 of Article 9 of RPC because the
defendant acted with loss of reason and self control upon seeing that Ribis was taking material possession of the
palay.

6. LADISLAO ESPINOSA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181071

March 15, 2010

Respondent.
FACTS: On 6 August 2000, private complainant Andy Merto, bearing a grudge against the petitioner, went to the
house of the latter. While standing outside the house, Merto shouted violent threats, challenging the petitioner to
face him outside.
Sensing Mertos agitated state and fearing for the safety of his family, petitioner went out of his house to reason with
and pacify Merto. However, as soon as he drew near the private complainant, the latter hurled a stone at the
petitioner. The petitioner was able to duck just in time to avoid getting hit and instinctively retaliated by hitting the
left leg of the private complainant with a bolo scabbard. Merto fell to the ground. Petitioner then continuously
mauled the private complainant with a bolo scabbard, until the latters cousin, Rodolfo Muya, restrained him.
22 September 2000, petitioner was originally charged with Frustrated Homicide. Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and
trial thereafter ensued.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction with the modification that the penalty imposed
by the trial court should be lowered by one degree in accordance with the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense under Article 69.
ISSUE: The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether under the set of facts given in this case, complete self-defense
may be appreciated in favor of the petitioner.
HELD: Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner merely used a scabbard in fending off the unlawful aggression
the totality of the circumstances shows that after the aggressor was taken down to the ground, the petitioner ceased
to be motivated with the lawful desire of defending himself. He was, by then, acting with intent to harm the private
complainant whose aggression had already ceased. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit.
7. Colinares Vs People
I.

THE FACTS

Accused-appellant Arnel Colinares (Arnel) was charged with frustrated homicide for hitting the head of the
private complainant with a piece of stone. He alleged self-defense but the trial court found him guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law
was only up to 6 years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction
for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. His
conviction was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

II.

THE ISSUES

Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower [lesser] offense [of attempted homicide] and
a reduced probationable penalty, may he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court voted to PARTIALLY GRANT the appeal, MODIFIED the CA decision and found
Arnel GUILTY of ATTEMPTED (not frustrated) HOMICIDE and SENTENCED him to and indeterminate but
PROBATIONABLE penalty of 4 months of arresto mayor as minimum and 2 years and 4 months of prision
correccional as maximum. The Court alsovoted 8-7 to allow Arnel to APPLY FOR PROBATION within 15 days
from notice that the record of the case has been remanded for execution to trial court.]
YES, Arnel may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.
Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment
of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of
attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment
of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as
maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of
the case to the RTC.
[W]hile it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to such
privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his
maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of
the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation,
taking into account the full circumstances of his case.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel
based on the trial courts annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe
penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Courts judgment of conviction for a lesser offense
and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial courts judgmenteven if this has been found in
error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of
his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao
gets the whip). Where is justice there?
Here, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did
not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, By taking this appeal, I choose
not to apply for probation. The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a
ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the
sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the
option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted
homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC
done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right
penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.

DISSENTING and CONCURRING OPINION

PERALTA, J.:
In view of the provision in Section 4 of the Probation Law that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction, prevailing
jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies because the law is unmistakable about it.
However, it has been proposed that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the
appeal is solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit, as this is equitable. In this regard, an accused
may be allowed to apply for probation even if he has filed a notice of appeal, provided that his appeal is limited to
the following grounds:
1. When the appeal is merely intended for the correction of the penalty imposed by the lower court, which
when corrected would entitle the accused to apply for probation; and
2. When the appeal is merely intended to review the crime for which the accused was convicted and that the
accused should only be liable to the lesser offense which is necessarily included in the crime for which he was
originally convicted and the proper penalty imposable is within the probationable period.
In both instances, the penalty imposed by the trial court for the crime committed by the accused is more
than six years; hence, the sentence disqualifies the accused from applying for probation. Thus, the accused should
be allowed to file an appeal under the aforestated grounds to seek areview of the crime and/or penalty imposed by
the trial court. If, on appeal, the appellate court finds it proper to modify the crime and/or the penalty imposed, and
the penalty finally imposed is within the probationable period, then the accused should be allowed to apply for
probation.
In addition, before an appeal is filed based on the grounds enumerated above, the accused should first file a
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court anchored on the above-stated grounds and manifest his
intent to apply for probation if the motion is granted. The motion for reconsideration will give the trial court an
opportunity to review and rectify any errors in its judgment, while the manifestation of the accused will immediately
show that he is agreeable to the judgment of conviction and does not intend to appeal from it, but he only seeks a
review of the crime and/or penalty imposed, so that in the event that the penalty will be modified within the
probationable limit, he will apply for probation.
It is believed that the recommended grounds for appeal do not contravene Section 4 of the Probation Law,
which expressly prohibits only an appeal from the judgment of conviction. In such instances, the ultimate reason of

the accused for filing the appeal based on the aforestated grounds is to determine whether he may avail of probation
based on the review by the appellate court of the crime and/or penalty imposed by the trial court.Allowing the
aforestated grounds for appeal would give a qualified convicted offender the opportunity to apply for probation if his
ground for appeal is found to be meritorious by the appellate court, thus, serving the purpose of the Probation Law
to promote the reformation of a penitent offender outside of prison.
On the other hand, probation should not be granted to the accused in the following instances:
1. When the accused is convicted by the trial court of a crime where the penalty imposed is within the
probationable period or a fine, and the accused files a notice of appeal; and
2. When the accused files a notice of appeal which puts the merits of his conviction in issue, even if there
is an alternative prayer for the correction of the penalty imposed by the trial court or for a conviction to a lesser
crime, which is necessarily included in the crime in which he was convicted where the penalty is within the
probationable period.
There is wisdom to the majority opinion, but the problem is that the law expressly prohibits the filing of an
application for probation beyond the period for filing an appeal. When the meaning is clearly discernible from the
language of the statute, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Thus, the remedy is the amendment of
Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, and not adaptation through judicial interpretation.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

It must be stressed that in foreclosing the right to appeal his conviction once the accused files an
application for probation, the State proceeds from the reasonable assumption that the accuseds submission to
rehabilitation and reform is indicative of remorse. And in prohibiting the trial court from entertaining an application
for probation if the accused has perfected his appeal, the State ensures that the accused takes seriously the privilege
or clemency extended to him, that at the very least he disavows criminal tendencies. Consequently, this Courts grant
of relief to herein accused whose sentence was reduced by this Court to within the probationable limit, with a
declaration that accused may now apply for probation, would diminish the seriousness of that privilege because in
questioning his conviction accused never admitted his guilt. It is of no moment that the trial courts conviction of
petitioner for frustrated homicide is now corrected by this Court to only attempted homicide. Petitioners physical
assault on the victim with intent to kill is unlawful or criminal regardless of whether the stage of commission was
frustrated or attempted only. Allowing the petitioner the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty
glosses over the fact that accuseds availment of appeal with such expectation amounts to the same thing:
speculation and opportunism on the part of the accused in violation of the rule that appeal and probation are
mutually exclusive remedies.

8. SPO2 LOLITO NACNAC VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 191913, MARCH 21, 2012
FACTS:
On the fateful night of February 20, 2003 SPO2 Nacnac the accused-appellant, the victim and together with
other police officers were on duty. SPO2 Nacnac had a heated argument with SPO1 Espejo which led to a violent
scenario, killing SPO1 Espejo. SPO2 Nacnac was found guilty of homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the justifying circumstances of the petitioners acts constitutes a valid self-defense.
HELD:
Yes. The refusal of the victim to follow a lawful order from petitioner , his superior , considering also the
negative words uttered by the victim in response to SPO2 Nacnac, his drunken situation, his profession as being a
police officer and the warning shot fired by the petitioner justifies the acts done as mere defending himself from an
inebriated and disobedient colleague.
The lone wound inflicted on the victim supports that petitioner feared for his life and only shot the victim to
defend himself. It was a reasonable means chosen by the petitioner in defending himself in view of the proximity of
the armed victim, his drunken state, disobedience on lawful order and failure to stand down despite a warning shot.
9. Cano vs People
CONRADO CANO y SAMPANG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The primordial issue to be resolved in this petition for certiorari is whether or not petitioner killed his brother in self-defense.
Petitioner Conrado Cano y Sampang and his deceased brother Orlando Cano were rivals in the Rush ID Photo business and
had booths along the sidewalk of Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila fronting the Philippine Trust Bank and Uniwide Sales Department
Store. The fateful altercation which culminated in the fatal stabbing of Orlando Cano stemmed out of this rivalry, particularly the
incident where Conrado took the business permit from the booth of Orlando without his permission thus incurring the latters ire.
The prosecutions version of what transpired as summarized in the Peoples brief shows that in the morning of May 31, 1993,
at about 7:00 oclock, the victim Orlando Cano arrived at the Rush ID Booth of petitioner located below the LRT line in Rizal Avenue,
Sta. Cruz, Manila. The victim asked David Olivario, an employee of petitioner, where the latter was. The victim angrily said that
petitioner was pakialamero. He also said, Putang ina niya! Why did he Xerox our permit. Since petitioner had not yet arrived, the
victim returned to his own Rush ID booth located several meters away.
[1]

[2]

Later, at about 9:30 a.m., petitioner arrived at his Rush ID booth. After giving supplies to Olivario, petitioner said he was going
to the City Hall. He faced the mirror and started to comb his hair. The victim suddenly arrived and held petitioner on the shoulders
and turned him around. The victim asked him, Anong gusto mong mangyari? Accused did not answer.
[3]

The victim tried to stab petitioner with a balisong but the latter was able to run and lock himself inside the dark room inside his
booth. The victim followed him and tried to open the door of the dark room and shouted, Lumabas ka diyan! Putang ina mo,
papatayin kita! Petitioner did not come out.The victim tried to force the door open by kicking it and stabbed the door with
his balisong. The door of the dark room suddenly opened and petitioner emerged carrying a pair of scissors. The victim and
petitioner struck at each other. During the scuffle, the scissors fell from petitioners hand. He then grabbed the knife of the victim
who, in turn, picked up the scissors. They again attacked each other.
[4]

The victim fell and his wife rushed to his side. Petitioner fled from the scene. The victims wife asked for assistance from the
people in the vicinity. The victim was then loaded on a jeep and was rushed to a hospital, but he was dead on arrival.
[5]

The autopsy report submitted by the medico-legal officer of the Western Police District, Dr. Manuel Lagonera, shows that the
victim sustained at least thirty (30) stab wounds, six (6) of which were fatal. On the other hand, petitioner suffered only an incised
wound on the right hand measuring six (6) cm., which required less than nine (9) days of treatment.
[6]

Petitioner had a different account of what transpired. He testified that on May 31, 1993 at around 9:30 a.m. he went to his
Rush ID booth in front of the Philtrust Bank to deliver supplies to his photographer, David Olivario. After handing over said supplies
to Olivario, petitioner intended to go to the Manila City Hall to apply for a business permit.
[7]

[8]

Petitioners earlier application for a permit was denied. He sought a reconsideration from the city officials and argued that his
brother was issued a similar permit. In order to prove his point, he borrowed the permit of his brother from his nephew, Wilson
Reyes, to have it machine copied. After doing so, petitioner returned it. The victim apparently resented this because petitioner was
informed by David Olivario that Gloria Cano later went to petitioners stall angrily inquiring why they got the permit.
[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

As petitioner was combing his hair and preparing to leave for the Manila City Hall, the victim, Orlando, suddenly appeared
from behind, grabbed him by the left shoulder and jerked him around so that they were face to face. As they stood face to face,
Orlando menacingly said, Anong gusto mong mangyari? Petitioner noticed Orlando holding a balisong, and he ran to the dark room
of his stall.
[13]

[14]

[15]

The victim pursued him and tried to force open the locked dark room door by kicking it and stabbing it with the fan knife. He
kept shouting, Get out of there! Pakialamero ka! Get out of there and I will kill you! The door suddenly gave way and, as it opened,
the victim charged at petitioner, but he was able to evade the attack. Snatching a pair of scissors nearby, petitioner retaliated but the
scissors fell from his grasp because it was parried by the victim. Petitioner then grabbed the hand of the victim holding
the balisong and they grappled to gain possession thereof. He eventually wrested control of the knife and as he stood momentarily,
the victim picked up the scissors and again lunged at him.
[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

With nowhere to go, petitioner was forced to defend himself from the onslaught of the victim who was armed with the nineinch long pair of pointed scissors. No bystanders tried to pacify them as they engaged in their deadly struggle for almost two (2)
minutes. Suddenly, the victim collapsed and fell bloodied to the floor.
[20]

[21]

Petitioner stooped to lift his brother up, intending to bring him to the hospital. However, he was hit by the victims wife with a
chair. Then, she started shouting, Holdupper! Petitioner was forced to flee from the scene for fear of being lynched by the people
who had gathered around armed with clubs. The people pursued him but when he saw a policeman coming in his direction, he
threw the balisong away and raised his hands in surrender. He was then brought to the police precinct and later to the hospital for
treatment of his injuries.
[22]

[23]

[24]

Petitioner was charged with Homicide in an Information which alleges

[25]

That on or about May 31, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one ORLANDO CANO y SAMPANG, by then and there stabbing the latter on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the said ORLANDO CANO Y SAMPANG mortal and fatal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-121668 and filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 31.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. The case thereupon proceeded to trial. After trial, the
court a quo rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime and sentencing him to serve an
imprisonment of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased P50,000.00 plus costs.
[26]

Petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 19254.

During the pendency of the appeal, Gloria Cano, the widow of the victim, executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay stating, among
others, that petitioner merely acted in self-defense and that she was withdrawing the charge against him. This sworn statement
became the basis of an Urgent Motion for New Trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence filed by counsel for petitioner.
[27]

[28]

[29]

This motion for new trial was, however, denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated March 19, 1998.

[30]

The appellate court subsequently rendered judgment affirming petitioners conviction but modifying the penalty to an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment ranging from nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Petitioner was likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim actual
damages of P24,605.75; P50,000.00 as moral damages and another P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto plus costs.
[31]

Preliminarily, the Solicitor General argues that the petition raises merely factual issues, such as whether or not petitioner is
entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of provocation or threat and voluntary
surrender. These issues, says the Solicitor, are not proper for a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Concededly, those who seek to avail of the remedies provided by the rules must adhere to the requirements thereof, failure of
which the right to do so is lost. It is, however, equally settled that rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense and are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would
be defeated. They should be liberally construed so that litigants can have ample opportunity to prove their claims and thus prevent
a denial of justice due to technicalities.
[32]

[33]

Therefore, we shall proceed to resolve the issue of whether or not petitioner is entitled to invoke the justifying circumstance of
self-defense, considering that what is at stake is not merely his liberty, but also the distinct possibility that he will bear the stigma of a
convicted felon and be consigned to the fate of being a social pariah for the rest of his life.
As can be seen from the foregoing, the prosecution and the defense have diametrically opposed factual versions of what
transpired immediately preceding the killing. Our task is to determine which of them is the truth. In resolving such conflict, dealing as
it does with the credibility of witnesses, the usual rule is for us to respect the findings of the trial court considering that it was in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during trial. Nonetheless, this rule is circumscribed by well-established exceptions.
[34]

[35]

In the case at bar, the record shows circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked, or the significance of
which has been misinterpreted, that if considered would affect the result of the case.
[36]

For self-defense to prosper, petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Although all the three elements must concur, self-defense must rest firstly
on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression has been proved, no self-defense may be
successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. In other words in self-defense, unlawful aggression is a primordial element.
It presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person not a mere threatening
or intimidating attitude but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor.
[37]

[38]

[39]

In the case at bar, there are several material circumstances which were ignored by both the court a quo and the appellate
tribunal.
First, contrary to the findings of both the appellate and trial courts, there are facts extant on record which clearly shows that it
was an armed victim who initially attacked the petitioner with a balisong. Petitioner testified on the assault thus:
David Olivario, who was five meters away and saw what transpired, corroborated petitioners account. He remained steadfast
and unwavering on cross-examination despite intense grilling by the prosecution and further clarificatory questioning from the trial
court itself.
[41]

[42]

[43]

Second, the physical evidence is more in accord with petitioners version of what transpired, specifically his assertion that it
was the victim who was armed and persisted in his attack on the petitioner even though the latter locked himself inside the dark
room of his stall to protect himself. The findings of Police Investigator SPO3 Julian Z. Bustamante contained in his Advance
Information Report discloses that [H]oles were observed at the door near the door lock of suspects rush ID photo booth apparently
made by a hard pointed instrument Aside from stating that a fan knife and a pair of scissors which both yielded positive results for
[44]

[45]

traces of human blood were recovered, the report went further to note that the bloodied scissor were ( sic) recovered in front of
suspects rush ID photo booth door.
[46]

The foregoing entries of the Advance Information Report, particularly that referring to the location of the bloodied scissors,
supports petitioners claim that when he could no longer avoid the unlawful aggression of the victim, he was compelled to grab at the
instrument inside the booth to defend himself. However, the scissors fell from his grasp, thus forcing him to desperately grapple for
possession of the fan knife.
Third, circumstances prior to the fatal incident shows that it was the victim who purposely sought to confront the petitioner
because the latter had his business permit machine copied without his permission. Maria Cano, an aunt of the victim and petitioner,
testified thus:
Fourth, the record reveals that while indeed numerous wounds were sustained by the victim, the Medico-Legal Officer who
conducted
the
autopsy
admitted
that
of
the
thirty-five
(35)
wounds
supposedly
inflicted, thirty-three
(33) were scratches and contusions while only six (6) were penetrating or stab wounds. As regards the finding that petitioner
suffered only one hand wound, it should be stressed that the superficiality of the nature of the wounds inflicted on the accused does
not, per se, negate self-defense. Indeed, to prove self-defense, the actual wounding of the person defending himself
is not necessary. It is sufficient that the aggression be attempted so as to give rise to the right to prevent it. The act of a person
armed with a bladed weapon pursuing another constitutes unlawful aggression because it signifies the pursuers intent to commit an
assault with this weapon.
[48]

[49]

[50]

The particular circumstances which confronted the petitioner at the time of the incident condoned the means he employed to
protect his life. It must be remembered that the measure of rational necessity is to be found in the situation as it appeared to
petitioner at the time when the blow was struck. The law does not require that he should mete out his blows in such manner that
upon a calm and deliberate review of the incident it will not appear that he exceeded the precise limits of what was absolutely
necessary to put his antagonist hors de combat, or that he struck one blow more than was absolutely necessary to save his own life;
or that he failed to hold his hand so as to avoid inflicting a fatal wound where a less severe stroke might have served the purpose.
Under such conditions, an accused cannot be expected to reflect coolly nor wait after each blow to determine the effects thereof.
[51]

. . . the reasonableness of the means employed to repel an actual and positive aggression should not be gauged by the standards that the mind of
a judge, seated in a swivel chair in a comfortable office, free from care and unperturbed in his security, may coolly and dispassionately set
down. The judge must place himself in the position of the object of the aggression or his defender and consider his feelings, his reactions to
the events or circumstances. It is easy for one to state that the object of the aggression or his defender could have taken such action, adopted such
remedy, or resorted to other means. But the defendant has no time for cool deliberation, no equanimity of mind to find the most reasonable action,
remedy or means to. He must act from impulse, without time for deliberation. The reasonableness of the means employed must be gauged by
the defenders hopes and sincere beliefs, not by the judges.
[52]

Fifth, there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of petitioner. When the law speaks of provocation either as a
mitigating circumstance or as an essential element of self-defense, it requires that the same be sufficient or proportionate to the act
committed and that it be adequate to arouse one to its commission. It is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or
annoying. This third requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2) when, even if
provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending
himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act
of aggression.
[53]

[54]

Petitioner borrowed the permit of the victim and had it photocopied without the latters permission two (2) days before the
incident. The victim and his wife resented this. However, this can hardly be considered a provocation sufficient to merit so deadly
an assault with a bladed weapon.Moreover, the act was neither immediate nor proximate. What, in fact, appears on record is the
bellicose temperament of the victim and his spouse who, despite the advice of their Aunt Maria Cano to calm down, still persisted in
confronting petitioner. When the question is raised who between the accused and the offended party gave provocation, the
circumstances of subjective, objective and social character may be considered in reaching a definite conclusion. Thus an accused,
to prove provocation in connection with his plea of self-defense, may show that the victim, as in this case, had a quarrelsome and
irascible disposition.
[55]

[56]

[57]

[58]

Sixth, two other notable circumstances on record tend to show that petitioner was impelled by the instinct of self-preservation
rather than the murderous urge of one bent on killing. The first is when petitioner was able to wrest the balisong from the victim,
he never took advantage of the opportunity to attack his already weaponless brother. Rather, he stood still and was forced to act
only when the victim picked up the scissors and lunged at him again. The second instance is when the victim fell. Had petitioner
[59]

been actuated by homicidal intentions, he would have persisted in his attack on his prostrate brother. He did nothing of the sort. He,
in fact, intended to lift the victim up and bring him to the hospital but the sudden appearance of the victims wife who hit him with a
chair forced him to flee. Moreover, armed people were attracted by the shouts of the victims wife and had gathered and started
pursuing him.
[60]

Seventh, while the general policy is for the courts not to attach any persuasive evidentiary value to the affidavit of retraction
of the victims widow, such sworn statement acquires a weightier and more decisive evidentiary consideration when taken in
conjunction with the other prevailing facts in this case. Thus, it has oft been said that where inculpatory facts and circumstances are
susceptible of two or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused while the others may be
compatible with a finding of guilt, the Court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty
required for conviction.
[61]

All told, evidence shows that petitioner acted in lawful self-defense. Hence, his act of killing the victim was attended by a
justifying circumstance, for which no criminal and civil liability can attach. Article 11 (1) of the Revised Penal Code expressly
provides that anyone who acts in lawful self-defense does not incur any criminal liability. Likewise, petitioner is not civilly liable for
his lawful act. The only instance when a person who commits a crime with the attendance of a justifying circumstance incurs civil
liability is when he, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another, pursuant to subdivision 4 of
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. Otherwise stated, if a person charged with homicide successfully pleads self-defense, his
acquittal by reason thereof will extinguish his civil liability.
[62]

[63]

[64]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Conrado
Cano y Sampang is ACQUITTED of the crime charged against him and his immediate release from custody is ordered unless there
is another cause for his continued detention.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

10. People vs Bates

Facts:
Around 2:00 in the afternoon of November 28, 1995, Edgar Fuentes,
Simon Fuentes and Jose Boholst left Barangay Esperanza, Ormoc City to deliver
copra to a certain Fely Rodado at Barangay Green Valley, Ormoc City. After
delivering copra around 5:00 in the afternoon, the three men headed back to
Barangay Esperanza. While they were along a trail leading to the house of
Carlito Bates, the latter suddenly emerged from the thick banana plantation
surrounding the trail, aiming his firearm at Jose Boholst who was then walking
ahead of his companions. Jose grabbed Carlitos right hand and elbow and tried
to wrest possession of the firearm. While the two were grappling for possession,
the gun fired, hitting Carlito who immediately fell to the ground. At that instant,
Marcelo Bates and his son Marcelo Bates, Jr., brother and nephew of Carlito,
respectively, emerged from the banana plantation each brandishing a bolo. They
immediately attacked Jose hacking him several times. Jose fell to the ground
and rolled but Marcelo and his son kept on hacking him. Marcelo, then, turned to
Simon and Edgar and shouted huwes de kutsilyo. Upon hearing the same,
Simon and Edgar ran.
Upholding the prosecution evidence, the trial court rendered its Judgment,
finding Marcelo Bates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.

Issue:
Whether or not Marcelo could validly invoke the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation?

Decision:
Passion and obfuscation may not be properly appreciated in favor of
appellant. To be considered as a mitigating circumstance, passion or
obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of
lawlessness or revenge or from anger and resentment. In the present case,
clearly, Marcelo was infuriated upon seeing is brother, Carlito, shot by Jose.
However, a distinction must be made between the first time that Marcelo hacked
Jose and the second time that the former hacked the latter. When Marcelo
hacked Jose right after seeing the latter shoot at Carlito, and if appellant
refrained from doing anything else after that, he could have validly invoked the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when, upon seeing his
brother Carlito dead, Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then was already prostrate on the ground and hardly
moving, hacking Jose again was a clear case
of someone acting out of anger in the spirit of revenge.

11. People vs Sumicad

FACTS:

Setting: Feb 23, 1931, 5:30pm, Plaridel, Occidental Misamis

Accused Julian Sumicad was resting from hauling logs for the construction of a chapel. Segundo Cubol
passed by where he was resting.

Sumicad had rendered five and a half days of service to Cubol. He asked Cubol for the money (payment)
that Cubol owed him.

Cubol answered with, What debt!, insulted Sumicad and struck him with his fist.

Sumicad got up and moved backward, trying to escape, but Cubol pursued him. Sumicad found himself
cornered by a pile of logs. As Cubol pressed upon him, Sumicad drew his bolo and delivered a blow to the
right shoulder. Cubol lunged at Sumicad, trying to wrestle the bolo from him. Sumicad struck two other
blows. One blow broke through the cranium, the other made a cut extending from the left eyebrow to the
nose and upper lip.

Cubol gave down and crawled away, sat on a nearby log.

Witness Francisco Villegas asked Cubol if he had struck Sumicad with his fists, he said yes. Villegas told
Sumicad to surrender himself to the authorities, which he did.

Cubol died in about an hour. A knife was found in his pocket. Sumicad testified that when he inflicted the
blow, Cubol was trying to draw the knife from his pocket.

ISSUE:
1

Did Sumicad inflict blows in self-defense?

Is Sumicad criminally liable?

RULING: REVERSED
1

Yes

Element #1: Deceased was aggressor Cubol admitted that he hit Sumicad with his fists

Element #2: There was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused quarrel which
resulted to Cubols death was of his own doing; accused was not materially to blame in bringing about
trouble

When the aggression begun, the accused retreated until he was cornered in the angle of a pile of logs.
Accused first delivered a cut on the left shoulder (labo nito, kanina sabi right tapos ngayon left).
Sanitary officer reported that this could not have resulted in death. Instead of desisting assault,
deceased pressed forward and tried to get the bolo. Given this, accused was justified in using the bolo
as a weapon, for it would have been an act of suicide to permit that weapon to pass into the hands of
his assailant.
The reputation of the deceased for violence is pertinent, for it shows that when the fatal blows were
struck, the accused had reasonable grounds for believing that he was in grave peril to life or limb.
Deceased was known to his neighbors to be a dangerous man.
Under the circumstances, Sumicad had the right to resist the aggression with the bolo, and if he
unfortunately inflicted a fatal blow, it must be considered to have been given in justifiable self-defense.

No
All elements necessary to constitute justifiable self-defense are present in the case.

DISSENTING OPINION: C.J. Avancea

Incomplete self-defense: defendants use of bolo was not a reasonably necessary means of defending
himself against the others attack, which was but a matter of fisticuffs
having received the first blow on the arm, the deceased was justified in acting as he did, in the reasonable
belief that defendant would continue the attack with that weapon.

12. People vs Luague

13. People vs Dela Cruz

Facts:
In an Information filed on August 11, 2003, accused-appellant Leozar Dela Cruz y Balobal was indicted for the
crime of murder of Vincent Pimentel under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon arraignment, he pleaded
not guilty to the charge.

On September 5, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding Leozar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
attended by treachery and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. On February 27, 2008, the CA rendered the
appealed decision, affirming the findings of the RTC and the conviction of Leozar but modifying the award of
damages.
Accused raises the same assignment of errors as in his Brief, to wit: first, that the courts a quo erred in appreciating
the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery; and second, that the courts a quo gravely erred in convicting
him of murder instead of homicide.
Issue:
Was there treachery?
Ruling:
Yes. The fact that Leozar and Vincent did not quarrel prior to the killing is indicative of the treachery employed by
Leozar. After Vincent paid Leozar some money, he left and went inside the alley. When Vincent came back to
Mockingbird St. from the alley, Leozar deliberately employed means with treachery affording Vincent no
opportunity to defend himself, i.e., Leozar draped his arm around Vincent and slash/slit his neck using a 24-inch
bladed samurai. The fatal neck wound caused Vincents death, described in his death certificate as "hemorrhagic
shock secondary to an incised wound of the neck." All told, the victim was unaware of the imminent attempt on his
life, and was not in a position to defend himself. Clearly, treachery was present in this killing.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a
warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim
no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of
means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
14. Toledo vs People
FACT:
On 16 September 1995, when the victim, Ricky Guarte is about to sleep heard some stones being hurled at the roof
of his house. He saw the appellant stoning their house. Ricky then asked the appellant the reason why he was
stoning their house. However, without any warning, attacked and stabbed Ricky on the abdomen
with a bolo which caused the latters
untimely death. According to the petitioner, Ricky and his friends having a drinking spree ordered them not to make
loud noises. He then sleeps but he was awakened by loud noises coming from Ricky and his three companions.
When he peeped through the window he saw Ricky pulled out a balisong, pushed the door and threatened to stab the
petitioner. He then got his bolo and returned to the door. The bolo accidentally hit Ricky on the stomach while he
was pushing the door.On September 17, 1995 at 11:00am, the petitioner surrendered to the barangay captain. The
court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty as charged. The trial court did not give credence and probative
weight to the testimony of the petitioner that his bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach. On appeal in the
CA, the petitioner raised the following issue in his brief as appellant:WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSEDAPPELLANT CAN BE CRIMINALLY HELD LIABLE FOR THE ACCIDENTAL DEATH OF RICKY GUARTE

Invoking Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner claimed that he stabbed the victim by
accident; hence, he is exempt from criminal liability for the death of the victim. The CA rendered judgment
affirming the assailed decision with modifications. The CA also denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration
thereof. The appellate court ruled that the petitioner failed to prove that he acted in self-defense. Aggrieved, the
petitioner filed the instant petition for review, contending that the CA erred in not finding that he acted in selfdefense when he stabbed the victim by accident and prays that he be acquitted of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide based on the evidence on record?
.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide based on theevidence on record?
RULING:
The Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the petitioner failed to prove self-defense with clear and convincing
evidence. Hence, the decision of the CA affirming, on appeal, the decision of the RTC is correct. The contention of
the petitioner has no merit. The petitioner testified that his bolo hit the victim accidentally. He asserted in the RTC
and in the CA that he is exempt from criminal liability for the death of the victim under Article 12, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code which reads: However, the petitioner now alleges that he acted in self-defense when he
stabbed the victim. As such, he contends, he is not criminally liable under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. The petitioner is not permitted to change his theory on appeal because the case is tried and decided
upon that theory in the court below. The case will be reviewed and decided on that theory and not approached and
resolved from a different point of view. Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code
necessarily implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of
another with the use of reasonable means. The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and irresistible
master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the
absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The petitioner failed to prove that the victim was killed by
accident, without fault or intention on his part to cause it. The petitioner was burdened to prove with clear and
convincing evidence, the essential requisites for the exempting circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4. A person
is performing a lawful act; 2. With due care; 3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; 4. Without fault or
intention of causing it. In light of all the foregoing, the petition is denied. The assailed decision of the court of
appeals is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
15. People vs Erfectana

16. PEOPLE V. VENTURA

Spouses Jaime and Aileen Bocateja were sleeping in their room. At around 2am, Jaime was roused from his sleep by
accused Felix Ventura (armed with firearm) and Arante Flores (with a bladed weapon) who were able to stealthily
enter the house by cutting a hole in the kitchen door. Ventura pointed the gun at Jaimes face, announce a hold
up and hit Jaime on the head. The 2 then struggled for the gun, and since Jaime was winning, Ventura called on
Flores to stab Jaime. Flores did stab him 3 times. When wife Aileen saw her husband in danger, she cried for help

and Flores stabbed her 4 times (she died eventually). The spouses niece who was sleeping upstairs, ran downstairs
and recognized Flores as a former employee of the spouses butcher shop. She called on their neighbors for help.
Ventura and Flores then fled. The police intercepted the accused and from them recovered a .38 caliber revolver with
bullets and a blood-stained knife. Bombo radio covered their arrest and when asked why, Ventura answered that he
suspects that
his wife was carrying on an affair with Jaime. It turned out that Venturas wife was a maid for the Bocateja spouses.
Ventura saw his wife wearing a new ring, and the wife said it was from Jaime who was courting her. She was
dismissed as a maid when Aileen found out their illicit relations. After Ventura and his wife split, the former tried to
confirm the truth from Flores who worked for Bocatejas meat shop. He confirmed the affair and helped Ventura
with the crime.

Trial court: guilty of attempted murder (Jaime),

with aggravating circumstance of evident premediation, dwelling, nighttime and breaking of door to gain entrance.
Reclusion temporal max. Also, guilty of murder (Aileen), aggravated by abuse of superior strength, dwelling,
nighttime, breaking of door. Death.

Issue: w/n not guilty of murder (accused argue homicide lang) MURDER!

Ruling: [for passion and obfuscation] Court ruled out the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
as mitigating circumstance. While it is true that jealousy may give rise to P&O, it is necessary that the act
which produces the obfuscation was NOT far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. This
is the same with immediate vindication of a grave offense it cannot be considered where sufficient time
elapsed for the accused to regain his composure.
Here, Venturas suspicions were aroused a
week before the stabbing incident, when he first
confronted his wife about the ring. Also, on the day when they planned to commit the crime, 10 hours lapsed from
the time they left their home, armed with weapons already, until they entered the Bocateja residence. Within that
time, Ventura even had time to change his clothes at a relatives house, accused even had dinner at the market.
At the victims residence, they waited 3 hours (because they didnt want to be caught) before they actually carried
out their plan. Certainly, there was enough time that passed for Venturas emotions to cool.
Other crim-related things:
- There was evident premeditation. The execution
of the act was preceded by cool thought. It requires: (1) the time when the accused

determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3)
sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of
his act. Also, the fact that they were armed only showed their careful and deliberate plan of carrying out a killing.
- There was clear conspiracy between the
accused. Theyre both principals
- There was taking advantage of superior strength
in killing Ailleen. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to
the means of defense available to the person attacked. It depends on the age, size and strength of the parties, and is
considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, which is taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the
opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the
victim was completely defenseless.
Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim,
considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening the defense, although not
annulling it. Hence, the fact that Aileen attempted to fend off the attack on her and her husband by throwing nearby
objects, such as an electric cord, at appellant
Flores does not automatically negate the possibility that the latter was able to take advantage of his superior strength.

17. People vs Dijan