Hypostasis, schema negotiation and other dynamic

phenomena in the “inventory of linguistic units”

Dominik Lukeš, University of East Anglia
http://www.dominiklukes.net, d.lukes@uea.ac.uk
August 2007, NDCL, Cardiff

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Summary of the
argument
Cognitive linguistics (primarily through the
groundbreaking work of Lakoff, Langacker and
Croft) has made great strides towards establishing
a credible view of language as a “structured
inventory of conventional linguistic units” (i.a.
Langacker, 1990). In particular, their refusal to
separate syntax, semantics and pragmatics, has
made it possible to view phenomena previously
thought aberrant as an integral part of language.
However, much more has been implied than said
about how this ‘structured inventory’ is
structured. What processes operate within it and
when do they come into play? It appears to be
generally accepted that blending theory provides a
reliable blueprint for how these ‘conventional
linguistic units’ are activated and integrated into
conceptually coherent and linguistically cohesive
utterances but what of the relations among the
building blocks themselves? We know from Lakoff
and Langacker that they are not atomic and that
their relationships are hierarchical and schematic.
Croft further adds that the operations performed
on them are minimal. But the question of how
they receive their schematicity and how they enter
into the hierarchical relationships is left
unanswered. Both cognitive grammar and
blending theory operate with the concept of
entrenchment but the details of the processes
through which entrenchment occurs are left to our
imagination. Similarly, the processes through
which language speakers retrieve units are also
thought to be mostly uniform and largely
unconscious, and as such outside the scope of
linguistic investigation.
This paper suggests that in order to understand
how the ‘unit inventory’ of language is created,
maintained and utilized, and how units are
retrieved, we must investigate language more
rigorously at the arena (I purposely do not use the
term level) of discourse (both dialogic and
expository). Specifically, I will introduce examples
of two processes that occur in discourse and that
are illustrative of the functioning of the unit
inventory of language. They are hypostasis and
schema negotiation. Both of these phenomena
point to the dynamic nature of unit repository but
they do it in such a way that illustrates the
practical impact of some of the most basic
assumptions behind cognitive grammar.
Hypostasis is a term that has fallen out of favor
with linguists since the 1950s. When it was first
introduced by Bloomfield it referred to a
particular use of synsemantic (i.e. supposedly
meaning-less) lexical items with a reference to
their function, as in ‘I’m tired of his buts and ifs’.
Cognitive grammar, of course, does not recognize
the synsemantic/autosemantic lexicon dichotomy
but claims that both ‘but’ and ‘butt’ have the same
type of ‘lexical meaning’ which differs in its level
of schematicity. Significantly, even grammatical
constructions are seen has having substantially
the same kind of meaning. However, to my
knowledge no attempts have been made to
investigate the processes through which levels of
schematicity are negotiated in language. This
paper’s principal claim is that far from being the
peripheral anomaly of Bloomfield’s time or the
forgotten curiosity of today, hypostasis and other
means through which schematicity of linguistic
units is negotiated are ubiquitous in discourse and
that speakers’ ability to process them is probably
crucial to our view of language as an inventory of
units rather than rules and units. It is what makes
it possible for units previously thought to be poles
apart in the level-based view of language (such as
‘tired’ and ‘if’) to integrate together seamlessly in
discourse. I contend that linguistic units are not
‘stored’ with their schematicity but rather that the
degree to which they are schematic is constantly
being negotiated through hypostasis-like
processes. I will present examples of this
negotiation from various types of discourse from
task-oriented conversation to academic exposition
and demonstrate how hypostasis in utterances
such “Making common sense more common.” or
“Today’s pins and needles day … and I got me on
… them.” is being used to negotiate the
schematicity of linguistic units.
Levels of hypostasis
Hypostasis is not used very often in linguistics
today and as such doesn’t have a fixed definition. I
use the term in two related senses. First and
foremost, hypostasis is part of the human
linguistic competence. It is as important a
principle of language as the ability to blend
constructions. In a sense it could be seen as a kind
of “reverse blending” but a better way of looking at
it is as a special kind of blending constraint where
the process itself becomes part of the mappings
between mental spaces. In this sense, hypostasis is
a process underlying the whole process of frame
and schema negotiation. This process is essential
for much of humor, double entendre, polysemy
disambiguation, language policy, language
instruction and indeed linguistics itself. It is
ubiquitous at all levels of traditional linguistic
description from sound, through morphology and
syntax, all the way to discourse. Bolinger’s
definition of hypostasis as a process through
which “language becomes an instrument to probe
itself rather than some other part of reality” is
most apt. However, I also occasionally refer to
hypostasis in a way only slightly expanded from
the original Bloomfieldian sense, as a “deviations
from the ordinary tie-up of phonetic form with
dictionary meaning”, i.e. something that happens
at the level of the word/phrase. In this, it is
distinct from schema and frame negotiation which
operate at the level of discourse.
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Polysemy negotiation
Hypostasis is apparent in instances of negotiating
polysemy, even when the potential for confusion is
rather low.
Rafe: The last time [pause] I had a small
fracture in my hand. and. So I went to the doctor
and she took the X-Rays [interruption]
Tom: [interrupting] The last time? Does this
happen to you often?
Rafe: No, no, no. The last time I went to the
doctor. It was for a small fracture.
Buzz Out Loud, 20 Aug 2007, ep. 542 min 32
This and the following example are extended
instances of Third Turn Repair (constructions
similar to 'I don't mean X, I mean Y') described by
Schegloff (1997). In both these cases, the speakers
become aware of a potential interpretation (an
opportunistic blending) and feel the need to
manage this conversationally.
AM: The first thing this George Bush does when
he comes in, he starts to redecorate to get rid of
the stain of the Clinton years.
Guest: Yes, and the [suppressing laughter] fact
that it is the White House is very important.
[interrupted]
AM: [Interrupting] Not literally I hasten to add.
All: [Laughter]
BBC 4, Start the Week, 24 Apr, 2007
A brief survey of recorded semi-formal
conversations would reveal this to be a common
feature of semi-fluent speech. It can be used
locally or employed as a cohesive device across a
longer stretch of text (see below).
Usage negotiation
What this data (these data?) implies is that there
is a scale between language instruction and
language usage negotiation such as the following:
Molly: Cumin is a very handy spice. You say
cumin, you say cumin?
Kelly:Yeah. And I say tumeric.
Molly: Oh, really?
Kelly: I do and I think I'm wrong. [sigh]
Molly: Anyway.
Gadgettes, 2 Aug 2007, ep. 54, min 2
Pinker’s Language Mavens fall on this continuum
somewhere in the middle, as does language
purism and folk etymology. The following
example shows that usage negotiation is not just a
local matter quickly to be abandoned and can
indeed persist across an extended discourse. The
two speakers (quoted from an official transcript)
refer to the fact that the device they are describing
does not have an established term in a variety of
ways. This fact clearly disrupts the flow of the
conversation but it nevertheless adds to the
cohesion of the whole text. In fact, they refer to it
after a substantial gap (both of time and topic)
Dominik Lukeš Hypostasis and schema negotiation
and can nevertheless refer to it simply by stressing
the term in question. At least three different
strategies are used to push the negotiation along,
all of them relying on the ability to hypostasize. A
more detailed inventory of these strategies is
needed.
Leo: He also says he’s now using
pip.verisign.com as his primary OpenID
account, changing from ClaimID. I use ClaimID,
too. So I will switch over because that means
when I do my OpenID verification I’ll use the
dongle. Right? A fob.
Steve: Exactly. Whatever we call it.
Leo: Whatever you call it.
Steve: There was some discussion about that,
too, in our mail. Apparently the official word is
that a dongle is something that you plug into
something, like the old parallel port dongles
that were used for protecting high-value
software, and in fact even to this day are still
used for, like, expensive vertical market
software. Whereas a fob is a freestanding, you
know, standalone thing that you don’t plug into
something. So, like, okay.
Leo: That actually is what I thought. Well, to
me a fob is something you put on your watch
chain or your watch. But anyway, that’s another
matter.
15 minutes later
Leo: Mark Paynter, Sydney, Australia, has an
interesting observation, again about the
fob/dongle/key.
Steve: Doohickey.
Leo: Doohickey. He says, I obtained a PayPal
security fob dongle key, which is a good idea.
But it occurred to me that a spoof PayPal site
could do a pop-up window for the key and
simply accept any number that is entered. The
way to test it would be to enter a completely
wrong number, and if it accepts it, then it didn’t
check. So security needs to be checked by using
"not" logic rather than "and" expressions.
Steve: I thought that was sort of an interesting
observation. Of course the point this brings up is
that there are two different things that we would
like to have happen. The dongle fob key
doohickey is used normally when you’re trying
to authenticate yourself to the remote server.
Mark’s point is that, by lying, by deliberately
lying to the site which may be spoofing, you’re
authenticating it.
15 minutes later
Leo: I have to say I love that feeling. That’s just
so cool. And I’m going to right away go to
pip.verisign.com and make that my OpenID
provider because that means - I’m correct in
thinking that that means that whenever I did an
OpenID login, I’d have to use the fob now;
right?
Steve: You would have to use the fob, exactly,
given that you use VeriSign as your OpenID
provider. Nothing would prevent you from
having also a different OpenID provider. And
what I like about the VeriSign approach is that
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 they do have the ability to simultaneously
register multiple credentials and non-fob - I
just hate that word, but you know - non-
fob authentication alternatives also. So, I mean,
they’re really coming up to speed nicely. And
we’re going to be talking about it in greater
detail next week.
Security Now (http://www.grc.com/sn/SN-
106.htm)
Lexical meaning
negotiation
It is not simply the usage of words (from
pronunciation to syntax) but also their meaning.
In the following example, the speaker describes
the usage of the word, points out a ‘logical’
inconsistency between different uses and makes a
judgment regarding the ‘correct’ use and meaning.
Again, any speaker of English will recognize that
as a common feature.
Reviewer: It's a grown up film. It has mature
themes. In the way that word should really be
applied. Nowadays 'mature' means Quentin
Tarantino jumping around with an axe.
Interviewer: So the mature themes here are
what?
Reviewer: Immature, stupid, adolescent. I
mean, [I have] nothing wrong with imature,
stupid and adolescent, but please don't call it
mature. You know.
Interviewer: But the mature themes here…
Reviewer: I'm sorry. ….
Mark Kermode, Film Review, Podcast, April 27,
2007, Radio 5 Live, min 37
Domain mapping
negotiation
This area is perhaps of most interest to cognitive
linguistics. The following example shows an
extremely common strategy of negotiating domain
mapping.
President Bush was hired to know more than the
people, to be told all the deep inside intelligence,
all the facts Americans are not told, and do the
right and smart thing in response.
That’s the deal. It’s the real “grand bargain.” If
you are a midlevel Verizon executive who lives
in New Jersey, this is what you do: You hire a
president and tell him to take care of everything
you can’t take care of–the security of the nation,
its well-being, its long-term interests. And you
in turn do your part. You meet your part of the
bargain. You work, pay your taxes, which are
your financial contribution to making it all
work, you become involved in local things–the
boy’s ball team, the library, the homeless
shelter. You handle what you can handle within
your ken, and give the big things to the
president.
And if he can’t do it, or if he can’t do it as well as
you pay the mortgage and help the kid next
Dominik Lukeš Hypostasis and schema negotiation
door, you get mad. And you fire him.
OpinionJournal - Peggy Noonan
Like with the examples in previous sections, this
can happen both locally, as well as provide a
cohesive link to a larger stretch of discourse, or
indeed intertextually. A recent example of this is
the various negotiations that surround the war in
Iraq. One of those is exploring how well the Iraq
war corresponds to the Vietnam war. Countless
texts, most recently including a speech by
president Bush, explore the various possibilities of
domain mapping including the possible inferences
that can be drawn from these mappings. (These
texts also interestingly reveal folk theories of
metaphorical inference).
How clearly accessible to reference the process is
can be illustrated on a repeated quip by American
TV satirist Stephen Colbert (quoted below on a
message board):
As it was put on The Colbert Report: Iraq is not
Vietnam (Iraq is dry, Vietnam is wet). They're as
different as butter and margarine (I Can't
Believe It's Not Vietnam!).
(Reader comment on
http://savetheamericanfamily.blog-
city.com/bush_jokes.htm)
In this instantly comprehensible joke, Colbert
refers to the process, makes a statement regarding
his assessment of it, and opens a discursive space
for further critique. The use of his joke in a
discussion forum (similar uses constituting a
common argumentative strategy) illustrates the
effectiveness of Colbert’s hypostasis.
Frame negotiation:
Schemas, scripts, images
This process described in more detail elsewhere
(Lukeš, manuscript, please email for details) is
aptly illustrated by the following example of how
images of heroism are negotiated through
reference to popular narratives.
Conservatives continue to use Fox’s 24 to
support hawkish policies …conservative talk
radio host Laura Ingraham told host Bill
O’Reilly: “The average American out there loves
the show 24. OK? They love Jack Bauer. They
love 24. In my mind that’s close to a national
referendum that it’s OK to use tough tactics
against high-level Al Qaeda operatives as we’re
going to get.”
…
On the November 30, 2006, edition of his CNN
Headline News program, Beck responded to an
email that asked about the “ill treatment of our
prisoners in Guantanamo” and asserted: “Now
me, I’m for more Jack Bauers. The Jack Bauer
that has to extract information.” Media Matters
Process reflection
As was apparent event from some of the previous
examples, the entire process of linguistic
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negotiation can be open to introspection through
hypostasis. This can take on collective features as
demonstrated on http://www.popvssoda.com, a
website that invites visitors to register their
preferred term for referring to soft drinks along
with their locale to help determine US-wide usage
patterns. This can even be lexicalized as evidenced
by the use of the words meta and meme in current
web usage (metafilter.com, techmeme.com) but
more extended stretches of text also recur as a sort
of discourse topos, for instance the frequent
reference to the fact that so called “Web 2.0
companies” often use names with the last vowel
omitted (e.g. Flickr.com).
This can also happen in a smaller discourse
community. Another example can be found in a
popular technology podcast Buzz Out Loud: A
caller suggests an analogy and the hosts discuss
both the aptness of the analogy itself as well as the
medium of analogies for elucidating certain
issues. In effect the speakers are negotiating a
frame and the framework (i.e. the medium of
communication) at the same time. (See
http://www.hermeneuticheretic.net/analogies-in-
public-discourse-negotiation-of-frames-and-
hypostasis-of-channels for audio). The following
example suggests that the process is not limited to
‘higher-level’ phenomena:
One small word is one giant sigh of relief for
Armstrong “That’s one small step for man, one
giant leap for mankind” they heard him say as
he dropped from the ladder of his spacecraft to
make the first human footprint on the lunar
surface.
But from the moment he said it, and for 37 years
since, debate has raged over whether the Nasa
astronaut might have fluffed his lines. Mr
Armstrong has long insisted that he meant to
say “one small step for a man...” which would
have been a more meaningful and
grammatically correct version, free of tautology.
But even the astronaut himself could not be
sure.
http://www.hermeneuticheretic.net/local-
grammars-and-space-exploration
Entrenched hypostases and
hypostasized
entrenchments
Much of social linguistic convention (including
prescriptive grammar and manuals of style) can
be seen as a consequence of hypostasis. But even
framings that remain unexposed to conscious
examination and are often considered good
examples of the ‘unconscious’ nature of cognitive
processing, can be hypostasized, as in the
following ‘blonde joke’.
A blonde walks into a library and shouts, "CAN I
HAVE A CHEESE BURGER AND CHIPS?!?"
The librarian replies, "This is a library."
Dominik Lukeš Hypostasis and schema negotiation
"Sorry," the blonde whispers in a barely audible
voice, "can I have a cheese burger and chips?"
http://www.funny-games.biz/jokes/blonde-in-
library.html
Clearly, the joke refers to the woman’s inability to
make the correct frame adjustment. The frame of
the library contains schemas of forms of talk and
purpose of visit. The blonde only understands the
former.
Conclusions and caveats
It is astounding, how little attention have these
processes received in cognitive linguistics and in
linguistics in general. There is no doubt that
hypostasis is a frequent occurrence that goes
beyond the few examples Bloomfield used to
illustrate his point. Neither is it a mere deviation.
Rather it is a central process that probably plays a
significant role in how the “inventory of linguistic”
units is structured. At the very least, there is
evidence that alongside the “automatic” changes
in the inventory (cf. Labov 1994, 2001), at least
some parts of it are structured and modified
through negotiation of its hypostasis.
Of course, it is the very definition of language that
the vast majority of usage cannot be hypostasized
as a matter of course. However, what is important
that anything in language and linguistic behavior
can be and is subject to hypostasis. Hypostasis
occurs spontaneously at all levels of language.
There are several caveats to keep in mind:
1. Not all parts of the linguistic inventory are
equally amenable to hypostasis. This was pointed
out by Talmy at ICLC 2007 with respect to
introspection. For instance in a daily podcast, two
presenters (Leo Laporte and Dick di Bartolo) refer
to a special segment as either “turn the table
Tuesday” or “turn the tables Tuesday”. Over the
course of a year, they have settled into each using
a different variant after a certain amount of
idiolectal variation. Quite obviously, this is a
prime candidate for hypostasis and explicit usage
negotiation but it never took place (even though
other instances of hypostasis and negotiation were
attested). This could be due to a lack of awareness
or simply a lack of suitable device for reference.
Or it could be entirely coincidental.
2. It is possible that not all speakers are equally
able, willing to hypostasize (see also Talmy). This
would accord well with research on learning styles
but needs further investigation since it might have
consequences for the nature of mental processing
of language.
One last question that needs to be posed is
whether the commonality of these language
strategies is language specific. Hypostasis, it
would seem, has to be a universal feature of
language, but the inventory of devices that can be
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used to express it is certainly varied. For instance,
“no pun intended” is an English device to manage
hypostasis in conversation that doesn’t have a
parallel in many other languages. More research,
particularly of languages where hypostasis is not
given a formal educational support, is needed. But
there appears to be variation even among
European languages. English speaking cultures
seem to have institutionalized word play to a
higher degree than, for instance Czech although
word play is of course equally common in both
languages.

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