Constitutional Law 1: State Immunity

Case Digest: The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.

G.R. No. 101949 01December 1994
FACTS: This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land
consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque.
Said lot was contiguous with two other lots. These lots were sold to Ramon
Licup. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold, a
dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and
clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was
the sale by petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana.
ISSUE: Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business
relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity
RULING: As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution,
we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law.
Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are
deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and
consequence of our admission in the society of nations. In the present
case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real
estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act
jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and
subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it
acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature
in the Philippines. The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling
the lot of concern is non-proprietary in nature. The lot was acquired by
petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was
made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct
thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The decision to
transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise
clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the lot for
profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the
squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it
for the purpose of the donation.
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Edilberto G.
Sandoval, RTC of Manila, Branch 9, Caylao et.al G. R. No. 84607,
March 19, 2003
FACTS: The doctrines of immunity of the government from suit are
expressly provided in the Constitution under Article XVI, Section 3. It is

provided that the State may not be sued without its consent. Some
instances when a suit against the State is proper are: (1) When the
Republic is sued by name; (2) When the suit is against an unincorporated
government agency; (3) When the suit is, on its face, against a
government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong
not to the officer but to the government. With respect to the incident that
happened in Mendiola on January 22, 1987 that befell twelve rallyists, the
case filed against the military officers was dismissed by the lower court.
The defendants were held liable but it would not result in financial
responsibility to the government. The petitioner (Caylao Group) filed a suit
against the State that for them the State has waived its immunity when
the Mendiola Commission recommended the government to indemnify the
victims of the Mendiola incident and the acts and utterances of President
Aquino which is sympathetic to the cause is indicative of State's waiver of
immunity and therefore, the government should also be liable and should
be compensated by the government . The case has been dismissed that
State has not waived its immunity. On the other hand, the Military Officer
filed a petition for certiorari to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 9.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit and
therefore should the State be liable for the incident?
HELD: No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission
regarding the indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims
of the incident does not in any way mean liability automatically attaches to
the State. The purpose of which is to investigate of the disorders that took
place and the recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State.
The acts and utterances of President Aquino does not mean admission of
the State of its liability. Moreover, the case does not qualify as suit against
the State. While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate
liability does not pertain to the government. The military officials are held
liable for the damages for their official functions ceased the moment they
have exceeded to their authority. They were deployed to ensure that the
rally would be peaceful and orderly and should guarantee the safety of the
people. The court has made it quite clear that even a high position in the
government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure
another. The court rules that there is no reversible error and no grave
abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Judge in issuing the
questioned orders.

Constitutional Law 1: State Immunity

G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972
VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as
Commissioner of Pub. Highways and REP. OF THE PHIL,
defendants-appellees.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
FACTS: Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner of a lot in Cebu City.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a
portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the
Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been
appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor
General, who disallowed it in his 9th Endorsement. Thus, Amigable filed in
the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and
Nicolas Cuenca (Commissioner of Public Highways) for the recovery of
ownership and possession of her lot. The defendants denied the plaintiffs
allegations stating: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having
been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of
action for the recovery had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a
suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees
and costs had no valid basis since the Government had not given its
consent to be sued; and(4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu
that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango
Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. On July 29,
1959, the court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction
over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and
ownership of the lot on the ground that the government cannot be sued
without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to
hear and decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages, being a money
claim against the government; and that it had long prescribed, nor did it
have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its
consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.
ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government
RULING: Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government
appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed
any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the
appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she

could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in

question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes
of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by
the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is
now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for
the government to make due compensation which it could and should have
done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis
should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the
form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up
to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition, the
government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be
fixed by the trial court after hearing. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed
from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the
determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the
appellant is entitled as above indicated.
REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-30671November 28, 1973
Facts: On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No.
2156-R in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and
International Construction Corporation and against petitioner confirming
the arbitration award in the amount of P1, 712,396.40. The award is for
the satisfaction of a judgment against the Philippine Government. On June
24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo Villasor issued an
Order declaring the decision final and executory. Villasor directed the
Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute said
decision. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with
several Banks, specially on Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB. The funds of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with Philippine Veterans
Bank and PNB are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the
payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian
personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP. Petitioner, on
certiorari, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor
for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against
the properties of the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment are null and
void.

Constitutional Law 1: State Immunity

Issue: Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid?
Held: What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the
dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of
constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the
state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its
consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends. The State may not be sued without its consent. A
corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is
that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if
the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be
sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the
stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since the government funds and properties may not
be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by
the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.
Dept. of Agriculture vs. NLRC
Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security
Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the
latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements,
guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of
the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of
wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift
differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages
against
the
DA
and
the
security
agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally
liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the
complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not
appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The
Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the

judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency.

Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the
DA.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in
the
case
Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that the State
may not be sued without its consent reflects nothing less than a
recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express
affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the
jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A
sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on
which
the
right
depends.
The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be
sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The
States consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may
be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the
other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this
situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign
immunity.
But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of
its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is
executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is
done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have descended to
the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned
contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in
character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards
clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the

Constitutional Law 1: State Immunity

State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act
327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to
the Commission on Audit.

although they are considered to be public in character, they are not exempt
from garnishment (legal proceedings).
GAUDENCIO RAYO vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN
G.R. No. L-55273-83 December 19, 1981

RAYO vs. CFI of BULACAN

Facts:
1. During the height of typhoon Kading, the National Power Corporations
plant superintendent Chavez opened simultaneously all the three
floodgates of the Angat Dam.
2. As a direct and immediate result, several towns in Bulacan were flooded
(particularly Norzagaray). About a hundred of its residents died and
properties worth million of pesos were destroyed.
3. The petitioners, who are among the unfortunate victims of the mancaused flood, filed several complaints for damages against NPC and the
plant superintendent.
4. NPC claimed, as its defense, that in the operation of the Angat Dam, it is
performing a purely governmental function. Thus, it cannot be sued
without the express consent of the State.
5. The petitioners opposed the claim of NPC and claimed that it is
performing not governmental but merely proprietary functions and that
based on the organic charter (charter -a legal document that provides for
the creation of a corporate entity) of NPC, it can be sued and be sued in
any court.
Issue: Whether or not the power of NPC to sue and be sued under its
organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort.

FACTS: At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent

opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam which
resulted in a sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of said
floodgates several towns in Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed
for damages against the respondent corporation.
Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents from dismissal of the
case and contended that the respondent corporation is merely performing a
propriety functions and that under its own organic act, it can sue and be
sued in court.
ISSUE:
1.
2.

W/N the respondent performs governmental functions with

respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam.
W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its
organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort.

HELD: The government has organized a private corporation, put money in

it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter.
As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of
its own, distinct and separate from that of the government. Moreover, the
charter provision that it can sue and be sued in any court.
BUREAU

OF

PRINTING,

SERAFIN

SALVADOR

and

MARIANO

Held: The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it

and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. NPC,
as a government owned and controlled corporation, has a personality of its
own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. In any court, NPC
can sue and be sued for tort. The petition of the petitioners was granted.

LEDESMA, petitioners, vs. THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES

Notes: Government-owned and controlled corporations have a personality

of their own, separate and distinct from the government. Therefore,

Facts: The action in question was upon complaint of the respondents

ASSOCIATION (NLU), et al. respondents.

G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961

Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula, Roberto

Constitutional Law 1: State Immunity

Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran filed by an acting

Note: The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the

prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein petitioner Bureau of

Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the

Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department

Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive

of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of

Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all

Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma

printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required

have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or

by the National Government and such other work of the same character as

coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the members

said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance)Executive

of the complaining association petition, in the exercise of their right to self-

Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code).

organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their

It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the

employment in order to discourage them from pursuing the union

General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the

activities.The petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano

Government, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in

Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to the and,

business or occupation for pecuniary profit.

by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that

respondents Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and
Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an administrative
investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations
petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and
be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged
for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing
government functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could be heard,
petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on
the question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for
suspension of the trial of the case on the merits pending the determination
of such jurisdictional question. The motion was granted, but after hearing,
the trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959
sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of
the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and,
consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of this order
was also denied by the court en banc.

Issue: whether or not Bureau of Printing can be sued.

Ruling: No. Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate
or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. Any suit,
action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would
actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and
the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent,
much less over its objection. t is true that the Bureau of Printing receives
outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on
regular working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the
conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature."
Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of
the service so requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime
compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the
head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it
cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly
proprietary in character. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to
undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an
industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for private

Constitutional Law 1: State Immunity

parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be

Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the

deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees

Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the

performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those

Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive

employed in its general governmental functions.

Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all
printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required

Bureau of Printing vs Bureau of Printing Employees Association

by the National Government and such other work of the same character as

G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961 1 SCRA 340

said Bureau may, by law or by order of the Executive Secretary, be

Facts: Upon complaint of the respondents of the Bureau of Printing

Employees Association against the Bureau of Printing, the complaint
alleged that the latter have been engaging in unfair labor practices by
interfering with, or coercing their employees, in the exercise of their right
to self-organization and discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their
employment in order to discourage them from pursuing the union
activities. The Petitioners of Bureau of Printing denied the charges of unfair
labor practices attributed to and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged,
among other things, that the respondents of the Bureau of Printing
Employees

Association

were

suspending

the

pending

result

of

an

administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules

and regulations petition; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical
personality to sue and be sued; that said bureau is not an industrial
concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic
performing government functions. The petitioners filed an "Omnibus
Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction
raised by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of the case
on the merits pending the determination of such juridical question.
Issue: Whether or not the Bureau of Printing, in the proceeding in the
action for unfair labor practice, lacks jurisdiction thereof.

authorized to undertake...". It has no corporate existence, and its

appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed
to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service
bureau

and obviously, not engaged in

business or occupation for

pecuniary profit. Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when
the interest of the service so requires. As a matter of administrative policy,
the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary
with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so
that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are
wholly proprietary in character. The additional work it executes for private
parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be
deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees
performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those
employed in its general governmental functions. As an office of the
Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of
Printing cannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were
to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding
against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government
cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection.
Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Court of Appeals - Not all
government entities whether corporate or not are immune from suits.

Held: The trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order dated January 27,

Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for

1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions

which the entity was organized. - Suits against State agencies with relation

of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature,". The

to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or non-

Constitutional Law 1: State Immunity

governmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations
created by the State to engage In matters partaking more of the nature of
ordinary business are not regarded as suits against the State
G.R. No. L-51806 November 8, 1988
CIVIL
AERONAUTICS
ADMINISTRATION,
petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNEST E. SIMKE, respondents. The
Solicitor General for petitioner. Ledesma, Guytingco, Veleasco &
Associates for respondent Ernest E. Simke.

Private respondent then filed an action for damages based on quasi-delict

with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VII against petitioner Civil
Aeronautics Administration or CAA as the entity empowered "to administer,
operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International
Airport ... ." [Sec. 32 (24), R.A. 776].
Said claim for damages included, aside from the medical and hospital bills,
consequential damages for the expenses of two lawyers who had to go
abroad in private respondent's stead to finalize certain business
transactions and for the publication of notices announcing the
postponement of private respondent's daughter's wedding which had to be
cancelled because of his accident [Record on Appeal, p. 5].

CORTES, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming the trial court decision which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff the amount of P15,589.55 as full reimbursement of his actual
medical and hospital expenses, with interest at the legal rate from the
commencement of the suit; the amount of P20,200.00 as consequential
damages; the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages; the amount of
P40,000.00 as exemplary damages; the further amount of P20,000.00 as
attorney's fees and the costs [Rollo, p. 24].

Judgment was rendered in private respondent's favor prompting petitioner

to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the trial court's
decision. Petitioner then filed with the same court a Motion for,
Reconsideration but this was denied.
Petitioner now comes before this Court raising the following assignment of
errors:
1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that the present the
CAA is really a suit against the Republic of the Philippines which cannot be
sued without its consent, which was not given in this case.

In the afternoon of December 13, 1968, private respondent with several

other persons went to the Manila International Airport to meet his future
son-in-law. In order to get a better view of the incoming passengers, he
and his group proceeded to the viewing deck or terrace of the airport.

2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that the injuries of

respondent Ernest E. Simke were due to petitioner's negligence although
there was no substantial evidence to support such finding; and that the
inference that the hump or elevation the surface of the floor area of the
terrace of the fold) MIA building is dangerous just because said respondent
tripped over it is manifestly mistaken circumstances that justify a review
by this Honorable Court of the said finding of fact of respondent appellate
court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622; Ramos v. CA, 63 SCRA
331.)

While walking on the terrace, then filled with other people, private
respondent slipped over an elevation about four (4) inches high at the far
end of the terrace. As a result, private respondent fell on his back and
broke his thigh bone.

3. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ordering petitioner to pay actual,

consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees to
respondent Simke although there was no substantial and competent
proof to support said awards I Rollo, pp. 93-94 1.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Private respondent is a naturalized Filipino citizen and at the time of the
incident was the Honorary Consul Geileral of Israel in the Philippines.

The next day, December 14, 1968, private respondent was operated on for
about three hours.

Constitutional Law 1: State Immunity

I. Invoking the rule that the State cannot be sued without its consent,
petitioner contends that being an agency of the government, it cannot be
made a party-defendant in this case.
This Court has already held otherwise in the case of National Airports
Corporation v. Teodoro, Sr. [91 Phil. 203 (1952)]. Petitioner contends that
the said ruling does not apply in this case because: First, in the Teodoro
case, the CAA was sued only in a substituted capacity, the National Airports
Corporation being the original party. Second, in the Teodoro case, the
cause of action was contractual in nature while here, the cause of action is
based on a quasi-delict. Third, there is no specific provision in Republic Act
No. 776, the law governing the CAA, which would justify the conclusion
that petitioner was organized for business and not for governmental
purposes. [Rollo, pp. 94-97].

Second, the Teodoro case did not make any qualification or limitation as to
whether or not the CAA's power to sue and be sued applies only to
contractual obligations. The Court in the Teodoro case ruled that Sections 3
and 4 of Executive Order 365 confer upon the CAA, without any
qualification, the power to sue and be sued, albeit only by implication.
Accordingly, this Court's pronouncement that where such power to sue and
be sued has been granted without any qualification, it can include a claim
based on tort or quasi-delict [Rayo v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
G.R. Nos. 55273-83, December 19,1981, 1 1 0 SCRA 4561 finds relevance
and applicability to the present case.
Third, it has already been settled in the Teodoro case that the CAA as an
agency is not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to
a private entity.

Such arguments are untenable.

xxx xxx xxx

First, the Teodoro case, far from stressing the point that the CAA was only
substituted for the National Airports Corporation, in fact treated the CAA as
the real party in interest when it stated that:

The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private

entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National
Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government,
but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime
objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the
travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the
exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of public
roads, be undertaken by private concerns. [National Airports Corp. v.
Teodoro, supra, p. 207.]

xxx xxx xxx

... To all legal intents and practical purposes, the National Airports
Corporation is dead and the Civil Aeronautics Administration is its heir or
legal representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its own rights
and in its own name. The better practice there should have been to make
the Civil Aeronautics Administration the third party defendant instead of
the National Airports Corporation. [National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro,
supra, p. 208.]
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

True, the law prevailing in 1952 when the Teodoro case was promulgated
was Exec. Order 365 (Reorganizing the Civil Aeronautics Administration
and Abolishing the National Airports Corporation). Republic Act No. 776
(Civil Aeronautics Act of the Philippines), subsequently enacted on June 20,
1952, did not alter the character of the CAA's objectives under Exec, Order
365. The pertinent provisions cited in the Teodoro case, particularly Secs. 3
and 4 of Exec. Order 365, which led the Court to consider the CAA in the
category of a private entity were retained substantially in Republic Act 776,
Sec. 32 (24) and (25).<re||an1w> Said Act provides:
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. Subject to the general
control and supervision of the Department Head, the Administrator shall
have among others, the following powers and duties:

Constitutional Law 1: State Immunity

xxx xxx xxx
(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the
Manila International Airport and all government-owned aerodromes except
those controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
including such powers and duties as: (a) to plan, design, construct, equip,
expand, improve, repair or alter aerodromes or such structures,
improvement or air navigation facilities; (b) to enter into, make and
execute contracts of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private
corporation or entity; ... .
(25) To determine, fix, impose, collect and receive landing fees, parking
space fees, royalties on sales or deliveries, direct or indirect, to any aircraft
for its use of aviation gasoline, oil and lubricants, spare parts, accessories
and supplies, tools, other royalties, fees or rentals for the use of any of the
property under its management and control.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the CAA is tasked with private or
non-governmental functions which operate to remove it from the purview
of the rule on State immunity from suit. For the correct rule as set forth in
the Tedoro case states:
xxx xxx xxx
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are
immune from suits. Immunity functions suits is determined by the
character of the objects for which the entity was organized. The rule is thus
stated in Corpus Juris:
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have
assumed to act in private or non-governmental capacity, and various suits
against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to
engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather
than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as
suits against the state. The latter is true, although the state may own stock
or property of such a corporation for by engaging in business operations
through a corporation, the state divests itself so far of its sovereign
character, and by implication consents to suits against the corporation. (59
C.J., 313) [National Airport Corporation v. Teodoro, supra, pp. 206-207;
Emphasis supplied.]

This doctrine has been reaffirmed in the recent case of Malong v. Philippine
National Railways [G.R. No. L-49930, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 631,
where it was held that the Philippine National Railways, although owned
and operated by the government, was not immune from suit as it does not
exercise sovereign but purely proprietary and business functions.
Accordingly, as the CAA was created to undertake the management of
airport operations which primarily involve proprietary functions, it cannot
avail of the immunity from suit accorded to government agencies
performing strictly governmental functions.
II. Petitioner tries to escape liability on the ground that there was no basis
for a finding of negligence. There can be no negligence on its part, it
alleged, because the elevation in question "had a legitimate purpose for
being on the terrace and was never intended to trip down people and injure
them. It was there for no other purpose but to drain water on the floor
area of the terrace" [Rollo, P. 99].
To determine whether or not the construction of the elevation was done in
a negligent manner, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the
premises.
xxx xxx xxx
... This Court after its ocular inspection found the elevation shown in Exhs.
A or 6-A where plaintiff slipped to be a step, a dangerous sliding step, and
the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury...
xxx xxx xxx
This Court during its ocular inspection also observed the dangerous and
defective condition of the open terrace which has remained unrepaired
through the years. It has observed the lack of maintenance and upkeep of
the MIA terrace, typical of many government buildings and offices. Aside
from the litter allowed to accumulate in the terrace, pot holes cause by
missing tiles remained unrepaired and unattented. The several elevations
shown in the exhibits presented were verified by this Court during the
ocular inspection it undertook. Among these elevations is the one (Exh. A)
where plaintiff slipped. This Court also observed the other hazard, the
slanting or sliding step (Exh. B) as one passes the entrance door leading to
the terrace [Record on Appeal, U.S., pp. 56 and 59; Emphasis supplied.]

Constitutional Law 1: State Immunity

The Court of Appeals further noted that:
The inclination itself is an architectural anomaly for as stated by the said
witness, it is neither a ramp because a ramp is an inclined surface in such a
way that it will prevent people or pedestrians from sliding. But if, it is a
step then it will not serve its purpose, for pedestrian purposes. (tsn, p. 35,
Id.) [rollo, p. 29.]
These factual findings are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Hence,
the CAA cannot disclaim its liability for the negligent construction of the
elevation since under Republic Act No. 776, it was charged with the duty of
planning, designing, constructing, equipping, expanding, improving,
repairing or altering aerodromes or such structures, improvements or air
navigation facilities [Section 32, supra, R.A. 776]. In the discharge of this
obligation, the CAA is duty-bound to exercise due diligence in overseeing
the construction and maintenance of the viewing deck or terrace of the
airport.
It must be borne in mind that pursuant to Article 1173 of the Civil Code,
"(t)he fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place." Here,
the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to
the public, requires that CAA insure the safety of the viewers using it. As
these people come to the viewing deck to watch the planes and
passengers, their tendency would be to look to where the planes and the
incoming passengers are and not to look down on the floor or pavement of
the viewing deck. The CAA should have thus made sure that no dangerous
obstructions or elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent any
undue harm to the public.
The legal foundation of CAA's liability for quasi-delict can be found in Article
2176 of the Civil Code which provides that "(w)hoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done... As the CAA knew of the existence of the
dangerous elevation which it claims though, was made precisely in
accordance with the plans and specifications of the building for proper
drainage of the open terrace [See Record on Appeal, pp. 13 and 57; Rollo,
p. 391, its failure to have it repaired or altered in order to eliminate the
existing hazard constitutes such negligence as to warrant a finding of
liability based on quasi-delict upon CAA.

The Court finds the contention that private respondent was, at the very
least, guilty of contributory negligence, thus reducing the damages that
plaintiff may recover, unmeritorious. Contributory negligence under Article
2179 of the Civil Code contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part
of the plaintiff, which although not the proximate cause of his injury,
contributed to his own damage, the proximate cause of the plaintiffs own
injury being the defendant's lack of due care. In the instant case, no
contributory negligence can be imputed to the private respondent,
considering the following test formulated in the early case of Picart v.
Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918):
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent man would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed
to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the
Roman law. The existence of the negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in
a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Abstract speculations cannot be here of much value but this much can be
profitably said: Reasonable men-overn their conduct by the circumstances
which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not
supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to
take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of
danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee
harm as a result of the course actually pursued' If so, it was the duty of the
actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight
of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision,
is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.... [Picart v.
Smith, supra, p. 813; Emphasis supplied.]
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower
court, could not have reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him,
considering the attendant factual circumstances. Even if the private
respondent had been looking where he was going, the step in question

Constitutional Law 1: State Immunity

could not easily be noticed because of its construction. As the trial court
found:
In connection with the incident testified to, a sketch, Exhibit O, shows a
section of the floorings oil which plaintiff had tripped, This sketch reveals
two pavements adjoining each other, one being elevated by four and onefourth inches than the other. From the architectural standpoint the higher,
pavement is a step. However, unlike a step commonly seen around, the
edge of the elevated pavement slanted outward as one walks to one
interior of the terrace. The length of the inclination between the edges of
the two pavements is three inches. Obviously, plaintiff had stepped on the
inclination because had his foot landed on the lower pavement he would
not have lost his balance. The same sketch shows that both pavements
including the inclined portion are tiled in red cement, and as shown by the
photograph Exhibit A, the lines of the tilings are continuous. It would
therefore be difficult for a pedestrian to see the inclination especially where
there are plenty of persons in the terrace as was the situation when
plaintiff fell down. There was no warning sign to direct one's attention to
the change in the elevation of the floorings. [Rollo, pp. 2829.]
III. Finally, petitioner appeals to this Court the award of damages to private
respondent. The liability of CAA to answer for damages, whether actual,
moral or exemplary, cannot be seriously doubted in view of one conferment
of the power to sue and be sued upon it, which, as held in the case of Rayo
v. Court of First Instance, supra, includes liability on a claim for quasi-dilict.
In the aforestated case, the liability of the National Power Corporation to
answer for damages resulting from its act of sudden, precipitate and
simultaneous opening of the Angat Dam, which caused the death of several
residents of the area and the destruction of properties, was upheld since
the o,rant of the power to sue and be sued upon it necessarily implies that
it can be held answerable for its tortious acts or any wrongful act for that
matter.
With respect to actual or compensatory damages, the law mandates that
the same be proven.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one are entitled to
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as
he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual on
compensatory damages [New Civil Code].

Private respondent claims P15,589.55 representing medical and

hospitalization bills. This Court finds the same to have been duly proven
through the testimony of Dr. Ambrosio Tangco, the physician who attended
to private respondent (Rollo, p. 26) and who Identified Exh. "H" which was
his bill for professional services [Rollo, p. 31].
Concerning the P20,200.00 alleged to have been spent for other expenses
such as the transportation of the two lawyers who had to represent private
respondent abroad and the publication of the postponement notices of the
wedding, the Court holds that the same had also been duly proven. Private
respondent had adequately shown the existence of such losses and the
amount thereof in the testimonies before the trial court [CA decision, p. 81.
At any rate, the findings of the Court of Appeals with respect to this are
findings of facts [One Heart Sporting Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 5379053972, Oct. 23, 1981, 108 SCRA 4161 which, as had been held
time and again, are, as a general rule, conclusive before this Court [Sese v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66186, July 31, 1987,152 SCRA
585].
With respect to the P30,000.00 awarded as moral damages, the Court
holds private respondent entitled thereto because of the physical suffering
and physical injuries caused by the negligence of the CAA [Arts. 2217 and
2219 (2), New Civil Code].
With respect to the award of exemplary damages, the Civil Code explicitly,
states:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages, are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
liquidated or compensatory
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence.
Gross negligence which, according to the Court, is equivalent to the term
"notorious negligence" and consists in the failure to exercise even slight
care [Caunan v. Compania General de Tabacos, 56 Phil. 542 (1932)] can be
attributed to the CAA for its failure to remedy the dangerous condition of
the questioned elevation or to even post a warning sign directing the
attention of the viewers to the change in the elevation of the floorings
notwithstanding its knowledge of the hazard posed by such elevation
[Rollo, pp. 28-29; Record oil Appeal, p. 57]. The wanton disregard by the

Constitutional Law 1: State Immunity

CAA of the safety of the people using the viewing deck, who are charged
an admission fee, including the petitioner who paid the entrance fees to get
inside the vantage place [CA decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 25] and are,
therefore, entitled to expect a facility that is properly and safely maintained
justifies the award of exemplary damages against the CAA, as a
deterrent and by way of example or correction for the public good. The
award of P40,000.00 by the trial court as exemplary damages
appropriately underscores the point that as an entity changed with
providing service to the public, the CAA. like all other entities serving the
public. has the obligation to provide the public with reasonably safe
service.
Finally, the award of attorney's fees is also upheld considering that under
Art. 2208 (1) of the Civil Code, the same may be awarded whenever
exemplary damages are awarded, as in this case, and,at any rate, under
Art. 2208 (11), the Court has the discretion to grant the same when it is
just and equitable.
However, since the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) has taken
over the management and operations of the Manila International Airport
[renamed Ninoy Aquino International Airport under Republic Act No. 6639]
pursuant to Executive Order No. 778 as amended by executive Orders Nos.
903 (1983), 909 (1983) and 298 (1987) and under Section 24 of the said
Exec. Order 778, the MIAA has assumed all the debts, liabilities and
obligations of the now defunct Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), the
liabilities of the CAA have now been transferred to the MIAA.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition for review on
certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
51172-R is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. FIRMEG.R. No. L52179 April 8, 1991
Facts:
A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate
of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck owned by Tanquilino
Velasquez and a dumptruck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union
and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the
jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they
sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for

damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot,

owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the
aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner
and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Petitioner filed its answer and
raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of
the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner
and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the
collision. Respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme ordered defendants
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and
severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses. Private respondents stress
that petitioner has not considered that every court, including respondent
court, has the inherent power to amend and control its process and orders
so as to make them conformable to law and justice.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of
discretion whenit deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability
of the State amounting tolack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
Ruling: Non-suability of the state. The doctrine of non-suability of the
State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution,
to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."Consent takes the
form of express or implied consent. Municipal corporations, for example,
like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged
in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can
sue and be sued."Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued,
liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance
that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the
other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed
itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is
only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable."Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the
torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality
depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality,
is performing governmental or proprietary functions.
Dual capacity of LGU. Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and
their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from
sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto,

Constitutional Law 1: State Immunity

their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such
capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public
functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers,
agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities
exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their
existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and
agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the
municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state
or sovereign power."It has already been remarked that municipal
corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence
to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be
held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the
municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a
load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal
streets."In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of
the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of
Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of
the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. We
already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte
, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that
"the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver
worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental
activities."After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence,
We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for
the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions.

Principle/s:
1. General Rule: Public funds are not subject to levy and
execution. Unless otherwise, provided by the statute.
2. States inherent power of eminent domain (expropriation)
Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990
Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land
owned by private respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc.
After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land
which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,
291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the
corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of

funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order
was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration,
contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied
upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public
funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the
case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio. The RTC dismissed such
motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed
said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from
garnishment and levy upon execution.
Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC
judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds
garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are
public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper
appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In
this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to
levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal
revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are
intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from
execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has
passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds
deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly
affected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land
which has been in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's
blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation of
land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain
should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.
Municipality of Makati vs. CA
Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land
owned by private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc.
After hearing, the RTC fixed the appraised value of the property at
P5,291,666.00, and ordered petitioner to pay this amount minus the
advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private
respondent. It then issued the corresponding writ of execution
accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which
was deposited in PNB. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied
upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public
funds without the proper appropriation required under the law. The RTC
denied the motion. CA affirmed; hence, petitioner filed a petition for review
before the SC.

Constitutional Law 1: State Immunity

Issue:
1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from garnishment
and
levy
upon
execution?
2. If so, what then is the remedy of the private respondents?
Held:
1. Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not
subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute.
More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal,
which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at
execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality.
Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and
which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing
the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt
from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has
passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount
corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision, no levy under
execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner.

2. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left
with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without
justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered
against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to
compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation
ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds
therefore.
For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the
subject property notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its
legal obligation to pay just compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its
possession of the property since the same has been the site of Makati West
High School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will not condone
petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from
expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. The State's power of
eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and
justice. (Municipality of Makati vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1,
1990)