De Venecia vs.

Sandiganbayan
GR 130240 February 5, 2002
FACTS: On 12 March 1993, an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan
against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a
Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite. In its Resolution dated 6 June
1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to
suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997,
the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18
August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be held in contempt
of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for
reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he
can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House
Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr.
in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10
days from notice. Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of
the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuao, Cashier, House of
Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of
Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law is a
penalty or a precautionary measure; and
(2)Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of
Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019.
HELD: As ruled in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan , the suspension
provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and
purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary
measure resorted to upon the filing of valid Information.
As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of
separation of powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the
mandate of RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is
distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision
is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.
Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his
prosecution by influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence
and from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. It is thus an
incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the other hand, the
suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed
sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior
to enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor
and integrity.

The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have

effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from
its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes that each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative,
the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance
within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from
unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.