Republic of the Philippines vs.

Salem Investment Corporation

Facts:
On 17 February 1983, Batas Pambansa 340 was passed authorizing the
expropriation of parcels of lands in the names of Maria del Carmen
Roxas de Elizalde and Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. de Santos, including a
portion of the land, consisting of 1,380 square meters, belonging to
Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama covered by TCT 16913. On 14
December 1988, or 5 years thereafter, Milagros and Inocentes De la
Rama entered into a contract with Alfredo Guerrero whereby the De la
Ramas agreed to sell to Guerrero the entire property covered by TCT
16213, consisting of 4,075 square meters for the amount of
P11,800,000.00. The De la Ramas received the sum of P2,200,000.00 as
partial payment of the purchase price, the balance thereof to be paid
upon release of the title by the Philippine Veterans Bank. On 3
November 1989, Guerrero filed in the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City a
complaint for specific performance (Civil Case 6974-P) to compel the De
la Ramas to proceed with the sale. On 10 July 1990, while the case was
pending, the Republic of the Philippines filed the case (Civil Case 7327)
for expropriation pursuant to BP 340. Among the defendants named in
the complaint were Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama as registered
owners of Lot 834, a portion of which (Lot 834-A) was part of the
expropriated property. Upon the deposit of P12,970,350.00 representing
10% of the approximate market value of the subject lands, a writ of
possession was issued on 29 August 1990 in favor of the government.
On 2 May 1991, Guerrero filed a motion for intervention alleging that the
De la Ramas had agreed to sell to him the entire Lot 834 on 14
December 1988 and that a case for specific performance had been filed
by him against the De la Ramas. On 9 September 1991, the trial court
approved payment to the De la Ramas at the rate of P23,976.00 per
square meter for the taking of 920 square meters out of the 1,380
square meters. Meanwhile, on 18 September 1991, the trial court
rendered a decision in the case for specific performance upholding the
validity of the contract to sell and ordering the De la Ramas to execute
the corresponding deed of sale covering the subject property in favor of
Guerrero. The De la Ramas appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CV35116) but their petition was dismissed on 28 July 1992. They tried to
appeal to the Supreme Court (GR 106488) but again they failed in their
bid as their petition for review was denied on 7 December 1992.
Meanwhile, on 2 October 1991, Guerrero filed an Omnibus Motion
praying that the just compensation for the land be deposited in court
pursuant to Rule 67, 9 of the Rules of Court. As his motion for
intervention and omnibus motion had not yet been resolved, Guerrero
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus, certiorari, and

injunction with temporary restraining order (CA-GR SP 28311) to enjoin

the Republic from releasing or paying to the De la Ramas any amount
corresponding to the payment of the expropriated property and to
compel the trial court to resolve his two motions. On 12 January 1993,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writ of
mandamus. Nonetheless, the De la Ramas filed on 17 March 1993 a
Motion for Authority to Withdraw the deposit made by the Republic in
1991, which was denied on 7 May 1993. On 16 June 1993, the De la
Ramas filed a Motion for Execution again praying that the court's order
dated 9 September 1991, approving the recommendation of the
appraisal committee, be enforced. On 22 June 1993, the trial court
denied the motion of the De la Ramas holding that there had been a
change in the situation of the parties, therefore, making the execution of
9 September 1991 Order inequitable, impossible, or unjust. Thus, with
the decision in the action for specific performance in Civil Case 6974-P
having become final, an order of execution was issued by the Pasay City
RTC, and as a result of which, a deed of absolute sale was executed by
the Branch Clerk of Court on 8 March 1994 in favor of Guerrero upon
payment by him of the sum of P8,808,000.00 on 11 January 1994 and
the further sum of P1,608,900.00 on 1 February 1994 as full payment for
the balance of the purchase price under the contract to sell. The entire
amount was withdrawn and duly received by the De la Ramas.
Thereafter, the De la Ramas sought the nullification of the 22 June 1993
order of the trial by filing a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the
Court of Appeals. This petition was, however, dismissed in a decision
dated 29 July 1994 of the appellate court. Finally, on 5 April 1995, the
Pasay City Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, declared Guerrero the
rightful owner of the 920-square meter expropriated property and
ordered payment to him of just compensation for the taking of the land.
This decision was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The De
la Ramas filed a petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the legal interest should be 6% or 12%
Held:
The decision dated 18 September 1991 has long become final and
executory. The decision therein ordered the De la Ramas to pay
Guerrero, among others, the legal interest of the amount of
P2,200,000.00 from 2 August 1989 until the deed of absolute sale is
executed in favor of Guerrero. Specifically, the court therein rationalized
that (1) the legal rate of interest for damages, and even for loans where
interest was not stipulated, is 6% per annum (Article 2209, Civil Code);

that (2) the rate of 12% per annum was established by the Monetary
Board when, under the power vested in it by PD 116 to amend Act 2655
(more commonly known as the Anti Usury Law), it amended Section 1 by
increasing the rate of legal interest for loans, renewals and forbearance
thereof, as well as for judgments, from 6% per annum to 12% per
annum; and that (3) inasmuch as the Monetary Board may not repeal or
amend the Civil Code, in the face of the apparent conflict between
Article 2209 and Act 2655 as amended, the ruling of the Monetary Board
applies only to banks, financing companies, pawnshops and
intermediaries performing quasi-banking functions, all of which are
under the control and supervision of the Central Bank and of the
Monetary Board. Thus, the court held therein that (1) the interest rate on
the P2,200,000.00 paid to the de la Ramas by Guerrero at the inception
of the transactions should be only 6% per annum from 2 August 1989,
and as of 2 January 1994 this amounts to the sum of P583,000.00 and
P11,000.00 every month thereafter until the deed of absolute sale over
the property subject matter of this case is executed; that (2) the
amounts payable by the de la Ramas to Guerrero therefore stands at a
total of P1,383,000.00. Offsetting this amount from the balance of
P8,800,000.00, Guerrero must still pay to the de la Ramas the sum of
P7,417,000.00; and that (3) since Guerrero has already deposited with
the Clerk of Court of the court the sum of P5,808,100.00 as of 11
January 1994; he should add to this the sum of Pl,608,900.00. The De la
Ramas can no longer question a judgment which has already become
final and executory. Hence, they are already barred from questioning it
in a proceeding before the Supreme Court.

It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is

said to have been completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just
compensation that title over the property passes to the government.
Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed and
terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains
with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all
rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his
property, subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it
through expropriation.

Note: this case enunciated

initiated. SC ruled as follows:

Facts:

how

expropriation

should

be

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the

plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of
its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with
an order, if not dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that
the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose declared in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint"xxx.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissionersxxx

Estate of Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone

GR 137285, 23, June 2000

On 15 May 1981, Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), then called

as the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated before the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite expropriation proceedings on 3 parcels of
irrigated riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B)
of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, with an approximate area of
29,008 square meters, is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez (TCT T113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite). More than 10 years later, the
said trial court in an Order dated 11 July 1991 upheld the right of
PEZA to expropriate,
among others,
Lot
1406
(A and
B).
Reconsideration of the said order was sought by the Estate of Salud
Jimenez contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private
corporation, Philippine Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a
public purpose. In an Order dated 25 October 1991, the trial court
reconsidered the Order dated 11 July 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from

expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained.

Finding the said order unacceptable, PEZA interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, the Estate and PEZA entered into a
compromise agreement, dated 4 January 1993. The compromise
agreement provides "(1) That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal
from the Order of the Honorable Court dated October 25, 1991 which
released lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings. On the other
hand, defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees to waive, quitclaim and
forfeit its claim for damages and loss of income which it sustained by
reason of the possession of said lot by plaintiff from 1981 up to the
present. (2) That the parties agree that defendant Estate of Salud
Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B with an area of 13,118 square meters
which forms part of the lot registered under TCT No. 113498 of the
Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the name of the plaintiff and the same
shall be swapped and exchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167
square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14772 of
the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will be transferred to the name
of Estate of Salud Jimenez. (3) That the swap arrangement recognizes
the fact that the lot 1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of
defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the
government based on Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991.
However, instead of being paid the just compensation for said lot, the
estate of said defendant shall be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T14772. (4) That the parties agree that they will abide by the terms of the
foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision to be rendered
based on this Compromise Agreement is immediately final and
executory." The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for
the approval of the said compromise agreement entered into between
the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the appeal with the Court
of Appeals. In the Order dated 23 August 1993, the trial court approved
the compromise agreement. However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of
Lot 434 to the Estate inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the
covering TCT T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on 13
March 1997, the Estate filed a "Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated
August 23, 1993." In the Order dated 4 August 1997, the trial court
annulled the said compromise agreement entered into between the
parties and directed PEZA to peacefully turn over Lot 1406- A to the
Estate. Disagreeing with the said Order of the trial court, respondent
PEZA moved for its reconsideration, which was denied in an order dated
3 November 1997. On 4 December 1997, the trial court, at the instance
of the Estate, corrected the Orders dated 4 August 1997 and 3

November 1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and not Lot 1406-A
that should be surrendered and returned to the Estate. On 27 November
1997, PEZA interposed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify the Orders dated 4 August
1997 and 3 November 1997 of the trial court. Acting on the petition, the
Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated 25 March 1998, partially granted
the petition by setting aside the order of the trial court regarding "the
peaceful turn over to the Estate of Salud Jimenez of Lot 1406- B" and
instead ordered the trial judge to "proceed with the hearing of the
expropriation proceedings regarding the determination of just
compensation over Lot 1406-B." The Estate sought reconsideration of
the Decision dated 25 March 1998. However, the appellate court in a
Resolution dated 14 January 1999 denied the Estate's motion for
reconsideration. The Estate filed a petition for review on certiorari with
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the purpose of the expropriation by PEZA is of public use.
Held:
This is an expropriation case which involves two (2) orders: an
expropriation order and an order fixing just compensation. Once the first
order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to
expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be questioned. Contrary
to the Estate's contention, the incorporation of the expropriation order in
the compromise agreement did not subject said order to rescission but
instead constituted an admission by the Estate of PEZA's authority to
expropriate the subject parcel of land and the public purpose for which it
was expropriated. This is evident from paragraph three (3) of the
compromise agreement which states that the "swap arrangement
recognizes the fact that Lot 1406-B covered by TCT T-113498 of the
estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of
the government based on the Order of the Honorable Court dated 11
July 1991." It is crystal clear from the contents of the agreement
that the parties limited the compromise agreement to the
matter of just compensation to the Estate. Said expropriation order is
not closely intertwined with the issue of payment such that failure to
pay by PEZA will also nullify the right of PEZA to expropriate. No
statement to this effect was mentioned in the agreement. The Order was
mentioned in the agreement only to clarify what was subject to
payment. Since the compromise agreement was only about the mode of

payment by swapping of lots and not about the right and purpose to
expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B, only the originally agreed form of
compensation that is by cash payment, was rescinded. PEZA has the
legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same
was for a valid public purpose. PEZA expropriated the subject parcel of
land pursuant to Proclamation 1980 dated 30 May 1980 issued by
former President Ferdinand Marcos. Meanwhile, the power of eminent
domain of respondent is contained in its original charter, Presidential
Decree 66. Accordingly, subject Lot 1406-B was expropriated "for the
construction of terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto."
The authority is broad enough to give PEZA substantial leeway in
deciding for what public use the expropriated property would be utilized.
Pursuant to this broad authority, PEZA leased a portion of the lot to
commercial banks while the rest was made a transportation terminal.
Said public purposes were even reaffirmed by Republic Act 7916, a law
amending PEZA's original charter. As reiterated in various case, the
"public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing
conditions. The term "public use" has acquired a more
comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying
strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader
notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. What ultimately emerged
is a concept of public use which is just as broad as "public welfare."

Expropriation Small property Owners

GR. No. 137152
| January 29, 2001
City of Mandaluyong, petitioner vs.
Aguilar, respondents
Nature of Case:
Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the
decision of the RTC dismissing amended complaint in SCA No.
1427 for expropriation of two (2) parcels of land in
Mandaluyong City.
Dispositive: The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the
RTC decision.
Facts
Antonio, Francisco, Thelma, Eusebio, and Rodolfo N. Aguilar,
constructed residential houses several decades ago on a
portion of the 3 lots located at 9 de Febrero Street,
Barangay Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong. The Aguilars had since
leased out these houses to tenants until the present. On the
vacant portion of the lots, other families constructed residential
structures which they likewise occupied. In 1983, the lots were
classified by Resolution 125 of the Board of the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council as an Area for Priority
Development for urban land reform under Proclamation 1967 and
2284 of then President Marcos. As a result of this classification,
the tenants and occupants of the lots offered to purchase the land
from the Aguilars, but the latter refused to sell.
On 7 November 1996, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Mandaluyong, upon petition of the Kapit bisig, an association of
tenants and occupants of the subject land, adopted Resolution
516, Series of 1996 authorizing Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City
of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the expropriation of the
subject lots and construction of a medium-rise condominium for
qualified occupants of the land. On 10 January 1996, Mayor Abalos
allegedly sent a letter to the Aguilars offering to purchase the said
property at P3,000.00 per square meter. On 4 August 1997, the
City filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig
City a complaint for expropriation, seeking to expropriate 3
adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square
meters in the names of the Aguilars, and praying that the fixing of
just compensation at the fair market value of P3,000.00 per
square meter. In their answer, the Aguilars, except Eusebio who
died in 1995, denied having received a copy of Mayor Abalos' offer

to purchase their lots. The prosecution filed motion for suspension

of the accused public officials, and finding that said accused were
charged under a valid information, the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution suspending the said public
officials from their respective public positions, or from any other
public office that they may be holding.
They alleged that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and
capricious, and is not for a public purpose; that the subject lots
are their only real property and are too small for expropriation,
while the City has several properties inventoried for socialized
housing; and that the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square
meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. As
counterclaim, the Aguilars prayed for damages of P21 million. On
5 November 1997, the City filed an Amended Complaint and
named as an additional defendant Virginia N. Aguilar and, at the
same time, substituted Eusebio Aguilar with his heirs. The City
also excluded from expropriation TCT N59870 and thereby
reduced the area sought to be expropriated from three (3) parcels
of land to two (2) parcels totaling 1,636 square meters. The
Amended Complaint was admitted by the trial court on 18
December 1997. On 17 September 1998, the trial court issued an
order dismissing the Amended Complaint after declaring the
Aguilars as "small property owners" whose land is exempt from
expropriation under Republic Act 7279.
The court also found that the expropriation was not for a public
purpose for the City's failure to present any evidence that the
intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are landless and
homeless residents of Mandaluyong. The City moved for
reconsideration. On 29 December 1998, the court denied the
motion. The City filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE/S of the CASE:

(a) Whether the City has exhausted all means to acquire the land
under the hands of private persons, but which is within the Areas
for Priority Development (APD).
SUPREME COURT RULING
Presidential Decree (PD) 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act, was
issued by then President Marcos in1978. The decree adopted as a State
policy the liberation of human communities from blight, congestion and
hazard, and promotion of their development and modernization, the
optimum use of land as a national resource for public welfare.

Pursuant to this law, Proclamation 1893 was issued in 1979

declaring the entire
Metro Manila as Urban Land Reform Zone for purposes of urban land
reform. This was amended in 1980 by Proclamation 1967 and in 1983 by
Proclamation 2284 which identified and specified 245 sites in Metro
Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones.
The acquisition of lands for socialized housing is governed by several
provisions in the law. Pursuant to Section 9 of RA 7279, Lands for
socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1)
government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3)
unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared
Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP)
sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not
yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired;
and (6) privately- owned lands. Section 9, however, is not a single
provision that can be read separate from the other provisions of the law.
It must be read together with Section 10 of RA 7279. Thus, lands for
socialized housing under RA 7279 are to be acquired in several modes.
Among these modes are the following: (1) community mortgage; (2)
land swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5)
donation to the government; (6) joint venture agreement; (7) negotiated
purchase; and (8) expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to
two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted; and (b) parcels of land owned by small
property owners are exempt from such acquisition. The acquisition of
the lands in the priority list must be made subject to the modes and
conditions set forth in the next provision. In other words, land that lies
within the APD may be acquired only in the modes under, and subject to
the conditions of, Section 10. Herein, the City claims that it had faithfully
observed the different modes of land acquisition for socialized housing
under RA 7279 and adhered to the priorities in the acquisition for
socialized housing under said law. It, however, did not state with
particularity whether it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in
Section 9 of the law before it decided to expropriate the subject lots. The
law states "expropriation shall be resorted to when other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted."
The City alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by negotiated
purchase. The City, through the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots
from the Aguilars but the latter refused to sell. As to the other modes of
acquisition, no mention has been made. Not even Resolution 516, Series
of 1996 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of
Mandaluyong to effect the expropriation of the subject property states
whether the city government tried to acquire the same by community
mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking,

donation to the government, or joint venture agreement under Section 9

of the law.

Doctrine:
Power of Eminent Domain
G.R. No. 142304

June 20, 2001

CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,

vs.
OSCAR, FELICITAS, JOSE, BENJAMIN, ESTELITA, LEONORA AND
ADELAIDA, ALL SURNAMED SERRANO, respondents.
Brief:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated
November 16, 1999, and resolution, dated February 23, 2000, of the
Court of Appeals reversing the order, dated December 15, 1998, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila and perpetually enjoining it from
proceeding with the petitioner's complaint for eminent domain in Civil
Case No. 94-72282.
Facts:

On 21 December 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance

7833, authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila's First
District in Tondo, covered by TCTs 70869, 105201, 105202, and 138273
of the Register of Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold and distributed
to qualified occupants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program
of the City of Manila. One of the properties sought to be expropriated,
denominated as Lot 1-C, consists of 343.10 square meters, and was in
the name of Feliza de Guia. Lot 1-C was assigned to Edgardo De Guia,
one of the heirs of Alberto De Guia, in turn one of the heirs of Feliza de
Guia. On 29 July 1994, the said property was transferred to Lee Kuan
Hui, in whose name TCT 217018 was issued. The property was
subsequently sold on 24 January 1996 to Demetria De Guia to whom TCT
226048 was issued. On 26 September 1997, the City of Manila filed an
amended complaint for expropriation (Civil Case 94-72282) with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, against the supposed owners of
the lots covered by TCTs 70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201, 105202, and
138273, which included herein respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose,
Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida, all surnamed Serrano. On 12
November 1997, the Serranos filed a consolidated answer, praying the
exemption of Lot 1-C from expropriation. Upon motion by the City, the
trial court issued an order, dated 9 October 1998, directing the City to
deposit the amount of P1,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value
of the properties. After the City had made the deposit, the trial court
issued another order, dated 15 December 1998, directing the issuance
of a writ of possession in favor of the City. The Serranos filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On 16 November 1999, the Court
of Appeals rendered a decision holding that although Lot 1-C is not
exempt from expropriation because it undeniably exceeds 300 square
meters which is no longer considered a small property within the
framework of RA 7279, the other modes of acquisition of lands
enumerated in 59-10 of the law must first be tried by the city
government before it can resort to expropriation, and thus enjoined the
City from expropriating Lot 1-C. In its resolution, dated 23 February
2000, the Court of Appeals likewise Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 44 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) denied two motions for reconsideration filed
by the City. The City filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether it was premature to determine whether the requirements of RA
7279, 9-10 have been complied with.

Held:
Rule 67, 2 provides that "Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time
thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have
the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property
involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such
deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the
deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic
of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government
depositary. If personal property is involved, its value shall be
provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be fixed
by the court. After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff
or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the
property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with
service of copies to the parties." Thus, a writ of execution may be issued
by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made
by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of
the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these
requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes
ministerial. Herein, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it
became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ of
possession. The distinction between the Filstream and the present case
is that in the former, the judgment in that case had already become final
while herein, the trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ
of possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not
petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in RA 7279.
Whether the City has complied with these provisions requires the
presentation of evidence, although in its amended complaint petitioner
did allege that it had complied with the requirements. The determination
of this question must await the hearing on the complaint for
expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the
properties sought to be expropriated. Expropriation proceedings consists
of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined
that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second,
the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of
private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not
more than three commissioners.

Eslaban vs. Vda. de Onorio [GR 146062, 28 June 2001]

Facts:
Clarita Vda. de Onorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto.
Nino, South Cotabato with an area of 39,512 square meters (Lot 1210-APad-11-000586, TCT T-22121 of the Registry of Deeds, South Cotabato).
On 6 October 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA,
approved the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the

said lot, affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof. De Onorio's

husband agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they
be paid by the government for the area taken after the processing of
documents by the Commission on Audit. Sometime in 1983, a Right-ofWay agreement was executed between De Onorio and the NIA. The NIA
then paid De Onorio the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages.
De Onorio subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and
Fees whereby she waived any compensation for damages to crops and
improvements which she suffered as a result of the construction of a
right-of-way on her property. The same year, Eslaban offered De Onorio
the sum of P35,000,00 by way of amicable settlement (financial
assistance) pursuant to Executive Order 1035, 18. De Onorio
demanded payment for the taking of her property, but Eslaban/NIA
refused to pay. Accordingly, De Onorio filed on 10 December 1990 a
complaint against Eslaban before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying
that Eslaban/NIA be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as
compensation for the portion of her property used in the construction of
the canal constructed by the NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs.
Eslaban admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the
property of De Onorio and that NIA paid a certain landowner whose
property had been taken for irrigation purposes, but Eslaban interposed
the defense that:
(1) the government had not consented to be sued; (2) the total area
used by the NIA for it irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600
square meters; and (3) that De Onorio was not entitled to compensation
for the taking of her property considering that she secured title over the
property by virtue of a homestead patent under Commonwealth Act 141.
On 18 October 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, ordering the
NIA to pay to De Onorio the sum of P107,517.60 as just compensation
for the questioned area of
24,660 square meters of land owned by De Onorio and taken by the NIA
which used it for its main canal plus costs. On 15 November 1993, the
NIA appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on 31 October 2000,
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. NIA filed the petition for
review.
Issue:
Whether the valuation of just compensation is determined at the time
the property was taken or at the time the complaint for expropriation is
filed.

Held:
Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or conveyed to applicants
thereof, and the deed grant or instrument of conveyance [sales patent]
registered with the Register of Deeds and the corresponding certificate
and owner's duplicate of title issued, such lands are deemed registered
lands under the Torrens System and the certificate of title thus issued is
as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued to
private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. The only
servitude which a private
property owner is required to recognize in favor of the government is the
easement of a "public highway, way, private way established by law, or
any government canal or lateral thereof where the certificate of title
does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined."
This implies that the same should have been pre-existing at the time of
the registration of the land in order that the registered owner may be
compelled to respect it. Conversely, where the easement is not preexisting and is sought to be imposed only after the land has been
registered under the Land Registration Act, proper expropriation
proceedings should be had, and just compensation paid to the
registered owner thereof. Herein, the irrigation canal constructed by the
NIA on the contested property was built only on 6 October 1981, several
years after the property had been registered on 13 May 1976.
Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have been filed and
just compensation
paid to the owner thereof before it could be taken for public use. With
respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned
property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market
value which should be paid or "that sum of money which a person,
desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received
therefor." Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount
to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land
within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the property owner is
made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his
land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless,
there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the
property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation
shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing
of the action of eminent domain. The value of the property, thus, must
be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the
filing of the complaint, "whichever came first.

compensation should be determined as of the date of filing of the

complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether just compensation should be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint.
Basis of Valuation for Just Compensation
Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government
Code)
CITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES DEDAMO
The City of Cebu, petitioner,
vs.
Spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo, respondent
G.R. No. 142971
May 7, 2002
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review Under Rule 45
BRIEF:
This is an appeal assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13 of
Cebu City.
FACTS:
The City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against
respondent spouses on 17 September 1993. The petitioner alleged that
the property will be used for the construction of a public road which shall
serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the
General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel
Roads in Cebu City. Based on the amended assessment submitted by
three commissioners (appointed by the parties and the court), the trial
court fixed the amount of P20,826,339.50 for just compensation.
Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just
compensation based on the actual value of the property at the time of
the actual taking in 1994. Instead, according to the City of Cebu, just

ACTIONS OF THE COURT

RTC: Directed petitioner to pay respondents just compensation which
was computed based on the value of the property at the actual time of
taking.
CA: Decision of RTC is AFFIRMED in toto.
SC: Decision of CA is AFFIRMED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
No. Applicable law is Section 19 of RA 7160 which expressly provides
that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual
taking.
The petitioner misread the ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. CA.
The High Court did not categorically rule in that case that just
compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. It
is explicitly stated in the decision that although the general rule in
determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the
property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule admits of
an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the
date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings.
More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and
voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of
the commission and approved by the trial court.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed judgment on the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59204, the petition in this case is
hereby DENIED.

District, Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24359

issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila. These parcels of land are
being occupied and leased by different tenants, among whom are
respondents Abiog, Maglonso and members of respondent Sampaguita
Bisig ng Magkakapitbahay, Incorporated (SBMI). Petitioners leased to
respondent Abiog Lot 2-E, Block 3007 of the consolidated subdivision
plan (LRC) Psd- 328345, with an area of 191 square meters[7] and to
respondent Maglonso, Lot 2-R, Block 2996 of the same consolidation
plan, with an area of 112 square meters.[8]

Estate of the heirs of The late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes

Vs.
City of Manila

Brief:
Before us are the following consolidated petitions filed by petitioners
Heirs of Jose B.L. Reyes and Edmundo Reyes: a petition for review of the
decision] of the Court of Appeals dated January 27, 1998 which ordered
the condemnation of petitioners properties and reversed the order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9, dated October 3, 1995
dismissing the complaint of respondent City of Manila (City) for
expropriation, and a petition for certiorari alleging that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a resolution
dated August 19, 1998 which issued a temporary restraining order
against the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manila, Branch 10, not to
(disturb) the occupancy of Dr. Rosario Abiog, one of the members of
SBMI, until the Supreme Court has decided the Petition for Review on
Certiorari and a resolution dated December 16, 1998 enjoining
petitioners from disturbing the physical possession of all the properties
subject of the expropriation proceedings.

On November 9, 1993 and May 26, 1994, respectively, Jose B.L. Reyes
and petitioners Heirs of Edmundo Reyes filed ejectment complaints
against respondents Rosario Abiog and Angelina Maglonso, among
others. Upon his death, Jose B.L. Reyes was substituted by his heirs.
Petitioners obtained favorable judgments against said respondents. In
Civil Case No. 142851-CV, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila,
Branch 10, rendered a decision dated May 9, 1994 against respondent
Abiog. In Civil Case No. 144205-CV, the MTC of Manila, Branch 3, issued
judgment dated May 4, 1995 against respondent Maglonso.

Respondents Abiog and Maglonso appealed the MTC decisions but the
same were deniedby the RTC of Manila, Branch 28, and the RTC of
Manila, Branch 38, respectively. Their appeals to the Court of Appeals
were likewise denied. As no appeals were further taken, the judgments
of eviction against respondents Abiog and Maglonso became final and
executory in 1998.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the two ejectment cases against

respondents Abiog and Maglonso, respondent City filed on April 25, 1995
a complaint for eminent domain (expropriation) of the properties of
petitioners at the RTC of Manila, Branch 9. The properties sought to be
acquired by the City included parcels of land occupied by respondents
Abiog, Maglonso and members of respondent SBMI.

Facts:
The records show that Jose B. L. Reyes and petitioners Heirs of Edmundo
Reyes are the pro-indiviso co-owners in equal proportion of 11 parcels of
land with a total area of 13,940 square meters situated at Sta. Cruz

The complaint alleged that, on March 10, 1995, respondent City thru
City Legal Officer Angel Aguirre, Jr. sent the petitioners a written offer to

purchase the subject properties for P10,285,293.38 but the same was
rejected. Respondent City prayed that an order be issued fixing the
provisional value of the property in the amount of P9,684,380 based on
the current tax declaration of the real properties and that it be
authorized to enter and take possession thereof upon the deposit with
the trial court of the amount of P1,452,657 or 15% of the aforesaid
value.

The Citys complaint for eminent domain was dismissed.The trial court
held that expropriation was inappropriate because herein petitioners
were in fact willing to sell the subject properties under terms acceptable
to the purchaser. Moreover, respondent City failed to show that its offer
was rejected by petitioners. Respondent Citys motion for reconsideration
was denied.

CA
On May 15, 1995, respondent SBMI, a registered non-stock corporation
composed of the residents of the subject properties (including as well as
representing herein respondents Abiog and Maglonso), filed a motion for
intervention and admission of their attached complaint with prayer for
injunction. Respondent SBMI alleged that it had a legal interest over the
subject matter of the litigation as its members were the lawful
beneficiaries of the subject matter of the case. It prayed for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the petitioners from ousting
the occupants of the subject properties. The trial court denied the
motion for intervention in an order dated June 2, 1995 on the ground
that the movants interest (was) indirect, contingent, remote, conjectual
(sic), consequential (sic) and collateral. At the very least, it (was), if it
(existed) at all, purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a right that
may or may not be granted.

The Orders appealed from are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
remanded to the lower court to determine specifically the amount of just
compensation.

SC

The petitions are GRANTED. In G.R. No. 132431, the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated January 27, 1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In G.R. No. 137146, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
August 19, 1998 and December 16, 1998 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE

Issue of the Case:

Court Rationale:
Whether there is violation of due process against the Reyeses in the
manner there property were expropriated and condemned in favor of
the City of Manila.

Actions of the Court:

Trial Court

The Filstream case is substantially similar in facts and issues to the

present case. In Filstream V. CA, the court held that the Sections 9&10 of
the Republic Act 7279 are limitations to the exercise to the power of
eminent domain, especially with respect to the order of priority in
acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as
a means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in order of priority
for purposes of socialize housing . In the same vein, expropriation
proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is
mandatory because these are the only safeguards of often times
helpless owners of private property against violation of due process
when their property is forcible taken from them from public use. Herein,

the city failed to prove strict compliance with the requirements with the
requirements of Section 9&10 of RA 7279. The city neither alleged in its
complaint nor proved during the proceedings before the trial court that
it complied with said requirements. Even in the CA , the city in its
pleadings failed to show its compliance with the law. The CA was
likewise on this specific jurisdictional issue. This is a clear violation of the
right to due process of the Reyeses.

NHA vs. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo

National Housing Authority, petitioner
vs.
HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO, COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ISAIAS DICDICAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
11, Cebu City, and PASCUAL Y. ABORDO, Sheriff, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 11, Cebu City,respondents
GR No. 154411

June 19, 2003

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
Nature of the Case:
Petition for review
Brief:
Petitioner filed a petition for review to annul the Writ of Execution of
expropriating the properties of the respondents (to be used for a
socialized housing project) because the just compensation is
unconscionable and cannot afford by the beneficiaries. SC denied the
petition.
Facts:
Petitioner NHA filed with the RTC of Cebu City an Amended Complaint for
eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot
and the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo for the purpose of developing a
socialized housing project. The Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo filed a
Manifestation stating that they were waiving their objections to
petitioner's power to expropriate their properties. The Court then
declared that the petitioner has the right to expropriate the properties of
the defendants and appointed commisioners to determine a just
compensation. The commisioners recommended that the just
compensation of the subject properties be fixed at P11,200.00 per
square meter. The trial court rendered Partial Judgment adopting the
recommendation. Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that the just compensation has no basis and support. But
both motions were denied by the RTC but it granted petitioner's prayer
for the inclusion of Lots 12, 13 and 19 for expropriation. Petitioner filed
with the CA a petition for certiorari. Meanwhile, the trial court issued an
Entry of Judgment over the partial judgment as modified by the Omnibus
Order. Subsequently, respondent Heirs filed a Motion for Execution which
was granted. CA on the other hand, dismissed the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioner on the ground that the Partial Judgment and Omnibus
Order became final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal the
same. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for a Clarificatory Ruling were also denied.
Petitioner filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss complaint for
eminent domain, alleging that the implementation of its socialized

housing project was rendered impossible by the unconscionable value of

the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries can
not afford which was denied. The same was also denied upon filing it to
the CA. Sheriff served on petitioner a Notice of Levy pursuant to the Writ
of Execution issued by RTC to enforce the Partial Judgment and the
Omnibus Order. Respondent sheriff served on the Landbank a Notice of
Third Garnishment against the deposits, moneys and interests of
petitioner therein. Subsequently, respondent sheriff levied on funds and
personal properties of petitioner.
Thus this petition for review.
Actions of the Court
RTC: Denied
CA: Denied
SC: Denied
Issues:
1. Whether the State can be compelled and coerced by the Courts
to exercise or continue with the exercise of its inherent power of
eminent domain.

2. Yes. Having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the

government, the funds of such government-owned and controlled
corporations and non-corporate agency as in this case NHA,
although considered public in character, are not exempt from
garnishment. Hence, it is clear that the funds of petitioner NHA
are not exempt from garnishment or execution. Petitioners prayer
for injunctive relief to restrain respondent from enforcing the
Notice of Levy and Garnishment against its funds and properties
must, therefore, be denied.
SC Ruling:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the trial courts
Order denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss the expropriation
proceedings is AFFIRMED. Petitioners prayer for injunctive relief against
the levy and garnishment of its funds and personal properties is DENIED.
The Temporary Restraining Order dated is LIFTED.

2. Whether Writs of Execution and Garnishment may be issued

against the State in an expropriation wherein the exercise of the
power of eminent domain will not serve public use or purpose.

Ruling:
1. Yes. The state can be compelled and coerced by the court to
continue exercise its inherent power of eminent domain since the
NHA does not exercise its right to appeal in the expropriation
proceeding before the court has rendered the case final and
executory. Respondent landowners had already been prejudiced
by the expropriation case. Petitioner cannot be permitted to
institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to
abandon it later when it finds the amount of just compensation
unacceptable.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO F. WYCOCO

G.R. No. 146733
January 13, 2004
FACTS:
This case is a consolidated petition of one seeking review of the decision
of CA modifying the decision of RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court,
and another for mandamus to compel the RTC to issue a writ of
execution and to direct Judge Caspillo to inhibit. Feliciano F. Wycoco is
the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare land. Wycoco voluntarily

offered to sell the land to the Department of Agrarian Reform for P14.9
million. DAR offered P2,280,159.82. The area which the DAR offered to
acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein. Wycoco
rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the
purpose of fixing the just compensation in a summary administrative
proceeding. Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust
account in the name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered
by DAR. In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmerbeneficiaries. On April 13, 1993, Wycoco filed the instant case for
determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City against DAR and LBP. On March 9, 1994, the DARAB
dismissed the case on its hand to give way to the determination of just
compensation by the RTC. Meanwhile, DAR and LBP filed their respective
answered that the valuation of Wycocos property was in accordance
with law and that the latter failed to exhaust administrative remedies by
not participating in the summary administrative proceedings before the
DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over determination of land
valuation. On November 14, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in
favor of Wycoco. It ruled that there is no need to present evidence in
support of the land valuation in as much as it is of public knowledge that
the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva
Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took
judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690
hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00. It
also awarded Wycoco actual damages for unrealized profits plus legal
interest. The DAR and the LBP filed separate petitions before the Court
of Appeals. The petition brought by DAR on jurisdictional and procedural
issues was dismissed. This prompted Wycoco to file a petition for
mandamus before this Court praying that the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City be executed, and that Judge Caspillo be
compelled to inhibit himself from hearing the case. The petition brought
by LBP on both substantive and procedural grounds was likewise
dismissed by the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals
modified its decision by deducting from the compensation due to
Wycoco the amount corresponding to the 3.3672 hectare portion of the
94.1690 hectare land which was found to have been previously sold by
Wycoco to the Republic. LBP contended that the Court of Appeals erred
in its ruling.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case acting as
Special Agrarian Court.

2. Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, whether

compensation arrived at supported by evidence.

or

not

the

3. Whether or not Wycoco can compel DAR to purchase the entire land.
4. Whether or not the awards of interest and damages for unrealized
profits is valid.
HELD:
1. Yes, the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court, acquired jurisdiction of
the case. Sections 50 and 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) provides: Section 50.Quasi-judicial Powers
of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Section
57.Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act.
2. No, the compensation arrived is not supported by evidence. In
arriving at the valuation of Wycocos land, the trial court took judicial
notice of the alleged prevailing market value of agricultural lands
without apprising the parties of its intention to take judicial notice
thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence provides: Sec. 3.
Judicial Notice. When Hearing Necessary. During the trial, the court, on
its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to
take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon. After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court,
on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of
any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case. The trial court should have
allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically
assuming a valuation without basis. Only the market value was taken
into account in determining the just compensation. Since other factors
were not considered, thecase was remanded for determination of just
compensation.

3. No, the DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the entire property

voluntarily offered by Wycoco. The power to determine whether a parcel
of land may come within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program is essentially lodged with the DAR. That Wycoco will
suffer damages by the DARs non-acquisition of the approximately 10
hectare portion of the entire land which was found to be not suitable for
agriculture is no justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole area.
4. Yes, Wycocos claim for payment of interest is partly meritorious. The
trust account opened as the mode of payment of just compensation
should be converted to a deposit account. The conversion should be
retroactive in application in order to rectify the error committed by the
DAR in opening a trust account and to grant the landowners the benefits
concomitant to payment in cash or LBP bonds. Otherwise, petitioners
right to payment of just and valid compensation for the expropriation of
his property would be violated. The interest earnings accruing on the
deposit account of landowners would suffice to compensate them
pending payment of just compensation.
The award of actual damages for unrealized profits should be deleted
because Wycoco failed to show proof of loss. Wycocos petition for
mandamus in G.R. No. 146733 was dismissed. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, acting as Special Agrarian Court
cannot be enforced because there is a need to remand the case to the
trial court for determination of just compensation. Likewise, the prayer
for the inhibition of Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo was denied for lack of
basis.

Estate of the heirs of The late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes

Vs.
City of Manila
Brief:
Before us are the following consolidated petitions filed by petitioners
Heirs of Jose B.L. Reyes and Edmundo Reyes: a petition for review of the
decision] of the Court of Appeals dated January 27, 1998 which ordered
the condemnation of petitioners properties and reversed the order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9, dated October 3, 1995
dismissing the complaint of respondent City of Manila (City) for
expropriation, and a petition for certiorari alleging that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a resolution
dated August 19, 1998 which issued a temporary restraining order
against the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manila, Branch 10, not to
(disturb) the occupancy of Dr. Rosario Abiog, one of the members of
SBMI, until the Supreme Court has decided the Petition for Review on
Certiorari and a resolution dated December 16, 1998 enjoining
petitioners from disturbing the physical possession of all the properties
subject of the expropriation proceedings.

Facts:
The records show that Jose B. L. Reyes and petitioners Heirs of Edmundo
Reyes are the pro-indiviso co-owners in equal proportion of 11 parcels of
land with a total area of 13,940 square meters situated at Sta. Cruz
District, Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24359
issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila. These parcels of land are
being occupied and leased by different tenants, among whom are
respondents Abiog, Maglonso and members of respondent Sampaguita
Bisig ng Magkakapitbahay, Incorporated (SBMI). Petitioners leased to
respondent Abiog Lot 2-E, Block 3007 of the consolidated subdivision
plan (LRC) Psd- 328345, with an area of 191 square meters[7] and to
respondent Maglonso, Lot 2-R, Block 2996 of the same consolidation
plan, with an area of 112 square meters.[8]

On November 9, 1993 and May 26, 1994, respectively, Jose B.L. Reyes
and petitioners Heirs of Edmundo Reyes filed ejectment complaints
against respondents Rosario Abiog and Angelina Maglonso, among
others. Upon his death, Jose B.L. Reyes was substituted by his heirs.
Petitioners obtained favorable judgments against said respondents. In
Civil Case No. 142851-CV, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila,
Branch 10, rendered a decision dated May 9, 1994 against respondent
Abiog. In Civil Case No. 144205-CV, the MTC of Manila, Branch 3, issued
judgment dated May 4, 1995 against respondent Maglonso.

Respondents Abiog and Maglonso appealed the MTC decisions but the
same were deniedby the RTC of Manila, Branch 28, and the RTC of
Manila, Branch 38, respectively. Their appeals to the Court of Appeals
were likewise denied. As no appeals were further taken, the judgments
of eviction against respondents Abiog and Maglonso became final and
executory in 1998.

of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the petitioners from ousting

the occupants of the subject properties. The trial court denied the
motion for intervention in an order dated June 2, 1995 on the ground
that the movants interest (was) indirect, contingent, remote, conjectual
(sic), consequential (sic) and collateral. At the very least, it (was), if it
(existed) at all, purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a right that
may or may not be granted.
Issue of the Case:
Whether there is violation of due process against the Reyeses in the
manner there property were expropriated and condemned in favor of
the City of Manila.
Actions of the Court:

Trial Court

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the two ejectment cases against

respondents Abiog and Maglonso, respondent City filed on April 25, 1995
a complaint for eminent domain (expropriation) of the properties of
petitioners at the RTC of Manila, Branch 9. The properties sought to be
acquired by the City included parcels of land occupied by respondents
Abiog, Maglonso and members of respondent SBMI.

The Citys complaint for eminent domain was dismissed.The trial court
held that expropriation was inappropriate because herein petitioners
were in fact willing to sell the subject properties under terms acceptable
to the purchaser. Moreover, respondent City failed to show that its offer
was rejected by petitioners. Respondent Citys motion for reconsideration
was denied.

The complaint alleged that, on March 10, 1995, respondent City thru
City Legal Officer Angel Aguirre, Jr. sent the petitioners a written offer to
purchase the subject properties for P10,285,293.38 but the same was
rejected. Respondent City prayed that an order be issued fixing the
provisional value of the property in the amount of P9,684,380 based on
the current tax declaration of the real properties and that it be
authorized to enter and take possession thereof upon the deposit with
the trial court of the amount of P1,452,657 or 15% of the aforesaid
value.

CA

On May 15, 1995, respondent SBMI, a registered non-stock corporation

composed of the residents of the subject properties (including as well as
representing herein respondents Abiog and Maglonso), filed a motion for
intervention and admission of their attached complaint with prayer for
injunction. Respondent SBMI alleged that it had a legal interest over the
subject matter of the litigation as its members were the lawful
beneficiaries of the subject matter of the case. It prayed for the issuance

The Orders appealed from are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
remanded to the lower court to determine specifically the amount of just
compensation.
SC
The petitions are GRANTED. In G.R. No. 132431, the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated January 27, 1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In G.R. No. 137146, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
August 19, 1998 and December 16, 1998 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE
Court Rationale:
The Filstream case is substantially similar in facts and issues to the
present case. In Filstream V. CA, the court held that the Sections 9&10 of
the Republic Act 7279 are limitations to the exercise to the power of

eminent domain, especially with respect to the order of priority in

acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as
a means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in order of priority
for purposes of socialize housing . In the same vein, expropriation
proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is
mandatory because these are the only safeguards of often times
helpless owners of private property against violation of due process
when their property is forcible taken from them from public use. Herein,
the city failed to prove strict compliance with the requirements with the
requirements of Section 9&10 of RA 7279. The city neither alleged in its
complaint nor proved during the proceedings before the trial court that
it complied with said requirements. Even in the CA , the city in its
pleadings failed to show its compliance with the law. The CA was
likewise on this specific jurisdictional issue. This is a clear violation of the
right to due process of the Reyeses.

Eminent Domain, Just Compensation

Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
GR 106804,
12 August 2004
Ponente: Carpio, J
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review before the Supreme Court
BRIEF
This is a petition for review of the 30 March 1992 Decision and 14
August 1992 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CV No. 16930.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 17, Tabaco, Albay in Civil Case No. T552.

FACTS
Petitioner National Power Corporation ("NPC") is a public corporation
created to generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power
and to transmit electric power nationwide.NPC is authorized by law to
acquire property and exercise the right of eminent domain. Private
respondent Antonino Pobre ("Pobre") is the owner of a 68,969 squaremeter land ("Property") located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi,
Albay. The Property is covered by TCT No. 4067 and Subdivision Plan 119709.
NPC then became involved with Pobre's Property in three instances:
First was on 18 February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one year
eleven lots from the approved subdivision plan.
Second was sometime in 1977, the first time that NPC filed its
expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 square-meter
portion of the Property. On 23 October 1979, the trial court ordered the
expropriation of the lots upon NPC's payment of P25 per square meter or
a total amount of P207,790. NPC began drilling operations and
construction of steam wells. While this first expropriation case was
pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by
NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials altered the topography
of some portions of the Property. NPC did not act on Pobre's complaints
and NPC continued with its dumping.
Third was on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its second expropriation
case against Pobre to acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of the
Property. This is the subject of this petition. NPC needed the lot for the
construction and maintenance of Naglagbong Well Site F-20, pursuant to
Proclamation No. 7396 and Republic Act No. 5092. NPC immediately
deposited P5,546.36 with the Philippine National Bank. The deposit
represented 10% of the total market value of the lots covered by the
second expropriation. On 6 September 1979, NPC entered the 5,554
square-meter lot upon the trial court's issuance of a writ of possession to
NPC.
On 10 December 1984, Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second
complaint for expropriation. Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his
Property. Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected by
NPC's actions and for the payment of damages.
Issue: Whether NPC had taken the entire property of Pobre and must pay
just compensation for the whole property considered part of the
expropriation instituted by NPC.

ACTIONS of the COURT

RTC:
Yes. Issued its Decision in favor of Pobre. RTC issued its Order
denying NPC's motion for reconsideration.

In United States v. Causby, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that when
private property is rendered uninhabitable by an entity with the power
to exercise eminent domain, the taking is deemed complete. Such
taking is thus compensable.

The trial court found the following badges of NPC's bad faith: (1) NPC
allowed five years to pass before it moved for the dismissal of the
second expropriation case; (2) NPC did not act on Pobre's plea for NPC to
eliminate or at least reduce the damage to the Property; and (3) NPC
singled out Pobre's Property for piecemeal expropriation when NPC could
have expropriated other properties which were not affected in their
entirety by NPC's operation.

In this jurisdiction, the Court has ruled that if the government takes
property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use,
after many years the property owner may demand payment of just
compensation. This principle is in accord with the constitutional
mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.

The trial court found the just compensation to be P50 per square meter
or a total of P3,448,450 for Pobre's 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC
failed to contest this valuation. Since NPC was in bad faith and it
employed dilatory tactics to prolong this case, the trial court imposed
legal interest on the P3,448,450 from 6 September 1979 until full
payment. The trial court awarded Pobre attorney's fees of P150,000.

n this case, NPC appropriated Pobre's Property without resort to

expropriation proceedings. NPC dismissed its own complaint for the
second expropriation. At no point did NPC institute expropriation
proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion subject
of the second expropriation. The only issues that the trial court had to
settle were the amount of just compensation and damages that NPC had
to pay Pobre.

CA: Yes. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
However, the appellate court deleted the award of attorney's fees
because Pobre did not properly plead for it. The Court of Appeals denied
NPC's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated 14 August 1992.
SC: NPC must Pay Just Compensation for the Entire Property.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of
the expropriated land to the landowner. However, when possession of
the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither
convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to
the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation.
In this case, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that it is no
longer possible and practical to restore possession of the Property to
Pobre. The Property is no longer habitable as a resort-subdivision. The
Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has
completely lost the Property as if NPC had physically taken over the
entire 68,969 square-meter Property.

This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed

its complaint for expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a
simple case of recovery of damages, the provisions of the Rules of Court
on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no
longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was
dispensable.
We have held that the usual procedure in the determination of just
compensation is waived when the government itself initially violates
procedural requirements. NPC's taking of Pobre's property without filing
the appropriate expropriation proceedings and paying him just
compensation is a transgression of procedural due process.
From the beginning, NPC should have initiated expropriation proceedings
for Pobre's entire 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC did not. Instead,
NPC embarked on a piecemeal expropriation of the Property. Even as the
second expropriation case was still pending, NPC was well aware of the
damage that it had unleashed on the entire Property. NPC, however,
remained impervious to Pobre's repeated demands for NPC to abate the
damage that it had wrought on his Property.

Just compensation is the fair and full equivalent of the loss.

SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. The appealed
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 March 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No.
16930 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. National Power Corporation is
ordered to pay Antonino Pobre P3,448,450 as just compensation for the
68,969 square-meter Property at P50 per square meter. National Power
Corporation is directed to pay legal interest at 6% per annum on the
amount adjudged from 6 September 1979 until fully paid. Upon National
Power Corporation's payment of the full amount, Antonino Pobre is
ordered to execute a Deed of Conveyance of the Property in National
Power Corporation's favor. National Power Corporation is further ordered
to pay temperate and exemplary damages of P50,000 and P100,000,
respectively. No costs.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Petition for Review
BRIEF
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals which sustained the ruling of Regional Trial Court denying
contention of the petitioner Republic that it has retained the ownership
the contended lot despite its failure to pay respondents predecessors-ininterest the just compensation.
FACTS
On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
instituted a special civil action for expropriation with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Cebu involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar
Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military
reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name
of Gervasia Denzon under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921
with an area of 25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of
Eulalia Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of 13,164
square meters.
After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to
the Order of the CFI dated October 19, 1938, the Republic took
possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14, 1940, the CFI rendered
its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of
P4,062.10 as just compensation.

EMINENT DOMAIN
Republic of the Philippines v. Lim
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellant
vs.
VICENTE LIM, plaintiff-appellee
G.R. No. 161656
June 29, 2005
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez

In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the
National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it
denied knowledge of the matter. On September 6, 1961, Lt. Manuel
Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised
value of the lots within a reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961,
the Denzons successors-in-interest, Francisca Galeos- Valdehueza and
Josefina Galeos-Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of
possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property.
On November 9, 1961, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932
and 939 were issued in the names of Francisca Valdehueza and Josefina
Panerio, respectively. Annotated thereon was the phrase subject to the
priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of

land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market
value.
On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of
Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have
retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the
Republics failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the
expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their
land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favour of the
Republic.
They appealed the CFIs decision to the SC. The latter held that
Valdehueza and Panerio are still registered owners of Lots 932 and 939,
there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to
Vicente Lim, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim
despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976 and the Title
was issued in his name.
On August 20, 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of
title with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against the petitioner.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent declaring plaintiff Vicente
Lim the absolute and exclusive owner of Lot No. 932 with all the rights of
an absolute owner including the right to possession.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and sustained the
RTC Decision. CA assailed that This is contrary to the rules of fair play
because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the
land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
just for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade
or more, in this case more than 50 years, before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with the loss.
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC alleging that the Republic
has remained the owner of Lot 932.
ISSUE of the CASE

Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its
failure to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just
compensation
ACTION of the COURTS
RTC: Rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff-appellee
CA: The decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED
SC: The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED in toto. Petitioner is MR is
DENIED with FINALITY.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay is contrary
to the rules of fair play, as just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the
land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
just. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated
property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if
the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be
treated as a trespasser ab initio
Let this case, therefore, serve as a wake-up call to the Republic that in
the exercise of its power of eminent domain, necessarily in derogation of
private rights, it must comply with the Constitutional limitations. This
Court, as the guardian of the peoples right, will not stand still in the
face of the Republics oppressive and confiscatory taking of private
property, as in this case.
In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of
just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from
the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property.
This is in consonance with the principle that the government cannot
keep the property and dishonor the judgment.
To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government
to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and
equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes
property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the
payment of just compensation.

SUPREME COURT RULING

G.R. No. 155746

October 13, 2004

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

in toto.
The Republics motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY. No
further pleadings will be allowed.

DIOSDADO LAGCAO, DOROTEO LAGCAO and URSULA LAGCAO,

petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA, Branch 23, Regional Trial Court,
Cebu, and the CITY OF CEBU, respondent.

Nature of Case:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated July 1, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Cebu City upholding the validity of the
City of Cebus Ordinance No. 1843, as well as the lower courts order
dated August 26, 2002 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
FACTS
In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One
of these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City, with an
area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965, petitioners purchased Lot 1029 on
installment basis. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, including Lot
1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried
to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This
prompted the latter to sue the province for specific performance and
damages in the then Court of First Instance.
In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is
unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for
the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the
concept of "public use" contemplated in the Constitution. They allege
that it will benefit only a handful of people. The ordinance, according to
petitioners, was obviously passed for politicking, the squatters
undeniably being a big source of votes.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu of the
land owned by petitioners contravenes the Constitution and applicable
laws

The exercise by local government units of the Power of Eminent

Domain

ACTIONS of the COURT

RTC: Petition dismissed.
SC: Constrained to nullify the subject ordinance.

COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS

Under Section 48 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, local legislative power shall be exercised by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the city. The legislative acts of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod in the exercise of its lawmaking authority are
denominated ordinances.
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and
can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By
virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the
power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to
Section 19 of RA 7160:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose,
or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws xxx. (italics supplied).
Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners
lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for
the homeless and low-income residents of the City.
However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most serious
social problems of the country, local government units do not possess
unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking
solutions to this problem.
There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1)
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. Thus, the exercise by local government units
of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA
7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance
with certain well-established basic principles of a substantive nature.

These principles require that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6)
must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing substantive
requirements.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 1, 2002 decision
of Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

. Declared the expropriation is justified and in lawful exercise

of the right of //eminent domain.
2. Declaring a balance of P1,990 in favor of Apolonio Go Puco,
Jr. with legal interest from November 16, 1947 until fully
paid;

AIR TRANSPORATION OFFICE vs GOPUCO

(Power of Eminent Domain)
G.R. No. 158563, June 30, 2005
Second Division
Chico-Nazario,J

Nature of the Case: Instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer
for preliminary injunction on the decision of the defunct Court of First
Instance of Abra, Branch I

3. Ordering the landowners to deliver the TCTs and transfer the

ownership to the petitioner.

No appeal was taken so the decision of the CFI becomes final and
executory, hence, the title was transferred to the Republic of the
Philippines.

Upon opening of the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority

(MCIAA), the Lahug Airport was ordered closed by Pres. Cory.

Gopuco wrote to the Bureau of Air Transportation seeking the

return of his lot and offering to return the money previously
receive.

RA 6958 was enacted transferring the assets of the Lahug Airport

to MCIAA.

Respondent filed an amended complaint for recovery of

ownership of his lot against the Air Transportation Office
considering that the original purpose for which the property was
expropriated had ceased or otherwise been abandoned. He also
alleged that they were assured that the expropriated lots would
be resold to them for the same price in the event that the Lahug
Airport would be abandoned.

Brief:
Respondent issued Notice of Seizure' and the "Notice of Sale" to the
petitioner of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for nonpayment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31.

FACTS:

Respondent Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. was the owner of a lot located

in the vicinity of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City.

National Airport Corporation (NAC) informed the owners of the

various lots surrounding the Lahug Airport that the government
was acquiring their lands for purposes of expansion.

Some owners agreed to sell their lands with the assurance that
they would be able to repurchase the same when these would no
longer be used by the airport. Respondent refused to do so.

Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), formerly NAC filed a

complaint with CFI of Cebu for for the expropriation of Lot No. 72
and its neighboring realties. The complaint was granted by the
CFI who ordered the ff:

ISSUE: WON the private property expropriated for a particular public use
be returned to its former owner when that particular public use is
abandoned?
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
RTC: The complaint is DISMISSED and ordered the herein respondent to
pay the MCIAA exemplary damages, litigation expenses and costs.

Court of Appeals: REVERSED the decision. The petitioners were ordered

to reconvey Lot No. 72 to Gopuco upon payment of the reasonable price
and deleted the award to the petitioners of exemplary damages,
litigation expenses and costs.
Motion for Reconsideration was DENIED.
Supreme Court: The decision of the CA is REVERSED.
RATIONALE:
Eminent domain is generally described as the highest and most exact
idea of property remaining in the government that may be acquired for
some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced
purchase by the State. Also often referred to as expropriation, an
inherent power of sovereignty and need not be clothed with any
constitutional gear to exist;
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by
purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public
use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use,
without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion
to the former owner. In the present case, Gopuco failed to present any
evidence at all concerning a right of repurchase in his favour, neither he
is not a party to the compromise agreements, thus, he cannot legally
invoke the same.
Valid and Definite Offer - Eminent Domain
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., vs
MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, respondent.
G.R. No. 152230
August 9, 2005
Ponente: CALLEJO, SR.
NATURE OF CASE
Petition for Review of CA decision and resolution

BRIEF
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the CA and its Resolution,
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The assailed decision
affirmed the order of the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the
respondent Municipality (now City) of Pasig as having the right to
expropriate and take possession of the subject property.
FACTS
On April 1993, ordinance was approved by Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig
authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to
acquire a portion of the property of Ching Cuancos and appropriate its
fund.
Municipality filed a complaint against Ching Cuancos for expropriation of
the property under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 (Local
Government Code). Municipality alleged that it notified Ching Cuancos,
by letter, of its intention to purchase the portion of their property for
public use as an access road but they refused to sell the portion.
Ching Cuangcos claimed that they had sold the property to JILCSFI since
February 1993. It was purchased for the purpose of constructing a
school building and a church as worship center.
ISSUES of the CASE
(1) whether the respondent complied with the requirement, under
Section 19 of the Local Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to
acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint; (2) whether its
property which is already intended to be used for public purposes may
still be expropriated by the respondent; and (3) whether the requisites
for an easement for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the New
Civil Code may be dispensed with.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: declared Municipality (now City) of Pasig has the right to
expropriate and take possession of the subject property
CA: denied motion for reconsideration, affirmed RTC order
SC: granted Petition. The Decision and Resolution of the CA are
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint
of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling thereof.
COURT RATIONALE
Eminent Domain: Nature and Scope
It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the
primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance

the general welfare. Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to

every independent government without the necessity for constitutional
recognition. The provisions found in modern constitutions of civilized
countries relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by
implication grant the power to the government, but limit the power
which would, otherwise, be without limit. Thus, our own Constitution
provides that [p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. Furthermore, the due process and equal protection
clauses act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this
governmental power.
Strict Construction and Burden of Proof
The grant of the power of eminent domain to local government units is
grounded on Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 which reads:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power
of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit
of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws;
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made
to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That
the local government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%)
of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the
amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by
the proper court based on the fair market value at the time of the taking
of the property.
The following requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain by a local government unit must be complied with:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing
the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to
exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose
or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section
9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of
the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not
accepted.
Valid and Definite Offer
Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code provides:
ARTICLE 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale.
(a) The offer to buy private property for public use or purpose shall be in
writing. It shall specify the property sought to be acquired, the
reasons for its acquisition, and the price offered.
(b) If the owner or owners accept the offer in its entirety, a contract of
sale shall be executed and payment forthwith made.
(c) If the owner or owners are willing to sell their property but at a price
higher than that offered to them, the local chief executive shall call
them to a conference for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the
selling price. The chairman of the appropriation or finance committee
of the sanggunian, or in his absence, any member of the sanggunian
duly chosen as its representative, shall participate in the conference.
When an agreement is reached by the parties, a contract of sale shall
be drawn and executed.
(d) The contract of sale shall be supported by the following documents:
(1) Resolution of the sanggunian authorizing the local chief executive
to enter into a contract of sale. The resolution shall specify the
terms and conditions to be embodied in the contract;
(2) Ordinance appropriating the amount specified in the contract;
and
(3) Certification of the local treasurer as to availability of funds
together with a statement that such fund shall not be disbursed or
spent for any purpose other than to pay for the purchase of the
property involved.
It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to
obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove compliance
with the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the
complaint. The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer
to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary
acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the
expense and delay of a court action.
In the present case, the only evidence adduced by the respondent to
prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is
the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr.

Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. It is

merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price that may be
mutually acceptable to both parties and not a valid and definite
offer.

probative weight. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of
the ocular inspection must be rejected.

Public Necessity
The contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be
expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the
construction of a place for religious worship and a school for its
members is rejected. It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila
Railroad Co., that:
A historical research discloses the meaning of the term public use to
be one of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the
individual increases and each demand is a new use to which the
resources of the individual may be devoted for whatever is beneficially
employed for the community is a public use.

The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a

road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential
requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil
Code. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the
grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location
and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious
and wantonly injurious. Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the
public good and there is genuine necessity of public character.
Government may not capriciously choose what private property should
be taken.
However, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing
in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If,
at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the subject
property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified thereof. The
petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process. An ocular
inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the
parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. Consequently,
any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no

SUPREME COURT RULING

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without
prejudice to the refiling thereof.

their rights to any form of compensation. If there is indeed any right to

remuneration due to these two entities arising from NAIA 3, they have
not yet been established by the courts of the land.

Republic v. Gingoyon GR 166429, 19 December 2005

Facts:
This case is a motion for reconsideration for a previous decision of the
SC. In the assailed decision of the SC, it ruled that PIATCO should be
justly compensated before the Government can take over the NAIA
Terminal 3. Now, the Government is arguing that PIATCO should not be
paid
because
it
has
pending
obligations
with
Takenaka Corporation (Takenaka)
and Asahikosan (Asahikosan)
Corporation for services rendered by the said corporations in building
the Terminal. It argues that the said corporations still has pending liens
on the Terminal. The situation the Republic now faces is that if any part
of its Php3,002,125,000 deposit is released directly to PIATCO, and
PIATCO, as in the past, does not wish to settle its obligations directly
to Takenaka, Asahikosan and Fraport, the Republic may end up having
expropriated a terminal with liens and claims far in excess of its actual
value, the liens remain unextinguished, and PIATCO on the other hand,
ends up with the Php3,0002,125,000 in its pockets gratuitously.
Issue:
Should the Government pay PIATCO just compensation before taking
over the Terminal?
Held:
Yes.
The Court is wont to reverse its previous rulings based on factual
premises that are not yet conclusive or judicially established. Certainly,
whatever claims or purported liens Takenaka and Asahikosan against
PIATCO or over the NAIA 3 have not been judicially established.
Neither Takenaka norAsahikosan are parties to the present action, and
thus have not presented any claim which could be acted upon by this
Court. The earlier adjudications in Aganv. PIATCO made no mention of
either Takenaka or Asahikosan, and certainly made no declaration as to

It must be emphasized that the conclusive ruling in the Resolution

dated 21 January 2004 in Agan v. PIATCO (Agan 2004) is that PIATCO, as
builder of the facilities, must first be justly compensated in accordance
with law and equity for the Government to take over the facilities. It is
on that premise that the Court adjudicated this case in its 19 December
2005 Decision.
While the Government refers to a judgment rendered by a London court
in favor of Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO in the amount of
US$82 Million, it should be noted that this foreign judgment is not yet
binding on Philippine courts. It is entrenched in Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure that a foreign judgment on the mere
strength of its promulgation is not yet conclusive, as it can be annulled
on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. It is likewise recognized
in Philippine jurisprudence and international law that a foreign judgment
may be barred from recognition if it runs counter to public policy.
Assuming that PIATCO indeed has corresponding obligations to other
parties relating to NAIA 3, the Court does not see how such obligations,
yet unproven, could serve to overturn the Decision mandating that the
Government first pay PIATCO the amount of 3.02 Billion Pesos before it
may acquire physical possession over the facilities. This directive
enjoining payment is in accordance with Republic Act No. 8974, and
under the mechanism established by the law the amount to be initially
paid is that which is provisionally determined as just compensation. The
provisional character of this payment means that it is not yet final, yet
sufficient under the law to entitle the Government to the writ of
possession over the expropriated property.
There are other judicial avenues outside of this Motion for
Reconsideration wherein all other claims relating to the airport facilities
may be ventilated, proved and determined. Since such claims involve
factual issues, they must first be established by the appropriate trier of
facts before they can be accorded any respect by or binding force on
this Court.

Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate

private property to the public use, whenever the public exigency
requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a
reasonably compensation therefor. It is the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is
inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government.
This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It
delegates the power thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and public
utility corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations. LGUs have
no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when
expressly authorized by statute.
Masikip v. City of Pasig G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006
- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must
be expressly provided for by statute

Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant
to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use,
purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws.

FACTS:

Provided:

Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land,

which the City of Pasig sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the
sports development and recreational activities of the residents of
Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused.

(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was
not accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing
of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least 15% fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration; and
(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by
the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property

On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said

portion of land for the alleged purpose that it was in line with the
program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to
deserving poor sectors of our community.
Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint
for expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed
by the rial court on the ground that there was genuine necessity to
expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the Court of Appeals,
which dismissed petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property
HELD:

There is already an established sports development and recreational

activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no
genuine necessity to justify the expropriation. The records show that
the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which
became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the
expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres
Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization,
not the residents of Caniogan.

Whether the excavated soil should be included in computation of just

compensation
Ruling:
Petition denied.
There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from
that of the expropriated properties, contrary to what the RTC did. In the
context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate
from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation ordinarily refers to
the value of the land to compensate for what the owner of the land
actually loses. Such value could only be that which prevailed at the time
of the taking.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (NIA) vs. RURAL BANK OF

KABACAN
GR NO. 185125, 15 JANUARY 2012
Facts:
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) filed with the RTC of Kabacan
a complaint for
Expropriation of a portion of 3 parcels of land covering a total of
14,497.91 sqm. For its Malitubog-Marigado irrigation project. The
committee formed by the RTC pegged the fair market value of the land
at Php 65.00 per sqm. It also added to its computation the value of the
soil excavated from portions of the 2 lots. RTC adopted the findings of
the committee despite the objections of NIA to the inclusion of the value
of the excavated soil in the computation of the value of the land. NIA,
through Office of the SolGen, appealed to the CA which affirmed with
modifications the RTCs decision. CA deleted the value of the soil in
determination of compensation but affirmed RTCs valuation of the
improvements made on the properties.
Issue:

In NAPOCOR vs. Ibrahim, the SC held that rights over lands are
indivisible. The conclusion is drawn for Article 437 of the Civil Code
which provides: The owner of the land is the owner of its surface and of
everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make
any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without
detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He
cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
Thus, ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil
under it.
Hence, CA correctly modified the RTCs decision when it ruled it is
preposterous that NIA will be made to pay not only for the value of land
but also for the soil excavated from such land when such excavation is
necessary phase in the building of the irrigation projects. The NIA will
make use of the excavated soil is of no moment and is of no concern to
the owner of the landowner who has been paid the fair market of his
land. As pointed out by the OSG, the law does not limit the use of the
expropriated land to the surface area only. To sanction the payment of
the excavated soil is to allow the landowners to recover more than the
value of the land at the time of the taking, which is the true measure of
the damages, or just compensation, and would discourage the
construction of important public improvements.

FACTS
Under Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, the NPC is authorized to
enter private property provided that the owners thereof shall be
indemnified for any actual damage caused thereby.
For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose Transmission Line and
Tower, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented
by her son, Vicente, for an easement of right of way over her property,
Lot No. 2076. The property, which was partly agricultural and partly
residential land, was located in Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan
and covered by Tax Declaration.
The payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued at
P6,000,000.00 (at P600.00 per square meter) was then processed.
However, the NPC Board of Directors approved Board Resolution No. 972468 stating that it would pay only P230.00 per sq m for the residential
portion and P89.00 per sq m for the agricultural portion

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner

vs.
MARIA MENDOZA SAN PEDRO, represented by VICENTE,
HERMINIA and FRANCISCO, all surnamed SAN PEDRO,
respondents
G.R. No. 170945
September 26, 2006
Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J
NATURE OF CASE
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF
Before the Court is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 72860, and
its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

On January 15, 1998, the NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). During the pre-trial on January 25, 1999,
the parties agreed that the only issue for resolution was the just
compensation for the property. The court appointed a committee of
commissioners to ascertain and recommend to the trial court the just
compensation for the properties, composed of Atty. Josephine L.
Sineneng-Baltazar, the Clerk of Court, as chairperson; and Engr. Oscar C.
Cruz, Provincial Assessor of Bulacan, and Atty. Henry P. Alog of the
Litigation Department of NPC to serve as members-commissioners
thereof
ISSUE (Police Power-related)
Whether ruling of RTC and CA based on the majority report [on the
subject property's just compensation] is exorbitant and devoid of factual
and legal basis
Whether petitioner shall pay only an easement fee to respondent's heirs
ACTIONS of the Court
RTC:
Rendered judgment declaring as well-grounded, fair and reasonable the
compensation for the property as recommended by Atty. Baltazar and
Engr. Cruz [Lot 2076 (agricultural) @ P499/sqm; residential portion of
property @ P800/sqm].

CA: Dismissed the appeal of NPC and ruled that the July 12, 1999
majority report [recommended by Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz] was
based on uncontroverted facts, supported by documentary evidence and
confirmed by the commissioners' ocular inspection of the subject
properties
SC: Appeal is denied and ruling of CA is affirmed.
COURT RATIONALE
In the Majority Report [recommended by Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz],
the commissioners found that the property was located in a highlydeveloped area and was accessible through an all-weather road. The
lone fact that there was no available sales data on properties within the
vicinity of respondent's land for 1996 and 1997 and that the BIR zonal
value was P60.00 per sq m for residential and P30.00 per sq m for
agricultural did not proscribe the commissioners and the trial court from
making their own reasonable estimates of just compensation, after
considering all the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities.
Conformably with the rulings of this Court, the majority report took into
account the most profitable likely use of the remaining area; and the
size, shape, accessibility, as well as listings of other properties within the
vicinity.
The easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of
the Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC
against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use and makes the instant case fall within
the ambit of expropriation.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72860 is
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 155605. September 27, 2006
LECA REALTY CORPORATION VS. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain for the taking of some
portions of their properties. Attached to the complaint is was Resolution

No. 94-1 of the City Appraisal Committee of Mandaluyong, which was

created to appraise the properties that would be affected by the
construction of the project in question. Commissioners submitted their
report dated January 8, 1998, and recommended the fair market value
of properties of Leca Realty Corporation and Leeleng Realty Inc.:
P50,000 per sq.m., the Commissioners took into consideration the
following factors: property location, identification[,] neighborhood data,
community facilities and utilities, highest and best use, valuation and
reasonable indication of land values within the vicinity.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Republic is bound and put in estoppel by the gross
negligence/mistake of its agent/former counsel.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals incurred an error of law in affirming the
amount fixed by the trial court based on the report of the board of
commissioners.
HELD:
There was no reason why the Republic could not have moved to
reconsider the assailed CA Decision or appealed it within the
reglementary period. These procedural devices (reconsideration and
appeal) were not only available; they would have also constituted plain,
speedy and adequate remedies for questioning the alleged errors in the
CA Decision. Petitions must be filed within 60 days. In the present case,
the Petition was filed after over a year. The rule on non-estoppel of the
government is not designed to perpetrate an injustice. The request was
predicated on the conclusion that the "compensation costs as
recommended by the commissioners and fixed by the court in the
above-mentioned Decision are reasonable and acceptable"; and that the
"move will hasten the legal process, thereby shorten the time of the
proceedings and stop the running of interest. The more critical issue is
the determination of the amount of just compensation for the
expropriated property of Leca in GR 155605. The Republic avers that the
values arrived at in the Commissioners' Report were not supported by
sufficient evidence. Leca, alleges that the fair market value ascribed to
its property was not sufficient. As both the Republic and Leca correctly
pointed out, however, the Commissioners' Report relied heavily on
newspaper advertisements of offers of sale of properties in the vicinity. It
must be noted, though, that the interest of Petitioner Leca is distinct and
separate from and will in no way affect the settled rights and interests of
the other parties that did not appeal the judgment of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition of Leca Realty Corporation is REMANDED to

the trial court for the proper determination of the amount of just
compensation

Eminent
Domain:
Compensation

Concept

of

Determination

of

Just

REPUBLIC (DPWH), petitioner vs.

ISMAEL ANDAYA, respondent
GR No. 160656
June 15, 2007
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.
BRIEF:
This is an appeal for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Butuan City, Branch 33 for the enforcement of easement of right of way.
FACTS:
The Republic or State is enforcing its power by issuing a writ of
possession on the property of Ismael Andaya for the easement of right
of way (60 meter limit). The easement is for planned construction of
concrete levees and floodwalls for Phase 1, Stage 1 of the Lower Agusan
Development Project.
Both parties, appealed the expropriation proceedings to CA. The
petitioner contested the awards of severance damages and attorneys
fees while Andaya is demanding for just compensation for his entire
property because the taking of easement would rendered the remaining
property as unusable and uninhabitable.
ISSUE:
Whether Andaya is entitled to just compensation for the remaining area
of his property not subject to easement of right of way.

COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:

YES, Andaya is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be

neither more or less than the monetary equivalent of the land.

Taking, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not

only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the owner
of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical
destruction or material impairment of the value of his property.
Using this standard of taking, there is no doubt that there was also
taking of the remaining area of Andayas property. The Board observed
and the court affirmed that the nature and effect of the floodwalls would
deprive Andaya of the normal use of the remaining areas. It would
prevent ingress and egress to the property and turn into a catch basin
for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River.
The Constitution states, that no person shall be deprived of his private
property without due process of law; and in expropriation case, an
essential element of due process is that there must be just
compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Section
9, Article III of the Constitution mandates, that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation.
Although the State needs only 10 meter easement equivalent to 701
square meters, it is also settled that the State should not be liable for
the 3,742 sqm. , which constitute the difference between tis area of 701
sqm and the 4,443 sqm to which it is fully entitled to use as easement,
free of charge under Section 112 of the Public Land Act.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals modifying the decision
of the RTC of Butuan City is AFFIRMED with modification. The case is
REMANDED to the RTC for the determination of the final just
compensation of 5,937 sq. meters with interest of 6% per annum from
the date of writ of possession or actual taking until fully paid.

G.R. No. 161219

October 6, 2008

MARINDUQUE MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 seeks the reversal of the 27 February 2003
Decision2 and 17 November 2003 Resolution 3of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 72402. In its 27 February 2003 Decision, the Court of
Appeals set aside the 15 May 20024 and 24 June 20025 Orders of Judge
Mamindiara P. Mangotara, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Lanao del Norte, Branch 1, Iligan City (trial court), and ordered the trial
court to give due course to respondent National Power Corporation's
(NAPOCOR) appeal. In its 17 November 2003 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation and Industrial Enterprises, Inc.
(petitioners).
The Facts
On 1 June 1999, NAPOCOR filed a complaint6 for expropriation against
petitioners for the construction of the AGUS VI Kauswagan 69 KV
Transmission Line Project. NAPOCOR sought to expropriate 7,875 square
meters of petitioners' property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. T-955 and T-956.7
Petitioners filed their answer8 with counterclaim and alleged that the
expropriation should cover not only 7,875 square meters but the entire

parcel of land. Petitioners claimed that the expropriation would render

the remaining portion of their property valueless and unfit for whatever
purpose.
In its 5 December 2001 Decision, 9 the trial court fixed the fair market
value of the 7,875-square meter lot at P115 per square meter.10 The trial
court also directed the commissioners to submit a report and determine
the fair market value of the "dangling area," consisting of 58,484 square
meters, affected by the installation of NAPOCOR's transmission lines.
NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order dated 4
February 2002,11 the trial court denied NAPOCOR's motion.
In its 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision, 12 the trial court declared
that the "dangling area" consisted of 48,848.87 square meters and fixed
its fair market value at P65 per square meter. The trial court ruled that
petitioners are entitled to consequential damages because NAPOCOR's
expropriation impaired the value of the "dangling area" and deprived
petitioners of the ordinary use of their property.
NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order dated 24 June
2002,13 the trial court denied the motion for being moot and academic
because on 2 April 2002, NAPOCOR filed a Notice of Appeal 14 of the 19
March 2002 Supplemental Decision.
On the other hand, petitioners moved for the execution of the trial
court's 5 December 2001 Decision and 19 March 2002 Supplemental
Decision. In its 26 April 2002 Order, the trial court partially granted
petitioners' motion and, on 2 May 2002, issued the writ of execution for
the 5 December 2001 Decision.
On 29 April 2002, petitioners filed a "motion to strike out or declare as
not filed the notice of appeal dated April 2, 2002; to declare the
supplemental decision as final and executory; and to issue the
corresponding writ of execution thereon." Petitioners argued that
NAPOCOR violated Section 11, Rule 13 15 of the Rules of Court because
NAPOCOR filed and served the notice of appeal by registered mail.
According to petitioners, NAPOCOR had all the vehicles and manpower
to personally serve and file the notice of appeal.

NAPOCOR opposed petitioners' motion and alleged that its legal office is
"severely undermanned" with only one vehicle and one employee,
acting as secretary, handling 300 active cases in Mindanao. NAPOCOR
also added that it was highly irregular for petitioners to question its
mode of service and filing only at this stage of the proceedings because
since the inception of the case, NAPOCOR had resorted to registered
mail instead of personal service.
In its 15 May 2002 Order, the trial court granted petitioners' motion and
denied NAPOCOR's notice of appeal. The trial court gave more credence
to petitioners' allegations and declared that NAPOCOR's explanation was
a "patent violation" of the Rules. The trial court considered the notice of
appeal as not filed at all and, since the period of appeal had already
expired, declared its 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision final and
executory.
NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration. 16 In its 24 June 2002 Order,
the trial court denied NAPOCOR's motion.
On 23 August 2002, NAPOCOR filed a special civil action for certiorari
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Court of
Appeals. NAPOCOR argued that the trial court acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction and gravely abused its discretion when it denied
NAPOCOR's notice of appeal of the 19 March 2002 Supplemental
Decision on the sole ground that it was not filed and served personally.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 27 February 2003 Decision, the Court of Appeals ruled in
NAPOCOR's favor and set aside the trial court's 15 May 2002 and 24
June 2002 Orders. The Court of Appeals also ordered the trial court to
give due course to NAPOCOR's appeal. The Court of Appeals declared
that the trial court acted whimsically and capriciously when it denied the
notice of appeal and declared the 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision
final and executory. The Court of Appeals noted that service by
registered mail was previously resorted to by both parties and yet, this
was the first time petitioners questioned NAPOCOR's mode of service.
The Court of Appeals added that the trial court should have given due
course to NAPOCOR's appeal because of the large amount of public
funds involved considering the significant disparity between the area
sought to be expropriated and the "dangling area." The Court of Appeals

also said that the Rules should be liberally construed to effect

substantial justice.

the case, NAPOCOR had resorted to registered mail and yet, petitioners
only raised this issue when the notice of appeal was filed.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 17 November 2003

Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion.

Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules, personal service of pleadings

and other papers is the general rule while resort to the other modes of
service and filing is the exception. When recourse is made to the other
modes, a written explanation why service or filing was not done
personally becomes indispensable.18 If no explanation is offered to justify
resorting to the other modes, the discretionary power of the court to
expunge the pleading comes into play.19

Hence, this petition.

The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort,20 we ruled:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial

court's issuance of the 15 May 2002 and 24 June 2002 Orders
was attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the 19 March
2002 Supplemental Decision is not final and executory.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On
NAPOCOR's
failure
to
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court

comply

with

Section

11,

Petitioners maintain that the trial court had the "wide latitude of
discretion" to consider the notice of appeal as not filed at all because
NAPOCOR failed to comply with the Rules.
On the other hand, NAPOCOR argues that the Rules allow resort to other
modes of service and filing as long as the pleading was accompanied by
a written explanation why service or filing was not done personally.
NAPOCOR maintains that it complied with the Rules because the notice
of appeal contained an explanation why NAPOCOR resorted to service
and filing by registered mail - due to lack of manpower to effect personal
service.17 NAPOCOR also insists that petitioners are estopped from
questioning its mode of service and filing because since the inception of

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11,

Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and
filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and
filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or
filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place
and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when
personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other
modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not
practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an
explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the
subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and
theprima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for
violation of Section 11.21
In this case, NAPOCOR complied with the Rules. NAPOCOR's notice of
appeal sufficiently explained why the notice of appeal was served and
filed by registered mail - due to lack of manpower to effect personal
service. This explanation is acceptable for it satisfactorily shows why
personal service was not practicable.22 Moreover, the Court of Appeals
correctly considered the importance of the issue involved in the case.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the 15 May
2002 and 24 June 2002 Orders.
On NAPOCOR's failure to file a record on appeal

Petitioners maintain that NAPOCOR's appeal should be dismissed

because NAPOCOR failed to file a record on appeal and consequently, it
failed to comply with the material data rule.23
NAPOCOR argues that in this case the filing of a record on appeal is
"superfluous" because the trial court had nothing else to resolve as the
19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision finally disposed of the case.
Moreover, NAPOCOR states that petitioners only raised this issue in
petitioners' comment before the Court of Appeals.
No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and
other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or the Rules
of Court so require.24 The reason for multiple appeals in the same case is
to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate
and distinct issue is resolved by the trial court and held to be final. 25 In
such a case, the filing of a record on appeal becomes indispensable
since only a particular incident of the case is brought to the appellate
court for resolution with the rest of the proceedings remaining within the
jurisdiction of the trial court.
Jurisprudence recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a
complaint for expropriation because there are two stages in every action
for expropriation.26 The first stage is concerned with the determination
of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in
the suit.27 The order of expropriation may be appealed by any
party by filing a record on appeal. 28 The second stage is concerned
with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the
property sought to be expropriated.29 A second and separate appeal
may be taken from this order fixing the just compensation.30
In this case, since the trial court fully and finally resolved all conceivable
issues in the complaint for expropriation, there was no need for
NAPOCOR to file a record on appeal. In its 5 December 2001 Decision,
the trial court already determined NAPOCOR's authority to exercise the
power of eminent domain and fixed the just compensation for the
property sought to be expropriated. NAPOCOR filed a motion for
reconsideration. But after the trial court denied the motion, NAPOCOR
did not appeal the decision anymore. Then, in its 19 March 2002
Supplemental Decision, the trial court fixed the just compensation for
the "dangling area." NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration and the

trial court denied the motion. NAPOCOR then filed a notice of appeal. At
this stage, the trial court had no more issues to resolve and there was
no reason why the original records of the case must remain with the trial
court. Therefore, there was no need for NAPOCOR to file a record on
appeal because the original records could already be sent to the
appellate court.
Moreover, petitioners did not raise this issue in their "motion to strike
out or declare as not filed the notice of appeal dated April 2, 2002; to
declare the supplemental decision as final and executory; and to issue
the corresponding writ of execution thereon" before the trial court. It is
settled that an issue not raised during the trial could not be raised for
the first

time on appeal as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair

play, justice, and due process.31
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 27 February 2003
Decision and 17 November 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 72402.
SO ORDERED.

Judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the

defendants Leticia and Ervin Abad et. als. Ordering the latter
and
all
persons
claiming
rights
under
them
to VACATE andSURRENDER possession of the premises.

Reversed the
complaint.

RTC
Expropriation - Unlawful Detainer
GR. No. 189239
| November 24, 2010
Spouses Abad, petitioner vs.
Fil-Homes Realty, respondents
Nature of Case:
Petition for review on the decision of the Court of Appeals for
revoking and setting aside the RTCs decision and reinstating
with modification the MeTCs decision.
Dispositive: The Supreme Court dismissed denied the petition for
review.
Facts

Fil-Homes filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against

petitioners. Respondent alleged that since 1980, they have
made demands for petitioners to vacate, but they went
unheeded. Petitioners countered that there is no possession by
tolerance for they have been in adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than 30 years;
and that respondents predecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas
Development Corporation, had no title to the lots. During the
pendency of the case, the city of Paranaque filed a case of
expropriation. A writ of possession was granted to the city.
The respondent won in the unlawful detainer case, but the RTC
reversed the ruling upon appeal reasoning that there was no
"tolerance" on the part of Respondents. On appeal of the
Respondents to the CA, it upheld the decision of the MeTC.
Thus, the current petition.

ISSUE/S of the CASE:

(a) Whether the petitioner can claim any rights over the lots on
the basis of the issuance of a writ of possession in the
expropriation proceedings by the City.
ACTIONS of the COURT
MeTC

MeTC

decision

and dismissed respondents

SUPREME COURT RULING

Petition is devoid of merit.
As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary
nature, are not suspended or their resolution held in abeyance despite
the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership. In the present case,
the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation
proceedings did not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City.
Such issuance was only the first stage in expropriation.
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of
the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety
of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with
an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned
with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that
expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is not
complete until payment of just compensation. Accordingly, the issuance
of the writ of possession in this case does not write finis to the
expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is
necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the final just
compensation.
There is even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in
favor of respondents prior to the City's possession of the lots respecting
petitioners claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots,
the city ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings
does not state so.

Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the lots on the basis
of the ordinance. Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it
is non sequitur for petitioners to claim that they are automatically
entitled to be beneficiaries thereof. For certain requirements must be
met and complied with before they can be considered to be
beneficiaries.

Doctrine:
Power of Eminent Domain
G.R. No. 156684

April 6, 2011

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF
MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents
Brief:
The petitioners appeal the adverse decision promulgated on October 18,
2002 and resolution promulgated on January 17, 2003, whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the order issued in their
favor on February 19, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, in
Mandaluyong City (RTC). Thereby, the CA upheld Resolution No. 552,
Series of 1997, adopted by the City of Mandaluyong (City) authorizing its
then City Mayor to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation
of the parcel of land registered in the names of the petitioners.
Facts:

The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square

meters situated between Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street
in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as
their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families.
Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source of income.
On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City
adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor
Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the
expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing
it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city
inhabitants.
The petitioners became alarmed and filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its
being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and
effect. The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere
authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate the legal steps towards
expropriation, which included making a definite offer to purchase the
property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was
premature.
Issue:
Held:
Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) required the City to
pass an ordinance, not adopt a resolution, for the purpose of initiating
an expropriation proceeding. In this regard, Section 19 of The Local
Government Code clearly provides, viz:
Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power
of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit
of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to
the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the
local government unit may immediately take possession of the property
upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a

deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair
market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be
paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property.
A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment
of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of
initiating an expropriation proceeding. Indeed, in Municipality of
Paraaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, a case in which the Municipality of
Paraaque based its complaint for expropriation on a resolution, not an
ordinance, the Court ruled so:
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other
public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the
power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress
and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed "through the
law conferring the power or in other legislations." In this case, Section
19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain,
also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows:
"Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power
of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit
of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to
the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the
local government unit may immediately take possession of the property
upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair
market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be
paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can
exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to
exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9 Article III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer
was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power
of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council.
Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be
authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs.
Court of Appeals to show that a resolution may suffice to support the
exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. This case, however, is not in
point because the applicable law at that time was BP 337, the previous
Local Government Code, which had provided that a mere resolution
would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160,
the present Local Government Code which was already in force when the
Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for
this purpose.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms
"resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is
different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on
a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two
are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance,
but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members.

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through

a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the
previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear
divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA
7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to
an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is determined principally from
the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation
would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." In
the instant case, there is no reason to depart from this rule, since the
law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a
derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people. Accordingly,
the manifest change in the legislative language from "resolution"
under BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 demands a strict
construction. "No species of property is held by individuals with greater
tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously,
than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature
interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the
law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation."
Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the
immediate possession of the land under expropriation proceedings may
be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure the
prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the
owner. 20 This bar against prohibition comes from the nature of the
power of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land
intended for public use,21 and the interest of the affected landowner is
thus made subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State
decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of judicial
review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine
the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected
landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just
compensation for the taking of their property or when there has been no
agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of
prohibition become available.

Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering
that only a resolution expressing the desire of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners property was issued. As of
then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial
challenge, for the power of eminent domain could be exercised by the
City only through the filing of a verified complaint in the proper
court. Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified
complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until then,
the petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their
property under the power of eminent domain.
Stages in Action for Expropriation
Proper Remedy (Certiorari vs Ordinary Appeal)
REPUBLIC vs. LEGASPI
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES),
petitioner,
vs.
RODOLFO L. LEGASPI, SR., QUEROBIN L. LEGASPI, OFELIA LEGASPIMUELA, PURISIMA LEGASPI VDA. DE MONDEJAR, VICENTE LEGASPI,
RODOLGO LEGASPI II, and SPOUSES ROSALINA LIBO-ON and
DOMINADOR LIBO-ON, respondents
G.R. No. 177611
April 18, 2012
Ponente: PEREZ, J.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review Under Rule 45
BRIEF:
This is an appeal assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals denying for lack of merit the Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed
by the petitioner, thru the University of the Philippines Visayas (UPV), for
the nullification of the orders issued by the RTC.
FACTS:
In December 1978, Rosalina Libo-on sold her property to the UPV which
the latter immediately took possession in line with its educational
development plan and stated building therein road networks,
infrastructure, and school facilities. However, Rosalina informed UPV
that she is rescinding the sale of the property because she is no longer

the owner of said property having conveyed the same thru barter to the
other respondents herein on September 1978. Said property was already
subdivided and separately registered under the name of Legaspi, et al.
UPV thereafter filed a complaint for eminent domain against Legaspi et
al. after efforts to negotiate with respondents failed. The RTC issued an
order of condemnation on 3 out of the 10 parcels of land in upholding
the right to expropriate of UPV. An order fixing the just compensation
was subsequently issued by the RTC on the 3 expropriated properties.
The condemnation proceedings continued for the other 7 parcels of land.
On November 2003, the RTC issued a condemnation order the last 7
properties EXCLUDING the area occupied by Villa Marina Beach (VMB).
UPV filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the exclusion
of VMB area from the condemned lots if bereft of legal basis and
contrary to the evidence presented in the case. Om the other hand, the
respondents also filed their MR alleging that the 7 lots ordered for
expropriation are occupied by VMB. The RTC then issued the order
denying the MR of petitioner herein and granted the manifestation of the
respondents thereby denying expropriation of the 7 properties.
UPV filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 before
the CA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. However, the CA
dismissed the petition on the ground that under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedures, the proper remedy from the assailed orders was an ordinary
appeal which, once lost, cannot be substituted by a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari and mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether an ordinary appeal, under Rule 67, can be substituted by a Rule
65 petition and mandamus.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
RTC: Dismissed the complaint for eminent domain based on MR filed by
respondents.
CA: Denied petition under Rule 65.
SC: Decision of CA was REVERSED, Order of RTC NULLIFIED and
remanded case to RTC for proper resolution.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
Governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings for
expropriation consist of two stages: (1) condemnation of the property

after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or

public use; and (2) determination of just compensation.
In the case at bench, the RTC split the determination of UPVs right of
expropriation over the ten lots. Without any appeal having been
perfected on the 3 lots subjected for expropriation, the RTC order
attained finality and left no more question as to the propriety of the
acquisition of said lots for public purpose. Accordingly, the RTC correctly
went on to issue the order fixing the just compensation.
Although certiorari cannot be generally used as a substitute for a lapsed
appeal, the rule had been relaxed on a number of occasions, where its
rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.
The High Court has allowed the issuance of a writ of certiorari despite
the availability of appeal where the latter remedy is not adequate or
equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient or there is need to promptly
relieve the aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an
inferior court or tribunal. Indeed, certiorari and appeal are not mutually
exclusive remedies in certain exceptional cases, such as when there is
grave abuse of discretion or when public welfare so requires.
Petitioner has more than amply demonstrated that the RTCs issuance of
the assailed orders was attended with grave abuse of discretion. In the
context of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, grave abuse of discretion is
meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To Supreme Courts mind, the grave
abuse of discretion imputable against the RTC was manifested as early
in the assailed 17 November 2003 order, without giving any rationale
therefor, and while it upheld the petitioners right of expropriation over
the remaining 7 lots, it excluded the area occupied by VMB Resort
owned and operated by respondent Rodolfo Legaspi Sr. No less than the
Constitution mandates that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based. The RTC likewise gravely abused its discretion when,
in total disregard of the evidence on record, it issued the second
assailed order which reconsidered its first assailed order and altogether
denied petitioners right of expropriation over the remaining 7 lots.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, premised considered, the CAs Decision dated 26 April
2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered
NULLIFYING the assailed orders dated 17 November 2003 and 31 May
2004 and directing the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 38, to

resolve the case in compliance with Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution and in accordance with the evidence on record.

Just Compensation
NPC vs. YCLA Sugar Dev't Corp
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner
vs.
YCLA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent
GR No. 193936
December 11, 2013
Ponente: Reyes, J.

Nature of the Case:

Petition for review on certiorari1under Rule 45
Brief:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
seeking to annul and set aside the the CA decision affirming the RTC's
decision in fixing the amount of just compensation at P1,000.00 per sq
m of the respondent's properties subject for expropriation.
Facts:
NPC is a government owned and controlled corporation created for the
purpose of undertaking the development of hydroelectric power

throughout the Philippines. It is thus authorized to exercise the power of

eminent domain to carry out the said purpose. Respondent YCLA Sugar
Devt Corp is the registered owner of three parcels of land situated in
Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. In order to complete its 69 KV CalapanMamburao Island Grid Project in Puerto Galera, NPC had to construct
transmission lines that would traverse several private properties,
including the said parcels of land owned by YCLA. Accordingly, NPC filed
a Complaint for expropriation with the RTC against YCLA and several
other individuals. The NPC sought the expropriation of a portion of the
parcels of land owned by the said defendants for the acquisition of an
easement of right-of-way over areas that would be affected by the
construction of transmission lines. The portion of YCLAs properties that
would be affected by the construction of NPCs transmission lines has an
aggregate area of 5,846 square meters. YCLA filed its Answer alleging
that the Complaint should be dismissed outright due to NPCs failure to
allege the public use for the intended expropriation of its properties.
The parties moved for the constitution of a Board of Commissioners to
be appointed by the RTC to determine the reasonable amount of just
compensation to be paid by the NPC. Meanwhile, the RTC, acting on
NPCs urgent ex- parte motion, issued a writ of possession placing NPC
in possession of the properties sought to be expropriated. Board of
Commissioners fixed the amount of just compensation of the subject
properties at P500.00 per sq m. YCLA objected to the amount claiming
that the amount of just compensation should be fixed at P900.00 per sq
m considering the improvements in their properties. Amount for just
compensation was redetermined after YCLA, upon the court's order
submitted supporting documents on its position on the proper valuation
of the subject properties. Its motion, asking the RTC to direct the Board
of Commissioners to conduct an ocular inspection over the subject
properties and, thereafter, amend/revise the Board of Commissioners
Report was granted. The Board of Commissioners submitted its second
Report fixing the just compensation of the at P1,000.00 per sq m. The
RTC rendered a Decision which adopted the report and recommendation
of the Board of Commissioners.
NPC appealed to CA contending that the amount of just compensation is
too excessive considering that the subject properties were barren and
undeveloped agricultural lands at the time it instituted the action for
expropriation. But the CA affirmed the RTC's decision.
Thus, thus petition.
Actions of the Court

RTC: Denied
CA: Denied
SC: Partially granted
Issue:
Whether the RTC and the CA had sufficient basis in arriving at the
questioned amount of just compensation of the subject properties.
Ruling:
No.
In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full
and fair equivalent of the property. The measure is not the takers gain,
but the owners loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of
the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of "just
compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value
of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition;
or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one
who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government.
It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as
of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution
of the action precedes entry into the property, the amount of just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the
complaint.
In this case, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on the Board of
Commissioners Report which was arrived at after conducting an ocular
inspection of the subject properties. However, the recommendation as to
the amount of just compensation was based on the prevailing market
value of the subject properties in 2003. What escaped the attention of
the lower courts is that the prevailing market value of the subject
properties in 2003 cannot be used to determine the amount of just
compensation considering that the Complaint for expropriation was filed
by NPC on December 2, 1997.

Further, the Court notes that the Board of Commisioners merely alleged
that its members arrived at the amount ofP1,000.00 per sq m as just
compensation for the subject properties based on actual sales,
presumably of surrounding parcels of land, and on the opinion of
"reliable persons" that were interviewed. However, the Report is not
supported by any corroborative documents such as sworn declarations
of the "reliable persons" that were supposedly interviewed.
The trial court, in expropriation cases, may accept or reject, whether in
whole or in part, the report submitted by the Board of Commissioners,
which is merely advisory and recommendatory in character. Considering
that the legal basis for the determination of just compensation for the
subject properties is insufficient, the respective Decisions of the RTC and
the CA should be set aside. It is unsupported by any documentary
evidence and its recommendation as regards the amount of just
compensation.
SC Ruling:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant
petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals and
the Decision of the RTC of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro are hereby SET
ASIDE. This case is remanded to the trial court for the proper
determination of just compensation, in conformity with this Decisi
G.R. NO. 172551 : JANUARY 15, 2014
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, Respondent.

v.

YATCO

BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Yatco Agricultural Enterprises (Yatco) was the registered of
owner of a 27-hectare parcel of agricultural land (property) in Calamba,
Laguna. On April 30, 1999, the government placed the property under
the coverage if its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued the property at P1,126,132.89.
Yatco did not find the valuation acceptable and thus elevated the matter
to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD), which then conducted summary administrative
proceedings for the determination of just compensation.

The PARAD valued the property at P16,543,800.00, using the property

current market value. LBP did not move to reconsider the PARAD ruling.
Instead it filed with the RTC-SAC a petition for the judicial determination
of just compensation.
RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at P200 per square
meter based on the RTC branch 35 and 36. RTC-SAC did not give weight
to the LBP evidence in justifying its valuation, pointing out that the LBP
failed to prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure and failed
to consider the valuation in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL).
The CA dismissed LBP appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC-SAC determination of just compensation
for the property was proper?
HELD: The RTC-SAC determination of just compensation for the property
was not proper.
Civil law : determination of just compensation under the DAR
The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial
function. Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 explicitly vests the RTC-SAC the
original and exclusive power to determine just compensation for lands
under CARP coverage. To guide the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its
function, Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the factors required to
be taken into account to correctly determine just compensation.The law
(under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657) likewise empowers the DAR to issue
rules for its implementation.The DAR thus issued DAR AO 598incorporating the law listed factors in determining just compensation
into a basic formula that contains the details that take these factors into
account.
That the RTC-SAC must consider the factors mentioned by the law (and
consequently the DAR implementing formula) is not a novel concept. In
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, we said that the RTC-SAC
must consider the factors enumerated under Section 17 of R.A. No.
6657, as translated into a basic formula by the DAR, in determining just
compensation.
In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms
Corporation, we again affirmed the need to apply Section 17 of R.A. No.
6657 and DAR AO5-98 in just compensation cases.There, we considered

the CA and the RTC in grave error when they opted to come up with their
own basis for valuation and completely disregarded the DAR formula.
The need to apply the parameters required by the law cannot be
doubted; the DAR administrative issuances, on the other hand, partake
of the nature of statutes and have in their favor a presumption of
legality. Unless administrative orders are declared invalid or unless the
cases before them involve situations these administrative issuances do
not cover, the courts must apply them.
The RTC-SAC adopted Branch 36 valuation without any qualification or
condition. Yet, in disposing of the present case, the just compensation
that it fixed for the property largely differed from the former.Note that
Branch 36 fixed a valuation of P20.00 per square meter; while the RTCSAC, in the present case, valued the property at P200.00 per square
meter. Strangely, the RTC-SAC did not offer any explanation nor point to
any evidence, fact or particular that justified the obvious discrepancy
between these amounts.
In ascertaining just compensation, the fair market value of the
expropriated property is determined as of the time of taking. The ime of
takingrefers to that time when the State deprived the landowner of the
use and benefit of his property, as when the State acquires title to the
property or as of the filing of the complaint, per Section 4, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court.
As a final note and clarificatory reminder, we agree that the LBP is
primarily charged with determining land valuation and compensation for
all private lands acquired for agrarian reform purposes. But this
determination is only preliminary.The landowner may still take the
matter of just compensation to the court for final adjudication.

National Power Corporation vs. Judge Angas, GRs 60225-26, 8

May 1992
Facts:
National Power Corporation filed a complaint of eminent domain
for 2 lands in the regional trial court.I t was condemned and the
just compensation was fixed at 6%. One of the respondents
(sittie
batara)then
filed an
ex-parte
motion
for
execution
praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid
balance of P14,300.00 for the lands expropriated from her, including

legal interest which she computed at6% per annum. The said
motion was granted by the lower court. Thereafter, the lower court
directed the petitioner to deposit with its Clerk of Court the sums of
money as adjudged in the joint decision dated June15,
1979.
Petitioner complied with said order and deposited the sums of
money with interest computed at 6% per annum. On February 10, 1981,
one of the private respondents(Pangonatan Cosna Tagol), filed with
the trial court an ex-parte motion in Civil Case No. 2248 praying, for
the
first
time,
that
the
legal
interest
on
the
just
compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at 12%
per annum as allegedly "authorized under and by virtue of Circular No.
416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
116and in a decision of the Supreme Court that legal interest
allowed in the judgment of the courts, in the absence
of
express
contract, shall
be
computed
at12% per annum." The other
respondent (Batara) then followed and asked the court for the same.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration arguing that the decision
is already final and executory and cannot be modified. The court said
that it merely amplifies its decision and set the legal interest into
12%
and denied the reconsideration. Central Bank Circular No. 416
reads: By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1of Act No.
2655, as amended, otherwise known as the "Usury
Law," the
Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has
prescribed that the rate of interest for the loan or forbearance
of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such
rate
of
interest, shall be twelve per cent(12%) per annum.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just
compensation for expropriated lands, the law
applicable is Article
2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate or
Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal interest rate at 12%
per annum?
Held:
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the Central Bank circular
applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. The
term "judgments" as used in Section 1 of the Usury Law, as
well as in Central Bank Circular No.416, should be interpreted to
mean only judgments involving loan or forbearance of money,
goods or credits, following the principle of ejusdem generis.
Under this doctrine, where general terms follow the designation of
particular things or classes of persons or subjects, the general term

will be construed to comprehend those things or persons of

the same class or of the same nature as those specifically
enumerated. Obviously, therefore, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and not
Central Bank Circular No. 416, is the law applicable to the case
at bar. Said law reads: Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the
payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the
indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary,
shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the
absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per
annum. The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits and to judgments
involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.
This is evident not only from said
circular
but
also
from
Presidential Decree No.116, which amended Act No. 2655, otherwise
known as the Usury Law. On the other hand, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code
applies to transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as
damages, in connection with any delay in the performance of the
obligation arising therefrom other than those covering loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits.
As for private respondents' argument that Central Bank Circular
No. 416 impliedly repealed or modified Art. 2209 of the Civil Code,
suffice it to state that repeals or even amendments by implication
are not favored if two laws can be fairly reconciled. The Courts
are slow to hold that one statute has repealed another by implication,
and they will not make such an adjudication if they can refrain
from
doing
so,
or
if they can arrive at another result by any
construction which is just and reasonable. Besides, the courts will not
enlarge the meaning of one act in order to decide that
it
repeals
another
by
implication,
nor
will
they adopt an interpretation
leading to an adjudication of repeal by implication unless it is inevitable
and a clear and explicit reason therefor can be adduced. They
contemplate different situations.

Eminent Domain, Just Compensation

Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
National Power Corporation v. Henson,
GR No. 129998,
December 29, 1998
Ponente: Third Division, Pardo (J): 3 concur
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review before the Supreme Court
BRIEF
The case is an appeal via certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando,
Pampanga, in a special civil action for eminent domain, ordering the
National
Power
Corporation
(NPC)
to
pay
respondents
landowners/claimants just compensation for the taking of their five (5)
parcels of land, with an area of 63,220 square meters at P400.00, per
square meter, with legal interest from September 11, 1990, plus costs of
the proceedings.
FACTS
On 21 March 1990, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) originally
instituted with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Third Judicial District,
Branch 46, San Fernando, Pampanga a complaint for eminent domain,
later amended on 11 October 1990, for the taking for public use of 5
parcels of land, owned or claimed by Lourdes Henson (married to
Eugenio Galvez), Josefina Henson (married to Petronio Katigbak, Jesusa
Henson, Corazon Henson (married to Jose Ricafort), Alfredo Tanchiatco,
Bienvenido David, Maria Bondoc Capili (married to Romeo Capili), and
Miguel Manoloto, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 squaremeters,
for the expansion of the NAPOCOR Mexico Sub-Station. On 28 March
1990, NAPOCOR filed an urgent motion to fix the provisional value of the
subject parcels of land. On 20 April 1990, Henson, et. al. filed a motion
to dismiss. They did not challenge NAPOCOR's right to condemn their

property, but declared that the fair market value of their property was
from P180.00 to P250.00 per square meter. On 10 July 1990, the trial
court denied Henson, et. al.'s motion to dismiss, but the court did not
declare that NAPOCOR had a lawful right to take the property sought to
be expropriated. However, the court fixed the provisional value of the
land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of 63,220 square
meters of Henson, et. al.'s property, to be deposited with the Provisional
Treasurer of Pampanga. NAPOCOR deposited the amount on 29 August
1990. On 5 September 1990, the trial court issued a writ of possession
in favor of NAPOCOR, and, on 11 September 1990, the court's deputy
sheriff placed NAPOCOR in possession of the subject land. On 22
November 1990, and 20 December 1990, the trial court granted the
motions of Henson, et. al. to withdraw the deposit made by NAPOCOR of
the provisional value of their property amounting to P5,831,100.00, with
a
balance of P690,900.00, remaining with the Provisional Treasurer of
Pampanga. On 5 April 1991, the trial court issued an order appointing 3
commissioners to aid the in the reception of evidence to determine just
compensation for the taking of subject property. After receiving the
evidence and conducting an ocular inspection, the commissioners
submitted to the court their individual reports. However, the trial court
did not conduct a hearing on any of the reports. On 19 May 1993, the
trial court rendered judgment fixing the amount of just compensation to
be paid by the NAPOCOR for the taking of the entire area of 63,220
squares meters at P400.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon
computed from 11 September 1990, when NAPOCOR was placed in
possession of the land, plus attorney's fees of P20,000.00, and costs of
the proceedings. In due
time, NAPOCOR appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 23 July 1997, the
Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming that of the Regional Trial
Court, except that the award of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees was
deleted. NAPOCOR filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the determination of the court of the just compensation
or the provisional value to be awarded to the owners of the property
would be valid without hearing on the report of the Commissioners.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Yes. The amount fixed by the court was valid even without the
hearing of the reports of the Commissioners. The trial court fixed the
value of the land at P400.00 per square meter, which was the selling
price of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision, the Santo
Domingo Village Subdivision.
CA: Affirmed the judgment of the RTC.

SC: Modified the decision of the RTC and CA. The Court fixes the amount
of P375.00, per square meter, as the just compensation to be paid to
respondents for the taking of their property.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The parcels of land sought to be expropriated, however, are undeniably
idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft of any improvement.
Except for the Henson family, all the other landowners were admittedly
farmer beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the Department of
Agrarian Reform. However, the land has been reclassified as residential.
The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the
principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner.
Unfortunately, the trial court, after creating a board of commissioners to
help it determine the market value of the land did not conduct a hearing
on the report of the commissioners. The trial court fixed the fair market
value of subject land in an amount equal to the value of lots in the
adjacent fully developed subdivision. This finds no support in the
evidence. The valuation was even higher than the recommendation of
anyone of the commissioners (Commissioner Mariano C. Tiglao fixed the
fair market value at P350.00 per square meter, while Commissioner
Arnold P. Atienza fixed it at P375.00 per square meter, and
Commissioner Victorino Oracio fixed it at P170.00 per square meter).
Commissioner Atienza's recommendation appears to be the closest
valuation to the market value of lots in the adjoining fully developed
subdivision. Considering that the subject parcels of land are
undeveloped raw land, the price of P375.00 per square meter would
appear to the Court as the just compensation for the taking of such raw
land.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the trial
court subject of the appeal are hereby MODIFIED. No costs in all
instances.