Karl Mannheim

1893-1947

Read each of the following items.

(Perdue 1986:388-393)

Perdue, William D. 1986. Sociological Theory: Explanation,

Paradigm, and Ideology. Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield Publishing
Company.

Karl Mannheim (1883-1947)

Ideology and Utopia

...Karl Mannheim was born in Budapest. He was the only child of a Hungarian
father and a German mother. After graduation from the humanistic gymnasium in
Budapest, he studied in Berlin, Budapest, Paris, and Freiburg. His professors
included Lukacs and Edmund Husserl... Despite an early interest in philosophy,
Mannheim turned to the human sciences, coming to be influenced by the thought
of Weber and Marx. In 1925 he came to the major intellectual center in Germany,
the University of Heidelberg, where he habilitated as an unsalaried lecturer.
Karl Mannheim left Heidelberg for the University of Frankfurt in 1929, where he
was a professor of sociology and economics. With the rise to power of the Nazis,
he was dismissed in 1933 and fled to Great Britain, where he became a lecturer
in sociology at the London School of Economics. Twelve years later, he became
a professor in the university's Institute of Education. During his tenure at
Heidelberg, Frankfurt, and the London School of Economics, Mannheim
pioneered with systematic efforts in the sociology of knowledge. While in Great
Britain, he was also editor of the International Library of Sociology and Social
Reconstruction. This contributed to the growth and respectability of sociology in
England.

Early in his career, Mannheim centered his analysis first in problems of

interpretation, then in epistemology (the study of the origin, nature, methods, and
limits of knowledge), and finally in particular kinds of knowledge. As his
sociological interpretation matured, he made systematic inquiry into the social
forces contributing to the emergence and shaping of certain forms of knowledge.
These included (but were not limited to) the impact of generations, intellectual
traditions, and class interests on the differing conceptions of truth.

The modern classic Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of

Knowledge was published before Mannheim fled the Nazis. After the
development of this masterpiece (1929-1931), he moved from a study of ideas to
the study of social structure. Here the focus was on such issues as the
bureaucratization of society, the structural formation of personality, the position
and role of intelligentsia, and the relationship between sociology and social
policy. His work on the nature of democracy foresaw a coming elite disintegration
and irrationality. Thus, before Mannheim's premature death in 1947, he had
conceptualized sociology as a means for planning societies to avoid both the
dangers of totalitarianism and the class system.

Assumptions

The conception of human nature that prevails in Ideology and Utopia is one of
reason, mediation, and self-reflection. Indeed, "scientific critical self-awareness"
on the part of those who work in the social sciences presupposes a certain
attribute of the mind, an awareness of the relationship between social structure
and systems of thought. This is not to argue that all those participating in social
processes are doomed to falsify reality. Nor must they somehow suspend their
value judgments and will to action. Instead, Mannheim held that to participate
knowingly in social life presupposes that one can understand the often hidden
nature of thought about society. Human beings have the potential for self-
examination and contextual awareness. And only when these are understood
can one have a comprehension of the formal object under study (Mannheim
[1936] 1968:46-47...).
Simply put, there is a point in time, a moment of truth, when "the inner connection
between our role, our motivations, and our type and manner of experiencing the
world suddenly dawns upon us" ([1936] 1968:47). To be sure, some level of
social determinism is real, for sociologists and all those who seek to unravel the
puzzles of social life (including the puzzle of knowledge itself). None of us is free
to exercise some metaphysical power of will. However, to the extent that one
uses the power of reason to gain insight into the sources of such determinism, to
that extent a relative freedom from determinism is possible. It follows that this
potential for simultaneously comprehending self, the socio-historical context, and
the object to be analyzed must be realized (especially by sociologists).

Certain assumptions concerning the nature of society remain constant

throughout Mannheim's work. He returned again and again to the themes of
conflict: of classes (and their systems of thought), of political movements, and of
the necessary dissenting role of the intelligentsia. He addressed, as well shall
see, the wider ground of the sociology of knowledge, but within that generality,
he considered the specific question of ideological structure. However, for
Mannheim the "ideological structure does not change independently of the class
structure and the class structure does not change independently of the economic
structure" ([1936] 1968:130).

This sense of the "structural totality of society" Mannheim attributed to Marx. He

built his theoretical system on the threefold structural tendencies of Marx's earlier
body of thought: first of all, that the mode of material production shapes the
political sphere (and the rest of the "superstructure"); second, that change in the
material base is closely connected with "transformations in class relations" and
corresponding shifts in power; and third, that idea structures may dominate
people at any historical period, but that these ideologies may be understood and
their change predicted theoretically.

Nevertheless, unlike Marx, who emphasized that the ideas of the ruling class
prevailed, Mannheim held that class-divided societies contain a special stratum
for "those individuals whose only capital consisted in their education" ([1936]
1968:156). As this stratum comes to draw from different classes, it will contain
contradictory points of view. Hence, the social position of intellectuals is not
merely a question of their class origin. Its "multiformity" provides the "potential
energy" for members of the intellectual stratum to develop a social sensibility and
to grasp the dynamic and conflicting forces of society ([1936] 1968:156-157).

Mannheim's conception of human science reflects a synthesis of idealism and

materialism, spirit, and society (Wolff 1971:xiv). Kurt Wolff has identified
Mannheim's fundamental question: How can social conditioning be reconciled
with the "inexhaustibility and unforeseeability" of ideas and spirit? And as a
corollary, how can spirit and society be saved? Mannheim believed that a
sociology of knowledge would resolve this question and advance the discipline
as a science. Above all, a sociology of knowledge would enable its user to
realize a more accurate determination of the facts ([1936] 1968:296).

Now, the task of a sociology of knowledge is not simply one of getting ride of
bias, propaganda, or unrecognized values. Rather, even when knowledge is
freed of all forms of "distortion," it will contain inherent "traces" that are an
inevitable part of the structure of truth. For example, knowledge is never a matter
of pure ideas that rise disembodied from their maker. It has implications for social
action. Furthermore, it reflects the position in society of the knower as well as the
corresponding events and dominant ideas of specific historical periods.
Knowledge, even the scientific sort, does not exist in some separate sphere of
truth. It is an intricate part of an altogether human process, bound up in the
interrelationships of history, society, and psychology. Knowledge is truly of this
world ([1936] 1968:292-309).

Theoretical Content

In his attempt to explain ideology, Mannheim identified two distinct meanings: the
particular and the total. The first of these refers to the common conception of
ideology as distortion. The particular conception of ideology ranges in meaning
from a more or less conscious attempt at manipulating others to unwitting self-
deception. Those who employ it analytically seek to uncover only a part of an
opponent's assertions. The particular conception also focuses on a purely
psychological level, perhaps accusing the opponent of deception, but always
assuming that both parties share common criteria of validity. Finally, the
particular conception seeks to uncover the hidden interests or motivations of the
opponent.

The total conception of ideology is far more inclusive. It refers to thought

systems associated with an age or specific sociohistorical group (such as a
class). It focuses on the "total structure of the mind" as it occurs for an epoch or a
group. (Hence, it is not the mind of an individual or association of individuals but
the constellation of ideas and their processing that reflects a period or group.)
The total conception of ideology will call into question the opponent's "total
Weltanschauung," including the mode of thought. (Thus, the opponent is not
seen as an individual or concrete group as much as a perspective that reflects a
collective life.) From this total conception, it follows that there may exist
essentially different intellectual universes, each with a distinctive set of criteria by
which truth is judged. Finally, the total conception is not concerned with
"motivations" or "interests" at a psychological level but rather seeks the
relationship between social forces and worldview.

While the meaning of particular ideology is self-evident, the total conception is

more troublesome. However, it becomes clearer when used analytically to
understand a class-based conception of reality. For Mannheim, the owning and
working classes represent different worldviews, different modes of thinking, and
different criteria for "truth." Hence, their ideologies are not to be understood in
terms of individuals or motivations.

For example, the individual proletariat does not necessarily possess all of the
elements of the working class Weltanschauung. Each may participate only
fragmentally in the whole outlook of the group. What then of the "motivations"
that are "behind" a particular view? For Mannheim, idea systems (or any specific
piece of one) are rather the function of different social categories, situations, or
settings. The interests reflected in ideas are those of the larger spheres of age,
class, and other sociological forces ([1936] 1968:55-75).

It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that Mannheim's sociology of

knowledge will employ a total conception of ideology ([1936] 1968:265-266). But
it does something more. It advances a distinctly sociological conception of
epistemology, a way of understanding the relationships between historical and
social structure and the very grounds by which knowledge is judged. Mannheim
did this by making the critical distinction between relativism and relationism.

To argue that knowledge is relative today is to say that "all historical thinking is
bound up with the concrete position in life of the thinker" ([1936] 1968:78-79). In
an older sense, relative thought was the knowledge that came from the purely
subjective standpoint of the knower. But whether considered alone or in
combination, these forms of relativism mean either (1) that subjective knowledge
is untrue, or (2) that certain historical and biographical events "taint" the
knowledge of an era. Both conceptions of relativism assume that there is an
absolute "truth" that is being compromised.

In order to free thought from relativism, Mannheim introduced the concept of

relationism. By "relationism" he meant that the grounds for knowledge are not
invariant, continuing form age to age. Hence to argue that knowledge is relational
is to say that "there are spheres of thought in which it is impossible to conceive of
absolute truth existing independently of the values and position of the subject
and unrelated to the social context" ([1936] 1968:79). However, this does not
mean that "anything" goes, for once one understands the historical knowledge is
relational, one must discriminate between what is true and false. In other words,
"which social standpoint" (with its corresponding perspective) comes closer to the
truth? (In this case, Mannheim's conception of the "perspectivization" factor is
clearly informed by the work of Lukacs...)

Truth seeking for Mannheim, is obviously not an asocial process. But there is
more. The questions of knowledge and truth are often bound up in political forms
of struggle ([1936] 1968:36) and their corresponding views of the world. (Hence,
the title of the book, Ideology and Utopia.) By "ideology" Mannheim meant those
total systems of thought held by society's ruling groups that obscure the real
conditions and thereby preserve the status quo. "Utopian" thinking signifies just
the opposite. Here, total systems of thought are forged by oppressed groups
interested in the transformation of society. From the utopian side, the purpose of
social thought is not to diagnose the present reality but to provide a rationally
justifiable system of ideas to legitimate and direct change.

Thus, for Mannheim, "ideology" means the ruling groups become blind to
knowledge that would threaten their continued domination, whereas "utopia"
means that oppressed groups selectively perceive "only those elements in the
situation which tend to negate it" (1968:40). Remember that Mannheim was not
arguing that both sides are simply biased. And there is more to his position than
the argument that there are different truths. (Admittedly, it is not unusual for
those interested in the preservation of the existing order to have a different
agenda of questions, thus different answers, than do those interested in change.)
To be clear, because of its structural position, one "side" may be closer to a
specific truth than another. However, when both sides address the same
question, then judgments still must be made concerning the truths of their
answers.

Critique

Throughout his career, Mannheim sought to establish relationships between

structural categories and modes of thought. Thus, he looked at classes, sects,
generations, and parties to conceptualize differences in their worldviews. In
Ideology and Utopia, for example, he identified different forms or ideal types (see
Max Weber...) of the "utopian mentality." For example, early religious sects (such
as the Anabaptists) joined with other oppressed groups in the "spiritualization of
politics." Their revolutionary conception of society was fixed on the establishment
of a millennial kingdom on earth.

The bourgeois thinking of the Enlightenment also struck at the waning power of
the aristocracy. They represented a socially ascendant class whose utopian
mentality took the form of a "liberal-humanitarian" ideal. This ideal featured a
reasoned form of progress, and it was advanced by the middle stratum of
society. This stratum, in turn, was disciplined by a "conscious self-cultivation" and
sought justification in a new ethics and intellectual culture that undermined the
world of the nobility.

Other forms of utopian mentality include the "conservative mode," bent on

controlling the anarchism of "inner freedom" that threatens the utopian dream.
The last is the "socialist-communist" mode," which locates human freedom in the
breakdown of capitalist culture ([1936] 1968:247). Given this range, it is clear that
thought which is utopian in one context may be ideological in another.

Despite this promising delineation of ideal types of utopian thought, Mannheim

proved historically imprecise in associating ideas and social position. This
problem can be generalized to his work as a whole. Put clearly, Mannheim was
routinely content to interpret knowledge from the vantage point of idealist
philosophy. He struggled with the context of ideas and their interrelations within
the structure of an overall system of thought. When he introduced the larger
question of structure, he did little more than claim that knowledge is bound up in
social position. When he dealt with specific classes or movements, he was
content to use them more as illustrations of how thought systems differ. He
seldom specified the real, material conditions that give rise to ideological and
utopian visions.

References

Mannheim, Karl. [1936] 1968. Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the

Sociology of Knowledge. Translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils. New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World.

Wolff, Kurt H. 1971. "Introduction." Pp. x-cxxxiii in From Karl Mannheim, ediited
by Kurt H. Wolff. New York: Oxford University Press.