G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992 LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner, vs.HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR.,.

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit of the Municipality of
Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The referral-complaint of the police was received by the

Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. The corresponding information was filed with
the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed.-denied.
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent judge.
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the
following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure: On. Criminal Cases s it is a violation of municipal or city
ordiance:
Sec. 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be
either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or
preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases
shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de
oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading
as follows:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with
the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the
alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint
against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also
invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of
municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal
ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision

does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the
case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to
conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted
on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription
shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section
2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include
administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter
of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict
between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"
under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged
commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of
Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May
30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the

filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after
the crime had already prescribed.
Criminal Case in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It
is so ordered.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 69863-65 : December 10, 1990.]
192 SCRA 183
LINO BROCKA, BENJAMIN CERVANTES, COSME GARCIA, RODOLFO SANTOS, VALENTINO
SALIPSIP, RICARDO VEGA, ERIC MARIANO, JOSE EMMANUEL OYALES, RONNIE MATTA,
ALFREDO VIAJE, RUBEN EUGENIO, REYNALDO ORTIZ, ORLANDO ORTIZ, NOEL REYES,
EDUARDO IMPERIAL, NESTOR SARMIENTO, FRANCO PALISOC, VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN,
ALBERTO REYES, JESSIE PINILI, ROMULO AUGUIS, DOMINADOR RESURRECION III, RONNIE
LAYGO, ROSAURO ROQUE, CLARENCE SORIANO, OCTAVO DEPAWA, CARLITO LA TORRE,
SEVERNO ILANO, JR., DOMINGO CAJIPE, ALAN ALEGRE, RAMON MARTINEZ, MA. GILDA
HERNANDEZ, EDNA P. VILLANUEVA, DOLLY S. CANU, MELQUIADES C. ATIENZA, ELIGIO P. VERA
CRUZ, ROGER C. BAGAN, ABUNDIO M. CALISTE, Petitioners, vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MAJ.
GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS, BRIG. GENERAL PEDRO BALBANERO, COL. ABAD, COL. DAWIS,
SERGIO APOSTOL, P/LT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and JUDGE RICARDO TENSUAN, Respondents.
This petition was originally filed on February 13, 1985 to secure the release of petitioners on habeas
corpus and to permanently enjoin the City Fiscal of Quezon City from investigating charges of "Inciting to
Sedition" against petitioners Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos,
(hereafter Brocka, et al.). On learning that the corresponding informations for this offense has been filed
by the City Fiscal against them on February 11, 1985, a supplemental petition was filed on February 19,
1985 (p. 51, Rollo) to implead the Presiding Judge, 1 and to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo) and the issuance of warrants for their arrests,
including their arraignment. Since then President Ferdinand E. Marcos had ordered the provisional
release of Brocka, et al., the issue on habeas corpus has become moot and academic (p. 396, Rollo). We
shall thus focus on the question of whether or not the prosecution of the criminal cases for Inciting to
Sedition may lawfully be enjoined.:-cralaw
Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern Police District following the
forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held in sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the
Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO). Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal
Assembly in Criminal Cases Nos. 37783, 37787 and 37788 with Branch 108, Regional Trial Court, NCJR,
Quezon City. 2
Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly and for whom no
bail was recommended, the other petitioners were released on bail of P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s
provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent petition for bail for which daily hearings from
February 1-7, 1985 were held.
However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka, et al. remained in
detention, respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against
them on January 28, 1985 (p. 6, Rollo). Neither the original, duplicate original nor certified true copy of the
PDA was ever shown to them (p. 367, Rollo).
Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11, 1985 with Inciting to Sedition, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo), without prior notice to their counsel
(p. 7, Rollo). The original informations filed recommended no bail (p. 349, Rollo). The circumstances
surrounding the hasty filing of this second offense are cited by Brocka, et al. (quoting from a separate
petition filed on their behalf in G.R. Nos. 69848-50 entitled "Sedfrey A. Ordoez vs. Col. Julian Arzaga, et
al."), as follows:
"x x x
"6. The sham' character of the inquest examination concocted by all respondents is starkly bizarre when
we consider that as early as 10:30 A.M. today, February 11, 1985, Benjamin Cervantes was able to
contact undersigned petitioner by phone informing counsel that said Benjamin Cervantes and the 4 other
persons who are the subjects of this petition will be brought before the Quezon City Fiscal at 2:30 for
undisclosed reasons: subsequently, another phone call was received by petitioning counsel informing him
that the appearance of Benjamin Cervantes et al. was to be at 2:00 P.M. When petitioning counsel arrived
in the office of Assistant City Fiscal Arturo Tugonon, the complainants' affidavits had not yet been received
by any of the panel of three assistant city fiscals, although the five persons under detention were already
in the office of said assistant fiscal as early as 2:00 P.M. It was only at 3:00 when a representative of the
military arrived bringing with him alleged statements of complainants against Lino Broka (sic) et al. for
alleged inciting to sedition, whereupon undersigned counsel asked respondent Colonel Agapito Abad
'who ordered the detained persons to be brought to the office of Assistant Fiscal Arturo Tugonon since
there were no charges on file;' and said Colonel Agapito Abad said aloud: 'I only received a telephone call
from Colonel Arzaga about 11:00 A.M. to bring the detained persons today I am only the custodian.' At

3:15, petitioning counsel inquired from the Records Custodian when the charges against Lino Broka (sic)
had been officially received and he was informed that the said charges were never coursed through the
Records Office.
"7. Under the facts narrated above, respondents have conspired to use the strong arm of the law and
hatched the nefarious scheme to deprive Lino Broka (sic) et al. the right to bail because the utterances
allegedly constituting inciting to sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code are, except for
varying nuances, almost verbatim the same utterances which are the subject of Criminal Cases No.
37783, 37787 and 37788 and for which said detained persons are entitled to be released on bail as a
matter of constitutional right. Among the utterances allegedly made by the accused and which the
respondents claimed to be violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code are: 'Makiisa sa mga
drivers, "Makiisa sa aming layunin, "Digmaang bayan ang sagot sa kahirapan,' Itigil ang pakikialam ng
imperyalismo sa Pilipinas,' 'Rollback ng presyo ng langis sa 95 Centavos.' (See Annex B)
"8. That when petitioning counsel and other members of the defense panel requested that they be given 7
days within which said counsel may confer with their clients the detained persons named above, the
panel of assistant fiscals demanded that said detained persons should sign a 'waiver' of their rights under
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for the grant of said request, which is a harassing
requirement considering that Lino Broka (sic) et al. were already under the detention, albeit illegally, and
they could not have waived the right under Rule 125 which they did not enjoy at the time the ruling was
made by the panel of assistant city fiscals." (pp. 4-6, Rollo in G.R. 69848-50).
They were released provisionally on February 14, 1985, on orders of then President F. E. Marcos. The
circumstances of their release are narrated in Our resolution dated January 26, 1985, as quoted in the
Solicitor General's Manifestation as follows:
"G.R. Nos. 69848-50 (Sedfrey A. Ordoez, Petitioner, vs. Col. Julian Arzaga, et al., Respondents).
Petitioner Sedfrey A. Ordoez filed this petition for habeas corpus in behalf of Lino Brocka, Benjamin
Cervantes, Cosme Garcia, Alexander Luzano, and Rodolfo Santos, who were all detained under a
Preventive Detention Action (PDA) issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on January 28, 1985.
They were charged in three separate informations of the crime of illegal assembly under Art. 146,
paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 1834. On February 7, 1985, the Honorable
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Regional Trial Judge of Quezon City, issued a resolution in the above criminal
cases, directing the release of the five accused on bail of P6,000.00 for each of them, and from which
resolution the respondent fiscals took no appeal. Immediately thereafter, the accused filed their respective
bail bonds. This notwithstanding, they continued to be held in detention by order of the respondent
colonels; and on February 11, 1985, these same accused were 'reinvestigated,' this time on charges of
'inciting to sedition' ** under Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code, following which corresponding cases
were filed. The respondents complied with Our resolution requiring them, inter alia, to make a RETURN of
the writ of habeas corpus. In their RETURN, it appeared that all the accused had already been released,
four of them on February 15, 1985 and one February 8, 1985. The petitioner, nevertheless, argued that
the petition has not become moot and academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the
law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition." (p. 395, Rollo).
Hence, this petition.
Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment are sufficient bases for
enjoining their criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the second offense of inciting to sedition is
illegal, since it is premised on one and the same act of attending and participating in the ACTO jeepney
strike. They maintain that while there may be a complex crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law
does not allow the splitting of a single act into two offenses and filing two informations therefor, further,
that they will be placed in double jeopardy.
The primary issue here is the legality of enjoining the criminal prosecution of a case, since the two other
issues raised by Brocka, et al. are matters of defense against the sedition charge.
We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the second offense of inciting to
sedition.
Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction,
preliminary or final. There are however exceptions, among which are:
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al.,
L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang,
et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil.
556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October 29,
1966, 18 SCRA 616);
"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760,
March 25, 1960);

"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo,
18 L.J. [1953], cited in Raoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf, Guingona, et al
vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and
"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground
has been denied (Salonga vs. Pao, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
"7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful
arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1958)." (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that the criminal
proceedings had become a case of persecution, having been undertaken by state officials in bad faith.:
nad
Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.'s release from detention
(before their release on orders of then Pres. Marcos). This PDA was, however, issued on January 28,
1985, but was invoked only on February 9, 1985 (upon receipt of the trial court's order of release). Under
the guidelines issued, PDAs shall be invoked within 24 hours (in Metro Manila) or 48 hours (outside Metro
Manila). (Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 28, 1985, 139 SCRA 349). Noteworthy also is Brocka,
et al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas for its production, the prosecution merely presented a purported
xerox copy of the invoked PDA (par. 4, Counter-Rejoinder, p. 367, Rollo).
The foregoing circumstances were not disputed by the Solicitor General's office. In fact they found
petitioner's plight "deplorable" (par. 51, Manifestation, p. 396, Rollo).
The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and inoperational PDA, certainly betrays
respondent's bad faith and malicious intent to pursue criminal charges against Brocka, et al.
We have expressed Our view in the Ilagan case that "individuals against whom PDAs have been issued
should be furnished with the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the
official having official custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension" (supra, p. 369).
We do not begrudge the zeal that may characterize a public official's prosecution of criminal offenders.
We, however, believe that this should not be a license to run roughshod over a citizen's basic
constitutional lights, such as due process, or manipulate the law to suit dictatorial tendencies.
We are impelled to point out a citizen's helplessness against the awesome powers of a dictatorship. Thus,
while We agree with the Solicitor General's observation and/or manifestation that Brocka, et al. should
have filed a motion to quash the information, We, however, believe that such a course of action would
have been a futile move, considering the circumstances then prevailing. Thus, the tenacious invocation of
a spurious and inoperational PDA and the sham and hasty preliminary investigation were clear signals
that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al. in detention until the second offense of "Inciting to
Sedition" could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew. As a matter of
fact the corresponding informations for this second offense were hastily filed on February 11, 1985, or two
days after Brocka, et al.'s release from detention was ordered by the trial judge on February 9, 1985.
Constitutional rights must be upheld at all costs, for this gesture is the true sign of democracy. These may
not be set aside to satisfy perceived illusory visions of national grandeur.: nad
In the case of J. Salonga v. Cruz Pao, We point out:
"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect
for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted
and vexatious prosecution . . ." (G.R. No. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438-at p. 448).
We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges,
as in the instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time
that charges were filed, and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted, charges that
are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Cases on RULE 117

G.R. No. 83754

February 18, 1991

TEODORO B. CRUZ, JR., petitioner, vs. CA, Fifteenth Division, respondents.

The petitioner was charged before the RTC of Makati, along with several others, in four separate informations for
estafa thru falsification of public documents.
It was alleged that the petitioner, together with Melania Guerrero, who produced a special power of attorney claimed
establish have been executed by the late Clemente Guerrero, had conspired with their co-accused in selling some
properties of the decedent to the widow's sister, Luz Andico, through fictitious deeds of sale notarized by the
petitioner sometime in November and December of 1980.
Upon arraignment on June 1, 1984, the petitioner and his co-accused entered a plea of not guilty. Subsequently, the
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the four informations "(did) not charge an offense." At
the hearing on this motion, the petitioner submitted testimonial and documentary evidence which was not refuted by
the prosecution. For its part, the prosecution submitted no evidence at an but later moved to deny the motion.
The MTD-to was eventually denied by the trial court, as so was the subsequent motion for reconsideration. The
petitioner questioned the denial of the motions before this Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals. CA
also dismissed the petition. (The respondent Court, then presided over by Judge Madayag, cited as ground of the
denial of the motion to dismiss to avoid technicalities that may arise later. This is interrelated to the first
ground in the denial interest of substantial justice that the prosecution could adduce evidence during the
trial. Thus, to hold otherwise is to sanction a shrewd maneuver by petitioner wherein he files a motion to
quasi/dismiss after arraignment, presents his evidence supporting his ground therefor, and without the State being
able to present its evidence in chief. Under the circumstances, what is needed is a full-blown hearing.
Moreover, assuming that the procedure pursued by the petitioner in outright presenting his evidence in support of his
motion to dismiss, although the prosecution has not as yet presented its evidence in chief is sanctioned by the Rules,
still the respondent Court, under the circumstances, did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss and
subsequently, the motion for reconsideration. Respondent Court must have been not convinced of the evidence
presented, hence, its judicial prerogative to deny the dismissal of the charges.
What is essential and important is for the petitioner to show by his own evidence that the documents, subject of the
charges, were prepared and notarized by him clearly prior to the death of Clemente Guerrero on June 24, 1980 and
not simply prior to the months of November and December, 1980 when the offense was committed, as alleged in the
Information because each Information may be amended as regards the date of the commission of the offense without
impairing the rights of the petitioner (People v. Gerardo Rivera, et al., 33 SCRA 746). The amendment will only be a
matter of form and will not "affect the nature and essence of the crime as only charged."
The petitioner is now before us on certiorari and faults the above-quoted decision as the informations do not charge
an offense.
The petition must fail.
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense
charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss/quash on the ground that it charges no offense may be properly sustained.
The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, a reading of the informations will disclose that the essential elements of
the offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It is not proper therefore to resolve the charges at the very
outset, in a preliminary hearing only and without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The issues require a fuller
examination. Given the circumstances of this case, we feel it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at
this stage of the proceedings and to dismiss the informations of the basis only of the petitioner's evidence,
such as it is.
It is clear that the trial judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when he denied the motion to dismiss on the
grounds that "(a) interest of substantial justice that the prosecution could adduce evidence during the trial; and (b) to
avoid technicalities that may arise later." On the contrary, his action was authorized under U.S. v. Barredo, Upon a
motion of the provincial fiscal to dismiss a complaint upon which an accused person has been remanded for trial by a
justice of the peace, it rests in the sound discretion of the judge whether to accede to such motion or not. Ordinarily,
of course, he will dismiss the action in accordance with the suggestion of an experienced fiscal who has personally
investigated the facts. But if he is not satisfied with the reason assigned by the fiscal, or if it appears to him from the
record of the proceedings in the court of the justice of the peace, or as a result of information furnished by the private
prosecutor, or otherwise, that the case should not be dismissed, he may deny the motion.
Indeed, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, this denial was proper because the petitioner failed to controvert in
his motion to dismiss substantial circumstances alleged in the affidavit complaint: Upon a motion of the provincial
fiscal to dismiss a complaint upon which an accused person has been remanded for trial by a justice of the peace, it

rests in the sound discretion of the judge whether to accede to such motion or not. Ordinarily, of course, he will
dismiss the action in accordance with the suggestion of an experienced fiscal who has personally investigated the
facts. But if he is not satisfied with the reason assigned by the fiscal, or if it appears to him from the record of the
proceedings in the court of the justice of the peace, or as a result of information furnished by the private prosecutor,
or otherwise, that the case should not be dismissed, he may deny the motion.
The petitioner's contention that the questioned transactions were already in existence before the months of
November and December 1980, when they were supposedly falsified, is a matter of defense best examined during
the trial rather than in the preliminary hearing on his motion to dismiss. The prosecution should be given ample
opportunity to prove the allegations in the information at the appropriate time, and that is the trial itself. The proper
time to offer it, following the normal procedure prescribed in Rule 119, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, is after the
prosecution shall have presented its pay evidence during the trial.
In the case of People v.Cadabis, this Court held:
Save where the Rules expressly permit the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash, the general
principle is that in the hearing of such motion only such facts as are alleged in the information, and those
admitted by the fiscal, should be taken into account in the resolution thereof. Matters of defense can not be
produced during the hearing of such motions, except where the rules expressly permit, such as extinction of
criminal liability, prescription and former jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).
But we do not agree with the ruling of the respondent court that the motion to quash should have been filed before
the petitioner and his co-accused were arraigned, conformably to Section 1 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Sec. 1. Time to move to quash. At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the
complaint or information.
It is true that a person who does not move to quash a complaint or information until after he has pleaded is deemed
to have waived all objections then available which are grounds of a motion to quash. However, this is subject to
exception. By express provision of Sec. 8 of the same rule, failure to assert certain grounds in a motion to quash filed
prior to the plea does not operate as a waiver of the right to invoke them later. Even after arraignment, a motion to
dismiss the information may be filed if it is based on the ground that: (a) the information charges no offense; (b) the
trial court has no jurisdiction; (c) the penalty or the offense has been extinguished; and (d) that double jeopardy has
attached.
The petitioner contends that the prosecution is now estopped from questioning the motion to dismiss, having
participated without objection in the hearing thereof and not having controverted the evidence adduced by the movant
at that time. This is untenable. Estoppel does not he against the government because of the supposedly mistaken
acts or omissions of its agents. As we declared in People v. Castaeda, "there is the long familiar rule that erroneous
application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute
and that the government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents."
It remains to observe that an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it
be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal
from the judgment after trial. The petitioner should have proceeded with the trial of the case in the court below,
without prejudice to his right, if final judgment is rendered against him, to raise the same question before the proper
appellate court.
The procedure was well defined in Acharon v. Purisima, thus:
. . . Moreover, when the motion to quash filed by Acharon to nullify the criminal cases filed against him was
denied by the Municipal Court of General Santos his remedy was not to file a petition for certiorari but to go
to trial without prejudice on his part to reiterate the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if,
after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by
law. This is the procedure that he should have followed as authorized by law and precedents. Instead, he
took the usual step of filing a writ of certiorari before the Court of First Instance which in our opinion is
unwarranted it being contrary to the usual course of law.
Where it is clear that the information does not really charge an offense, the case against the accused must be
dropped immediately instead of subjecting him to the anxiety and inconvenience of a useless trial. The accused is
entitled to such consideration.And indeed, even the prosecution will benefit from such a dismissal because it can then
file a corrected information provided the accused had not yet pleaded and jeopardy has not yet attached. There is no
point in proceeding under a defective information that can never be the basis of a valid conviction.1wphi1
But such is not the situation in the case at bar. As already observed, the challenged informations are not insufficient
on their face and neither did the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing justify their dismissal even before the
trial had commenced. If "substantial justice" is to be accorded by this Court, as the petitioner insists, then the step it
must take is to sustain the denial of the motion to dismiss and allow the criminal cases to follow their normal course.
That is what we rule now.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Criminal Cases Nos. 7332, 7333, 7334 and 7335 are remanded to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145, for further proceedings.

[G.R. No. 110315. January 16, 1998] RENATO CUDIA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, The
HON.CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI,
Angeles City, respondents.
Petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, by members of the then
174th PC Company, allegedly for possessing an unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Camp Pepito,
Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, where he was detained. A preliminary investigation was thereafter conducted
by an investigating panel of prosecutors. As a result thereof, the City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an
information against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession and under his control one (1) .38 Cal. Revolver (paltik) without any Serial Number
with six (6) live ammunitions, which he carried outside of his residence without having the necessary
authority and permit to carry the same.
The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. Upon his arraignment on,
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the attention of
the parties to the fact that, contrary to the information, petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat,
and not in Angeles City. Inasmuch as there was an existing arrangement among the judges of the
Angeles City RTCs as to who would handle cases involving crimes committed outside of Angeles City, the
judge ordered the re-raffling of the case to a branch assigned to criminal cases involving crimes
committed outside of the city. Thereafter, the case was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.
On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information charging
petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The case was likewise
raffled to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the prosecutor in the first case to file a
Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, stating that thru inadvertence and oversight, the
Investigating Panel was misled into hastily filing the Information in this case, it appearing that the
apprehension of the accused in connection with the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm and
ammunition was made in Bgy. Sta. Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pampanga and that the Provincial Prosecutor had filed its own information against the
accused, as a result of which two separate informations for the same offense had been filed against
petitioner. The latter filed his opposition to the motion, but the trial court nonetheless, granted said motion
to dismiss in its order dated April 3, 1990.
On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash 2 nd Criminal Case on the ground that his continued
prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he had been
arraigned in 1st crim. case, and which had been dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right
not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court denied the motion to
quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, stating that there
was no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on the ground that the petitioner could not have been
convicted under the first information as the same was defective. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied; hence, this appeal.
In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same
or a frustration thereof.
In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to prove the
existence of the following:
(a) Court of competent jurisdiction (b) Valid complaint or information (c) Arraignment (c) Valid plea
(e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.
It is undisputed that petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, that he pleaded not guilty
therein, and that the same was dismissed without his express consent, nay, over his opposition even. We
may thus limit the discussion to determining whether the first two requisites have been met.
As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction, for jurisdiction to try
the case is essential to place an accused in jeopardy. The Court of Appeals and the Solicitor General
agreed that Branch 60, which originally had cognizance of Criminal Case No. 11542, had no jurisdiction
over the case. In the words of the Solicitor General:

The first jeopardy did not also attach because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City was
not the proper venue for hearing the case. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, being an essential
element of jurisdiction. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients
thereof took place. Although both Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which
has jurisdiction to try offenses committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner was arraigned before
Branch 60, not Branch 56.
It must be borne in mind that the question of jurisdiction of a court over cases filed before it must be
resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. Administrative Order
No. 7, Series of 1983 provides that:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, and
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 864 of the President of the Philippines, dated January 17, 1983, the
territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Region One to Twelve are hereby defined as follows:
PAMPANGA
1. Branches LVI to LXII, inclusive, with seats at Angeles City comprising ANGELES CITY and the
municipalities of Mabalacat, Magalang, and Porac as well as part of Clark Field U.S. Airbase.
Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned. Consequently,
notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges of the Angeles City RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably
had jurisdiction over instant case.
With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles
City had no authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of
Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:
Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:
b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all
penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or
complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his
assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena
for the purpose.
It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare
informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when
required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or
presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire
jurisdiction.
Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor in filing the
information in question is deemed a waiver thereof. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
petitioners plea to an information before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all objections to it
insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express
provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions relating to want of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent
officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused
(herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in
the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent.
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If,
therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance
that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused
cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first
information would not be a bar to petitioners subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a
defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.
Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error of the investigating
panel and the same should not be used to prejudice and penalize him. It is an all too familiar maxim that
the State is not bound or estopped by the mistakes or inadvertence of its officials and employees. To rule
otherwise could very well result in setting felons free, deny proper protection to the community, and give
rise to the possibility of connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.
Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal, should have
been the remedy sought by the prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court, in Galvez vs. Court of
Appeals has ruled that even if amendment is proper, pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite
plausible under the same provision that, instead of an amendment, an information may be dismissed to
give way to the filing of a new information.

In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice
putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense for the simple reason that the absence
of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first information meant that petitioner could never have been
convicted on the strength thereof.
As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant petition
must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
G.R. No. 88232 February 26, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, in his capacity as Acting
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Br. 22, Cabagan, Isabela; ELVINO AGGABAO and VILLA SURATOS,
respondents.
Upon complaint by Alma T. Aggabao, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cabagan, Isabela filed on July
25, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22, an information against private
respondents Elvino Aggabao and Villa Suratos for the crime of concubinage allegedly committed in
September 1983. Upon being arraigned, private respondents entered a plea of not guilty. The
complainant was represented before the trial court by a private prosecutor. During the trial, private
respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that concubinage,
under Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is punishable with prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods, which is equivalent to imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months, well within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, and
not of the Regional Trial Court. The prosecution filed an opposition to the motion contending that the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage because destierro, the imposable
penalty on the concubine has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The trial court
sustained private respondent's position and granted the motion to dismiss.
Private prosecutor, together with the assistant provincial prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela, filed on June 16,
1989 the instant petition assailing the order of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss the criminal
information against private respondents. This Court denied the petition due to late payment of docket and
legal research fees and for lack of merit. The Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of the Court denying the petition. Subsequently, the private prosecutor filed a separate motion for
reconsideration. In these motions, the Solicitor General and the private prosecutor submitted additional
arguments to support their position that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the crime of
concubinage.
At the outset, it must be stated that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor General.
Instead, it was filed by the private prosecutor and the assistant provincial prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela,
with the offended party, Alma T. Aggabao, being named co-petitioner of the People of the Philippines. The
Court has already ruled that while it is the fiscal who represents the People of the Philippines in the
prosecution of offenses before the trial courts, when such criminal actions are brought to the Court of
Appeals or to the Supreme Court, it is the Solicitor General who must represent the People of the
Philippines, not the fiscal [City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina, G.R. No. 83996, October 21, 1988, 166
SCRA 614] nor the private prosecutor, even with the conformity of the assistant provincial prosecutor
[People v. Dacudao, G.R. No. 81389, February 21, 1989]. Nevertheless, considering that the Solicitor
General has intervened in this case by filing a motion for reconsideration of the Court resolution dated
July 17, 1989 denying the petition, the Court has decided to forego technicalities and to resolve the issues
raised. Moreover, since it is now apparent that the only petitioner in this case is the People of the
Philippines as represented by the Solicitor General, payment of the legal fees is not necessary in
accordance with Rule 141, Sec. 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner first contends that private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction after
the prosecution has rested its case and the defense has started to present its evidence. Furthermore,
petitioner complains that "it took two (2) years and six (6) months before anyone to take (sic) notice of the
jurisdictional infirmity [Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 12]. Hence, according to petitioner, private respondents are
barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction, estoppel having already set in.
The contention is without merit. In our legal system, the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings [Rule 117, Sec. 8, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure; U.S. v. Castanares, 18
Phil. 210 (1911)]. It is true that in Vera v. People, G.R. No. L-31218, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 711 and
in People v. Munar, G.R. No. L-37642, October 22, 1973, 53 SCRA 278, cases cited by the Solicitor
General and private prosecutor in their pleadings, the Court held that jurisdiction cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. However, these cases can readily be distinguished from the case at bar by the fact
that the issue of jurisdiction was raised only on appeal. In the instant case, the private respondents made
the jurisdictional challenge pending the trial and before the trial court has rendered any judgment on the
merits.
Moreover, the ruling in Vera v. People and People v. Munar that jurisdiction may not be raised for the first
time on appeal, is the exception rather than the general rule.
The doctrine in those cases was first enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15,
1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36, where the Court stated that:

. . . a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean,
136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the
question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject- matter of the action or of the parties is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public
policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the meats, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court ... And in
Littleton vs. Burges, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and
invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-34362, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 399 [See also Dy v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 68544, October 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 211], the Court held that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
is an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case
because of the presence of laches. The Court said:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is
that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements
which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however,
that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated
therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket
doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the
exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the
issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was
held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the
first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been
rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches
is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.
The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy No judgment has yet
been rendered by the trial court in this case. And as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional
defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal
element of laches to be absent, the Court holds that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, Vera v. People
and People v. Munar does not control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question
of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, must apply. Private respondents
are not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Having disposed of the procedural issue, the Court will now proceed with the main issue of whether or not
the Regional Trial Court has original jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage.
The crime of concubinage is penalized by Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code which reads as follows:
Art. 334.
Concubinage. Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or,
shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or
shall cohabit with her in any other place shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.
The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro. (Emphasis supplied.)
According to Sec. 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (hereinafter referred to
as the inferior courts) shall exercise "[e]xclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof . . ." On the other hand, the "Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. .
." [Sec. 20. B.P. Blg. 129].
The penalty imposable on the husband who commits concubinage is prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods, which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months. Hence, as regards the husband, there is no question that concubinage is within the exclusive

original jurisdiction of the inferior courts. The problem concerns the concubine upon whom the imposable
penalty is destierro.
The Solicitor General and the private prosecutor point out that the duration of destierro, which is between
six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years [Art. 27, RPC], is beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior
courts to impose. Thus, they conclude that either (1) the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage [Solicitor General's Motion for Reconsideration, p.
11; Rollo, p. 521; or (2) the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts have "split jurisdiction," the latter
having jurisdiction over the crime as regards the husband and the former as regards the concubine
[Private Prosecutor's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3; Rollo, p. 58].
These propositions are both untenable. It has already been held by the Court in Uy Chin Hua v.
Dinglasan, 86 Phil. 617 (1950) and People v. Santos, 87 Phil. 687 (1950) that a crime punishable with the
penalty of destierro is within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts. This is so because in the scale of
penalties outlined in Art. 71, destierro comes after arresto mayor. * And since under the Judiciary Act of
1948 [Republic Act No. 296], crimes punishable with arresto mayor are within the jurisdiction of the
inferior courts, it follows that crimes punishable with destierro are also within the jurisdiction of such
courts. In explaining its conclusion that destierro is lighter than arresto mayor and therefore cognizable by
the inferior courts, the Court, in Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, supra at p. 619, stated the following:
Destierro is not a higher penalty than arresto mayor. Arresto mayor means imprisonment or complete
deprivation of liberty, whereas destierro means banishment or only a prohibition from residing within a
radius of 25 kilometers from the actual residence of the accused for a specified length of time. The
respective severities of arresto mayor and destierro must not be judged by the duration of each of these
penalties, but by the degree of deprivatin of liberty involved. Penologists have always considered
destierro lighter than arresto mayor. Such criterion is reflected both in the old Spanish Penal Code and in
our Revised Penal Code. In the graduated scale of article 71 the lawmaker has placed destierro below
arresto mayor. There is, therefore, no basis in fact or in law for holding that destierro is a higher penalty
than arresto mayor and that an offense penalized with destierro falls under the jurisdiction of the court of
first instance.
The Court is well-aware of the fact that Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan and People v. Santos were decided
under the Judiciary Act of 1948 pursuant to which justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of
chartered cities had original jurisdiction over "all offenses in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for not more than six months" [Sec. 87 (b)] while Courts of First Instance had original
jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six
months" [Sec. 44 (f)]. There being no mention in said Act of crimes for which the penalty is not
imprisonment, these aforecited cases were decided on the premise that "there exists a gap in the law as
to which court shall have original jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro or banishment" [Uy
Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, supra, at p. 620].
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), the inferior courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over "all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four (4) years and
two (2) months [Sec. 32 (2)] while the Regional Trial Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction" in all
criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body" [Sec. 20]. Ostensibly,
Sec. 20 of B. P. Blg. 129 would grant to the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over crimes punishable with
destierro, such as concubinage, since destierro is not an offense punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four (4) years and two (2) months. However, the Court, after a careful reading of B.P. Blg. 129,
is of the considered opinion that there was no intention to overturn the doctrine laid down in Uy Chin Hua
v. Dinglasan and People v. Santos. It is quite evident that among the important factors considered in the
allocation of jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts are the gravity of both
the offense and the imposable penalty. It is not, therefore unreasonable to state that the legislature
granted to the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over crimes whose penalties are harsher than those
vested in the inferior courts. And since it is already a settled rule that destierro, by its nature, is a lighter
penalty than imprisonment [Uy Chin Hua v. Dingalasan, supra], it follows that even under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over crimes punishable with destierro is vested not in the
Regional Trial Courts but in the inferior courts.
More particularly in this case, the crime of concubinage has two penalties, one for the husband and
another for the concubine. The penalty for the husband, prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, is
unquestionably within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts. Considering that Art. 344 of the Revised Penal
Code states that "[t]he offended party [in the crime of concubinage] cannot institute criminal prosecution
without including both the guilty parties," it is clearly in the interest of the orderly administration of justice
that the concubine be tried with the erring husband before the inferior courts. The legislature could not
have intended to allow the absurd situation wherein the inferior court has jurisdiction over the crime of
concubinage only as regards the husband while the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the same
crime with respect to the concubine.
In fine, the Court, after a careful consideration of the pertinent laws, as well as the jurisprudence on the
matter, holds that the crime of concubinage is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior
courts. The Regional Trial Courts have no original jurisdiction over the said crime. Hence, the court a quo
committed no reversible error in dismissing the criminal information against private respondents. At any
rate, considering that the dismissal of the case by the court a quo on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is
not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense [Rule 117, Secs. 6 and 7, Revised Rules on

Criminal Procedure] and considering further that the crime has not yet prescribed [See Art. 90, RPC], the
offended wife is not precluded from initiating the filing of another criminal information against private
respondents before the proper court.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit. The reimbursement of the legal
fees paid by the private prosecutor for the filing of this petition is hereby ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81381 September 30, 1988
EFIGENIO S. DAMASCO, petitioner, vs.JUDGE HILARIO L. LAQUI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Metropolitan Trial Court, Br. 59, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
In an Information dated 11 September 1987, but filed only on 17 September 1987 with the Municipal Trial
Court of Mandaluyong, Branch 59, presided over by respondent Judge Laqui, petitioner Atty. Damasco
was charged with the crime of grave threats committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of July 1987, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
threaten one Rafael K. Sumadohat with the infliction upon his person of a wrong amounting to a crime,
that is, by then and there uttering the following remarks, to wit:
BAKIT MO AKO GINAGANITO? MAGBABAYAD KA ... PAPATAYIN KITA ... MAYROON AKONG BARIL,
BABARILIN KITA, TAGADIYAN LANG AKO
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. After trial, respondent judge found that the
evidence presented did not establish the crime of grave threats but only of light threats . As a
result, petitioner was convicted of the latter crime and was sentenced to pay a fine of P100.00 and the
costs.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the dispositive part of respondent Judge's
decision, contending that he cannot be convicted of light threats, necessarily included in grave threats
charged in the information, as the lighter offense had already prescribed when the information was filed.
Petitioner states that the crime was committed on 8 July 1987 and the information was filed only on 17
September 1987 or after the lapse of 71 days. (Incidentally the affidavit complaint was filed with the
Fiscal's Office only on 7 September 1987, or after the lapse of 61 days from 8 July 1987. 1 ) Upon the
other hand, the crime of light threats, which is a light offense, prescribes in two (2) months 2 which means
sixty (60) days.
Lower court denied his motion - The Court holds on to the principle that the allegation in the information
confers jurisdiction and that jurisdiction once acquired cannot be lost. Since the Court acquired jurisdiction
to try the case because the information was filed within the prescriptive period for the crime charged,
which is Grave Threats, the same cannot be lost by prescription, if after trial what has been proven is
merely light threats.
The Office of the Solicitor GeneralThe jurisdiction of the lower court over the crime was never questioned. Rather, the legal dispute lies in
whether or not it was proper for respondent Judge to still convict petitioner after finding him guilty of the
lesser offense of light threats but which has already prescribed. Verily, the query should be answered in
the negative for reasons heretofore discussed.
In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that where an accused has been found to
have committed a lesser offense includible within the graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of
the lesser offense if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to
sanction a circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accussing the defendant of
the graver offense.
However, Philippine jurisprudence considers prescription of a crime or offense as a loss or waiver by the
State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law. Hence, while it is the rule that an
accused who fails to move to quash before pleading, is deemed to waive all objections which are
grounds of a motion to quash, yet, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, which
under Art. 69 of the Revised Penal Code extinguishes criminal liability. To apply the suggestion in
the aforecited memorandum could contravene said Article 89, which is a part of substantive law. This
position is further strengthened by Sec. 8, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which added
extinction of offense as one of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the effects of a failure to assert
a ground of a motion to quash.
Thus, as suggested by the cited memorandum, a departure from the ruling in Francisco vs. CA, can be
done only "through an overhaul of some existing rules on criminal procedure to give prescription a limited
meaning, i.e., a mere bar to the commencement of a criminal action and therefore, waivable. But this will
have to contend with the Constitutional provision that while the Supreme Court has the power to

promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleadings, practice
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and the legal
assistance to the underprivileged, such rules shall not however diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision is SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 92201 August 21, 1991

RUDOLFO S. MAGAT and MINERVA F. MAGAT, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
The petitioners state that the respondent court instead of dismissing their petition and thereby affirming a
judgment of conviction should have ordered the complaint dismissed on the ground of prescription or
acquitted them for failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On October 14, 1985, the petitioners were charged before the MTC of Pasay City under a complaint filed
by Ma. Luisa F. Domocmat for serious slander allegedly committed on May 12, 1985 in Room 335 of the
Manila Sanitarium and Hospital in Pasay City.
The alleged defamatory words are:
By Rudolfo S. Magat:
Ikaw tarantada kang babae. Kung ilang beses kitang kinantot. Yang asawa mo sira.
Kayong lahat kayang-kaya ko.
By Minerva F. Magat:
Putang babae ka. Malandi ka. Palibhasa hindi ka na naka-kantot ng asawa ko. Ikaw
Clarie yong asawa mo naman ang lalandian niya palibhasa hindi na siya naka-kantot ng
asawa ko. (Rollo, p. 61)
The petitioners are spouses working for the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Rudolfo is a practising
physician in the hospital while Minerva is the secretary-receptionist in the Radiology Department of the
same institution.
After trial, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay convicted the accused spouses of light slander.
S.C --- The quarrel in Room 335 of the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital took place on May 12, 1985 at
about 10:00 to 10:30 o'clock in the morning. The complaint of Mrs. Domocrat with the complaint-affidavit
of Dr. Clarita Garcia was filed on September 17, 1985 or 132 days later. The sworn complaint was
actually filed in the trial court on October 14, 1985.
When the trial court rendered its decision on January 19, 1989 and found the petitioners guilty of light
slander, it had no jurisdiction to sentence them to a P150.00 fine with moral damages, attorney's fees,
and costs. The offense ascertained from the evidence adduced during trial was a light offense and under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light offenses prescribe in two (2) months.
It is, therefore, evident that the trial court committed reversible error in convicting the petitioners of a crime
that had already been extinguished through prescription. It was likewise error for the Regional Trial Court
to try to correct the error by simply convicting the petitioners of the higher offense. Our review of the
records also indicates the presence of reasonable doubt as to what words were really spoken during the
incident.
Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible source, which in this case is difficult to
ascertain, but should also be credible in itself
There is no evidence in the record that Dr. and Mrs. Magat on one hand and Mrs. Domocmat on the other
belong to a group of liberated or "swinging" couples in whose married life, sexual liaisons are not
shocking or opprobrious and can, therefore, be bandied around in spontaneous utterances
In the light of the foregoing, the case should have been dismissed by the Metropolitan Trial Court as the
light offense for which the petitioners were found guilty had already prescribed when the complaint was
filed. However, since either inadvertence, neglect, or a desire to be vindicated led the petitioners to

appeal a case where under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability had already been totally
extinguished, we dismiss the complaint on grounds of reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116,
Pasay City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioners are ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable
doubt.

G.R. No. L-18819

March 30, 1963

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MAXIMINO PLAZA, defendant-appellee.
DIZON, J.:
Appeal by the State from an order of the Municipal Court of Butuan City dismissing the information filed in
Criminal Case No. 2721, as against Maximino Plaza, on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not
constitute a criminal offense.
The aforesaid information charged Esperanza Ato de Lamboyog, Capistrano Lamboyog and Maximino
Plaza with estafa, alleging:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1954, in the City of Butuan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring, cooperating together and
helping one another with accused Esperanza Ato de Lamboyog and her husband Capistrano
Lamboyog pretending and misrepresenting themselves to be the sole and absolute owners of a
real estate situated at Barrio Ba-an, Butuan City, covered by Tax Declaration No. 3824 (9949
located at Doot, Barrio Ba-an, Butuan City) more particularly described as follows, to wit:
"A parcel of agricultural land bounded on the north by Jose Ato, on the East by Ba-an
River, on the South by Pedro Plaza and on the West by the Agusan River, containing an
area of 7,413 square meters, more or less," when in fact and in truth the above-named
accused knew that the said land above described was already sold in a pacto de retro
sale dated July 21, 1953, and later on converted the same sale into an absolute sale on
September 3, 1953, in favor of Felipe F. Paular, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to defraud said Felipe F. Paular knowing that said property has
been previously sold to the said Felipe P. Paular in the amount of P400.00, both accused
entered into agreement whereby the said property above-described was sold by the
accused Esperanza Ato de Lamboyog and her aforementioned husband, to his coaccused Maximino Plaza and falsely represented the same property to be free from
encumbrance, to the damage and prejudice of said Felipe F. Paular in the amount of
P400.00 excluding the improvements thereon . . . .
Defendant Plaza filed a motion to quash the information on the grounds that (1) the fact charged do not
constitute an offense insofar as he was concerned;(2) that the information charged more than one
offense; and (3) that the criminal liability had been extinguished by prescription of the crime. The court
found the first ground to be well taken and dismissed the information as against him. Hence this appeal..
A perusal of the information discloses that it charges that three defendants with "conspiring, cooperating
together and helping one another etc.," to commit the offense charged, while at the same time another
portion thereof would seem to imply that the Lamboyog spouses falsely represented to their co-defendant,
Maximino Plaza, that the property they were selling to him was free from encumbrance an allegation
justifying the inference that Plaza did not know that the property he was buying had been previously sold
to the offended party, Felipe F. Paular. In view of this, we are of the opinion that the real defect of the
information is not that the facts alleged therein do not constitute a punishable offense but that its
allegations, as to Plaza's participation and possible guilt, are vague.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
But even assuming that the lower court was right in holding that the facts alleged in the information do not
constitute a punishable offense, as far as defendant Plaza was concerned, the case should not have
been dismissed with respect to him. Instead, pursuant to the provisions of Section 7, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, the lower court should have given the prosecution an opportunity to amend the
information. That under the provisions of said rule, the trial court may order the filing of another
information or simply the amendments of the one already filed is clearly in accordance with the settled
rule in this jurisdiction (U.S. vs. Muyo, 2 Phil. 177; People vs. Tan, 48 Phil. 877, 880).

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is ordered
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

G.R. No. L-45129

March 6, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Batangas, Second Branch, and MANUEL OPULENCIA, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas
Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched
and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated
by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and
contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and
"architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" owned by the private respondent. These
electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or
decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and
cold storage] plant." During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written
statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the
readings of his electric meter.
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas
City an information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas
City. A violation of this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from Five Pesos
(P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the
discretion of the court." This information reads as follows:
The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3 (b) in
relation to Sec. 6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of ordinance No. 1, S. 1974, with damage to the City
Government of Batangas, and penalized by the said ordinance, committed as follows:
That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud the City Government of Batangas,
without proper authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices to lower
or decrease the consumption of electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at Kumintang, Ibaba, this
city and as a result of such unathorized installations of electric wirings and devices made by the accused,
the City Government of Batangas was damaged and prejudiced in the total amount of FORTY ONE
THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine currency,
covering the period from November 1974 to February, 1975, to the damage and prejudice of the City
Government of Batangas in the aforestated amount of P41,062.16, Philippine currency.
The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2 February 1976, he filed
a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed
and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City
Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on
the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two
months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by the
fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975.
Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of
electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. This
information read as follows:
The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of the crime of theft, defined and
penalized by Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:
That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974, and the 21st day of February, 1975, at
Kumintang, lbaba, Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Batangas
Electric Light System, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and appropriate
electric current valued in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND

SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Batangas Electric Light System, owned and operated by the City Government of Batangas, in the
aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.
The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash,
dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second
information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. By
Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered
the case dismissed. The gist of this Order is set forth in the following paragraphs:
The only question here is whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly pleaded by the
accused in the motion to quash.
The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the
offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be
based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to
the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the
prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently
under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from
the same act or set of acts.
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20,
section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense." (Emphasis in the original) The second sentence of said clause
provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
of the same act provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is
not included in or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies,
even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an
ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act
conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. 12
Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations
charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if
there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
In other words, the "taking" of electric current was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric
wiring and devices.
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to
a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The
Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may
be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or
a frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the
technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second
offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for
offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or
overlapping sets of technical elements. As Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras
cautioned in People vs. del Carmen et al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951):
While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense, it seems elementary
that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single
act. Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission may give use to several prosecutions depending upon the
ability of the prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by said act or
omission, by simply adding or subtracting essential elements. Under the theory of appellant, the crime of
rape may be converted into a crime of coercion, by merely alleging that by force and intimidation the
accused prevented the offended girl from remaining a virgin. (88 Phil. at 53; emphases supplied)
By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a
common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and
sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or
statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find
It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the
Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an
acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the
crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order
sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
15

It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for certiorari and mandamus in this case. It
is difficult to summon any empathy for a businessman who would make or enlarge his profit by stealing
from the community. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment because an Assistant City
Fiscal by inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information for an offense which he should have
known had already prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the fundamental law to hold the protection
of the right against double jeopardy available even to the private respondent in this case.
The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. Because no reservation of the right to file a
separate civil action was made by the Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal action both before
the City Court of Batangas City and the Court of First Instance of Batangas. The extinction of criminal
liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the extinction of civil
liability arising from the offense charged. In the present case, as we noted earlier, accused Manuel
Opulencia freely admitted during the police investigation having stolen electric current through the
installation and use of unauthorized elibctrical connections or devices. While the accused pleaded not
guilty before the City Court of Batangas City, he did not deny having appropriated electric power.
However, there is no evidence in the record as to the amount or value of the electric power appropriated
by Manuel Opulencia, the criminal informations having been dismissed both by the City Court and by the
Court of First Instance (from which dismissals the Batangas City electric light system could not have
appealed 17) before trial could begin. Accordingly, the related civil action which has not been waived
expressly or impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City for reception of
evidence on the amount or value of the electric power appropriated and converted by Manuel Opulencia
and rendition of judgment conformably with such evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil action for related civil
liability be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City for further proceedings as indicated
above. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-41251. March 31, 1976.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and MANUEL GEROMO, Petitioners, v. HON. GREGORIO CONSULTA,
AS ACTING MUN. JUDGE OF GUINOBATAN, ALBAY, and LEA B. OLAGUER,Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
When the criminal complaint for usury (Criminal Case No. 43578) filed against private respondent before the
municipal court of Guinobatan, Albay was dismissed on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute
an offense, petitioner filed before the Court of First Instance of the province a petition for certiorari assailing
the municipal courts order. The same was dismissed although the court made it known that another
complaint may be filed against private respondent in accordance with the provisions of Section 3, Rule 117.
Thereafter, another complaint for violation of the Usury law (Criminal Case No. 4738) was filed against
private Respondent. The latter moved to quash on the ground that the filing of the second complaint would
put her in double jeopardy. The respondent court dismissed the complaint as well as denied the motion for
reconsideration of that dismissal. Hence, the petition which the Court decide to treat as a special civil action.
The Supreme Court held as error the respondent courts posture that the dismissal of the complaint in
Criminal Case No. 4578 is a bar to the subsequent filing of another complaint against private respondent for
the same offense on the ground of double jeopardy.
Judgment reversed.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 117, SEC. 2(a) NOT BAR TO
PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME OFFENSE. Where the order sustaining the motion to quash the complaint is
based on Subsection (a) of Section 2 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, that the facts charged in the complaint
do not constitute an offense, then the dismissal of said complaint will not be a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense, for it is so provided in Section 8 of Rule 117 that an order sustaining the motion to quash
is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds
specified in Section 2, Subsection (f) and (h) of this rule. In People v. Austria, 94 Phil. 897, this Court held
that if an information is dismissed and the accused is discharged on a demurrer or on petition of the fiscal or
the accused, or on the courts own motion, because the information or complaint is either void or fatally
defective, or when it does not charge the proper offense, such dismissal and the consequent discharge of
the accused is not a bar to his prosecution for the same offense.
2. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES AS A DEFENSE. In order that the protection against double jeopardy may issue
in favor of an accused person, the following requisites must be present in the original prosecution: (a) a
valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d)
the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or terminated without his
express consent.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. The complaint for violation of the Usury Law (Act No. 2655) filed with the
municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay against private respondent was not sufficient in form and substance to
support a conviction. A mere reading of the first complaint readily showed its substantial defect. On its face
it was evident that no violation of the Usury Law was committed because the interest of .03% per month
or .36% which private respondent charged the petitioner for his loan or forbearance did not exceed the 14%
allowed by the law for loans without security. The complaint therefore did not charge any offense.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT ON APPLICATION OF DEFENDANT OPERATES AS WAIVER.
When a criminal case is dismissed upon the express application of the defendant, the dismissal is not a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a
waiver of his constitutional prerogative against double jeopardy as he thereby prevents the court from
proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering judgment of conviction against him.
5. JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS; RES JUDICATA; DISMISSAL WHICH IS NOT A DECISION ON THE MERITS
CANNOT BAR A SUBSEQUENT CASE BASED ON THE SAME OFFENSE. An order of the municipal court
dismissing the first complaint for usury is not a decision on the merits thereof. Said order cannot be a bar to
the prosecution of the second complaint for the same offense upon the principle of res judicata. In People v.
Bellosillo, 9 SCRA 835, this Court held: "Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the
merit, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense." Besides, the provision of
Rule 30, Section 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that a "dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the court", does not apply to criminal cases.
6. LACHES; MEANING OF. In a general sense, laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done

earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

DECISION

MARTIN, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Order of the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay in Criminal Case No.
4738, entitled People of the Philippines v. Lea B. Olaguer dismissing the complaint in said case on the
ground that the same will place private respondent in double jeopardy.
On June 23, 1973, petitioner Manuel Geromo filed with the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay, a
complaint (Criminal Case No. 4578) against private respondent Lea B. Olaguer charging her with violation of
the Usury Law (Act 2655, Sec. 1 in relation to Section 19) allegedly committed as follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"That in or about November, 1972, at Guinobatan, Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Hon.
Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lend money and
goods to the undersigned in the total sum of P560.00 and after payment of P30.00 leaving a balance of
P530.00, charged a usurious rate of interest of .03% per month and for eight (8) months from November,
1972 to June, 1973, or a total of P607.20, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned.
"That by reason of the aforesaid criminal act committed by the accused, the undersigned suffered and will
suffer damages of no less than P10,000.00 including attorneys fees and incidental expenses."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Upon arraignment, private respondent pleaded not guilty and immediately moved orally to quash the
complaint on the ground that it charges no offense.
On July 17, 1973, pursuant to the order of the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay, private respondent filed
a written motion to quash the aforesaid complaint alleging that the allegations contained in the aboveentitled case or the facts charged do not constitute an offense (Paragraph (e), Sec. 2, Rule 117 of the New
Rules of Court).
On January 31, 1974, the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay ordered the dismissal of the complaint
against private Respondent. Petitioner Manuel Geromo filed a motion to reconsider said order and/or motion
to reinstate or accept an amended complaint against private respondent but the same was denied. As a
result petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Albay (Case No. 5003) assailing
the order of the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay, dismissing the complaint he filed against
private Respondent.
On June 7, 1974, the Court of First Instance of Albay dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
although it made known to petitioner that another complaint may be filed against private respondent in
accordance with the provisions of Section 3, Rule 117.
On June 17, 1974, petitioner filed with the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay, the respondent Court
herein, another complaint (Criminal Case No. 4738) for violation of the Usury Law against
privateRespondent. But the respondent Court dismissed the same upon a motion to quash filed by private
respondent on the ground that the filing of the second complaint will put the accused in double jeopardy.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order but the same was denied by the respondent Court.
Hence, this instant petition for certiorari, which in a resolution dated November 5, 1975, this Court treated
as special civil action, considered the comments of private respondent as answer and required both parties
to file simultaneous memoranda. In the same resolution the People of the Philippines was considered
impleaded as principal party petitioner.
The main issue in this petition is whether or not the quashal or dismissal of Criminal Case No. 4578 of the
Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay, against private respondent upon motion to quash filed by the latter
and the subsequent filing of another complaint (Criminal Case No. 4738) with the respondent Court against
her for the same offense had placed private respondent in double jeopardy.
1. The posture taken by the respondent Court that the dismissal of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 4578
against private respondent is a bar to the subsequent filing of another complaint against her for the same
offense on the ground that the private respondent would be placed in double jeopardy, is wrong. It will be
noted that the order sustaining the motion to quash the complaint against petitioner was based on
Subsection (a) of Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court that the facts charged in the complaint do
not constitute an offense. If this is so then the dismissal of said complaint will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense, for it is so provided in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court that an
order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the
motion was based on the grounds specified in Section 2, Subsection (f) and (h) of this rule 1 and the
records clearly show that the ground relied upon by the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay in dismissing
the first complaint (Criminal Case No. 4738) is not one of those exceptions provided for under Section 8,
supra. It is not a case where the criminal action or liability of the private respondent has been extinguished,
nor a case where the private respondent has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged because the first complaint under which she was prosecuted does not
allege facts constituting any offense. In order that the protection against double jeopardy may issue in favor
of an accused person, the following requisites must be present in the original prosecution: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or terminated without his
express consent. 2 The complaint for violation of the Usury Law (Act. No. 2655) filed with the Municipal
Court of Guinobatan, Albay against private respondent is not sufficient in form and substance to support a

conviction. A mere reading of the first complaint will readily show its substantial defect. Thus it alleged." . .
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lend money and goods to the undersigned in
the total sum of P560.00 and after payment P30.00 leaving a balance of P530.00, charged a usurious rate of
interest of .03% per month and for eight (8) months from November, 1972 to June, 1973, or a total of
P607.20 to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned." On the face of the complaint it is evident that no
violation of the Usury Law was committed because the interest of .03% per month or .36% which private
respondent charged the petitioner for his loan or forbearance did not exceed the 14% allowed by the Usury
Law for loans without security. The complaint therefore does not charge any offense. In People v. Austria, 3
this Court held that if an information is dismissed and the accused is discharged on a demurrer or on
petition of the fiscal or the accused, or on the courts own motion, because the information or complaint is
either void or fatally defective, or when it does not charge the proper offense, such dismissal and the
consequent discharge of the accused is not a bar to his prosecution for the same offense.
2. Furthermore, the quashing of the first complaint (Criminal Case No. 4578) against private respondent for
insufficiency as prayed for by the latter can in no way be used by him to plead that he has already been
placed in jeopardy. 4 The act of private respondent in asking for the dismissal of the complaint against him
operates as a waiver of her defense of double jeopardy in the second prosecution for the same offense:
When a criminal case is dismissed upon the express application of the defendant, the dismissal is not a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a
waiver of his constitutional prerogative against double jeopardy as he thereby prevents the court from
proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering judgment of conviction against him. 5
3. Private respondent contends that petitioner has not questioned the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Albay dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner (Civil Case No. 5003) assailing the order of
the Municipality of Guinobatan, Albay, dismissing the original complaint (Criminal Case No. 4578) as well as
the order denying the motion to reinstate or to accept the amended complaint. He thus concludes that the
order of the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay dismissing the original complaint is final. But the order of
the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay in Criminal Case No. 4578 dismissing the first complaint for usury
against the private respondent was not a decision on the merits thereof. Not being a decision on the merits,
said order of dismissal cannot bar the prosecution of the second complaint against private respondent for
the same offense upon the principle of res judicata. In People v. Bellosillo, 6 this Court held: "Where an
order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merit, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent
case based on the same offense." Besides, the provision of Rule 30, Section 3 of the Rules of Court to the
effect that a "dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided
by the court", does not apply to criminal cases. 7
4. Private respondent further claims that the present suit suffers from laches as the order sought to be set
aside dates back to November 24, 1974. This contention is untenable. In a general sense, laches is failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. 8 It is evident from the record that petitioner has perfected his appeal from the order in question
within the reglementary period. So the lower court remanded the record of the case to the Court of First
Instance of Albay. However, his case was elevated to this Court on question of law upon motion by the
Provincial Fiscal. Obviously no laches has attached to the present suit.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the order of the respondent Court, dismissing Criminal
Case No. 4738 and ordering said Court to proceed with the trial thereof.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.