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G.R. No.

100150 January 5, 1994


BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO
ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND
OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human
Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition,
with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The
petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further
hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et
al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990,
signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an
Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management
Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received
by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the
North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the
respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July
1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North
EDSA. 1Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private
respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be
removed to give way to the "People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group,
led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners,
asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be
addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the
demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR
Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing
the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North
EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private


respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection,
and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the
demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in
favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and
food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the
petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation
of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's
jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by
the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of
Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a
moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor
dwellers in Metro-Manila;
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3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that
the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium
in the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor
dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even
this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1
August 1990 that the complainants are indeed,
vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government
land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North
Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole
and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a
certain business establishment (should) be allowed to
operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke
or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds
clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for


postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21
September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise
manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by
the petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should be
understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of
civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this
case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage
in business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and
submitted for resolution, along with the contempt charge that had
meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously
objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss
was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in
contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of
P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners'
motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its
constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who
complained of the gross violations of their human and
constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be
and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional)
Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating
civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial
body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It
added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's
right to development, to life and to dignity. All these
brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by
respondents with little regard at the same time for the

basic rights of women and children, and their health,


safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically
scarred and traumatized the children, who were
witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration
of Man's inhumanity to man.
In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration
was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991;
it was subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution 16 of 18 June
1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the
CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the
private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at
the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the
vendors affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was
excused from filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The latter
thus filed its own comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its
Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of
private respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the
resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon
Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, 20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the
exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so
superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21

The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987
Constitution, thus: to
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party,
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof
in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and
provide for preventive measures and legal aid services
to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or
detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research,
education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
promote human rights and to provide for compensation
to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance
with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under
its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance
with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may


be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss,
the CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the
Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial
body. 23 This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court.
In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the Court, through then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it
is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in
no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court
explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in
the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is
not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not
have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to
the other kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine the extent
of CHR's investigative power.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a


term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at
best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on
human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the
Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is
"(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants,
representing different sectors of the society, have given the following
varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man
by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts
of the world, whether the Philippines or England,
Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan,
Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to
life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the
press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of
the accused to due process of law; political rights, such
as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to
public office, and to form political associations and
engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to
an education, employment, and social services. 25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the
individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . .
Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted
by the State but can only be recognized and protected by
it. 26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic,
social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply
because he is human. They are part of his natural birth,
right, innate and inalienable. 28

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more


specifically, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to
include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural,
political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to
the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along

with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable


rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers
of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific
provisions on human rights and in creating an independent
commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at
the country's experience under the martial law regime which may
have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our
fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices,
aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others,
comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an
advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of
Human Rights in the Philippines," 29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973
enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human
rights expressed in the International Covenant, these
rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of
Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action
then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands
became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were
detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for
years, without charges, until ordered released by the
Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to
petition for the redress of grievances became useless,
since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes.
Press and other mass media were subjected to
censorship and short term licensing. Martial law
brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, and judges lost independence and security of
tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They
were required to submit letters of resignation and were
dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to
extort confessions were practiced as declared by
international bodies like Amnesty International and the
International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional
Commission, we can see the following discussions during its 26
August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must
be made clear in view of the importance of human

rights and also because civil and political rights have


been determined by many international covenants and
human rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as
the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and
subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a
wide territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and
the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity
would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its
tasks so that the commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because
civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on
the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every
single right of an individual involves his civil right or his
political right. So, where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights
have been made clear in the language of human rights
advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on
the right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair
and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific
rights that are considered enshrined in many
international documents and legal instruments as
constituting civil and political rights, and these are
precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil
and political rights as defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the
other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will
encompass social and economic rights, and there are
other violations of rights of citizens which can be
addressed to the proper courts and authorities.

xxx xxx xxx


MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission
to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the
commission will be authorized to take under its wings
cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are
under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and
prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I
correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier
that we would like to define the specific parameters
which cover civil and political rights as covered by the
international standards governing the behavior of
governments regarding the particular political and civil
rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or
prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced
during martial law which we would now like to
safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I
had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is,
perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those
rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the
rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in
the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral
parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying
that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by
human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and
political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the
scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the
past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of
human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the

defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended


the rights of people to decent living, food, decent
housing and a life consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human
rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the
committee, so as not to confuse the issue?

rights specified in other convention which I do not


remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to
the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner
mentioned another.

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.


MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond
also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on
Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of
rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners
and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials;
4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and
hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the
religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is
recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with
Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make
the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as
much as possible, without prejudice to future
expansion. The coverage of the concept and
jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was
actually disturbed this morning when the reference was
made without qualification to the rights embodied in the
universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later
on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights
contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President,
Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or
linked the concept of human right with other human

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the


International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of
which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that,
although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other
covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are
rights specified in that other convention which may not
be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be
wise to link our concept of human rights to general
terms like "convention," rather than specify the rights
contained in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
concerned, the Committee, before the period of
amendments, could specify to us which of these
articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of
civil and political rights, not for the purpose of including
these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give
the sense of the Commission as to what human rights
would be included, without prejudice to expansion later
on, if the need arises. For example, there was no
definite reply to the question of Commissioner
Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be
considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the
various specific civil and political rights that we felt
must be envisioned initially by this provision
freedom from political detention and arrest prevention
of torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as
crimes involving disappearance, salvagings,
hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is limited to
politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil

and political rights of a specific group of individuals,


and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the
definite areas.

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the


victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how
much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .

MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the


record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept
or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with
the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They


cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients
who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more
abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases
involved are very delicate torture, salvaging, picking
up without any warrant of arrest, massacre and the
persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power
like politicians, men in the military and big shots.
Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be
independent.

MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal


Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an
international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to
each and every specific article therein, but only to
those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as
we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even
clear as to the distinction between civil and social
rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants:
the International Covenant and Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant
contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to
organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et
cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment
the sense of the committee to those that the
Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx

I would like very much to emphasize how much we


need this commission, especially for the little Filipino,
the little individual who needs this kind of help and
cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only
on civil and political violations because if we open this
to land, housing and health, we will have no place to
go again and we will not receive any
response. . . . 30 (emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987
Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human
Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights"
(Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the
state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants,
and are not connected with the organization or
administration of the government. They include the
rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the
laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined
civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue
of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term
may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of
being enforced or redressed in a civil action.

Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary


servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures,
and imprisonment for debt. 32
Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of
government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of
petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the
management of government. 34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,
aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a
Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the
more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for
instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of
political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of
tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)
salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the
religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have
any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority,
it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the
delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial
jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that
"Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights
that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into
account its recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to
be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as
temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is
planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the
land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take
judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger
to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed
paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one
that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant.
Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed visa-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared
to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political
rights" intended by the Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to


"adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court."
Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its
revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with
the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That
power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply
only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of
procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To
exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against
persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly
withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and
the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a
semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us,
however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an
adjudicative power that it does not possess. InExport Processing Zone
Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36 the Court, speaking
through Madame Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to
"provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection" may not be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to
issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that
were the intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law". It is never derived by
implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid
services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of
preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from
proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself
has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge
of any court in which the action is pending [within his
district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of
the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction
is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending
principal action, for the preservation or protection of the

rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other


purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate
action, its findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of
government. 37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of
P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by the
demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is
there lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to question the
disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the
appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by
the petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before
it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the
matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a
preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done,
and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to
promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition
has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from
precisely doing that. 39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The
Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further
proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the
P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore
issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 206666

January 21, 2015

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,


ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, Respondents.

The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No.
7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion Perpetua to
Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in accordance with Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the accused Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification.

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court are (1) a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, both of the Revised Rules of Court, by Atty. Alicia
Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), which essentially prays for the issuance of
the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 2013 and
April 23, 2013 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), Second Division and En bane, respectively, in SPA No.
13-211 (DC), entitled "Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. Joseph Ejercito
Estrada" for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) a Petition-inIntervention filed by Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), wherein he prays to be
declared the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in
view of private respondent former President Joseph Ejercito Estradas
(former President Estrada) disqualification to run for and hold public
office.
1

The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito


Estrada has been under detention shall be credited to him in full as
long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.

The Facts
The salient facts of the case are as follows:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the
Philippines, for the crime of plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al."
The dispositive part of the graft courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding the accused, Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of PLUNDER, defined in and penalized by Republic Act
No. 7080, as amended. On the other hand, for failure of the
prosecution to prove and establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty.
Edward S. Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder, and
accordingly, the Court hereby orders their ACQUITTAL.

Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as


amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the Court hereby declares the
forfeiture in favor of the government of the following:
(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty[-]Two Million Seven
Hundred Ninety[-]One Thousand Pesos (P545,291,000.00),
with interest and income earned, inclusive of the amount of
Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00), deposited in
the name and account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty[-]Nine Million Pesos
(P189,000,000.00), inclusive of interests and income earned,
deposited in the Jose Velarde account.
(3) The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as
"Boracay Mansion" located at #100 11th Street, New Manila,
Quezon City.
The cash bonds posted by accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty.
Edward S. Serapio are hereby ordered cancelled and released to the
said accused or their duly authorized representatives upon
presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment thereof and
subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. Likewise, the
hold-departure orders issued against the said accused are hereby
recalled and declared functus oficio.
4

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal


Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by

way of pardon, to former President Estrada. The full text of said


pardon states:
MALACAAN PALACE
MANILA

On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada "received


and accepted" the pardon by affixing his signature beside his
handwritten notation thereon.
6

On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of


Candidacy for the position of President. During that time, his
candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC: (1) SPA No. 09024 (DC), a "Petition to Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy" filed by Rev. Elly Velez B. Lao Pamatong, ESQ; (2) SPA
No. 09-028 (DC), a petition for "Disqualification as Presidential
Candidate" filed by Evilio C. Pormento (Pormento); and (3) SPA No.
09-104 (DC), a "Petition to Disqualify Estrada Ejercito, Joseph M.from
Running as President due to Constitutional Disqualification and
Creating Confusion to the Prejudice of Estrada, Mary Lou B" filed by
Mary Lou Estrada. In separate Resolutions dated January 20, 2010 by
the COMELEC, Second Division, however, all three petitions were
effectively dismissed on the uniform grounds that (i) the Constitutional
proscription on reelection applies to a sitting president; and (ii) the
pardon granted to former President Estrada by former President
Arroyo restored the formers right to vote and be voted for a public
office. The subsequent motions for reconsideration thereto were
denied by the COMELEC En banc.
7

By the President of the Philippines


PARDON
WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who
have reached the age of seventy (70),
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six
and a half years,
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no
longer seek any elective position or office,
IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by
the Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder
and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored
to his civil and political rights.
The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in
full, including all writs and processes issued by the Sandiganbayan in
pursuance hereof, except for the bank account(s) he owned before his
tenure as President.
Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,
this pardon shall take effect.
Given under my hand at the City of Manila, this 25th Day of October, in
the year of Our Lord, two thousand and seven.

After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections,


however, former President Estrada only managed to garner the
second highest number of votes.
Of the three petitioners above-mentioned, only Pormento sought
recourse to this Court and filed a petition for certiorari, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 191988, entitled "Atty. Evilio C. Pormento v.
Joseph ERAP Ejercito Estrada and Commission on Elections." But in
a Resolution dated August 31, 2010, the Court dismissed the
aforementioned petition on the ground of mootness considering that
former President Estrada lost his presidential bid.
9

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured


into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time
vying for a local elective post, that ofthe Mayor of the City of Manila.
10

Gloria M. Arroyo (sgd.)


By the President:
IGNACIO R. BUNYE (sgd.)
Acting Executive Secretary

On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a


Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before
the COMELEC. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC).
Risos Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that "[Former President
Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his

Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.


26558 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetuawith
Perpetual Absolute Disqualification." She relied on Section 40 of the
Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which state respectively, that:
11

In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013,the COMELEC, Second Division,


dismissed the petition for disqualification, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
12

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving


moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;

The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that "[h]aving taken judicial


cognizance of the consolidated resolution for SPA No. 09-028 (DC)
and SPA No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010 En Banc resolution
affirming it, this Commission will not be labor the controversy further.
Moreso, [Risos-Vidal] failed to present cogent proof sufficient to
reverse the standing pronouncement of this Commission declaring
categorically that [former President Estradas] right to seek public
office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by
former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Since this Commission has already
spoken, it will no longer engage in disquisitions of a settled matter lest
indulged in wastage of government resources."

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of


allegiance to the Republic;

The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was


denied in a Resolution dated April 23, 2013.

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Courts jurisdiction by filing


the present petition. She presented five issues for the Courts
resolution, to wit:

Sec. 40, Local Government Code:


SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here


or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have
acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the
same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble minded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgmentfor subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense
for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to
be a candidate and to hold any public office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphases supplied.)

13

I. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE


OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT
ESTRADAS PARDON WAS NOT CONDITIONAL;
II. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
ESTRADA IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN AS MAYOR OF
MANILA UNDER SEC. 40 OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENTCODE OF 1991 FOR HAVING BEEN
CONVICTED OF PLUNDER, AN OFFENSE INVOLVING
MORAL TURPITUDE;
III. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
DISQUALIFICATION ON THE GROUND THAT THE CASE
INVOLVES THE SAME OR SIMILAR ISSUES IT ALREADY

RESOLVED IN THE CASES OF "PORMENTO VS.


ESTRADA", SPA NO. 09-028 (DC) AND IN "RE: PETITION TO
DISQUALIFY ESTRADA EJERCITO, JOSEPH M. FROM
RUNNING AS PRESIDENT, ETC.," SPA NO. 09-104 (DC);
IV. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT
ESTRADAS PARDON NEITHER RESTORED HIS RIGHT OF
SUFFRAGE NOR REMITTED HIS PERPETUAL ABSOLUTE
DISQUALIFICATION FROM SEEKING PUBLIC OFFICE; and
V. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT HAVING EXERCISED ITS POWER
TO MOTU PROPRIO DISQUALIFY RESPONDENT ESTRADA
IN THE FACE OF HIS PATENT DISQUALIFICATION TO RUN
FOR PUBLIC OFFICE BECAUSE OF HIS PERPETUAL AND
ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION TO SEEK PUBLIC OFFICE
AND TO VOTE RESULTING FROM HIS CRIMINAL
CONVICTION FOR PLUNDER.
14

While this case was pending beforethe Court, or on May 13, 2013, the
elections were conducted as scheduled and former President Estrada
was voted into office with 349,770 votes cast in his favor. The next day,
the local board of canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected
Mayor of the City of Manila.
On June 7, 2013, Lim, one of former President Estradas opponents
for the position of Mayor, moved for leave to intervene in this case. His
motion was granted by the Court in a Resolution dated June 25,
2013. Lim subscribed to Risos-Vidals theory that former President
Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office as the pardon
granted to the latter failed to expressly remit his perpetual
disqualification. Further, given that former President Estrada is
disqualified to run for and hold public office, all the votes obtained by
the latter should be declared stray, and, being the second placer with
313,764 votes to his name, he (Lim) should be declared the rightful
winning candidate for the position of Mayor of the City of Manila.

question for resolution by the Court, that is, whether or not the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified
to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon
granted to him by former President Arroyo.
In her petition, Risos-Vidal starts her discussion by pointing out that
the pardon granted to former President Estrada was conditional as
evidenced by the latters express acceptance thereof. The
"acceptance," she claims, is an indication of the conditional natureof
the pardon, with the condition being embodied in the third Whereas
Clause of the pardon, i.e., "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office."
She explains that the aforementioned commitment was what impelled
former President Arroyo to pardon former President Estrada, without it,
the clemency would not have been extended. And any breach thereof,
that is, whenformer President Estrada filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for President and Mayor of the City of Manila, he breached the
condition of the pardon; hence, "he ought to be recommitted to prison
to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence x x x and disqualifies
him as a candidate for the mayoralty [position] of Manila."
16

Nonetheless, Risos-Vidal clarifies that the fundamental basis upon


which former President Estrada mustbe disqualified from running for
and holding public elective office is actually the proscription found in
Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 ofthe OEC. She
argues that the crime of plunder is both an offense punishable by
imprisonment of one year or more and involving moral turpitude; such
that former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold
public elective office.

15

The Issue
Though raising five seemingly separate issues for resolution, the
petition filed by Risos-Vidal actually presents only one essential

Even with the pardon granted to former President Estrada, however,


Risos-Vidal insists that the same did not operate to make available to
former President Estrada the exception provided under Section 12 of
the OEC, the pardon being merely conditional and not absolute or
plenary. Moreover, Risos-Vidal puts a premium on the ostensible
requirements provided under Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. A pardon shall not work the restoration of
the right to hold publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights
be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal Their accessory
penalties. The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period
of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned
as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon. (Emphases supplied.)
She avers that in view of the foregoing provisions of law, it is not
enough that a pardon makes a general statement that such pardon
carries with it the restoration of civil and political rights. By virtue of
Articles 36 and 41, a pardon restoring civil and political rights without
categorically making mention what specific civil and political rights are
restored "shall not work to restore the right to hold public office, or the
right of suffrage; nor shall it remit the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification for the principal
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal." In other
words, she considers the above constraints as mandatory
requirements that shun a general or implied restoration of civil and
political rights in pardons.
17

Risos-Vidal cites the concurring opinions of Associate Justices


Teodoro R. Padilla and Florentino P. Feliciano in Monsanto v.
Factoran, Jr. to endorse her position that "[t]he restoration of the right
to hold public office to one who has lost such right by reason of
conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently pardoned, cannot be
left to inference, no matter how intensely arguable, but must be
statedin express, explicit, positive and specific language."
18

Applying Monsantoto former President Estradas case, Risos-Vidal


reckons that "such express restoration is further demanded by the
existence of the condition in the [third] [W]hereas [C]lause of the
pardon x x x indubitably indicating that the privilege to hold public
office was not restored to him."
19

On the other hand, the Office ofthe Solicitor General (OSG) for public
respondent COMELEC, maintains that "the issue of whether or not the
pardon extended to [former President Estrada] restored his right to run
for public office had already been passed upon by public respondent

COMELEC way back in 2010 via its rulings in SPA Nos. 09-024, 09028 and 09-104, there is no cogent reason for it to reverse its standing
pronouncement and declare [former President Estrada] disqualified to
run and be voted as mayor of the City of Manila in the absence of any
new argument that would warrant its reversal. To be sure, public
respondent COMELEC correctly exercised its discretion in taking
judicial cognizance of the aforesaid rulings which are known toit and
which can be verified from its own records, in accordance with Section
2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court on the courts discretionary power to
take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, orare
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
them because of their judicial functions."
20

Further, the OSG contends that "[w]hile at first glance, it is apparent


that [former President Estradas] conviction for plunder disqualifies him
from running as mayor of Manila under Section 40 of the [LGC], the
subsequent grant of pardon to him, however, effectively restored his
right to run for any public office." The restoration of his right to run for
any public office is the exception to the prohibition under Section 40 of
the LGC, as provided under Section 12 of the OEC. As to the seeming
requirement of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., the
express restoration/remission of a particular right to be stated in the
pardon, the OSG asserts that "an airtight and rigid interpretation of
Article 36 and Article 41 of the [RPC] x x x would be stretching too
much the clear and plain meaning of the aforesaid provisions." Lastly,
taking into consideration the third Whereas Clause of the pardon
granted to former President Estrada, the OSG supports the position
that it "is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon and cannot
therefore serve to restrict its effectivity."
21

22

23

Thus, the OSG concludes that the "COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Resolutions."
24

For his part, former President Estrada presents the following


significant arguments to defend his stay in office: that "the factual
findings of public respondent COMELEC, the Constitutional body
mandated to administer and enforce all laws relative to the conduct of
the elections, [relative to the absoluteness of the pardon, the effects
thereof, and the eligibility of former President Estrada to seek public
elective office] are binding [and conclusive] on this Honorable
Supreme Court;" that he "was granted an absolute pardon and thereby
restored to his full civil and political rights, including the right to seek
public elective office such as the mayoral (sic) position in the City of

Manila;" that "the majority decision in the case of Salvacion A.


Monsanto v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,which was erroneously cited by
both Vidal and Lim as authority for their respective claims, x x x reveal
that there was no discussion whatsoever in the ratio decidendi of the
Monsanto case as to the alleged necessity for an expressed
restoration of the right to hold public office in the pardon as a legal
prerequisite to remove the subject perpetual special disqualification;"
that moreover, the "principal question raised in this Monsanto case is
whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute
pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement toher former
position without need of a new appointment;" that his "expressed
acceptance [of the pardon] is not proof that the pardon extended to
[him] is conditional and not absolute;" that this case is a mere rehash
of the casesfiled against him during his candidacy for President back
in 2009-2010; that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code
"cannot abridge or diminish the pardoning power of the President
expressly granted by the Constitution;" that the text of the pardon
granted to him substantially, if not fully, complied with the requirement
posed by Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code as it was categorically
stated in the said document that he was "restored to his civil and
political rights;" that since pardon is an act of grace, it must be
construed favorably in favor of the grantee; and that his
disqualification will result in massive disenfranchisement of the
hundreds of thousands of Manileos who voted for him.
25

26

The Court's Ruling


The petition for certiorari lacks merit.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored allhis civil and political rights, which naturally includes the
right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the
pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. Recall that the petition for disqualification filed by
Risos-Vidal against former President Estrada, docketed as SPA No.
13-211 (DC), was anchored on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to
Section 12 of the OEC, that is, having been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, and involving moral
turpitude, former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and
hold public elective office notwithstanding the fact that he is a grantee

of a pardon that includes a statement expressing "[h]e is hereby


restored to his civil and political rights." Risos-Vidal theorizes that
former President Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor of
Manila inthe May 13, 2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to hold
any local elective post despite the presidential pardon extended to him
in 2007 by former President Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did
not expressly provide for the remission of the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification, particularly the restoration of his (former
President Estrada) right to vote and bevoted upon for public office.
She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the
foundations of her theory.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to
and accepted by former President Estrada does not actually specify
which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former
President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President
Estradas rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise
remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her
intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the
pardons text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative
action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section
5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines
possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of
executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided
in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for
violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the
President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only


instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be
in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a
final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws,
rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation
coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act
of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning
power of the President.
In Cristobal v. Labrador and Pelobello v. Palatino, which were
decided under the 1935 Constitution,wherein the provision granting
pardoning power to the President shared similar phraseology with
what is found in the present 1987 Constitution, the Court then
unequivocally declared that "subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action." The Court reiterated this pronouncement in
Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. thereby establishing that, under the present
Constitution, "a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action." Thus, it is unmistakably the longstanding position of this Court that the exercise of the pardoning power
is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with by
Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided
for by the Constitution.
27

28

29

This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the Presidents


power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation,
was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out
an exception from the pardoning power of the President in the form of
"offenses involving graft and corruption" that would be enumerated and
defined by Congress through the enactment of a law. The following is
the pertinent portion lifted from the Record of the Commission (Vol. II):
MR. ROMULO. I ask that Commissioner Tan be recognized to
introduce an amendment on the same section.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tan is recognized.
SR. TAN. Madam President, lines 7 to 9 state:
However, the power to grant executive clemency for violations of
corrupt practices laws may be limited by legislation.

I suggest that this be deletedon the grounds that, first, violations of


corrupt practices may include a very little offense like stealing P10;
second, which I think is more important, I get the impression, rightly or
wrongly, that subconsciously we are drafting a constitution on the
premise that all our future Presidents will bebad and dishonest and,
consequently, their acts will be lacking in wisdom. Therefore, this
Article seems to contribute towards the creation of an anti-President
Constitution or a President with vast responsibilities but no
corresponding power except to declare martial law. Therefore, I
request that these lines be deleted.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President,may the Committee react to that?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, please.
MR. REGALADO. This was inserted here on the resolution of
Commissioner Davide because of the fact that similar to the provisions
on the Commission on Elections, the recommendation of that
Commission is required before executive clemency isgranted because
violations of the election laws go into the very political life of the
country.
With respect to violations of our Corrupt Practices Law, we felt that it is
also necessary to have that subjected to the same condition because
violation of our Corrupt Practices Law may be of such magnitude as to
affect the very economic systemof the country. Nevertheless, as a
compromise, we provided here that it will be the Congress that will
provide for the classification as to which convictions will still require
prior recommendation; after all, the Congress could take into account
whether or not the violation of the Corrupt Practices Law is of such
magnitude as to affect the economic life of the country, if it is in the
millions or billions of dollars. But I assume the Congress in its
collective wisdom will exclude those petty crimes of corruption as not
to require any further stricture on the exercise of executive clemency
because, of course, there is a whale of a difference if we consider a
lowly clerk committing malversation of government property or funds
involving one hundred pesos. But then, we also anticipate the
possibility that the corrupt practice of a public officer is of such
magnitude as to have virtually drained a substantial portion of the
treasury, and then he goes through all the judicial processes and later
on, a President who may have close connections with him or out of
improvident compassion may grant clemency under such conditions.
That is why we left it to Congress to provide and make a classification
based on substantial distinctions between a minor act of corruption or

an act of substantial proportions. SR. TAN. So, why do we not just


insert the word GROSS or GRAVE before the word "violations"?
MR. REGALADO. We feel that Congress can make a better distinction
because "GRAVE" or "GROSS" can be misconstrued by putting it
purely as a policy.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. May I speak in favor of the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO. The power to grant executive clemency is essentially
an executive power, and that is precisely why it is called executive
clemency. In this sentence, which the amendment seeks to delete, an
exception is being made. Congress, which is the legislative arm, is
allowed to intrude into this prerogative of the executive. Then it limits
the power of Congress to subtract from this prerogative of the
President to grant executive clemency by limiting the power of
Congress to only corrupt practices laws. There are many other crimes
more serious than these. Under this amendment, Congress cannot
limit the power of executive clemency in cases of drug addiction and
drug pushing which are very, very serious crimes that can endanger
the State; also, rape with murder, kidnapping and treason. Aside from
the fact that it is a derogation of the power of the President to grant
executive clemency, it is also defective in that it singles out just one
kind of crime. There are far more serious crimes which are not
included.
MR. REGALADO. I will just make one observation on that. We admit
that the pardoning power is anexecutive power. But even in the
provisions on the COMELEC, one will notice that constitutionally, it is
required that there be a favorable recommendation by the Commission
on Elections for any violation of election laws.
At any rate, Commissioner Davide, as the principal proponent of that
and as a member of the Committee, has explained in the committee
meetings we had why he sought the inclusion of this particular
provision. May we call on Commissioner Davide to state his position.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.


MR. DAVIDE. I am constrained to rise to object to the proposal. We
have just approved the Article on Accountability of Public Officers.
Under it, it is mandated that a public office is a public trust, and all
government officers are under obligation to observe the utmost of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, to lead modest lives and
to act with patriotism and justice.
In all cases, therefore, which would go into the verycore of the concept
that a public office is a public trust, the violation is itself a violation not
only of the economy but the moral fabric of public officials. And that is
the reason we now want that if there is any conviction for the violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which, in effect, is a
violation of the public trust character of the public office, no pardon
shall be extended to the offender, unless some limitations are
imposed.
Originally, my limitation was, it should be with the concurrence of the
convicting court, but the Committee left it entirely to the legislature to
formulate the mechanics at trying, probably, to distinguish between
grave and less grave or serious cases of violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Perhaps this is now the best time, since we
have strengthened the Article on Accountability of Public Officers, to
accompany it with a mandate that the Presidents right to grant
executive clemency for offenders or violators of laws relating to the
concept of a public office may be limited by Congress itself.
MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Sarmiento is recognized.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I briefly speak in favor of the amendment by
deletion.
Madam President, over and over again, we have been saying and
arguing before this Constitutional Commission that we are
emasculating the powers of the presidency, and this provision to me is
another clear example of that. So, I speak against this provision. Even
the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions do not provide for this kind of
provision.
I am supporting the amendment by deletion of Commissioner Tan.

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.

MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Tingson would like to be recognized.


THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tingson is recognized.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, I am also in favor of the
amendment by deletion because I am in sympathy with the stand of
Commissioner Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo. I do believe and we should
remember that above all the elected or appointed officers of our
Republic, the leader is the President. I believe that the country will be
as the President is, and if we systematically emasculate the power of
this presidency, the time may come whenhe will be also handcuffed
that he will no longer be able to act like he should be acting.

MR. PADILLA. Only one sentence, Madam President. The


Sandiganbayan has been called the Anti-Graft Court, so if this is
allowed to stay, it would mean that the Presidents power togrant
pardon or reprieve will be limited to the cases decided by the Anti-Graft
Court, when as already stated, there are many provisions inthe
Revised Penal Code that penalize more serious offenses.
Moreover, when there is a judgment of conviction and the case merits
the consideration of the exercise of executive clemency, usually under
Article V of the Revised Penal Code the judge will recommend such
exercise of clemency. And so, I am in favor of the amendment
proposed by Commissioner Tan for the deletion of this last sentence in
Section 17.

So, Madam President, I am in favor of the deletion of this particular


line.

THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now, Mr. Floor Leader?

MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Colayco would like to be recognized.

MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one more.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Colayco is recognized.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Natividad is recognized.

MR. COLAYCO. Thank you very much, Madam President.

MR. NATIVIDAD. I am also against this provision which will again chip
more powers from the President. In case of other criminals convicted
in our society, we extend probation to them while in this case, they
have already been convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we can
offer mercy to them is through this executive clemency extended to
them by the President. If we still close this avenue to them, they would
be prejudiced even worse than the murderers and the more vicious
killers in our society. I do not think they deserve this opprobrium and
punishment under the new Constitution.

I seldom rise here to object to or to commend or to recommend the


approval of proposals, but now I find that the proposal of
Commissioner Tan is worthy of approval of this body.
Why are we singling out this particular offense? There are other crimes
which cast a bigger blot on the moral character of the public officials.
Finally, this body should not be the first one to limit the almost absolute
power of our Chief Executive in deciding whether to pardon, to
reprieve or to commute the sentence rendered by the court.
I thank you.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now?
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Padilla would like to be recognized, and
after him will be Commissioner Natividad.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized.

I am in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Tan.


MR. ROMULO. We are ready tovote, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Is this accepted by the Committee?
MR. REGALADO. The Committee, Madam President, prefers to
submit this to the floor and also because of the objection of the main
proponent, Commissioner Davide. So we feel that the Commissioners
should vote on this question.
VOTING

THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of the proposed


amendment of Commissioner Tan to delete the last sentence of
Section 17 appearing on lines 7, 8 and 9, please raise their hand.
(Several Members raised their hand.)

A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law, as


proposed by Risos-Vidal, is unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat
or unduly restrict the power of the President to grant executive
clemency.

As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised
their hand.)

It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a


statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba
legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be
no departure. It is this Courts firm view that the phrase in the
presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President
Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil and political rights" substantially
complies with the requirement of express restoration.

The results show 34 votes in favor and 4 votes against; the


amendment is approved. (Emphases supplied.)
30

The proper interpretation of Articles


36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or
diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the President to
pardon persons convicted of violating penal statutes.
The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidals interpretation that the said
Articles contain specific textual commands which must be strictly
followed in order to free the beneficiary of presidential grace from the
disqualifications specifically prescribed by them.
Again, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. A pardon shall not work the restoration of
the right to hold publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights
be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal Their accessory
penalties. The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period
of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned
as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon. (Emphases supplied.)

31

The Dissent of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed with Risos Vidal
that there was no express remission and/or restoration of the rights of
suffrage and/or to hold public office in the pardon granted to former
President Estrada, as required by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the aforementioned codal
provisions must be followed by the President, as they do not abridge
or diminish the Presidents power to extend clemency. He opines that
they do not reduce the coverage of the Presidents pardoning power.
Particularly, he states:
Articles 36 and 41 refer only to requirements of convention or form.
They only provide a procedural prescription. They are not concerned
with areas where or the instances when the President may grant
pardon; they are only concerned with how he or she is to exercise
such power so that no other governmental instrumentality needs to
intervene to give it full effect.
All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes
to include in the pardon the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to
hold public office, or the remission of the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification,he or she should do so expressly.
Articles 36 and 41 only ask that the President state his or her
intentions clearly, directly, firmly, precisely, and unmistakably. To
belabor the point, the President retains the power to make such
restoration or remission, subject to a prescription on the manner by
which he or she is to state it.
32

With due respect, I disagree with the overbroad statement that


Congress may dictate as to how the President may exercise his/her
power of executive clemency. The form or manner by which the
President, or Congress for that matter, should exercise their respective
Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be interfered with unless
it is so provided in the Constitution. This is the essence of the principle
of separation of powers deeply ingrained in our system of government
which "ordains that each of the three great branches of government
has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its
own constitutionally allocated sphere." Moreso, this fundamental
principle must be observed if noncompliance with the form imposed by
one branch on a co-equal and coordinate branch will result into the
diminution of an exclusive Constitutional prerogative.
33

For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should
be construed in a way that will give full effect to the executive
clemency granted by the President, instead of indulging in an overly
strict interpretation that may serve to impair or diminish the import of
the pardon which emanated from the Office of the President and duly
signed by the Chief Executive himself/herself. The said codal
provisions must be construed to harmonize the power of Congress to
define crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the
power of the President to grant executive clemency. All that the said
provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty does
notcarry with it the remission of the accessory penalties unless the
President expressly includes said accessory penalties in the pardon. It
still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive
clemency and, specifically, to decide to pardon the principal penalty
while excluding its accessory penalties or to pardon both. Thus,
Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided upon
by the President on the penalties imposedin accordance with law.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua
and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first
sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former
President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the
principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The
sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties
that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence,
even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indubitable from the textof the pardon that the accessory penalties of

civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly


remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In this jurisdiction, the right toseek public elective office is recognized
by law as falling under the whole gamut of civil and political rights.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003," reads as
follows:
34

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain
or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must
meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and
swear an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to
the country where they took that oath; (4) Those intending to
practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public
office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to,
those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public
office in the country of which theyare naturalized
citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non


commissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphases
supplied.)
No less than the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to
which the Philippines is a signatory, acknowledges the existence of
said right. Article 25(b) of the Convention states: Article 25

On the other hand, the theory of Risos-Vidal goes beyond the plain
meaning of said penal provisions; and prescribes a formal requirement
that is not only unnecessary but, if insisted upon, could be in
derogation of the constitutional prohibition relative to the principle that
the exercise of presidential pardon cannot be affected by legislative
action.
Risos-Vidal relied heavily on the separate concurring opinions in
Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. to justify her argument that an absolute
pardon must expressly state that the right to hold public office has
been restored, and that the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification has been remitted.
36

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of
the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions:

This is incorrect.

xxxx
(b) To vote and to be electedat genuine periodic elections which shall
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors[.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Recently, in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, the Court
unequivocally referred to the right to seek public elective office as a
political right, to wit:
35

Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office


specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their
right to run for public office. The petitioners failure to comply there with
in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on
September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to
seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her
Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective
office in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective
office is unequivocally considered as a political right. Hence, the Court
reiterates its earlier statement that the pardon granted to former
President Estrada admits no other interpretation other than to mean
that, upon acceptance of the pardon granted tohim, he regained his
FULL civil and political rights including the right to seek elective
office.

Her reliance on said opinions is utterly misplaced. Although the


learned views of Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Florentino P.
Feliciano are to be respected, they do not form partof the controlling
doctrine nor to be considered part of the law of the land. On the
contrary, a careful reading of the majority opinion in Monsanto, penned
by no less than Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, reveals no statement
that denotes adherence to a stringent and overly nuanced application
of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code that will in effect
require the President to use a statutorily prescribed language in
extending executive clemency, even if the intent of the President can
otherwise be deduced from the text or words used in the pardon.
Furthermore, as explained above, the pardon here is consistent with,
and not contrary to, the provisions of Articles 36 and 41.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of
the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.
Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for
any elective local position. Risos-Vidal argues that former President
Estrada is disqualified under item (a), to wit:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence[.] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Likewise, Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but it
provides for an exception, to wit:

Section 12. Disqualifications. x x x unless he has been given plenary


pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphasis supplied.)
As earlier stated, Risos-Vidal maintains that former President
Estradas conviction for plunder disqualifies him from running for the
elective local position of Mayor of the City of Manila under Section
40(a) of the LGC. However, the subsequent absolute pardon granted
to former President Estrada effectively restored his right to seek public
elective office. This is made possible by reading Section 40(a) of the
LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC.

committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither


makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that
former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a
condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil
and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a
preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or
preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment,
usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not
form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of
the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas
clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and
therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon
conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of
the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
40

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the


LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a
legal escape from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In
other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been
granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment
of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold
any public office, whether local or national position.
Take notice that the applicability of Section 12 of the OEC to
candidates running for local elective positions is not unprecedented. In
Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court acknowledged the
aforementioned provision as one of the legal remedies that may be
availed of to disqualify a candidate in a local election filed any day
after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than
the date of proclamation. The pertinent ruling in the Jalosjos case is
quoted as follows:
37

38

What is indisputably clear is that false material representation of


Jalosjos is a ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since
the false material representation arises from a crime penalized by
prision mayor, a petition under Section 12 ofthe Omnibus Election
Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also be
properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his
petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
on Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly
provides multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt
belongs to petitioner. (Emphasis supplied.)

41

On this matter, the Court quotes with approval a relevant excerpt of


COMELEC Commissioner Maria Gracia Padacas separate concurring
opinion in the assailed April 1, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC in
SPA No. 13-211 (DC), which captured the essence of the legal effect of
preambular paragraphs/whereas clauses, viz:
The present dispute does not raise anything which the 20 January
2010 Resolution did not conclude upon. Here, Petitioner Risos-Vidal
raised the same argument with respect to the 3rd "whereas clause" or
preambular paragraph of the decree of pardon. It states that "Joseph
Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office." On this contention, the undersigned reiterates the
ruling of the Commission that the 3rd preambular paragraph does not
have any legal or binding effect on the absolute nature of the pardon
extended by former President Arroyo to herein Respondent. This ruling
is consistent with the traditional and customary usage of preambular
paragraphs. In the case of Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, the
Supreme Court ruled on the legal effect of preambular paragraphs or
whereas clauses on statutes. The Court stated, viz.:

39

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the
pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of
the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely


an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of
rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its
operation much less prevail over its text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on


Respondents promise never to seek a public office again, the former
ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself.
Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the
decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd
preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon
extended to former President Estrada. (Emphasis supplied.)
42

Absent any contrary evidence, former President Arroyos silence on


former President Estradas decision torun for President in the May
2010 elections against, among others, the candidate of the political
party of former President Arroyo, after the latters receipt and
acceptance of the pardon speaks volume of her intention to restore
him to his rights to suffrage and to hold public office.
Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by
the President is in issue, the Court must turn to the only evidence
available to it, and that is the pardon itself. From a detailed review
ofthe four corners of said document, nothing therein gives an iota of
intimation that the third Whereas Clause is actually a limitation,
proviso, stipulation or condition on the grant of the pardon, such that
the breach of the mentioned commitment not to seek public office will
result ina revocation or cancellation of said pardon. To the Court, what
it is simply is a statement of fact or the prevailing situation at the time
the executive clemency was granted. It was not used as a condition to
the efficacy orto delimit the scope of the pardon.
Even if the Court were to subscribe to the view that the third Whereas
Clausewas one of the reasons to grant the pardon, the pardon itself
does not provide for the attendant consequence of the breach thereof.
This Court will be hard put to discern the resultant effect of an eventual
infringement. Just like it will be hard put to determine which civil or
political rights were restored if the Court were to take the road
suggested by Risos-Vidal that the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to
his civil and political rights" excludes the restoration of former
President Estradas rights to suffrage and to hold public office. The
aforequoted text ofthe executive clemency granted does not provide
the Court with any guide asto how and where to draw the line between
the included and excluded political rights.
Justice Leonen emphasizes the point that the ultimate issue for
resolution is not whether the pardon is contingent on the condition that
former President Estrada will not seek janother elective public office,
but it actually concerns the coverage of the pardon whether the

pardon granted to former President Estrada was so expansive as to


have restored all his political rights, inclusive of the rights of suffrage
and to hold public office. Justice Leonen is of the view that the pardon
in question is not absolute nor plenary in scope despite the statement
that former President Estrada is "hereby restored to his civil and
political rights," that is, the foregoing statement restored to former
President Estrada all his civil and political rights except the rights
denied to him by the unremitted penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification made up of, among others, the rights of suffrage and to
hold public office. He adds that had the President chosen to be so
expansive as to include the rights of suffrage and to hold public office,
she should have been more clear on her intentions.
However, the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights," to the mind of the Court, iscrystal clear the pardon granted to
former President Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was not only
unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in
character, as the term "political rights"adverted to has a settled
meaning in law and jurisprudence.
With due respect, I disagree too with Justice Leonen that the omission
of the qualifying word "full" can be construed as excluding the
restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. There
appears to be no distinction as to the coverage of the term "full political
rights" and the term "political rights" used alone without any
qualification. How to ascribe to the latter term the meaning that it is
"partial" and not "full" defies ones understanding. More so, it will be
extremely difficult to identify which of the political rights are restored by
the pardon, when the text of the latter is silent on this matter.
Exceptions to the grant of pardon cannot be presumed from the
absence of the qualifying word "full" when the pardon restored the
"political rights" of former President Estrada without any exclusion or
reservation.
Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that the pardon
granted to former President Estrada was absolute in the absence of a
clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or
support the Presidential intent to grant a limited pardon.
To reiterate, insofar as its coverageis concerned, the text of the pardon
can withstand close scrutiny even under the provisions of Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to


lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
In light of the foregoing, contrary to the assertions of Risos-Vidal, the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
The Court has consistently held that a petition for certiorariagainst
actions of the COMELEC is confined only to instances of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to patentand substantial denial of due process,
because the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters
falling within its domain.
43

As settled in jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary


exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the
whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to
an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to
act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be condemned as
having been done with grave abuse of discretion, such an abuse must
be patent and gross.
44

The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately


demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a "whimsical, arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion orrefusal to
perform a positive duty enjoined by law" or were so "patent and gross"
as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
On the foregoing premises and conclusions, this Court finds it
unnecessary to separately discuss Lim's petition-in-intervention, which
substantially presented the same arguments as Risos-Vidal's petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and petition-inintervention are
DISMISSED. The Resolution dated April 1, 2013 of the Commission on
Elections, Second Division, and the Resolution dated April 23, 2013 of
the Commission on Elections, En bane, both in SPA No. 13-211 (DC),
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON.


RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial

Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.


JIMENEZ, respondents.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule
vis--vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government.
His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his
fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield
him in times of need. The Court is now called to decide
whether to uphold a citizens basic due process rights, or the
governments ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle
sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful
guardian of the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following
factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is
founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the
Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of
crime both in the state where it was committed and the state
where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty
with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the
Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested
countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive
department and the courts in the proper implementation of
said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin
M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of

the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty


Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and the Government of the United States of America"
(hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty).
The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its
concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also
expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting
Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of
the documents accompanying an extradition request upon
certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer
of the requested state resident in the Requesting
State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from
the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No.
0522 containing a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to
the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the
warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern
District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said
extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private
respondent appears to be charged in the United States with
violation of the following provisions of the United States
Code (USC):
A)......18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit
offense or to defraud the United States; two [2]
counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
B)......26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or
defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5
years on each count);

C)......18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or


television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5
years on each count);
D)......18 USC 1001 (False statement or
entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5
years on each count);
E)......2 USC 441f (Election contributions in
name of another; thirty-three [33] counts;
Maximum Penalty less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No.
249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take
charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began
with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the
extradition request and the documents in support thereof.
The panel found that the "official English translation of
some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request
and that there are some other matters that needed to be
addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents,
private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated
July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the
official extradition request from the U. S. Government, as
well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and
that he be given ample time to comment on the request after
he shall have received copies of the requested papers.
Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on
the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.

Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be


given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the
United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the
Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondents July 1, 1999 letter,
petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received
by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the
foregoing requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with
copies of the extradition request and supporting
documents from the United States
Government, pending evaluation by this
Department of the sufficiency of the extradition
documents submitted in accordance with the
provisions of the extradition treaty and our
extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition
Treaty between the Philippines and the United
States enumerates the documentary
requirements and establishes the procedures
under which the documents submitted shall be
received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary
requirements under our domestic law are also
set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the
aforementioned documents is not a preliminary
investigation nor akin to preliminary
investigation of criminal cases. We merely
determine whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law and treaty
have been complied with by the Requesting
Government. The constitutionally guaranteed

rights of the accused in all criminal


prosecutions are therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for
extradition when the person sought to be
extradited will be furnished by the court with
copies of the petition, request and extradition
documents and this Department will not pose
any objection to a request for ample time to
evaluate said documents.
2. The formal request for extradition of the
United States contains grand jury information
and documents obtained through grand jury
process covered by strict secrecy rules under
United States law. The United States had to
secure orders from the concerned District
Courts authorizing the United States to disclose
certain grand jury information to Philippine
government and law enforcement personnel for
the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any
further disclosure of the said information is not
authorized by the United States District Courts.
In this particular extradition request the United
States Government requested the Philippine
Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure
of the subject information. This Departments
denial of your request is consistent with Article
7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which
provides that the Philippine Government must
represent the interests of the United States in
any proceedings arising out of a request for
extradition. The Department of Justice under
P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign
governments in all extradition requests.

3. This Department is not in a position to hold


in abeyance proceedings in connection with an
extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which
we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith".
Extradition is a tool of criminal law
enforcement and to be effective, requests for
extradition or surrender of accused or
convicted persons must be processed
expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999,
private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and
the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation,
for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private
respondent the extradition documents, to give him access
thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or
oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the
request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set
aside herein petitioners letter dated July 13, 1999); and
prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the
extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in
court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the
extradition of private respondent to the United States), with
an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105,
Rollo).

The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No.


99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional
trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the
Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August
9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved
that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the
same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated
the previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the
respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice,
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, their agents and/or
representatives to maintain the status quo by
refraining from committing the acts
complained of; from conducting further
proceedings in connection with the request of
the United States Government for the
extradition of the petitioner; from filing the
corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial
court; and from performing any act directed to
the extradition of the petitioner to the United
States, for a period of twenty (20) days from
service on respondents of this Order, pursuant
to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court
shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed
upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is

set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 oclock in the


morning. The respondents are, likewise,
ordered to file their written comment and/or
opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings,
arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
BECAUSE:
I.

BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO


REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS
COMPLAINED OF, I. E., TO DESIST FROM
REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT
ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL
EXTRADITION REQUEST AND
DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON,
OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE
MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR
MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND

PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT,


GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN
ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE
MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.

PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY


PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING
LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE
EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE
PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;

Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C.


Lantion, your agents, representatives or any
person or persons acting in your place or stead
are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST
from enforcing the assailed order dated August
9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil
Case No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G.
DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of
the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)

III.

THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS),


CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON
ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND
SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO


RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS
PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND
WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE
INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent
to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a
temporary restraining order (TRO)
providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately
and continuing until further orders from this

The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999,


after which the parties, as directed, filed their respective
memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural
and substantive issues are patent. However, a review of
these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both
parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the
pleadings: During the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic
due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative
answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial
court, moot and academic (the issues of which are
substantially the same as those before us now), while a
negative resolution would call for the immediate lifting of
the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus
allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the
filing of the extradition petition with the proper regional trial
court. Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is
adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this

entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and


obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would
indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between private
respondents basic due process rights and the provisions of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has
elected to go directly into the substantive merits of the case,
brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the
propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the
issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial
court.
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition
procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was
executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the
implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069,
also called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a)
thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an accused
from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state
or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a
penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of
the requesting state or government." The portions of the
Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged
and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the
Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:

1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge


and the warrant of arrest issued by the authority of the
Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or
some other instruments having equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested,
with the fullest particulars as to the name and identity of the
accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the
acts or omissions complained of, and the time and place of
the commission of these acts;
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the
contents of said law, and the designation or description of
the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the
request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the
request.
(Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Section 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the
duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently
provides:
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet
the requirements of this law and the relevant
treaty or convention, he shall forward the
request together with the related documents to
the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an attorney in his
office to take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the
executive authority given the task of evaluating the

sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is


the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage
of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RPUS Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must
ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information
which describe the identity and probable location of the
person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural
history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the
essential elements of the offense for which extradition is
requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the
punishment for the offense;
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any
time limit on the prosecution or the execution of punishment
for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information
specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said Article, as
applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested
State, would provide probable cause for his arrest and
committal for trial if the offense had been committed there;

8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge


or other competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must
also see to it that the accompanying documents received in
support of the request had been certified by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State
resident in the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052
from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the
Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides
that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive
authority of the Requested State determines that the request
is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military
offense which is not punishable under non-military penal
legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that
the extradition request and its supporting documents are
sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall
deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall
immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office
to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P. D.
No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written
petition with the proper regional trial court of the province
or city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition
request under consideration (Paragraph
[2], ibid.).

The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt


of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable,
issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to
appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed
in the order. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it
appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of
the accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph
[1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the
prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether
the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special
proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof
provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the
provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and
not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings,
shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree
provides that the attorney having charge of the case may,
upon application by the Requesting State, represent the latter
throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a
decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons
therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima
facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said
decision is appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose
decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section
12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing
appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply
in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day
period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).

The trial court determines whether or not the offense


mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the
application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions
mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The
trial court also determines whether or not the offense for
which extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph
[1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as
backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the
nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the
only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition
petition after the request and all the supporting papers are
forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is
the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the
extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under
Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether
or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense
is a military offense which is not punishable under nonmilitary penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided
in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the
Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the
extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us,
it would appear that there was failure to abide by the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is
true that the extradition request was delivered to the
Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the
following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of
Justice received the request, apparently without the
Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of

thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying


documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the
Department of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this
regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he
simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice,
indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of
Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities.
Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to
determine the completeness of the documents and to
evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the
requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RPUS Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this
connection that although the Department of Justice had no
obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the
Department also had to go over them so as to be able to
prepare an extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 2425). Notably, it was also at this stage where private
respondent insisted on the following: (1) the right to be
furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right
to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of
time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in
support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation
proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing of
private respondent's opposition to the request.
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of
their duties and authority, one abdicating its powers and the
other enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign
Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a
manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its
own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to
evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private
respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.

Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of


regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly
reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents
and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the
request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements
of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field
of law, could not privately review the papers all by himself.
He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How
then could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less
than one day, make the more authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings
proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not
a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it
is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage,
the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a
technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of
the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if
on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the
crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a
determination whether or not the request is politically
motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August
31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article
3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be
characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in
contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an
administrative bodys quasi-judicial power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves:
(a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts
based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an
order or decision supported by the facts proved (De
Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198,
citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial

power, which is also known as examining or investigatory


power, is one of the determinative powers of an
administrative body which better enables it to exercise its
quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law,
1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body
to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the
activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction
(Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by
means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses,
production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p.
64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing,
and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agencys performance of its rule-making or
quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is
indispensable to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the
Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an
investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It
does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited
to investigating the facts and making findings in respect
thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether
an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or
merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the
exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights
and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only
purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted
before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to
it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence
of judicial discretion and judgment.

The above description in Ruperto applies to an


administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition
documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard
to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State
and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to
determine whether the papers comply with the requirements
of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the
basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely
initial and not final. The body has no power to determine
whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the
role of the court. The bodys power is limited to an initial
finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed
in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary
investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by
certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels
of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the
deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This
deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the
provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the
submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty
provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may
request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending
presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US
Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged
after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4).
Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period
of 20 days after which the arrested person could be
discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the
Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only
mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested
State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously
detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5],
Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be

discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the


purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight
from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of
the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree
No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective
extraditees liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It
is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very
imminent one.
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that
the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency
conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of
which are essentially criminal since such technical
assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and
ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective
extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool"
for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence,
therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a
criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had
occasion to make available to a respondent in an
administrative case or investigation certain constitutional
rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal
prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice
Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights
formerly available only at the trial stage that had been
advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the
right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn,
August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).

In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344


[1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination
under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends
to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or
penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a
licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which
could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine
if found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal
vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the
revocation of ones license as a medical practitioner, is an
even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative
charge of unexplained wealth against a respondent which
was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft
Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation
may result in forfeiture of property, the administrative
proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such
forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the
earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]),
where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid down
the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or
criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute such that if an
indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the
criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature,
although it may be civil in form; and where it must be
gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be
criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If,
however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of
the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is
civil in nature.
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of
deprivation of ones property or property right. No less is this

true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it


does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed
second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over
property, for while forfeited property can be returned or
replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and
beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request
exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country,
thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the
process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may have
the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the
respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation,
which may result in the filing of an information against the
respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the
deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioners reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235
SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, Petitioners Memorandum) that the
extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation
nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is
not authority for petitioners conclusion that his preliminary
processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The
characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the
applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law.
It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice,
information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
"any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the
discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the

general public good, which regards and preserves these


principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due
process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516).
Compliance with due process requirements cannot be
deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual
concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in
their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States
accord common due process protection to their respective
citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine
Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical
language and terminology, but more importantly, they are
alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have
expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are
informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation,
their dynamic and resilient character which make them
capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having
been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the
exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The
requirements of due process are interpreted in both the
United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law
the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this
effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal
straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of
the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process
of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of
cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78).
Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea
of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owners
Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849
[1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice

which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden


vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive
due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law
in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty,
or property, and procedural due process which consists of
the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the
guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent
tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic
rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and
civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well.
Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the
proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any
pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they
may claim the right to appear therein and present their side
and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative
investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court guarantees the respondents basic due process rights,
granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the
complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents,
and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof.
Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all
other evidence submitted by the complainant.
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable
in certain instances, such as:

1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for


immediate action, like the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive
suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges
(Section 63, Local Government Code, B. P. Blg. 337), the
padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene
movies or like establishments which are immediate threats
to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a
passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that
is, where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the
right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice
to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and
levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the
replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but
the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query
may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings fall under any of the described situations
mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition
proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the
subject treaty involves the U.S.
Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate
rendition or extradition which is based on the Extradition
Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and
international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition
or extradition, the governor of the asylum state has the duty

to deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The


Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a
liberal construction to carry out their manifest purpose,
which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible of persons
for trial to the state in which they have been charged with
crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve
extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or
the demand must be in proper form, and all the elements or
jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear
on the face of the papers, such as the allegation that the
person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the
offense charged was committed, and that the person
demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or
that prosecution has been begun in the demanding state
before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The
extradition documents are then filed with the governor of the
asylum state, and must contain such papers and documents
prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the
instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such
as an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate.
Statutory requirements with respect to said charging
instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are
necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the governor of
the asylum state to effect the extradition (35 C.J.S. 408410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of
the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of
conviction or sentence and other instruments
accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished
and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is directory.
However, the right being such a basic one has been held to
be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex
parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex
parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853).

In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally


provide for the presentation to the executive authority of the
Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of
the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular
officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding
nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioners memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he
attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the
Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice,
summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles,
which are basically governed by a combination of treaties
(with special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty),
federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the
diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for the
provisional arrest of an individual may be made directly by
the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department
of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional
arrest, a formal request for extradition is transmitted
subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming
Philippine extradition request to the Department of Justice.
Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a
declaration confirming that a formal request has been made,
that the treaty is in full force and effect, that under Article 17
thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal representation in
extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as
extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the
documents have been authenticated in accordance with the
federal statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequent
extradition hearing.

3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a


warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18
U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold
a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the
extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the
person arrested is extraditable to the foreign country. The
court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the
defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the
defendant is being sought for offenses for which the
applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is
probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person
sought and that he committed the offenses charged
(Ibid.)
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction
to certify extraditability after having received a "complaint
made under oath, charging any person found within his
jurisdiction" with having committed any of the crimes
provided for by the governing treaty in the country
requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a
long line of American decisions pronounce that international
extradition proceedings partake of the character of a
preliminary examination before a committing magistrate,
rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged
fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for
extradition are present, it incorporates its determinations in
factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the
persons extraditability. The court then forwards this
certification of extraditability to the Department of State for
disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate decision

whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary


of State (18 U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate
questions concerning the motives of the requesting
government in seeking his extradition. However, a person
facing extradition may present whatever information he
deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the
final determination whether to surrender an individual to the
foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United
States, extradition begins and ends with one entity the
Department of State which has the power to evaluate the
request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and,
in the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or
not to act on the courts determination of extraditability. In
the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs
which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and
having satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see
pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of
Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for
extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the
request to the Department of Justice which has taken over
the task of evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so
warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition for
extradition.
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the
U.S. Government should the person sought to be extradited
be given due process rights by the Philippines in the
evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioners primary
concern is the possible delay in the evaluation process.

We agree with private respondents citation of an American


Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious
procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a
proper state interest worthy of cognizance in
constitutional adjudication. But the
Constitution recognizes higher values than
speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly
say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the
Due Process Clause, in particular, that they
were designed to protect the fragile values of a
vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing
concern for efficiency and efficacy that may
characterize praiseworthy government officials
no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same
interest as the Philippine Government that no
right that of liberty secured not only by the
Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution
but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at
the altar of expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondents
Memorandum.)
In the Philippine context, this Courts ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic
system is that where the rights of the individual
are concerned, the end does not justify the
means. It is not enough that there be a valid
objective; it is also necessary that the means

employed to pursue it be in keeping with the


Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse
constitutional shortcuts. There is no question
that not even the strongest moral conviction or
the most urgent public need, subject only to a
few notable exceptions, will excuse the
bypassing of an individuals rights. It is no
exaggeration to say that a person invoking a
right guaranteed under Article III of the
Constitution is a majority of one even as
against the rest of the nation who would deny
him that right (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343,
375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioners argument that
extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be
effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused
or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and
adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always
incompatible. They do not always clash in discord.
Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry
a disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered
liberty."
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the
evaluation stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in
the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not
occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum
state may not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be
compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close
evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal
and statutory requirements, which are significantly

jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819).


Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority
of the requested state has the power to deny the behest from
the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful
examination of the extradition documents the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the
requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not forward
the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the
extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid
requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction
to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of
Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with
the requirements of the law and the treaty since it even
informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the
extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and
without the official English translation, and those that are
not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits
that consultation meetings are still supposed to take place
between the lawyers in his Department and those from the
U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the
evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an
abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how then
can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently necessitates
immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can
be dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is
tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a
later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity
and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On
one hand, there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the
other, it results in an administrative determination which, if

adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate


incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to the filing
of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as
Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him),
faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition
petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation
proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed
under the treaty and the implementing law. The prejudice to
the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of
administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and
shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution,
private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III
which reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are
available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right
to information on matters of public concern, and (2) the
corollary right of access to official records and documents.
The general right guaranteed by said provision is the right to
information on matters of public concern. In its
implementation, the right of access to official records is

likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are


"subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Bernas,
The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p.
104) and rely on the premise that ultimately it is an informed
and critical public opinion which alone can protect the
values of democratic government (Ibid.).

deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to


be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not
exactly the right to information on matters of public
concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he
invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private


respondents letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall
under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the
matters contained in the documents requested are not of
public concern. On the other hand, private respondent argues
that the distinction between matters vested with public
interest and matters which are of purely private interest only
becomes material when a third person, who is not directly
affected by the matters requested, invokes the right to
information. However, if the person invoking the right is the
one directly affected thereby, his right to information
becomes absolute.

The right to information is implemented by the right of


access to information within the control of the government
(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be
contained in official records, and in documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.

The concept of matters of public concern escapes exact


definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in
the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of
public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept
embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
want to know, either because these directly affect their lives
or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150
SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the
people and any citizen has "standing".
When the individual himself is involved in official
government action because said action has a direct bearing
on his life, and may either cause him some kind of

In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent


pertain to official government action from the U. S.
Government. No official action from our country has yet
been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to
matters of foreign relations with the U. S. Government.
Consequently, if a third party invokes this constitutional
provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of
public concern since they may result in the extradition of a
Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such
particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the
proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation
procedure, no official governmental action of our own
government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of
the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the
extradition hearing would already fall under matters of
public concern, because our government by then shall have
already made an official decision to grant the extradition
request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be
forthcoming.

We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject


matter of the instant controversy: Would private respondents
entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of
the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty?
Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a
conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the
Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the
proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the
provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the
Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves
only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice
and hearing to private respondent on foreign
relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most
fundamental maxims of international law, requires the
parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good
faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a
treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines
renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of
international law form part of the law of the land and no
further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public
International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in

which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of


international law and the provisions of the constitution or
statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard
for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited
constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law,
1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict
is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts
are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it
in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact
that international law has been made part of the law of the
land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the
municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied
in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are
given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a
statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may
be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
(Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between
international law and municipal or national law? En
contrario, these two components of the law of the land are
not pitted against each other. There is no occasion to choose

which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in


the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards
the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the
evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the
procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the
extradition petition and during the judicial determination of
the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing
are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However,
prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to
the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.

the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys.


The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by
petitioners revelation that everything it refuses to make
available at this stage would be obtainable during trial. The
Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court
concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury
information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil
of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition
proceedings. Not even during trial.

Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these


rights. Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure
as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of
the extradition request and the supporting documents.

One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the


Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and
procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the
conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in
jurisprudence for an application by analogy.

We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply
the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due
process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the
treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the
Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective
extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and
procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in
interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the
prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the
extradition documents from the governor of the asylum
state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same
becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure
of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding

A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.

Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the


evaluation process and a preliminary investigation since
both procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or
the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a
provisional arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the
Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec.
20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioners
theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does
this imply that for a period of time, the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article
III of the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in
cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety
requires it"? Petitioners theory would also infer that bail is
not available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee

when the extradition petition has already been filed in court


since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide
therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended " Can petitioner validly argue
that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and
hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees
in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto?

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that


"the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is
an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of
(Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC,
273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1
[1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315
[1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602
[1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In
essence, procedural due process refers to the method or
manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United
Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31
[1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of
constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or
treaty. Petitioners fears that the Requesting State may have
valid objections to the Requested States non-performance of
its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are
insubstantial and should not be given paramount
consideration.

How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty?


Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential
Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government
Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA
661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271
SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary
proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing
for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in
Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing
its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and
Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for
Members of the Integrated National Police who may be
charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the
Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although
summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity
of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due
process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
... [I]t is clear to us that what the opening
sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an
employee may be removed or dismissed even
without formal investigation, in certain
instances. It is equally clear to us that an
employee must be informed of the charges
preferred against him, and that the normal way
by which the employee is so informed is by
furnishing him with a copy of the charges
against him. This is a basic procedural
requirement that a statute cannot dispense with
and still remain consistent with the
constitutional provision on due process. The

second minimum requirement is that the


employee charged with some misfeasance or
malfeasance must have a reasonable
opportunity to present his side of the matter,
that is to say, his defenses against the charges
levelled against him and to present evidence in
support of his defenses.
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious
in nature, yet we upheld the due process rights of the
respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a
clear and present danger of loss of property or employment,
but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his
forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of
petitioners favorable action on the extradition request and
the deprivation of private respondents liberty is easily
comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity
jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside
legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith
Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530
[1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677
[1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not
even call for "justice outside legality," since private
respondents due process rights, although not guaranteed by
statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional
guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the
land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against
the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with

the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is


premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and
opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he
must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest
an errant and wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of
the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to
grant him a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil
Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and
academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered
dismissed.
SO ORDERED

WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE


COSETENG, as members of the Philippine
Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO
ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as
members of the House of Representatives
and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and
HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers;
CIVIL
LIBERTIES
UNION,
NATIONAL
ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM
ASSOCIATION,
CENTER
FOR
ALTERNATIVE
DEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN
FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL
RECONSTRUCTION
MOVEMENT,
DEMOKRATIKONG
KILUSAN
NG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and
PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in
representation of various taxpayers and as
non-governmental
organizations, petitioners,
vs. EDGARDO
ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA
RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ,
AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON,
NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA,
JOSE
LINA,
GLORIA
MACAPAGALARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS
OPLE, JOHN OSMEA, SANTANINA RASUL,
RAMON
REVILLA,
RAUL
ROCO,
FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in
their respective capacities as members of
the Philippine Senate who concurred in the

ratification by the President of the


Philippines of the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget
and
Management;
CARIDAD
VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National
Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Trade and
Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his
capacity as Secretary of Agriculture;
ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as
Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO,
in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his
capacity
as
Executive
Secretary,respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World


Trade Organization, abetted by the membership
thereto of the vast majority of countries has
revolutionized international business and economic
relations amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled
the world towards trade liberalization and economic
globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation
and privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are
ushering in a new borderless world of business by
sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretofore
traditional modes of promoting and protecting national
economies like tariffs, export subsidies, import quotas,
quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency
controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best

in specific industries in a market-driven and exportoriented global scenario are replacing age-old beggarthy-neighbor policies that unilaterally protect weak and
inefficient domestic producers of goods and
services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known
management guru, Increased participation in the world
economy has become the key to domestic economic
growth and prosperity.
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation
wrought by the Second World War, plans for the
establishment of three multilateral institutions -inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations
-- were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton
Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was
to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of warravaged and later developing countries; the second,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to
deal with currency problems; and the third, the
International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to
foster order and predictability in world trade and to
minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite
challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However,
for a variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by
the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB,
never took off. What remained was only GATT -- the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a
collection of treaties governing access to the
economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized
body administering the agreements or dependable
system of dispute settlement.

After half a century and several dizzying rounds of


negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo
Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave
birth to that administering body -- the World Trade
Organization -- with the signing of the Final Act in
Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO
Agreement by its members.
[1]

Like many other developing countries, the


Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the
goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two
letters to the Senate (infra), of improving Philippine
access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products. The
President also saw in the WTO the opening of new
opportunities for the services sector x x x, (the
reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with
exporting x x x, and (the attraction of) more
investments into the country.Although the Chief
Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the
Philippines - - and this is of special interest to the legal
profession - - will benefit from the WTO system of
dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the
independent WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute
Settlement
Panels
and
(2)
Appellate
Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were settled
mainly through negotiations where solutions were
arrived at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining
strengths,
and
where
naturally, weak
and
underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.
The Petition in Brief

Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the


Philippines to place nationals and products of membercountries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products and (2) that the WTO intrudes, limits and/or
impairs the constitutional powers of both Congress and
the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this
Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a selfreliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to
qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use
of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods.
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution
prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization? Does it
prescribe Philippine integration into a global economy
that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These
are the main questions raised in this petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on
constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the
Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of
the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for
brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation
and enforcement through the release and utilization of
public funds, the assignment of public officials and
employees, as well as the use of government
properties and resources by respondent-heads of
various executive offices concerned therewith. This
concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97,
dated December 14, 1994.

The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro,
then
Secretary
of
the Department of Trade and Industry
(Secretary
Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh,
Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act,
for brevity).
By signing the Final Act, Secretary Navarro on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
[2]

(a)tosubmit,asappropriate,theWTOAgreementforthe
considerationoftheirrespectivecompetentauthorities,with
aviewtoseekingapprovaloftheAgreementinaccordance
withtheirprocedures;and
(b)toadopttheMinisterialDeclarationsandDecisions.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine
Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from
the President of the Philippines, stating among others
that the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted
to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section
21, Article VII of the Constitution.
[3]

On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine


Senate received another letter from the President of
the Philippines likewise dated August 11, 1994, which
stated among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act,
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate
[4]

for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of


the Constitution.
On December 9, 1994, the President of the
Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate
adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled Concurring
in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization.
[5]

On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate


adopted Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is
hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby
concurs, in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization. The text of the WTO Agreement
is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations and includes various agreements and
associated legal instruments (identified in the said
Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and
collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade
Agreements, for brevity) as follows:
[6]

ANNEX1
Annex1A:MultilateralAgreementonTradeinGoods
GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade
1994

AgreementonTextilesandClothing
AgreementonTechnicalBarriersto
Trade
AgreementonTradeRelatedInvestment
Measures
AgreementonImplementationofArticle
VIoftheGeneralAgreementon
TariffsandTrade1994
AgreementonImplementationofArticle
VIIoftheGeneralonTariffsand
Trade1994
AgreementonPreShipmentInspection
AgreementonRulesofOrigin
AgreementonImportsLicensing
Procedures
AgreementonSubsidiesand
CoordinatingMeasures
AgreementonSafeguards

AgreementonAgriculture

Annex1B:GeneralAgreementonTradeinServicesand
Annexes

AgreementontheApplicationof
Sanitaryand

Annex1C:AgreementonTradeRelatedAspectsof
IntellectualPropertyRights

PhytosanitaryMeasures

ANNEX2

UnderstandingonRulesandProcedures
GoverningtheSettlementofDisputes
ANNEX3
TradePolicyReviewMechanism
On December 16, 1994, the President of the
Philippines signed the Instrument of Ratification,
declaring:
[7]

NOWTHEREFORE,beitknownthatI,FIDELV.
RAMOS,PresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,after
havingseenandconsideredtheaforementionedAgreement
EstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganizationandthe
agreementsandassociatedlegalinstrumentsincludedin
Annexesone(1),two(2)andthree(3)ofthatAgreement
whichareintegralpartsthereof,signedatMarrakesh,
Moroccoon15April1994,doherebyratifyandconfirmthe
sameandeveryArticleandClausethereof.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the
President of the Philippines is composed of the
Agreement Proper and the associated legal
instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and
three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts
thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by
Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO
Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned)
but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions
and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13,

1996, the Solicitor General describes these two latter


documents as follows:
[8]

TheMinisterialDecisionsandDeclarationsaretwentyfive
declarationsanddecisionsonawiderangeofmatters,such
asmeasuresinfavorofleastdevelopedcountries,
notificationprocedures,relationshipofWTOwiththe
InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF),andagreementson
technicalbarrierstotradeandondisputesettlement.
TheUnderstandingonCommitmentsinFinancialServices
dwellon,amongotherthings,standstillorlimitationsand
qualificationsofcommitmentstoexistingnonconforming
measures,marketaccess,nationaltreatment,anddefinitions
ofnonresidentsupplieroffinancialservices,commercial
presenceandnewfinancialservice.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was
filed. After careful deliberation on respondents
comment and petitioners reply thereto, the Court
resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to
the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their
respective memoranda. The Court also requested the
Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador
to the United Nations stationed in Geneva,
Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as
Bautista Paper, for brevity, (1) providing a historical
background of and (2) summarizing the said
agreements.
[9]

During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996,


the Court directed:

(a)thepetitionerstosubmitthe(1)SenateCommittee
Reportonthematterincontroversyand(2)thetranscriptof
proceedings/hearingsintheSenate;and
(b)theSolicitorGeneral,ascounselforrespondents,tofile
(1)alistofPhilippinetreatiessignedpriortothePhilippine
adherencetotheWTOAgreement,whichderogatefrom
Philippinesovereigntyand(2)copiesofthemultivolume
WTOAgreementandotherdocumentsmentionedinthe
FinalAct,assoonaspossible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court
said it would consider the case submitted for
resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16,
1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of
the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated
October 24, 1996, he listed the various bilateral or
multilateral treaties or international instruments
involving
derogation
of
Philippine
sovereignty. Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted
their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January
30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996,
petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
A.Whetherthepetitionpresentsapoliticalquestionoris
otherwisenotjusticiable.

B.WhetherthepetitionermembersoftheSenatewho
participatedinthedeliberationsandvotingleadingto
theconcurrenceareestoppedfromimpugningthe
validityoftheAgreementEstablishingtheWorld
TradeOrganizationorofthevalidityofthe
concurrence.
C.WhethertheprovisionsoftheAgreement
EstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganization
contravenetheprovisionsofSec.19,ArticleII,and
Secs.10and12,ArticleXII,allofthe1987
PhilippineConstitution.
D.WhetherprovisionsoftheAgreementEstablishing
theWorldTradeOrganizationundulylimit,restrict
andimpairPhilippinesovereigntyspecificallythe
legislativepowerwhich,underSec.2,ArticleVI,
1987PhilippineConstitutionisvestedinthe
CongressofthePhilippines;
E.WhetherprovisionsoftheAgreementEstablishing
theWorldTradeOrganizationinterferewiththe
exerciseofjudicialpower.
F.WhethertherespondentmembersoftheSenateacted
ingraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackor
excessofjurisdictionwhentheyvotedfor
concurrenceintheratificationoftheconstitutionally
infirmAgreementEstablishingtheWorldTrade
Organization.
G.WhethertherespondentmembersoftheSenateacted
ingraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackor
excessofjurisdictionwhentheyconcurredonlyin

theratificationoftheAgreementEstablishingthe
WorldTradeOrganization,andnotwiththe
PresidentialsubmissionwhichincludedtheFinal
Act,MinisterialDeclarationandDecisions,andthe
UnderstandingonCommitmentsinFinancial
Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel
for respondents synthesized the several issues raised
by petitioners into the following:
[10]

1.WhetherornottheprovisionsoftheAgreement
EstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganizationandthe
AgreementsandAssociatedLegalInstrumentsincludedin
Annexesone(1),two(2)andthree(3)ofthatagreement
citedbypetitionersdirectlycontraveneorunderminethe
letter,spiritandintentofSection19,ArticleIIandSections
10and12,ArticleXIIofthe1987Constitution.
2.WhetherornotcertainprovisionsoftheAgreement
undulylimit,restrictorimpairtheexerciseoflegislative
powerbyCongress.
3.WhetherornotcertainprovisionsoftheAgreement
impairtheexerciseofjudicialpowerbythisHonorable
Courtinpromulgatingtherulesofevidence.
4.WhetherornottheconcurrenceoftheSenateinthe
ratificationbythePresidentofthePhilippinesofthe
AgreementestablishingtheWorldTradeOrganization
impliedrejectionofthetreatyembodiedintheFinalAct.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the
seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General

has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the


petition presents a political question or is otherwise not
justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the
Senate (Wigberto E. Taada and Anna Dominique
Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit; and (3)
whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted
in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for
concurrence in the ratification of the WTO
Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court
resolved to deal with these three issues thus:
(1)Thepoliticalquestionissuebeingveryfundamental
andvital,andbeingamatterthatprobesintothevery
jurisdictionofthisCourttohearanddecidethiscasewas
deliberateduponbytheCourtandwillthusberuleduponas
thefirstissue;
(2)Thematterofestoppelwillnotbetakenupbecausethis
defenseiswaivableandtherespondentshaveeffectively
waiveditbynotpursuingitinanyoftheirpleadings;inany
event,thisissue,evenifruledinrespondentsfavor,willnot
causethepetitionsdismissalastherearepetitionersother
thanthetwosenators,whoarenotvulnerabletothedefense
ofestoppel;and
(3)Theissueofallegedgraveabuseofdiscretiononthepart
oftherespondentsenatorswillbetakenupasanintegral
partofthedispositionofthefourissuesraisedbythe
SolicitorGeneral.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court
noted that the respondents did not question the locus
standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to
have waived the benefit of such issue.They probably

realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures


of public funds and serious international commitments
of the nation are involved here, and that
transcendental public interest requires that the
substantive issues be met head on and decided on the
merits, rather than skirted or deflected by procedural
matters.

(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE


CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES
THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION
OVER
WHICH
THIS
COURT
HAS
NO
JURISDICTION?

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate


on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition
no
doubt
raises
a
justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed
is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the
application or interpretation of a constitutional provision
is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it
becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by
constitutional mandate to decide.

(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT


AND ITS THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC.
19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE
XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the


matters raised in the petition is clearly set out in the
1987 Constitution, as follows:

(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND


ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE
EXERCISE
OF
LEGISLATIVE
POWER
BY
CONGRESS?

Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticeto
settleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegally
demandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetheror
nottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingto
lackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchor
instrumentalityofthegovernment.

[11]

To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon


shortly are:

(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR


INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL
POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING
RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE
WTO
AGREEMENT
AND
ITS
ANNEXES
SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT
IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT,
MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS,
AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS
IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?

The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction


Over the Controversy?

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial


departments duty and power to strike down grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government including Congress. It is
an innovation in our political law. As explained by
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether
or not a branch of government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or
[16]

[17]

so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion


amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction


on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO
Agreement and its three annexes.

As this Court has repeatedly and firmly


emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress
from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to
uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave
abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate
cases,
committed
by
any
officer,
agency,
instrumentality or department of the government.

Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic


Nationalism

[18]

As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion


and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no
hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be
given due course and the vital questions raised therein
ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Indeed, certiorari,
prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional
issues
and
to
review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and
executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take
jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review
the wisdom of the decision of the President and the
Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass
upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy
espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule
on the propriety of the governments economic policy of
reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative
restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it
will only exercise its constitutional duty to determine
whether or not there had been a grave abuse of

This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the


petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the letter, spirit
and intent of the Constitution mandating economic
nationalism are violated by the so-called parity
provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in
various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its
annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and
Declarations and in the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services.
Specifically, the flagship constitutional provisions
referred to are Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12,
Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as
follows:
ArticleII
DECLARATIONOFPRINCIPLESANDSTATE
POLICIES
xx xx xx xx
Sec.19.TheStateshalldevelopaselfreliantand
independentnationaleconomyeffectivelycontrolledby
Filipinos.

TRIMthatisinconsistentwiththeprovisionsof
ArticleIIIorArticleXIofGATT1994.

xx xx xx xx
ArticleXII
NATIONALECONOMYANDPATRIMONY
xx xx xx xx
Sec.10.xxx.TheCongressshallenactmeasuresthatwill
encouragetheformationandoperationofenterpriseswhose
capitaliswhollyownedbyFilipinos.
Inthegrantofrights,privileges,andconcessionscovering
thenationaleconomyandpatrimony,theStateshallgive
preferencetoqualifiedFilipinos.
xx xx xx xx

2.AnIllustrativelistofTRIMSthatareinconsistent
withtheobligationsofgeneraleliminationof
quantitativerestrictionsprovidedforinparagraph
IofArticleXIofGATT1994iscontainedinthe
AnnextothisAgreement.(AgreementonTrade
RelatedInvestmentMeasures,Vol.27,Uruguay
Round,LegalInstruments,p.22121,emphasis
supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
ANNEX
IllustrativeList

Sec.12.TheStateshallpromotethepreferentialuseof
Filipinolabor,domesticmaterialsandlocallyproduced
goods,andadoptmeasuresthathelpmakethemcompetitive.
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional
principles are desecrated by the following WTO
provisions quoted in their memorandum:
[19]

a)Intheareaofinvestmentmeasuresrelatedtotradein
goods(TRIMS,forbrevity):
Article2
NationalTreatmentandQuantitativeRestrictions.
1.Withoutprejudicetootherrightsandobligations
underGATT1994.noMembershallapplyany

1.TRIMSthatareinconsistentwiththeobligationof
nationaltreatmentprovidedforinparagraph4of
ArticleIIIofGATT1994includethosewhichare
mandatoryorenforceableunderdomesticlawor
underadministrativerulings,orcompliancewith
whichisnecessarytoobtainanadvantage,and
whichrequire:
(a)thepurchaseorusebyanenterpriseofproducts
ofdomesticoriginorfromanydomesticsource,
whetherspecifiedintermsofparticularproducts,
intermsofvolumeorvalueofproducts,orin
termsofproportionofvolumeorvalueofits
localproduction;or

(b)thatanenterprisespurchasesoruseofimported
productsbelimitedtoanamountrelatedtothe
volumeorvalueoflocalproductsthatitexports.
2.TRIMSthatareinconsistentwiththeobligationsof
generaleliminationofquantitativerestrictions
providedforinparagraph1ofArticleXIofGATT
1994includethosewhicharemandatoryor
enforceableunderdomesticlawsorunder
administrativerulings,orcompliancewithwhichis
necessarytoobtainanadvantage,andwhichrestrict:
(a)theimportationbyanenterpriseofproductsused
inorrelatedtothelocalproductionthatit
exports;
(b)theimportationbyanenterpriseofproductsused
inorrelatedtoitslocalproductionbyrestricting
itsaccesstoforeignexchangeinflowsattributable
totheenterprise;or
(c)theexportationorsaleforexportspecifiedin
termsofparticularproducts,intermsofvolume
orvalueofproducts,orintermsofapreparation
ofvolumeorvalueofitslocal
production.(AnnextotheAgreementonTrade
RelatedInvestmentMeasures,Vol.27,Uruguay
RoundLegalDocuments,p.22125,emphasis
supplied).
Theparagraph4ofArticleIIIofGATT1994referredtois
quotedasfollows:

Theproductsoftheterritoryofanycontractingparty
importedintotheterritoryofanyothercontracting
partyshallbeaccordedtreatmentnolessfavorablethan
thataccordedtolikeproductsofnationaloriginin
respectoflaws,regulationsandrequirementsaffectingtheir
internalsale,offeringforsale,purchase,transportation,
distributionoruse.theprovisionsofthisparagraphshallnot
preventtheapplicationofdifferentialinternaltransportation
chargeswhicharebasedexclusivelyontheeconomic
operationofthemeansoftransportandnotonthe
nationalityoftheproduct.(ArticleIII,GATT1947,as
amendedbytheProtocolModifyingPartII,andArticle
XXVIofGATT,14September1948,62UMTS8284in
relationtoparagraph1(a)oftheGeneralAgreementon
TariffsandTrade1994,Vol.1,UruguayRound,Legal
Instrumentsp.177,emphasissupplied).
b)Intheareaoftraderelatedaspectsofintellectual
propertyrights(TRIPS,forbrevity):
EachMembershallaccordtothenationalsofother
Memberstreatmentnolessfavourablethanthatit
accordstoitsownnationalswithregardtotheprotection
ofintellectualproperty...(par.1,Article3,Agreementon
TradeRelatedAspectofIntellectualPropertyrights,Vol.
31,UruguayRound,LegalInstruments,p.25432(emphasis
supplied)
(c)IntheareaoftheGeneralAgreementonTradein
Services:
NationalTreatment

1.Inthesectorsinscribedinitsschedule,and
subjecttoanyconditionsandqualificationssetout
therein,eachMembershallaccordtoservicesand
servicesuppliersofanyotherMember,inrespect
ofallmeasuresaffectingthesupplyof
services,treatmentnolessfavourablethanit
accordstoitsownlikeservicesandservice
suppliers.

viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the


Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative
procedures with its obligations as provided in the
annexed agreements. Petitioners further argue that
these provisions contravene constitutional limitations
on the role exports play in national development and
negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.

2.AMembermaymeettherequirementof
paragraphIbyaccordingtoservicesandservice
suppliersofanyotherMember,eitherformally
identicaltreatmentorformallydifferenttreatment
tothatitaccordstoitsownlikeservicesand
servicesuppliers.

On the other hand, respondents through the


Solicitor
General
counter
(1)
that
such
Charter provisions are not self-executing and merely
set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic
portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners
should not be read in isolation but should be related to
other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1
and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO
clauses do not conflict with the Constitution; and (4)
that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions
to protect developing countries like the Philippines
from the harshness of sudden trade liberalization.

3.Formallyidenticalorformallydifferenttreatment
shallbeconsideredtobelessfavourableifit
modifiestheconditionsofcompletioninfavourof
servicesorservicesuppliersoftheMember
comparedtolikeservicesorservicesuppliersof
anyotherMember.(ArticleXVII,General
AgreementonTradeinServices,Vol.28,
UruguayRoundLegalInstruments,p.22610
emphasissupplied).
It is petitioners position that the foregoing national
treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement
place nationals and products of member countries on
the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in
contravention of the Filipino First policy of the
Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the
phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos. The
constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when

[20]

We shall
arguments.

now

discuss

and

rule

on

these

Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing


By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a
declaration of principles and state policies. The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is
called the basic political creed of the nationby Dean
Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the
[21]

[22]

[23]

judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its


power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws. As held in the leading case
of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles
and state policies enumerated in Article II and some
sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions,
the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation.
[24]

In the same light, we held in Basco vs.


Pagcor that broad constitutional principles need
legislative enactments to implement them, thus:
[25]

OnpetitionersallegationthatP.D.1869violatesSections11
(PersonalDignity)12(Family)and13(RoleofYouth)of
ArticleII;Section13(SocialJustice)ofArticleXIIIand
Section2(EducationalValues)ofArticleXIVofthe1987
Constitution,sufficeittostatealsothatthesearemerely
statementsofprinciplesandpolicies.Assuch,theyare
basicallynotselfexecuting,meaningalawshouldbepassed
byCongresstoclearlydefineandeffectuatesuchprinciples.
Ingeneral,therefore,the1935provisionswerenotintended
tobeselfexecutingprinciplesreadyforenforcement
throughthecourts.Theywereratherdirectivesaddressedto
theexecutiveandtothelegislature.Iftheexecutiveandthe
legislaturefailedtoheedthedirectivesofthearticle,the
availableremedywasnotjudicialbutpolitical.The
electoratecouldexpresstheirdispleasurewiththefailureof
theexecutiveandthelegislaturethroughthelanguageofthe
ballot.(Bernas,Vol.II,p.2).

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an


alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles
are sourced from basic considerations of due process
and the lack of judicial authority to wade into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
making. Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his
concurring opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.,
explained these reasons as follows:
[26]

Mysuggestionissimplythatpetitionersmust,beforethe
trialcourt,showamorespecificlegalrightarightcastin
languageofasignificantlylowerorderofgeneralitythan
ArticleII(15)oftheConstitutionthatisormaybe
violatedbytheactions,orfailurestoact,imputedtothe
publicrespondentbypetitionerssothatthetrialcourtcan
validlyrenderjudgmentgrantingallorpartoftherelief
prayedfor.Tomymind,thecourtshouldbeunderstoodas
simplysayingthatsuchamorespecificlegalrightorrights
maywellexistinourcorpusoflaw,consideringthegeneral
policyprinciplesfoundintheConstitutionandtheexistence
ofthePhilippineEnvironmentCode,andthatthetrialcourt
shouldhavegivenpetitionersaneffectiveopportunitysoto
demonstrate,insteadofabortingtheproceedingsona
motiontodismiss.
Itseemstomeimportantthatthelegalrightwhichisan
essentialcomponentofacauseofactionbeaspecific,
operablelegalright,ratherthanaconstitutionalorstatutory
policy,foratleasttwo(2)reasons.Oneisthatunlessthe
legalrightclaimedtohavebeenviolatedordisregardedis
givenspecificationinoperationalterms,defendantsmay
wellbeunabletodefendthemselvesintelligentlyand
effectively;inotherwords,therearedueprocessdimensions
tothismatter.

Thesecondisabroadergaugeconsiderationwherea
specificviolationoflaworapplicableregulationisnot
allegedorproved,petitionerscanbeexpectedtofallbackon
theexpandedconceptionofjudicialpowerinthesecond
paragraphofSection1ofArticleVIIIoftheConstitution
whichreads:
Section1.xxx
Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticeto
settleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegally
demandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetheror
nottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingto
lackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchor
instrumentalityoftheGovernment.(Emphasessupplied)
Whensubstantivestandardsasgeneralastherighttoa
balancedandhealthyecologyandtherighttohealthare
combinedwithremedialstandardsasbroadrangingasa
graveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessof
jurisdiction,theresultwillbe,itisrespectfullysubmitted,to
propelcourtsintotheunchartedoceanofsocialand
economicpolicymaking.Atleastinrespectofthevastarea
ofenvironmentalprotectionandmanagement,ourcourts
havenoclaimtospecialtechnicalcompetenceand
experienceandprofessionalqualification.Whereno
specific,operablenormsandstandardsareshowntoexist,
thenthepolicymakingdepartmentsthelegislativeand
executivedepartmentsmustbegivenarealandeffective
opportunitytofashionandpromulgatethosenormsand
standards,andtoimplementthembeforethecourtsshould
intervene.

Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other


Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced
Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII,
apart from merely laying down general principles
relating to the national economy and patrimony, should
be read and understood in relation to the other
sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13
thereof which read:
Section1.Thegoalsofthenationaleconomyareamore
equitabledistributionofopportunities,income,andwealth;a
sustainedincreaseintheamountofgoodsandservices
producedbythenationforthebenefitofthepeople;andan
expandingproductivityasthekeytoraisingthequalityof
lifeforall,especiallytheunderprivileged.
TheStateshallpromoteindustrializationandfull
employmentbasedonsoundagriculturaldevelopmentand
agrarianreform,throughindustriesthatmakefulland
efficientuseofhumanandnaturalresources,andwhichare
competitiveinbothdomesticandforeignmarkets.However,
theStateshallprotectFilipinoenterprisesagainstunfair
foreigncompetitionandtradepractices.
Inthepursuitofthesegoals,allsectorsoftheeconomyand
allregionsofthecountryshallbegivenoptimum
opportunitytodevelop.xxx
xxxxxxxxx

Sec.13.TheStateshallpursueatradepolicythatservesthe
generalwelfareandutilizesallformsandarrangementsof
exchangeonthebasisofequalityandreciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays
down the basic goals of national economic
development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services provided by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising
the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then
ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by
expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony and in the use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced
goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures
that help make them competitive; and (3) by requiring
the State to develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. In
similar language, the Constitution takes into account
the realities of the outside world as it requires the
pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare
and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange
on the basis of equality and reciprocity; and speaks of
industries which are competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and
trade practices.
[27]

[28]

[29]

[30]

It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince


Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et
al., this Court held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII
of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs
no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for
its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable. However, as the
constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable
only in regard to the grants of rights, privileges and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony
and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It
refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue
here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII
is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether,
as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the
Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine
concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that
there are.
[31]

All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a


bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on the
bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection
of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition
and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods
and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage
the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
[32]

equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign


competition that is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that
the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect
weak and developing economies, which comprise the
vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where
major states have permanent seats and veto powers in
the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made
on the basis of sovereign equality, with each members
vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no
WTO equivalent of the UN Security Council.
WTOdecidesbyconsensuswheneverpossible,otherwise,
decisionsoftheMinisterialConferenceandtheGeneral
Councilshallbetakenbythemajorityofthevotescast,
exceptincasesofinterpretationoftheAgreementorwaiver
oftheobligationofamemberwhichwouldrequirethree
fourthsvote.Amendmentswouldrequiretwothirdsvotein
general.AmendmentstoMFNprovisionsandthe
Amendmentsprovisionwillrequireassentofall
members.AnymembermaywithdrawfromtheAgreement
upontheexpirationofsixmonthsfromthedateofnoticeof
withdrawals.
[33]

Hence, poor countries can protect their common


interests more effectively through the WTO than
through one-on-one negotiations with developed
countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can
form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda
more decisively than outside the Organization. This is

not merely a matter of practical alliances but a


negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic
principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize
the need of developing countries like the Philippines to
share
in
the
growth
in
international
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development. These basic principles are found in the
preamble of the WTO Agreement as follows:
[34]

ThePartiestothisAgreement,
Recognizingthattheirrelationsinthefieldoftradeand
economicendeavourshouldbeconductedwithaviewto
raisingstandardsofliving,ensuringfullemploymentanda
largeandsteadilygrowingvolumeofrealincomeand
effectivedemand,andexpandingtheproductionofandtrade
ingoodsandservices,whileallowingfortheoptimaluseof
theworldsresourcesinaccordancewiththeobjectiveof
sustainabledevelopment,seekingbothtoprotectand
preservetheenvironmentandtoenhancethemeansfor
doingsoinamannerconsistentwiththeirrespectiveneeds
andconcernsatdifferentlevelsofeconomicdevelopment,
Recognizingfurtherthatthereisneedforpositiveefforts
designedtoensurethatdevelopingcountries,andespecially
theleastdevelopedamongthem,secureashareinthe
growthininternationaltradecommensuratewiththeneeds
oftheireconomicdevelopment,
Beingdesirousofcontributingtotheseobjectivesby
enteringintoreciprocalandmutuallyadvantageous
arrangementsdirectedtothesubstantialreductionoftariffs
andotherbarrierstotradeandtotheeliminationof
discriminatorytreatmentininternationaltraderelations,

Resolved,therefore,todevelopanintegrated,moreviable
anddurablemultilateraltradingsystemencompassingthe
GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade,theresultsofpast
tradeliberalizationefforts,andalloftheresultsofthe
UruguayRoundofMultilateralTradeNegotiations,
Determinedtopreservethebasicprinciplesandtofurther
theobjectivesunderlyingthismultilateraltradingsystem,x
xx.(underscoringsupplied.)
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing
Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that
pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic
principles, the WTO Agreement grants developing
countries a more lenient treatment, giving their
domestic industries some protection from the rush of
foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in
general, preferential treatment is given to developing
countries in terms of the amount of tariff reduction and
the period within which the reduction is to be spread
out. Specifically, GATT requires an average tariff
reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be
effected within a period of six (6) years while
developing countries -- including the Philippines -are required to effect an average tariff reduction of only
24% within ten (10) years.
In
respect
to domestic subsidy,
GATT
requires developed countries to reduce domestic
support to agricultural products by 20% over six (6)
years, as compared to only 13% for developing
countries to be effected within ten (10) years.

In regard to export subsidy for agricultural


products, GATT requires developed countries to
reduce their budgetary outlays for export subsidy by
36% and export volumes receiving export subsidy
by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For developing
countries, however, the reduction rate is only twothirds of that prescribed for developed countries and a
longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect
such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in
protection from unfair foreign competition and trade
practices
including
anti-dumping
measures,
countervailing measures and safeguards against
import surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized
by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail
of these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis
for the statement that under the WTO, local industries
and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos
will be deprived of control of the economy. Quite the
contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations
like the Philippines have been taken into account; thus,
there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO,
the respondents have gravely abused their
discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to
steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of
economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be
set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
simply because we disagree with it or simply because
we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier
stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this case will
not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of
trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only
perform its constitutional duty of determining whether
the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.

Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign


Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a selfreliant and independent national economy does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods and services. It contemplates neither economic
seclusion nor mendicancy in the international
community. As
explained
by
Constitutional
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this
constitutional policy:
[35]

Economicselfrelianceisaprimaryobjectiveofa
developingcountrythatiskeenlyawareofoverdependence
onexternalassistanceforevenitsmostbasicneeds.Itdoes
notmeanautarkyoreconomicseclusion;rather,itmeans
avoidingmendicancyintheinternational
community.Independencereferstothefreedomfromundue
foreigncontrolofthenationaleconomy,especiallyinsuch
strategicindustriesasinthedevelopmentofnatural
resourcesandpublicutilities.
[36]

The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national


treatment, and trade without discrimination cannot be
struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are
rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO
members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based
on equality and reciprocity, the fundamental law
encourages industries that are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating
a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual
development of robust industries that can compete
with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino
[37]

managers and Filipino enterprises have shown


capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And
given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs
and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the
Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the
best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or
Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any
unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise,
nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that
Filipino companies should be pampered with a total
proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand,
respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make
available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and
services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most
reasonable prices. Consequently, the question boils
down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general
welfare of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal
(of favoring the general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos
general welfare because it will -- as promised by its
promoters -- expand the countrys exports and
generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment,
purchasing power and quality products at the most
reasonable rates to the Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve judgment
calls by our policy makers, for which they are

answerable to our people during appropriate electoral


exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto are
not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave
abuse of discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and
Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in
existence when the Constitution was drafted and
ratified in 1987. That does not mean however that the
Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its
framers might not have anticipated the advent of a
borderless world of business. By the same token, the
United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935
Constitution became effective.Did that necessarily
mean that the then Constitution might not have
contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of
sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN
Charter, thereby effectively surrendering part of its
control over its foreign relations to the decisions of
various UN organs like the Security Council?
It
is
not
difficult
to
answer
this
question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only
the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be
interpreted to cover even future and unknown
circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a
Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and
infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing
winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As
one eminent political law writer and respected
jurist explains:
[38]

TheConstitutionmustbequintessentialratherthan
superficial,therootandnottheblossom,thebaseand
frameworkonlyoftheedificethatisyettorise.Itisbutthe
coreofthedreamthatmusttakeshape,notinatwinklingby
mandateofourdelegates,butslowlyinthecrucibleof
Filipinomindsandhearts,whereitwillintimedevelopits
sinewsandgraduallygatheritsstrengthandfinallyachieve
itssubstance.Infine,theConstitutioncannot,likethe
goddessAthena,risefullgrownfromthebrowofthe
ConstitutionalConvention,norcanitconjurebymerefiatan
instantUtopia.Itmustgrowwiththesocietyitseekstore
structureandmarchapacewiththeprogressoftherace,
drawingfromthevicissitudesofhistorythedynamismand
vitalitythatwillkeepit,farfrombecomingapetrifiedrule,a
pulsing,livinglawattunedtotheheartbeatofthenation.
Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative
Power
The WTO Agreement provides that (e)ach Member
shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as
provided in the annexed Agreements. Petitioners
maintain that this undertaking unduly limits, restricts
and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the
legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the
1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress
of the Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign
powers of the Philippines because this means that
Congress could not pass legislation that will be good
for our national interest and general welfare if such
legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement,
which not only relates to the trade in goods x x x but
[39]

also to the flow of investments and money x x x as well


as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural
matters x x x.
[40]

More specifically, petitioners claim that said


WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is
lodged in the Congress. And while the Constitution
allows Congress to authorize the President to fix tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is
subject to specified limits and x x x such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may provide, as in fact it did
under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
[41]

[42]

Sovereignty Limited by International Law and


Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and
passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments
on this issue. However, while sovereignty has
traditionally been deemed absolute and allencompassing on the domestic level, it is however
subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed
to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a
member of the family of nations.Unquestionably, the
Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of
the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration
of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution
adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." By
the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by
generally accepted principles of international law,
[43]

which are considered to be automatically part of our


own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental
rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda -international agreements must be performed in good
faith. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on
the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
[44]

[45]

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or


restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of
their state power in exchange for greater benefits
granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After
all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in
pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits,
they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been
used to record agreements between States concerning
such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease
of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the
termination of war, the regulation of conduct of
hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of
commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying
down of rules governing conduct in peace and the
establishment of international organizations. The
sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in
reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions
enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the
very nature of membership in the family of nations and
(2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly
put by John F. Kennedy, Today, no nation can build its
[46]

destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is


over. The age of interdependence is here.
[47]

UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty


Thus, when the Philippines joined the United
Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented
to restrict its sovereign rights under the concept of
sovereignty as auto-limitation.47-A Under Article 2 of the
UN Charter, (a)ll members shall give the United
Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain
from giving assistance to any state against which the
United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement
action. Such assistance includes payment of its
corresponding share not merely in administrative
expenses but also in expenditures for the peacekeeping operations of the organization. In its advisory
opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of
Justice held that money used by the United Nations
Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo
were expenses of the United Nations under Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its
members must bear their corresponding share in such
expenses. In this sense, the Philippine Congress is
restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to
appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peacekeeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of
the said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy
diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting
again the exercise of sovereignty of members within
their own territory.Another example: although
sovereign equality and domestic jurisdiction of all
members are set forth as underlying principles in the

UN Charter, such provisos are however subject to


enforcement measures decided by the Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace and
security under Chapter VII of the Charter. A final
example: under Article 103, (i)n the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations
under any other international agreement, their
obligation under the present charter shall prevail, thus
unquestionably denying the Philippines -- as a member
-- the sovereign power to make a choice as to which of
conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has
entered into many other international pacts -- both
bilateral and multilateral -- that involve limitations on
Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the
Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24,
1996, as follows:
(a)BilateralconventionwiththeUnitedStatesregarding
taxesonincome,wherethePhilippinesagreed,
amongothers,toexemptfromtax,incomereceived
inthePhilippinesby,amongothers,theFederal
ReserveBankoftheUnitedStates,the
Export/ImportBankoftheUnitedStates,the
OverseasPrivateInvestmentCorporationofthe
UnitedStates.Likewise,insaidconvention,wages,
salariesandsimilarremunerationspaidbythe
UnitedStatestoitscitizensforlaborandpersonal
servicesperformedbythemasemployeesor
officialsoftheUnitedStatesareexemptfrom
incometaxbythePhilippines.

(b)BilateralagreementwithBelgium,providing,among
others,fortheavoidanceofdoubletaxationwith
respecttotaxesonincome.

(I)BilateralagreementwithFranceexemptingFrench
nationalsfromtherequirementofobtainingtransit
andvisitorvisaforasojournnotexceeding59days.

(c)BilateralconventionwiththeKingdomofSweden
fortheavoidanceofdoubletaxation.

(j)MultilateralConventiononSpecialMissions,where
thePhilippinesagreedthatpremisesofSpecial
MissionsinthePhilippinesareinviolableandits
agentscannotentersaidpremiseswithoutconsentof
theHeadofMissionconcerned.SpecialMissionsare
alsoexemptedfromcustomsduties,taxesandrelated
charges.

(d)BilateralconventionwiththeFrenchRepublicfor
theavoidanceofdoubletaxation.
(e)BilateralairtransportagreementwithKoreawhere
thePhilippinesagreedtoexemptfromallcustoms
duties,inspectionfeesandotherdutiesortaxes
aircraftsofSouthKoreaandtheregularequipment,
sparepartsandsuppliesarrivingwithsaidaircrafts.
(f)BilateralairserviceagreementwithJapan,wherethe
Philippinesagreedtoexemptfromcustomsduties,
excisetaxes,inspectionfeesandothersimilarduties,
taxesorchargesfuel,lubricatingoils,spareparts,
regularequipment,storesonboardJapaneseaircrafts
whileonPhilippinesoil.
(g)BilateralairserviceagreementwithBelgiumwhere
thePhilippinesgrantedBelgianaircarriersthesame
privilegesasthosegrantedtoJapaneseandKorean
aircarriersunderseparateairserviceagreements.
(h)BilateralnoteswithIsraelfortheabolitionoftransit
andvisitorvisaswherethePhilippinesexempted
Israelinationalsfromtherequirementofobtaining
transitorvisitorvisasforasojourninthePhilippines
notexceeding59days.

(k)MultilateralConventionontheLawofTreaties.In
thisconvention,thePhilippinesagreedtobe
governedbytheViennaConventionontheLawof
Treaties.
(l)DeclarationofthePresidentofthePhilippines
acceptingcompulsoryjurisdictionofthe
InternationalCourtofJustice.TheInternational
CourtofJusticehasjurisdictioninalllegaldisputes
concerningtheinterpretationofatreaty,any
questionofinternationallaw,theexistenceofany
factwhich,ifestablished,wouldconstituteabreach
ofinternationalobligation.
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has
effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign
powers of taxation, eminent domain and police
power. The underlying consideration in this partial
surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment
of the other contracting states in granting the same
privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials

and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the


Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.
Internationaltreaties,whetherrelatingtonuclear
disarmament,humanrights,theenvironment,thelawofthe
sea,ortrade,constraindomesticpoliticalsovereignty
throughtheassumptionofexternalobligations.Butunless
anarchyininternationalrelationsispreferredasan
alternative,inmostcasesweacceptthatthebenefitsofthe
reciprocalobligationsinvolvedoutweighthecosts
associatedwithanylossofpoliticalsovereignty.(T)rade
treatiesthatstructurerelationsbyreferencetodurable,well
definedsubstantivenormsandobjectivedisputeresolution
proceduresreducetherisksoflargercountriesexploiting
raweconomicpowertobullysmallercountries,by
subjectingpowerrelationstosomeformoflegalordering.In
addition,smallercountriestypicallystandtogain
disproportionatelyfromtradeliberalization.Thisisdueto
thesimplefactthatliberalizationwillprovideaccesstoa
largersetofpotentialnewtradingrelationshipthanincase
ofthelargercountrygainingenhancedsuccesstothesmaller
countrysmarket.
[48]

The point is that, as shown by the foregoing


treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived
without violating the Constitution, based on the
rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of x x x
cooperation and amity with all nations.
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial
Power

Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the


General Provisions and Basic Principles of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) intrudes on the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedures.
[49]

[50]

To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34,


TRIPS, it will be fruitful to restate its full text as
follows:
[51]

Article34
ProcessPatents:BurdenofProof
1.Forthepurposesofcivilproceedingsinrespectofthe
infringementoftherightsoftheownerreferredtoin
paragraph1(b)ofArticle28,ifthesubjectmatterofa
patentisaprocessforobtainingaproduct,thejudicial
authoritiesshallhavetheauthoritytoorderthe
defendanttoprovethattheprocesstoobtainanidentical
productisdifferentfromthepatented
process.Therefore,Membersshallprovide,inatleast
oneofthefollowingcircumstances,thatanyidentical
productwhenproducedwithouttheconsentofthe
patentownershall,intheabsenceofprooftothe
contrary,bedeemedtohavebeenobtainedbythe
patentedprocess:
(a)iftheproductobtainedbythepatentedprocessisnew;
(b)ifthereisasubstantiallikelihoodthatthe
identicalproductwasmadebytheprocessand
theownerofthepatenthasbeenunablethrough

reasonableeffortstodeterminetheprocess
actuallyused.
2.AnyMembershallbefreetoprovidethattheburden
ofproofindicatedinparagraph1shallbeonthealleged
infringeronlyiftheconditionreferredtoin
subparagraph(a)isfulfilledoronlyifthecondition
referredtoinsubparagraph(b)isfulfilled.
3.Intheadductionofprooftothecontrary,the
legitimateinterestsofdefendantsinprotectingtheir
manufacturingandbusinesssecretsshallbetakeninto
account.
From the above, a WTO Member is required to
provide a rule of disputable (note the words in the
absence of proof to the contrary) presumption that a
product shown to be identical to one produced with the
use of a patented process shall be deemed to have
been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented
process, (1) where such product obtained by the
patented product is new, or (2) where there is
substantial likelihood that the identical product was
made with the use of the said patented process but the
owner of the patent could not determine the exact
process
used
in
obtaining
such
identical
product. Hence, the burden of proof contemplated by
Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of
the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such
presumption. Such burden, properly understood,
actually refers to the burden of evidence (burden of
going forward) placed on the producer of the identical
(or fake) product to show that his product was
produced without the use of the patented process.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner


still has the burden of proof since, regardless of the
presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34,
such owner still has to introduce evidence of the
existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that
it is identical to the genuine one produced by the
patented process and the fact of newness of the
genuine product or the fact of substantial likelihood
that the identical product was made by the patented
process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in
changing the rules of evidence as the present law on
the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended,
otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a similar
presumption in cases of infringement of patented
design or utility model, thus:
SEC.60.Infringement.Infringementofadesignpatentor
ofapatentforutilitymodelshallconsistinunauthorized
copyingofthepatenteddesignorutilitymodelforthe
purposeoftradeorindustryinthearticleorproductandin
themaking,usingorsellingofthearticleorproductcopying
thepatenteddesignorutilitymodel.Identityorsubstantial
identitywiththepatenteddesignorutilitymodelshall
constituteevidenceofcopying.(underscoringsupplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement
of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption
applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented
process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood
that the identical product was made by the process
and the process owner has not been able through
reasonable effort to determine the process
used. Where either of these twoprovisos does not

obtain, members shall be free to determine the


appropriate method of implementing the provisions of
TRIPS within their own internal systems and
processes.

President. They contend that the second letter of the


President to the Senate which enumerated what
constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject
of concurrence of the Senate.

By and large, the arguments adduced in


connection with our disposition of the third issue -derogation of legislative power - will apply to this fourth
issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause
more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually
exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due
process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in our judicial system.

A final act, sometimes called protocol de clture,


is an instrument which records the winding up of the
proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually
includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties,
conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed
upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the
conference. It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a
summary of the proceedings of a protracted
conference which may have taken place over several
years. The text of the Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations is contained in just one page in Vol. I of
the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary
Navarro as representative of the Republic of the
Philippines undertook:

So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most


international conventions on patents, trademarks and
copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of
procedure will not be substantial.
[52]

Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO


Agreement and Not in Other Documents Contained
in the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in
the WTO Agreement and its annexes -- but not in the
other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely
the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services
-- is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes
abuse of discretion. They submit that such
concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed
because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which
in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro,
in representation of the Republic upon authority of the

[53]

[54]

[55]

"(a)tosubmit,asappropriate,theWTOAgreementfor
theconsiderationoftheirrespectivecompetent
authoritieswithaviewtoseekingapprovalofthe
Agreementinaccordancewiththeirprocedures;and
(b)toadopttheMinisterialDeclarationsandDecisions."
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed
concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from
its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in
the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were
deemed adopted without need for ratification. They

were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article


XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of
the members can meet to give effect to those
provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action,
and generally with a view to facilitating the operation
and furthering the objectives of this Agreement.
[56]

The Understanding on Commitments in Financial


Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to
the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members
which have indicated in their respective schedules of
commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly,
expansion of operation of existing financial service
suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer
and processing of information, and national treatment
with respect to access to payment, clearing systems
and refinancing available in the normal course of
business.
[57]

On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself


expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed
included as its integral parts, as follows:
[58]

ArticleII
ScopeoftheWTO

asMultilateralAgreements)areintegralpartsofthis
Agreement,bindingonallMembers.
3.TheAgreementsandassociatedlegalinstruments
includedinAnnex4(hereinafterreferredtoas
PlurilateralTradeAgreements)arealsopartofthis
AgreementforthoseMembersthathaveacceptedthem,
andarebindingonthoseMembers.ThePlurilateral
TradeAgreementsdonotcreateeitherobligationor
rightsforMembersthathavenotacceptedthem.
4.TheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade1994as
specifiedinannex1A(hereinafterreferredtoasGATT
1994)islegallydistinctfromtheGeneralAgreementon
TariffsandTrade,dated30October1947,annexedto
theFinalActadoptedattheconclusionoftheSecond
SessionofthePreparatoryCommitteeoftheUnited
NationsConferenceonTradeandEmployment,as
subsequentlyrectified,amendedormodified
(hereinafterreferredtoasGATT1947).
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware
of what it was concurring in as shown by the members
deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the
letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the
senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the
Senate was concurring in, as follows:
[59]

1.TheWTOshallprovidethecommoninstitutional
frameworkfortheconductoftraderelationsamongits
Membersinmatterstotheagreementsandassociated
legalinstrumentsincludedintheAnnexestothis
Agreement.
2.TheAgreementsandassociatedlegalinstruments
includedinAnnexes1,2,and3(hereinafterreferredto

[60]

THECHAIRMAN:Yes.Now,thequestionofthevalidity
ofthesubmissioncameupinthefirstdayhearingofthis
Committeeyesterday.WastheobservationmadebySenator
TaadathatwhatwassubmittedtotheSenatewasnotthe
agreementonestablishingtheWorldTradeOrganizationby
thefinalactoftheUruguayRoundwhichisnotthesameas

theagreementestablishingtheWorldTrade
Organization?Andonthatbasis,SenatorTolentinoraiseda
pointoforderwhich,however,heagreedtowithdrawupon
understandingthathissuggestionforanalternativesolution
atthattimewasacceptable.Thatsuggestionwastotreatthe
proceedingsoftheCommitteeasbeinginthenatureof
briefingsforSenatorsuntilthequestionofthesubmission
couldbeclarified.

Iamnowsatisfiedwiththewordingofthenewsubmission
ofPresidentRamos.

Andso,SecretaryRomulo,ineffect,isthePresident
submittinganew...ishemakinganewsubmissionwhich
improvesontheclarityofthefirstsubmission?

SENTOLENTINO,Mr.Chairman,Ihavenotseenthenew
submissionactuallytransmittedtousbutIsawthedraftof
hisearlier,andIthinkitnowcomplieswiththeprovisions
oftheConstitution,andwiththeFinalActitself.The
ConstitutiondoesnotrequireustoratifytheFinalAct.It
requiresustoratifytheAgreementwhichisnowbeing
submitted.TheFinalActitselfspecifieswhatisgoingtobe
submittedtowiththegovernmentsoftheparticipants.

MR.ROMULO:Mr.Chairman,tomakesurethatitisclear
cutandthereshouldbenomisunderstanding,itwashis
intentiontoclarifyallmattersbygivingthisletter.
THECHAIRMAN:Thankyou.
CanthisCommitteehearfromSenatorTaadaandlateron
SenatorTolentinosincetheyweretheonesthatraisedthis
questionyesterday?
SenatorTaada,please.
SEN.TAADA:Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
BasedonwhatSecretaryRomulohasread,itwouldnow
clearlyappearthatwhatisbeingsubmittedtotheSenatefor
ratificationisnottheFinalActoftheUruguayRound,but
rathertheAgreementontheWorldTradeOrganizationas
wellastheMinisterialDeclarationsandDecisions,andthe
UnderstandingandCommitmentsinFinancialServices.

SEN.TAADA....ofPresidentRamos,Mr.Chairman.
THECHAIRMAN.Thankyou,SenatorTaada.Canwehear
fromSenatorTolentino?AndafterhimSenatorNeptali
GonzalesandSenatorLina.

Inparagraph2oftheFinalAct,wereadandIquote:
BysigningthepresentFinalAct,therepresentatives
agree:(a)tosubmitasappropriatetheWTOAgreementfor
theconsiderationoftherespectivecompetentauthorities
withaviewtoseekingapprovaloftheAgreementin
accordancewiththeirprocedures.
Inotherwords,itisnottheFinalActthatwasagreedtobe
submittedtothegovernmentsforratificationoracceptance
aswhatevertheirconstitutionalproceduresmayprovidebut
itistheWorldTradeOrganizationAgreement.Andifthatis
theonethatisbeingsubmittednow,Ithinkitsatisfiesboth
theConstitutionandtheFinalActitself.
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.

THECHAIRMAN.Thankyou,SenatorTolentino,MayI
callonSenatorGonzales.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such


capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law. Failure on the part of the
petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result
in the dismissal of the petition.
[61]

SEN.GONZALES.Mr.Chairman,myviewsonthismatter
arealreadyamatterofrecord.Andtheyhadbeenadequately
reflectedinthejournalofyesterdayssessionandIdontsee
anyneedforrepeatingthesame.
Now,Iwouldconsiderthenewsubmissionasanactex
abudantecautela.
THECHAIRMAN.Thankyou,SenatorGonzales.Senator
Lina,doyouwanttomakeanycommentonthis?
SEN.LINA.Mr.President,Iagreewiththeobservationjust
madebySenatorGonzalesoutoftheabundanceof
question.Thenthenewsubmissionis,Ibelieve,statingthe
obviousandthereforeIhavenofurthercommenttomake.
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine
ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are
invoking this Courts constitutionally imposed duty to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence
therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a
writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion
may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

[62]

[63]

In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets


that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of
two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled
to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional
body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions
are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless
convincing proof and persuasive arguments are
presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court
will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing
well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion
and the presumption of regularity in the Senates
processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to
impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senates
exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO
Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the
Constitution.
[64]

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad


constitutional principles require the State to develop an
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor,
products, domestic materials and locally produced
goods. But it is equally true that such principles -- while

serving as judicial and legislative guides -- are not in


themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover,
there are other equally fundamental constitutional
principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate
the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity and
the promotion of industries which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying
its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged
impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative
and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the
generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and the adherence of the
Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with
all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting,
voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the
WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of
the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty
and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness
or despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility
in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that
this Court, or at least some of its members, may even
agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to
the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution
No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute
grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify
its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in
the exercise of our own judicial power and
duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid
exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise
was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of
judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between

the elected policy makers and the people. As to


whether the nation should join the worldwide march
toward trade liberalization and economic globalization
is a matter that our people should determine in electing
their policy makers.After all, the WTO Agreement
allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the
political desire of a member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the
best
seller Megatrends,
predicts
an
Asian
Renaissance where the East will become the
dominant region of the world economically, politically
and culturally in the next century. He refers to the free
market espoused by WTO as the catalyst in this
coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about
31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia
negotiating
for
membership
in
the
WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible
limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains
as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and
the veritable forum for the development of international
trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation,
stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly
enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the
advantages and disadvantages of globalization with its
on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the
future, the Philippines now straddles the crossroads of
an international strategy for economic prosperity and
stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through
their duly authorized elected officers, make their free
choice.
[65]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack


of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 213847

August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,


vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and
during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and
determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case,
albeit a good measure of the accuseds propensity for flight or for

causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of


bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
1

as to him would only be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ;


and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition
must further be seriously considered.

The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14,
2014 and August 8, 2014 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged
with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the
resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his
Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2

Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and
several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their
purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations
under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). On June 10,
2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus
Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he
be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him.
The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution
filed its Consolidated Opposition.
4

On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying


Enriles motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its
prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law. Accordingly,
the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.
8

On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile
voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP)
General Hospital following his medical examination.
10

Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital , and his Motion to Fix Bail , both dated July 7, 2014, which
were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. In support of the
motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because:
(a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty
11

12

13

On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed


resolution denying Enriles Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence
and the Court shall have made a determination that the evidence of
guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a
matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix
the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In
fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily,
no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature
for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail
because while he is charged with plunder, "the maximum penalty that
may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not reclusion
perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as
amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old
and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said that
the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s
is not taken into consideration. These circumstances will only be
appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the
accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail
because he is not a flight risk and his physical condition must also be
seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accuseds age, physical condition and his being a flight
risk are among the factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable
amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is premature for the
Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the
evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enriles


Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

14

On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed


resolution to deny Enriles motion for reconsideration filed vis--vis the
July 14, 2014 resolution.
15

Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for


certiorari , namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is
bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall
within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2)
circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
strong.

In its Comment , the Ombudsman contends that Enriles right to bail is


discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted
bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine
whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that
entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the
attendant circumstances.
17

Ruling of the Court


The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in
the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional
right to be released on bail, and further binds the court to wait until
after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.
18

19

B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively


that Enrile, if ever he would be convicted, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively
that evidence of Enriles guilt (if ever) is strong; hence,
Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight
risk.
16

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled


to bail as matter of right; th at it is the duty and burden of the
Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under
the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail;
that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of
plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence
of two mitigating circumstances his age and his voluntary surrender;
that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his
guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be
considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the
age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.

20

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from
committing additional crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee
the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by
the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher
than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as
a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest
in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the societys
interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.
22

23

2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 of the


Rules of Court , as follows:
24

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion


perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with
a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that,
under the law existing at the time of its commission and the application
for admission to bail, may be punished with death.
25

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted
of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence,
from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained
by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional
liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he
is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.
26

27

As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the


Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right
because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment
when evidence of guilt is not strong.
28

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon


conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty
of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114
is present, as follows:
29

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual


delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without
valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability
of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses,
or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in
Concerned Citizens v. Elma , "such discretion may be exercised only
after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused
for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its
grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there
has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution. The
indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in
Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :
30

31

32

x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court


already ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is
mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged
with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder
case without any hearing on the motion asking for it, without bothering
to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it turned out
later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole

basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of
whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed
at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima
facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the
persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established
unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already
presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of
guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled
as the accused to due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of
evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it.
Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character
and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him,
the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the
accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is
under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is
highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an
ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the
discretion of the court, should primarily determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a
summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be
allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate
on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein
offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion
of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness
in the examination and cross examination.
33

In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a


capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines
outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:
34

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion,


notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on
the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra)
Otherwise petition should be denied.
3.
Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the
presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated
in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of
the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily
surrendered.
35

Enriles averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution,


whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that
might be imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the
presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the
presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not
consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant
clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is,
therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has
bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being
appreciated in the accuseds favor.
36

Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enriles


averment on the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could
entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being
punishable with reclusion perpetua , simply because the
37

determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made


by the trial court.

and historys judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted


bail.

Nonetheless, in now granting Enriles petition for certiorari, the Court is


guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines
responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another


compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth


and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section
II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting
and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the
legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available
to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.
38

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as


well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the
grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also
to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the
detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 )
that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
39

In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in
court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is
highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter
respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore
that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in
both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service,
40

In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the


Director of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as
a geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations
conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:
41

(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels


on multiple drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of
the following :
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with
carotid and vertebral artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4,
4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial
calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat)
documented by Holter monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal
drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p
laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections;
(Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber
intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;

Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued


confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital ?

c. Alpha thalassemia;
PSUPT. JOCSON:
d. Gait/balance disorder;
No, Your Honor.
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain)
in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented
enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).

JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?

42

PSUPT. JOCSON:
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or
collectively, could pose significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1)
uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because
it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially
under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with
coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for
heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of
ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain circumstances (like
excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could
cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.
43

Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enriles advanced


age and ill health required special medical attention. His confinement
at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance, was not even
recommended by the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist doctor
of that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support
at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:

Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the
best.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused,
Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in your heart of the
present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.

44

JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

DR. SERVILLANO:

The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued


confinement of Senator Enrile at the Philippine National Police
Hospital?

Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but


probably if the condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities to
do those things, Your Honor.

DR. SERVILLANO:

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to
his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite

No, Your Honor.

45

imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of
preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented.
The Court has already held in Dela Rama v. The Peoples Court:

and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his


choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense
but, more importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the
trial.

46

x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the
following:
x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular
case, the illness of the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the
humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless
of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to
exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ;
47

xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute
to the effect that the petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal, early,
unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular
pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen similar cases,
later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and
medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that the
petitioners previous petition for bail was denied by the Peoples Court
on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not
active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the Peoples Court in
sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination
and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to
verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in
order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and
considering further that the said Peoples Court has adopted and
applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted
resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran
(case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the
said defendants were released on bail on the ground that they were ill
and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be
injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we
consequently hold that the Peoples Court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner on bail.
48

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will


then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed

On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish
before a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be
had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to
provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances
decisive of the issue of bail whose existence is either admitted by the
Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice that the
courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without
awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus balances the scales of
justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his
personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him
the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty.
49

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored


the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during
the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the
fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enriles
Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for
certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING
ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014;
ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond
of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate
release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is
being detained for some other lawful cause.
50

51

No pronouncement on costs of suit.


SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179267

June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE
JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all
surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of
86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million
adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for
husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved

the church and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to
curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The
National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW)
reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised
more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence and more than
90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate
partners such as their husbands and live-in partners." 3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by
women's groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts
of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by
women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any
person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
the woman has a common child.5 The law provides for protection
orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of
further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of
barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel,
social workers, health care providers, and other local government
officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for
assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection and due process
clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay
officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed,
for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil
Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against
her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She
claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and
economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support.7
Private respondent's claims

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years


old and the former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3)
children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural
child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie
Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years
old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife,
whose life revolved around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner,
who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and
demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade
private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her
friends. When she took up law, and even when she was already
working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and
prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the
fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one
point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a
bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the
godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when
private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted
to the household help about his sexual relations with said bank
manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just
using the woman because of their accounts with the bank. 10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private
respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their
quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and
shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At
another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that
caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their
daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his
paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann
on the chest and slapped her many times. When private respondent
decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear
that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small
boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son
said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of
his cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to
the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she
attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son

bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking
her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about
seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor
apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has
been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking antidepressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's
Bank that she intends to file charges against the bank manager,
petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He
then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving
her for good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with
them in the family home, that private respondent should just accept his
extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has
not sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is
afraid that he would take her children from her and deprive her of
financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes
on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the
construction of deep wells. He is the President of three corporations
326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros
Trading Corporation of which he and private respondent are both
stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said
corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary
of P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less
than P200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent through
the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same
corporation together with the bills for utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00
from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash
advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from
the corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him about the
affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building,
Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are
conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about
said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not
given private respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of
which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17

Action of the RTC of Bacolod City


Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of
violence against the private respondent and her children exists or is
about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for
thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the
conjugal dwelling or family home within 24 hours from receipt
of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering
that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal
dwelling; this order is enforceable notwithstanding that the
house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic
Act No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow
the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal
dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal
dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the
conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be
assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police
assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger
that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from her
when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother
and all her household help and driver from a distance of 1,000
meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where
the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise
communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or
through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her
children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards,
flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may
be subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm
and a Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police
Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the

PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He


should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in
his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the
children, including rental of a house for them, and educational
and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses
and other cash he received from all the corporations from 1
January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as
President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit
to the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an
accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by
the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days
of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting
support pendente lite, and considering the financial resources
of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she
will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put
up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE
MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial
court issued an amended TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days,
which included the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the
continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which
they are using in Negros Occidental.

Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support


could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to
the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the
denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1)
comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of
hearing. He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing
one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its
rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or
reducing the amount of the bond from P5,000,000.00 to a more
manageable level at P100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification
of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but
subject only to the following modifications prayed for by private
respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and
other personal belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge
Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel,
otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and
equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep


the peace, in two sufficient sureties.

c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City


Police Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal
dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until
48 hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner
Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the
conjugal home and make an inventory of the household
furniture, equipment and other things in the conjugal home,
which shall be submitted to the Court.

l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in


the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand

d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and


Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the
three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of

j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation


of the house in Paraaque, the continued use of the Starex
van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.

the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be


declared in indirect contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all
unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of
the children upon presentation of proof of payment of such
expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support;
failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of
harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed
another application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged
inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros
Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer president,
with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van
used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was
served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen
with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and
Joseph Eduard.25

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:


1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing,
personally or through another, acts of violence against the
offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with the
offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends,
relatives, employees or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie
J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers,
her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver
Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales,
security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other
household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall
not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are
temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three
children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the
schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner
including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees
directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through
the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two
men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the
boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion,
petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and
threatened her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann
subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation
of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber


firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;

Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by
the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a complaint for
kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This came
about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home
to get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things
inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private
respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola. 27

6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the


amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30)
days, which reads as follows:

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00


a month and Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from
August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from
March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00;

7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with


Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991
and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles,
respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle
which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;

8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or


otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real
properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in
which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest in,
especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St.,
Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties
which are conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the
respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1,"
and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325
and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B.
Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY
PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the
transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited
properties to any person, entity or corporation without the
personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall
affix her signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds,
due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be
forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these
properties to defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the
aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a
period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should
not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's
manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of private
respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed
in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy
of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5,
had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006.
The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally
terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006
is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously
extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until
further orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by
the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no


longer submitted the required comment to private respondent's motion
for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in
futility."33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before
the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP.
No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order,
challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of
the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity
of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted
product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary
Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the
amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court
dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the
constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil
case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly,
the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the
protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack
on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been
denied in the Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now
before us alleging that
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION
ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS
NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE
PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE LAW.

II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY,
UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT
FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO
PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of
the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CAG.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily
it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will
not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262
before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court
has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the
complex issue of constitutionality."41

We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts,
of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise
known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the
Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional
Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities
identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7
of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as
Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed,
the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or
any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
(Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City
remains possessed of authority as a court of general original
jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization,
admiralty or insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine
what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity
to the fundamental law."46The Constitution vests the power of judicial
review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all
RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the
Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it
speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases
where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:


xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest
opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before
the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same,
subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against
Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure
requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an
answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. (a) The respondent may file an
opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why
a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which
could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a
counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded
from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be
raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or
other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing
party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim
therein.51Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending

party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the
action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of his opponent's claim.52As pointed out by Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause
of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a
third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised
in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of
the case a quo because the right of private respondent to a protection
order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being
attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A.
9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the nonissuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature
should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his
Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is
one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence. 54 Be that
as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the
conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the
need for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been
marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their
direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties
which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible, within
the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection
order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct
of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC

provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire,


the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty
(30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise
modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be
necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private
respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate
the constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very
purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the
petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have
proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior
court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j)
of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for
certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the
appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the
amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and
it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an
expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before
judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting
permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement, 55 with more
reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
time,56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid,
does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In
Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States
declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their
entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are
not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are
unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune
from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The
imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be
unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in
equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable
injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the
trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing,
however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect
women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction
against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against
VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our
obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with
far-reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our
solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more
reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment 59 to
the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and
criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well be
committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not
enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the
law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No.
2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor,
Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi
Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized
measure"62 an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "AntiDomestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate
Relationships Act"63 providing protection to "all family members,
leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special
attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and
abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied
protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of
the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr.
President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns and
relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic
violence apart from against women as well as other members of the
household, including children or the husband, they fear that this would
weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the main

victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or
the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on
record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of
observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who
call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not
want to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are
also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here
members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing
protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, livein, common-law wives, and those related with the family.65

be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize


the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs
with this position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love
their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation.
Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or
not, no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal
opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho
Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the
Filipino woman.
xxxx

xxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion
whether to limit this to women and not to families which was the issue
of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would be
having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember
correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during
the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the
measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need
to protect women's rights especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who
have not had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their
live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we
broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee


came up with this bill because the family members have been included
in this proposed measure since the other members of the family other
than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are
most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the
measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively
few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children are
almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there
may not be enough protection extended to other family members
particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No.
7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of
abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for
one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the
same protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify
their abusive behavior against women. However, we should also
recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our
courts which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just
arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations
and to protect the family as the basic social institution. Though I
recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in
our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights
and dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family
members, particularly children.

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include


other family members as a critical input arrived at after a series of
consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and
other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other
senators.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale


used by the distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of
fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong
babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang
magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the
children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is
recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of
Senator Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this
particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the
net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale
mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito
Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the
proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she
is going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment
rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. more than the women, the children are very much
abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not
limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old
children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it
breaks my heart to find out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this
particular measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully
prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the
aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.

xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND


CHILDREN.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

xxxx

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There


being none, the amendment, as amended, is approved. 66

The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?


Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into
the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in
limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to
women and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may

be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it


is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be
perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek
its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of
separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only step in when
there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently
shown in this case.

classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or


rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the
laws.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly


situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case
of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact
that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the
essence of true equality."70

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of


equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is
not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should
be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does
not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on
persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A
law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member
of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that


R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be
discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by
favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the State extends its protection.

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women


According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National
Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence
against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal
power relationship between women and men otherwise known as
"gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people
to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on
dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's
companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society.
This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With
power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a
form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human
rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on
Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating
that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal
power relations between men and women, which have led to
domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the
prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence
against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which
women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men." 72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social
context of gender-based violence and developments in advocacies to

eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of


R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the
pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence
against women. The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use
force on members of the family under his control. I quote the early
studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in
patriarchy the institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually
all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In
ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife,
were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or
even kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her.
Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the
patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of
society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women.
Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as
saying husband and wife were one and that one was the husband.
However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English
common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their
wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed
husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their
thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to
chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the
preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing
violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States
followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court
of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the
common law right of a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick,
to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or
to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our

law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law
that the husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more
organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a
simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root
cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons,
bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their
crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the
liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote,
to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on
the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic
violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue
into an important public concern. No less than the United States
Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two
million women are the victims of severe assaults by their male
partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every
eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The
[American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked
underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages
women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude
the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who
are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is
conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence
agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the
above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all
women will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during
their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly
11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of
these incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating
takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence
is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse,
particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also
common.

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps


because they perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women
who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large
part because they have no other source of income... Returning to
one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of
Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims
in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of
female homicide victims are killed by their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence
Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less
successful. The United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the
UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In
1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on the role
and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City,
Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a
Commission on the Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half and full steps of
all these women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of
our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of
women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the
CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its
two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep.
Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations
omitted)

first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354
cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in
especially difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417
physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx
(T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases
for the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than
90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these
reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such
as their husbands and live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented
comparative statistics on violence against women across an eight-year
period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262
ranking first among the different VAW categories since its
implementation in 2004,74 thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women,
2004 - 2011*

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

201

997

927

659

837

811

770

1,04

38

46

26

22

28

27

194

148

185

147

204

167

26

580

536

382

358

445

485

74

3,553

2,335

1,892

1,505

1,307

1,498

2,01

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"


victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics
on violence against women and children show that
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in
2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the

53

37

38

46

18

54

218

924

1,269

2,387

3,599

5,285

319

223

199

182

220

208

62

19

29

30

19

19

121

102

93

109

109

99

17

11

16

24

34

152

16

34

23

28

18

25

90

50

59

59

83

703

6,271

5,374

4,881

5,729

6,905

9,485

five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men
who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women constituted
89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic
violence.75Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman
against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around
(18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from
their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the
hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual
assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a
spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or
emotional abuse.76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse
perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render
R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring
drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in
receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing
animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said
ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal
protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and drivers of
vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not
utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that,
while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the
city roads, "but their number must be negligible and their appearance
therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to
constitute a menace to the health of the community."77 The mere fact
that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not
violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of
persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some
degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.78

*2011 report covers only from January to August


C. Gender bias and prejudices
Source: Philippine National Police Women and Children Protection
Center (WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic
abuse and violence against men in the Philippines because incidents
thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not
even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of
women who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or

From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and
sentencing, crimes against women are often treated differently and
less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United
States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief
sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the
civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority
under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that

the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic


prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting
them to "double victimization" first at the hands of the offender and
then of the legal system.79

distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the
judges."85

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for
Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the
police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the
conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the
prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it
might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be
involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence." 80

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of


R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and
children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:

Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases
against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge
Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used
derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the complainant in
a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a
live-in partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress"
in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a
"prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed"
and of absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks
betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination
brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As
emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination
through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate
against men.82Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is
discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and
"hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the
CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures
"to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that
"(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from
a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State


values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect
for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the
family and its members particularly women and children, from violence
and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence
committed against women and children in keeping with the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international
human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the
Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional
Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October
6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to
women equality with men before the law87 and shall take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of
equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols.89 It is, thus,
bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing
conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well,
for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are
threatened by violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer
violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:

witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of


the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a


woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he
has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but
is not limited to, the following acts:

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a


woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the
following:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical


harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature,
committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited
to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness,
treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's
body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications
and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child
to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing
the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home
or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to
engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or
likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but
not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property,
public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital
infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the
physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to
which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the


victim from engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid,
serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of
the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial
resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the
conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or
solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted
provision are attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions
and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found in the
U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that the
definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference between
violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and
ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts
enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are
worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence
can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its
meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92that
phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common
money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or
emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case
of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness"
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the

statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical


exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds
of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out
the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may
likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the genderneutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover,
while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship,
it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v.
Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the
victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the
latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband)
had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her
insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally,
emotionally, mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the
issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due process clause
of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is
stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an
inkling of what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence
against women and their children, their family or household members,
and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the
offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their
daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of
their life.96

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that


the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to
curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard
the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
designated family or household member safety in the family residence,
and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the
employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to
award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure
their financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed
and verified by the petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility,
criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the
essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the
court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before
notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in
jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is
necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent
danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis
to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the
allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to
the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as
violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary
attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property,102 in the same way,
the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences
in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and
hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests,103among which is protection of women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the
court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the
respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from
service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the
petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the

court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from
service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the
immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent
requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days
from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on
the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice. 105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify,
must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show
cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be
issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for
protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner
of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an
inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive
imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may
have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that
was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May
23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to
allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order
dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to
show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he
chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an
"exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the
questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and
that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can
show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may
not now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the


respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the victim,
regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check"
issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. 108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of
the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order
shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the
offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either
temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or
permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent
must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct
a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things
and escort him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private
respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for
the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may
be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then
can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it
for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments,
instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done
violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer
the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this
provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the
Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows: 110

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to


mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a
process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily
reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence,
however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is
somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for
an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is
frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom
the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)

part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.112 On the


other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to
enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due observance."113

There is no undue delegation of


judicial power to barangay officials.

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by


the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available
Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening
to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the
Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of
his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and
ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay." 114

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of


judicial power which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the
"Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established by
law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to
issue protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to
inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto
in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that
these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of
judicial powers."115

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and
How. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection
order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to
desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A
Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the
protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte
determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be
acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued
by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was
unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be
effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex
parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any
barangay official to effect its personal service.

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a


preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground
to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine
reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence
against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that
would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the
issuance of a BPO.

1wphi1

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any


proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since
barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies are required to
extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very
unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the
chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay
officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their
duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
Conclusion

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an


unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such

a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words,


the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the
instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing
arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and
signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges
of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts
and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the
women's movement against domestic violence shows that one of its
most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If
we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle
of women for equality but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNAB

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973


PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION,
NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO,
ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO
VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for
petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and
members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers
in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular
second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5
P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of
their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge
Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following
stipulation of facts of the parties parties
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company
learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first
shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those
working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and
8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;

4. That a meeting was called by the Company on


March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's
canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1)
Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all
department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1)
Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de
Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and
(6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm
or deny said projected mass demonstration at
Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin
Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel,
confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that
the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because
it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu
explained further that the demonstration has nothing to
do with the Company because the union has no quarrel
or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that
the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized,
however, that any demonstration for that matter should
not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the
Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty.
C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that
workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report
for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the
existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an
illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another
meeting was convoked Company represented by Atty.
C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of:
Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu
and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of
March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to
the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may

join the Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the


first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be
excused from joining the demonstration and should
report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd
and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of
the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT
NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning
of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated
the Company's warning that the officers shall be
primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was
rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacaang demonstration will be held the following
morning; and

constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some


Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike because it was not directed against the
respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)

8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of


PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was
received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of
which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST
EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8,
Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)

Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the
aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29,
1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a
motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on
the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked
for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to
Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex
"G", pp. 57-60, rec. )

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400


proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent
Company that the first shift workers should not be required to
participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second
and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to
2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the
mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a
charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the
first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to
Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875,
and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A",
pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of
Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.).
Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969,
by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor
Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they
did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent
Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969;
that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their

After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by


the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September
15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas,
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible
for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a
consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the
respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)

In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p.
63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners
received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17
(should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the
amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners
had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27,
1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that
because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it
should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo, 1 which
held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for
the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said
five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written
arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for
reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en
banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners for
being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period

prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein
petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which
was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of
the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15,
16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5)
days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the
decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be
perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court
a petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the
ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time
was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by
the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their
counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk
(Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the
order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3,
1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 8889, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which
underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity
and worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the
cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of
man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent
in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty,
equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments,
and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the
Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of

political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and


officials, and toestablish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the
well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be
judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was
entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to
petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign
people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the
ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as
Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk,
but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice
Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and
the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not
only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of
his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru
these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive
public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can
appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. 8 Because these
freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in
our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost
as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing
space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the
passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the
power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against
the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful,
and of oligarchs political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of


assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such
priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored
by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the
means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to
validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other
hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a
more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate
danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it
has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando
in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion
in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo
in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and
Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of
speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition
for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and
women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro
relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to
the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz.
whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the
mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by
their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work,"
herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated
the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles
governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained.
The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before
Malacaang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen,
not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom
expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for
redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental
agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the
municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for

their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private
respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro
the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein
private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the
cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more
efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as
profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for
its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at
the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police
or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its
failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the
position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have
been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to
further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their
right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local
officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent
firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons
afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of
their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from
6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or
damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of
the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic
situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as
they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As
above intimated, the condition in which the employees found
themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally
affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their
families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated.
The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized
in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds
fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as
he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on
bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic
reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield and
armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming

ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and


social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can
produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard
the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of
inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound
on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition. 19

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of


the employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations,
in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular
working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial
Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to
stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working
hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers
and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom
should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969
could not have been legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction
would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even
if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent
Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in
any industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence
of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they suggested
to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.
should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be
averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective
demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity
of the Union members as well as their total presence at the
demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the
validity of their cause but also immediately action on the part of the
corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues
they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of
freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then
by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is
diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised

of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their


members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their
ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police
persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in
advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have
made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might
sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in
this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift
employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which
request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at
9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration
(pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or
compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for
excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass
demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is
gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian
as it is unconstitutional.

III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against
alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on
the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition
for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right
"to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights
guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged
by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their
mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of
which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees
to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against
such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the
respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift
should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of

dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting


speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves
at least equal protection as the concerted action of employees in
giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with
immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the appointment
and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic
Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the
protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act
No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is
for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned
order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company,
"while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution,"
nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and
"warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the
first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the
following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such
failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat
of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass
demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against
the local police, were more important to them because they had the
courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of
dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's
wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the
demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more
especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego
their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about
the desired relief from police abuses. But management was adamant
in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free
speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary
to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses
inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the
evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the
corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and

to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the


Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to
disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the
operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss
actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only
mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not
present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to
comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were
exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day
of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the
customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or
that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to
absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the
company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds
of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such
savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or
damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its
workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of
the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for
proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent
from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which
guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article
XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to
labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the
State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to
these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for
otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of
"meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the
Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law
"to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and
protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization
for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their

moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the


case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very
governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy
and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission its raison d'etre
as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right
divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is
null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction
secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained
through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the
judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of
an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced
confession, which violated his constitutional right against selfincrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present evidence in his
defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 26 even
after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm
trenched upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both
failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the
inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been
subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human
rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of
jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are
a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative
on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and
corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by
mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations
exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted
by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human
rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to
enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of
one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity
to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there
are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be
vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle
then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between
an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot
employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the
required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with
which to pay for competent legal services. 28-a

VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for
reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5) days from
notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall
be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for
reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of
procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations
pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or
seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated
September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they
could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two
(2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more
directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a
mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period
for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over
constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the
aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the
Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the
Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of
constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any
statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to
natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of
Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or
reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead
constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by
the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is
unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the
Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved
workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the
necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the
filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51;
Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in
the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one

day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates
the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated
September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to
be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts
adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of
ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15,
16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G",
pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the
herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.),
long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting
arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration.
Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution
dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for
being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period
(Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to
reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in suppf such
motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for
by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject
of 29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these
cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses
presently available must be specifically raised in the complaint or
answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such
pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be
raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the
determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of
the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which
no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is
thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court
gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule
of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise
yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before
the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their
defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered
no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny
application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on
such human rights.30-a

It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent


power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice
Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with
all situations without concerning itself about procedural
niceties that do not square with the need to do justice,
in any case, without further loss of time, provided that
the right of the parties to a full day in court is not
substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an
appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words,
when all the material facts are spread in the records
before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it
matters little that the error of the court a quo is of
judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there
render the appropriate judgment. Is within the
contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal
and within the power of this Court to strike down in an
appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be
beyond the admit of its authority, in appropriate
cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any error of
judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly
categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any
doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the
errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court
of Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or
excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal
grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here
and now even if such errors can be considered as
mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the
exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary
return of this case to the lower court for the sole
purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal.
(Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial
Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an unreasoning
adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein
laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to survive,
must be according supremacy over the property rights of their
employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case,

especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has


be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience
to the Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a Court
of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned
and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees
outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in
the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules
relied upon by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore
such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human
rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar
facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at is also
authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R.
charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was restated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case
of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the
petitioners in the motion for new trial is not "newly
discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of
procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such
criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial
Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No.
103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its,
rules or procedure and shall have such other powers
as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided,
however, That in the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy and in
exercising any duties and power under this Act, the
Court shall act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by
any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is
disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities

applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even


restricted to the specific relief demanded by the
parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to
future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496,
Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil.
Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe
that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the
respondent court to consider whether or not its
previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority
was founded on fact, without regard to the technical
meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v.
Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil.
578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with
"pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that the poor
workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer
seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the
fundamental law, simply because their counsel erroneously
believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23,
1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for
reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day
late considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when
they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the attainment of which
such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this
score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma
vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland
in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor
decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds
v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v.
Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy,
14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far
back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its properoffice as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm,
this Court has remained committed. The late Justice
Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was

of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of


procedural rule should never "sacrifice the ends
justice." While "procedural laws are no other than
technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they were
adopted not as ends themselves for the compliance
with which courts have organized and function, but as
means conducive to the realization the administration
of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have
remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical
language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial
rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated technicalities
with impairment of the sacred principles of justice."
(Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161
[1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they
"should give way to the realities of the situation."
(Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA
1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated
in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing
McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA
272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier
formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure
"are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense";
but are intended "to help secure substantial justice."
(Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule
were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the employment
of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day
absence from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the
severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the
other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who
participated in the demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter
of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union
members who are not officers, were not dismissed and only the Union
itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as
respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by
the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp.
20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400
or so employee participated in the demonstration, for which reason
only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in
the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were
so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for
work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued
in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.

The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should


have been simply to charge said one-day absence against their
vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the
petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union
leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as
that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal
blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive
hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not
from those who consciously seek to destroy our system
of Government, but from men of goodwill good men
who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the
fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an
impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable.
What we must remember, however, is thatpreservation
of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression
of liberty has the same effect whether the suppress or
be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against
misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the
infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our
Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands
of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender.
The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of
us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the
liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own
liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong to
a group that is important and respected, we must
recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play
for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good
conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention,


but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its
laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the
local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income
or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms
and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers.
This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted
to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of
its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs.
C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for
having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank
president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality,
nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the
promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission
of the respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in
their individual capacities when they wrote the lettercharge they were nonetheless protected for they were
engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their
right of self organization that includes concerted activity
for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some
members of this Court. For, as has been aptly
stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a
small group of employees, if in furtherance of their
interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by
the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union
activity be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have
allowed the respondents to air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to
discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in
giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure,
the right of self-organization of employees is not

unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S.


793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge
for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil.
Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is
undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the
normal exercise of the right of the employer to select
his employees or to discharge them. It is directed
solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with
the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in
unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an
interference with the employees' right of selforganization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a
refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair
labor practice within the meaning and intendment of
section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis
supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify
labor unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the
complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no
less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly
and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more
imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not
against the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with
full back pay from the date of their separation from the service until re
instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have
realized from other sources during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company,
Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, C.J, took no part.

.R. No. 204819

April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves


and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG
and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC.
[ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche,
Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S.
Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C.
Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M.
Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina
Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco
for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese
Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F
emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan
Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z.
Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children,
Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses
Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph
Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor,
Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and
on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho,
Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R.
Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho,
Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R.
Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their
minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her
minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas,
Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina
R. Laws, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN
A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of
Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic
Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE
COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson,
Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon,
THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and
THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Donato Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and
VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr.
Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal
capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr.
Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in
his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G.
IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC,
EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE
APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H.
LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG
SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein
represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and
in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte,
Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F.
Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O.
Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and
Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.

HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.


FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON.
ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and
Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, DirectorGeneral, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on
Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D.,
CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADOLUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and
ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS
ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA
COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos
For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the
Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD &
ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of
Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the
Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma
Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal capacity,
JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A.
CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES,
RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG,
RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,


Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172

x---------------------------------x

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN


CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE
BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A.
RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N.
RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

G.R. No. 206355

x---------------------------------x

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON


PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA,
ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.

G.R. No. 207563

x---------------------------------x

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M.


KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management,Respondents.

G.R. No. 207111


JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO
B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R.
ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of
our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he

ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good."
1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's


emergence as a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in
a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental
policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy,
the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that
concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The
government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its
very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the
development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the
main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws
and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the
executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring
concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz.
Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an
inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on
clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet
reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks
on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and
enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the
supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues
of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every
democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and
their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From
television debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by socio-political
activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy - the
clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in
every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto,
however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
2

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by spouses


Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their
personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on
behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child
Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational
institution (Jmbong);
5

(2) Petition for Prohibition, filed by the Alliance for the Family
Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria
Concepcion S. Noche and several others in their personal
capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn
(ALFI);
6

(3) Petition for Certiorari, filed by the Task Force for Family
and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
9

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by Serve Life


Cagayan De Oro City, Inc., Rosevale Foundation, Inc., a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several
others, in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
10

11

12

13

(5) Petition, filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as


a citizen (Bugarin);
14

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by Eduardo


Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the
Philippines, in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers
(Olaguer);
15

16

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by the


Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc., and several
others in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
17

18

19

(8) Petition, filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several


others, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(Echavez);
20

21

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law,
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact
that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris
controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions- in-intervention, to wit:

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by spouses


Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia,
in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those
yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his
capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
22

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by Pro-Life


Philippines Foundation Inc. and several others, in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its
associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
23

24

25

(11) Petition for Prohibition, filed by Millennium Saint


Foundation, Inc., Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita BorromeoGarcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their
capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar
(MSF);
26

27

that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives


which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and
other health problems.
36

The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The


petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional
guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public
funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the
petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are
believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the
constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.
37

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by John Walter


B. Juat and several others, in their capacities as citizens
(Juat) ;
28

29

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by Couples for


Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others, in their capacities
as citizens (CFC);
30

31

(14) Petition for Prohibition filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and


Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Tillah); and
32

(15) Petition-In-Intervention, filed by Atty. Samson S.


Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer
(Alcantara); and
33

(16) Petition-In-Intervention, filed by Buhay Hayaang


Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors


of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment,
as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice
on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full
and correct information on reproductive health programs and service,
although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.
38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and


Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR), provides that skilled health
professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to,
Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical
specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health
nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the
duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious
objectors.
39

40

34

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are


assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According
to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against
abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize
the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices
and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of
both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.
35

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to


protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of


mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an
affront to their religious beliefs.
41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious


freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the
"clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test"
to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the
right to free speech.
42

The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on


involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law
subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude
because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they
are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona

services for indigent women, under threat of criminal


prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.

43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by


PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render
reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation
would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to
avail of the practitioners services.
44

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It


is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it
makes them the primary target of the government program that
promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather
than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH
Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor.
45

The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due


process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of
imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague
because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as
"violation" of the RH Law.
46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates


the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the right
to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility
they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." It ignores the
management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to
conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and
judgment.
47

The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a


person to explain a full range of family planning methods is
plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred
way of family planning. The petitioners note that although
exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by
religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to
another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or
procedure.
48

The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family


protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law
providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes
upon their constitutional right to raise their children in
accordance with their beliefs.
49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will


undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real
dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to
mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their
family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child
who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to
determine whether their child should use contraceptives.
50

The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of nondelegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the
delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the
Emergency Drugs List (EDL).
51

The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision


under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.
52

The RH Law violates Natural Law.

53

The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local


Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law,
providing for reproductive health measures at the local
government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers
devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government
Code and R.A . No. 9054.
54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their
respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality
of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
which commented on the petitions in behalf of the
respondents, Congressman Edcel C. Lagman, former officials of the
Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and
Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez, the Filipino Catholic Voices for
Reproductive Health (C4RH), Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros, and
Atty. Joan De Venecia also filed their respective Comments-inIntervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013,
Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.
55

56

57

58

59

60

61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of


the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal
reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore,
the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some
petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions
are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has
no original jurisdiction.

In addition, R.A. No. 5921, approved on June 21, 1969, contained


provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional
substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided
that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking
abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug
Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person without a
proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the
assailed legislation took effect.

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN


Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population
problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term
economic development, enacted measures that promoted male
vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth. Among
these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16,
1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The
law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad
educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to
couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity
rates will be further reduced."

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments


raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining
the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period
of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.
62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the
counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues
raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to
be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on
August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument.
On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders
of the Court.
63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective


memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several
questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.
64

The Status Quo Ante


(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

66

67

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E .


Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79, dated December 8,
1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad
educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of
over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of
contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of
spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
68

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family


planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health. Under that policy, the country gave
priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to
be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made
in the International Conference on Population and
Development. Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A.
No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others,
mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and
programs for women, including family planning and sex education.
69

Prior to the RH Law


Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the
sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices.
As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729
entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution
of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs
and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or
distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."
65

70

71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the


country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry
number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the
country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in
2010. The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures
were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was
enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
access and information to the full range of modem family planning
methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples'
right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the
RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information
on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and
services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To
put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry
out its mandates.
72

ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the
parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following
principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of
judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify


and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's health
and population control.

4] Locus Standi

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the
government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of
the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of
life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI
prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of
the RH Law - must be maintained." It explains:
73

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and


contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and
Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are
prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a
physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under
the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay
officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the
implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent
possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and
provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer
of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and
universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices
and supplies.
74

5] Declaratory Relief

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:


1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; and (c) the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. The Constitution has truly
blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers
among the three branches of government.
83

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its


implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural
impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG
asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of
Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH
Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process" and
"characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency." The OSG
posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the
RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the
discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms
with the political departments, in particular, with Congress. It further
asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v.
Anti-Terrorism Council, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts
of the legislature.
75

76

77

78

79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it


cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be
enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has
yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims
that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a
speech-regulating measure.
80

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the


actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the
Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to
the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of
separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines; (b) the executive
82

84

85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the


doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts
proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their
respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts
of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy
is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.
86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social


disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon
the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done
within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time,
allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and
specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the
legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave
abuse of discretion. Thus, while the Court may not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do
so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results. The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to
protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the
Constitution.
87

88

89

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial


power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction
as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it
in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and
goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches,
since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to
make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective
authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after
said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort,
then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under
review. This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution
which expressly provides:
90

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court


and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases
supplied]

there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must


possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the lis mota of the case.
96

Actual Case or Controversy


Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not
present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to
be implemented. They claim that the questions raised by the petitions
are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been
charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no
showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected
by its operation. In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH
Law is premature.
97

As far back as Tanada v. Angara, the Court has unequivocally


declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials,
as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v.
COMELEC, Aldaba v. COMELEC, Magallona v. Ermita, and
countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
91

92

93

94

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that


it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
"The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant
case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by
constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government through the
definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary
in that balancing operation.
95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not


have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of
constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the
power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a)

98

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy


that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete,
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial
thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not
merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
99

100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the


requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the
act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed
by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the act complained of
101

102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic


of the Philippines, where the constitutionality of an unimplemented
103

Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was


put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass
upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed
that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights.
Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in
question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete
acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe.
Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough
to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering
that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only
becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because


medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They
must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge

108

109

110

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously


alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion
and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by
the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of
these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed
pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple
expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would
diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only
when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of
the Filipino people.
Locus Standi

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by
the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.
105

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file
their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge"
lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to
be enforced and applied against them, and the government has yet to
distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.
111

The Court is not persuaded.

112

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known


as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all
other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights
of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which
one's thoughts are externalized.
106

107

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S.


has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While
this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly
penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification
is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a
proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental


importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in
establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It
requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
113

issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of


difficult constitutional questions.
114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule
that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he
asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation
of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also
known as the prohibition against third-party standing.
115

Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on
standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest."
116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that
in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional
questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and
a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to
the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they
had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the
public.
117

issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the
youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative
need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only
to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be
resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects
the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom
of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all
these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive
health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of
society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication.
More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother
and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for
a life to be taken away before taking action.

118

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be
assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and
again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded
certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or
with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule
on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court
has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing nontraditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been
directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this
time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to
be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is
at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially
petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for
injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays
for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.
120

121

119

One Subject-One Title


Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated
as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law,


claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to
them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood,
the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due
process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control
measure.
122

123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not
a birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of
"responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.
124

125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the


Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus
of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's
population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and
children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As
stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on
the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These
family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly
geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to
reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal
and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers
the dissemination of information and provisions on access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and
supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole
idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the
central idea of the RH Law. Indeed, remove the provisions that refer
to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such
as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal
services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections
including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for
Women."
126

127

128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill
rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and
Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require
the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal
rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or
impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood"
are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of
the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees
the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health,
the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a
law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would
not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to
its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the
act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or
scope of the act."
129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and


"responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms,
the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought
to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be


made accessible to the public.
134

1-The Right to Life


Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life
and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.
130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting


abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that
prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take
effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent
of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized
ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "nonabortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies, medical research shows that
contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the
fertilized ovum which already has life.
131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good,


the petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use
contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.
132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the


Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or
supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation
effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also
considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise
or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective
patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it
shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination


that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As
the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and
consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other
experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford
deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment
only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an
abortive.
135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional


protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that various
studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the
fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is
constitutional since the law specifically provides that only
contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized
ovum are allowed.
136

The Court's Position


It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the
right to life.
137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on


natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent
upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends
any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.

133

Position of the Respondents


For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion.
They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since
the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning


methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the
enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices
"on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and
devices which prevent fertilization, to the promotion of male
vasectomy and tubal ligation, and the ratification of numerous
138

139

international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to


promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order
to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years,
however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods
evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive
health.
140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting


women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's
well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known
as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding
this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has
always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of noabortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." As will be discussed
later, these principles are not merely grounded on administrative
policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection
expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious
freedom.
141

When Life Begins*


Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the
question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that
should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that
the individual members of the Court could express their own views on
this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at
fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made
on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from


conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is
no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the
Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when
life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are
quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that
conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that
life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is
synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male
sperm. On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that
conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the
uterus.
142

143

Plain and Legal Meaning


It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in
the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:
144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that


where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction
that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood
in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the
text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is
assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of
the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an
important condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the


word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and
reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

When is the moment of conception?

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of


becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that
results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its
parents.

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the


ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as


the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon
resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under
normal conditions.

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the


beginning of human life, it was explained:

145

146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality.


In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano, it was written:
147

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the
life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation
thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
[Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US
Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at all
stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in
preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the
fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.
148

149

xxx

150

xxx

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The


first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive?
Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of
all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by
itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in
these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a
geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these
processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that
biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally
categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum
and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the
ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46
chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat,
only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must
conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as
night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.
151

Intent of the Framers


Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the
intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it
clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the
following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from the moment of conception."

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of


conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not because
of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was
described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum"
may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use
the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."
152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample


protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the
purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the moment
of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because
according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to
Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to
begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very,
very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from
the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we
should not give any doubt to Congress, too.
153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:


Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that
point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise during
the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The
provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean
when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to
determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today are
abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called
contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If
fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized
ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with
some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized
ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is
proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is
called abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and
should be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress


to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are abortifacient.
Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they
are already considered abortifacient.
154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of


the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal
protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest
opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the
Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from
enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did
not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact,
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a
constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the
determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a
question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based
on established evidence.
155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the


fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior
to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I


am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life of
the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by
fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the
legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of
the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these
implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of
Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a
categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn
from the moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no," not

"maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being


encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or
does it disagree with me?

Justice Bersamin:

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would


be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.

Atty. Noche:

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about
some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually
stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the
uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really
occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be
unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987
Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments.
There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms
are not classified as abortifacients.
157

So you have no objection to condoms?

Not under Section 12, Article II.


Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have
porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your
Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.

Atty. Noche:

Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.

Justice Bersamin:

Medical Meaning

There is no life.

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical


foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary
defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be
the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable
zygote."

Atty. Noche:

158

159

So, there is no life to be protected.


Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to


form a zygote from which the embryo develops."
160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological


Obstetrics), used by medical schools in the Philippines, also
concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of
fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the
formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that
dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
161

Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that:


"Human development begins after the union of male and female
gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization
(conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the
contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum)
and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the
sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a
new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell
that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from


Fertilization

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology mirror the same


position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process,
fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary
circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby
formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each
pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid
number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo
now exists as a genetic unity."

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory
advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation. According
to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive
stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous." Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical
authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that
pregnancy can be medically detected."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out


with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible
Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any


legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life
but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an
inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it
would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the
Constitution.

162

163

CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same
time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred
because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins.
Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that
destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported
good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a
human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is
no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where
only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical,
legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a
human organism and that the life of a new human being commences
at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion
is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of
any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of
human embryos.
164

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under


medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the
Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote
is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that
is, upon fertilization.

165

166

167

168

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the
utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation of
the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further
aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and
abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987
Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to
prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It
was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This

intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of


the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from
conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion
laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by
the Supreme Court.
169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent
and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to
make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that
the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the
moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law
is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to
the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the
uterus for implantation.

2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and
couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have
children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make
other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination,
coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so;
and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not
include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article


256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or
expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against


abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order,
letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to
or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act
No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly.

1] xx x.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the


following terms shall be defined as follows:

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in


prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
defines an abortifacient as:

170

xxx.
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of
methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to
reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive healthrelated problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which
is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of
reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion
complications;

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or


the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be
afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the
RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation,
but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient
is any drug or device that either:

xxx.
(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's


womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that
the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty
to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first,
prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as
discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing
or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any
drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an
abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all
that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It
also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon
implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes
that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already
has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it
becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the
mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded
protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is
nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the
fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords
protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction
abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in
the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of
implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And
as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion,
that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an
abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9
of the law that "any product or supply included or to be included in the
EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and
supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an
abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise,
cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an
abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance
when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.
171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal


and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the
proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent
and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the
EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and
supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be used as
abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under
the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or
acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills,
abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms
or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RHIRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following
terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined
as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the

prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the


mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined,
viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically
proven modern family planning method, device, or health product,
whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not
primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from
being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved
indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives"
and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb.
172

This cannot be done.


In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del
Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the
word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR must be struck
down for being ultra vires.
173

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a)


and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a)
of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is
danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way
for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life
of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it
appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an
"abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here,
the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the
approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of
their fail-safe mechanism.
174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the


FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this,

together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of


the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable
conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the
EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the primary
action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the
secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion,
and in line with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner
that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing
rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus,
the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be
declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the
RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary
effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the
approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12
of the Constitution."
175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion"


embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health
because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in
the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the
regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national
hospitals. Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit
that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly
increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to
women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased
when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is
contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is
associated with a threefold increased risk of venous
thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and
an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction. Given the
definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections
4(p) and (w) of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed
legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and
satisfying sex lives.
176

177

178

179

180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the
administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the
OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive
pose a danger to the health of women.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are


self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory.
There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions. In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, it was stated:

The Court's Position

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is


necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been,
that

181

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In


this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and
promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution
provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to
provide for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The
State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food
and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health,
manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's
health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled
person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and
their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices
and from substandard or hazardous products.

182

183

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered selfexecuting rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective.
These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing
to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners,
particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per
se. In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and
R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not
prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly
licensed by a physician - be maintained.
184

185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is


to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at
all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still
in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of
respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to
the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale,
distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will
still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No.
4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public
that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.
As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the
same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale,
Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices"
and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of
Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the
Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law
and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of
contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No.
4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or
corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or
without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such
sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or
portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing
fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material,
or agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the
primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the
provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five
hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more
than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA


No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No
medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or
device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise
be made available to the consuming public except through a
prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH
Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that
the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives,
whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and
baseless. [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
186

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:


The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section
10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of
family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall
coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and
implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and
budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels
and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who
want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used;
and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution
and monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of this
Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.


"Approved: June 18, 1966"

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and


devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still

in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be
from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that
the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will
done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all
possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy
responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for
any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their
use.
187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet
been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the
Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared
by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and
medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH
Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of
contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional
yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents
itself.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation
are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there are those who,
because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe
that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of
these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs
prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the willing
participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive
use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed
to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life,
and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and
denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life."
188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of


contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on
contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.
189

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot
legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are
safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains
their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the
mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have
been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not
Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular
hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and nonabortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family
planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other
safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products
and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not
mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they
are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress
that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective" without the proper scientific examination.

2. On Religious Accommodation and


The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to
address religious sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious
objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because
the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer
the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical
practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For
the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to
cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her
religious beliefs.
190

They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to


refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because although
it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to
refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l)
and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures.
They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object,

such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in


Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law
referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred
to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.

must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of


religious freedom.

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile,


contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another health care
service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting
healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the
act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality.
Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to
disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives
with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono
reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious
freedom of those upon whom they are required.

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does
not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be
it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or
belief. They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public
interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive
health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the
State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of
the Constitution, and that what the law only prohibits are those acts
or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive
health. They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee
informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled
to violate his religion against his free will.

The Respondents' Positions

191

192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious


objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health care services
to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces
the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a
serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's
belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH
Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the
public.
193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state
interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions
no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not
explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of
rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information,
choice and to make decisions according to religious convictions,
ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood)
are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment
of religious freedom.
194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law


requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible
parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They
claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the
implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious
beliefs. As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine
and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the
petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and
facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs

196

197

198

199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family


planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going
against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they
invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law. In other words,
by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the
petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic
Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this
on the entire citizenry.
200

201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same
does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it
being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the
religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is
required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to
information and who has the right to expect that the health care
professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents,
the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is
sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion
without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.
202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is


minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and impact.

203

195

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the


respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an
opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information

regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant


nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received
on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not
compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely
free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the
State.
204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that
natural family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics and
the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the
matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on
contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance
of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their
families.

religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain


benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as
tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in
government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public
schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that
the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and viceversa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus,
enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on
mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal
affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or
dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against
another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand
that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they
are good for the country.
1wphi1

The Church and The State


At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous
society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious
beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government,
in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural,
social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has
embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious
people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is
that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived
Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in
crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present
Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in
order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government
that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common
good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves
and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love,
equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested
their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people,
shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in
the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the
influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest
principles of morality. Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of
205

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be
preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision
utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple,
a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically
symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the
religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an
ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular
objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article
III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or


employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,
or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary
as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two
guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from
sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other
religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion
and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a
religion.
206

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect
for the inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of
religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly
interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and
faith. Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union wrote:
207

208

209

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the


support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect,
thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or
the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L.
ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen
form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that
the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe
as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with
the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to
impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate
invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden
may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates
conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its
purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is
valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the
state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden.

(Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144;
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to
serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote
freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms,
the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious
beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the
establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious
belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words,
the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power
to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious
beliefs and practices.
210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the


principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two
parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief.
The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of
Education:
211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by
one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including
religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most
anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may
appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of
orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief
and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel.
212

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome


power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the
rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated
into external acts that affect the public welfare."
213

Legislative Acts and the


Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the
State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This
has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor,
(Escritor) where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality214

accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent


and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution." In the same
case, it was further explained that"
215

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these


governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not
to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance.
"The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate
the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion." "What is sought
under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its
application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the
courts."
216

217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the


compelling state interest test is proper. Underlying the compelling
state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right
and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny. In
Escritor, it was written:
218

219

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these


limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause,
American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present
danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to
be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case
then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is
whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The
Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as
well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden
religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to
accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit
inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano ,
German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the
"grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The
fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and
present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society.
Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present
danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or
another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on
freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German
cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over
established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which
was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag

which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano


was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test,
but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to
the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society,
Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger"
and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech
has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German
doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the
benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction.
Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising
from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper
where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has
different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be
immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test
that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive
evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However,
not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to
religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred
position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of
all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an
invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher
sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is
premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus
the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just
and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert,
only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit
this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a
right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate.
Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the
fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to
carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would
allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until
they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the
state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide.
The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious
liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount
interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which
involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the
"compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests
of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious
liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining
supplied.]

The Court's Position


In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to
determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in
the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a
religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to
one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing
with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law,
custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench
should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have
authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee
of religious freedom.

legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and


evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered
and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified
through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying
marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding
support to promote modern natural methods of family planning,
especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of
acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of
Policy]

220

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects


religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with
assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his
religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions
in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these
rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section
2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution
and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the
nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood."
[Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access,
without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective
natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe,

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and
couples to have the number of children they desire with due
consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources
available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws,
public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family
planning methods that are in accordance with their religious
convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's
obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) ,
women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based
organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure
that reproductive health and population and development policies,
plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the
poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to
respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is
likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and
achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their
children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into
account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and
economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section
4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing
the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the
whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with
the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can
or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone,
nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do
so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that
the State cannot enhance its population control program through the
RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary
to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue
its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the
policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply
because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between
Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things
that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.
221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer


While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive
health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the NonEstablishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with
respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions
commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to
immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the
law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their
conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened
by government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test
in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent
Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious
objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from
obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment
of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no
less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious
objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor,

there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious


objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the
abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a
clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious
beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH
Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient
seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as
he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written,
"at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.
222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it
is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health
providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally
repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what
they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally
guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined
with the right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's
thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent.
With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the
protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their
beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The
Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in
his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. While the
RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent,
freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience
and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or
indirect, in the practice of one's religion.
223

224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions


of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other,
to provide access and information on reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine
the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court
is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers,
whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a

conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the


mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to
his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle
of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of
religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of
Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater
Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, that the midwives claiming to be
conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act
of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff
on their labor ward who were involved in abortions. The Inner House
stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the
person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean
more complexity and uncertainty."
225

226

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law
endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either
an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and
ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective
implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court
firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient
to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure
on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition
of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable
principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if
it would be against their conscience or will.

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or


municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act
and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.

Institutional Health Providers


The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals
and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health
care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law
penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with
their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court
deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of
religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to
Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information
regarding programs and services and in the performance of
reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care
service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office
of the Executive Secretary it was stressed:
228

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of


our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good."
10

This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The


conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the
religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible
distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the
mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious
objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without
distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all,
the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective
robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one
acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to
none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think
what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give
expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and,
thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more
permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom
of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition,
and freedom of association.
229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such


exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative
of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent

Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law,
the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention
on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in
upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions.
Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I
presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the RH Bill?

Compelling State Interest


The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the
respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1]
demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious
objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the
burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least
intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.

Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I
have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved


to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of a
more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a
conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his
religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained
the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic
Notes disclose the following:

Justice Mendoza:

Justice De Castro:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in
the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals
such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals,
head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of
their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Congressman Lagman:

... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the
compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a
conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious
belief?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:


Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:

Justice Mendoza:
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private
practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health
professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you
agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the
religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the
law must prevail.
230

Ahh, Your Honor, ..


Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a
compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving
professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise
matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between
medical doctors and their patients.

concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who


may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open
willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to
perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court
as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would


limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however
few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger
to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the
Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering
other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the
Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna
Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to
health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta
on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact,
reads:

231

232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It


also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one
believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act
against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's
belief.
233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or


health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject
provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is
contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the
information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she
even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the
burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is
immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on
reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the
infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the
respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a
person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents
have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the
means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least
intrusive means. Other than the assertion that the act of referring
would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a
conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of
religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no
other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective
without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health
234

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health


Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive,
culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and
programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which
addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity:
Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due
respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights
of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right
of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions,
and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal
services to address pregnancy and infant health and
nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective
methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality
education and health services without prejudice to the
primary right and duty of parents to educate their
children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract


infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV,
and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract
cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of
pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children,
women and children victims and survivors shall be
provided with comprehensive health services that
include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal
interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery,
and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual
dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical
standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their childbearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of
mental health problems of women and girls. In addition,
healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and
promoted through programs and projects as strategies
in the prevention of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State
shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete,
and accurate information and education on all the above-stated
aspects of women's health in government education and training
programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth and the development of moral
character and the right of children to be brought up in
an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the
enrichment and strengthening of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms


human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning
methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied
that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per
day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed,
x x x." He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts
and figures from reputable sources.
235

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization


reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent
from 1990 to 2008, although there was still no RH Law at that time.
Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of
maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.
236

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of
social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be
solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on
religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid
exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service
providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care
procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to
life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a
referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service,
resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger.
Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC,
manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on
grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an
emergency."
237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a
child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If,
however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be
deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:

Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author


of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of
double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother
of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict
situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the
doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he
can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is
medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is
intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of
the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore,
unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or
murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their
lives are equally valuable.
238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures


endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against
the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above,
whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case
would have been more than justified considering the life he would be
able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 as a condition for
the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a
reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory
reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of
the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be
spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of
family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they
be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who
receive any information during their attendance in the required
seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them,
are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable,
and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the
intervention of the State.
239

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i)
thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into
marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and
fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and
total development.
240

The Court cannot but agree.


The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the
family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV,
is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of
the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control
population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family
as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from
participating in the decision making process regarding their common
future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over

their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had


suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who
shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health
procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of
consent or authorization of the following persons in the following
instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case
of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures
shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal
litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require
mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as
they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section
3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the
"right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a
family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same
Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decisionmaking. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo
a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the
decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly
result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all
for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked
departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution.
241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private


matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision
they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size
of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The

decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively


to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart
their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right.
Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling
interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together
as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A.
No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides
that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and
spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section
3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents.
Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to
only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo
reproductive health procedure.
242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected
zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach
into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In
our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v.
Mutuc, where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando,
held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection." Marje adopted the ruling of the
US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, where Justice William
O. Douglas wrote:
243

244

245

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the
use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting
to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married
persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully
enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by

emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."
246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will
decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases
where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning
services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be
allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when
a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are
excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to
family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental
authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame
population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the
comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State
cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to
providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer
relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It
is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate
that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government." In this regard,
Commissioner Bernas wrote:
247

The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the
right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is
superior to that of the State. [Emphases supplied]
248

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise


parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to
mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of
marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would
result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It
would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of
maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the
State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to
as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the
role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not
the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a
compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental
authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception
provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the
consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be
made. There must be a differentiation between access to information
about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods
themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is
concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition
of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the
second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper
care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life
of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information
to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the
protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such
information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this
situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental
control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise
parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in
deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be
made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has

already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be


put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized
that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently
needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) should
be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental
consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents
their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are
"non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed
above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first
sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of
their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right
would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family.
249

5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24
thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or
imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to
the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational
institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe
that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students. Citing
various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data
gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of
contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce
and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia;
the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of
promiscuity among the youth.
250

251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section
14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on ageappropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on
the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to
educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious
beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus,
considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court
declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the

youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall


receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and
the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State
recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to
become productive members of society. Notably, it places more
importance on the role of parents in the development of their children
by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of
parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.
252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid
parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the
Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth
and their important role in nation building. Considering that Section
14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health
education, but also for values formation; the development of
knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual
abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of
gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and
emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's
rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and
responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RHIRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of
responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and
emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal
mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather
than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
253

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory


reproductive health education program shall be developed in
conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will
be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such
a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that
Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is
without merit.
254

While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the reproductive health education
program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that
the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and,
thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to
them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider"
among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is
a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion
further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private
health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation
exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering
reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is
unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving
reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from
rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding,
restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time
fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. Moreover, in determining
whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be
taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation
to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of
it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment.

suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need


of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care
professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3)
public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or
(4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs
under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily
renders primarily health care services in the community after having
been accredited to function as such by the local health board in
accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of
Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7
of the law, instead of "private health care service provider," should not
be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used
synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be
exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and
modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications
and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods"
are broad enough to include the providing of information and the
rendering of medical procedures.

255

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law
punishes health care service providers who intentionally withhold,
restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health
programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is
hereby quoted as follows:

256

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:


As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private
health care service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n)
of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care
institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily
to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion,
disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who
shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination
thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health including the right to

informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe,


non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to
agree with a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate,
faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or
propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. On the other hand,
the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is
intentional. Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote
a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public
as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive
health. Public health and safety demand that health care service
providers give their honest and correct medical information in
accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health
care service providers are not barred from expressing their own
personal opinions regarding the programs and services on
reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to
provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
257

258

7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal
protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the
poor because it makes them the primary target of the government
program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather
than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law
introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of
the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing
with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles and definition of terms of the law.
259

260

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the RH
Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, the Court had the
occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:

against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.


Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down
is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires
public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted
authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not
just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of
the government including the political and executive departments, and
extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws,
through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification."

261

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is


that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in
the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must


include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class
are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with
absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should
possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered

by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an


individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long
as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not
justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only,
or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the
class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave
out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's
reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the
needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in
addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The
State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire
to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the
RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While
the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as
elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the
"promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is
incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a
couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who
intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed
law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they
would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its
provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide
priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to
promote basic reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from


the mandatory reproductive health education program under Section
14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who
are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not
amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed
provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between
public educational institutions and private educational institutions,
particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic
freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it
violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude.
They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private
and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight
(48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts
to involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to
perform acts against their will.
262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned
in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to
slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the
discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services.
Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers
of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with
PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably
imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the
State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not
a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves
the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of
Congress to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of
professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health,
the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such
professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right
altogether.
263

264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude


connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar
means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed
provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and nongovernment reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro
bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty
is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and nongovernment reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the
liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide,
when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly,
therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render
pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service
was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court
does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather,
a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a
perceived legitimate state interest.
265

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it


should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from
this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not
allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or
otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the
FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to
be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).
266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not
only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and
cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity
empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It
should be understood that health services and methods fall under the
gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood
as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A.
No. 9711 reads:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created
an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the
Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the
Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers
and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and
of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples
of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with
the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the
preparation of health products standards, and to recommend
standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of
container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical
requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate
authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations
regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters,
distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other
establishments and facilities of health products, as determined
by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health
products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to
ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors,
importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and
non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA
any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has
caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious
injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon
verified complaint for health products, whether or not
registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health

products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days
and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due
process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or
withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death,
serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is
found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly
deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk
management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of
the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of
the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of
the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the
safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was
equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective.
Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by
Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting
only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and
"methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that
Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that
are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was
explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, as follows:
267

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that


the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government
units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said
Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining
to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant
and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the
duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall
also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national
agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code.
Local government units shall likewise exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities
as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and
effective provision of the basic services and facilities
enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not
limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take
on the functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect
of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a
categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded
projects, facilities, programs and services. Thus:
268

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government


and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems
that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of
the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature
may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific
solutions.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof,


public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the National Government
under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially
funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this
Section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for
such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases
supplied]

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region


of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national


government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which

funding has been provided by the national government under the


annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it.
269

270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it


pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, the hiring of
skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay health
workers, it will be the national government that will provide for the
funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes to national priority
programs which the local government is called upon to implement like
the RH Law.
271

272

273

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely
encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording
of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these
services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said
that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local
governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does
not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and
11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by
petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law
in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the
guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by
the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by
the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized
as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that
would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable
autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et
imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional
governments. Except for the express and implied limitations imposed
on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its
inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends
to all matters of general concern or common interest.
274

275

11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural
law, suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a
legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is
the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what
is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute,
executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it
is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural
laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by
theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical
school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the
actual law of the past or present. Unless, a natural right has been
transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down
a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the very case cited by the
petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to
examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the
Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used
sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights
inherent to man where no law is applicable.
276

277

278

279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the
taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It
only seeks to enhance the population control program of the
government by providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the
poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional
insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, nonabortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier
pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society
cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve.
After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a
recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than
the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one
religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of

the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity
and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded
so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist
alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not
escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising
poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause
of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal
distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty
will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the
very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in
the long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on
such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing
populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with
adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a
significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate,
innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one,
Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances
from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an
ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the
country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the
fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This
would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below
the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.
280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the
State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of
the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless,
the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid
down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking
body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is
the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of
the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the
policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this
Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the
application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial

legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always,


with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out
the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution
and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The
Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine
itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the
lawmaking body.
281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere


compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and
reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the
Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still
be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No.
4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of
Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed
legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "noncoercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be
maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
except with respect to the following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and nonmaternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic

Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures


without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to
refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of
his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR
regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which
added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and
void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as
extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar
as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared
as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.

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