Lim vs. Pacquing [G.R. No. 115044.

January 27, 1995]

16AUG
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A.
No. 409).
On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the
authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and
Amusements Board (GAB).
On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless
passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To
Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish,
Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms
And Conditions And For Other Purposes.
On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President
Marcos. The decree, entitled Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local
Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or
Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And
Other Forms Of Gambling, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all
existing franchises and permits issued by local governments.
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai.
The government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked
Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and
permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local
governments. ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-impairment
clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
RATIO:
Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or
even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any
subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised
legislative powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADCs
franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No.
115044, for the decision of the Courts First Division in said case, aside from not
being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since
only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting
ADCs possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot

be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents.

(Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)

JAWORSKI vs. PAGCOR

JAWORSKI vs. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 144463 - January 14, 2004
FACTS:
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a
government owned and controlled corporation existing under PD No. 1869
issued on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos.
On March 31, 1998, PAGCORs board of directors approved an instrument
denominated as Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of
Sports Betting and Internet Gaming, which granted Sports and Games
and Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) the authority to operate and
maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCORs casino locations, and Internet
Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors, provided that
to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are
established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games. On
September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia LI.
Reyes, and SAGE, represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr.,
and its President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-named
document. Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE
commended its operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a
trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings
available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.
Petitioner Senator Robert Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the
Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and
Sports, filed the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by
PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet.
He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise,
PD No. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason
that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet
gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet
was yet inexistent and gambling activities were confined exclusively to
real-space. Further, he argues that the internet, being an international

network of computers, necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of

the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate internet
gambling contravenes the limitation of PAGCORs franchise, under Section
14 of PD No. 1869 which provides: Place. The Corporation [i.e., PAGCOR]
shall conduct gambling activities or games of chance on land or water
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x.
Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under
any of the categories of the authorized gambling activities enumerated
under Section 10 of PD No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR the right,
privilege and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs,
and other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. He contends
that internet gambling could not have been included within the commonly
accepted definition of gambling casinos, clubs or other recreation or
amusement places as these terms refer to a physical structure in realspace where people who intend to bet or gamble go and play games of
chance authorized by law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PAGCOR is allowed to contract any of its franchise to
another entity such as SAGE.
RULING:
No.
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to
corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised
at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and
administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents,
under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on
them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the
conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the
manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of
conducting the business, the charter and the quality of the service to be
rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the
franchise are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operators and/or
management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to
relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to
another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power in view of
the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as
there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly

authorized to do so. In Lim v. Pacquing, the Court clarified that since ADC
has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so
operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate
the jai-alai in the City of Manila. By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a
separate legislative franchise and not ride on PAGCORs franchise if it
were to legally operate on-line Internet gambling.

Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

posted in RESWRI2 cases by katcobing
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod
City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A.
9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological
and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children
and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for
the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended
the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be
modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer
submitted the required comment as it would be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and
TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due
process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being
an unwanted product of an invalid law.

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the
petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the
trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is
filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to
the due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state
to protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and
jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family
Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that
if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the
trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano
v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and
apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women
over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The
essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte
cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention
that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be
sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the
case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject
for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial

power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive
power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function.
The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and
other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

GARCIA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts: Executive Order no 475 imposed an additional duty of 9% on crude oil and
oil products while Executive Order 478 imposed a special duty on crude oil and oil
products. Petitioners claimed that both EOs are unconstitutional because all revenue
measures must originate from the House of Representatives and the Tariff and
Customs Code authorized the president to increase the tariff duties only to protect
local industries but not to raise additional revenue for the government.
Issue: Whether or not the tariff rates imposed are valid?
Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The assailed Executive Orders are
valid. Congress may by law authorize the president to fit tariff rates and other
duties within specified limits. The issuance of these EOs authorized by Sections 104
and 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. There is nothing in the law that suggests

that the authority may only be exercised to protect local industries. Custom duties
may be designated to achieve more than one policy objective the protection of local
industries and to raise revenue for the government.
PISA vs CA
EO 1088 was upheld as valid & constitutional in Philippine Inter-island Shipping
Association vs CA (78 SCAD 197, 266 SCRA 489 [1997]). It was held that what
determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its
form but its natureThe power to fix the rates of charges for services
has always beenregarded as legislative in character.
EO 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the
rationalization of pilotage service charges through the imposition if uniform and
adjusted rates for foreign & coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports.
The PPA is duty-bound to comply with EO 1088. PPA may increase the rates but it
may not decrease them below those mandated by EO 1088.

Araneta v. Dinglasan
9/10/2014 0 Comments
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Delegation of Powers.
ARANETA v. DINGLASAN
84 PHIL 368
FACTS:
The five cases are consolidated for all of them present the same fundamental
question. Antonio Araneta is being charged for violating EO 62 which regulates
rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Another case is of Leon Ma.
Guerrero seeking to have a permit issued for the exportation of his manufactured
shoes. Another is of Eulogio Rodriguez seeking to prohibit the treasury from
disbursing funds pursuant to EO 225, while another is of Antonio Barredo attacking
EO 226 which appropriated funds to hold the national elections. They all content
that CA 671 or the emergency Powers Act is already inoperative and that all EOs
issued under said Act also ceased
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and effect
HELD:
CA 671 does not fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the act has to
be sought for in its nature, object to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved
and its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution provides that any
law passed by virtue thereof should be for a limited period. It is presumed that CA
671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the

law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the
legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the Constitutional scope of its
power. CA 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session of May
25, 1946, and that EO Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of
law. In a regular session, the power if Congress to legislate is not circumscribed
except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.

Rodriguez v. Gella
9/10/2014 0 Comments
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Delegation of Powers.
RODRIGUEZ v. GELLA
G.R. No. L-6266; February 2, 1953
FACTS:
On August 26, 1949, the court passed upon the status of CA No. 671 approved on
December 16, 1949. Five members held that the Act ceased to be operative in its
totality when the Congress convened in special session. Herein petitioners seek to
invalidate EO Nos. 545 and 546 appropriating the sum of P37, 850, 500 for urgent
and essential public works and setting aside the sum of P11, 367, 600 for relief from
typhoons, floods and other calamities. Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to
revoke CA 671 but was vetoed by the President.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 545 and 546 are still operative
HELD:
Act 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency whereby the consent of
the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the
trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in
eternity or the will of the agent. The logical view consistent with constitutionality is
to hold that the power lasted only during the emergency resulting from the last
world war. That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last
world war, was contemplated by the members of the National Assembly. Shelter
may not be sought in the proposition that the President should be allowed to
exercise emergency powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest
and for the welfare of the people because we have the Constitution designed to
establish a government under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy, and since
our government is based on the system of separation of powers. Wherefore, EO Nos.
545 and 546 are declared null and void.
DAVID VS MACAPAGAL - ARROYO
Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 PM

G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare

War and Delegate Emergency Power]
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [callingout power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the
Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
.rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act
of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of
the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the
members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged direct
injury resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful search committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and
GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give
full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out
the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor
General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions,
thus:
First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII
do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence
as well any act of insurrection or rebellion
Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the
decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under
Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the
words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written.
In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the
States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business
affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome
power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in
preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative
power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the

Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of

Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declarea state of
national emergency and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18,
Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional
objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the
tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or
practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the
President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency
powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is
just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.
Thus, when Section 17 states that the the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest, it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may
delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in
issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her
during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privatelyowned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine
when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses
affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has

no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17,
Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP

and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and
made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared unconstitutional.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VERA

Posted by kaye lee on 1:31 PM
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non Delegation of Legislative Powers]
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a
motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He
then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also
denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for
new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of
the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular
Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI
Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of
probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming
that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No.
4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several
provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this
reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This
Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards

have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves,
whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The
applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of
the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied
in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount
for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the
whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the
affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the
salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial
fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers
would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The
Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show
that if not one of the provinces and this is the actual situation now appropriate
the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No.
4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer.
Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.
Conference of Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. POEA
FACTS:
Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated
association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed
manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their
respective
foreign ship-owner-principals, urge the SC to annul Resolution No. 01, series of
1994, of
the Governing Board" of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05.
Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and
promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen
working
in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.
Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing Board resolves to amend
and
increase the compensation and other benefits as specified under Part II,
Section. C,
paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard Employment
Contract for Seafarers.
ISSUE: WON the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of legislative
power.
HELD: Yes.
The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA-based on

impermissible delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contented by

the public
respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
vs. POEA. The
governing Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the necessary rules
and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA). While the making of laws is a nondelegable power that pertains exclusively to
Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate
its
policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible,
to
anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is
required is
that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that
the
regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed
by
the law.
The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not
absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with
respect to
property or some object of value and which confer rights that may be asserted in a
court of
justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain
of the
general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public
welfare of the
entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State
of its police
power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety,
morals, comfort,
or general welfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby be
affected, for such
matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and
control them.
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further
amended the
previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the sufficient and valid
standard
of "fair and equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No.797 can no
longer be

disputed.
Case Digest: Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General
FACTS:
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued
executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the
implementation of said executive orders.
Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It
seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive
orders aforementioned.
ISSUE:
Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President
does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested
in the legislative department.
RULING:
Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of
the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well
as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the
Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not
include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to
create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely
fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the
President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities referred to

US v. Ang Tang Ho
G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922
Johns, J.
Issue:
whether Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
Held:
Yes. This question involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868,
in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should
be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the
promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of
the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under
what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the
proclamation, but says that it may be issued for any cause, and leaves the
question as to what is any cause to the discretion of the Governor-General. The
Act also says: For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn. The Legislature does not specify or define what is
an extraordinary rise. That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General.
The Act also says that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, is authorized to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act. It does not specify or define
what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary
rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall
take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or
defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of
the Governor-General to say what is or what is not a cause, and what is or what is
not an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, and as to what is a temporary rule or
an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this
state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation
fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or
without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been
any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have
been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts
and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a
crime.
A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the
legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of

the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take
effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or
event.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix the maximum sale price
that the industrial or merchant may demand. The law is a general law and not a
local or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and
different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and
delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial
treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative
power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial
treasurers and their deputies, who are hereby directed to communicate with, and
execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for
the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their
respective localities. The issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General
was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub
delegation of that power.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no
crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not any cause
for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not an extraordinary rise in the
price of palay, rice or corn, and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price
at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether
a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be
enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended.
The Legislature did not specify or define what was any cause, or what was an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn, Neither did it specify or define
the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the
proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all,
because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation
does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the
defendant is charged with the sale of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty
centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.
Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his
discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of
rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the
proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659

J. Cruz
Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer
confiscated by the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A
which prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to
another. Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a
writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of
the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive
order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O.
due to the outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before
an impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper
exercise of legislative power by the former president under Amendment 6 of the
1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue letters of
instruction that had the force of law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they
should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound
or excise the affliction.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really
presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an
existing law due to the grant of legislative authority over the president under
Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery.
In the due process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain
resilient. This was due to the avoidance of an iron rule laying down a stiff
command for all circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every
situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing conditions.

Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they be
confined to its interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against
arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or
rational connection between facts proved and fact presumed. An examplesis a
passport of a person with a criminal offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which
both restrains and is restrained bydure process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in
addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of carabos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive order, it cant be
said that it complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition
and the purpose sought has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due
process is not juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a
court of justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the
method toconfiscate carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or
his defense and punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separataion of
powers.
The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.
DE LA LLANA VS ALBA
Posted by kaye lee on 12:18 PM
GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982
FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition,
seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on
Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which
mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the
occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior
courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It
is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this
character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and
judges as provided for under the Constitution.

RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and
justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their
offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must
be made in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the

office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in
law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would
thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law,
the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Chiongbian vs. Orbos
G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995 CHIONGBIAN, et.al. v. ORBOS et.al.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an
autonomous region. The provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and TawiTawi, which voted for the creation of such region were later on known as the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Consistent with the authority granted by
Article XIX, Section 13 of RA 6734 which authorizes the President to merge the
existing regions, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 429 providing for
the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao. Petitioners contend
that Art. XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly
delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to merge by
administrative determination the existing regions or at any rate provides no
standard for the exercise of the power delegated and that the power granted is
not expressed in the title of the law.aw They also challenge the validity of E.O. No.
429 on the ground that the power granted by RA 6734 to the President is only to
merge regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in
Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from
Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the
Presidents discretion.
HELD:

No, in conferring on the President the power to merge by

administrative determination the existing regions following the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set
in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative
regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the
division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the
administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments
which the law requires should have regional offices. While
the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided
for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the
President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments. (Abbas v. COMELEC) The regions themselves are not territorial and
political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. The power conferred
on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries which has
been described as "administrative in nature. (Pelaez v. Auditor General)Thus, the
regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or
redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of
facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President
and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services
Tatad v. Secretary of Energy [Nov. 5, 1997]
24SEP
FACTS:
The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The
deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and
the (b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No. 372).
Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does
not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the
world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso
to the US dollar is considered stable.
Issue:
w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is unconstitutional.
sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation
of power, and (b) w/n the Executive misapplied RA No. 8180 when it considered the
depletion of the OPSF fund as factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil
industry in Feb. 1997.
HELD/RULING:
(a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. RA No. 8180 provided that the full deregulation will start at the end of March

1997 regardless of the occurrence of any event. Thus, the law is complete on the
question of the final date of full deregulation.
Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the Presidenthe is to
time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the world
market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is
considered stable.
Webster defines practicable as meaning possible to practice or perform, decline
as meaning to take a downward direction, and stable as meaning firmly
established.
(b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be
given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. The Executive
department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA No. 8180 when it
co0nsidered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The Executive is
bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in RA
No. 8180 for it has no powers to make laws.
ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST
CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC. (ECN), Petitioners
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC),
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER
UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC. (PECO),
Respondents
G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007
Facts:
RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001
(EPIRA), which
sought to impose a universal charge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose of
funding
NAPOCORs projects, was enacted and took effect in 2001.
Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating that the imposition of
the universal
charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation
without
representation for not giving the consumers a chance to be heard and be
represented.
Issue:
W/N the universal charge is a tax
Ruling:
NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the
States police
power. That public welfare is promoted may be gleaned from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA,
which

enumerates the policies of the State regarding electrification. Moreover, the Special
Trust Fund
feature of the universal charge reasonably serves and assures the attainment and
perpetuity of the
purposes for which the universal charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure the viability of
the countrys
electric power industry), further boosting the position that the same is an exaction
primarily in
pursuit of the States police objectives.
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental,
the imposition
is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally
raised does
not make the imposition a tax.
The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power.
The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity;
without taxes,
government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and wellbeing of the
people