Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Chapter15
MARXIST APPROACHES
TOINTERNATIONALLAW
RobertKnox
1 Introduction
Attempting to describe the definitive Marxist approach to anything is difficult. The Marxist tradition is a fractious one, filled with splits, disagreements, and
denunciations. Frequently the subject of these disagreements is whether the opposing sides position is even Marxist. This fractiousness is due in no small part to
the fact that Marxist theory is never simply theory, but instead is conceived of as a
guide to action.
Whilst this is equally true of Marxist legal theory, there is anotherseemingly
countervailingproblem:the relative lack of attention that Marxists have paid to
law. The writings of Marx and Engels have almost no systematic engagement with
legal questions, instead making only scattered and fragmentary references. This is
even truer of international law, which only crystallized in its modern incarnation
towards the end of their lives. Of course, Marxism is not simply the words of Marx
and Engels, and writers in the Marxist tradition have theorized and analysed law.
Yet compared to studies of political economy, aesthetics, or politics, Marxist studies of law have been relatively rare, and international law even moreso.
Added to this is a final complication. More than any of the other positions surveyed in this Handbook, Marxist international legal theory cannot be considered
as a separate entity from Marxist theoretical (and political) commitments as a
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whole. Whereas being a legal positivist does not necessarily commit one to any
conscious, coherent, or systematic understanding of historical development, or
of the relationship between the economy and society, the same cannot be said of
Marxist theory. Marxist international legal theory cannot be understood simply as
an internal position to the international legal discipline. Rather, it is the disciplinary application of the wider project of Marxism.
As such, Marxist international legal theory can only be understood in relation to
a number of other debates. Particularly important are Marxist debates about the
relationship between the base and superstructure, about the nature and function
of the state, and theories of ideology and hegemony. These debates have primarily
played out in Marxist domestic legal theory. Equally, insofar as we are dealing
with international law, it is vital to understand debates as to the dynamics of international capitalism, conducted under the rubric of imperialism.
This chapter will attempt to chart a course through this complex terrain. It will
begin by tracing the general contours of Marxist theory, and examine Marx and
Engels work. Following this, it will examine Marxist theories of imperialism and
their understanding of international law. It will then look specifically at Marxist
international legal theory, before concluding with some political reflections.
2 Marx andEngels
2.1 Base, Superstructure, and Historical Materialism
As Susan Marks notes, [t]o engage with Marxism is . . . to engage with the idea
that history is to be understood in materialist terms. 1 It is for this reason that
the Marxist method is known as historical materialism. Long and complicated
debates surround the precise nature of historical materialism, but the usual starting point is Marxs Preface to the Critique of Political Economy. There, Marx argued
that legal relations as well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the . . . general development of the human mind. Instead, they had
their roots in the material conditions of life.2 These relationsin their totality
constitute what are called the social relations, society, and, specifically a society at a
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definite stage of historical development.3 It was on the basis of these social relations
that legal, political, and cultural relationsarose:
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will . . . The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and
political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.4
This particular descriptionwhich has come to be known as the base (or basis)
and superstructure metaphorhas been controversial. Nonetheless, it establishes
a basic position for Marxists, who have sought to understand law by seeing it as
determined by social relations of production, and to situate it within the context of
broader political-economic structures.
Marx and Engels argued that the nature of economic relations will naturally vary
according to the character of the means of production.5 Different levels of the development of the productive forces would lead societies to arrive at a definite stage of
historical development.6 Examples of these included ancient society, feudal society,
and bourgeois society. Each of these societies had its own internal economic logic,
conditioning how and why production and consumption took place, and the way in
which it would reproduce itself. These distinctive logics also give rise to specific configurations of the superstructure. Vitally, this did not mean saying that the economic
structure would always be the visible, most important element in any society, but
rather that the economic structure explained why specific social forms (be they
law, politics or religion) played the chief part in particular modes of production.7
Marx and Engels did not simply consider economic structures to be static entities
governed by laws. Since these structures are social relations they are also relationships between groups of people, that is to say between classes. Societies following
the end of primitive communism, have been marked by a division between those
engaged in producing social wealth and those who are able to appropriate it. Thus
(to simplify grossly): in ancient societies there were slaves and slave-owners; in
feudal societies there were peasants, the nascent bourgeoisie, and feudal lords, and
under capitalism there are workers and capitalists. In any given mode of production these classes exist in opposition. They constantly engage in low-level struggles
and sometimes meet in open warfare over the nature of the mode of production.
Hence, Marx and Engels famous dictum that [t]he history of all hitherto existing
society is the history of class struggles.8 It is through the political, cultural, and
legal superstructure that classes become conscious of this conflict and fight itout.9
3
4
Ibid (emphasis in original).
Ibid4.
K Marx, Wage Labour and Capital in The Marx-Engels Reader (n 2)20317, at207.
6
Ibid.
7
K Marx, Capital:ACritique of Political Economy (Penguin Books NewYork 1990 [1867]) at176.
8
K Marx and F Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party in The Marx-Engels Reader (n 2)
469500, at473.
9
Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political (n2)5.
5
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Consequently, there are two avenues through which the economic structure
impacts upon the law. On the one hand, the logic of a given mode of production
will throw up distinctive social arrangements and social forms, of which law is one.
On the other hand, the class struggle will be expressed through, and impact upon,
thelaw.
K Marx and F Engels, The German Ideology in The Marx-Engels Reader (n 2)146200, at188.
12
13
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
K Marx, On the Jewish Question in The Marx-Engels Reader (n 2)2652,at34.
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was not always the case. Historically, civil society had a directly political character
because its various aspectsproperty, the family, and so onwere political, taking
the forms of lordship, castes, and guilds.15 Ownership, production, and appropriation were tied directly to political questions of status.
This changed with the rise of modern (capitalist) societies. In capitalist societies
there is no longer a direct link between ones customary, status-based position and
the appropriation of value; instead this is mediated through the market. In such
a situation, the interpenetration between state and society is no longer tenable.
As a result, the formation of the political state, and the dissolution of civil society
into independent individuals were part and parcel of the same historical process.16
This was where law entered the picture. When civil society had a directly political
character, relationships between individuals were mediated through privilege and
status, but once civil society was composed of independent individuals, their relations needed to instead be mediated throughlaw.17
Consequently, the so-called rights of man, as distinct from the rights of the
citizen, are simply the rights of a member of civil society, that is of egoistic man,
of man separated from other men and from the community.18 Here liberty is
the right to do everything which does not harm others, the limits of which were
determined by law. This liberty was the liberty of man regarded as an isolated
monad, withdrawn into himself.19 The practical application of the right of libertywhich is embodied in the law, which itself regulates relationships across
societyis the right of private property.20 Moreover, since civil society was the
mechanism through which the material basis of society was reproduced, the role
of political society was simply to preserve civil society.21
Marx and Engels thus drew a structural link between the emergence of capitalism and the dominance of law and legal relations. However, as noted earlier,
they also sought to understand the ways in which classes directly instrumentalized
law. Marxs Capitalwhilst sharing many of the insights aboveis interesting in
this respect, particularly in relation to the question of the working day. In Marxs
account, labour-power is a unique commodity because it is able to produce new
value. This is because capitalists only need pay workers sufficient money to reproduce their own existence. The difference between wages and the value that workers produce through their labour is known as surplus value. Capitalists constantly
strive to increase their surplus value and can do so by increasing the length of the
working day, or by forcing workers to be more productive.
In Chapter Ten of Capital, Marx showed the vital role that law played in capitalist
exploitation. Law is the form through which the employer and employee meet each
other as free persons, as independent owners of commodities.22 In other words,
15
18
22
(n 2) 44 (emphasis in original).
Ibid 42 (emphasis in original).
Capital (n 7)519.
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16
19
17
Ibid.
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23
28
(n 7)382.
Ibid897.
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24
29
Ibid.
Ibid899.
25
Ibid409.
30
Ibid915.
26
Ibid416.
31
Ibid918.
27
Ibid886.
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not mention international law in this context, although he did note that the power
of the state was deployed.32 Despite this, it is clear that these international processes were mediated through international lawfor example, colonial expansion
was enabled through the law of territorial acquisition and treaties played a central
role in guaranteeing trade and navigation.
32
33
34
(n 7)915.
Manifesto of the Communist Party (n 8)476.
Ibid477.
R Hilferding, Finance Capital:AStudy of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development (Routledge
NewYork1981)
35
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no longer simply involved the sale of commodities abroad but rather involved
establishing foreign business ventures and directly exploiting foreign labour. This
required the large-scale development of and investment in factories, transport
infrastructure, and so forth. In both of these instances it was the less-developed
capitalist economies which provided the fullest scope for increased profits. This
necessarily involved state-led interventions to subdue, develop, and transform
these economies. Thus, monopoly capitalism domestically gave rise to the continuous global expansion of capital, which had to violently subdue and transform
less-advanced economies; this was imperialism.
Although Hilferding laid the groundwork for a theory of imperialism, he was
more concerned with analysing how finance capital operated domestically. It was
Bukharin and Lenin who drew the strands of his argument together. Essentially,
they followed Hilferding, but claimed that the developments he described had
given rise to an international division of labour, representing a qualitatively distinct
stage of capitalism, which was now a world system of colonial oppression and . . . financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority . . . by a handful of advanced
countries.36
They further argued that this system gave rise to intense rivalry between capitalist states.37 Because of the exclusionary nature of the tariff system, capitalists
competed against each other for economic territory. Insofar as these capitalists
dominated their respective states, economic competition was also transformed
into political and military competition. Thus, for Lenin and Bukharin, imperialism was marked by a struggle between the advanced capitalist powers for the
division and redivision of the world.38
These authors did not engage in many explicit reflections on international law.
But given the close connection between international law and the events they
analysed, some reflection was inevitable. They all suggested that international
law was one of the mechanisms through which the struggle between imperial
powers was conducted and through which colonial oppression was enacted. This
was especially true in the case of treaties, which were seen as codifying particular balances of forces. Lenin, for instance, argued that the Treaty of Versailles
was an unparalleled and predatory peace and that [t]hrough the Treaty a situation had arisen wherein seven-tenths of the worlds population are in a condition of servitude.39 He also thought that the international institutions of his time
36
VI Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism:APopular Outline (Foreign Languages
Press Peking 1970)at5.
37
NI Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy (Merlin Press London1972).
38
Ibid150.
39
VI Lenin, Speech Delivered at a Conference of Chairmen of Uyezd Volost and Village Executive
Committees of Moscow Gubernia October 15, 1920 in MS Levin (ed), VI Lenin, Collected Works
(Progress Moscow 1966) vol 31, 31833, at326.
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314
41
(n 39)323.
K Kautsky, The League of Nations, Justice (10 April 1923)3.
43
Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (n 36)97.
Ibid101.
44
VI Lenin, A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism in VI Lenin, Collected Works
(n 39)vol 23, 2876,at44.
45
Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (n 36)96.
46
K Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism:The Last Stage of Imperialism (Panaf London1971).
47
A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism (n 44)488.
48
Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (n 36)89 (emphasis in original).
42
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49
VI Lenin, Conditions of Admission into the Communist International in VI Lenin, Collected
Works (n 39)vol 31, 20611, at208.
50
JN Hazard, Pashukanis is No Traitor (1957) 51 American Journal of International Law3858.
51
EB Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism in P Beirne and R Sharlet (eds),
Pashukanis:Selected Writings on Marxism and Law (Academic Press London 1980) 37131,at58.
52
Ibid (emphasis in original).
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analyse what this character (or form) was and what conditions gave rise to it. As
such, accounts which merely sought to introduce the element of class struggles53
into a positivistic theory of law, simply gave a history of economic forms with a
more or less weak legal colouring.54 Thisone might argueis an apt description
of how Marxist theorists of imperialism understood internationallaw.
Following Marxs On the Jewish Question (and his scattered musings in Capital),
Pashukanis argued that the conditions that give rise to the legal form are those of
commodity exchange. In order for commodities to be exchanged, their guardians
must . . . recognize each other as owners of private property; this juridical relation, whose form is the contract . . . mirrors the economic relation.55 Accordingly,
each commodity owner must recognize the other as an equal, in an abstract,
formal sense. But since within any exchange there is the possibility of dispute,
there needs to be a way to regulate these disputes, and it is here that law arises.
For Pashukanis, the legal form is that which regulates disputes between formally
equal, abstract individuals.
Since commodity exchange predates capitalism, so too did law;56 however, it
existed in specific pockets of social life, intertwined with custom, status, religion,
and privilege.57 As capitalism came to dominate, so too did commodity exchange,
and therefore law. However, it was not simply that there was more exchange, and
therefore more law. In the logic of capitalism (as opposed to exchange generally) separate and random acts of exchange turn into a broad systematic circulation of commodities.58 In this situation, value ceases to be embodied in specific
exchanges and becomes an abstract category, since everything must be exchangeable. Asimilar transformation occurs with law, with the rise of an abstract, universal legal subject.59
In his account of international law, Pashukanis combined this commodity-form
theory with Lenins account of imperialism. Pashukanis argued that international
law was in fact the oldest form of law, since one could trace rudimentary international legal institutions to the most ancient periods of class and even pre-class
society.60 This was because commodity exchange initially took place not between
individuals but amongst communities.61 However, as with domestic law, it was
only with capitalism that international law came to full-flower. Firstly, capitalism
witnessed the extension and blossoming of commodity exchange internationally.
Secondly, the independent sovereign state, generally seen as the central subject of
international law, was itself a product of the development of capitalism. This began
53
54
55
(n 51)41.
Ibid42.
Capital (n 7)178.
57
58
The General Theory of Law and Marxism (n 51)79.
Ibid801.
Ibid77.
59
Ibid778.
60
EB Pashukanis, International Law in Pashukanis:Selected Writings on Marxism and Law
(n 51)16883, at175.
61
Ibid.
56
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with the formation of absolute monarchies, whose economic basis was the development of mercantile capital62 but it was only with the bourgeois revolutions that
this process was fully completed. These developments separated state rule from
private rule, and transformed political power into a special force and the state into
a special subject, a subject not to be confused with those persons who . . . were the
bearers of state authority.63
Since these states are class states enmeshed in a system of imperialism, their class
basis is expressed through international law. Thus, picking up on Lenins theory
of imperialism, Pashukanis argued that rather than a neutral body of global rules,
international law is the legal form of the struggle of the capitalist states among themselves for domination over the rest of the world.64 Like Lenin, Pashukanis studied
the role of particular treaties in structuring and articulating imperialist domination, arguing that a treaty obligation is nothing other than a special form of the
concretization of economic and political relationships.65 Similarly, Pashukanis was
attentive to the way in which international law structured the relationship between
the advanced capitalist countries and the colonial world. He argued that the division of states into civilized and semi-civilized66 was rooted in the exploitative
logic of imperialism, and that international law was the totality of forms which
the capitalist, bourgeois states apply in their relations with each other, while the
remainder of the world is considered as a simple object of their completed transactions.67 Finally, he drew attention to the fact that directly juridified colonial domination was not the only mechanism of international capitalist exploitation. Just as
private law assumes all subjects are formally equal yet simultaneously permits real
inequality in property so too did international law recognize that states have equal
rights yet in reality they are unequal in their significance and their power.68 This is
even more the case given the absence of a centralized internationalstate.
This latter proposition is the central starting point of China Mivilles 2005
attempt to apply systematically Pashukanis insights to the study of international
lawBetween Equal Rights. This book has been at the centre of the contemporary
revival in Marxist international legal theory, andlike Pashukanishas become
an obligatory reference point. Miville argues that a full application of Pashukanis
commodity-form theory is able to illuminate some of the central problems of the
international legal discipline. In particular, Pashukanis is able to answer the ageold question of whether international law is reallylaw.
One of the criticisms most frequently levelled at international law is that it cannot really be law because there is no overarching sovereign to enforce it. By insisting that law was to be understood as a relationship between abstract, formally equal
subjects, Pashukanis displaced this focus. However, one might still ask, absent
62
66
(n 60)173.
Ibid172.
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63
67
64
Ibid174.
Ibid 169 (emphasis in original).
68
Ibid.
Ibid178.
65
Ibid181.
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318
some notion of enforcement, can we really talk about law? It is here that Miville
attempts to go beyond Pashukanis. Miville argues that Pashukanis failed to properly account for the violence at the heart of the commodity-form. Pashukanisin
what Miville dubs a characteristic slip69argued that [c]oercion . . . contradicts
the fundamental precondition for dealings between the owners of commodities.70
For Miville, this cannot be true. In order for a commodity to be meaningfully
mine-not-yours . . . some forceful capabilities are implied, absent this, it could be
taken from me, and there would be no act of exchange.71 This connection between
violence and exchange carries over into the legal form, as the violence of allowing
something to remain mine-not-yours is also the vindication of legal rights.
It is this argument, for Miville, that fundamentally cements international laws
law-ness. Because coercion is inherent in the commodity formthat is, it can operate as between the parties themselvesthere is no need for a superordinate overarching sovereign to be present. Rather, without superordinate authorities . . . the
coercive violence of the legal subjects themselves . . . regulates the legal relation.72 Indeed,
as Pashukanis himself pointed out, even domestically a major portion of civil law
relationships are carried out without any state intervention.73
The question of violence is also intrinsically linked to the question of laws
content. Miville follows Martti Koskenniemi in arguing that international law
is indeterminate. Famously, Koskenniemi holds that the international legal order
is structured by a fundamental tension. On the one hand, it is composed of independent, sovereign states which can only be voluntarily bound. This creates
principles which take state will as their starting point. On the other hand, this
cannot not be a source of obligation for states, since international law needs to bind
states, even when they do not desire to be bound. For Koskenniemi this tension
is a symptom of the broader structure of the international legal order itself:one
can always proceed from state interest (apology) or world order (utopia). The attendant arguments are both equally legitimate, and mutually opposed, meaning
international law can never provide an answer on its ownterms.
Miville accepts this account, although he argues it is idealist, since it locates
this contradiction in liberal thought, rather than capitalist social relations.74 More
importantly, Miville asks how it is, given indeterminacy, that arguments are nonetheless resolved. Miville turns to Marx, who arguedin the context of the Factory
Actsthat between equal rights, force decides; that is to say that insofar as there
are two equally compelling legal arguments, it will be force which chooses between
them.75 Domestically, this is done by the state. However, in the international legal
arena [t]here is no state to act as final arbiter of competing claims and accordingly
69
C Miville, Between Equal Rights:AMarxist Theory of International Law (Brill Leiden 2005)
at126.
70
71
72
73
Ibid143.
Ibid126.
Ibid133.
International Law (n 60)180.
74
75
Between Equal Rights (n 69)54.
Capital (n 7)344.
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319
[t]he means of violence remains in the hands of the very parties disagreeing over
the interpretation of law.76
The form that this violence takes is conditioned by the social relations in which
it is articulated. Internationally this is imperialism, the vision of which Miville
like Pashukanistakes from Lenin and Bukharin. Miville takes this to its logical
extreme, arguing that since [t]he necessity of this unequal violence derives precisely from . . . juridical equality, it follows that in its universalised form, predicated on juridical equality . . . international law assumes imperialism.77
As such, there is a structural connection between international law and
imperialismfirstly, insofar as the international legal form is bound up with the
spread of international capitalism, and secondly, because only the violence of imperialism can effectively resolve legal arguments. Thus, whilst relying on classical
Marxist theories of imperialism, the commodity-form theory goes beyond their
account of international law. International law and imperialism are not simply
coincident, but fundamentally connected. However, Miville goes further than
this. He argues that with the full flowering of capitalism internationally, international law becomes universal, permeating every international incident and the
very fabric of the international system.78 Thus, rather than simply being structurally connected, international law actually comes to structure and constitute the
world.79
76
80
81
77
78
79
(n 7)292.
Ibid 293 (emphasis in original).
Ibid282.
Ibid283.
Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (n2)5.
ME Cain and A Hunt, Marx and Engels on Law (Academic Press London 1979)atix.
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320
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321
(n 84)637.
T Krever, International Criminal Law: An Ideology Critique (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of
International Law 70123, at720.
96
Ibid722.
97
S Marks, Human Rights and Root Causes (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 5778,at71.
98
S Marks, False Contingency (2009) 62 Current Legal Problems121.
99
M Bedjaoui, Towards A New International Economic Order (Holmes & Meier New York
1979)at63.
100
101
Ibid49.
Ibid37.
95
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322
For Bedjaoui, the problem was not that law created unequal relationships102
but rather that there was a dichotomy between law and reality,103 where formal
legal equality covered up real inequality through a laissez-faire and easy-going
attitude which . . . led . . . to legal non-intervention, which favoured the seizure of
the wealth and possessions of weaker peoples.104 This was a result of his broader
understanding of law as a moment in the evolution of social and economic acts,
stabilizing . . . the balance achieved between them.105 Accordingly, there was no necessary relationship between law and imperialism. Although law was conservative,
if reality changes so as to become more egalitarian, the law inevitably . . . takes the
new material data into account.106
Bedjaouis approach of rooting legal argument in the changing relationships of
imperialism is reflected in contemporary Marxist scholarship. Perhaps the most
prominent exponent of this approach is BS Chimni, who argues that the juridical
is simultaneously the sociological.107 According to Chimni, the intimate interconnection between the domestic and international under capitalism means that
international relations flow from the internal organization of states.108 Since every
state in the global order sits atop a mode of production, [t]he foreign policy of a
state is integrally linked to its domestic policy.109
However, the capitalist mode of production is always global, and so the international economy is not just an agglomeration of national economies. Rather, capitalism produces a world market which functions on the basis of an international
division of labour, which defines the relationship between domestic economies
and the world economy.110 Consequently, Chimni argues that international law and
institutions [are] a device which serves sectional global interests.111 The dominant
classes within the international division of labour seek to realize their interests
through international law.112 Therefore, any change in the international division of
labour will be reflected in international law.113
For Chimni, there have been five epochs of imperialism, each of which fundamentally shaped international law. The first was from 16001760, the period of old
colonialism. This was characterized by primitive accumulation and mercantilist
102
103
104
105
106
(n 99)112.
Ibid63.
Ibid49.
Ibid106.
Ibid112.
BS Chimni, International Law and World Order:ACritique of Contemporary Approaches (Sage
NewYork 1993) at218.
108
BS Chimni, Marxism and International Law:AContemporary Analysis (1999) Economic and
Political Weekly 33749, at337.
109
110
Ibid.
International Law and World Order (n 107)221.
111
Marxism and International Law (n 108)338.
112
Of course, the process is complicated, with class interest not being directly translated into international law, because foreign policy is a compound expression of several factors:dominant class
interests, the compromise with other social classes, national security concerns, cultural anxieties,
resistance movements [and so forth]:BS Chimni, Prolegomena to a Class Approach to International
Law (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 5782,at68.
113
International Law and World Order (n 107)221.
107
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323
115
116
117
(n 107)231.
Ibid233.
Ibid235.
Ibid250.
BS Chimni, International Institutions Today:An Imperial Global State in the Making (2004)
15 European Journal of International Law 137, at 9 (emphasis in original).
119
Ibid7.
118
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remodelled the economies of peripheral societies along lines that make them much
more attractive for transnational capital and reshaped their political life through
the discourse of good governance.
The sum total of these relationships means that a global state is in the process
of formation. The function of this state is to realize the interests of transnational
capital and powerful states in the international system to the disadvantage of third
world states and peoples.120 Accordingly, this is a global imperial state. It is important to note here that Chimni is not arguing that a global state has displaced
national states. Rather, he argues that the structural role of sovereign states in the
international order has been transformed through globalization, leading to international institutions and these states performing the functions of a global state.
This, he argues, is a step back from the gains made by bourgeois democratic law,
and a new global social movement must attempt to democratize the globalstate.
Chimnis account might be seen as something of a materialist account of international law from above, with its focus on changing patterns of capitalist accumulation.121 Insofar as resistance does appear, it does so briefly in his account of
decolonization. In stark contrast to this is Bill Bowrings work. Bowring starts
from the proposition that one cannot view law and rights as deracinated empty
forms122 but instead they must be understood as the subjects and objects of real
struggles in the real world.123 Thus, he gives a substantive account of international
law, in which it is understood as the product of human struggle.124 In his vision,
international law responds to great historical upheavals (the French, Russian, and
anti-colonial revolutions) by embedding their principles.
(n 118)12.
See also M Neocleous, International Law as Primitive Accumulation; Or, the Secret of
Systematic Colonization (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 94162; A Rasulov, Writing
About Empire:Remarks on the Logic of a Discourse (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law
44971.
122
B Bowring, Degradation of the International Legal Order:The Rehabilitation of Law and the
Possibility of Politics (Routledge-Cavendish Oxford 2008) at109.
123
124
Ibid111.
Ibid112.
125
K Marx, Theses on Feuerbach in The Marx-Engels Reader (n 2)1435, at145.
121
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325
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326
about the structural relationship between law and capitalism, and law and imperialism.131 The great advantage to Pashukanis (and Miville), no matter what one
thinks of their answers to these questions, is that they actually attempt to do this.
Whilst much of the work noted in this chapter offers gestures in this direction, or
contains implicit theoretical perspectives, there is little systematic reflection on
these issues. Absent this, whilst impressive strides can be made, the question of the
relationship between law and social change on a broader levelwhat we might dub
the question of Marxist legal theoryremains unanswered.
131
R Knox, What is to be Done (With Critical Legal Theory)? (2011) 22 Finnish Yearbook of
International Law3150.
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