G.R. No.

160261
November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how
passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the
determination by the independent branches of government of the nature,
scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the
Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at
times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal
branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the
legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart
antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous
sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the
present controversy subject of the instant petitions whether the filing of the
second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in
the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question
has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it
was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is
sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this
Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort
to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor
legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest
lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court
is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation
of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge
by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the
sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has
been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of
each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government,
intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for
the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and
coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of
enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity
of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being
of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the

Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at
least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute
the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath
or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person
shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the
12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment
Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress.
The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House
Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS
RULES

12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II
INITIATING
IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of
Initiating
Impeachment.
Impeachment shall be
initiated only by a verified
complaint for
impeachment filed by any
Member of the House of
Representatives or by
any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof or

RULE V
BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF
IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE
SAME OFFICIAL
Section 16. Impeachment
Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. In cases where a
Member of the House files a
verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen files a
verified complaint that is
endorsed by a Member of the
House through a resolution of
endorsement against an

by a verified complaint or
resolution of
impeachment filed by at
least one-third (1/3) of all
the Members of the
House.

impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings
against such official are deemed
initiated on the day the
Committee on Justice finds that
the verified complaint and/or
resolution against such official,
as the case may be, is sufficient
in substance, or on the date the
House votes to overturn or affirm
the finding of the said Committee
that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be,
is not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be,
by at least one-third (1/3) of the
Members of the
House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment
with the Secretary General.

RULE V
BAR AGAINST
IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of
Bar. No impeachment
proceedings shall be
initiated against the same
official more than once
within the period of one
(1) year.

Section 17. Bar Against

Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. Within a period
of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as
such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the
original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a

Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella,
which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid
of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." 6 The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed
by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which
shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session
days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. 10 To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed
with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third
District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by abovementioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at
least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et.
al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that
he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all
available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the
issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the
capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to
bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the
House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17
and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional;
(2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of
Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of
the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike
it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules
which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently
enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens
and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental
importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a
writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from
filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate;
and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate
and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has
accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad
Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves
public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct
the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further
proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court
has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in
the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the
second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers
and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for
an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting,
adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second

impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from

transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and
Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House
of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only
constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition
for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any
act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they
have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of
taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme
Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and
pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment
complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null
and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President
from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second
impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the
Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any
proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members
are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen,
taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition,
which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that
Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second
impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and
a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray
in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging
that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the
Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections
16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of
Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be
declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et.
al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class
suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed
in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a
writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from
conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and
that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment
complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in
interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino,
alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and
transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered
operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in
accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting
the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the
impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in
his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the
time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without
any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the

Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief

Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L.
Hofilea, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in
the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains
to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of
their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from
endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that
the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging
his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is
founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund
(JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of
Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and
audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for
Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the
issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve
matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent
House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from
accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens
and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the
second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement
and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared
null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin
Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the
Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be
prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263,
the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction
to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the
Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed
for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as
null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295,
which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition,
petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House
Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by
the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle
of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment
complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried
because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum, 19 and
as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be
forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October
28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the
Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the
Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its
Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b)
require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as
the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5,
2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici

curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to

maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in
their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions
moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives
through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way
of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court
has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of
government under the Constitution, from the performance of its
constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even
date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to
Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over
the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power,
authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and
decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the
respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article
XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court
resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b)
require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5,
2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate
President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is
concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or
in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable
issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute
itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the
Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues
raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to
Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and
160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on
October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress
and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of
all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial
determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No.
160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene"
in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's
Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention
were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and
the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney
Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues
outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be
invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and
whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of
impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of

impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on
Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues
arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and
opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this
Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and
novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those
arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential prerequisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled;
and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be
discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of
judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment
complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of
the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by
Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions,
unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in
Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice
Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which
can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the
power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide,
that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty
however limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a
system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations
and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and
agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution
had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels, for then
the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of
rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations
and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they
should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no
express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to
speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set
at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one
and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is

granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2

of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who
is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth
all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren
legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people
as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.24(Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the
proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in
all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which
is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not
explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has
"been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and
a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v.
Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief
Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring
what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is
first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally,
but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the
constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the
United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed
to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law
repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well
as other departments, are bound by that instrument.28(Italics
in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in
the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our
courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted
political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact
effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the

Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed
an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which,
together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the
bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast
powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express provision
but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution
has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. x x x And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of
its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government through the definition
and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between
them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that
balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of
discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the aforequoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time
into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for
which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of
its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It
says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it
first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the
government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product
of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has
some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary
during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions
and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the

authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and

other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law
failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political,
we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law
regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power
of the agencies and offices of the government as well as
those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle
matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this
Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the wellsettled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search
for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is
where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given theirordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in
which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document,
it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the
need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been
held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and
the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times,
and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to

make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to

effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking
through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with
the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure
the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted
as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief
Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could
not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for
the benefit of one person without considering that it could
also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to
the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself
alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that
great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court
affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction
that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and
must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.45(Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to
other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates
and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to
arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons
for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and
jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel
argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings
from the coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et.

al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial
character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the
impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole
power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of
judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to
determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment
proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker
De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on
American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v.
United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the
framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try
impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and
balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the
judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution
to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of
impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the
American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to
support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide
impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the
Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all
issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of
the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that
it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to
determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling
within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as
Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs.
COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not
be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable
because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and
needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to
that of the United States, their paths of development have long since
diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical
cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme
Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial
review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and
lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a
power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include
the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the
House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment
cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These
limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the
one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments
undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress
and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial
statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should
defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full
well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the abovementioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution
did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the
language of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power
of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by
respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is
beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern
the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to
perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power
of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power
of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona,
Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of
the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an
act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the
Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that
when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared
null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of
the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether
the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based
on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section
18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v.
Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing
the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial
review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution,
the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract
from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by
the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of
whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect
may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the
National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted
as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both
are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of
judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is
subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of

legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of

constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people
as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the
original)

Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends
that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has
sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former
Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have
standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public
interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are
subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of
the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution
and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law
is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the wellentrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to
vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the
Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction
of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest
and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil
procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the
arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate
the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus
standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in
interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note
. . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy
underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether
a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to
sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards
ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing
restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary
in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in
some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action
taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing
is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is
whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the
suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the

petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief

Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own
rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a
class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession which were
supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given
standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is
about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of
the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected
to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke
the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he
has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. 80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a
taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to
most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal
to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the
Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate
the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its
members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the
outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its
interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of
their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore,
behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues
presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens,
persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the
interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all
interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle,
binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the
court.89Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently
represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail.
Since petitionersadditionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers,
however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole
ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in
G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the

following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds
or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues
raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on
the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue
of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are
of paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however,
mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter
is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence
of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In
petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does
not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules
of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.
While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts
when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's
case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262.
Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the
same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al.
has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking
their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this
insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives
is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been
complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental
importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed
a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional
issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the
Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the
Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires
of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the
respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the
limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs
with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's
jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence
of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of
Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives.
Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions
are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues
relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he
was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be
denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the
standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said

petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and

spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against
abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of
such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners
seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations
omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege
that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or
in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his
mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with
standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that
for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass
on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of
the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance
with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been
carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the
House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional
act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v.
Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant
petitions are premature. Amicus curiaeformer Senate President Jovito R.
Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a
decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality
anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate
should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of
Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts
to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw
their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for
an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves
when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to
the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the
Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue
of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment
complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and
(3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would
continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or
both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact
that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the
Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of
constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or
otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier
quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought
from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to
"those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided

by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full

discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without
any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking
cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this
Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to
exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the
seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed
jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988
case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of
whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court
shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof.
Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a
question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine
to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime
motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its
application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the
usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major
branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the
executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its
decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to
conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful
of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's
indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee
on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It
says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it
first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the
government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of
our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions
and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the
authority of courts to order the release of political detainees,
and other matters related to the operation and effect of
martial law failed because the government set up the
defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said:
"Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon
it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but
it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the
martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are
familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of

the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will

start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case
of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken.
Martial law was announced on September 22, although the
proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for
the delay in its publication was that the administration had
apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September
21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22,
the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media
could not publish any story not only because our main writers
were already incarcerated, but also because those who
succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being
the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional
Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or
22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the
fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the
proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971
Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One
of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon.
So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by
representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what the
delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable
to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973
Constitution was presented to the President around December 1,
1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a
plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in
the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less
public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The
purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of
the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in
January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague,
Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of
the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling
effect that Malacaang felt the danger of its approval. So, the
President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and
announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to
be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be
submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of
its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of
the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated
as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came
into existence. The questions to be propounded were released
with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was
unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in
the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the
plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court
praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When
the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the
Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the
President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force
because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the
referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the
departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session
room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court
and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the
1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in
force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential
proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and that
the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10
to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the
Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were
residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any

referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did

they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any
referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a
majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no
referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is
a big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But
another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue
was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the
case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of
"political question" was set up. There have been a number of
other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected
because the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its
functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power?
What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function:
to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which
are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are
guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In
a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling
to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your
wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply
with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her
main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights
guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them
by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human
dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,
hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of
government, the Supreme Court has, also another important
function. The powers of government are generally
considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its
own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that
supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid
or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power
of the agencies and offices of the government as well as
those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the
subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice
Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial
power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court

alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by

law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman
seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional
questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to
ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether
the government had authority or had abused its authority to
the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction,
that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the
duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be
decided by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical
need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away
with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse
of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not
intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to
define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it
says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the
definition that we might make may not cover all possible
areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the
problems arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact
that truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial
power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a
duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature
called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away
with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there
are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2)
those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for
respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the
other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can
review questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP
College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction
over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the
present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice
Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have
normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro
Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this
Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in
a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries

has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that

obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said
provision by no means does away with the applicability of
the principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this
Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes
even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we
were to assume that the issue presented before us was political
in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable
political questions and non-justiciable political questions, however.
Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic.
There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v.
Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or thepotentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are
interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion
that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American
concept of judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less
discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional
issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a nonjusticiable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether
there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly
acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the
present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment
complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in
accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on
Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional
infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of
the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional
for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under

Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More
importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court
to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which
the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds
for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of
public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no
better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and
other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of
both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard
therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable
political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under
Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever
possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this
Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass
upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the
parties and that when it is raised,if the record also presents
some other ground upon which the court may rest its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional
question will be left for consideration until a case arises in
which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act
No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction
over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the
essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question
are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of
judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is
truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the
invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several
constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could
possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the
remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by
the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among
other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly
resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF,
which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be
unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on
investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the
judiciary.121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the
studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said
Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue
of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the
resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule
of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of
legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required
by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further
strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in
support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the
Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative
inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v.
Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both
houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution.
Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that
the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not be
compelled to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et.
al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment
complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the
provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of
the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment,
and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives
signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy
the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the
"verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said
Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of
Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of
Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of
Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution
requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically
become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
"forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by
at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not
having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second
impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the
House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the
Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed
by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen

upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which

shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session
days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined
that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be
76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second
impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the
signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise
asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at
least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives
as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the
Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at
least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment
complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra,
does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on
impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption
as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the
fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No.
160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second
impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis
for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for
naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the
efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for
the determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said
intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of
Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own.
Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as
they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether
Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by
the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section
3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the
ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole
power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court
reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over
justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that
"[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over
the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature
has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because
Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option
before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is
not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no
other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this
Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the
Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is dutybound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words
of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a
solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is
vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because

no other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court
had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon
the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable
duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his]
appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary]
their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits
of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless
in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person,
interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to
resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had
already been settled in the case ofAbbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In
that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal
a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof
from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that
all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This
would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three JusticesMembers whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the
matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the
substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his
other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same
objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court
or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the
Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone
has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the
highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly
imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the
framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the
possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators
elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment
thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake
of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24
seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides
no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the
substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose
disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must
simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness
and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and
Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself
from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates,
refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he
sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in
the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are
merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its
entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its
Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power
of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court,
particularly a majority of them, is nothing short ofpro
tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by
the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of
his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the
Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case
with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their
judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power

of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial

independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned
and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon
a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the
original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when
it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the
"seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by
US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation
in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to
decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as
a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by
means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could
transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the
legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of
the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some
other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule
has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question,
the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the
Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of
a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can
be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more
striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks
a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public
official interested only in the performance of his official duty will
not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed
the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have
the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional.
In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity
Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on
behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at
the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised,
it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized
in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as
required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of
the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in

the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial
restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead
to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They
stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of
interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and
humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the
judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable
official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of
this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the
diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in
the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly
stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a
constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding
the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their
constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a
crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to
act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or
executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court
has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the
judgment has not only juridical effects but also political
consequences. Those political consequences may follow even
where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an
act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure
to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision
for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation,
follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and
"in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to
sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was
disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law
regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the
coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner
and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the
laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches
of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval,
violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental
law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by
the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, towit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of
justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political
beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries
within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of
their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of
laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary
powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system,
[public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to
protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments
by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their
own personal beliefs.142

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia,
argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution,
contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1)
is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body,
which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that
initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2),
Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to
wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the
House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of
the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one
year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the
same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been
initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has
yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term
"initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,
Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate
Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as
proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during
the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner
Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the
instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act
of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint,
dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in
Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take
initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries
do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New
International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means
"to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's
position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral
arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is
a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an
end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to
the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments
leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The
beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its
referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that
impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee
votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a
contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say
"impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed
initiated." The language is recognition that initiation happened
earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a
time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking
into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the
procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these
would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the
Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of
which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is
borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on

Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge

of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang
Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the
resolution covers several steps in the impeachment
proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker
committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report,
transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the
Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my
thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed
out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the
committee resolution containing the Articles of
Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the
floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of
the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon
wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment
to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It
is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or
disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the
Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been
bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of
the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The
proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have
submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration
of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all
affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact
formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any
of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to
18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the
word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then
capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word
"by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at
least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far
as the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified
complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it
the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words
"Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of
the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the
Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President,
that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is
only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you,
Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and
accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of
the complaint. In his amicus curiaebrief, Commissioner Maambong
explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of
Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that
the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the
complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of
impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was
already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3,
paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view
as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5)
means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by
an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the
word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on
impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year,
(Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to
initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object
in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the
principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the
legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first
provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members,
can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has
"exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can
do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a
"proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must
be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to
begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a
beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the
House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified
complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a
private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives;
(2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which
may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the
Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be
forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which
either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a
contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one
third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are
prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House
"initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable
public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully
charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment
court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not
initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because
that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding"
initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The
action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that
follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary

meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of
at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
toinitiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete
the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate
impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus
the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his
explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of
the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the
Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as
they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into
ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they
understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can
initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House
of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
principle of reddendo singula singulisby equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a
doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and
referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members
of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint
may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by
the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives
of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning
from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court
could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation
of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated
that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the
Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this
Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly
recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case,
he states that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional
Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that
intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of
the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions.
There are at present only two members of this Court who participated in the
1986 Constitutional Commission Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf
Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for
obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal
opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has
examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of
Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power
to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is

premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to

promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."
Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the
phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said
rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI
clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote
of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration
by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by
the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power,
then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of
either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge
of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However,
in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later
Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting
Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the
construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the
Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. InArroyo v. De
Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente
Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by
its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method
are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo
v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine
setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the
Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will
trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume
jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the
principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases
involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US
1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is
in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional
rules. It held:

"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house
may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in
pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day,
passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the
Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in
the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk
and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in
determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House
Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not
what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the
Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal.
Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly,
of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With
the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings.
It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are
open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment
of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a
rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a
length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once
exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject
to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body
or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass
upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was
found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any
constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right;
and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the result
sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not
allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the
principle of separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling
reason for courts to categorically reject the political question
defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power.
For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our
courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also
xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state
constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to
our courts in view of our experience under martial law where
abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial
scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led
by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the
judiciary vis--vis the Executive and the Legislative departments
of government.155
xxx

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this

Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.
Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution
imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a
branch or instrumentality of government or any of its
officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court
against the other branches of government despite their more
democratic character, the President and the legislators being
elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the
courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the
Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court
vis--vis the other branches of government. This provision was
dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that
a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort
abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul
acts of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the
new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to
activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience
as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the
1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached
constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot
do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress
this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations
not by finding out what it should not do but what
it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not
resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious
consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at
bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to
review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true
to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if
we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with
timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe
the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other
branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of
our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator
Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial
power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be
depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our
own history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant
petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and
the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v.
US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the
constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As
already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the
House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It
adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power"
is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme
Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This
reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine
House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated,

furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be

exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if
there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by
the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at
least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5)
of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice,
the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a
phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective
consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama,
conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the
controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two
weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally
exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle
to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view
on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether
for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets
armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter.
Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the
academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions for a return to a
state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches
affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national
life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of
Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told,
urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the
prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint
against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions
were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor
for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack
of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at
halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the
impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the
question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been
already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite
conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of
judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the
construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the
land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which
only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in
accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of
government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls

under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it
to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the
process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial
supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved
on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings
initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed
one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this
Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the
government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the
discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring
about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our
society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality
of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of
this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the
members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of
the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has
long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting
legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions.
This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by
whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever
imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered
judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted
to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest
ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the
fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's
official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there
are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in
a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now
from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply
a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any
legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as
essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect
for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government
branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of
legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real
meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases
especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief
Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court.
But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have
less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's
rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to
test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the
Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a
crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this
Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally
important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to
discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and
aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House
of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5,
section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951
November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP
National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by
MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY,
PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF
CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN
SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL
SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN
SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF
QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF
LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY
OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO,
CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY
OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ,
and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 177499
November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP
National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by
MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN,
PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF
KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL
SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and
MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS
ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF
LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY
OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO,
CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY
OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ,
and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x
G.R. No. 178056
November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP
National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by
MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR,
PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF
LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,

CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY

OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO,
CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY
OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ,
and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the
League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry
P. Treas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and
enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent
municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
The Facts
During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting
24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No.
9009 (RA 9009),5 which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in
the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to
convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue
Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. 6
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the
12th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,8 which sought to exempt
from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities
whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12thCongress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate
for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint
Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood
bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the
16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the
cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February
2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The
cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from
March to July 2007 without the President's signature.11
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as
well as for violation of the equal protection clause.12Petitioners also lament
that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities
under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.13
The Issues
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution,
and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the
present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA

9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five
years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the
criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in
any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are
clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was
never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the
13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Preliminary Matters
Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws
administered by the COMELEC,14 like the Cityhood Laws, which direct the
COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws.
Petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because
Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the League with the
"primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting
city government administration and securing, through proper and legal
means, solutions thereto."15 Petitioners-in-intervention,16 which are existing
cities, have legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be
reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P.
Treas has legal standing because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer
he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds,
like the release of more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than
what the law allows.
Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This
law specifically amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which
now provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally
generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and
if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as
certified by the Land Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income
of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more
islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement.

Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood

bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three cityhood bills became law before the
enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during
the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income requirement of P100 million
in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon
during the 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However,
the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the
unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and
December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress,
individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be
exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No.
9009.
This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from
the income requirement of P100 million prescribed in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood
bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity
of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the
11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the
cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent
municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws.17 This
basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the
Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively.
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow
the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any
other law. There is only one Local Government Code.18 The Constitution
requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria
necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law,
like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively
the creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can
govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that
the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same
uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local
Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed
in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase
the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a
city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the
Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to
become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does
not contain any exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent
municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress
when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the
increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section
10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional.

To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government

Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local
Government Code are essential to implement a fair and equitable
distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article
X of the Constitution provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in
the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis
supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and
discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes
to local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being
equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an
annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population
and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are
material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national
taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just
distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,
Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids like deliberations of Congress if
the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts determine
the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four
corners.19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts
simply apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal application of
the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort
to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the
law.20
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, did not provide any exemption from the increased
income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood
bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no
exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that
any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased
income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in
applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009.
The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government
Code
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities
from RA 9009, as shown by the various deliberations on the matter during
the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption
into law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009
but Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities
because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to
Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that
the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city, including any
exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government
Code. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such
criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through
a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the
Local Government Code.
Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution
prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by a general
law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations.
Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest of the common good and
subject to the test of economic viability. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation,
organization, or regulation" of private corporations in a general law
applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a
private corporation through a special law or charter.
Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable
Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed
during the 11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the
adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations
conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became
worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These hearings and
deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the
13th or subsequent Congresses.
The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved
bills filed in one Congress become functus officio upon adjournment of that
Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next
Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006
during the 13th Congress, the bills had to start from square one again, going
through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the
filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on
Unfinished Business, provides:
Sec. 123. x x x
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the
expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding
Congress as if presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on
Unfinished Business, states:
Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of
the following:
a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at
the time of its last adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is
disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the end of a session shall be
resumed at the commencement of the next session as if no adjournment
has taken place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished
Business are deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved
cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12th and
13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009
certain municipalities, have no legal significance. They do not qualify as
extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses.
Applicability of Equal Protection Clause
If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement, the
criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the
equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the
Local Government Code, could be assailed on the ground of absence of a
valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption
is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such
exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated
in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such
exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause. The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic
Act No. 9009 The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one
sentence exemption provision contains no classification standards or
guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are
not exempted.
Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that
municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100
million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the
equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact
that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the
11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid

classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption

from the P100 million income requirement.
To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on
substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government
objective which is the purpose of the law,23 not limited to existing conditions
only, and applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid
classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. 24
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending
cityhood bills in the 11thCongress and municipalities that did not have
pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is
not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the
purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a
municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have
pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency
of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the
purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from
converting into cities.
Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed
that a pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a condition for
exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they
been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their
own cityhood bills. These municipalities, even if they have bigger annual
income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into
cities if their income is less than P100 million.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the
exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA
9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the
requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing
conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v.
Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in
business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to
newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court
held:
We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may
be prospective in operation and may except from its sweep those presently
engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples are
statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those
entering the profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt
those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or
laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing
establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on
its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an activity in the interest
of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an
economic advantage to those engaged in a given business at an
arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry after that
date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any relation
to the public health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage
monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk
business. In the absence of any such showing, we have no right to conjure
up possible situations which might justify the discrimination. The
classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the
equal protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16
municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date the filing of
their cityhood bills before the end of the 11thCongress - as against all other
municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities

cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.

Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws,
even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would
still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and
declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act
Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408,
9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
SO ORDERED.

December 21, 2009

DECISION
VELASCO, JR. J.:
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute
must be read according to its spirit or intent,[1] for what is within the spirit is
within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within
the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. [2] Put a bit
differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within
the statute as if within the letter; and that which is within the letter of the
statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the
lawmakers.[3] Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an
interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.[4]
So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of
Congress, a co-equal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have
at once one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of
statutes.[5] This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of
government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three
great departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for
each others acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one
of its official functions. Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults
against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that
the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no
constitutional prescription or concept is infringed.[6] Consequently, before a
law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict
with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the
Court.[7]
BACKGROUND
The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of
Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P.
Treas[8] assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,[9] each
converting the municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws,
hereinafter) and seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws.
By Decision[10] dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote,
granted the petitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being
violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and the
equal protection clause.
Subsequently, respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for
reconsideration, raising, as one of the issues, the validity of the factual
premises not contained in the pleadings of the parties, let alone established,
which became the bases of the Decision subject of reconsideration.[11] By
Resolution of March 31, 2009, a divided Court denied the motion for
reconsideration.
A second motion for reconsideration followed in which respondent LGUs
prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully pray that the Honorable Court

reconsider its Resolution dated March 31, 2009, in so far as it denies for
lack of merit respondents Motion for Reconsideration dated December 9,
2008 and in lieu thereof, considering that new and meritorious arguments
are raised by respondents Motion for Reconsideration dated December 9,
2008 to grant afore-mentioned Motion for Reconsideration dated December
9, 2008 and dismiss the Petitions For Prohibition in the instant case.

the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited only to the initial vote on the
petition or also to the subsequent voting on the motion for reconsideration
where the Court is called upon and actually votes on the constitutionality of
a law or like issuances. Or, as applied to this case, would a minute
resolution dismissing, on a tie vote, a motion for reconsideration on the sole
stated groundthat the basic issues have already been passed suffice to
hurdle the voting requirement required for a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws in question?

Per Resolution dated April 28, 2009, the Court, voting 6-6, disposed of the
motion as follows:

The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31, 2009,
which denied the initial motion on the sole ground that the basic issues had
already been passed upon betrayed an evenly divided Court on the issue of
whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed
passed upon the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said
decision. But at the end of the day, the single issue that matters and the
vote that really counts really turn on the constitutionality of the cityhood
laws. And be it remembered that the inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in
the April 28, 2009 Resolution was the last vote on the issue of whether or
not the cityhood laws infringe the Constitution. Accordingly, the motions of
the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote, should be deliberated anew
until the required concurrence on the issue of the validity or invalidity of the
laws in question is, on the merits, secured.

By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31

March 2009 is DENIED for lack of merit. The motion is denied since there is
no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of 31 March 2009.
The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November
2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited pleading, and the Motion for Leave
to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention x x x filed by counsel for Ludivina
T. Mas, et al. are also DENIED. No further pleadings shall be entertained.
Let entry of judgment be made in due course. x x x
On May 14, 2009, respondent LGUs filed a Motion to Amend the Resolution
of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave
to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct
Further Proceedings Thereon.
Per its Resolution of June 2, 2009, the Court declared the May 14, 2009
motion adverted to as expunged in light of the entry of judgment made on
May 21, 2009. Justice Leonardo-De Castro, however, taking common cause
with Justice Bersamin to grant the motion for reconsideration of the April 28,
2009 Resolution and to recall the entry of judgment, stated the observation,
and with reason, that the entry was effected before the Court could act on
the aforesaid motion which was filed within the 15-day period counted from
receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution.[12]
Forthwith, respondent LGUs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of June 2, 2009 to which some of the petitioners and petitionersin-intervention filed their respective comments. The Court will now rule on
this incident. But first, we set and underscore some basic premises:
(1) The initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision, as
Justice Leonardo-De Castro noted, indeed raised new and substantial
issues, inclusive of the matter of the correctness of the factual premises
upon which the said decision was predicated. The 6-6 vote on the motion
for reconsideration per the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the
motion on the sole ground that the basic issues have already been passed
upon reflected a divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying
Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the basic issues
raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision;
(2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April 28,
2009 was precipitated by the tie vote which served as basis for the issuance
of said resolution. This May 14, 2009 motionwhich mainly argued that a tie
vote is inadequate to declare a law unconstitutional remains unresolved;
and
(3) Pursuant to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving the
constitutionality of a law shall be heard by the Court en banc and decided
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2,
2009 Resolution boils down to whether or not the required vote set forth in

It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the majority of
the Members contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution,
which requires that:
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, x x x shall
be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon. (Emphasis added.)
Webster defines majority as a number greater than half of a total.[13] In plain
language, this means 50% plus one. In Lambino v. Commission on
Elections, Justice, now Chief Justice, Puno, in a separate opinion,
expressed the view that a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority
and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value.[14]
As may be noted, the aforequoted Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched, exacts a
majority vote in the determination of a case involving the constitutionality of
a statute, without distinguishing whether such determination is made on the
main petition or thereafter on a motion for reconsideration. This is as it
should be, for, to borrow from the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco: x x x
[E]ven assuming x x x that the constitutional requirement on the
concurrence of the majority was initially reached in the x x x ponencia, the
same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for
reconsideration.[15]
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e.,
Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC, respectively,
providing that:
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is
equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the
case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision
is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed;
in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand
affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be
denied.
A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or
resolution of the Court En Banc or of a Division may be granted upon a vote
of a majority of the En Banc or of a Division, as the case may be, who
actually took part in the deliberation of the motion.

If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed

denied.
But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution,
the aforequoted provisions ought to be applied in conjunction with the
prescription of the Constitution that the cases shall be decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon. To
repeat, the last vote on the issue of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills
is that reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolutiona 6-6 deadlock.
On the postulate then that first, the finality of the November 18, 2008
Decision has yet to set in, the issuance of the precipitate [16] entry of
judgment notwithstanding, and second, the deadlocked vote on the second
motion for reconsideration did not definitely settle the constitutionality of the
cityhood laws, the Court is inclined to take another hard look at the
underlying decision. Without belaboring in their smallest details the
arguments for and against the procedural dimension of this disposition, it
bears to stress that the Court has the power to suspend its own rules when
the ends of justice would be served thereby.[17] In the performance of their
duties, courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which would result
in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are only tools crafted to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application must be
eschewed, if they result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a
rigid and technical application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When
a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the
rules is in order.[18] Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules
or excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher
interests of justice so require.[19]
While perhaps not on all fours with the case, because it involved a purely
business transaction, what the Court said in Chuidian v.
Sandiganbayan[20] is most apropos:
To reiterate what the Court has said in Ginete vs. Court of Appeals and
other cases, the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere instruments
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are not to be applied
with severity and rigidity when such application would clearly defeat the very
rationale for their conception and existence. Even the Rules of Court
reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules,
inclusive of the one-motion rule, can be so pervasive and compelling as to
alter even that which this Court has already declared to be final. The
peculiarities of this case impel us to do so now.
The Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009, as well as their May 14,
2009 motion to consider the second motion for reconsideration of the
November 18, 2008 Decision unresolved, and also grants said second
motion for reconsideration.
This brings us to the substantive aspect of the case.
The Undisputed Factual Antecedents in Brief
During the 11th Congress,[21] fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills were filed before
the House of Representatives.[22] Of the fifty-seven (57), thirty-three (33)
eventually became laws. The twenty-four (24) other bills were not acted
upon.
Later developments saw the introduction in the Senate of Senate Bill (S.
Bill) No. 2157[23] to amend Sec. 450 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The
proposed amendment sought to increase the income requirement to qualify
for conversion into a city from PhP 20 million average annual income to PhP
100 million locally generated income.

In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as RA 9009 to take
effect on June 30, 2001. As thus amended by RA 9009, Sec. 450 of the
LGC of 1991 now provides that [a] municipality x x x may be converted into
a component city if it has a [certified] locally generated average annual
income x x x of at least [PhP 100 million] for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 2000 constant prices.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12th Congress
adopted in July 2001 House (H.) Joint Resolution No. 29[24] which, as its title
indicated, sought to exempt from the income requirement prescribed in RA
9009 the 24 municipalities whose conversions into cities were not acted
upon during the previous Congress. The 12th Congress ended without the
Senate approving H. Joint Resolution No. 29.
Then came the 13th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which saw the
House of Representatives re-adopting H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as H.
Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarding it to the Senate for approval.
The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution. During
the Senate session held on November 6, 2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
Jr. asserted that passing H. Resolution No. 1 would, in net effect, allow a
wholesale exemption from the income requirement imposed under RA 9009
on the municipalities. For this reason, he suggested the filing by the House
of Representatives of individual bills to pave the way for the municipalities to
become cities and then forwarding them to the Senate for proper action.[25]
Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed, through their
respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Common to all 16 measures
was a provision exempting the municipality covered from the PhP 100
million income requirement.
As of June 7, 2007, both Houses of Congress had approved the individual
cityhood bills, all of which eventually lapsed into law on various dates. Each
cityhood law directs the COMELEC, within thirty (30) days from its approval,
to hold a plebiscite to determine whether the voters approve of the
conversion.
As earlier stated, the instant petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws
unconstitutional for violation of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, as well as
for violation of the equal-protection clause. The wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities, the petitioners bemoan, will reduce the share of
existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), since more cities will
partake of the internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of the
LGC of 1991.[26]
Petitioners-in-intervention, LPC members themselves, would later seek
leave and be allowed to intervene.
Aside from their basic plea to strike down as unconstitutional the cityhood
laws in question, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention collectively pray
that an order issue enjoining the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites in
the affected areas. An alternative prayer would urge the Court to restrain
the poll body from proclaiming the plebiscite results.
On July 24, 2007, the Court en banc resolved to consolidate the petitions
and the petitions-in-intervention. On March 11, 2008, it heard the parties in
oral arguments.
The Issues
In the main, the issues to which all others must yield pivot on whether or not
the cityhood laws violate (1) Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and (2) the
equal protection clause.
In the November 18, 2008 Decision granting the petitions, Justice Antonio
T. Carpio, for the Court, resolved the twin posers in the affirmative and

accordingly declared the cityhood laws unconstitutional, deviating as they

do from the uniform and non-discriminatory income criterion prescribed by
the LGC of 1991. In so doing, the ponencia veritably agreed with the
petitioners that the Constitution, in clear and unambiguous language,
requires that all the criteria for the creation of a city shall be embodied and
written in the LGC, and not in any other law.
After a circumspect reflection, the Court is disposed to reconsider.
Petitioners threshold posture, characterized by a strained interpretation of
the Constitution, if accorded cogency, would veritably curtail and cripple
Congress valid exercise of its authority to create political subdivisions.
By constitutional design[27] and as a matter of long-established principle, the
power to create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in
character.[28] But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by
law, create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a
province, city, or municipality. We said as much in the fairly recent
case, Sema v. CIMELEC.[29] The 1987 Constitution, under its Art. X, Sec.
10, nonetheless provides for the creation of LGUs, thus:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government codeand
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied.)
As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the
creation of political subdivisions in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code, subject to the approval of the
voters in the unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable
indicators of viability, i.e., area, population, and income, now set forth in
Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as amended by RA 9009. The petitioners
would parlay the thesis that these indicators or criteria must be written only
in the LGC and not in any other statute. Doubtless, the code they are
referring to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing their point, they conclude that the
cityhood laws that exempted the respondent LGUs from the income
standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the Constitution.
Petitioners posture does not persuade.
The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional
provision. Save for the use of the term barrio in lieu of barangay, may
be instead of shall, the change of the phrase unit or units topolitical
unit and the addition of the modifier directly to the word affected, the
aforesaid provision is a substantial reproduction of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the
1973 Constitution, which reads:
Section 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit
or units affected. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears notice, however, that the code similarly referred to in the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions is clearly but a law Congress enacted. This is consistent
with the aforementioned plenary power of Congress to create political units.
Necessarily, since Congress wields the vast poser of creating political
subdivisions, surely it can exercise the lesser authority of requiring a set of
criteria, standards, or ascertainable indicators of viability for their creation.
Thus, the only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the
clause in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other,
which can impose the criteria. The eminent constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., in his treatise on Constitutional Law, specifically on the subject
provision, explains:

Prior to 1965, there was a certain lack of clarity with regard to the power to
create, divide, merge, dissolve, or change the boundaries of municipal
corporations. The extent to which the executive may share in this power
was obscured by Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan.[30] Pelaez v.
Auditor General subsequently clarified the Cardona case when the
Supreme Court said that the authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature.[31] Pelaez, however, conceded that the
power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of
an administrative nature-involving as it does, the adoption of means and
ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities.[32] Pelaez was
silent about division, merger, and dissolution of municipal corporations. But
since division in effectcreates a new municipality, and both dissolution and
merger in effect abolish a legal creation, it may fairly be inferred that these
acts are also legislative in nature.
Section 10 [Art. X of the 1987 Constitution], which is a legacy from the 1973
Constitution, goes further than the doctrine in the Pelaez case. It not only
makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities x x x subject to criteria
established in the local government code, thereby declaring these actions
properly legislative, but it also makes creation, division, merger, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundaries subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. [33] x x x
(Emphasis added.)
It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution
speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or
codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991.[34] Be it noted that at the time
of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337,
the then LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the
LGC, then they would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would
then not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as
they did in Art. X, Sec. 3[35] of the Constitution.
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress
can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject
enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need
not be embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal
repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity.
Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law,
adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as
efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA
9009 upped the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million
to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws
is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically
exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier
mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively
decreased the already codified indicators.
Petitioners theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC
and not in any other law strikes the Court as illogical. For if we pursue their
contention to its logical conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying the new and
increased income criterion would, in a way, also suffer the vice of
unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that petitioners do not question
the constitutionality of RA 9009, as they in fact use said law as an argument
for the alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.
As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood laws, validly
decreased the income criterion vis--vis the respondent LGUs, but without
necessarily being unreasonably discriminatory, as shall be discussed
shortly, by reverting to the PhP 20 million threshold what it earlier raised

to PhP 100 million. The legislative intent not to subject respondent LGUs to
the more stringent requirements of RA 9009 finds expression in the
following uniform provision of the cityhood laws:

statement regarding the basis for the proposed increase from PhP 20
million to PhP 100 million in the income requirement for municipalities
wanting to be converted into cities, viz:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The City of x x x shall be exempted
from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.

Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be

included in the whole set of proposed amendments that we have introduced
to precisely amend the [LGC]. However, it is a fact that there is a mad rush
of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities. Whereas in 1991,
when the [LGC] was approved, there were only 60 cities, today the number
has increased to 85 cities, with 41 more municipalities applying for
conversion x x x. At the rate we are going, I am apprehensive that
before long this nation will be a nation of all cities and no
municipalities.

In any event, petitioners constitutional objection would still be untenable

even if we were to assume purely ex hypothesi the correctness of their
underlying thesis, viz: that the conversion of a municipality to a city shall be
in accordance with, among other things, the income criterion set forth in the
LGC of 1991, and in no other; otherwise, the conversion is invalid. We shall
explain.
Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of
contention, the Court finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less,
intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from
the PhP 100 million income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws,
which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final
analysis, to the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. We shall now proceed
to discuss this exemption angle.[36]
Among the criteria established in the LGC pursuant to Sec.10, Art. X of the
1987 Constitution are those detailed in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 under
the heading Requisites for Creation. The section sets the minimum income
qualifying bar before a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
considered for cityhood. Originally, Sec. 164 of BP 337 imposed an average
regular annual income of at least ten million pesos for the last three
consecutive years as a minimum income standard for a municipal-to-city
conversion. The LGC that BP 337 established was superseded by the LGC
of 1991 whose then Sec. 450 provided that [a] municipality or cluster
of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average
annual income, x x x of at least twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for
at least two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices x x x. RA
9009 in turn amended said Sec. 450 by further increasing the income
requirement to PhP 100 million, thus:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster
of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally
generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at leastOne Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the
last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it
has either of the following requisites:
xxxx
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income. (Emphasis supplied.)
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in
which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis[37] or strictly
literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to
inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice.[38] To obviate this aberration,
and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the
law itself,[39] resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its
letter.[40]
It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical
inferences derivable therefrom assume relevancy in discovering legislative
intent.[41]
The rationale behind the enactment of RA 9009 to amend Sec. 450 of the
LGC of 1991 can reasonably be deduced from Senator Pimentels
sponsorship speech on S. Bill No. 2157. Of particular significance is his

It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among other
things, that the financial requirement, which, under the [LGC], is fixed
at P20 million, be raised to P100 million to enable a municipality to have the
right to be converted into a city, and the P100 million should be sourced
from locally generated funds.
Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, of
the pendency of several bills on cityhood, wherein the applying
municipalities were qualified under the then obtaining PhP 20 millionincome threshold. These included respondent LGUs. Thus, equally
noteworthy is the ensuing excerpts from the floor exchange between then
Senate President Franklin Drilon and Senator Pimentel, the latter stopping
short of saying that the income threshold of PhP 100 million under S. Bill
No. 2157 would not apply to municipalities that have pending cityhood bills,
thus:
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point. x
xx
THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the
Senate which propose the conversion of a number of municipalities into
cities and which qualify under the present standard.
We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill
becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the standard as proposed in this bill
to those bills which are pending for consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL, Mr. President, it might not be fair to make this bill x
x x [if] approved, retroact to the bills that are pending in the Senate for
conversion from municipalities to cities.
THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to reflect
that view? Or does it not become a policy of the Chamber, assuming that
this bill becomes a law x x x that it will apply to those bills which are already
approved by the House under the old version of the [LGC] and are now
pending in the Senate? The Chair does not know if we can craft a language
which will limit the application to those which are not yet in the Senate. Or is
that a policy that the Chamber will adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is
necessary to put that provision because what we are saying here will form
part of the interpretation of this bill. Besides, if there is no retroactivity
clause, I do not think that the bill would have any retroactive effect.
THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which are
already pending in the Chamber will not be affected.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr.
President.[42] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
What the foregoing Pimental-Drilon exchange eloquently indicates are the
following complementary legislative intentions: (1) the then pending
cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement

of PhP 100 million that S. Bill No. 2159 proposes; and (2) RA 9009 would
not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned.

This brings us to the challenge to the constitutionality of cityhood laws on

equal protection grounds.

Given the foregoing perspective, it is not amiss to state that the basis for the
inclusion of the exemption clause of the cityhood laws is the clearcut intent of Congress of not according retroactive effect to RA 9009. Not
only do the congressional records bear the legislative intent of exempting
the cityhood laws from the income requirement of PhP 100 million.
Congress has now made its intention to exempt expressin the challenged
cityhood laws.

To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment to

respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption from the
standard PhP 100 million minimum income requirement, violate Sec.1, Art.
III of the Constitution, which in part provides that no person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws.

Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in
interpreting a statute. In construing a statute, the proper course is to start
out and follow the true intent of the Legislature and to adopt the sense that
best harmonizes with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the
policy and objects of the legislature.[43] In fact, any interpretation that runs
counter to the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid. [44] Torres v.
Limjap could not have been more precise:
The intent of a Statute is the Law. If a statute is valid, it is to have effect
according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is x x x the
essence of the law and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain
and give effect to that intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a
law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it
may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not
follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and
purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative
enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and
follow the true intent of the legislature x x x.[45] (Emphasis supplied.)
As emphasized at the outset, behind every law lies the presumption of
constitutionality.[46] Consequently, to him who would assert the
unconstitutionality of a statute belongs the burden of proving
otherwise.Laws will only be declared invalid if a conflict with the Constitution
is beyond reasonable doubt.[47] Unfortunately for petitioners and petitionersin-intervention, they failed to discharge their heavy burden.
It is contended that the deliberations on the cityhood bills and the covering
joint resolution were undertaken in the 11th and/or the 12th Congress.
Accordingly, so the argument goes, such deliberations, more particularly
those on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain
municipalities, are without significance and would not qualify as extrinsic
aids in construing the cityhood laws that were passed during the
13th Congress, Congress not being a continuing body.
The argument is specious and glosses over the reality that the cityhood
billswhich were already being deliberated upon even perhaps before the
conception of RA 9009were again being considered during the
13th Congress after being tossed around in the two previous Congresses.
And specific reference to the cityhood bills was also made during the
deliberations on RA 9009. At the end of the day, it is really immaterial if
Congress is not a continuing legislative body. What is important is that the
debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress and the steps taken in
the enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in relation to RA
9009 or vice versa, were part of its legislative history and may be consulted,
if appropriate, as aids in the interpretation of the law.[48] And of course the
earlier cited Drilon-Pimentel exchange on whether or not the 16
municipalities in question would be covered by RA 9009 is another vital link
to the historical chain of the cityhood bills. This and other proceedings on
the bills are spread in the Congressional journals, which cannot be
conveniently reduced to pure rhetoric without meaning whatsoever, on the
simplistic and non-sequitur pretext that Congress is not a continuing body
and that unfinished business in either chamber is deemed terminated at the
end of the term of Congress.

Petitioners challenge is not well taken. At its most basic, the equal
protection clause proscribes undue favor as well as hostile discrimination.
Hence, a law need not operate with equal force on all persons or things to
be conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution.
The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic
concept of due process, every unfair discrimination being an offense against
the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a
separate clause in Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution to provide for a more
specific protection against any undue discrimination or antagonism from
government. Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on the basis of the
due process clause. But if a particular challenged act partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
equal protection clause.[49] This constitutional protection extends to all
persons, natural or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial
persons, as the respondent LGUs herein, are, however, entitled to
protection only insofar as their property is concerned.[50]
In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot
plausibly invoke the equal protection clause, precisely because no
deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood
laws. The LCPs claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially
reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs
would not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee.
Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities to already
stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be
allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities that are not covered by
the uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke
constitutional protection. For, at this point, the conversion of a municipality
into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as
such.
As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal
protection does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or
privileges conferred and responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal
protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting
upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that
inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify,[51] necessarily
implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based
on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not
be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members
of the same class.[52] The Court finds that all these requisites have been met
by the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal
protection clause.
As things stand, the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen (16)
municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction. Indeed,
respondent LGUs, which are subjected only to the erstwhile PhP 20 million
income criterion instead of the stringent income requirement prescribed in
RA 9009, are substantially different from other municipalities desirous to be
cities. Looking back, we note that respondent LGUs had pending cityhood
bills before the passage of RA 9009. There lies part of the tipping
difference. And years before the enactment of the amendatory RA 9009,
respondents LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted for
cityhood under the LGC of 1991. Due to extraneous circumstances,
however, the bills for their conversion remained unacted upon by Congress.

As aptly observed by then Senator, now Manila Mayor, Alfredo Lim in his
speech sponsoring H. Joint Resolution No. 1, or the cityhood bills,
respondent LGUs saw themselves confronted with the changing of the
rules in the middle of the game. Some excerpts of Senator Lims
sponsorship speech:
x x x [D]uring the Eleventh Congress, fifty-seven (57) municipalities applied
for city status, confident that each has met the requisites for conversion
under Section 450 of the [LGC], particularly the income threshold ofP20
million. Of the 57 that filed, thirty-two (32) were enacted into law; x x x while
the rest twenty-four (24) in all failed to pass through Congress. Shortly
before the long recess of Congress in February 2001, to give way to the
May elections x x x, Senate Bill No. 2157, which eventually became [RA]
9009, was passed into law, effectively raising the income requirement for
creation of cities to a whooping P100 million x x x. Much as the
proponents of the 24 cityhood bills then pending struggled to beat the
effectivity of the law on June 30, 2001, events that then unfolded were
swift and overwhelming that Congress just did not have the time to act
on the measures.
Some of these intervening events were x x x the impeachment of
President Estrada x x x and the May 2001 elections.
The imposition of a much higher income requirement for the creation of a
city x x x was unfair; like any sport changing the rules in the middle of the
game.
Undaunted, they came back during the [12th] Congress x x x. They filed
House Joint Resolution No. 29 seeking exemption from the higher income
requirement of RA 9009. For the second time, [however], time ran out
from them.
For many of the municipalities whose Cityhood Bills are now under
consideration, this year, at the closing days of the [13th] Congress, marks
their ninth year appealing for fairness and justice. x x x
I, for one, share their view that fairness dictates that they should be given a
legal remedy by which they could be allowed to prove that they have all the
necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the
[LGC] prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Hence, when House Joint
Resolution No. 1 reached the Senate x x x I immediately set the public
hearing x x x. On July 25, 2006, I filed Committee Report No. 84 x x x. On
September 6, I delivered the sponsorship x x x.
x x x By November 14, the measure had reverted to the period of individual
amendments. This was when the then acting majority leader, x x x informed
the Body that Senator Pimentel and the proponents of House Joint
Resolution No. 1 have agreed to the proposal of the Minority Leader for the
House to first approve the individual Cityhood Bills of the qualified
municipalities, along with the provision exempting each of them from the
higher income requirement of RA 9009. x x x This led to the certification
issued by the proponents short-listing fourteen (14) municipalities deemed
to be qualified for city-status.
Acting on the suggestion of Senator Pimentel, the proponents lost no time in
working for the approval by the House of Representatives of their individual
Cityhood Bills, each containing a provision of exemption from the higher
income requirement of RA 9009. On the last session day of last year,
December 21, the House transmitted to the Senate the Cityhood Bills of
twelve out of the 14 pre-qualified municipalities. Your Committee
immediately conducted the public hearing x x x.
The whole process I enumerated [span] three Congresses x x x.
In essence, the Cityhood Bills now under consideration will have the same
effect as that of House Joint Resolution No. 1 because each of the 12 bills

seeks exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. The

proponents are invoking the exemption on the basis of justice and
fairness.
Each of the 12 municipalities has all the requisites for conversion into
a component city based on the old requirements set forth under
Section 450 of the [LGC], prior to its amendment by RA 9009, namely: x
x x[53] (Emphasis supplied.)
In hindsight, the peculiar conditions, as depicted in Senator Lims speech,
which respondent LGUs found themselves in were unsettling. They were
qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 009. Because of
events they had absolutely nothing to do with, a spoiler in the form of RA
9009 supervened. Now, then, to impose on them the much higher income
requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be
indeed unfair, to borrow from Senator Lim. Thus, the imperatives of
fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they
would be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for
city status, using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its
amendment by RA 9009. Truly, the peculiar conditions of respondent LGUs,
which are actual and real, provide sufficient grounds for legislative
classification.
To be sure, courts, regardless of doubts they might be entertaining, cannot
question the wisdom of the congressional classification, if reasonable, or the
motivation underpinning the classification.[54] By the same token, they do not
sit to determine the propriety or efficacy of the remedies Congress has
specifically chosen to extend. That is its prerogative. The power of the
Legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is, to
reiterate, neither curtailed nor denied by the equal protection clause. A law
can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is
without reasonable basis.
The classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The
exemption of respondent LGUs/municipalities from the PhP 100 million
income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality occasioned by the
passage of the amendatory RA 9009. From another perspective, the
exemption was unquestionably designed to insure that fairness and justice
would be accorded respondent LGUs. Let it be noted that what were then
the cityhood bills covering respondent LGUs were part and parcel of the
original 57 conversion bills filed in the 11th Congress, 33 of those became
laws before the adjournment of that Congress. The then bills of the
challenged cityhood laws were not acted upon due, inter alia, to the
impeachment of then President Estrada, the related jueteng scandal
investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the
aborted impeachment.
While the equal protection guarantee frowns upon the creation of a
privileged class without justification, inherent in the equality clause is the
exhortation for the Legislature to pass laws promoting equality or reducing
existing inequalities. The enactment of the cityhood laws was in a real
sense an attempt on the part of Congress to address the inequity dealt the
respondent LGUs. These laws positively promoted the equality and
eliminated the inequality, doubtless unintended, between respondent
municipalities and the thirty-three (33) other municipalities whose cityhood
bills were enacted during the 11th Congress. Respondent municipalities and
the 33 other municipalities, which had already been elevated to city status,
were all found to be qualified under the old Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991
during the 11thCongress. As such, both respondent LGUs and the 33 other
former municipalities are under like circumstances and conditions. There is,
thus, no rhyme or reason why an exemption from the PhP 100 million
requirement cannot be given to respondent LGUs. Indeed, to deny
respondent LGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to
the 33 other municipalities when, at the outset they were similarly situated,
is tantamount to denying the former the protective mantle of the equal
protection clause. In effect, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention are

creating an absurd situation in which an alleged violation of the equal

protection clause of the Constitution is remedied by another violation of the
same clause. The irony is not lost to the Court.

substantially distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for

cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP 20 million income
level exacted under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.

Then too the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 is not limited in application

only to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply
for all time, as long as the contemplated conditions obtain. To be more
precise, the legislative intent underlying the enactment of RA 9009 to
exclude would-be-cities from the PhP 100 million criterion would hold sway,
as long as the corresponding cityhood bill has been filed before the
effectivity of RA 9009 and the concerned municipality qualifies for
conversion into a city under the original version of Sec. 450 of the LGC of
1991.

And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional.
As we see it, petitioners have not overturned the presumptive
constitutionality of the laws in question.

Viewed in its proper light, the common exemption clause in the cityhood
laws is an application of the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 on the
cityhood bills. It is not a declaration of certain rights, but a mere declaration
of prior qualification and/or compliance with the non-retroactive effect of RA
9009.
Lastly and in connection with the third requisite, the uniform exemption
clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before
the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC
of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of PhP 20 million. It is
hard to imagine, however, if there are still municipalities out there belonging
in context to the same class as the sixteen (16) respondent LGUs.
Municipalities that cannot claim to belong to the same class as the 16
cannot seek refuge in the cityhood laws. The former have to comply with the
PhP 100 million income requirement imposed by RA 9009.
A final consideration. The existence of the cities consequent to the approval
of the creating, but challenged, cityhood laws in the plebiscites held in the
affected LGUs is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been
organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and
employees. Other resulting events need not be enumerated. The operative
fact doctrine provides another reason for upholding the constitutionality of
the cityhood laws in question.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court ought to abandon as it hereby
abandons and sets aside the Decision of November 18, 2008 subject of
reconsideration. And by way of summing up the main arguments in support
of this disposition, the Court hereby declares the following:

(1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009
to apply to the cityhood bills which became the cityhood laws in question. In
other words, Congress intended the subject cityhood laws to be exempted
from the income requirement of PhP 100 million prescribed by RA 9009;
(2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450
of the LGC of 1991, to exempt respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million
income requirement;
(3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th
Congress. It is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing body. The
hearings and deliberations during the 11th and 12th Congress may still be
used as extrinsic reference inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which were
filed before the passage of RA 9009 were being considered during the
13th Congress. Courts may fall back on the history of a law, as here, as
extrinsic aid of statutory construction if the literal application of the law
results in absurdity or injustice.
(4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that
each had pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that

WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2,

2009, their Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring
Instead that Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of
March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008
Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings, dated May 14,
2009, and their second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated
November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009,
and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry
of judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED.
The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention
are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390,
9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435,
9436, and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.

April 24, 2010

CARPIO, J.:
For resolution are (1) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration and (2)
motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009 filed by petitioners
League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. and (3) the ad cautelam motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago
City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City.
On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote,
struck down the subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. On 31 March
2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the
respondents' first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the
Supreme Court En Banc, by asplit vote, denied the respondents' second
motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the 18 November 2008 Decision
became final and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the Book of
Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.
However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without
any exceptional and compelling reason, the Court En Banc unprecedentedly
reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality
of the Cityhood Laws in the Decision of 21 December 2009.
Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for reconsideration
meritorious and accordingly reinstates the 18 November 2008 Decision
declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.
A. Violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow
the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any
other law. There is only one Local Government Code.[1] The Constitution
requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria
necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law,
like the Cityhood Laws.
The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and
other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory
criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or
deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase
the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a
city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment
the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to
become a city must satisfy the P100 million income
requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by
RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent
municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress
when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the
increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently
unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.
RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. Section 1
of RA 9009 pertinently provides: "Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is hereby
amended to read as follows: x x x." RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the
Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450
of the Local Government Code. Considering the Legislature's primary
intent to curtail "the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into
cities," RA 9009 increased the income requirement for the creation of
cities. To repeat, RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government
Code, as it expressly amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
The language of RA 9009 is plain, simple, and clear. Nothing is unintelligible
or ambiguous; not a single word or phrase admits of two or more
meanings. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 by increasing the income requirement for the creation of cities.
There are no exemptions from this income requirement. Since the law is
clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a
city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go
beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where the law does not make an
exemption, the Court should not create one.[2]
B. Operative Fact Doctrine
Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional
but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity,
may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the
invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is
unconstitutional.
However, the minority's novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is
that the enactment of the Cityhood Laws and the functioning of the 16
municipalities as new cities with new sets of officials and

employees operate to contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood

Laws. This novel theory misapplies the operative fact doctrine and sets a
gravely dangerous precedent.
Under the minority's novel theory, an unconstitutional law, if already
implemented prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court, can
no longer be revoked and its implementation must be continued despite
being unconstitutional. This view will open the floodgates to the wanton
enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate
implementation before the Court can declare them unconstitutional. This
view is an open invitation to serially violate the Constitution, and be quick
about it, lest the violation be stopped by the Court.
The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied
as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law
produces no effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional
an unconstitutional act. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil
Corporation,[3]the Court stated:
The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no
rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal
effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed.
Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be
refunded in accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust
enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule,
only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of
an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute
prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will
impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus,
it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts
done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. (Emphasis
supplied)
The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an
unconstitutional law.Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional
law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law,
prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter
of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or
modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional
law itself.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood
Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the
Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the
payment of salaries and supplies by the "new cities" or their issuance of
licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective.
This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain
void. Only the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional laws
are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people
who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to
the Court's declaration of their unconstitutionality.
C. Equal Protection Clause

banc."
As the Court held in the 18 November 2008 Decision, there is no substantial
distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference
to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income
requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does
not affect or determine the level of income of a
municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have
pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally
related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable
municipalities from converting into cities.
Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits
the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA
9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates
the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to
existing conditions only. In fact, the minority concedes that "the
conditions (pendency of the cityhood bills) adverted to can no longer be
repeated."
Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16
municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date the filing
of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress - as against all
other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA
9009.
In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities
cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.
Clearly, as worded, the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws,
even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would
still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
D. Tie-Vote on a Motion for Reconsideration
Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. - Where the court en
banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had,
the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no
decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be
dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall
stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall
be denied. (Emphasis supplied)
The En Banc Resolution of 26 January 1999 in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, reads:
A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR
RESOLUTION OF THE COURTEN BANC OR OF A DIVISION MAY BE
GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF
THE EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO
ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION.
IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED. (Emphasis supplied)
The clear and simple language of the clarificatory en banc Resolution
requires no further explanation. If the voting of the Court en banc results in
a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. The Court's prior
majority action on the main decision stands affirmed.[4]This clarificatory
Resolution applies to all cases heard by the Court en banc, which
includes not only cases involving the constitutionality of a law, but also, as
expressly stated in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, "all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en

The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for
reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for
reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no
reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in
any court order or directive.[5] The judgment stands in full
force.[6] Undeniably, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior
majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior
majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying
reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is
not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior
decision. Here, the tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to
overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009
Resolution, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied.
Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not mean
that the present cases were left undecided because there remain the
Decision of 18 November 2008 and the Resolution of 31 March 2009 where
a majority of the Court en banc concurred in declaring the unconstitutionality
of the sixteen Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision
and the 31 March 2009 Resolution, which were both reached with the
concurrence of a majority of the Court en banc, are not reconsidered
but stand affirmed.[7] These prior majority actions of the Courten
banc can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote
because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative action.
The denial, by a split vote, of the second motion for
reconsideration inevitably rendered the 18 November 2008 Decision
final. In fact, in its Resolution of 28 April 2009, denying the second motion
for reconsideration, the Court en banc reiterated that no further pleadings
shall be entertained and stated that entry of judgment be made in due
course.
The dissenting opinion stated that "a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority
and a non-majority does not constitute a rule with precedential value."[8]
Indeed, a tie-vote is a non-majority - a non-majority which cannot overrule a
prior affirmative action, that is the 18 November 2008 Decision striking
down the Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision stands
affirmed. And assuming a non-majority lacks any precedential value, the 18
November 2008 Decision, which was unreversed as a result of the tie-vote
on the respondents' second motion for reconsideration, nevertheless
remains binding on the parties.[9]
Conclusion
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that "no x x x
city shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code." This provision can only be
interpreted in one way, that is, all the criteria for the creation of cities must
be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code. In this case, the
Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local
Government Code, provided an exemption from the increased income
requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws
contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
does not cripple Congress' power to make laws. In fact, Congress is not
prohibited from amending the Local Government Code itself, as what
Congress did by enacting RA 9009. Indisputably, the act of amending laws
comprises an integral part of the Legislature's law-making power. The
unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress
provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution
that "[n]o x x x city x x x shall be created except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code." In other words,

Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the

challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the motions for reconsideration of the 21
December 2009 Decision andREINSTATE the 18 November 2008 Decision
declaring UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act
Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408,
9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
We NOTE petitioners' motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, Brion, Peralta, Villarama, Jr.,
Mendoza, and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Corona, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Abad, and Perez, JJ.,
joins the dissent of J. Velasco, Jr.
Nachura and Del Castillo, JJ., no part.
G.R. No. 176951
February 15, 2011
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), Represented by LCP
National President Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by
Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal
capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Baybay, Province of
Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu; Municipality of
Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag,
Province of Surigao del Sur; Municipality of Borongan, Province of
Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of
Quezon, Respondents.
x -x
G.R. No. 177499
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), Represented by LCP
National President Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by
Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal
capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of
Basilan; Municipality of Tabuk, Province of Kalinga; Municipality of
Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province
of Ilocos Norte; Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental; and
Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of Negros Oriental, Respondents.
x -x
G.R. No. 178056
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), Represented by LCP
National President Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by
Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal
capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province
of Agusan del Norte; Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu;
Municipality of El Salvador, Province of Misamis Oriental; Municipality
of Naga, Cebu; and Department of Budget and
Management, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For consideration of this Court are the following pleadings:
1. Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010
dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of
Baybay, et al.; and
2. Opposition [To the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
August 24, 2010].
Meanwhile, respondents also filed on September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010 for
Hearing. This motion was, however, already denied by the Court En Banc.

A brief background
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed
by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of
Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen
(16) laws,1 each converting the municipality covered thereby into a
component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject
laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5
vote,2 granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as
unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal
protection clause.
In the Resolution dated March 31, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a 7-5
vote,3 denied the first motion for reconsideration.
On April 28, 2009, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution, with a vote of 66,4 which denied the second motion for reconsideration for being a
prohibited pleading.
In its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court En Banc clarified its April 28, 2009
Resolution in this wise
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that: No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution by the same party shall be entertained. Thus, a decision
becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the
first motion for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for
reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court therefore allows the filing
of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion
for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed the
filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for
reconsideration was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of
the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2008 Decision
and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for
reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.5
Then, in another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by
a vote of 6-4,6 declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of
7-6,7 resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to
Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009, both filed by petitioners, and the
Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention
Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and
Oroquieta City, reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision. Hence, the
aforementioned pleadings.
Considering these circumstances where the Court En Banc has twice
changed its position on the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws, and
especially taking note of the novelty of the issues involved in these cases,
the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010
deserves favorable action by this Court on the basis of the following cogent
points:
1.
The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution.
Article X, Section 10 provides
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
The tenor of the ponencias of the November 18, 2008 Decision and the
August 24, 2010 Resolution is that the exemption clauses in the 16
Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional because they are not written in the
Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), particularly Section 450 thereof, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009, which took effect on June 30,
2001, viz.

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. a) A municipality or a cluster of

barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally
generated annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at
least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for at least two (2)
consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:
xxxx
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income. (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at
least P20,000,000.00 for the last two (2) consecutive years, based on 1991
constant prices.
Before Senate Bill No. 2157, now R.A. No. 9009, was introduced by Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, there were 57 bills filed for conversion of 57
municipalities into component cities. During the 11th Congress (June 1998June 2001), 33 of these bills were enacted into law, while 24 remained as
pending bills. Among these 24 were the 16 municipalities that were
converted into component cities through the Cityhood Laws.
The rationale for the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 can be gleaned from the
sponsorship speech of Senator Pimentel on Senate Bill No. 2157, to wit
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be included
in the whole set of proposed amendments that we have introduced to
precisely amend the Local Government Code. However, it is a fact that
there is a mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities.
Whereas in 1991, when the Local Government was approved, there were
only 60 cities, today the number has increased to 85 cities, with 41 more
municipalities applying for conversion to the same status. At the rate we are
going, I am apprehensive that before long this nation will be a nation of all
cities and no municipalities.
It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among other
things, that the financial requirement, which, under the Local Government
Code, is fixed at P20 million, be raised to P100 million to enable a
municipality to have the right to be converted into a city, and the P100
million should be sourced from locally generated funds.
What has been happening, Mr. President, is, the municipalities aspiring to
become cities say that they qualify in terms of financial requirements by
incorporating the Internal Revenue share of the taxes of the nation on to
their regularly generated revenue. Under that requirement, it looks clear to
me that practically all municipalities in this country would qualify to become
cities.
It is precisely for that reason, therefore, that we are seeking the approval of
this Chamber to amend, particularly Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160,
the requisite for the average annual income of a municipality to be
converted into a city or cluster of barangays which seek to be converted into
a city, raising that revenue requirement from P20 million to P100 million for
the last two consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices.8
While R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was well aware
of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those
covered by the Cityhood Laws, desiring to become component cities which
qualified under the P20 million income requirement of the old Section 450 of
the LGC. The interpellation of Senate President Franklin Drilon of Senator
Pimentel is revealing, thus
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the Senate
which propose the conversion of a number of municipalities into cities and
which qualify under the present standard.
We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill
becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the standard as proposed in this bill
to those bills which are pending for consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, it might not be fair to make this bill,
on the assumption that it is approved, retroact to the bills that are pending in
the Senate conversion from municipalities to cities.

THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to reflect

that view? Or does it not become a policy of the Chamber, assuming that
this bill becomes a law tomorrow, that it will apply to those bills which are
already approved by the House under the old version of the Local
Government Code and are now pending in the Senate? The Chair does not
know if we can craft a language which will limit the application to those
which are not yet in the Senate. Or is that a policy that the Chamber will
adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is
necessary to put that provision because what we are saying here will form
part of the interpretation of this bill. Besides, if there is no retroactivity
clause, I do not think that the bill would have any retroactive effect.
THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which are
already pending in the Chamber will not be affected.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. Thank you Mr. Chairman.9
Clearly, based on the above exchange, Congress intended that those with
pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered by
the new and higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A.
No. 9009. When the LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment
carried with it both the letter and the intent of the law, and such were
incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws was
gauged.
Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the
pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC,
as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress,
when the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the
individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to
exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange between then Senate
President Drilon and Senator Pimentel, it cannot be denied that Congress
saw the wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from complying
with the higher income requirement imposed by the amendatory R.A. No.
9009. Indeed, these municipalities have proven themselves viable and
capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. It is also
acknowledged that they were centers of trade and commerce, points of
convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and
other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In this regard, it is
worthy to mention the distinctive traits of each respondent municipality,
viz
Batac, Ilocos Norte It is the biggest municipality of the 2nd District of
Ilocos Norte, 2nd largest and most progressive town in the province of
Ilocos Norte and the natural convergence point for the neighboring towns to
transact their commercial ventures and other daily activities. A growing
metropolis, Batac is equipped with amenities of modern living like banking
institutions, satellite cable systems, telecommunications systems. Adequate
roads, markets, hospitals, public transport systems, sports, and
entertainment facilities. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5941,
introduced by Rep. Imee R. Marcos.]
El Salvador, Misamis Oriental It is located at the center of the CagayanIligan Industrial Corridor and home to a number of industrial companies and
corporations. Investment and financial affluence of El Salvador is aptly
credited to its industrious and preserving people. Thus, it has become the
growing investment choice even besting nearby cities and municipalities. It
is home to Asia Brewery as distribution port of their product in Mindanao.
The Gokongwei Group of Companies is also doing business in the area. So,
the conversion is primarily envisioned to spur economic and financial
prosperity to this coastal place in North-Western Misamis Oriental.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 6003, introduced by Rep. Augusto H.
Bacullo.]
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte It is the largest of the eleven (11)
municipalities in the province of Agusan del Norte. It plays strategic
importance to the administrative and socio-economic life and development
of Agusan del Norte. It is the foremost in terms of trade, commerce, and
industry. Hence, the municipality was declared as the new seat and capital
of the provincial government of Agusan del Norte pursuant to Republic Act

No. 8811 enacted into law on August 16, 2000. Its conversion will certainly
promote, invigorate, and reinforce the economic potential of the province in
establishing itself as an agro-industrial center in the Caraga region and
accelerate the development of the area. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
3094, introduced by Rep. Ma. Angelica Rosedell M. Amante.]
Borongan, Eastern Samar It is the capital town of Eastern Samar and the
development of Eastern Samar will depend to a certain degree of its
urbanization. It will serve as a catalyst for the modernization and progress of
adjacent towns considering the frequent interactions between the populace.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 2640, introduced by Rep. Marcelino C.
Libanan.]
Lamitan, Basilan Before Basilan City was converted into a separate
province, Lamitan was the most progressive part of the city. It has been for
centuries the center of commerce and the seat of the Sultanate of the
Yakan people of Basilan. The source of its income is agro-industrial and
others notably copra, rubber, coffee and host of income generating
ventures. As the most progressive town in Basilan, Lamitan continues to be
the center of commerce catering to the municipalities of Tuburan, Tipo-Tipo
and Sumisip. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5786, introduced by Rep.
Gerry A. Salapuddin.]
Catbalogan, Samar It has always been the socio-economic-political
capital of the Island of Samar even during the Spanish era. It is the seat of
government of the two congressional districts of Samar. Ideally located at
the crossroad between Northern and Eastern Samar, Catbalogan also hosts
trade and commerce activates among the more prosperous cities of the
Visayas like Tacloban City, Cebu City and the cities of Bicol region. The
numerous banks and telecommunication facilities showcases the healthy
economic environment of the municipality. The preeminent and sustainable
economic situation of Catbalogan has further boosted the call of residents
for a more vigorous involvement of governance of the municipal government
that is inherent in a city government. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
2088, introduced by Rep. Catalino V. Figueroa.]
Bogo, Cebu Bogo is very qualified for a city in terms of income, population
and area among others. It has been elevated to the Hall of Fame being a
five-time winner nationwide in the clean and green program. [Explanatory
Note of House Bill No. 3042, introduced by Rep. Clavel A. Martinez.]
Tandag, Surigao del Sur This over 350 year old capital town the province
has long sought its conversion into a city that will pave the way not only for
its own growth and advancement but also help in the development of its
neighboring municipalities and the province as a whole. Furthermore, it can
enhance its role as the provinces trade, financial and government center.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5940, introduced by Rep. Prospero A.
Pichay, Jr.]
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur It is a first class municipality and the biggest in
terms of population in the entire province. It has the most progressive and
thickly populated area among the 14 municipalities that comprise the
province. Thus, it has become the center for trade and commerce in Agusan
del Sur. It has a more developed infrastructure and facilities than other
municipalities in the province. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 1899,
introduced by Rep. Rodolfo Ompong G. Plaza.]
Carcar, Cebu Through the years, Carcar metamorphosed from rural to
urban and now boast of its manufacturing industry, agricultural farming,
fishing and prawn industry and its thousands of large and small commercial
establishments contributing to the bulk of economic activities in the
municipality. Based on consultation with multi-sectoral groups, political and
non-government agencies, residents and common folk in Carcar, they
expressed their desire for the conversion of the municipality into a
component city. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3990, introduced by
Rep. Eduardo R. Gullas.]
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental Its population is second highest in the
province, next only to the provincial capital and higher than Canlaon City
and Bais City. Agriculture contributes heavily to its economy. There are very
good prospects in agricultural production brought about by its favorable
climate. It has also the Tanon Strait that provides a good fishing ground for
its numerous fishermen. Its potential to grow commercially is certain. Its
strategic location brought about by its existing linkage networks and the

major transportation corridors traversing the municipality has established

Guihulngan as the center of commerce and trade in this part of Negros
Oriental with the first congressional district as its immediate area of
influence. Moreover, it has beautiful tourist spots that are being availed of
by local and foreign tourists. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3628,
introduced by Rep. Jacinto V. Paras.]
Tayabas, Quezon It flourished and expanded into an important politicocultural center in [the] Tagalog region. For 131 years (1179-1910), it served
as the cabecera of the province which originally carried the cabeceras own
name, Tayabas. The locality is rich in culture, heritage and trade. It was at
the outset one of the more active centers of coordination and delivery of
basic, regular and diverse goods and services within the first district of
Quezon Province. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3348, introduced by
Rep. Rafael P. Nantes.]
Tabuk, Kalinga It not only serves as the main hub of commerce and trade,
but also the cultural center of the rich customs and traditions of the different
municipalities in the province. For the past several years, the income of
Tabuk has been steadily increasing, which is an indication that its economy
is likewise progressively growing. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3068,
introduced by Rep. Laurence P. Wacnang.]
Available information on Baybay, Leyte; Mati, Davao Oriental; and Naga,
Cebu shows their economic viability, thus:
Covering an area of 46,050 hectares, Baybay [Leyte] is composed of 92
barangays, 23 of which are in the poblacion. The remaining 69 are rural
barangays. Baybay City is classified as a first class city. It is situated on the
western coast of the province of Leyte. It has a Type 4 climate, which is
generally wet. Its topography is generally mountainous in the eastern
portion as it slopes down west towards the shore line. Generally an
agricultural city, the common means of livelihood are farming and fishing.
Some are engaged in hunting and in forestall activities. The most common
crops grown are rice, corn, root crops, fruits, and vegetables. Industries
operating include the Specialty Products Manufacturing, Inc. and the
Visayan Oil Mill. Various cottage industries can also be found in the city
such as bamboo and rattan craft, ceramics, dress-making, fiber craft, food
preservation, mat weaving, metal craft, fine Philippine furniture
manufacturing and other related activities. Baybay has great potential as a
tourist destination, especially for tennis players. It is not only rich in
biodiversity and history, but it also houses the campus of the Visayas State
University (formerly the Leyte State University/Visayas State College of
Agriculture/Visayas Agricultural College/Baybay National Agricultural
School/Baybay Agricultural High School and the Jungle Valley Park.)
Likewise, it has river systems fit for river cruising, numerous caves for
spelunking, forests, beaches, and marine treasures. This richness, coupled
with the friendly Baybayanos, will be an element of a successful tourism
program. Considering the role of tourism in development, Baybay City
intends to harness its tourism potential.
(<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baybay City> visited September 19, 2008)
Mati [Davao Oriental] is located on the eastern part of the island of
Mindanao. It is one hundred sixty-five (165) kilometers away from Davao
City, a one and a half-hour drive from Tagum City. Visitors can travel from
Davao City through the Madaum diversion road, which is shorter than taking
the Davao-Tagum highway. Travels by air and sea are possible, with the
existence of an airport and seaport. Mati boasts of being the coconut capital
of Mindanao if not the whole country. A large portion of its fertile land is
planted to coconuts, and a significant number of its population is largely
dependent on it. Other agricultural crops such as mango, banana, corn,
coffee and cacao are also being cultivated, as well as the famous Menzi
pomelo and Valencia oranges. Mati has a long stretch of shoreline and one
can find beaches of pure, powder-like white sand. A number of resorts have
been developed and are now open to serve both local and international
tourists. Some of these resorts are situated along the coast of Pujada Bay
and the Pacific Ocean. Along the western coast of the bay lies Mt.
Hamiguitan, the home of the pygmy forest, where bonsai plants and trees
grow, some of which are believed to be a hundred years old or more. On its
peak is a lake, called Tinagong Dagat, or hidden sea, so covered by
dense vegetation a climber has to hike trails for hours to reach it. The

mountain is also host to rare species of flora and fauna, thus becoming a
wildlife sanctuary for these life forms. (<http://mati.wetpain.com/?t=anon>
accessed on September 19, 2008.)
Mati is abundant with nickel, chromite, and copper. Louie Rabat, Chamber
President of the Davao Oriental Eastern Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, emphasized the big potential of the mining industry in the province
of Davao Oriental. As such, he strongly recommends Mati as the mining
hub in the Region.
(<http://www.pia.gov.ph/default.asp?m=12&sec=reader&rp=1&fi=p080115.h
tm&no.=9&date, accessed on September 19, 2008)
Naga [Cebu]: Historical BackgroundIn the early times, the place now
known as Naga was full of huge trees locally called as Narra. The first
settlers referred to this place as Narra, derived from the huge trees, which
later simply became Naga. Considered as one of the oldest settlements in
the Province of Cebu, Naga became a municipality on June 12, 1829. The
municipality has gone through a series of classifications as its economic
development has undergone changes and growth. The tranquil farming and
fishing villages of the natives were agitated as the Spaniards came and
discovered coal in the uplands. Coal was the first export of the municipality,
as the Spaniards mined and sent it to Spain. The mining industry triggered
the industrial development of Naga. As the years progressed,
manufacturing and other industries followed, making Naga one of the
industrialized municipalities in the Province of Cebu.
Class of Municipality 1st class
Province Cebu
Distance from Cebu City 22 kms.
Number of Barangays 28
No. of Registered Voters 44,643 as of May 14, 2007
Total No. of Precincts 237 (as of May 14, 2007)
Ann. Income (as of Dec. 31, 2006) Php112,219,718.35 Agricultural,
Industrial, Agro-Industrial, Mining Product
(<http://www.nagacebu.com/index.php?option=com.content&view=article
id=53:naga-facts-and-figures&catid=51:naga-facts-and-figures&Itemid=75>
visited September 19, 2008)
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its
legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution,
to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.10 The Constitution, as the
expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The
grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and
comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all
purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage
and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution
has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and extends
to matters of general concern or common interest.11
Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making
powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it
enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again
exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress
enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic
viability for the creation of local government unitsincome, population, and
land area. Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with
respect to the conversion of municipalities into component cities when it
enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only
from locally-generated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to
exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified
income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and
blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside
development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities
as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in
effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption
clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the
concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such
Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. For this

reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24,
2010 Resolution on their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood
Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.
2.
The Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 6, Article X and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Both the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution
impress that the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause
enshrined in the Constitution. Further, it was also ruled that Section 6,
Article X was violated because the Cityhood Laws infringed on the just
share that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention shall receive from the
national taxes (IRA) to be automatically released to them.
Upon more profound reflection and deliberation, we declare that there was
valid classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate the equal
protection clause.
As this Court has ruled, the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution
permits a valid classification, provided that it: (1) rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same
class.12
The petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction between
municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and
municipalities that did not have pending bills, such that the mere pendency
of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to
distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income
requirement. This contention misses the point.
It should be recalled from the above quoted portions of the interpellation by
Senate President Drilon of Senator Pimentel that the purpose of the
enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the mad rush of
municipalities wanting to be converted into cities and the apprehension that
before long the country will be a country of cities and without municipalities.
It should be pointed out that the imposition of the P100 million average
annual income requirement for the creation of component cities was
arbitrarily made. To be sure, there was no evidence or empirical data, such
as inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount. The imposition of a
very high income requirement ofP100 million, increased from P20 million,
was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become
component cities. And to highlight such arbitrariness and the absurdity of
the situation created thereby, R.A. No. 9009 has, in effect, placed
component cities at a higher standing than highly urbanized cities under
Section 452 of the LGC, to wit
Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. (a) Cities with a minimum
population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants, as certified by
the National Statistics Office, and with the latest annual income of at least
Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as
certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.
(b) Cities which do not meet above requirements shall be considered
component cities of the province in which they are geographically located.
(Emphasis supplied)
The P100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009, being an
arbitrary amount, cannot be conclusively said to be the only amount
sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential
government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with
the size of its population, per Section 713 of the LGC. It was imposed
merely because it is difficult to comply with. While it could be argued
that P100 million, being more than P20 million, could, of course, provide the
essential government facilities, services, and special functions vis--vis the
population of a municipality wanting to become a component city, it cannot
be said that the minimum amount ofP20 million would be insufficient. This is
evident from the existing cities whose income, up to now, do not comply
with the P100 million income requirement, some of which have lower than
the P20 million average annual income. Consider the list14 below
CITY
AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME
1. Marawi City
5,291,522.10
2. Palayan City
6,714,651.77

3. Sipalay City
9,713,120.00
4. Canlaon City
13,552,493.79
5. Himamaylan City
15,808,530.00
6. Isabela City
16,811,246.79
7. Munoz City
19,693,358.61
8. Dapitan City
20,529,181.08
9. Tangub City
20,943,810.04
10. Bayawan City
22,943,810.04
11. Island Garden City of Samal
23,034,731.83
12. Tanjay City
23,723,612.44
13. Tabaco City
24,152,853.71
14. Oroquieta City
24,279,966.51
15. Ligao City
28,326,745.86
16. Sorsogon City
30,403,324.59
17. Maasin City
30,572,113.65
18. Escalante City
32,113,970.00
19. Iriga City
32,757,871.44
20. Gapan City
34,254,986.47
21. Candon City
36,327,705.86
22. Gingoog City
37,327,705.86
23. Masbate City
39,454,508.28
24. Passi City
40,314,620.00
25. Calbayog City
40,943,128.73
26. Calapan City
41,870,239.21
27. Cadiz City
43,827,060.00
28. Alaminos City
44,352,501.00
29. Bais City
44, 646,826.48
30. San Carlos City
46,306,129.13
31. Silay City
47,351,730.00
32. Bislig City
47,360,716.24
33. Tacurong City
49,026,281.56
34. Talisay City (Negros Occidental) 52,609,790.00
35. Kabankalan City
53,560,580.00
36. Malaybalay City
54,423,408.55
37. La Carlota City
54,760,290.00
38. Vigan City
56,831,797.19
39. Balanga City
61,556,700.49
40. Sagay City
64,266,350.00
41. Cavite City
64,566,079.05
42. Koronadal City
66,231,717.19
43. Cotabato City
66,302,114.52
44. Toledo City
70,157,331.12
45. San Jose City
70,309,233.43
46. Danao City
72,621,955.30
47. Bago City
74,305,000.00
48. Valencia City
74,557,298.92
49. Victorias City
75,757,298.92
50. Cauayan City
82,949,135.46
51. Santiago City
83,816,025.89
52. Roxas City
85,397,830.00
53. Dipolog City
85,503,262.85
54. Trece Martires City
87,413,786.64
55. Talisay City (Cebu)
87,964,972.97
56. Ozamis city
89,054,056.12
57. Surigao City
89,960,971.33
58. Panabo City
91,425,301.39
59. Digos City
92,647,699.13

The undeniable fact that these cities remain viable as component cities of
their respective provinces emphasizes the arbitrariness of the amount
of P100 million as the new income requirement for the conversion of
municipalities into component cities. This arbitrariness can also be clearly
gleaned from the respective distinctive traits and level of economic
development of the individual respondent municipalities as above
submitted.
Verily, the determination of the existence of substantial distinction with
respect to respondent municipalities does not simply lie on the mere
pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. This Court sees
the bigger picture. The existence of substantial distinction with respect to
respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the
purpose of the law, not by R.A. No. 9009, but by the very purpose of the
LGC, as provided in its Section 2 (a), thus
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.(a) It is hereby declared the policy of
the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy
genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government
units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.
The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National
Government to the local government units.
Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces.
Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and
viability of respondent municipalities to become the States partners in
accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions,
which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for
cityhood up to the present. Truly, the urgent need to become a component
city arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such condition continues to
exist.
Petitioners in these cases complain about the purported reduction of their
just share in the IRA. To be sure, petitioners are entitled to a just share,
not a specific amount. But the feared reduction proved to be false when,
after the implementation of the Cityhood Laws, their respective shares
increased, not decreased. Consider the table15 below
CY 2006 IRA
CY 2008 IRA
(Before Implementation of (Actual Release After
CITY
Sixteen [16] Cityhood
Implementation of Sixteen [16]
Laws)
Cityhood Laws)
Bais
219,338,056.00
242,193,156.00
Batangas 334,371,984.00
388,871,770.00
Bayawan
353,150,158.00
388,840,062.00
Cadiz
329,491,285.00
361,019,211.00
Calapan
227,772,199.00
252,587,779.00
Calbayog 438,603,378.00
485,653,769.00
Cauayan
250,477,157.00
277,120,828.00
Gen. Santos 518,388,557.00
631,864,977.00
Gingoog
314,425,637.00
347,207,725.00
Himamaylan 248,154,381.00
277,532,458.00
Iloilo
358,394,268.00
412,506,278.00
Iriga
183,132,036.00
203,072,932.00
Legaspi
235,314,016.00
266,537,785.00
Ligao
215,608,112.00
239,696,441.00
Oroquieta 191,803,213.00
211,449,720.00
Pagadian 292,788,255.00
327,401,672.00
San Carlos 239,524,249.00
260,515,711.00
San
182,320,356.00
204,140,940.00
Fernando
Santiago
508,326,072.00
563,679,572.00

Silay
216,372,314.00
241,363,845.00
Surigao
233,968,119.00
260,708,071.00
Tacurong 179,795,271.00
197,880,665.00
Tagaytay
130,159,136.00
152,445,295.00
Tarlac
348,186,756.00
405,611,581.00
Tangub
162,248,610.00
180,640,621.00
Urdaneta
187,721,031.00
207,129,386.00
Victorias
176,367,959.00
194,162,687.00
Zamboanga 918,013,016.00
1,009,972,704.00
What these petitioner cities were stating as a reduction of their respective
IRA shares was based on a computation of what they would receive if
respondent municipalities were not to become component cities at all. Of
course, that would mean a bigger amount to which they have staked their
claim. After considering these, it all boils down to money and how much
more they would receive if respondent municipalities remain as
municipalities and not share in the 23% fixed IRA from the national
government for cities.
Moreover, the debates in the Senate on R.A. No. 9009, should prove
enlightening:
SENATOR SOTTO. Mr. President, we just want to be enlightened again on
the previous qualification and the present one being proposed. Before there
were three
SENATOR PIMENTEL. There are three requisites for a municipality to
become a city. Let us start with the finance.
SENATOR SOTTO. Will the distinguished sponsor please refresh us? I
used to be the chairman of the Committee on Local Government, but the
new job that was given to me by the Senate has erased completely my
memory as far as the Local Government Code is concerned.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President, with pleasure. There are three
requirements. One is financial.
SENATOR SOTTO. All right. It used to be P20 million.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. It is P20 million. Now we are raising it to P100
million of locally generated funds.
SENATOR SOTTO. In other words, the P20 million before includes the IRA.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. No, Mr. President.
SENATOR SOTTO. It should not have been included?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. The internal revenue share should never have been
included. That was not the intention when we first crafted the Local
Government Code. The financial capacity was supposed to be
demonstrated by the municipality wishing to become a city by its own effort,
meaning to say, it should not rely on the internal revenue share that comes
from the government. Unfortunately, I think what happened in past
conversions of municipalities into cities was, the Department of Budget and
Management, along with the Department of Finance, had included the
internal revenue share as a part of the municipality, demonstration that they
are now financially capable and can measure up to the requirement of the
Local Government Code of having a revenue of at least P20 million.
SENATOR SOTTO. I am glad that the sponsor, Mr. President, has spread
that into the Record because otherwise, if he did not mention the
Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management,
then I would have been blamed for the misinterpretation. But anyway, the
gentleman is correct. That was the interpretation given to us during the
hearings.
So now, from P20 million, we make it P100 million from locally generated
income as far as population is concerned.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. As far as population is concerned, there will be no
change, Mr. President. Still 150,000.
SENATOR SOTTO. Still 150,000?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.
SENATOR SOTTO. And then the land area?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. As to the land area, there is no change; it is still 100
square kilometers.
SENATOR SOTTO. But before it was either/or?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is correct. As long as it has one of the three

requirements, basically, as long as it meets the financial requirement, then it
may meet the territorial requirement or the population requirement.
SENATOR SOTTO. So, it remains or?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. We are now changing it into AND.
SENATOR SOTTO. AND?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.
SENATOR SOTTO. I see.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is the proposal, Mr. President. In other
words
SENATOR SOTTO. Does the gentleman not think there will no longer be
any municipality that will qualify, Mr. President?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. There may still be municipalities which can qualify,
but it will take a little time. They will have to produce more babies. I do not
knowexpand their territories, whatever, by reclamation or otherwise. But
the whole proposal is geared towards making it difficult for municipalities to
convert into cities.
On the other hand, I would like to advert to the fact that in the amendments
that we are proposing for the entire Local Government Code, we are also
raising the internal revenue share of the municipalities.
SENATOR SOTTO. I see.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. So that, more or less, hindi naman sila dehado in
this particular instance.
SENATOR SOTTO. Well, then, because of that information, Mr. President, I
throw my full support behind the measure.
Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Thank you very much, Mr. President. (Emphasis
supplied)16
From the foregoing, the justness in the act of Congress in enacting the
Cityhood Laws becomes obvious, especially considering that 33
municipalities were converted into component cities almost immediately
prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. In the enactment of the Cityhood
Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities covered thereby from the
disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt increase in the income
requirement of R.A. No. 9009, acknowledging the privilege that they have
already given to those newly-converted component cities, which prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same footing or class
as the respondent municipalities. Congress merely recognized the capacity
and readiness of respondent municipalities to become component cities of
their respective provinces.
Petitioners complain of the projects that they would not be able to pursue
and the expenditures that they would not be able to meet, but totally ignored
the respondent municipalities obligations arising from the contracts they
have already entered into, the employees that they have already hired, and
the projects that they have already initiated and completed as component
cities. Petitioners have completely overlooked the need of respondent
municipalities to become effective vehicles intending to accelerate
economic growth in the countryside. It is like the elder siblings wanting to kill
the newly-borns so that their inheritance would not be diminished.
Apropos is the following parable:
There was a landowner who went out at dawn to hire workmen for his
vineyard. After reaching an agreement with them for the usual daily wage,
he sent them out to his vineyard. He came out about midmorning and saw
other men standing around the marketplace without work, so he said to
them, You too go along to my vineyard and I will pay you whatever is fair.
They went. He came out again around noon and mid-afternoon and did the
same. Finally, going out in late afternoon he found still others standing
around. To these he said, Why have you been standing here idle all day?
No one has hired us, they told him. He said, You go to the vineyard too.
When evening came, the owner of the vineyard said to his foreman, Call
the workmen and give them their pay, but begin with the last group and end
with the first. When those hired late in the afternoon came up they received
a full days pay, and when the first group appeared they thought they would
get more, yet they received the same daily wage. Thereupon they
complained to the owner, This last group did only an hours work, but you
have paid them on the same basis as us who have worked a full day in the

scorching heat. My friend, he said to one in reply, I do you no injustice.

You agreed on the usual wage, did you not? Take your pay and go home. I
intend to give this man who was hired last the same pay as you. I am free to
do as I please with my money, am I not? Or are you envious because I am
generous?17
Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting the Cityhood
Laws, only sought the well-being of respondent municipalities, having seen
their respective capacities to become component cities of their provinces,
temporarily stunted by the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. By allowing
respondent municipalities to convert into component cities, Congress
desired only to uphold the very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to make the local
government units enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable
them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals,
which is the very mandate of the Constitution.
Finally, we should not be restricted by technical rules of procedure at the
expense of the transcendental interest of justice and equity. While it is true
that litigation must end, even at the expense of errors in judgment, it is
nobler rather for this Court of last resort, as vanguard of truth, to toil in order
to dispel apprehensions and doubt, as the following pronouncement of this
Court instructs:
The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of
the legislature exceed the constitutional limitations and are invalid has
always been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty.
The courts invariably give the most careful consideration to questions
involving the interpretation and application of the Constitution, and approach
constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising their power in this
respect with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance; and they
should never declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their judgment,
beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act
unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution to be in contravention
of the Constitution x x x, the case must be so clear to be free from doubt,
and the conflict of the statute with the constitution must be irreconcilable,
because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the
patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in
favor of its validity until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act
to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to
resolve the doubt in favor of its validity.18
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
August 24, 2010, dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by respondents
Municipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. The Resolution dated August
24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood LawsRepublic
Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407,
9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491are declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.