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Revising the Battle of the Narrative

By John DeRosa
Journal Article | Jul 16 2015 - 12:51pm

Revising the Battle of the Narrative


John DeRosa
This essay was developed in collaboration with Dr. Sara Cobb, Director of the Center for Narratives and
Conflict Resolution at George Mason University. Any omissions or errors are the responsibility of this
author alone.
"The US was slow to recognize the importance of information and the battle for the narrative in achieving
objectives at all levels; it was often ineffective in applying and aligning the narrative to goals and desired
end states."[1] Since this lesson was catalogued in the Decade of War study, US military doctrine has
begun to recognize the centrality of narratives to conflict. It asserts narratives define the logic of action.
Narratives are central to representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic
groupings, and tribal elements. They provide a basis for interpreting information, experiences, and the
behavior and intentions of other individuals and communities. Stories about a communitys history
provide models of how actions and consequences are linked. Thus, narratives shape decision making in
two ways: they provide an interpretive framework for a complicated and uncertain environment and offer
idealized historical analogies that can serve as the basis for strategies.[2]
However, even as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs implored ...we actually learn the lessons from the last
decade of war," the US continues to struggle with employing information as an instrument of national
power.[3] After proclaiming the centrality of narratives to conflict, it relegates narratives to an ancillary
messaging effort to legitimize government actions and delegitimize an adversary's.[4] Through this
approach the US concedes the primacy of narratives, and consequently the overarching logic of action, to
the adversary.
Narratives are more than a messaging effort. They account for your actions, the actions of others and the
consequences of those actions. More importantly, as a reflection of words and symbols, "[narratives]
prove more powerful than billions of dollars in aid or bombs and bulletsat least in opening up
opportunities for practical solutions."[5] To find these opportunities and leverage information as an
instrument of national power, an alternative approach to narratives is necessary.
This alternative approach should improve how the military visualizes the environment and engages with
relevant actors. It transitions its gaze outward, engaging not only its own interests but with how others in
the conflict (allies, partners, noncombatants, and adversaries) articulate meaning to action. Inasmuch, this
narrative approach introduces "...a more complex description of the history, which in turn, opens up new
ways of describing present problems and future solutions.[6]
The following vignette illustrates an alternative narrative approach. The military activities of this vignette

are purely hypothetical and are intended to serve as a basis for informed discussion. The use of recent
operational events merely demonstrates the practical application of this approach within extant force
structure, operations, exercises, and activities. It will examine how the military would identify,
understand, and influence the narratives of relevant actors. This vignette will focus on the narrative
components of military operations and not expand into other potential operations that could involve the
joint force.
The area of interest for this vignette falls within the US European Command (EUCOM) area of
responsibility (Figure 1). This vignette conducts operations, actions and activities with a joint operational
area (JOA) defined as the geographical area comprising the combination of air, land and maritime
domains in the Black Sea and Eastern Balkans (Figure 2).

Figure 1 - Area of Interest; Source: Washington Post

Figure 2 - Joint Operational Area; Source: RFE/RL


With the March 2014 annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea by Russia and the subsequent
separatist conflict in the Donbass region of Eastern Ukraine, a frozen conflict in the Republic of Moldova
has begun to thaw. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the declaration of independence of the
Republic of Moldova, the autonomous region of Transnistria has been subject to a tug-of-war between proRussian elements and Moldovan government. With the remnants of the Soviet 14th Guards Army,
Transnistrian separatists augmented by Russians and Ukrainian volunteers fought the defense forces of the
newly independent Moldova.[7] After two years of fighting, a cease-fire was reached between the two
sides and remains today. Settlement of this conflict remains elusive despite the longstanding 5+2
negotiation framework which includes the Republic of Moldova, Transnistria (the parties), the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Ukraine, Russia (intermediaries) and (as
observers) the European Union (EU) and ?US.[8] Since the cease-fire, Russian forces remain in the region
reportedly acting as peacekeepers, as well as guarding military equipment and munitions belonging to
the former Soviet Army.
Currently, no United Nations member nations recognize the independence of the Transnistria. Transnistria
has received diplomatic recognition from Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.
Following the March 2014 annexation of Crimea, the Transnistria parliament asked Russia to recognize
the republics independence.[9]
On the economic front, Moldova is the poorest country in Europe. In much the same vein as their
Ukrainian neighbors, Moldovas economic development has been tied to a path of European integration
that has drawn the ire of Russia and the roughly 30 percent of Transnistrias 500,000 residents who
identify as Russian.[10] In July 2014, the Moldovan parliament ratified a EU association deal similar to
the deal that sparked the crisis in neighboring Ukraine.[11] Moscow continues to increase pressure on
Moldova citing the negative impact on the Confederation of Independent States free trade zone and other
emerging economic blocs. Following the EU association deal, Russia and Transnistria signed a package of
agreements establishing closer cooperation on the economy, trade, transport, agriculture, and science in
July 2014.[12]
On the security front, Moldova cooperates with the NATO on democratic, institutional and defense
reforms. Since its independence, Moldova has been increasing its cooperation with NATO culminating in
an Individual Partnership Action Plan between NATO and Moldova signed in 2006. Most recently
Moldova has contributed peacekeeping forces to the NATO mission in Kosovo. Since the onset of the
Ukrainian Crisis, Moldova has requested the withdrawal of remaining Russian military in Transnistria and
the remaining weapons stockpile of the former Soviet Army left there.
U.S. strategic objectives include ensuring the stability of regional allies and partners, dissuading Russian
provocation of this conflict and annexation of Transnistria, and building capacity of the Moldovan Armed
Forces to sustain control over their territory. As part of its theater campaign plan, EUCOM begins a
coordinated application of a narrative approach to military operations identifying, understanding, and
influencing relevant actors and continuing to support and advance a comprehensive settlement protecting
Moldovas sovereignty and territorial integrity, while providing a special status for Transnistria.
As part of the ongoing theater campaign, the EUCOM staff provides the commander a variety of
assessments and estimates that facilitate understanding the operational environment. Utilizing narrative
analysis, the staff amasses critical information of the landscape of core narratives and the actors who tell
these stories begins to map the geography that the commander needs to navigate. The critical information
needed to support these narrative assessments and estimates are gathered through a variety of means.

Narratives derived within the discourse of politics, religion, education, or popular cultures are extensive
but a few dominate with their simplicity and their applicability to this conflict.
Examining social communication of publicly available sources provides a clustering of important
conversations. Within which are dominant narratives promoting meaning for actions and allowing actors
to make sense of the world around them. Traditional print, radio, television, social media, and public
speeches and interviews of influential actors all provide access to stories shaping the narrative landscape.
EUCOM implements this approach leveraging its Strategic Foresight program that uses ...advanced
software to systematically locate and use unclassified materials from verified sources such as scholars,
think tanks, foreign governments and proven reputable commercial information sources.[13]
An understanding of the stories, roles, and personalities reveals relevant actors and an understanding of
who they are, what threatens them and why, and what their hopes are for the future. One such narrative
dominating political discourse is the "Fortress Russia" narrative.[14] The narrative of "Fortress Russia" is
framed in the belief that Russia has historically been under siege from North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). This narrative has most recently been told as states strive to accede to NATO. Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov reinforced this narrative by calling NATO expansion provocations undermining the
commitment to build a system of equal and even-handed security in Europe.[15]
Additionally, as a tool of predictive intelligence, understanding narrative frameworks reveals the logics of
action for a given community. As an example, a strategic narrative of Vladimir Putin foretold Russias
action in Crimea in 2014. In his annual presidential address in December 2013, he shared a vision of an
active foreign policy in adjacent territories striving to respect peoples independence and identity
supported by Russias history, culture, and spirituality. [We]we will strive to be leaders, defending
international law, striving for respect and national sovereignty and peoples independence and identitywe
will strive to be leaders, defending international law, striving for respect and national sovereignty and
peoples independence and identitywe will strive to be leaders, defending international law, striving for
respect and national sovereignty and peoples independence and identity will strive to be leaders,
defending international law, striving for respect and national sovereignty and peoples independence and
identity.[16]
Due to the muting nature of dominant discourse, it will be necessary to access other stories being told on
the ground to compose a fuller accounting of the narrative landscape. These other stories can be accessed
through the normal course of engagement of US government representatives in the region. Engagements
through the diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation activities are ready opportunities to uncover
other stories being told. For example, since 1999, the North Carolina National Guards State Partnership
program has been providing business engagement opportunities nested within broader defense and
security cooperation activities.[17] Additionally, other muted stories often include that of women involved
in this conflict. To reach these stories, NATOs implementation plan for the United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security includes Partnership for Peace engagement
opportunities for workshops, projects and initiatives allowing for deeper elaboration and understanding of
womens narratives.[18] These engagements provide additional opportunities to elaborate other stories.
EUCOMs (hypothetical) mapping of the narrative landscape begins to form constellations of
conversations (see Figure 3). Visualizing the narrative landscape as a constellation of conversations
reveals the weight and breadth of dominant narratives, the existence of complementary and counter
narratives, and the points of intersection between these conversations. The points of intersection reveal
possible engagement opportunities to begin interacting the narratives and having conversations that matter.

Figure 3 Constellations of Conversations; Source: Dr. Sara Cobb


With the narrative landscape mapped and relevant actors identified, the EUCOM team extends their
regional and country engagement by opening conversations with local leaders, listening, and asking
questions designed to elaborate on the core stories they discovered. The US Office for Defense
Cooperation in Moldova is a key site for ongoing engagement with local leaders embedded in a larger
operational strategy developed by the U.S. Embassy country team. The Defense Attachs development of
bilateral cooperation activities provide a regular venue for listening and asking questions with senior
leadership in the Moldovan Ministry of Defense about the stories found in the narrative assessments.
Additionally, US Special Operations Command deploys Civil-Military Support Elements to support US
and Moldovan defense, diplomacy, and development objectives. These small-footprint organizations
provide the US Country Team an opportunity to engage relevant Transnistria actors and their stories
where the Moldovan authorities or US interagency team may lack the capability or capacity to operate.[19]
Marines and Sailors of the Black Sea Rotational Force, from a US Army Europe base in Romanias Mihail
Kog?lniceanu International Airport, engage the broader stories exchanged during training and exercises
with twenty-one partner nations throughout the Black Sea, Balkan and Caucasus regions including
Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria. The Marines and Sailors also conduct community relations
and civic action projects improving schools and hospitals opening opportunities to listen to the narratives
at the community level.[20] Other narrative engagement opportunities include Moldovan and other
regional military officers and civilian government official participation in resident and non-resident
education programs at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.
EUCOM and the Country Team, in cooperation with other regional diplomatic, defense, and development
partner institutions (NATO, OSCE, EU, etc.) begin the process of enacting narrative understanding
fostered over the course of its various engagements with relevant actors. Narrative understanding is
enacted through the elaboration of new subordinate storylines that add complexity to the very simplistic
conflict narratives. This approach recognizes the fundamental conflict dynamic of simplifying and
condensing narratives in a process of mutual de-legitimation.[21] De-legitimation exacerbates conflict
by marginalizing parties to the conflict, reducing the ability to negotiate divisions within society, and
rationalizing their withdrawal and/or violence.[22] Instead, in this alternative approach, narratives
promote the capacity to deliberate, engaging in conversations clarifying the discourse between different
groups, and ultimately eliciting support for a vision of the future.

In an opportunity to the elaborate new subordinate storylines, at the 2015 Munich Security Conference
Russian President expressed a belief that Russia has historically been under siege, and NATO was a
manifestation of medieval siege engines. The Russian President claimed that NATO ...has put its
frontline forces on our borders, and NATO expansion ...represents a serious provocation that reduces
the level of mutual trusts.[23] As opposed to retorting with a defensive criticism of the Russian President,
EUCOM Commander, in a subsequent question-and-answer session with several regional military chiefs,
commends Russias collaborative relationship with NATO. This collaboration could resolve some of the
pressing security challenges related to terrorism, the Islamic State, and weapons of mass destruction. The
EUCOM Commander subsequently extends an invitation for Russias Chief of the General Staff to
participate in a Partnership for Peace planning commission prior to the 2016 NATO summit.[24]
At the local level, following the conclusion of EUCOMs Rapid Trident 15, a multinational exercise
designed to promote regional stability and security, the US Navy engaged to develop more complex
narratives in the region through community relations (COMREL) projects. Twenty-three sailors from the
USS Whidbey Island (LSD-41) volunteered their time and efforts during a 10-day COMREL project in
Tiraspol, Moldova in the Transnistria region. The sailors work in the community helped create new
subordinate storylines of cooperation and goodwill in the Tiraspol community.[25] Additionally, US Air
Force combat aviation advisors deployed at the conclusion of Rapid Trident to train and advise the
Moldovan Air Force in preparation for their support of the NATO-led peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.
These advisors will provide rotary-wing aircrew training and offer operational advice to promote safety
and interoperability between coalition partners.[26] In a complementary effort to the US Navys COMREL
project, the US Air Forces advisors also facilitate creating new subordinate storylines of cooperation and
goodwill between the NATO alliance and Moldova.
Now, with narrative landscape mapped, relevant actors identified, and an understanding of narratives
through a variety of engagements, EUCOM has laid the groundwork to influence behavior through
relational development. In this vignette, we hypothetically see EUCOM and the Country team engaging in
the narratives of Moldova and Transnistria through exercises, COMRELs, and civil affairs actions
approved by the government of Moldova. Transnistrian and Moldovan interests begin to be heard and
elaborated by both parties as facilitated by asking questions and reflecting on the respective narratives in a
non-coercive manner with relevant actors from both sides of the conflict. It is when one party of the
conflict believes its' interest are heard by other because other has elaborated it as part of their own
narrative, and vice versa, we begin to see a relationship change that allows for collaborative problem
solving.
Once parties begin to acknowledge the possibility of legitimacy of others through elaboration, the
narrative space opens to writing new stories of interdependence.[27] This interdependence destabilizes
dominant conflict narratives and introduces complexity to narratives with the addition of new plot events,
new logics, new themes, and new character roles.[28] These now more complex narratives ultimately
provide new logics for action and expand the opportunity for collective learning and problem solving.[29]
EUCOM and their partners develop these more complex narratives through face-to-face conversations, in
dialogues, in policy negotiations, and in planning meetings with community leaders.
Grounded in a more complex narrative, Moldovan and Transnistrian leaders are able to transform their
conflict story to generate sustainable relations, creating legitimacy for all parties and ultimately supporting
the emergence of new histories and new futures. Defense and Security Cooperation activities are
expanded to include collaborative planning forums and scenario building workshops that, utilizing the
transformed conflict story, allows Moldovans and Transnistrians to own their problems and work
collaborative to find new solutions.

End Notes
[1] Department of Defense (June 2012). "Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past
Decade of Operations." Suffolk, Virginia: Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, p. 2. Available at:
handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA570341
[2] Department of Defense (November 2013). Joint Publication (JP) 324: Counterinsurgency.
Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. II-9.
[3] Decade of War. p. v.
[4] JP 324, p. II-4.
[5] Atran, S. (2010). Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists. Ecco
Press / HarperCollins, pp. 401.Bacevich, A. (2008). The Limits of Power: The End of American
Exceptionalism. New York: Metropolitan Books, p. 401.
[6] Cobb, S. (2013). Narrative Braiding and the Role of Public Officials in Transforming the Publics
Conflicts. Conflict and Narrative: Explorations in Theory and Practice, 1(1), p. 21. Available at:
http://journals.gmu.edu/NandC/issue/1
[7] Bobick, M. S. (2014). Separatism Redux: Crimea, Transnistria, and Eurasia's de facto States.
Anthropology Today, 30(3), 3-8.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Kolst, P. (June 2014). Transnistria is a bridge too far for Russia. Open Democracy
https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/p%C3%A5l-kolst%C3%B8/transnistria-is-bridge-too-far-forrussia
[10] Bobick.
[11] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, (November 13, 2014) EU Parliament Ratifies Political, Trade
Agreement with Moldova. Accessed at: http://www.rferl.org/content/moldova-eu-approves-politicaltrade-pact/26690501.html
[12] Reuters (July 3, 2014). Russia defies Moldovas EU pact by boosting Transnistria trade. Accessed
at: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/russia-defies-moldovas-eu-pact-boosting-transnistriatrade-303263
[13] Busch, W. (2013). What's Strategic Foresight? U.S. European Command. Available at:

http://www.eucom.mil/media-library/blog%20post/25060/whats-strategic-foresight
[14] Wood, A. (February, 26, 2015). After Putin. The American Interest; Cohen, A. (October 18, 2012)
"Putins New Fortress Russia." New York Times; and Bershidsky, L (August, 4, 2014). Russia's Siege
Mentality. Bloomberg View, Available at: http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-08-04/russia-s-

siege-mentality
[15] Lavrov, S. (September 2014). Remarks by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and answers to
questions from the media during a press conference on the sidelines of the 69th session of the UN General
Assembly, New York, 26 September 2014. Available at: http://www.missiontonato.ru/en/news/581/
[16] Putin, V. (December 2013). Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly. Available at:
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19825
[17] North Carolina - Moldova Partnership. Available at:

https://www.secretary.state.nc.us/partnership/thepage.aspx
[18] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2014). NATO/EAPC Action Plan for the Implementation Of

The NATO/EAPC Policy On Women, Peace And Security. Available at:


http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_06/20140626_140626-wps-action-plan.pdf
[19] Han, J.S. and Youtz, B.D. (2012). Grains of Truth: The Role of Civil-Military Support Elements in

Special Operations. Special Warfare, 25:3, 40.


[20] Clark, P. (2013). Black Sea Rotational Force 13 deploys. Defense Video and Imagery Distribution

System. http://www.dvidshub.net/news/103543/black-sea-rotational-force-13deploys#.VKa2Joo8LCQ#ixzz3Ng4OmiC0 and Perkins, D. (2015). Marines train in anti-armor tactics


alongside Moldovan troops. Marine Corps Times.
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2015/01/01/marines-train-moldovan-troops/21047141/
[21] Cobb, S. (2013). Narrative Braiding. p. 24
[22] Ibid,.
[23] Putin, V. (2007). Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy.

http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.shtml
[24] Russia joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program June 20, 1994.
[25] USS Abraham Lincoln Public Affairs (2013). USS Abraham Lincoln Officer Volunteers in

Moldova. http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=76623 and U.S. Army Europe (2012).


Rapid Trident 2012 begins in Ukraine. http://www.eucom.mil/media-library/article/23908/multinationalpartnership-and-interoperability-rapid-trident-2012-begins-in-ukra
[26] Vick, A. J. (2006). Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era. Washington, DC: RAND.

[27] Cobb, S. (2012). Narratives and Conflict Transformation: Building Community, Building Betterformed Stories. Center for Narratives and Conflict Resolution. Accessed at:
http://www.gishurim.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/SARACOBB.pdf
[28] Davies, B. and Harr, R., Positioning and Personhood, in Harr, R., & Van Langenhove, L. (Eds.).

(1999). Positioning theory: Moral contexts of intentional action. Oxford: Blackwell.


[29] Cobb, S. (2013). Speaking of Violence: The Politics and Poetics of Narrative In Conflict Resolution.

Oxford University Press, p. 271.

About the Author


John DeRosa
John DeRosa continues to serve over twenty years as a soldier, officer, and civilian
in the U.S. Department of Defense. Concurrently, he is an Adjunct Associate
Professor in the Government and Politics Department of the University of Maryland
University College and a Fellow with the Center on Global Interests. He received a
MSc in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University, a M.A in
National Security Studies, and a B.A. in Economics from California State University,
San Bernardino. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. at George Mason Universitys
School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Follow John on twitter @jpderosa (
https://twitter.com/jpderosa)

Available online at : http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/revising-the-battle-of-the-narrative


Links:
{1} http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/john-derosa
{2} http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomatic_recognition
{3} http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhazia
{4} http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Ossetia
{5} http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nagorno-Karabakh_Republic
{6} http://journals.gmu.edu/NandC/issue/1
{7} https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/p%C3%A5l-kolst%C3%B8/transnistria-is-bridge-too-farfor-russia
{8} http://www.rferl.org/content/moldova-eu-approves-political-trade-pact/26690501.html
{9} http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/russia-defies-moldovas-eu-pact-boosting-transnistriatrade-303263
{10} http://www.eucom.mil/media-library/blog%20post/25060/whats-strategic-foresight
{11} http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-08-04/russia-s-siege-mentality
{12} http://www.missiontonato.ru/en/news/581/
{13} http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19825
{14} https://www.secretary.state.nc.us/partnership/thepage.aspx
{15} http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_06/20140626_140626-wps-actionplan.pdf
{16} http://www.dvidshub.net/news/103543/black-sea-rotational-force-13deploys#.VKa2Joo8LCQ#ixzz3Ng4OmiC0
{17} http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2015/01/01/marines-train-moldovantroops/21047141/
{18}

http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.shtml
{19} http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=76623
{20} http://www.eucom.mil/media-library/article/23908/multinational-partnership-and-interoperabilityrapid-trident-2012-begins-in-ukra
{21} http://www.gishurim.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/SARACOBB.pdf
{22} https://twitter.com/jpderosa
{23} http://smallwarsjournal.com/comment/reply/25528#comment-form
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