A Critique of "Structural Marxism and Human Geography"

Author(s): Vera Chouinard, Ruth Fincher, James Duncan and David Ley
Source: Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp.
137-150
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Commentary
A Critique of "Structural Marxism and
Human Geography"

IN their article, "Structural Marxism and Hu-

ence generally is that the majority of Marxist

man Geography," James Duncan and

"traditions" share the philosophical and

David Ley draw upon an impressive range of

theoretical limitations of "structural Marx-

philosophical sources in order to advance a

ism." But the precise meaning of such

critique of Marxist work by geographers

"traditions" as "political economy" or

(Duncan and Ley 1982). The authors' objec-

"structural Marxism" is not specified. There

tive is to show that Marxist work in geography

are assertions that the "theoretical treatment

obscures social processes by imposing rigid

of political economy" may be distinguished

theoretical concepts upon a complex reality

from "concrete historiographic study" and

(p. 31). Toward this end, it is argued that Marx-

that "historiographic work" challenges the

ist geographers (like "structural" Marxists in

"structural tradition" (p. 31), which imply that

general) attribute causal power to conceptual

the defining characteristic of both political

entities (e.g., "capital") that are abstracted

economy and "structural Marxism" is that

from human experience and practice (pp.

they are not "concrete." So, in subsequent

31-44). According to the authors, this ten-

discussion of reification as "misplaced con-

dency toward "reification" derives in part

creteness" (p. 37), Duncan and Ley treat Marx-

from a continued adherence to Hegelian ide-

ian theoretical concepts such as "mode of

alism by political economists (pp. 54-55).

production" and "class" as "reified supraindividual entities" (p. 36). Moreover, as the

It is our view that Duncan and Ley have

failed to make a convincing case for this as-

idealist flaws associated with Althusser's

sessment of Marxist geographical work and

"extreme version of structuralism" (p. 35) are

political economy. The reasons for this are

attributed not only to work in the political

threefold. First, the authors' account of vari-

economy tradition, but also to that of Marxist

ous "traditions" in Marxist social science ig-

geographers, it would appear that the authors

nores such important matters as the devel-

regard this criterion of "concreteness" as

opment of a variety of approaches since the

sufficient to characterize the various "tradi-

mid-1970s. Secondly, the arguments ad-

tions" in Marxist social science. We object to

vanced with regard to Marxist theory, meth-

this superficial distinction between struc-

od, and philosophy suffer from logical gaps

turalism, political economy, and Marxist ge-

and insufficient substantiation. And finally,

ography on the one hand, and historical

by failing to specify their own epistemologi-

studies on the other because it is based on

cal and theoretical alternative to a Marxist

major errors of omission in Duncan and Ley's

approach in human geography, the authors

account of Marxist social science.

have foreclosed constructive debate on the

The authors' distinction between historical

issues raised. Our commentary will consider

and other Marxist "traditions" ignores the

each of these shortcomings in turn.

analyses of those who have followed neither

Thompson (1978) to his extreme disavowal of

Marxist social theory, nor Althusser (1976) to

Errors of Omission in the Portrayal of

Marxist "Traditions"

his self-professed "theoreticism" or extreme

idealist abstractions. By failing to discuss the

work of those Marxists who insist that the apA central proposition in Duncan and Ley's

plication of concepts like "capital accumula-

critique of Marxist geography and social sci-

tion" requires detailed historical study of how

Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 73(1), 1983, pp. 137-150

? Copyright 1983 by Association of American Geographers

137

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138 Chouinard and Fincher

human practices give rise to specific social

1980; Larrain 1979). The failure to consider

relations and conditions (e.g., Foster 1977;

this history of "structural Marxism" leads the

Corrigan 1980; Rose 1981), Duncan and Ley

authors to further errors of omission in their

give the false impression that a dichotomy

account of Marxist geography and political

exists between theoretical and empirical or

economy. In their critique of "economism" or

"concrete" Marxist work.

Duncan and Ley fail to consider whether or

"the overdependence on economic categories" in Marxist geographical work (p. 45),

not it is valid to treat Marxist concepts as if

for example, Duncan and Ley allege that

they refer solely to material objects or entities

"structural Marxism" is so economistic that it

and so are led to an erroneous conflation of

constitutes "a mirror image of the equally ex-

the use of theoretical concepts with reifica-

treme neoclassical concept of consumer

tion. Thus, despite their recognition that Marx

sovereignty" (p. 46). This is a curious charge

was in fact critical of analyses that treat social

because, like other "Western Marxist" tradi-

relations as relations between things (p. 35),

tions, structuralism emphasized philosophi-

the authors treat the concepts employed by

cal and cultural concerns instead of focusing

Marxist geographers as self-evidently "re-

on the "classical" (pre-1920) economic

ified" (pp. 36-37). A related error is that it

problems of Marxist analysis (Anderson

is the language instead of the import of Marx-

1976). Indeed, it has been argued that a major

ist analyses which is subjected to criticism.

contribution of "structural Marxism" to Marx-

Good examples of this practice may be found

ist social science was to stress cultural and

on page 38, where statements by David Har-

ideological aspects of the state and politics

vey are twice quoted out of the context of

(Clarke, Connell, and McDonough 1978; Hol-

their theoretical meaning and then given the

loway and Picciottio 1978). At the very least

particular "objectified" interpretation favored

then, the charge that the structuralist influ-

in the critique. The inadequacy of this form of

ence in Marxist geography leads to econo-

criticism is revealed when one considers that

mism requires demonstration rather than

a distinctive feature of Marxist concepts is

assumption. Similarly, it is not obvious that

that they refer to both specific social relations

"structural Marxism" owes its idealism to

(such as that between capitalists and wage-

Hegel (p. 49), as the nonmaterialist philo-

laborers) and the "objectified" forms in which

sophical principles used by Althusser and

these relations are experienced in capitalist

his followers derive from Spinoza (Althusser

societies (as in the exchange of money-wages

1976; Anderson 1976).

for labor-power) (see Marx 1976, Ch. 1;

The neglect of the history of "structural

Sweezy 1968; Geras 1972; Rubin 1975). This

Marxism" also leads Duncan and Ley to ig-

dual quality of materialist concepts means

nore the historical context of the Marxist geo-

that one cannot simply presume that an

graphical items selected for comment. Had it

analyst such as Harvey is referring to a reified

been pointed out that the early 1970s was the

entity when he uses such concepts as "capi-

time when the writings of the so-called

tal accumulation" (p. 38). On the contrary, it

"French structural Marxists" were first being

was precisely such a singular meaning that

published in English, then it might have been

Duncan and Ley needed to demonstrate in

clearer that the geographical work selected

their critique of Marxist geography.

Another omission in Duncan and Ley's

by Duncan and Ley (written in the mid-1970s

for the most part) was a contribution to the

characterization of Marxist "traditions" is

ensuing debate. At least the authors might

that they do not specify the historical signifi-

then have begun to provide an historical ex-

cance and context of "structural Marxism."

planation for the alleged "continuity" be-

The treatment of structuralism and "theoreti-

tween Marxist geography and the "extreme

cal political economy" as virtually synony-

version of structuralism" established by Al-

mous (p. 31) gives the false impression of

thusser (p. 35).

identical characteristics and development. In

In condemning Marxist work in human ge-

fact, as an examination of the history of Marx-

ography, Duncan and Ley not only ignore the

ism readily shows, the "structuralist school"

history of Marxist geography but also fail to

is a recent (early 1960s) and quite distinctive

specify the limits that they assign to Marxist

addition to the "traditions" of Marxist politi-

geographical work. This latter omission is a

cal economy (Althusser 1969; Anderson 1976,

serious one, as researchers not labeled

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Commentary

139

"geographers" conduct work on geographic

lations between consciousness and struc-

topics: Lebas notes the prominence of spatial

ture" (p. 41). A more balanced assessment

problems in the Marxist research of the mid-

would at least acknowledge the facts that:

to late 1970s (Harloe and Lebas 1981, xi), an

Marxist geographers have made preliminary

interest that has been pursued by sociolo-

efforts to join recent debates on ideology; a

gists, economists, political scientists, ur-

"diminished" or less-than-perfect concept of

banists, regional planners, and others. More-

consciousness is not peculiar to Marxist so-

over, geographers publish work from a Marxist

perspective in less-than-obviously geographic

cial science (see the excellent discussion by

Larrain 1979); and far from Marxists ignoring

outlets (e.g., Overton 1978; Walker 1978; Rose

"social psychology" (p. 41), some of the most

1980; Harmon 1981a). In order to generalize

innovative work in contemporary Marxist so-

about the nature of Marxist geographic work

and Marxist work in human geography it is

cial analysis centers on precisely this problem

(Hall et al. 1978; Grayson 1980). Similarly, the

necessary, therefore, to define and identify

authors' treatment of the Marxist concept of

relevant geographic work carefully. The lack

"class" as an example of "ossification" in-

of such rigor in Duncan and Ley's review

explicably ignores recent efforts to enhance

renders their generalizations about Marxist

the flexibility of this Marxist theoretical cate-

geography suspect.
Another serious omission in Duncan and

gory. Examples include Wright's (1979) use of

the concept of "contradictory class loca-

Ley's treatment of Marxist geography and so-

tions" and Burawoy's (1981) consideration of

cial science is that they ignore the "post-

the implications of job stratification for strug-

structuralist" debates that have come to

gles within the workplace and political arena.

If one judges the contributions by geog-

dominate Marxism since the mid-1970s. Con-

trary to the impression of conceptual "stasis"

raphers to these advances as meager in

and "ossification" left by the authors (pp.

number, one should also recall that much of

44-56), there have been many efforts to re-

this work originates in disciplines other than

fine and broaden Marxist social analysis.

geography (e.g., sociology and political science) and has only recently been available in

These includes recent work by geographers

on the development of capitalism as a mode

published form. Geographers have just begun

of production (e.g., Smith 1982; Boddy 1981;

to explore these new perspectives and to ac-

Massey 1978) and advances in Marxist social

quaint themselves with associated research

science such as the following: work on the

topics.

production and experience of culture (Barrett

The most serious silence in Duncan and

et al. 1979; Williams 1981); feminist studies of

Ley's critique is that they fail to specify the

capitalism (Fox 1980); Gramscian analyses of

philosophical bases of various "traditions" in

Marxist social science. In view of the authors'

political institutions, struggles, and forms of

consciousness (Laclau 1977; Mouffe 1979);

and various advances in the study of ideology

(Sumner 1979; Larrain 1979). The participation of geographers in these innovations can

be seen in such collections as Dear and Scott

(1981) and Harloe and Lebas (1981), in jour-

nals like Antipode and the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, and in
recent efforts to tackle the analysis of subjec-

tive experience from within a Marxist geo-

graphic perspective (Harvey 1978a; Peet

1980; Harman 1981b; Eyles 1981).
It is only by ignoring recent developments
in Marxist social science, then, that Duncan

and Ley can reduce the meaning of the Marxist concept of "ideology" to "habituation"
(p. 40) and assert that Marxist geographers
are unwilling "to deal with the admittedly difficult questions of the empirical reality of re-

focus on philosophical issues (p. 31), it is little

short of astonishing that nowhere in the
critique is the philosophy of historical materialism even acknowledged, let alone assessed.
This is no minor lapse, as Duncan and Ley's
argument that nonhistoriographic Marxist
"traditions" suffer from the philosophical and
theoretical limitations of "structural Marxism" depends upon demonstrating the pervasive influence of Hegelian idealism throughout the history of Marxist studies (pp. 33-

38). And as geographers such as Gregory

(1978, p. 110) have observed of Marx's relation to Hegel:
But Marx was led to the opposite conclusion,
namely "that legal relations as well as forms of
state are to be understood neither in themselves
nor from the so-called general development of
the human mind, but rather have their roots in

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140

Chouinard

and

Fincher

the material conditions of life." Essence and

phenomena were transposed and idealism was
replaced by materialism.

Logical Errors in the Critique of

Marxist Theory, Method,
and Philosophy

If Duncan and Ley have an argument as to

A second source of misrepresentation in

why idealism and historical materialism can

Duncan and Ley's critique is that their argu-

be treated as equivalent philosophies, then

ments concerning Marxist theory, method,

their critique demands that this be presented,

and philosophy advance through logical

especially because there are many who do

not share such a view (Marx and Engels 1846;

leaps that are difficult to justify in light of the

Marcuse 1960; Keat and Urry 1975; Sayer

we shall assess the logic and substance of the

1979; Collier 1979a). If they do not have such

following central propositions in Duncan and

evidence presented. To illustrate this problem,

a case, then they presumably also have not

Ley's critique: that Marxist theory suffers

considered such pertinent questions as

from conceptual "ossification" and is there-

whether or not it is defensible to treat histori-

fore inadequate for social explanation; that

cal materialism as an "holistic philosophy"

the use of Marxist theory involves a rejection

(p. 31). We would argue that it is not, and that

of the view that people shape history; that the

it was precisely Marx's achievement to found

Marxist method of abstraction is necessarily

a philosophy that avoided the opposite ex-

idealist; that the Marxist method of analysis is

tremes of "atomism" and "holism" (Collier

inherently "economistic"; and finally that a

1979b). By treating the "individual" as an

Marxist epistemology entails a commitment

historical, social being, it was possible to re-

to "objective" science, the literal use of

gard social relations and institutions as the

theory, and "empirical confusion."

products of human practice without thereby

Duncan and Ley begin their argument that

falling into either the individualist fallacy of

Marxist theory is inadequate for social expla-

unconstrained agency, or the holist fallacy of

nation with the assertion that the broad

a transcendental "motor of history" (p. 33).

"range of what currently passes for Marxist

Or, as Marx (1852) put it, "Men make their

analysis" renders "the Marxian designation

own history, but not of their own free will, not

imprecise, if not self-contradictory" (p. 31).

under circumstances they themselves have

Although this statement is offered as evi-

chosen but under the given and inherited cir-

dence that it is difficult to criticize Marxist

cumstances with which they are confronted."

We feel that these major omissions in Dun-

work, it also serves as the basis for a

"functionalist" critique of Marxist theory and

can and Ley's paper render their account of

analysis: evidence that accords with the au-

structural Marxism, Marxist geography, and

Marxist social science irresponsible. It is

thors' a priori assessment of Marxism (such

as Althusserian abstraction) functions as the

quite insufficient, in our view, to make a brief

substantive basis of the critique, while con-

exonerating statement ("while we do not

mean to imply that Marxist geographers are

trary evidence (such as the broad scope of

all to be associated with Althusser's extreme

critique by treating it as if it were necessarily a

version of structuralism," p. 35) and then to

flaw or "contradiction" within Marxist social

Marxist study) is rendered functional to the

treat all Marxist work in geography and much

science (cf. Duncan and Ley 1982, 41-44).

of social science generally as if it were

"guilty" of the extreme problems of idealism

Thus despite the fact that a broad "spectrum

associated with Althusserian abstraction. As

tradicting Duncan and Ley's claim that Marx-

of published work" provides evidence con-

indicated above, this seriously misrepresents

ist theory in geography, (as well as in clas-

the contemporary development of Marxist

sical and structural "traditions" (pp. 47-49))

social science. And as Duncan and Ley have

refused to excuse Harvey (1978b) for in-

stasis," the functionalist logic of the critique

suffers from "conceptual and theoretical

adequacies in his paper that he attributed to

permits such evidence to be ignored. The ad-

lack of time or space (p. 51), we think it only

vantage of this form of criticism is that Marx-

fair that they not be permitted the same ex-

ist analysts cannot refute the authors' claims

cuse for these major silences in their critique.

about Marxist theory: if they demonstrate

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Commentary
conceptual flexibility in research, then their

141

conceptual limitations of Marxist theory ren-

field is incoherent; if, on the other hand, they

der it inadequate for social analysis on the

fail to develop theoretical innovations, then

grounds that this proposition rests on the

they are guilty of "conceptual ossification."

exclusion of relevant evidence and on a logi-

In addition to their illogical exclusion of

cally inconsistent theoretical alternative.

contrary evidence, Duncan and Ley also pro-

A second proposition in Duncan and Ley's

tect their claims for the conceptual inade-

critique of Marxist theory is that the use of

quacy of Marxist theory from "empirical" re-

Marxist concepts commits one to the view that

futation by ignoring recent debates in Marxist

history and classes have logics or "missions"

social science, and by implicitly advocating

that have "nothing to do with people's con-

theoretical eclecticism. The authors' charge

sciously trying to 'shape history' " (p. 43). The

that Marxist theory is conceptually limited

logical error in this case is that evolutionary

implies that the range of social questions ad-

terminology is equated with "teleological ex-

dressed by Marxist concepts cannot be ex-

planation," where "some Rationality ... is

tended. Yet extensions to the purview of Marx-

guiding events in the world to some preor-

ist theory such as Wright's (1979) work on

dained goal" (p. 43). Dun1.an and Ley ob-

contradictory class positions, and analyses of

serve, for example, that Marxist geographers

the production and experience of culture

have used such phrases as "capitalism ma-

(Barrett et al. 1979), have been prominent in

tures" in their discussions of the historical

contemporary Marxist debates. And insofar

development of capitalist societies (p. 43).

as Duncan and Ley's argument that "to the

But the way that their argument is advanced

extent that Marxist geographers believe

from this observation about language to the

capitalism to be a determining force, other

conclusion that Marxist explanation in geog-

types of explanation are believed unneces-

raphy ignores human practice is by failing to

sary, and many important explanatory factors

mention that Marxists regard struggle be-

are precluded from the analysis" (p. 37) con-

tween classes as the primary source of his-

stitutes a call for a theoretically eclectic alter-

torical change (Esping-Andersen, Friedland,

native to Marxism, it must be deemed a logi-

and Wright 1976). And contrary to the impres-

cally inconsistent basis for the rejection of

sion created by the authors that most Marxist

Marxist (and other) social theories. Unless

"traditions" regard class struggles as some-

one endorses a theory of the absolute ran-

how independent of individual practices, it

domness of social reality, one's social theory

was by making social practices the funda-

must involve some conception of determina-

mental basis of his theory of history that Marx

tion (be it focused on "capitalism," "liber-

was able to break with the extreme "atomis-

alism," the individual psyche, or some more

tic" or "individualistic" version of materialism

complex combination). Every theory has

espoused by Feuerbach (Suchting 1979).

fundamental premises that would be con-

Given the long-standing Marxist emphasis

tradicted were the premises of other theories

upon human actions in the production of

to be combined with them. So, for example,

historical outcomes, we regard the posing by

it would be inconsistent to attempt to main-

Duncan and Ley of terms like "capital" or

tain both that the mode of production of

" potent abstract structures" (p. 55) as "reified

material life establishes ultimate limits to

entities" with causal power over individual

the individual's practical opportunities and

actions, as a fundamental misrepresentation

experiences and that the individual psyche is

of the place of human agency in Marxist ge-

the final determinant of human practice (see

ography and theory generally. The literature

Keat 1981 on this problem with regard to

that can be cited to refute such an assess-

Habermas's attempt to develop a materialist-

ment includes recent work by geographers on

psychoanalytic theory of societal develop-

how class struggle shapes the organization of

ment). It is for this reason that we regard

state institutions and different branches of

Duncan and Ley's implicit advocacy of

capitalist industry (e.g., Fincher 1981; Rose

theoretical eclecticism as an argument

1981; Beamish 1981; Storper and Walker 1980).

against the consistent use of all social theory.

A central proposition in Duncan and Ley's

And we therefore reject the claim that the

critique of the methodology of most Marxist

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142 Chouinard and Fincher

"traditions" is that Marxist abstraction is ide-

materialists are now tackling such difficult

alist. The authors' arguments for this claim,

questions as the development and human ex-

however, involve another logical gap. Be-

perience of capitalist law (Cotterrell 1981) and

cause the question of whether or not idealist

the role of scientific practices in the eco-

and materialist forms of abstraction are sig-

nomic, political, and cultural development

nificantly different is not considered, the

of capitalist societies (Rose and Rose 1976).

reader is left with the impression that all

Duncan and Ley's philosophical case

abstraction is idealist. If this is indeed the

against a Marxist approach in human geog-

case, then substantial justification for this

raphy rests upon the proposition that a Marx-

stance is required because (as noted above)

ist epistemology commits one to a "conven-

there are those who regard concepts ab-

tional" or elitist belief in the "objectivity" of

stracted from the material conditions of life

scientific knowledge (p. 44), and to the de-

as nonidealist (e.g., Zietlin 1981). Moreover,

fense of a priori social knowledge (owing to

the related charge that Marxists have been

the literal use of theory and lack of empirical

unable to overcome the problem of moving

"validation" (pp. 54-56)). Once again, the ar-

between various levels of abstraction and

guments advanced to support this claim suf-

empirical "reality" (pp. 47-50) is advanced

fer from gaps in logic and substantiation. For

not only without assessing relevant Marxist

example, both positivism and structural Marxism are condemned for their claims to be

work (Mollenkopf 1981; Gibson 1981), but

also without considering whether or not this

"objective" science, and yet no effort is made

problem is unique to the Marxist method of

to examine the very different meanings of

abstraction. The latter question is especially

"objectivity" in each epistemology. Accord-

important because, without a specific critique

ing to positivist philosophy, scientific ob-

of Marxist or structural Marxist abstraction,

Duncan and Ley have criticized nonempiricist

jectivity is achieved when the investigator

maintains "value-neutrality" in his/her obser-

methodologies generally rather than "struc-

vations and attempts to invalidate hypotheses

tural Marxism and human geography."

by testing them against empirical data. For

those who accept a Marxist philosophy, on

A second proposition in Duncan and Ley's

critique of Marxist methodology in geography

and social science generally is that it is inher-

the other hand, "objectivity" entails a recognition of the antagonistic relations upon which

ently "economistic." We noted above that in

class societies are based and a "value-laden"

order to bring this charge of "economism"

commitment to test the validity of historical

against "structuralists in geography" (p. 47)

materialist theory in practical struggle (on

and "Marxian analysis" in general (p. 46) it is

this topic see Easlea (1973)). Similarly, the

necessary to ignore recent analyses of the

authors' argument that "empirical confusion"

state (Jessop 1977); of women and the family

is the necessary result of the use of structural

(Zaretsky 1973); of capitalist culture (Williams

Marxist theory, because concepts are literally

1973, 1981); and of various questions about

"imposed" on empirical reality (pp. 50-52),

subjective experience under capitalism

fails to consider the contemporary "post-

(Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies

empiricist" understanding that data never

1978). The logical question raised by these

test theory and that theory always "appropri-

developments, and persistently ignored by

ates" or defines data relevant to it (Laclau

Duncan and Ley, is whether or not there is an

1977; Sayer 1979; Hesse 1980). By ignoring

important difference between materialist and

economistic methods of social analysis. We

such important differences between positivist

and nonpositivist epistemologies, Duncan

would argue that the strength of Marx's mate-

and Ley commit the logical fallacy of criticiz-

rialist analysis of capitalism was that it de-

ing nonempiricist epistemologies for being

manded the questioning of capitalist society

nonempiricist (i.e., for having validation pro-

as a material way of life, and not simply as a

cedures that differ from those of empiricist

type of economy. It was for this reason that

science). The authors further confuse the

Marx hoped to supplement his economic

issue by claiming that "structural Marxism

work with a separate analysis of political in-

does not always engage in conventional vali-

stitutions (see Rodolsky 1977). And it is for

dation procedures" (p. 54) without specifying

the same reason that contemporary historical

either the meaning of "conventional," or

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Commentary

those occasions when "structural Marxism"

143

failed to include supportive comments about

could be said to engage in such procedures.

Marxist work, but that they did not offer con-

In view of these weaknesses in their philo-

structive criticisms with regard to such issues

sophical arguments, we find Duncan and

as the relationship between "agency and

Ley's characterization of contemporary Marx-

structure" (pp. 38-41). By this we mean that

ism as bedeviled by a "conventional" view

after having rejected Marxist "solutions" to

of scientific knowledge and a "crisis" of

epistemological and theoretical problems as

theoretical "literalism" and empirical "hetero-

hopelessly inadequate, the authors never ex-

doxy" (pp. 49-50) very unpersuasive indeed.

plicitly propose and justify an alternative that

On the Lack of Clear Alternatives to a

are hints, here and there, of the characteris-

Marxist Approach in Geography

tics of a theory that Duncan and Ley would

would resolve the stated difficulties. There

prefer to their interpretation of structural

A third major shortcoming in Duncan and

Marxism. It seems to be the case, for example,

Ley's critique of Marxist geography and so-

that the authors are prepared to reject mate-

cial science is that it fails to specify a clear

rialist abstraction as too "idealist" and that

alternative to Marxist theory, method, and

they advocate a type of theory that is more

philosophy. This means that the claim that if

"empirically testable" (p. 55). A more eclectic

structural Marxist theory is dispensable, then

conceptual approach seems preferred to the

"a distinctively Marxist identity to empirical

theoretical "closure" attributed to Marxist

study has been severely challenged" (p. 54)

work (p. 55). Greater consideration of "so-

remains unsubstantiated. For there are two

cial" and "psychological" factors (p. 54), and

conditions that would sustain the logic of this

especially of the behavior of individuals (p.

argument and yet neither is considered by the

46), seems to be strongly advocated. How-

authors. First, if "structural theory" ex-

ever, and quite apart from the fact that it is

hausted Marxist theory in general, then it

erroneous to criticize Marxism for not pos-

would necessarily follow that to discard the

sessing these characteristics (because Marx-

former would be to abandon a Marxist in-

ism does not claim to have them in the first

terpretation of empirical facts. However, as

place), Duncan and Ley do not specify why a

argued above, structural theory does not

theory with these properties would be an im-

exhaust Marxist theory in general. Therefore,

provement over Marxist social science.

we are left with a second possibility: if it were

We not only reject those aspects of an al-

shown that the "dispensability" of structural

ternative approach to human geography that

Marxist theory derives from the fact that there

could be distilled from Duncan and Ley's

exists a theoretical, methodological, and

"hints" (i.e., empiricist validation procedures,

epistemological alternative that is demonstra-

direct correspondence between theoretical

bly superior to all Marxist approaches, then

categories and empirical data, theoretical

a rejection of "structural Marxism" could

eclecticism, and a focus on psychological and

constitute a severe challenge to Marxist "em-

behavioral factors as primary in historical ex-

pirical study." Unfortunately, Duncan and Ley

planation), but we also find that the inade-

do not provide either a clear alternative or a

quacy with which their alternative is proposed

demonstration of its superiority. It is to the

and justified stifles constructive debate with

implications of this silence in their critique of

the authors. If constructive communication is

Marxist work that we now turn.

At the outset of their discussion, Duncan

an important element of "more satisfactory

scholarship" (p. 31), then it is difficult to un-

and Ley suggest that "some might see this

derstand how scholarship can be advanced

paper as an ungracious response to Peet's

without explicit discussion of the alterna-

invitation 'to see radical geography system-

tive(s) to an approach that has been severely

atically evaluated for what it has to offer' " (p.

criticized.

31). As indicated above, we regard their

treatment of Marxist geography and social

Conclusion

science not as "ungracious," but as misleading and irresponsible. What is equally

Three general shortcomings in Duncan and

disturbing, in our view, is not that the authors

Ley's review of Marxist geography and social

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144

Chouinard

and

Fincher

science have been noted in this critique.

(1) a functionalist interpretation of evi-

These are errors of omission in the charac-

dence contrary to their a priori assess-

terization of "traditions" in Marxist social science; logical inconsistencies in the critique of

Marxist theory, method, and philosophy; and

the lack of an explicit alternative to a Marxist

ment of Marxist theory,

(2) an implicit advocacy of theoretical eclecticism,

(3) misrepresentation of human agency in

approach in human geography. We have

Marxist theory by ignoring the centrality

noted the following vital omissions in the au-

of class struggle in Marxist explanation,

thors' treatment of Marxist "traditions:"

(1) The work of those Marxists who have

(4) the conflation of idealist with materialist abstraction,

followed neither the structural nor the

(5) the conflation of materialist and econ-

historiographic "traditions" is not dis-

omistic methods of social analysis, and

(6) the failure to distinguish between

cussed.
(2) The question of whether or not it is valid

to treat Marxist concepts as if they refer

positivist and nonpositivist epistemologies.

solely to material objects is not consid-

We have argued that these gaps in logic and

ered.

substantiation undermine Duncan and Ley's

(3) The historical significance and context

propositions about the theory, method, and

of "structural Marxism" is not speci-

philosophy of Marxism. And in the last part of

fied.

our commentary we have suggested that the

(4) Relevant aspects of the history of Marx-

authors' failure to propose and justify a clear

ist geographical work are ignored.

alternative to Marxist geography has discour-

(5) The limits assigned to Marxist geo-

aged constructive debate on the issues raised

graphical work are not specified.

in their critique.

(6) Nonstructuralist approaches in Marxist

These shortcomings encourage us to reject

social science and the participation of

Duncan and Ley's pessimistic assessment of

geographers in these developments are

Marxist geography and social science. And

not considered.

although we are certainly prepared to agree

(7) They fail to specify the philosophical

that there is much challenging work still to be

bases of Marxist "traditions" and, in

done in developing Marxist social science,

particular, to acknowledge the philoso-

especially with regard to ideology, culture,

phy of historical materialism.

and the importance of political institutions,

It has been argued that these major omissions

we prefer to explore new possibilities for a

lead Duncan and Ley to a superficial charac-

sophisticated, materialist explanation of

terization of Marxist "traditions" and to an ir-

these phenomena in capitalism. We do not

responsible account of structural Marxism,

expect our critics to endorse this decision,

Marxist geography, and Marxist social science.

Logical inconsistencies identified in the

but we would hope that future "critical

analyses" of Marxist work in geography might

authors' critique of Marxist theory, method,

offer more opportunities for a constructive

and philosophy include:

exchange of ideas between social theorists.

Vera Chouinard and Ruth Fincher, Department of Geography, McMaster University,

Hamilton, Ont., L8S 4K1.

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Comment in Reply

CHOUINARD and Fincher have chosen a

social science." Having claimed that this is

diversionary procedure to level their

what we are doing, they then take us to task

critique. First they spend the bulk of their

for (a) not analyzing "poststructuralist" Marx-

commentary arguing that we should have

ist geography and (b) not analyzing non-

written our paper on something other than

structuralist Marxist social science. It would

structural Marxism, and second they make

at present be a simple enough task to an-

almost no attempt to defend the research of

alyze poststructural Marxist geography, for

the geographers that we criticized. It would

there is so little of it. A handful of articles by

seem they are unwilling or unable to defend

geographers are cited, some of which were

published after we submitted our paper to the

this work.
Let us first set out once again what our

Annals. In fact, Chouinard and Fincher admit

paper is and is not about. Its title, "Structural

that there is very little poststructural work to

Marxism and Human Geography," directs the

analyze, even two years after we submitted

reader to geographers whose work fits into a

our final draft, when they write, "If one judges

structural Marxist perspective. Throughout

the contributions by geographers to these

the paper we make it clear that this is the

advances meager in number, one should also

body of work that we are critiquing. Yet

recall that much of this work originates in

Chouinard and Fincher have chosen to over-

disciplines other than geography (e.g.,

look this fact. Throughout their commentary

sociology and political science) and has only

they claim that rather than analyzing struc-

recently been available in published form.

tural Marxism in geography we are in fact

Geographers have just begun to explore

analyzing all of Marxist geography or even

these new perspectives and to acquaint

"the contemporary development of Marxist

themselves with associated research topics."

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Commentary

147

Again, we could hardly have analyzed what

here is that each position is attacked and

geographers have just now "begun to

neither thoroughly defended. In fact, it is

explore." Perhaps it is this very poverty of

nonstructural geographic work that leads

defend structural Marxism in geography that

Chouinard and Fincher to state that our paper

"forecloses constructive debate."

Chinouard and Fincher's unwillingness to

is really about Marxist social science in gen-

Chouinard and Fincher's ambivalence

eral, a claim they make repeatedly throughout

the paper. Having stated that this is our goal,

about the structural work that we criticize

emerges, curiously enough, in an attack on us

they proceed to admonish us for not having

rather than on the geographers who put for-

discussed the work of nonstructural Marxists

ward the structural theory. They suggest that

who are not geographers. Having found little

we have misguided notions about the nature

in geography to contradict our view, they try

fishing in better-stocked waters. We would

structural geographers. For example, they

of Marxism when we are simply quoting the

not be so bold as to undertake an assessment

claim that we are wrong in associating a

of all Marxian social science. Rather it

seemed quite enough to examine the dominant
mode of Marxist explanation in geography.

holistic philosophy with Marxism; if so, what

Having restated the focus of our paper, let

derson, Santos, and Walker (Duncan and Ley

do they make of the explicit claims that Marxism is holistic that are made by Harvey, An-

us now turn to a related issue raised by

1982, 35)? They claim that we should not as-

Chouinard and Fincher. They claim that "by

failing to specify their own epistemological

we demonstrate (Duncan and Ley 1982,

and theoretical alternative to a Marxist approach in human geography, the authors

argue such a teleological position. To try, as

have foreclosed constructive debate on the

issues raised.". There is some confusion here

evolutionism from teleology is unacceptable.

sociate teleology with Marxism and yet, as

42-43), it is the Marxists themselves who

Chouinard and Fincher do, to separate

about the nature of academic criticism. An

Evolutionism is simply a type of teleology

individual or group of scholars puts forward a

propounded by Darwin. Applying this partic-

theoretical position either in papers explicitly

ular version of teleology to society is as sus-

devoted to this task or implicitly in empirical

reports. Others who find fault with the particular theory criticize it in terms of such criteria

pect a form of explanation as are other forms

of teleological explanation (see Giddens 1981).
Our critics state that the structural geographers that we cite do not engage in reified

as its model of man, its internal logical consistency, its ability to shed light on human ac-

explanation, even though we demonstrate

tion, and so on. Those who hold the theory

that they do, drawing examples from their

should be able to defend it on these grounds,

and if they are unable to do so, then they

claim that although these geographers' ex-

work (Duncan and Ley 1980, 35-44). They

should give some thought to its modification.

planations might appear reified, they could

In other words, a theory should be able to

not be because Marxism draws upon a rela-

withstand this sort of test on its own. The idea

that this is not possible and that constructive
debate about the merits of a theory can take
place only if a kind of comparison test is

tional view. But as we have shown (pp.

33-34), Hegel, from whom Marx received his

relational view, treated relations in a reified
manner (i.e., all things are internally related to

performed is an elusive suggestion. The com-

Geist). Contrary to what Chouinard and

parison test will not necessarily tell one

Fincher believe, therefore, a relational view

whether a theory is flawed or not. For ex-

does not necessarily guarantee that reifica-

ample, one might put forward two theories

tion is absent. Therefore, whereas a relational

for comparison, both of which are severely

view does not necessarily entail reification,

flawed. Only by submitting a theory to close

we have shown that in the case of the struc-

scrutiny and letting it stand or fall on its own

tural geographers it may and indeed often

merits can one ascertain its worth. However,

if one does not choose to defend the merits

does so.

of a position, then a debating technique is

tural Marxist geographers talk about class

to shift the attack from one's own position to

struggle, they could not be engaging in reifi-

that of one's critics. What usually happens

cation. However, this is no guard against

Similarly, they argue that because struc-

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148

Duncan

and

Ley

reification. The question is not whether actors

by saying that a crude materialism which

act, clearly they do, but why do they act?

posits an inert subject of necessity falls back

What are the driving forces behind, for exam-

upon idealism to drive that subject. We can

ple, class struggle? Are these actions con-

scarcely take credit for this insight, for,

ceived of as highly determined by a reified,

among others, the link between mechanical

supra-individual system, or is a degree of in-

materialism and idealism was pointed out by

dividual volition to be included in the model

Marx in his critique of Feuerbach.

of man? We have argued that the structural

geographers have a reified and overdetermined view which does not grant the degree

of individual volition that in fact exists, and

we have supported our argument with quotations from authors like Harvey, who writes,
"Yet this historical mission does not stem
from the inherent greed of the capitalist; it

arises, rather, out of forces entirely independent of the capitalist's individual will" (Dun-

The chief defect of all hitherto existing

materialism-that of Feuerbach included-is
that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity,
practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened
that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism was developed by idealism-but only
abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not

know real, sensuous activity as such (Marx

1972, 107).

can and Ley 1982, 39). The author is stating

that a "historical mission" is being driven by

If actors are seen as "mere bearers," ab-

forces entirely independent of individual will.

stracted agents of structures, if it is asserted

We are simply left to wonder what these

that there is no place in Marxism for "social"

supra-individual and, we might add, tele-

or "psychological" factors, nor for the be-

ological "forces" might be. And why is there

havior of individuals, then surely Marx would

no treatment of individual or group volition or

have concluded, as he did upon seeing these

creativity in this model? Surprisingly, Chou-

same shortcomings in Feuerbach, that under-

inard and Fincher later in their paper suggest

lying an impoverished materialism is the driv-

an answer. In discussing what they surmise

ing force of idealism, developed "abstractly"

to be our alternative to structural Marxism

as it is in structural Marxism. It was precisely

they write, "Greater consideration of 'social'

for this reason that the Marxian historian

and 'psychological' factors, and especially of

E. P. Thompson argued that it is structural

the behavior of individuals, seems to be

Marxism which Marx "would have recognized

strongly advocated. However ... it is errone-

instantly as an idealism" (Thompson 1978, 205).

ous to criticise Marxism for not possessing

As a result of Chouinard and Fincher's in-

these characteristics (because Marxism does

troducing the diversions of a literature we did

not claim to have them in the first place)."

not claim to address, the criticisms we raised

Our authors have surely erred in suggesting

against a structural Marxist tradition in geog-

that there are no variants of Marxism that

raphy remain intact and scarcely challenged.

would include any social-psychological

The challenges the commentators do raise

factors or would have a concern for the

are not substantial and commonly appear as

behavior of individuals. Clearly such themes

language games, allowing assertions and

are integral to the writing of such scholars

nominalism to take the place of real argu-

as Raymond Williams or E. P. Thompson.

ment. For example, they simply assert that

However, we would argue that structural

there is no problematic relation between

Marxism lacks these characteristics, and it is

theoretical abstraction and empirical work.

precisely this which makes it such an impov-

This is no answer to a closely documented

erished theory. Given this admitted failure to

six-page discussion in our paper, which in-

consider individual behavior, or social and

cludes Harvey's (1975) more perceptive re-

psychological factors, it is little wonder that

mark that "we have to force an intersection

even as seemingly active an endeavor as

between the theoretical abstractions, on the

class struggle should be reified?

one hand, and the materialist investigations

A related issue concerns skepticism that we

of actual historical configurations on the

could link idealism to a position that is avow-

other" (our emphasis). It was this task,

edly materialist, for it is argued that the two

moreover, of "transformation from the gen-

concepts are antithetical. We would respond

eral to the concrete which comprised the

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Commentary

149

central thrust of Marx's unfinished work."

1978; Gouldner 1980) see as of crisis propor-

Chouinard and Fincher clearly disagree with

tion. Symptomatic is their deflection of

Harvey and many other social theorists (e.g.,

economism as a serious charge. We cited no

Gouldner 1980) in failing to perceive serious un-

fewer than six contemporary authorities fa-

resolved problems in forcing the intersection.

vorably disposed to Marxist analysis who

Perhaps they might respond that it is not

identified the abiding centrality of this prob-

what they write but what they mean that

lem in Marxist scholarship, and a number of

should be examined (as they state at one

examples from the geographical literature.

point in defense of structuralist work), but

But for our authors economism is a non-

such linguistic dexterity raises the suspicion

issue, either a charge that has not been sub-

that semantic obfuscation is a shelter to con-

stantiated or else a problem that has now

ceal fuzzy thinking. In this context a major

been resolved. It is worth recalling Stedman

theme of their essay is that we do not treat

Jones's more accurate remark that "they

historical materialism as such. Conveniently,

(Marx and Engels) did not resolve the prob-

however, in place of itemizing the differences

lem, any more than we have" (Stedman Jones

between historical materialism and the liter-

1979).

ature we criticize, Chouinard and Fincher

A related point concerns the authors' views

primarily refer the reader to a reading list.

on conceptual flexibility. If developed by Marx-

This overlooks the point that a number of

ists it is theoretically innovative, if suggested

authors whom we cite refer to their own work

by us it is theoretically eclectic. Aside from

as materialist, including Harvey (as is exem-

the imposition of bald value judgments, there

plified in his quotation above). Thus once

is a more important issue at stake. First, the

again there is an internal and unresolved

point at debate is not one of theoretical eclec-

contradiction in the authors' commentary.

ticism but of theoretical adequacy; indeed,

Moreover, merely to cite historical material-

to many people Marx's own attempted syn-

ism as a label is no argument. Though such

thesis of British political economy, French

nominalism is not uncommon among Marxist

socialism, and German social philosophy

geographers, it is no substitute for a real

would appear highly eclectic. Such is often

argument, which would need to address

the norm with creative thinkers. Our paper

certain weaknesses of the position (Giddens

1981). One of the key weaknesses is a diffuseness, which can embrace authors as

demonstrates why the literature we examine

is not theoretically adequate. One objection

in our argument is directed against its reduc-

disparate as Harvey and J. B. Jackson (Punter

tionism, and an attraction toward reduc-

1982), or Raymond Williams and Vidal de la

tionism seems to be espoused by Chouinard

Blache (Gregory 1981). So much elasticity has

and Fincher in their preference for social

been introduced in such a perspective ("vac-

theory that "establishes ultimate limits" and

uous pluralism," as one commentator has

poses a "final determinant." Some very dif-

termed it) that it is difficult to see that it has

ficult questions are engaged here, for al-

theoretical edge and specificity (Ley 1982).

though reductionism in the social sciences

Historical materialism in these terms seems

may be logically correct it is commonly

more of a linguistic construction than a

simplistic in an explanatory sense. On the

theoretically integrated position.

This is one example of a tendency by

other hand, analysis that is more consistent

with empirical circumstances normally intro-

Chouinard and Fincher to skate over difficult

duces explanatory contingencies that fall

problems with a jejeune optimism that does

outside the range of reductionist theory. In-

not acknowledge the existence of such

cumbent upon our authors is to demonstrate

problems. They are critical that our paper

how their materialism simultaneously retains

does not cover the whole range of Marxist

a specific theoretical identity and is adequate

at the level of historical explanation. An alter-

traditions, yet they fail to appreciate that the

very existence of these traditions with their

native position following such varied authors

acute internal disputes points to serious un-

as Giddens (1979) or Thompson (1978) would

resolved contradictions within the Marxist

make lesser claims for their theoretical

paradigm (and also Marxist practice), con-

structure, treating theory as contingent or

tradictions that some authors (Thompson

even as a heuristic (in a noninstrumental

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150

Duncan

and

Ley

sense) in order to provide more adequate ex-

standard for testing the truth-value of propo-

sitions against empirical data. But Marxist

planation.

But Chouinard and Fincher have closed off

theory, they argue, must not be tested in such

this option for themselves through their

a manner. Instead, it must meet the judgment

ideological commitment. For in a revealing

of history as a source of liberating practice.

passage they acknowledge that objectivity for

E. P. Thompson has cited history's negative

Marxists entails "a 'value-laden' commitment

verdict against this form of validation of

to test the validity of historical materialist

theoretical Marxism: "The greatest ideal ob-

theory in practical struggle." Theoretical re-

stacle has been the caricature of socialism

ductionism is thereby ultimately a political

presented by the fact of socialist states"

necessity, not an empirical one. So, too, ver-

(Thompson 1978, 169). For Thompson this

ification of a theoretical position must be po-

represents a political crisis that he copes with

litical rather than empirical. Indeed, following

through a romantic utopianism for the future

the neo-Kantians, facts are discounted as a

(pp. 169-71). But for Chouinard and Fincher

mere construction of theory. There are two

(unlike Thompson) the historical record

final points to be made here. First, if empirical

poses both an intellectual and a political

validation is discounted, what are we to make

crisis, for political change is set up as the

of the commentators' repeated allusions to

guarantor of valid theory. Utopianism may be

"evidence" in challenging our critique? At

a solace in politics; it is far less easy to justify

one point they use the arguments of "evi-

within the realm of scientific discourse. The

dence" five times in two consecutive sen-

absence of an adequate verification pro-

tences. This sounds like a less lofty and more

cedure remains as a crippling problem.

defensible usage than their own ideological

James Duncan and David Ley, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1 W5

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