Professional Documents
Culture Documents
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human
Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition,
with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The
petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further
hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et
al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990,
signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an
Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management
Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received
by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the
North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the
respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July
1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North
EDSA. 1Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private
respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be
removed to give way to the "People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group,
led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners,
asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be
addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the
demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR
Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing
the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North
EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987
Constitution, thus: to
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party,
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof
in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and
provide for preventive measures and legal aid services
to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or
detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research,
education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
promote human rights and to provide for compensation
to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance
with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under
its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance
with law; and
The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No.
7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion Perpetua to
Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in accordance with Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the accused Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court are (1) a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, both of the Revised Rules of Court, by Atty. Alicia
Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), which essentially prays for the issuance of
the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 2013 and
April 23, 2013 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), Second Division and En bane, respectively, in SPA No.
13-211 (DC), entitled "Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. Joseph Ejercito
Estrada" for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) a Petition-inIntervention filed by Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), wherein he prays to be
declared the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in
view of private respondent former President Joseph Ejercito Estradas
(former President Estrada) disqualification to run for and hold public
office.
1
The Facts
The salient facts of the case are as follows:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the
Philippines, for the crime of plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al."
The dispositive part of the graft courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding the accused, Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of PLUNDER, defined in and penalized by Republic Act
No. 7080, as amended. On the other hand, for failure of the
prosecution to prove and establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty.
Edward S. Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder, and
accordingly, the Court hereby orders their ACQUITTAL.
13
While this case was pending beforethe Court, or on May 13, 2013, the
elections were conducted as scheduled and former President Estrada
was voted into office with 349,770 votes cast in his favor. The next day,
the local board of canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected
Mayor of the City of Manila.
On June 7, 2013, Lim, one of former President Estradas opponents
for the position of Mayor, moved for leave to intervene in this case. His
motion was granted by the Court in a Resolution dated June 25,
2013. Lim subscribed to Risos-Vidals theory that former President
Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office as the pardon
granted to the latter failed to expressly remit his perpetual
disqualification. Further, given that former President Estrada is
disqualified to run for and hold public office, all the votes obtained by
the latter should be declared stray, and, being the second placer with
313,764 votes to his name, he (Lim) should be declared the rightful
winning candidate for the position of Mayor of the City of Manila.
question for resolution by the Court, that is, whether or not the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified
to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon
granted to him by former President Arroyo.
In her petition, Risos-Vidal starts her discussion by pointing out that
the pardon granted to former President Estrada was conditional as
evidenced by the latters express acceptance thereof. The
"acceptance," she claims, is an indication of the conditional natureof
the pardon, with the condition being embodied in the third Whereas
Clause of the pardon, i.e., "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office."
She explains that the aforementioned commitment was what impelled
former President Arroyo to pardon former President Estrada, without it,
the clemency would not have been extended. And any breach thereof,
that is, whenformer President Estrada filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for President and Mayor of the City of Manila, he breached the
condition of the pardon; hence, "he ought to be recommitted to prison
to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence x x x and disqualifies
him as a candidate for the mayoralty [position] of Manila."
16
15
The Issue
Though raising five seemingly separate issues for resolution, the
petition filed by Risos-Vidal actually presents only one essential
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal Their accessory
penalties. The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period
of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned
as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon. (Emphases supplied.)
She avers that in view of the foregoing provisions of law, it is not
enough that a pardon makes a general statement that such pardon
carries with it the restoration of civil and political rights. By virtue of
Articles 36 and 41, a pardon restoring civil and political rights without
categorically making mention what specific civil and political rights are
restored "shall not work to restore the right to hold public office, or the
right of suffrage; nor shall it remit the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification for the principal
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal." In other
words, she considers the above constraints as mandatory
requirements that shun a general or implied restoration of civil and
political rights in pardons.
17
On the other hand, the Office ofthe Solicitor General (OSG) for public
respondent COMELEC, maintains that "the issue of whether or not the
pardon extended to [former President Estrada] restored his right to run
for public office had already been passed upon by public respondent
COMELEC way back in 2010 via its rulings in SPA Nos. 09-024, 09028 and 09-104, there is no cogent reason for it to reverse its standing
pronouncement and declare [former President Estrada] disqualified to
run and be voted as mayor of the City of Manila in the absence of any
new argument that would warrant its reversal. To be sure, public
respondent COMELEC correctly exercised its discretion in taking
judicial cognizance of the aforesaid rulings which are known toit and
which can be verified from its own records, in accordance with Section
2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court on the courts discretionary power to
take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, orare
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
them because of their judicial functions."
20
22
23
Thus, the OSG concludes that the "COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Resolutions."
24
26
28
29
MR. NATIVIDAD. I am also against this provision which will again chip
more powers from the President. In case of other criminals convicted
in our society, we extend probation to them while in this case, they
have already been convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we can
offer mercy to them is through this executive clemency extended to
them by the President. If we still close this avenue to them, they would
be prejudiced even worse than the murderers and the more vicious
killers in our society. I do not think they deserve this opprobrium and
punishment under the new Constitution.
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised
their hand.)
31
The Dissent of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed with Risos Vidal
that there was no express remission and/or restoration of the rights of
suffrage and/or to hold public office in the pardon granted to former
President Estrada, as required by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the aforementioned codal
provisions must be followed by the President, as they do not abridge
or diminish the Presidents power to extend clemency. He opines that
they do not reduce the coverage of the Presidents pardoning power.
Particularly, he states:
Articles 36 and 41 refer only to requirements of convention or form.
They only provide a procedural prescription. They are not concerned
with areas where or the instances when the President may grant
pardon; they are only concerned with how he or she is to exercise
such power so that no other governmental instrumentality needs to
intervene to give it full effect.
All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes
to include in the pardon the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to
hold public office, or the remission of the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification,he or she should do so expressly.
Articles 36 and 41 only ask that the President state his or her
intentions clearly, directly, firmly, precisely, and unmistakably. To
belabor the point, the President retains the power to make such
restoration or remission, subject to a prescription on the manner by
which he or she is to state it.
32
For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should
be construed in a way that will give full effect to the executive
clemency granted by the President, instead of indulging in an overly
strict interpretation that may serve to impair or diminish the import of
the pardon which emanated from the Office of the President and duly
signed by the Chief Executive himself/herself. The said codal
provisions must be construed to harmonize the power of Congress to
define crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the
power of the President to grant executive clemency. All that the said
provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty does
notcarry with it the remission of the accessory penalties unless the
President expressly includes said accessory penalties in the pardon. It
still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive
clemency and, specifically, to decide to pardon the principal penalty
while excluding its accessory penalties or to pardon both. Thus,
Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided upon
by the President on the penalties imposedin accordance with law.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua
and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first
sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former
President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the
principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The
sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties
that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence,
even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indubitable from the textof the pardon that the accessory penalties of
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain
or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must
meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and
swear an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to
the country where they took that oath; (4) Those intending to
practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public
office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to,
those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public
office in the country of which theyare naturalized
citizens; and/or
On the other hand, the theory of Risos-Vidal goes beyond the plain
meaning of said penal provisions; and prescribes a formal requirement
that is not only unnecessary but, if insisted upon, could be in
derogation of the constitutional prohibition relative to the principle that
the exercise of presidential pardon cannot be affected by legislative
action.
Risos-Vidal relied heavily on the separate concurring opinions in
Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. to justify her argument that an absolute
pardon must expressly state that the right to hold public office has
been restored, and that the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification has been remitted.
36
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of
the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions:
This is incorrect.
xxxx
(b) To vote and to be electedat genuine periodic elections which shall
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors[.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Recently, in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, the Court
unequivocally referred to the right to seek public elective office as a
political right, to wit:
35
38
41
39
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the
pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of
the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
III.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply
the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due
process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the
treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the
Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective
extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and
procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in
interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the
prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the
extradition documents from the governor of the asylum
state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same
becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure
of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding
in specific industries in a market-driven and exportoriented global scenario are replacing age-old beggarthy-neighbor policies that unilaterally protect weak and
inefficient domestic producers of goods and
services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known
management guru, Increased participation in the world
economy has become the key to domestic economic
growth and prosperity.
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation
wrought by the Second World War, plans for the
establishment of three multilateral institutions -inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations
-- were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton
Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was
to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of warravaged and later developing countries; the second,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to
deal with currency problems; and the third, the
International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to
foster order and predictability in world trade and to
minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite
challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However,
for a variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by
the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB,
never took off. What remained was only GATT -- the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a
collection of treaties governing access to the
economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized
body administering the agreements or dependable
system of dispute settlement.
The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro,
then
Secretary
of
the Department of Trade and Industry
(Secretary
Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh,
Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act,
for brevity).
By signing the Final Act, Secretary Navarro on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
[2]
(a)tosubmit,asappropriate,theWTOAgreementforthe
considerationoftheirrespectivecompetentauthorities,with
aviewtoseekingapprovaloftheAgreementinaccordance
withtheirprocedures;and
(b)toadopttheMinisterialDeclarationsandDecisions.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine
Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from
the President of the Philippines, stating among others
that the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted
to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section
21, Article VII of the Constitution.
[3]
ANNEX1
Annex1A:MultilateralAgreementonTradeinGoods
GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade
1994
AgreementonTextilesandClothing
AgreementonTechnicalBarriersto
Trade
AgreementonTradeRelatedInvestment
Measures
AgreementonImplementationofArticle
VIoftheGeneralAgreementon
TariffsandTrade1994
AgreementonImplementationofArticle
VIIoftheGeneralonTariffsand
Trade1994
AgreementonPreShipmentInspection
AgreementonRulesofOrigin
AgreementonImportsLicensing
Procedures
AgreementonSubsidiesand
CoordinatingMeasures
AgreementonSafeguards
AgreementonAgriculture
Annex1B:GeneralAgreementonTradeinServicesand
Annexes
AgreementontheApplicationof
Sanitaryand
Annex1C:AgreementonTradeRelatedAspectsof
IntellectualPropertyRights
PhytosanitaryMeasures
ANNEX2
UnderstandingonRulesandProcedures
GoverningtheSettlementofDisputes
ANNEX3
TradePolicyReviewMechanism
On December 16, 1994, the President of the
Philippines signed the Instrument of Ratification,
declaring:
[7]
NOWTHEREFORE,beitknownthatI,FIDELV.
RAMOS,PresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,after
havingseenandconsideredtheaforementionedAgreement
EstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganizationandthe
agreementsandassociatedlegalinstrumentsincludedin
Annexesone(1),two(2)andthree(3)ofthatAgreement
whichareintegralpartsthereof,signedatMarrakesh,
Moroccoon15April1994,doherebyratifyandconfirmthe
sameandeveryArticleandClausethereof.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the
President of the Philippines is composed of the
Agreement Proper and the associated legal
instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and
three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts
thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by
Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO
Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned)
but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions
and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13,
TheMinisterialDecisionsandDeclarationsaretwentyfive
declarationsanddecisionsonawiderangeofmatters,such
asmeasuresinfavorofleastdevelopedcountries,
notificationprocedures,relationshipofWTOwiththe
InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF),andagreementson
technicalbarrierstotradeandondisputesettlement.
TheUnderstandingonCommitmentsinFinancialServices
dwellon,amongotherthings,standstillorlimitationsand
qualificationsofcommitmentstoexistingnonconforming
measures,marketaccess,nationaltreatment,anddefinitions
ofnonresidentsupplieroffinancialservices,commercial
presenceandnewfinancialservice.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was
filed. After careful deliberation on respondents
comment and petitioners reply thereto, the Court
resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to
the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their
respective memoranda. The Court also requested the
Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador
to the United Nations stationed in Geneva,
Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as
Bautista Paper, for brevity, (1) providing a historical
background of and (2) summarizing the said
agreements.
[9]
(a)thepetitionerstosubmitthe(1)SenateCommittee
Reportonthematterincontroversyand(2)thetranscriptof
proceedings/hearingsintheSenate;and
(b)theSolicitorGeneral,ascounselforrespondents,tofile
(1)alistofPhilippinetreatiessignedpriortothePhilippine
adherencetotheWTOAgreement,whichderogatefrom
Philippinesovereigntyand(2)copiesofthemultivolume
WTOAgreementandotherdocumentsmentionedinthe
FinalAct,assoonaspossible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court
said it would consider the case submitted for
resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16,
1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of
the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated
October 24, 1996, he listed the various bilateral or
multilateral treaties or international instruments
involving
derogation
of
Philippine
sovereignty. Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted
their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January
30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996,
petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
A.Whetherthepetitionpresentsapoliticalquestionoris
otherwisenotjusticiable.
B.WhetherthepetitionermembersoftheSenatewho
participatedinthedeliberationsandvotingleadingto
theconcurrenceareestoppedfromimpugningthe
validityoftheAgreementEstablishingtheWorld
TradeOrganizationorofthevalidityofthe
concurrence.
C.WhethertheprovisionsoftheAgreement
EstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganization
contravenetheprovisionsofSec.19,ArticleII,and
Secs.10and12,ArticleXII,allofthe1987
PhilippineConstitution.
D.WhetherprovisionsoftheAgreementEstablishing
theWorldTradeOrganizationundulylimit,restrict
andimpairPhilippinesovereigntyspecificallythe
legislativepowerwhich,underSec.2,ArticleVI,
1987PhilippineConstitutionisvestedinthe
CongressofthePhilippines;
E.WhetherprovisionsoftheAgreementEstablishing
theWorldTradeOrganizationinterferewiththe
exerciseofjudicialpower.
F.WhethertherespondentmembersoftheSenateacted
ingraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackor
excessofjurisdictionwhentheyvotedfor
concurrenceintheratificationoftheconstitutionally
infirmAgreementEstablishingtheWorldTrade
Organization.
G.WhethertherespondentmembersoftheSenateacted
ingraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackor
excessofjurisdictionwhentheyconcurredonlyin
theratificationoftheAgreementEstablishingthe
WorldTradeOrganization,andnotwiththe
PresidentialsubmissionwhichincludedtheFinal
Act,MinisterialDeclarationandDecisions,andthe
UnderstandingonCommitmentsinFinancial
Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel
for respondents synthesized the several issues raised
by petitioners into the following:
[10]
1.WhetherornottheprovisionsoftheAgreement
EstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganizationandthe
AgreementsandAssociatedLegalInstrumentsincludedin
Annexesone(1),two(2)andthree(3)ofthatagreement
citedbypetitionersdirectlycontraveneorunderminethe
letter,spiritandintentofSection19,ArticleIIandSections
10and12,ArticleXIIofthe1987Constitution.
2.WhetherornotcertainprovisionsoftheAgreement
undulylimit,restrictorimpairtheexerciseoflegislative
powerbyCongress.
3.WhetherornotcertainprovisionsoftheAgreement
impairtheexerciseofjudicialpowerbythisHonorable
Courtinpromulgatingtherulesofevidence.
4.WhetherornottheconcurrenceoftheSenateinthe
ratificationbythePresidentofthePhilippinesofthe
AgreementestablishingtheWorldTradeOrganization
impliedrejectionofthetreatyembodiedintheFinalAct.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the
seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General
Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticeto
settleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegally
demandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetheror
nottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingto
lackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchor
instrumentalityofthegovernment.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[17]
[18]
TRIMthatisinconsistentwiththeprovisionsof
ArticleIIIorArticleXIofGATT1994.
xx xx xx xx
ArticleXII
NATIONALECONOMYANDPATRIMONY
xx xx xx xx
Sec.10.xxx.TheCongressshallenactmeasuresthatwill
encouragetheformationandoperationofenterpriseswhose
capitaliswhollyownedbyFilipinos.
Inthegrantofrights,privileges,andconcessionscovering
thenationaleconomyandpatrimony,theStateshallgive
preferencetoqualifiedFilipinos.
xx xx xx xx
2.AnIllustrativelistofTRIMSthatareinconsistent
withtheobligationsofgeneraleliminationof
quantitativerestrictionsprovidedforinparagraph
IofArticleXIofGATT1994iscontainedinthe
AnnextothisAgreement.(AgreementonTrade
RelatedInvestmentMeasures,Vol.27,Uruguay
Round,LegalInstruments,p.22121,emphasis
supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
ANNEX
IllustrativeList
Sec.12.TheStateshallpromotethepreferentialuseof
Filipinolabor,domesticmaterialsandlocallyproduced
goods,andadoptmeasuresthathelpmakethemcompetitive.
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional
principles are desecrated by the following WTO
provisions quoted in their memorandum:
[19]
a)Intheareaofinvestmentmeasuresrelatedtotradein
goods(TRIMS,forbrevity):
Article2
NationalTreatmentandQuantitativeRestrictions.
1.Withoutprejudicetootherrightsandobligations
underGATT1994.noMembershallapplyany
1.TRIMSthatareinconsistentwiththeobligationof
nationaltreatmentprovidedforinparagraph4of
ArticleIIIofGATT1994includethosewhichare
mandatoryorenforceableunderdomesticlawor
underadministrativerulings,orcompliancewith
whichisnecessarytoobtainanadvantage,and
whichrequire:
(a)thepurchaseorusebyanenterpriseofproducts
ofdomesticoriginorfromanydomesticsource,
whetherspecifiedintermsofparticularproducts,
intermsofvolumeorvalueofproducts,orin
termsofproportionofvolumeorvalueofits
localproduction;or
(b)thatanenterprisespurchasesoruseofimported
productsbelimitedtoanamountrelatedtothe
volumeorvalueoflocalproductsthatitexports.
2.TRIMSthatareinconsistentwiththeobligationsof
generaleliminationofquantitativerestrictions
providedforinparagraph1ofArticleXIofGATT
1994includethosewhicharemandatoryor
enforceableunderdomesticlawsorunder
administrativerulings,orcompliancewithwhichis
necessarytoobtainanadvantage,andwhichrestrict:
(a)theimportationbyanenterpriseofproductsused
inorrelatedtothelocalproductionthatit
exports;
(b)theimportationbyanenterpriseofproductsused
inorrelatedtoitslocalproductionbyrestricting
itsaccesstoforeignexchangeinflowsattributable
totheenterprise;or
(c)theexportationorsaleforexportspecifiedin
termsofparticularproducts,intermsofvolume
orvalueofproducts,orintermsofapreparation
ofvolumeorvalueofitslocal
production.(AnnextotheAgreementonTrade
RelatedInvestmentMeasures,Vol.27,Uruguay
RoundLegalDocuments,p.22125,emphasis
supplied).
Theparagraph4ofArticleIIIofGATT1994referredtois
quotedasfollows:
Theproductsoftheterritoryofanycontractingparty
importedintotheterritoryofanyothercontracting
partyshallbeaccordedtreatmentnolessfavorablethan
thataccordedtolikeproductsofnationaloriginin
respectoflaws,regulationsandrequirementsaffectingtheir
internalsale,offeringforsale,purchase,transportation,
distributionoruse.theprovisionsofthisparagraphshallnot
preventtheapplicationofdifferentialinternaltransportation
chargeswhicharebasedexclusivelyontheeconomic
operationofthemeansoftransportandnotonthe
nationalityoftheproduct.(ArticleIII,GATT1947,as
amendedbytheProtocolModifyingPartII,andArticle
XXVIofGATT,14September1948,62UMTS8284in
relationtoparagraph1(a)oftheGeneralAgreementon
TariffsandTrade1994,Vol.1,UruguayRound,Legal
Instrumentsp.177,emphasissupplied).
b)Intheareaoftraderelatedaspectsofintellectual
propertyrights(TRIPS,forbrevity):
EachMembershallaccordtothenationalsofother
Memberstreatmentnolessfavourablethanthatit
accordstoitsownnationalswithregardtotheprotection
ofintellectualproperty...(par.1,Article3,Agreementon
TradeRelatedAspectofIntellectualPropertyrights,Vol.
31,UruguayRound,LegalInstruments,p.25432(emphasis
supplied)
(c)IntheareaoftheGeneralAgreementonTradein
Services:
NationalTreatment
1.Inthesectorsinscribedinitsschedule,and
subjecttoanyconditionsandqualificationssetout
therein,eachMembershallaccordtoservicesand
servicesuppliersofanyotherMember,inrespect
ofallmeasuresaffectingthesupplyof
services,treatmentnolessfavourablethanit
accordstoitsownlikeservicesandservice
suppliers.
2.AMembermaymeettherequirementof
paragraphIbyaccordingtoservicesandservice
suppliersofanyotherMember,eitherformally
identicaltreatmentorformallydifferenttreatment
tothatitaccordstoitsownlikeservicesand
servicesuppliers.
3.Formallyidenticalorformallydifferenttreatment
shallbeconsideredtobelessfavourableifit
modifiestheconditionsofcompletioninfavourof
servicesorservicesuppliersoftheMember
comparedtolikeservicesorservicesuppliersof
anyotherMember.(ArticleXVII,General
AgreementonTradeinServices,Vol.28,
UruguayRoundLegalInstruments,p.22610
emphasissupplied).
It is petitioners position that the foregoing national
treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement
place nationals and products of member countries on
the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in
contravention of the Filipino First policy of the
Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the
phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos. The
constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when
[20]
We shall
arguments.
now
discuss
and
rule
on
these
[22]
[23]
OnpetitionersallegationthatP.D.1869violatesSections11
(PersonalDignity)12(Family)and13(RoleofYouth)of
ArticleII;Section13(SocialJustice)ofArticleXIIIand
Section2(EducationalValues)ofArticleXIVofthe1987
Constitution,sufficeittostatealsothatthesearemerely
statementsofprinciplesandpolicies.Assuch,theyare
basicallynotselfexecuting,meaningalawshouldbepassed
byCongresstoclearlydefineandeffectuatesuchprinciples.
Ingeneral,therefore,the1935provisionswerenotintended
tobeselfexecutingprinciplesreadyforenforcement
throughthecourts.Theywereratherdirectivesaddressedto
theexecutiveandtothelegislature.Iftheexecutiveandthe
legislaturefailedtoheedthedirectivesofthearticle,the
availableremedywasnotjudicialbutpolitical.The
electoratecouldexpresstheirdispleasurewiththefailureof
theexecutiveandthelegislaturethroughthelanguageofthe
ballot.(Bernas,Vol.II,p.2).
Mysuggestionissimplythatpetitionersmust,beforethe
trialcourt,showamorespecificlegalrightarightcastin
languageofasignificantlylowerorderofgeneralitythan
ArticleII(15)oftheConstitutionthatisormaybe
violatedbytheactions,orfailurestoact,imputedtothe
publicrespondentbypetitionerssothatthetrialcourtcan
validlyrenderjudgmentgrantingallorpartoftherelief
prayedfor.Tomymind,thecourtshouldbeunderstoodas
simplysayingthatsuchamorespecificlegalrightorrights
maywellexistinourcorpusoflaw,consideringthegeneral
policyprinciplesfoundintheConstitutionandtheexistence
ofthePhilippineEnvironmentCode,andthatthetrialcourt
shouldhavegivenpetitionersaneffectiveopportunitysoto
demonstrate,insteadofabortingtheproceedingsona
motiontodismiss.
Itseemstomeimportantthatthelegalrightwhichisan
essentialcomponentofacauseofactionbeaspecific,
operablelegalright,ratherthanaconstitutionalorstatutory
policy,foratleasttwo(2)reasons.Oneisthatunlessthe
legalrightclaimedtohavebeenviolatedordisregardedis
givenspecificationinoperationalterms,defendantsmay
wellbeunabletodefendthemselvesintelligentlyand
effectively;inotherwords,therearedueprocessdimensions
tothismatter.
Thesecondisabroadergaugeconsiderationwherea
specificviolationoflaworapplicableregulationisnot
allegedorproved,petitionerscanbeexpectedtofallbackon
theexpandedconceptionofjudicialpowerinthesecond
paragraphofSection1ofArticleVIIIoftheConstitution
whichreads:
Section1.xxx
Judicialpowerincludesthedutyofthecourtsofjusticeto
settleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegally
demandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetheror
nottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingto
lackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofanybranchor
instrumentalityoftheGovernment.(Emphasessupplied)
Whensubstantivestandardsasgeneralastherighttoa
balancedandhealthyecologyandtherighttohealthare
combinedwithremedialstandardsasbroadrangingasa
graveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessof
jurisdiction,theresultwillbe,itisrespectfullysubmitted,to
propelcourtsintotheunchartedoceanofsocialand
economicpolicymaking.Atleastinrespectofthevastarea
ofenvironmentalprotectionandmanagement,ourcourts
havenoclaimtospecialtechnicalcompetenceand
experienceandprofessionalqualification.Whereno
specific,operablenormsandstandardsareshowntoexist,
thenthepolicymakingdepartmentsthelegislativeand
executivedepartmentsmustbegivenarealandeffective
opportunitytofashionandpromulgatethosenormsand
standards,andtoimplementthembeforethecourtsshould
intervene.
Sec.13.TheStateshallpursueatradepolicythatservesthe
generalwelfareandutilizesallformsandarrangementsof
exchangeonthebasisofequalityandreciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays
down the basic goals of national economic
development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services provided by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising
the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then
ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by
expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony and in the use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced
goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures
that help make them competitive; and (3) by requiring
the State to develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. In
similar language, the Constitution takes into account
the realities of the outside world as it requires the
pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare
and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange
on the basis of equality and reciprocity; and speaks of
industries which are competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and
trade practices.
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
ThePartiestothisAgreement,
Recognizingthattheirrelationsinthefieldoftradeand
economicendeavourshouldbeconductedwithaviewto
raisingstandardsofliving,ensuringfullemploymentanda
largeandsteadilygrowingvolumeofrealincomeand
effectivedemand,andexpandingtheproductionofandtrade
ingoodsandservices,whileallowingfortheoptimaluseof
theworldsresourcesinaccordancewiththeobjectiveof
sustainabledevelopment,seekingbothtoprotectand
preservetheenvironmentandtoenhancethemeansfor
doingsoinamannerconsistentwiththeirrespectiveneeds
andconcernsatdifferentlevelsofeconomicdevelopment,
Recognizingfurtherthatthereisneedforpositiveefforts
designedtoensurethatdevelopingcountries,andespecially
theleastdevelopedamongthem,secureashareinthe
growthininternationaltradecommensuratewiththeneeds
oftheireconomicdevelopment,
Beingdesirousofcontributingtotheseobjectivesby
enteringintoreciprocalandmutuallyadvantageous
arrangementsdirectedtothesubstantialreductionoftariffs
andotherbarrierstotradeandtotheeliminationof
discriminatorytreatmentininternationaltraderelations,
Resolved,therefore,todevelopanintegrated,moreviable
anddurablemultilateraltradingsystemencompassingthe
GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade,theresultsofpast
tradeliberalizationefforts,andalloftheresultsofthe
UruguayRoundofMultilateralTradeNegotiations,
Determinedtopreservethebasicprinciplesandtofurther
theobjectivesunderlyingthismultilateraltradingsystem,x
xx.(underscoringsupplied.)
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing
Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that
pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic
principles, the WTO Agreement grants developing
countries a more lenient treatment, giving their
domestic industries some protection from the rush of
foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in
general, preferential treatment is given to developing
countries in terms of the amount of tariff reduction and
the period within which the reduction is to be spread
out. Specifically, GATT requires an average tariff
reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be
effected within a period of six (6) years while
developing countries -- including the Philippines -are required to effect an average tariff reduction of only
24% within ten (10) years.
In
respect
to domestic subsidy,
GATT
requires developed countries to reduce domestic
support to agricultural products by 20% over six (6)
years, as compared to only 13% for developing
countries to be effected within ten (10) years.
Economicselfrelianceisaprimaryobjectiveofa
developingcountrythatiskeenlyawareofoverdependence
onexternalassistanceforevenitsmostbasicneeds.Itdoes
notmeanautarkyoreconomicseclusion;rather,itmeans
avoidingmendicancyintheinternational
community.Independencereferstothefreedomfromundue
foreigncontrolofthenationaleconomy,especiallyinsuch
strategicindustriesasinthedevelopmentofnatural
resourcesandpublicutilities.
[36]
TheConstitutionmustbequintessentialratherthan
superficial,therootandnottheblossom,thebaseand
frameworkonlyoftheedificethatisyettorise.Itisbutthe
coreofthedreamthatmusttakeshape,notinatwinklingby
mandateofourdelegates,butslowlyinthecrucibleof
Filipinomindsandhearts,whereitwillintimedevelopits
sinewsandgraduallygatheritsstrengthandfinallyachieve
itssubstance.Infine,theConstitutioncannot,likethe
goddessAthena,risefullgrownfromthebrowofthe
ConstitutionalConvention,norcanitconjurebymerefiatan
instantUtopia.Itmustgrowwiththesocietyitseekstore
structureandmarchapacewiththeprogressoftherace,
drawingfromthevicissitudesofhistorythedynamismand
vitalitythatwillkeepit,farfrombecomingapetrifiedrule,a
pulsing,livinglawattunedtotheheartbeatofthenation.
Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative
Power
The WTO Agreement provides that (e)ach Member
shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as
provided in the annexed Agreements. Petitioners
maintain that this undertaking unduly limits, restricts
and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the
legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the
1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress
of the Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign
powers of the Philippines because this means that
Congress could not pass legislation that will be good
for our national interest and general welfare if such
legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement,
which not only relates to the trade in goods x x x but
[39]
[42]
[45]
(b)BilateralagreementwithBelgium,providing,among
others,fortheavoidanceofdoubletaxationwith
respecttotaxesonincome.
(I)BilateralagreementwithFranceexemptingFrench
nationalsfromtherequirementofobtainingtransit
andvisitorvisaforasojournnotexceeding59days.
(c)BilateralconventionwiththeKingdomofSweden
fortheavoidanceofdoubletaxation.
(j)MultilateralConventiononSpecialMissions,where
thePhilippinesagreedthatpremisesofSpecial
MissionsinthePhilippinesareinviolableandits
agentscannotentersaidpremiseswithoutconsentof
theHeadofMissionconcerned.SpecialMissionsare
alsoexemptedfromcustomsduties,taxesandrelated
charges.
(d)BilateralconventionwiththeFrenchRepublicfor
theavoidanceofdoubletaxation.
(e)BilateralairtransportagreementwithKoreawhere
thePhilippinesagreedtoexemptfromallcustoms
duties,inspectionfeesandotherdutiesortaxes
aircraftsofSouthKoreaandtheregularequipment,
sparepartsandsuppliesarrivingwithsaidaircrafts.
(f)BilateralairserviceagreementwithJapan,wherethe
Philippinesagreedtoexemptfromcustomsduties,
excisetaxes,inspectionfeesandothersimilarduties,
taxesorchargesfuel,lubricatingoils,spareparts,
regularequipment,storesonboardJapaneseaircrafts
whileonPhilippinesoil.
(g)BilateralairserviceagreementwithBelgiumwhere
thePhilippinesgrantedBelgianaircarriersthesame
privilegesasthosegrantedtoJapaneseandKorean
aircarriersunderseparateairserviceagreements.
(h)BilateralnoteswithIsraelfortheabolitionoftransit
andvisitorvisaswherethePhilippinesexempted
Israelinationalsfromtherequirementofobtaining
transitorvisitorvisasforasojourninthePhilippines
notexceeding59days.
(k)MultilateralConventionontheLawofTreaties.In
thisconvention,thePhilippinesagreedtobe
governedbytheViennaConventionontheLawof
Treaties.
(l)DeclarationofthePresidentofthePhilippines
acceptingcompulsoryjurisdictionofthe
InternationalCourtofJustice.TheInternational
CourtofJusticehasjurisdictioninalllegaldisputes
concerningtheinterpretationofatreaty,any
questionofinternationallaw,theexistenceofany
factwhich,ifestablished,wouldconstituteabreach
ofinternationalobligation.
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has
effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign
powers of taxation, eminent domain and police
power. The underlying consideration in this partial
surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment
of the other contracting states in granting the same
privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials
[50]
Article34
ProcessPatents:BurdenofProof
1.Forthepurposesofcivilproceedingsinrespectofthe
infringementoftherightsoftheownerreferredtoin
paragraph1(b)ofArticle28,ifthesubjectmatterofa
patentisaprocessforobtainingaproduct,thejudicial
authoritiesshallhavetheauthoritytoorderthe
defendanttoprovethattheprocesstoobtainanidentical
productisdifferentfromthepatented
process.Therefore,Membersshallprovide,inatleast
oneofthefollowingcircumstances,thatanyidentical
productwhenproducedwithouttheconsentofthe
patentownershall,intheabsenceofprooftothe
contrary,bedeemedtohavebeenobtainedbythe
patentedprocess:
(a)iftheproductobtainedbythepatentedprocessisnew;
(b)ifthereisasubstantiallikelihoodthatthe
identicalproductwasmadebytheprocessand
theownerofthepatenthasbeenunablethrough
reasonableeffortstodeterminetheprocess
actuallyused.
2.AnyMembershallbefreetoprovidethattheburden
ofproofindicatedinparagraph1shallbeonthealleged
infringeronlyiftheconditionreferredtoin
subparagraph(a)isfulfilledoronlyifthecondition
referredtoinsubparagraph(b)isfulfilled.
3.Intheadductionofprooftothecontrary,the
legitimateinterestsofdefendantsinprotectingtheir
manufacturingandbusinesssecretsshallbetakeninto
account.
From the above, a WTO Member is required to
provide a rule of disputable (note the words in the
absence of proof to the contrary) presumption that a
product shown to be identical to one produced with the
use of a patented process shall be deemed to have
been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented
process, (1) where such product obtained by the
patented product is new, or (2) where there is
substantial likelihood that the identical product was
made with the use of the said patented process but the
owner of the patent could not determine the exact
process
used
in
obtaining
such
identical
product. Hence, the burden of proof contemplated by
Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of
the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such
presumption. Such burden, properly understood,
actually refers to the burden of evidence (burden of
going forward) placed on the producer of the identical
(or fake) product to show that his product was
produced without the use of the patented process.
[53]
[54]
[55]
"(a)tosubmit,asappropriate,theWTOAgreementfor
theconsiderationoftheirrespectivecompetent
authoritieswithaviewtoseekingapprovalofthe
Agreementinaccordancewiththeirprocedures;and
(b)toadopttheMinisterialDeclarationsandDecisions."
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed
concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from
its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in
the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were
deemed adopted without need for ratification. They
ArticleII
ScopeoftheWTO
asMultilateralAgreements)areintegralpartsofthis
Agreement,bindingonallMembers.
3.TheAgreementsandassociatedlegalinstruments
includedinAnnex4(hereinafterreferredtoas
PlurilateralTradeAgreements)arealsopartofthis
AgreementforthoseMembersthathaveacceptedthem,
andarebindingonthoseMembers.ThePlurilateral
TradeAgreementsdonotcreateeitherobligationor
rightsforMembersthathavenotacceptedthem.
4.TheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade1994as
specifiedinannex1A(hereinafterreferredtoasGATT
1994)islegallydistinctfromtheGeneralAgreementon
TariffsandTrade,dated30October1947,annexedto
theFinalActadoptedattheconclusionoftheSecond
SessionofthePreparatoryCommitteeoftheUnited
NationsConferenceonTradeandEmployment,as
subsequentlyrectified,amendedormodified
(hereinafterreferredtoasGATT1947).
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware
of what it was concurring in as shown by the members
deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the
letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the
senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the
Senate was concurring in, as follows:
[59]
1.TheWTOshallprovidethecommoninstitutional
frameworkfortheconductoftraderelationsamongits
Membersinmatterstotheagreementsandassociated
legalinstrumentsincludedintheAnnexestothis
Agreement.
2.TheAgreementsandassociatedlegalinstruments
includedinAnnexes1,2,and3(hereinafterreferredto
[60]
THECHAIRMAN:Yes.Now,thequestionofthevalidity
ofthesubmissioncameupinthefirstdayhearingofthis
Committeeyesterday.WastheobservationmadebySenator
TaadathatwhatwassubmittedtotheSenatewasnotthe
agreementonestablishingtheWorldTradeOrganizationby
thefinalactoftheUruguayRoundwhichisnotthesameas
theagreementestablishingtheWorldTrade
Organization?Andonthatbasis,SenatorTolentinoraiseda
pointoforderwhich,however,heagreedtowithdrawupon
understandingthathissuggestionforanalternativesolution
atthattimewasacceptable.Thatsuggestionwastotreatthe
proceedingsoftheCommitteeasbeinginthenatureof
briefingsforSenatorsuntilthequestionofthesubmission
couldbeclarified.
Iamnowsatisfiedwiththewordingofthenewsubmission
ofPresidentRamos.
Andso,SecretaryRomulo,ineffect,isthePresident
submittinganew...ishemakinganewsubmissionwhich
improvesontheclarityofthefirstsubmission?
SENTOLENTINO,Mr.Chairman,Ihavenotseenthenew
submissionactuallytransmittedtousbutIsawthedraftof
hisearlier,andIthinkitnowcomplieswiththeprovisions
oftheConstitution,andwiththeFinalActitself.The
ConstitutiondoesnotrequireustoratifytheFinalAct.It
requiresustoratifytheAgreementwhichisnowbeing
submitted.TheFinalActitselfspecifieswhatisgoingtobe
submittedtowiththegovernmentsoftheparticipants.
MR.ROMULO:Mr.Chairman,tomakesurethatitisclear
cutandthereshouldbenomisunderstanding,itwashis
intentiontoclarifyallmattersbygivingthisletter.
THECHAIRMAN:Thankyou.
CanthisCommitteehearfromSenatorTaadaandlateron
SenatorTolentinosincetheyweretheonesthatraisedthis
questionyesterday?
SenatorTaada,please.
SEN.TAADA:Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
BasedonwhatSecretaryRomulohasread,itwouldnow
clearlyappearthatwhatisbeingsubmittedtotheSenatefor
ratificationisnottheFinalActoftheUruguayRound,but
rathertheAgreementontheWorldTradeOrganizationas
wellastheMinisterialDeclarationsandDecisions,andthe
UnderstandingandCommitmentsinFinancialServices.
SEN.TAADA....ofPresidentRamos,Mr.Chairman.
THECHAIRMAN.Thankyou,SenatorTaada.Canwehear
fromSenatorTolentino?AndafterhimSenatorNeptali
GonzalesandSenatorLina.
Inparagraph2oftheFinalAct,wereadandIquote:
BysigningthepresentFinalAct,therepresentatives
agree:(a)tosubmitasappropriatetheWTOAgreementfor
theconsiderationoftherespectivecompetentauthorities
withaviewtoseekingapprovaloftheAgreementin
accordancewiththeirprocedures.
Inotherwords,itisnottheFinalActthatwasagreedtobe
submittedtothegovernmentsforratificationoracceptance
aswhatevertheirconstitutionalproceduresmayprovidebut
itistheWorldTradeOrganizationAgreement.Andifthatis
theonethatisbeingsubmittednow,Ithinkitsatisfiesboth
theConstitutionandtheFinalActitself.
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
THECHAIRMAN.Thankyou,SenatorTolentino,MayI
callonSenatorGonzales.
SEN.GONZALES.Mr.Chairman,myviewsonthismatter
arealreadyamatterofrecord.Andtheyhadbeenadequately
reflectedinthejournalofyesterdayssessionandIdontsee
anyneedforrepeatingthesame.
Now,Iwouldconsiderthenewsubmissionasanactex
abudantecautela.
THECHAIRMAN.Thankyou,SenatorGonzales.Senator
Lina,doyouwanttomakeanycommentonthis?
SEN.LINA.Mr.President,Iagreewiththeobservationjust
madebySenatorGonzalesoutoftheabundanceof
question.Thenthenewsubmissionis,Ibelieve,statingthe
obviousandthereforeIhavenofurthercommenttomake.
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine
ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are
invoking this Courts constitutionally imposed duty to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence
therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a
writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion
may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
[62]
[63]
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14,
2014 and August 8, 2014 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged
with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the
resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his
Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and
several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their
purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations
under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). On June 10,
2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus
Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he
be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him.
The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution
filed its Consolidated Opposition.
4
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile
voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP)
General Hospital following his medical examination.
10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital , and his Motion to Fix Bail , both dated July 7, 2014, which
were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. In support of the
motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because:
(a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty
11
12
13
14
19
20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from
committing additional crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee
the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by
the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher
than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as
a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest
in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the societys
interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.
22
23
2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted
of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence,
from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained
by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional
liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he
is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.
26
27
31
32
basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of
whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed
at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima
facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the
persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established
unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already
presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of
guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled
as the accused to due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of
evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it.
Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character
and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him,
the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the
accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is
under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is
highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an
ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the
discretion of the court, should primarily determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a
summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be
allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate
on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein
offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion
of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness
in the examination and cross examination.
33
In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in
court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is
highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter
respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore
that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in
both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service,
40
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
c. Alpha thalassemia;
PSUPT. JOCSON:
d. Gait/balance disorder;
No, Your Honor.
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain)
in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented
enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
42
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or
collectively, could pose significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1)
uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because
it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially
under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with
coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for
heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of
ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain circumstances (like
excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could
cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.
43
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the
best.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused,
Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in your heart of the
present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
44
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
DR. SERVILLANO:
DR. SERVILLANO:
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to
his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
45
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of
preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented.
The Court has already held in Dela Rama v. The Peoples Court:
46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the
following:
x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular
case, the illness of the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the
humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless
of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to
exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ;
47
xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute
to the effect that the petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal, early,
unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular
pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen similar cases,
later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and
medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that the
petitioners previous petition for bail was denied by the Peoples Court
on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not
active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the Peoples Court in
sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination
and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to
verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in
order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and
considering further that the said Peoples Court has adopted and
applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted
resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran
(case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the
said defendants were released on bail on the ground that they were ill
and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be
injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we
consequently hold that the Peoples Court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner on bail.
48
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish
before a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be
had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to
provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances
decisive of the issue of bail whose existence is either admitted by the
Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice that the
courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without
awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus balances the scales of
justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his
personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him
the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty.
49
51
the church and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to
curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The
National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW)
reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised
more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence and more than
90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate
partners such as their husbands and live-in partners." 3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by
women's groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts
of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by
women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any
person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
the woman has a common child.5 The law provides for protection
orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of
further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of
barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel,
social workers, health care providers, and other local government
officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for
assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection and due process
clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay
officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed,
for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil
Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against
her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She
claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and
economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support.7
Private respondent's claims
bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking
her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about
seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor
apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has
been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking antidepressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's
Bank that she intends to file charges against the bank manager,
petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He
then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving
her for good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with
them in the family home, that private respondent should just accept his
extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has
not sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is
afraid that he would take her children from her and deprive her of
financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes
on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the
construction of deep wells. He is the President of three corporations
326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros
Trading Corporation of which he and private respondent are both
stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said
corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary
of P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less
than P200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent through
the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same
corporation together with the bills for utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00
from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash
advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from
the corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him about the
affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building,
Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are
conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about
said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not
given private respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of
which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two
men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the
boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion,
petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and
threatened her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann
subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation
of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by
the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a complaint for
kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This came
about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home
to get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things
inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private
respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola. 27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30)
days, which reads as follows:
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY,
UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT
FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO
PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of
the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CAG.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily
it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will
not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262
before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court
has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the
complex issue of constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts,
of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise
known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the
Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional
Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities
identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7
of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as
Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed,
the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or
any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
(Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City
remains possessed of authority as a court of general original
jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization,
admiralty or insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine
what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity
to the fundamental law."46The Constitution vests the power of judicial
review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all
RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the
Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it
speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases
where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the
action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of his opponent's claim.52As pointed out by Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause
of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a
third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised
in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of
the case a quo because the right of private respondent to a protection
order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being
attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A.
9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the nonissuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature
should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his
Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is
one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence. 54 Be that
as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the
conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the
need for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been
marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their
direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties
which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible, within
the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection
order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct
of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the
trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing,
however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect
women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction
against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against
VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our
obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with
far-reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our
solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more
reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment 59 to
the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and
criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well be
committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not
enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the
law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No.
2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor,
Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi
Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized
measure"62 an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "AntiDomestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate
Relationships Act"63 providing protection to "all family members,
leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special
attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and
abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied
protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of
the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr.
President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns and
relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic
violence apart from against women as well as other members of the
household, including children or the husband, they fear that this would
weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the main
victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or
the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on
record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of
observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who
call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not
want to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are
also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here
members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing
protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, livein, common-law wives, and those related with the family.65
xxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion
whether to limit this to women and not to families which was the issue
of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would be
having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember
correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during
the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the
measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need
to protect women's rights especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who
have not had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their
live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we
broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is
recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of
Senator Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this
particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the
net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale
mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito
Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the
proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she
is going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment
rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. more than the women, the children are very much
abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not
limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old
children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it
breaks my heart to find out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this
particular measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully
prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the
aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
xxxx
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into
the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in
limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to
women and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the
laws.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact
that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the
essence of true equality."70
law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law
that the husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more
organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a
simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root
cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons,
bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their
crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the
liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote,
to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on
the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic
violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue
into an important public concern. No less than the United States
Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two
million women are the victims of severe assaults by their male
partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every
eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The
[American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked
underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages
women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude
the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who
are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is
conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence
agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the
above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all
women will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during
their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly
11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of
these incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating
takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence
is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse,
particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also
common.
first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354
cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in
especially difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417
physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx
(T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases
for the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than
90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these
reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such
as their husbands and live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented
comparative statistics on violence against women across an eight-year
period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262
ranking first among the different VAW categories since its
implementation in 2004,74 thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women,
2004 - 2011*
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
201
997
927
659
837
811
770
1,04
38
46
26
22
28
27
194
148
185
147
204
167
26
580
536
382
358
445
485
74
3,553
2,335
1,892
1,505
1,307
1,498
2,01
53
37
38
46
18
54
218
924
1,269
2,387
3,599
5,285
319
223
199
182
220
208
62
19
29
30
19
19
121
102
93
109
109
99
17
11
16
24
34
152
16
34
23
28
18
25
90
50
59
59
83
703
6,271
5,374
4,881
5,729
6,905
9,485
five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men
who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women constituted
89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic
violence.75Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman
against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around
(18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from
their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the
hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual
assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a
spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or
emotional abuse.76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse
perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render
R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring
drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in
receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing
animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said
ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal
protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and drivers of
vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not
utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that,
while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the
city roads, "but their number must be negligible and their appearance
therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to
constitute a menace to the health of the community."77 The mere fact
that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not
violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of
persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some
degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.78
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and
sentencing, crimes against women are often treated differently and
less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United
States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief
sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the
civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority
under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that
distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the
judges."85
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for
Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the
police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the
conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the
prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it
might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be
involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence." 80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases
against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge
Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used
derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the complainant in
a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a
live-in partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress"
in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a
"prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed"
and of absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks
betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination
brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As
emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination
through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate
against men.82Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is
discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and
"hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the
CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures
"to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that
"(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from
a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer
violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:
court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from
service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the
immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent
requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days
from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on
the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice. 105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify,
must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show
cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be
issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for
protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner
of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an
inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive
imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may
have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that
was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May
23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to
allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order
dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to
show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he
chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an
"exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the
questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and
that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can
show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may
not now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to
inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto
in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that
these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of
judicial powers."115
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and
How. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection
order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to
desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A
Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the
protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte
determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be
acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued
by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was
unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be
effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex
parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any
barangay official to effect its personal service.
1wphi1
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since
barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies are required to
extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very
unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the
chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay
officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their
duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for
petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and
members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers
in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular
second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5
P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of
their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge
Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following
stipulation of facts of the parties parties
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company
learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first
shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those
working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and
8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the
aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29,
1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a
motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on
the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked
for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to
Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex
"G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p.
63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners
received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17
(should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the
amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners
had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27,
1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that
because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it
should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo, 1 which
held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for
the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said
five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written
arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for
reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en
banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners for
being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period
prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein
petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which
was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of
the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15,
16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5)
days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the
decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be
perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court
a petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the
ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time
was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by
the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their
counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk
(Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the
order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3,
1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 8889, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which
underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity
and worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the
cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of
man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent
in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty,
equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments,
and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the
Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private
respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro
the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein
private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the
cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more
efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as
profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for
its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at
the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police
or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its
failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the
position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have
been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to
further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their
right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local
officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent
firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons
afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of
their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from
6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or
damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of
the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic
situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as
they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As
above intimated, the condition in which the employees found
themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally
affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their
families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated.
The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized
in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds
fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as
he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on
bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic
reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield and
armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against
alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on
the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition
for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right
"to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights
guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged
by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their
mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of
which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees
to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against
such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the
respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift
should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for
reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5) days from
notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall
be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for
reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of
procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations
pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or
seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated
September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they
could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two
(2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more
directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a
mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period
for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over
constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the
aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the
Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the
Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of
constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any
statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to
natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of
Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or
reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead
constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by
the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is
unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the
Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved
workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the
necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the
filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51;
Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in
the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one
day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates
the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated
September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to
be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts
adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of
ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15,
16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G",
pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the
herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.),
long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting
arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration.
Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution
dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for
being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period
(Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to
reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in suppf such
motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for
by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject
of 29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these
cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses
presently available must be specifically raised in the complaint or
answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such
pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be
raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the
determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of
the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which
no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is
thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court
gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule
of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise
yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before
the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their
defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered
no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny
application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on
such human rights.30-a
April 8, 2014
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN
A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of
Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic
Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE
COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson,
Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon,
THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and
THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Donato Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and
VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr.
Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal
capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr.
Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in
his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G.
IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC,
EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma
Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal capacity,
JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A.
CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES,
RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG,
RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
x---------------------------------x
x---------------------------------x
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of
our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good."
1
(2) Petition for Prohibition, filed by the Alliance for the Family
Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria
Concepcion S. Noche and several others in their personal
capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn
(ALFI);
6
(3) Petition for Certiorari, filed by the Task Force for Family
and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
9
11
12
13
16
18
19
21
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law,
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact
that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris
controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
24
25
27
29
31
40
34
43
The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of nondelegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the
delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the
Emergency Drugs List (EDL).
51
53
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their
respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality
of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
which commented on the petitions in behalf of the
respondents, Congressman Edcel C. Lagman, former officials of the
Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and
Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez, the Filipino Catholic Voices for
Reproductive Health (C4RH), Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros, and
Atty. Joan De Venecia also filed their respective Comments-inIntervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013,
Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the
assailed legislation took effect.
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the
counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues
raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to
be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on
August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument.
On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders
of the Court.
63
66
67
70
71
The RH Law
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the
parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following
principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of
judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the
government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of
the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of
life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI
prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of
the RH Law - must be maintained." It explains:
73
5] Declaratory Relief
DISCUSSION
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; and (c) the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. The Constitution has truly
blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers
among the three branches of government.
83
76
77
78
79
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines; (b) the executive
82
84
85
88
89
92
93
94
98
100
102
104
108
109
110
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by
the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.
105
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file
their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge"
lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to
be enforced and applied against them, and the government has yet to
distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.
111
112
107
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule
that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he
asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation
of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also
known as the prohibition against third-party standing.
115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on
standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest."
116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that
in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional
questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and
a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to
the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they
had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the
public.
117
issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the
youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative
need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only
to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be
resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects
the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom
of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all
these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive
health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of
society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication.
More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother
and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for
a life to be taken away before taking action.
118
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be
assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and
again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded
certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or
with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule
on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court
has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing nontraditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been
directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this
time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to
be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is
at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially
petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for
injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays
for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.
120
121
119
123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not
a birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of
"responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.
124
125
127
128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill
rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and
Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require
the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal
rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or
impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood"
are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of
the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees
the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health,
the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a
law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would
not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to
its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the
act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or
scope of the act."
129
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
133
139
143
145
146
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the
life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation
thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
[Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US
Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at all
stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in
preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the
fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.
148
149
xxx
150
xxx
xxx
xxx
Justice Bersamin:
Atty. Noche:
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about
some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually
stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the
uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really
occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be
unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987
Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments.
There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms
are not classified as abortifacients.
157
Atty. Noche:
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.
Justice Bersamin:
Medical Meaning
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
158
159
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory
advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation. According
to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive
stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous." Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical
authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that
pregnancy can be medically detected."
162
163
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same
time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred
because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins.
Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that
destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported
good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a
human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is
no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where
only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical,
legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a
human organism and that the life of a new human being commences
at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion
is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of
any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of
human embryos.
164
165
166
167
168
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the
utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation of
the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further
aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and
abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987
Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to
prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It
was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent
and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to
make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that
the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the
moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law
is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to
the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the
uterus for implantation.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and
couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have
children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make
other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination,
coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so;
and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not
include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
1] xx x.
170
xxx.
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of
methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to
reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive healthrelated problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which
is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of
reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion
complications;
xxx.
(a) Induces abortion; or
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9
of the law that "any product or supply included or to be included in the
EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and
supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an
abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise,
cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an
abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance
when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.
171
177
178
179
180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the
administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the
OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive
pose a danger to the health of women.
181
182
183
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered selfexecuting rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective.
These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing
to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners,
particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per
se. In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and
R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not
prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly
licensed by a physician - be maintained.
184
185
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the
same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale,
Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices"
and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of
Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the
Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law
and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of
contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No.
4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or
corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or
without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such
sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or
portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing
fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material,
or agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the
primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the
provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five
hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more
than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be
from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that
the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will
done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all
possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy
responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for
any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their
use.
187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet
been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the
Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared
by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and
medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH
Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of
contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional
yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents
itself.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation
are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there are those who,
because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe
that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of
these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs
prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the willing
participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive
use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed
to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life,
and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and
denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life."
188
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot
legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are
safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains
their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the
mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have
been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not
Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular
hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and nonabortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family
planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other
safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products
and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not
mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they
are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress
that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective" without the proper scientific examination.
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does
not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be
it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or
belief. They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public
interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive
health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the
State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of
the Constitution, and that what the law only prohibits are those acts
or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive
health. They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee
informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled
to violate his religion against his free will.
191
192
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state
interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions
no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not
explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of
rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information,
choice and to make decisions according to religious convictions,
ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood)
are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment
of religious freedom.
194
196
197
198
199
201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same
does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it
being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the
religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is
required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to
information and who has the right to expect that the health care
professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents,
the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is
sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion
without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.
202
203
195
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that
natural family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics and
the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the
matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on
contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance
of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their
families.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be
preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision
utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple,
a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically
symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the
religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an
ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular
objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article
III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect
for the inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of
religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly
interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and
faith. Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union wrote:
207
208
209
(Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144;
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to
serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote
freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms,
the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious
beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the
establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious
belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words,
the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power
to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious
beliefs and practices.
210
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by
one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including
religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most
anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may
appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of
orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief
and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel.
212
217
219
220
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and
couples to have the number of children they desire with due
consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources
available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws,
public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family
planning methods that are in accordance with their religious
convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's
obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) ,
women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based
organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure
that reproductive health and population and development policies,
plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the
poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to
respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is
likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and
achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their
children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into
account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and
economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section
4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing
the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the
whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with
the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can
or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone,
nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do
so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that
the State cannot enhance its population control program through the
RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary
to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue
its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the
policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply
because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between
Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things
that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.
221
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it
is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health
providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally
repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what
they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally
guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined
with the right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's
thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent.
With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the
protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their
beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The
Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in
his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. While the
RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent,
freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience
and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or
indirect, in the practice of one's religion.
223
224
226
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law
endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either
an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and
ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective
implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court
firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient
to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure
on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition
of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable
principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if
it would be against their conscience or will.
Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law,
the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention
on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in
upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions.
Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I
presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the RH Bill?
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I
have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
Justice De Castro:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in
the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals
such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals,
head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of
their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the
compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a
conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious
belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Justice Mendoza:
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private
practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health
professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you
agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the
religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the
law must prevail.
230
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a
compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving
professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise
matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between
medical doctors and their patients.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the
Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering
other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the
Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna
Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to
health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta
on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact,
reads:
231
232
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of
social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be
solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on
religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid
exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service
providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care
procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to
life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a
referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service,
resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger.
Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC,
manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on
grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an
emergency."
237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a
child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If,
however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be
deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i)
thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into
marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and
fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and
total development.
240
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected
zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach
into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In
our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v.
Mutuc, where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando,
held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection." Marje adopted the ruling of the
US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, where Justice William
O. Douglas wrote:
243
244
245
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the
use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting
to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married
persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully
enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."
246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will
decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases
where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning
services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be
allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when
a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are
excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to
family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental
authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame
population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the
comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State
cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to
providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer
relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It
is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate
that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government." In this regard,
Commissioner Bernas wrote:
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The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the
right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is
superior to that of the State. [Emphases supplied]
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5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24
thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or
imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to
the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational
institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe
that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students. Citing
various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data
gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of
contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce
and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia;
the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of
promiscuity among the youth.
250
251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section
14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on ageappropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on
the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to
educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious
beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus,
considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court
declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid
parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the
Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth
and their important role in nation building. Considering that Section
14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health
education, but also for values formation; the development of
knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual
abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of
gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and
emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's
rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and
responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RHIRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of
responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and
emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal
mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather
than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
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While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the reproductive health education
program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that
the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and,
thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to
them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider"
among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is
a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion
further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private
health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation
exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering
reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is
unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving
reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from
rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding,
restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time
fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. Moreover, in determining
whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be
taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation
to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of
it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment.
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The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law
punishes health care service providers who intentionally withhold,
restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health
programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is
hereby quoted as follows:
256
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who
shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination
thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health including the right to
258
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal
protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the
poor because it makes them the primary target of the government
program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather
than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law
introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of
the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing
with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles and definition of terms of the law.
259
260
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the RH
Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, the Court had the
occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:
261
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned
in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to
slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the
discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services.
Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers
of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with
PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably
imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the
State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not
a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves
the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of
Congress to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of
professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health,
the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such
professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right
altogether.
263
264
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not
only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and
cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity
empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It
should be understood that health services and methods fall under the
gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood
as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A.
No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created
an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the
Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the
Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers
and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and
of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples
of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with
the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the
preparation of health products standards, and to recommend
standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of
container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical
requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate
authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations
regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters,
distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other
establishments and facilities of health products, as determined
by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health
products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to
ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors,
importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and
non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA
any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has
caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious
injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon
verified complaint for health products, whether or not
registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health
products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days
and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due
process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or
withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death,
serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is
found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly
deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk
management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of
the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of
the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of
the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the
safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was
equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective.
Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by
Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting
only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and
"methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that
Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that
are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was
explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, as follows:
267
270
272
273
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely
encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording
of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these
services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said
that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local
governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does
not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and
11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by
petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law
in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the
guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by
the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by
the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized
as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that
would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable
autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et
imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional
governments. Except for the express and implied limitations imposed
on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its
inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends
to all matters of general concern or common interest.
274
275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural
law, suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a
legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is
the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what
is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute,
executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it
is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural
laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by
theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical
school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the
actual law of the past or present. Unless, a natural right has been
transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down
a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the very case cited by the
petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to
examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the
Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used
sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights
inherent to man where no law is applicable.
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277
278
279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the
taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It
only seeks to enhance the population control program of the
government by providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the
poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional
insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, nonabortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier
pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society
cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve.
After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a
recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than
the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one
religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of
the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity
and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded
so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist
alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not
escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising
poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause
of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal
distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty
will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the
very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in
the long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on
such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing
populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with
adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a
significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate,
innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one,
Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances
from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an
ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the
country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the
fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This
would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below
the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.
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Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the
State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of
the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless,
the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid
down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking
body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is
the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of
the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the
policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this
Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the
application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial