Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs.

Enrico Palomar
18 SCRA 247 Statutory Construction Construction; defined Noscitur A Sociis
In 1960, Caltex (Philippines), Inc. announced its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest. The
mechanics of the contest were as follows:
1. Participants must estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex
station will dispense during a specified period;

the courts to call for a construction on the statute in question. Palomar further argued that
even if the said contest, assuming arguendo, is not considered a lottery, the same is
considered as a gift enterprise which is still prohibited by the Postal Law to be mailed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Caltexs petition for declaratory relief is proper.
2. Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.

2. Contest is open to all car owners or licensed drivers;

HELD:

3. Participants need not buy any Caltex products to be eligible. No fee is required.

1. Yes. The petition is proper. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry
into the intended meaning of the words used in a certain law. As defined in Blacks Law
Dictionary: Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning
and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where
that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case
is not explicitly provided for in the law.

4. Participants just need to fill out a form and drop their entries at the nearest Caltex station.
To publicize their contest, Caltex sought the assistance of the Philippine Postal Office.
However, then acting Postmaster Enrico Palomar denied the request of Caltex as Palomar
deemed that the contest is a violation of the Postal Law (Chapter 52 of the Revised
Administrative Code [RAC]).
Palomar cited Section 1954 of the RAC:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of the
following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the
Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines,
or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to,
or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise,
or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device,
or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.
According to Palomar, the contest is a lottery hence, communications pertaining thereto
cannot be mailed by Caltex via Philippine Post.
Feeling aggrieved, Caltex brought the issue before the regular courts thru a petition for
declaratory relief. Caltex argued that their contest is not a lottery; that under prevailing
jurisprudence, lottery consists of the following elements:
a. consideration;
b. prize;
c. chance.
Caltex insists that their contest is not a lottery because the first element, consideration, is
missing. Said element is missing because participants are not required to pay anything
theres no consideration on the part of the participants.
Palomar assailed the petition as he argued that the same is not proper. He insisted that he
was merely applying the law and that there is no legal issue at all; that there is no need for

2. No.
The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is well taken, i.e., the first element is
lacking (no consideration).
The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court went on to discuss that under
prevailing jurisprudence and legal doctrines as well as definitions provided by legal
luminaries, there is no explicit definition as to what a gift enterprise is. However, under the
Postal Law, the term gift enterprise was used in association with the term lottery. As such,
the principle of noscitur a sociis, a principle in statutory construction, is applicable. Under
this principle, it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no
other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith.
Hence, applying noscitur a sociis, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so
also must the term gift enterprise be so construed. Therefore, since the contest does not
include a consideration, it is neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex should be allowed
to avail of the Philippine postal service.
_________________________________________________________________________

Immaculada L. Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legaland Collection & SSS

G.R. No. 170735 (December 17, 2007)
FACTS: Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, Eduardo de Leon, Ricardo de Leon, Pacita
Fernandez, and Consuelo Villanueva were directors of Impact Corporation. The corporation
was engaged in the business of manufacturing aluminum tube containers and operated two
factories. One was a "slug" foundry-factory located in Cuyapo, NuevaEcija, while the other
was an Extrusion Plant in Cainta, Metro Manila, which processed the "slugs" into aluminum
collapsible tubes and similar containers for toothpaste and other related products. Records
show that around 1978, Impact Corporation started encountering financial problems. By
1980, arises a problem with the employees of the corporation due unremitted SSS
contributions issues.
ISSUE: Whether or not the only surviving director of the corporation is liable for all the
workers whole collected and unremitted SSS contributions, with penalties.
HELD: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The surviving director of the Impact
Corporation is solely liable for the unremitted SSS premium contributions and penalties
therefor. The petitioner avers that under the social security law provision, the liability does
not include liability for the unremitted SSS premium contributions. Butaccordingly, the
sections must be understood or interpreted as a whole and not by parts. The liability
imposed ascontemplated under the provisions of the social security law does not preclude
the liability for the unremitted amount
_________________________________________________________________________
BRENT SCHOOL, INC.DIMACHE vs. RONALDO ZAMORA and DOROTEO R. ALEGRE
G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990 en banc
FACTS:
Private respondent Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by petitioner Brent
School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. The contract fixed a specific term for
its existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the agreement,
to July 17, 1976. Subsequent subsidiary agreements dated March 15, 1973, August 28,
1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the same terms and conditions, including the
expiry date, as those contained in the original contract of July 18, 1971.
On April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the
Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976.
The stated ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite
period of employment." Although protesting the announced termination stating that his
services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his
employment lasted for 5 years - therefore he had acquired the status of regular employee Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt therefor containing the
phrase, "in full payment of services for the period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of
contract."

The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an application for clearance to
terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the recommendation of
the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead required the reinstatement
of Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former position without loss of seniority rights
and with full back wages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have anathematized "fixed
period employment" or employment for a term.
RULING:
Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully terminated
with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he is declared not
entitled to reinstatement.
The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July 18, 1971,
at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been promulgated.
At that time, the validity of term employment was impliedly recognized by the Termination
Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787. Prior, thereto, it was the Code of Commerce
(Article 302) which governed employment without a fixed period, and also implicitly
acknowledged the propriety of employment with a fixed period. The Civil Code of the
Philippines, which was approved on June 18, 1949 and became effective on August
30,1950, itself deals with obligations with a period. No prohibition against term-or fixedperiod employment is contained in any of its articles or is otherwise deducible therefrom.
It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School and
Alegre, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration
thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court.
The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period employment contracts
under the Labor Code (PD 442), which went into effect on November 1, 1974. The Code
contained explicit references to fixed period employment, or employment with a fixed or
definite period. Nevertheless, obscuration of the principle of licitness of term employment
began to take place at about this time.
Article 320 originally stated that the "termination of employment of probationary employees
and those employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD shall be subject to such regulations as the
Secretary of Labor may prescribe." Article 321 prescribed the just causes for which an
employer could terminate "an employment without a definite period." And Article 319
undertook to define "employment without a fixed period" in the following manner: where
the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season.

Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding employment with "a definite period" and
"regular" employment were amended by Presidential Decree No. 850, effective December
16, 1975.

RCBC vs. IAC G.R. No. 74851, December 9, 1999

Article 320, dealing with "Probationary and fixed period employment," was altered by
eliminating the reference to persons "employed with a fixed period," and was renumbered
(becoming Article 271).

Facts: On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a Petition for Rehabilitation and for
Declaration of Suspension of Payments with the SEC.

As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation,
not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed
period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without reasonable
distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his
engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or
avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its
application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the
principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to
prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite
the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head.
Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed period
of employment as still good rulea rule reaffirmed in the recent case of Escudero vs. Office
of the President (G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989) where, in the fairly analogous case of a
teacher being served by her school a notice of termination following the expiration of the last
of three successive fixed-term employment contracts, the Court held:
Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses sight of the fact that her
employment was probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a definitive period. At the
expiration of the period stipulated in the contract, her appointment was deemed terminated
and the letter informing her of the non-renewal of her contract is not a condition sine qua non
before Reyes may be deemed to have ceased in the employ of petitioner UST. The notice is
a mere reminder that Reyes' contract of employment was due to expire and that the contract
would no longer be renewed. It is not a letter of termination.
Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre's employment was terminated upon the
expiration of his last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any
notice. The advance written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to said
petitioner was a mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of
termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which needed the approval of the
Department of Labor to make the termination of his services effective. In any case, such
clearance should properly have been given, not denied.
_________________________________________________________________________

Labels: Case Digests, Commercial Law

RCBC, one of the creditors listed in BF Homes inventory of creditors and liabilities, on
October 26, 1984, requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to extra-judicially foreclose its
real estate mortgage on some properties of BF Homes. BF Homes opposed the auction sale
and the SEC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioners filing of
a bond. Presumably unaware of the filing of the bond on the very day of the auction sale, the
sheriff proceeded with the public auction sale in which RCBC was the highest bidder for the
properties auctioned. But because of the proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld the
delivery to RCBC of the certificate of sale covering the auctioned properties.
On March 13, 1985, despite the SEC case, RCBC filed with RTC an action for mandamus
against the provincial sheriff of Rizal to compel him to execute in its favor a certificate of sale
of the auctioned properties.
On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management Committee for BF Homes.
Consequently, the trial court granted RCBCs motion for judgment on the pleading ordering
respondents to execute and deliver to petitioner the Certificate of Auction Sale.
On appeal, the SC affirmed CAs decision (setting aside RTCs decision dismissing the
mandamus case and suspending issuance to RCBC of new land titles until the resolution of
the SEC case) ruling that whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation
and suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference but
stand on equal footing with other creditors. Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: When should the suspension of actions for claims against BF Homes take effect?
Held: The issue of whether or not preferred creditors of distressed corporations stand on
equal footing with all other creditors gains relevance and materiality only upon the
appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body.
Upon cursory reading of Section 6, par (c) of PD 902-A, it is adequately clear that
suspension of claims against a corporation under rehabilitation is counted or figured up only
upon the appointment of a management committee or a rehabilitation takes effect as soon
as the application or a petition for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC may to some, be more
logical and wise but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of the law. To
insist on such ruling, no matter how practical and noble would be to encroach upon
legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law --- plainly judicial legislation.
Once a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body is appointed pursuant
to PD 902-A, all actions for claims against a distressed corporation pending before any
court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly; Suspension shall not
prejudice or render ineffective the status of a secured creditor as compared to a totally
unsecured creditor. What it merely provides is that all actions for claims against the
corporation, partnership or association shall be suspended. This should give the receiver a

chance to rehabilitate the corporation if there should still be a possibility for doing so. In the
event that rehabilitation is no longer feasible and claims against the distressed corporation
would eventually have to be settled, the secured creditors shall enjoy preference over the
unsecured creditors subject only to the provisions of the Civil Code on Concurrence and
Preferences of Credit.
_________________________________________________________________________
PARAS v COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169
Facts:
Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in
October 1995, A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents.
Public respondent COMELEC resolved to approve the petition and set the recall election on
November 13. In view of the petitioners opposition, COMELEC deferred the election and
rescheduled it on December 16, 1995. To prevent the recall election from taking place, the
petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial court issued a TRO. After
conducting a summary hearing, the court dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining
order. The public respondent on a resolution date January 5, 1996, rescheduled the recall
election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues
the pursuant to Section 74b of the Local Government code: no recall shall take place within
one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996
recall election is now barred (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 1996.
Issue:
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b
of the Local Government Code.
Held:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, that every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Paras
interpretation of the law is too literal that it does not accord with the intentions of the authors
of the law. The spirit rather that the letters of a law determines its construction. Hence, it was
held that the regular local election refers to an election where the office held by the local
elective official sought to be recalled.
_________________________________________________________________________

People vs. Jabinal

55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974
Antonio J.
Facts:
The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas
finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The
validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Courts
ruling in People vs. Mapa.
As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5,
1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint
was without the requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET
AGENT appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as
Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance
of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Courts decision in People vs.
Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.
Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless
decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were
reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa.
Issue:
Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and
Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and
Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
Ruling:
The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.
Reason:
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of
the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967,
but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
_________________________________________________________________________

BARA LIDASAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSFACTS:

RA 4790 creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao Del Sur was enacted
into law. Section 1 of the act reads: XxxSECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan,
Kabamawakan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
Matimos and Magolatung,in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao
del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and
independent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton,
Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Tagalog
xxx Bara Lidasan, petitioner in this instant case, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the Commission on Elections citing that the said law included two barrios from the
Municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and, ten barrios that are parts and parcel of
the Municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato, not Lanao del Sur thereby
changing the boundaries of the two provinces. Since elections are forth coming, the
COMELEC issued a resolution on August 15, 1967 which still puts the twelve barrios from
Cotabato Province under the new Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The
Office of the President thereafter recommended to COMELEC that the operation of the
statute be suspended be suspended until clarified by correcting legislation but the
COMELEC declared that the statute must be implemented unless declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Does the title of RA 4790 conform to the constitutional requirement that no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title
of the bill and whether RA 4790 is null and void.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled, to wit: 1. No, the title of RA 4790 does not conform with the
constitutional requirement regarding to title of statute since it is misleading and deceptive as
the legislation combines two purposes in one statute, namely, creates the Municipality of
Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur from twenty barrios from the Municipalities of Butig and
Balabagan, both of Lanao del Sur, and dismembers two municipalities of the Province of
Cotabato.2. Yes, RA 4790 is null and void
DUAL LIMITATIONS
Upon legislative power:
1. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, less than one statute, of heterogeneous
subjects.
2. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the
public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. It violates the
constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. It did not inform
the Congress the full impact of the Law. Moreover, It did not inform the citizens of Buldon
and Parangin Cotabato that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and
municipalities and that such will be added to the Province of Lanao del Sur. The subject was
the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. Hence, it makes the title misleading and

deceptive Even upon removing the barrios of Cotabato included in the municipality of
Dianaton, it is still unconstitutional because the valid part is not independent of the invalid
portion. Thus, it is indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.
_________________________________________________________________________
Arroyo v De VeneciaFacts:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
"constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to
raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. On
the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate
on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on
November 22,1996.
Issue:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed
is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated
House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.

Held:
That after considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding
that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240 This case is
therefore dismissed.
Ratio:
To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the
other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the
prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as
void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested
with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skulduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave
abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal
or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must
assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct

was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that
body.
In view of what is essential:
Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for
the enactment of a law, i.e., Art.VI, 26-27 are VIOLATED. First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it
was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies
are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.'
And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.' "Rules are hardly permanent in character. The
prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure
of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act
taken if the requisite numbers of members have agreed to a particular measure.
In view of the Courts jurisdiction:
This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency
has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different
view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no
power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts
cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules
of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which
a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction".

In view of the enrolled bill doctrine:

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and
the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if
old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an
inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is
not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to
do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful,
and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect
credit upon the name of popular government.
(In view of justifiability according to PUNO, J)
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justifiable.
Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume
jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of
power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on
cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators. The Constitution empowers each
house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between
the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to
be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination
of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate, or even more just.
_________________________________________________________________________
Tolentino versus Secretary of Finance

In view of House Rules:

Facts:

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in
cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must
restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that
nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure
is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been
the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the
debate, then the voting comes in. Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the
nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following
instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, and in re-passing a bill over the veto of the President.

Petitioner seeks re consideration on the on the decision of the Supreme Court dismissing
the cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716 otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-added Tax Law. Petitioner claimed that the law did not originate
exclusively from the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI Sec. 24 of the
Constitution. Though its original version House Bill No. 11197 was filed in the House of
Representatives then sent to the Senate where only first reading was conducted and then
the senate passed another version of the bill (Senate Bill No. 1630). Tolentino contended
that the Senate should have amended the House Bill No. 11197 by replacing it with the text
of S. No. 1630. In this way, the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version becomes
only the text of the House Bill.

In view of grave abuse:

Issues: 1. Whether the Senates action renders R.A. No. 7716constitutionally invalid.2.
Whether the Senate committed grave abuse of its discretion bypassing its own version of the
Bill.

Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"
has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power as to
amount to lack of power.

Held: No, R.A. No. 7716 is not unconstitutional. It is not the only instance in which the
senate proposed an amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting its own version. This
has happened twice during the eight Congress in R.A. No. 7369 and R.A. No.

7549.Petitioners contention concerns only a matter of form and did not establish any
substantial difference on both Bills. There was no grave abuse of discretion though Art. VI
sec. 24provides that all appropriation and revenue bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives; it further provides that the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments. It is an accepted practice for the Senate to introduce what is known as an
amendment by substitution, which may entirely replace the bill initiated in the House of
Representatives
_________________________________________________________________________
Mabanag vs Lopez Vito Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory
FACTS:
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by
senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their
seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some
senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each
house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which
has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already
entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed
but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress
had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have
been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed
or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution.
Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is
bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not they said
resolution was duly enacted by Congress

that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper
officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state. Section 313 of
the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official
documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission,
or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress,
by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order;
Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature,
when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said
bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment
thereof."
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the
legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the
journals.
_________________________________________________________________________
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez
FACTS: Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought the
refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609(Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating
that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign
exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and
approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioners separate importations of urea
and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA2609.The
pertinent portion of this statute reads: The margin established by the Monetary Board
shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by
and for the exclusive use of end-users
ISSUE:

HELD:

W/N urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee.

As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House
and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the
Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as
already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified
in section313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of
irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of
an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the
rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in
order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the
journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have
been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to
understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals,
disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."

HELD:

**Enrolled Bill

The term urea formaldehyde used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished product as
expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is distinct and separate
from urea and formaldehyde which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture of
synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a finished product, while the ones imported
by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the importation of urea and formaldehyde is
not exempt from the imposition of the margin fee.
_________________________________________________________________________

Morales v Subido

Facts: "In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill
6951 was referred, reported a substitute measure. It is to this substitute bill that Section 10
of the Act owes its present form and substance. "It is be noted that the Rodrigo amendment
was in the nature of an addition to the phrase 'who has served the police department of a
city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher,' under which the petitioner
herein, who is at least a high school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner finished
the second year of the law course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the
legislative process the phrase ["who has served the police department of a city or"] was
dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained. "The present insistence of the
petitioner is that the version of the provision, as amended at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was
the version approved by the Senate on third reading, and that when the bill emerged from
the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the
phrase "or has served as chief of police with exemplary record." In support of this assertion,
the petitioner submitted certified photo static copies of the different drafts of House Bill
6951showing the various changes made. In what purport to be the page proofs of the bill as
finally approved by both Houses of Congress. It is unmistakable up to this point that the
phrase, "who has served the police department of a city or, "was still part of the provision,
but according to the petitioner the House bill division deleted the entire provision and
substituted what now is Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads: "Minimum
qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed
chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or
has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein
for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed
Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher."
The petitioner also submitted a certified photo static copy of a memorandum which
according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found
attached to the page proofs of the bill, explaining the change in Section10, thus: "Section 10
was recast for clarity. (with the consent of Sen. Ganzon & Congressman Montano)."
Issue: Whether the change an employee, as purportedly was are writing to suit some stylistic
preferences, was in truth an alteration of meaning.
Held: ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied.
Ratio: The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon
the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of
their respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted
role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of law making,
with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The investigation
which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress. After all,
House cleaning the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be suggested by
the petitioner can best be effected by the occupants thereof. If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree."

_________________________________________________________________________
Astorga v Villegas
Facts: On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the
House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on
April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred
to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by
Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor
amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the
President Pro tempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case
of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor. On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines
sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing them that in
view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No.9266
(which had been returned to the Senate the previous July3), adding that "it would be
untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by
the two Houses of Congress." Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio
Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business
establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise
issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had
been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Issue: Whether the so-called RA 4065 became law and that Vice-Mayor Astorga should
exercise any of the powers conferred by RA4065.
Held: In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called
Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACTDEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES
OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR
THEPURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACTNUMBERED FOUR
HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISEKNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF
THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not
become law. The temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made
permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio: It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to
coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept,
as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated."
Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is
not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other
records of Congress for proof of its due enactment.
In view of the enrolled bill theory
The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional
question, the reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of
respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges
under the 'enrolled bill rule' born of that respect." It is a declaration by the two houses,
through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in

due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to
him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in
the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed
complete and unimpeachable.
As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act
in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.
The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department
to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution."
In view of Sec. 313 Act 190 of Rules of Evidence Code of Civil Procedures Justice Cesar
Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the
Court had jurisdiction to resolve the question presented, and affirming categorically that "the
enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us,"
specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in
the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure appears indeed to be the only
statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads: "The proceedings of the
Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals of those bodies or of either house
thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or
secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in the case of acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is in existence a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions
of such acts and of the due enactment thereof ."
In view of neutralization:
By the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized in this case
by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and
issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he
had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason
that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
In view of the signatures:
The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and
the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present
upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential.

Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes law, be presented to the President."
In view of the need to inquire through the Journal:
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to
the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is
merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief
Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed
text sent to the President and signed by him.
_________________________________________________________________________
Tanada v. Tuvera
GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)
Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless
so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3
judges. Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various
questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. February
Revolution took place, which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a
rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).
Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause unless otherwise provided.
Held: The clause unless it is otherwise provided, in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event
be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened
or extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and
regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board
circulars to fill in the details of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws.
Reasoning: The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately
upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date
specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

_________________________________________________________________________
United States vs Juan Pons
34 Phil. 729 Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Journals
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y
Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of
wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On
the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on
record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs
officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually
contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381,
Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such
contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381
was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that
his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the
special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this
is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if
Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC
refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are
conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both
the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought
into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and
to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses
cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the
legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28,
1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these
journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise
known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de
Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC
Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G.
Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by
the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government. Also on February
8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated
December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta,
Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz, and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay
Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Issue: Whether the memoranda of Feb 8, 1987 is null and void, thus prohibiting respondents
from taking over the appointed positions?
Ruling: Considering Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution which states that
Allelective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is
made within a period of one year from February 25,1986, it would seem that the
appointment was valid on Feb 8, 1987 since the term of the elective officials would end in
Feb 25, 1987. However, since the new constitution was ratified on Feb 2, 1987 and section
27 states that effectivity is immediate, thereby superseding the Provisional Constitution.
Furthermore, the 1987Constitution under ensures the autonomy of the barangays to ensure
their fullest development and the the Presidents power is for general supervision only
which is in line with the barangay election act of 1982.Relevantly, on Section 8 states that
terms of local officials is 3 years, except of barangay officials, which means that the 6-year
terms as stated in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 is still in effect unless otherwise stated
by law.
_________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________

De Leon vs Esguerra
Facts: In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was
elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana,
Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay

Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue GR L-78780, 23 July 1987

GR L-78780, 23 July 1987

Resolution
FACTS: Nitafan and some others seek to prohibit the CIR from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a
diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. On June 7 1987, the Court en banc had
reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income
tax.
HELD: What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be
decreased during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be
subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be
subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.

municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant
characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera Autonomous
Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional
Government and local government units. It further provides that:
SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for
the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .

_________________________________________________________________________

From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province
may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd
situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional
officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.

Ordillo vs Comelec (192 SCRA 100)

_________________________________________________________________________

Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.

Calderon vs Carale

The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the
creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province
and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city
above-mentioned.

In 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code.
RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments (COA).

Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating
that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the
votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.

Pursuant to the said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed Bartolome Carale et al as the
Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC. The appointments were
however not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Peter John Calderon questioned the
appointment saying that without the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in
violation of RA 6715. Calderon insisted that RA 6715 should be followed as he asserted that
RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec.
16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President in addition to
those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act
for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous
Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the
said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
Issue: The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the
only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region
can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.

208 SCRA 254 Political Law Appointment List of Appointees Requiring COA
Confirmation Cannot Be Expanded by Law

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, expand the list of public officers required to
be confirmed by the Commission on Appointment as listed in the Constitution.

Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.

HELD: No. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:

It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords provinces,

cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that region is to be made up of more
than one constituent unit. The term region used in its ordinary sense means two or more
provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the
Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces.
Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities,

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General: confirmation by the CoA is required
exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members
of the various Constitutional Commissions (first group). With respect to the other officers
(second to fourth group) whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and
to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments is required.
Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose
appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution
would have said so by adding the phrase and other officers required by law at the end of
the first sentence, or the phrase, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments at
the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to
provide for such additions.
This jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential
appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers
whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like
sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of
Audit, Civil Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on
Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but
omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such
appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law.
_________________________________________________________________________

The case at bar is a petition questioning the constitutionality of the impeachment

proceedings being held by the House of Representatives against Chief Justice Davide.
The first impeachment proceeding brought against the Chief Justice, together with other
associate justices, is by Joseph Estrada, for the alleged culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes. It proceeded due to good form
but was later on dismissed due to lack of substance.
Another impeachment proceeding was being brought against the Chief Justice, in a period
less than the one-year bar provided by the Constitution and the rules of the House of
Representatives. This was initiated by 2 representatives and was endorsed by many other
representatives.
This resulted to many petitions by many individuals as well as associations questioning the
constitutionality of such move by Congress. The petitions were consolidated having raised
similar issues. The petitions contend that the second impeachment proceeding was in
culpable violation of the Constitution wherein there is a one-year bar before one can initiate
impeachment proceedings against the same individual. The first proceeding was less than a
year away from the filing of the second proceeding.
Congress mainly contended that the Supreme Court had no power to inquire about the
impeachment proceedings as it is the former which has the power to facilitate or administer
impeachment proceedings, as provided by the Constitution. If the Supreme Court interrupts
and inquires about the proceedings, it will disturb the doctrine of separation of powers as
well as the doctrine of checks and balances. The impeachment proceeding is in itself under
the power of the Congress and is a political question.
Issue:
1.

w/n the second impeachment proceeding against Davide is constitutional?

2. w/n the impeachment proceeding was a political question wherein the SC cannot disturb
it?
Held:
1. It is prevalent that the second impeachment proceeding against the Chief Justice is
unconstitutional. Under Article XI of our present Constitution, it is provided that with regard to
the impeachment of public officials such as the Chief Justice, there is a one-year bar
provided. No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official within a
period of one year. The term initiate refers to the filing of the case against the official. It starts
when a complaint is filed with the Committee of Justice of the House of Representatives. It is
not initiated during the time when it is verified by the other members of the House or when it
is given to Senate for hearing.
2. It is said that the SC cannot question or inquire about the impeachment proceedings
since it will disturb the separation of power, check and balance between the branches of
government, and that the SC has vested interest in the issue.

Francisco v. HRET
Facts:

The Constitution was equivocal in granting the judiciary, moreover the SC, the duty to settle
controversies that are legally demandable and enforceable. It has been vested the duty to

check if there is any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or office of
government. In this petition wherein the constitutionality of the impeachment proceeding is
questioned, no one has the power to interpret the fundamental law of the land and answer
the issue of constitutionality other than the SC. Given such, even if the legislative that
commences and administers impeachment proceedings, it is not a bar for the SC to inquire
about their actions especially if constitutionality is involved.
_________________________________________________________________________
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS267 SCRA 402February 1997
En Banc
FACTS: Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS chose to award
during bidding in September 1995 the 51% outstanding shares of the respondent Manila
Hotel Corp. (MHC) to the Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, for the amount of Php 44.00 per
share against herein petitioner which is a Filipino corporation who offered Php 41.58 per
share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of
MHC, petitioner matched the formers bid prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a
managers check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the GSIS refused to accept both
the bid match and the managers check. One day after the filing of the petition in October
1995, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from perfecting and consummating
the sale to the Renong Berhad. In September 1996, the Supreme Court En Banc accepted
the instant case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the
1987Constitution
COURT RULING: The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease
and desist from selling the51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad,
and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel. According to
Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article11 of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself
and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc
emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the
provision in question. The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the
51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national
pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners
_________________________________________________________________________

VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
NATURE:
These are petitions including:
1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, which essentially prays for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 2013 and April 23,
2013 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En
banc, respectively.
(2) a Petition-in-Intervention[ filed by Alfredo S. Lim praying to be declared the 2013 winning
candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent former President
Joseph Ejercito Estradas) disqualification to run for and hold public office

FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former
President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction
during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states that He
is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy[7] for the
position of President but was opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification.
None of the cases prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only
managed to garner the second highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized
elections.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena,
and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a local elective post, that of the
Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada
before the COMELEC because of Estradas Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan
Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute
Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in
relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition
for disqualification holding that President Estradas right to seek public office has been
effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim
garnered the second highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of
Manila.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted
for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail
to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions were issued in a whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or were so
patent and gross as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point
of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the
language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that
both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in
the pardon. The sentence which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights, expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to
Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to
him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in
absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a
plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has
been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense
involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or
national position.
FALLO: Petition is dismissed
_________________________________________________________________________

TIDCORP v. CSC
G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013

FACTS:
August 30, 2001, Arsemio de Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as Financial
Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP, a government-owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC) created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080. His appointment was included in
TIDCORPs Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) for August 2001, which was submitted to
the CSC Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Field Office.
September 28, 2001, Director Leticia M. Bugtong disallowed De Guzmans appointment
because the position of Financial Management Specialist IV was not included in the DBMs
Index of Occupational Service.
TIDCORPs Executive Vice President Jane U. Tambanillo appealed the invalidation of De
Guzmans appointment to Director IV Agnes Padilla of the CSC- NCR. According to
Tambanillo, Republic Act No. 8494, which amended TIDCORPs charter, empowers its Board
of Directors to create its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and to approve its
own compensation and position classification system and qualification standards.
CSC-NCR Director Padilla denied Tambanillos appeal because De Guzmans appointment
failed to comply with Section 1, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, which
requires that the position title of an appointment submitted to the CSC must conform with the
approved Position Allocation List and must be found in the Index of Occupational Service.
Since the position of Financial Management Specialist IV is not included in the Index of
Occupational Service, de Guzmans appointment to this position must be invalid.
TIDCORPs President and CEO Joel C. Valdes sent CSC Chairperson Karina ConstantinoDavid a Letter appealing Director Padillas decision to the CSC-Central Office (CO). Valdes
reiterated TIDCORPs argument that RA 8494 authorized its Board of Directors to determine
its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and exempted TIDCORP from all
existing laws on compensation, position classification and qualification standards.
In its Resolution No. 30144, the CSC-CO affirmed the CSC-NCRs decision that de
Guzmans appointment should have complied with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, as
amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15. Rule III, Section 1(c) is explicit in requiring
that the position title indicated in the appointment should conform with the Position Allocation
List and found in the Index of Occupational Service. Otherwise, the appointment shall be
disapproved. In disallowing De Guzmans appointment, the CSC-CO held that Director
Bugtong was simply following the letter of the law.
TIDCORP moved to reconsider the CSC-COs decision, but this motion was denied,
prompting TIDCORP to file a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA. The petition asserted
that the CSC-CO committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 030144 and
Resolution No. 031037.
CA denied TIDCORPs petition and upheld the ruling of the CSC-CO in Resolution No.
30144 and Resolution No. 31037. The CA noted that filing a petition for certiorari was an
improper recourse; TIDCORP should have instead filed a petition for review under Section 1,
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA, however, brushed aside the procedural defect, ruling
that the assailed resolutions should still stand as they are consistent with law and
jurisprudence.
In its present petition for review on certiorari, TIDCORP argued that the CSCs interpretation
of RA 8494 is misplaced.

ISSUE:

without the corresponding license

Whether or not RA 8494 command TIDCORP to follow issued requirements pursuant to the
Position Classification Act despite its exemption from laws involving position classification.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence obtained without search warrant is admissible in court

HELD:
No, RA 8494 does not command TIDCORP to follow issued requirements pursuant to the
Position Classification Act despite its exemption from laws involving position classification.
Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
This plain-meaning rule or verba legis is derived from the maxim index animi sermo est
(speech is the index of intention) and rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent and preclude the court
from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words,
to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as
are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute
there should be no departure.
The phrase to endeavour means to to devote serious and sustained effort and to make
an effort to do. It is synonymous with the words to strive, to struggle and to seek. The use of
to endeavour in the context of RA 8494 means that despite TIDCORPs exemption from
laws involving compensation, position classification and qualification standards, it should still
strive to conform as closely as possible with the principles and modes provided in RA 6758.
The phrase as closely as possible, which qualifies TIDCORPs duty to endeavour to
conform, recognizes that the law allows TIDCORP to deviate from the Position
Classification Act, but it should still try to hew closely with its principles and modes. Had the
intent of Congress been to require TIDCORP to fully, exactly and strictly comply with the
Position Classification Act, it would have so stated in unequivocal terms. Instead, the
mandate it gave TIDCORP was to endeavour to conform to the principles and modes of RA
6758, and not to the entirety of this law.
_________________________________________________________________________
REVALDO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 170589 April 16, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood lumber
in violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code. That on or about the 17th day of June 1992,
Revaldo, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess
96.14 board ft. of flat lumber with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any
legal document as required under existing forest laws and regulations from proper
government authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the government. Upon arraignment,
petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The RTC rendered judgment
on 1997 convicting petitioner of the offense charged, he appealed and the Court of Appeals
ruled that motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the lumber
without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the police officers
was illegal and thus the items seized should not have been admitted in evidence against
him. Petitioner argues that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant when
they went to his house to verify the report that petitioner had in his possession lumber

HELD:
When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber were lying around the
vicinity of petitioners house. The lumber were in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine,
objects falling in "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When asked whether he had
the necessary permit to possess the lumber, petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner
merely replied that the lumber in his possession was intended for the repair of his house and
for his furniture shop. There was thus probable cause for the police officers to confiscate the
lumber. There was, therefore, no necessity for a search warrant. Petitioner was in
possession of the lumber without the necessary documents when the police officers
accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically admitted the possession and ownership
of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal documents
therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his dilapidated
house. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documentation consummates
the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law. Therefore, the
appealed decision convicting petitioner for violation of Section 68 (now Section 77) of the
Forestry Code is affirmed.
_________________________________________________________________________
ARNEL SAGANA, Petitioner, vs. RICHARD A. FRANCISCO, Respondent
FACTS
On 13 December 1994, petitioner Arnel Sagana filed a Complaint for Damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioner alleged that on 20 November 1992,
respondent Richard A. Francisco, with intent to kill and without justifiable reason, shot him
with a gun hitting him on the right thigh. As a result, petitioner incurred medical expenses
and suffered wounded feelings, and was compelled to engage the services of a lawyer, due
to respondents refusal to pay said expenses.
The courts process servers tried to serve the summons to the respondent but to no
avail. They were constantly told that the respondent does not live in the address given by the
respondent. At the end, the process server left a copy of the summons to the respondents
brother, Michael Francisco.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, alleging that despite
service of summons, respondent still failed to file an Answer. On 16 February 1996, the trial
court issued an Order finding that the summons was validly served to respondent through
his brother, Michael. It thus declared respondent in default and allowed petitioner to present
his evidence ex parte. Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and court documents were
furnished to respondent at No. 36 Sampaguita St.
In the meantime, on 1 March 1996, Michael Francisco, through his counsel, Atty.
Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, filed a Manifestation and Motion denying that he received the
summons or that he was authorized to receive summons on behalf of his brother,
respondent Richard Francisco. He alleged that the substituted service did not comply with
Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, since summons was not served at defendants

residence or left with any person who was authorized to receive it on behalf of the
defendant.
On 4 October 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying Michael Franciscos
Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit. On 20 September 1999, the trial court rendered
its Decision in favor of the petitioner.
On 23 November 1999, respondent Richard A. Francisco filed a Notice of Appeal,
claiming that he received a copy of the trial courts Decision on 9 November 1999 and that
the same was contrary to the law, facts, and evidence, and praying that his appeal be given
due course. On 5 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to file their respective
briefs, a copy of which was sent to respondent by registered mail at No. 36 Sampaguita St.,
Baesa, Quezon City.
On 3 September 2002, respondent attended the preliminary conference; however
the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Thus, on 13 August 2003, the Court of
Appeals granted the appeal and setting aside the Decision of the trial court. The appellate
court held that the service of summons was irregular and such irregularity nullified the
proceedings before the trial court. Since it did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent, the trial courts decision was void.
ISSUE
Whether the substituted service of summons was validly made upon the respondent.
HELD
YES. However, the supreme court, do not intend this ruling to overturn jurisprudence to
the effect that statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly,
faithfully, and fully, and that any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is
considered ineffective. An overly strict application of the Rules is not warranted in this case,
as it would clearly frustrate the spirit of the law as well as do injustice to the parties, who
have been waiting for almost 15 years for a resolution of this case. We are not heedless of
the widespread and flagrant practice whereby defendants actively attempt to frustrate the
proper service of summons by refusing to give their names, rebuffing requests to sign for or
receive documents, or eluding officers of the court. Sheriffs are not expected to be sleuths,
and cannot be faulted where the defendants themselves engage in deception to thwart the
orderly administration of justice.
_________________________________________________________________________

(PIRMA), filed with Comelec a petition to amend the Constitution to lift the term limits of
elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the Comelec issued an
order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set
the case for hearing.
At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public
Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenorsoppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one
which is cognizable by the Comelec.
The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil
action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against Comelec and the Delfin
petition rising the several arguments, such as the following:
o The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The
peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting
of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative.
The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.
Issue:
(1) w/n Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
(2) w/n Comelce Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the
conduct of such initiative.
(3) w/n the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an
amendment of the Constitution.
Held:
(1) Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing
legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted
the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.
(2) The portion of Comelec Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an
established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non
delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter
cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to
peoples initiative.
(3) The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other
provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional
guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political
dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision
in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has
become academic.

SANTIAGO V. COMELEC
Fact:
Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action

_________________________________________________________________________

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO et al. versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

G.R. No. 180050

February 10, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition forcertiorari under Rule65 to
nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being
unconstitutional. Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the population of the
Province of Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A special census was afterwards conducted by the
Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte which yielded a population count of 371,576
inhabitants with average annual income for calendar year 2002-2003 of P82, 696,433.23
and with a land area of 802.12 square kilometers as certified by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance. Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local Government Code, a
province may be created if it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million
based on 1991 constantprices as certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of
not less than 250,000inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least
2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need
not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or
cities, which do not contribute to the income of the province. Thereafter, the bill creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands was enacted into law and a plebiscite was held subsequently
yielding to 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative. With the approval of the people
from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands,
Dinagat Islands was created into a separate and distinct province. Respondents argued that
exemption from the land area requirement is germane to the purpose of the Local
Government Code to develop self-reliant political and territorial subdivisions. Thus, the rules
and regulations have the force and effect of law as long as they are germane to the objects
and purposes of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR) valid.
RULING: No.
The rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any
exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. The IRR
went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it
added the italicized portion The land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the purpose of the law a sit
already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in creating a territorial subdivision.
Thus, there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules
and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails.
______________
The National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat Islands population is 120,813. Its land
area is 802.12 square kilometers and its average annual income is P82,696,433.23, as
certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. On October 2, 2006, the President
approved into law R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3,

2006, the COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation
of the province under the LGC which yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative
votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte
and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of
provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May
14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials
who assumed office on July 1, 2007.
Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro and other former political
leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R.
No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the creation
of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress,
and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial
territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. Is R.A. No.
9355 constitutional?
Suggested Answer:
February 10, 2010 Ruling
No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below the Local Government Code (LGC)
minimum population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat Islands, with an
approximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC minimum land area
requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that paragraph 2 of
Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which
exempts proposed provinces composed of one or more islands from the land area
requirement, was null and void as the said exemption is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC.
There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and
regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and
regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law, held the Court. (GR
No. 180050, Navarro v. Ermita, May 12, 2010)
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their
respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12, 2010,
the Supreme Court denied the said motions.
April 12, 2011 Ruling
Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011), the Honorable
Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No. 9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and
the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof
are declared VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall
not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is declared
VALID.
According to the SC, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite
indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component

cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.

province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of
becoming a province. (Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011)

But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one
(1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in
Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a
municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration
of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is
expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

_________________________________________________________________________

xxx There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and
municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would
form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It
is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in
Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but
fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when
the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was
intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect
the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
xxxConsistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and
meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective
local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results.
The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be
counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended
province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves,
also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are
exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442,
respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land
area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands.
fellester.blogspot.com This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive
preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands
and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural
progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option
would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a
province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to
one with a contiguous land mass.
xxx What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local
government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking
into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time fellester.blogspot.com
of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times
more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The
delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.
Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere
fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

694 SCRA 477 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Department Party-List
System
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC andBANAT
vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections
in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified
as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the partylist system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or

lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political
constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the
practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really no
constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide
sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized
and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.

major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can
acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system
itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower
house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act
7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies as
they are ideologically marginalized.

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. V. COMELEC

G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed
by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections

Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the
intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is
that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)

December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Divisions
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) registration and accreditation as a
political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the
elections because PBB does not represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for
the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike

Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled

summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed
manifestations of intent to participate in the elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).

13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The
COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of
these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official.

39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for
the elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.

the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from
joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To
exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
_________________________________________________________________________

ISSUE:

AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & EQUIPMENT COMPANY V. LINGAD

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

G.R. No. L-26406, October 31, 1969

HELD:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions
in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the
Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying
petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to
determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the
coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first
three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector. This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for
sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list
system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for
the first three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, clearly making the
party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means
that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that
qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.

FACTS:
In the petition for declaratory relief, the then Secretary of Labor, Jose B. Lingadand the then
Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards, Ruben F. Santos being named as
respondents, appellant Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Incorporated alleged that it
was duly incorporated on January 5, 1961 and that from the start of its operation, its
employees were paid on a daily and monthly basis.
April 21, 1965 the aforesaid amendatory act took effect and that respondents construed its
provision in such a way as to require the petitioner to increase the salaries of all the monthly
paid employees of the petitioner to a minimum of P180.00 (not P152.00) which according to
them is the applicable minimum wage rate for the monthly paid employees.
Petitioner sought to justify its refusal to abide by the interpretative bulletin of respondents
requiring the increase to a minimum of P180.00 a month for employees paid on a monthly
basis in this wise: The petitioner believes that Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 602 particularly that
portion prohibiting the reduction of wages paid to employees in excess of the minimum wage
established in the Act only refers and applies to employers in business prior to and at the
time of enactment Act and that the prohibition thereof against reduction of supplements as
envisioned in Sec 19 should not be applied prospectively to employers coming into
existence subsequent to the effective date of said Act.
The lower court rejected such a contention. Thus: Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 4180 provides that
Any provision of law previously enacted on the subject matter of this Act that is inconsistent
with any provision of this Act is hereby repealed. Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 602 not being
inconsistent with R.A. No. 4180 has not been repealed; on the other hand, the provisions of
Section 19 of R.A. No. 602 not being inconsistent with R.A. No. 4180 were deemed and
impliedly re-enacted.
ISSUE:

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for
sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.

Whether or not the lower court decided the matter correctly.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. To require all national and regional parties
under the party-list system to represent the marginalized and underrepresented is to
deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the
party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win
in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from

Yes, the lower court decided the matter correctly. Even if the plain legislative purpose so
evident on the face of the statute is not to vitalize and implement what the Constitution
enjoins, still there is no escape from an equally authoritative principle of statutory
construction that bars acceptance on what appellant would foist upon the judiciary as an
acceptable interpretation. It is fundamental that once the policy or purpose of the law has

HELD:

been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. From Ty Sue v. Hord, decided
in 1909, it has been our constant holding that the choice between conflicting theories falls
on that which best accords with the letter of the law and with its purpose. The next year, in
an equally leading decision, United States v. Toribio, there was a caveat against a
construction that would tend to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator.
If the interpretation offered by appellant would be considered acceptable, then there would
be a negation of the above purpose of the amendatory act increasing the minimum wage
law. That would be to defeat and frustrate rather than to foster its policy. It must be rejected.
_________________________________________________________________________

February 3 2003, Juanita Tan, corporate treasurer of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the
corporation), a family corporation doing business under the name and style Guan Yiac
Hardware, submitted a letter to the corporations Board of Directors (Board) statingthat
Felicidad Chan Sy did not make cash deposits to any of the corporations banks from 1
November 2001 to 31 January 2003, thus the total bank remittances for the past years were
less than reflected in the corporate financial statements, accounting books and records.
Finally, Juanita Tan sought to be free from any responsibility over all corporate funds.
April 5, 2003, Banaria, Banaria & Company in its report, the accounting firm attributed to the
Spouses Sy P67,117,230.30 as unaccounted receipts and disbursements from 1994 to
2002.
April 15, 2003, a demand letter was subsequently served on the Spouses Sy. On the same
date, the children of the Spouses Sy allegedly stole from the corporation cash, postdated
checks and other important documents. After the incident, the Spouses Sy allegedly
transferred residence and ceased reporting to the corporation. Thereupon, the corporation
filed a criminal complaint for robbery against the Spouses Sy before the City Prosecutors
Office of Manila.

UNITED STATES VS LUIS TORIBIO

Police Power
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His
request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless
slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and was
sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law
mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise
of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the property
for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of
the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as
would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is acquired
and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of
others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.

July 1, 2003, the corporation, through Romer S. Tan, filed its Amended Complaint for
Accounting and Damages against the Spouses Sy before the RTC Manila, praying for a
complete and true accounting of all the amounts paid to, received and earned by the
company since 1993 and for the restitution of the said amount.The complaint also prayed for
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and or preliminary injunction to restrain Sy Chim from
calling a stockholders meeting on the ground of lack of authority.
September 9, 2003, the Spouses Sy filed their Motion for Leave to File Third-Party
Complaint, praying that their attached Third Party Complaint be allowed and admitted
against Sy Tiong Shiou and his spouse. In the said third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy
accused Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan as directly liable for the corporations claim for
misappropriating corporate funds.
October 8, 2003, the trial court granted the motion for leave to file the third-party complaint,
and forthwith directed the issuance of summons against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.
January 16, 2004, their counsel allegedly discovered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan
were not furnished with the copies of several pleadings, as well as a court order, which
resulted in their having been declared in default for failure to file their answer to the thirdparty complaint; thus, they instead filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals granted the petition of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita
Tan.61The appellate court declared that a third-party complaint is not allowed under the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799
(Interim Rules).
ISSUE: Whether or not a third-party complaint is prohibited by the Interim Rules.

_________________________________________________________________________
SY TIONG V. SY CHIM
G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009
FACTS:

HELD: No, the third-party complaint should be allowed. For while a third-party complaint is
not included in the allowed pleadings, neither is it among the prohibited ones. Nevertheless,
this conflict may be resolved by following the well-entrenched rule in statutory construction,
that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that
every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Statutes, including rules, should be
construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed

and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the
mischief and secure the benefits intended. A statute should therefore be read with reference
to its leading idea, and its general purpose and intention should be gathered from the whole
act, and this predominant purpose will prevail over the literal import of particular terms or
clauses, if plainly apparent, operating as a limitation upon some and as a reason for
expanding the signification of others, so that the interpretation may accord with the spirit of
the entire act, and so that the policy and object of the statute as a whole may be made
effectual and operative to the widest possible extent. Otherwise stated, the spirit, rather than
the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in the rules in this case,
must be read according to its spirit and intent
_________________________________________________________________________

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES

L-2877 (38 SCRA 284) March 31, 1971

FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his commonlaw spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in
1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September
13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only
sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by
virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in1962, had the land declared in
her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon
declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and
Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.
HELD: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses
during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. As
stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials. The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not
necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As
a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the
other half. Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
_________________________________________________________________________
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT V.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Energy, et.al. (G.R. No. 180771 and 181527)
DATE: 21 April 2015
PONENTE: J. Leonardo-De Castro
FACTS

On 13 June 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX).
The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic
and magnetic data. Geophysical and satellite surveys as well as oil and gas sampling in
Taon Strait was conducted.
On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract No.
46 (SC-46) for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in
a block covering approximately 2,850 sqm. offshore the Taon Strait.
From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around Taon Strait,
including a multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kms. to
determine the areas underwater composition.
During the 2nd sub-phase of the project, JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well.
Since the same was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguisan and Pinamungajan
where the Taon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to
comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements under Presidential
Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586), entitled Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement
System, Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures and For Other
Purposes.
On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) of the Taon
Strait issued Resolution No. 2007-01 where it adopted the Initial Environmental
Examination commissioned by JAPEX, and favourably recommended the approval of
the latters application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).
On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Taon Strait.
From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with a
depth of 3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town.
On 17 December 2007, two separate original petitions were filed commonly seeking that
the implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for violation of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the Resident Marine Mammals which inhibit
the waters in and around the Taon Strait, joined by Stewards Gloria Estenzo Ramos
and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and friends seeking their
protection. Also impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No. 181527, the petitioners are the Central Visayas
Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental
organization established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII and
representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, Cebu. Their contentions are:
A study made after the seismic survey showed that there is a drastic reduce in fish
catch by 50-70% attributable to the destruction of the payao or the artificial reef.
The ECC obtained by the respondents is invalid because there is no public
consultations and discussions prior to its issuance.
SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, considering that there is no general law prescribing the standard or
uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil
exploration and extraction
FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer
radius from the point where the oilrig was located, an area grated than the 1.5kilometer radius exclusion zone stated in the Initial Environmental Examination

The respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L.
Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and
Chairman of Taon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield
Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX. Their counterallegations are:
The Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file the
petition.
SC-46 is constitutional.
The ECC was legally issued.
The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21 June
2008.

ISSUES
1.
2.
3.

WON the case is moot and academic

WON Petitioners have a legal standing
WON SC-46 is unconstitutional

RULING
1.

2.

No. The Court makes clear that the moot and academic principle is not a magic
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Despite the
termination of SC-46, the Court deems it necessary to resolve the consolidated petitions
as it falls within the exceptions. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the
Constitution, the environmental and livelihood issues raised undoubtedly affect the
publics interest, and the respondents contested actions are capable of repetition.
Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a
citizen suit, and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violation of our environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of nature:
Section 5. Citizen suit. Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights
or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the
court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of
action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest
their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice
thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected baragngays copies of said
order.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by
their respective provisions. (Emphasis supplied)
Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure
may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.

Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became
effective, the SC had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in
environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to be brought in the name of
generations yet unborn based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
It is also worth noting that the Stewards in the present case are joined as real
parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species.
3.

Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in part:

The President may enter into agreement with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution. (Emphases
supplied)
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) or the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972. Although the Court finds that PD 87 is sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other conditions, that the
President be a signatory to SC-46, and that the Congress be notified of such contract,
renders it null and void.
SC-46 appears to have been entered into and signed by the DOE through its then
Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor
alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.
Service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our
natural resources are of paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence,
safeguards were out in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously
observed and likewise eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate departments and
agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or approved of the service contracts
herself.
Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now
the DOE, obtain the Presidents approval for the execution of any contract under said
statute.
The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-46 vis--vis other pertinent laws to
serve as a guide for the Government when executing service contracts.
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Taon Strait is an environmentally critical area,
having been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope
of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after
undergoing an Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) to determine the effects of such
activity on its ecological system.

Public respondents admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the 2 nd
sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of the exploration well. This means that no
environmental impact evaluation was done when the seismic surveys were conducted.
Unless the seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the Taon Strait, such
surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1586.
While PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for
petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of
this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Taon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically
allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Taon Strait, no energy resource exploitation
and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.
_________________________________________________________________________
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991]
Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were
directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged
participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was
no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for
dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, butthe application was
denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted
the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared
that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.

motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been
expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date
specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence."
Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of
G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of
violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their
release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. *
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts
and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized
and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of
Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to
bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest,
there was substantial compliance with the requirementsof due process and the right to a
speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge
investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted
men were involved in the failed coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948,
the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise
the right of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020
and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the
release of the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
_________________________________________________________________________

The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition forhabeas corpus on
the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was
referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the
petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.

LAMB VS PHIPPS

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.

Facts:

Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their
side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and
then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until
March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal

Lamb was the superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony until he resigned on Dec. 31,
1911 due to ill health. Before that he was assigned as provincial treasurer for
Marinduque, Mindoro and Laguna. He requested the Auditor General, Phipps, for his
clearance certificate (showing that Lamb has accounted for all property and funds under
his custody) in order that Lamb may be allowed to leave the Philippines without
incurring criminal liability.

Phipps, although the records of the Auditor General show that Lamb indeed has settled
his accounts, refuses to issue the certificate because a certain Fernandez may bring a
civil suit against the government. However the records also show that Fernandez
signed the receipt acknowledging payment from the government.
The petition for mandamus, asking the SC to compel Phipps to issue the certificate was
demmurred to by the auditor because it is a suit against the government and the petition
states no cause of action.
The SC initially asked Lamb to amend his petition but the latter did not do so hence the
SC decided the case upon the facts Lamb intended to make.

Issue: W/N Mandamus may issue to compel the auditor general to issue the certificate of
clearance of Lamb.

Fourth, that when an appeal is taken to the Governor-General and the latter
disapproves of the accounting made by the auditor, he must at once forward to the
Secretary of War for final action the matter in controversy.

The SC held that since the nature of the Auditors job requires him to exercise
discretion, he may not compelled by mandamus to issue the certificate to Lamb. Also,
there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy afforded to Lamb in that the Auditors
decision may be appealed to the Governor-General. The SC relied on the case of
Decatur vs. Paulding where it was held the the US courts that an Auditor may not be
compelled by mandamus. Also, the SC held that the decision of the executive branch is
not reviewable by the courts.
Dissent of Justice Trent:

Justice Trent makes issue about the supposition of the majority in the allegations Lamb
intended to make saying that the Court cannot do so without substantiating that
inference which in his mind the majority did not discharge this burden.
In the final analysis, the whole case, up to this point, is narrowed down to one question
only; that is, Can the courts control by mandamus the judgment and the discretion
which were exercised by the respondent when he denied the relator's request for a
certificate of clearance upon the grounds (1) that a probable suit might be brought by
one Fernandez against the Government, and (2) that the Government, in all probability,
would have to pay the claims of the relator for leave, salary, and transportation? I shall
now attempt to demonstrate that this question is, upon sound legal principles, to be
answered in the affirmative, and in so doing, I shall disregard as inapplicable all the
authorities cited in the majority opinion which tend to support the general proposition
that the decision of the Auditor upon matters pertaining to the settlement of bonded
officers' accounts is final and conclusive, because the accounts of the relator as
superintendent of the Iwahig Penal colony have been, according to the pleadings,
balanced, leaving the relator owing the Government nothing.
That one Fernandez cannot sue the Government in a civil action without its consent is
well known by everyone. Then, why should the respondent be allowed to hold up the
claims of the relator for accrued leave, salary, and transportation on this ground? In
deciding to do so, what kind of judgment and discretion did he use?
The point of Justice Trent is that in order to determine whether mandamus should issue
the court must be governed by the nature of the duty sought to be enforced and not by
the nature of the office held by the respondent( Marbury v Madison)
The courts will not interfere where it is necessary to weigh the evidence and decide on
which side a nice preponderance lies. A strict adherence to such a rule would, however,
require the courts in every case to go into the merits and decide on which side the
preponderance lies, exactly the same as in any ordinary case. But discretion is no
concrete thing to be conferred or transferred as a piece of land or a commission to
office. It is a trait of character bestowed by nature upon all men in a greater or less
degree. If the law permits an officer to act with discretion, he must necessarily use that
discretion. He can, in the nature of things, use no other. Legal discretion is, after all,
nothing but a man-made standard for measuring and keeping within bounds the
personal discretion of such public officers. If they fail to make their official acts conform
to this standard, they will be called to account. For political of legislative acts, they are
responsible directly to the people. But if it be administrative and properly within the
jurisdiction of the courts, the courts will provide the remedy.

Ratio:NO

The certificate of clearance is needed only for bonded government employees and there
is no averment that Lamb is a bonded employee other than having custody of
government property and funds, however, the SC assumed that Lamb was a bonded
officer.
It is confidently contended that the Auditor is not obliged under the law to accept a mere
paper accounting as final and conclusive as to the real responsibility of Government
employees and to issue a clearance upon that alone. He may, it is true, if he is satisfied;
but certainly, he may, if he so desires and if he has any doubt about the correctness of
such accounts, make an actual examination of the funds and property represented by
such paper accounts or balances.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and
unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is clear duty imposed by
law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel
action. If the duty is ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely
discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. In the present case,
however, the mandamus is not for the purpose of the compelling action only. It is
presented for the purpose of requiring particular action on the part of the Auditor. There
is a very wide distinction between the use of the writ of mandamus to compel action and
its use to compel particular action on the part of a public official, board, or officer upon
whom particular duties are imposed by law.
The following are the powers and duties of the Auditor General:
First, that the Auditor for the Philippine Islands has exclusive jurisdiction in the first
instance to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and
receipts from whatever source of every governmental entity within the Philippine
Islands.
Second, that his decision or the result of his accounting upon such revenues and
receipts and accounts is final and conclusive upon all parties unless an appeal is taken
within a period of one year.
Third, that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands (See sec. 36, Act No. 1792) is
not possessed with power to revoke or alter or modify the results of accountings made
by the Auditor without reference to the Secretary of War.

_________________________________________________________________________

GOVERNOR RODOLFO C. FARIAS and AL NACINO, petitioners, vs.

MAYOR ANGELO N. BARBA, VICE MAYOR MANUEL S. HERNANDO and EDWARD
PALAFOX, respondents.

L-116763; 256 SCRA 396

April 19, 1996

ISSUE:

Who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure?

FACTS:

Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
On March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without leave to the United States.

To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a recommendation for the appointment of
Edward Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the
recommendation was made to Mayor Barba. The resolution, containing the
recommendation, was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte
purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the Local
Government Code, disapproved the resolution for the reason that the authority and power
to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the Governor. Accordingly, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of petitioner Al
Nacino. On June 8, 1994, the Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and swore him in office
that same day. On the other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward
Palafox to the same position.

HELD:

The person who has the power to appoint under such circumstance is the Governor upon
the recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned which is the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Nicolas where the vacancy occurs.
The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent
Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding paragraph, neither
is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was
vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the
provincial governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas.
On the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang
Bayan but it was the mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him.
_________________________________________________________________________
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. (G.R.
No. 123169. November 4, 1996)
Ponente: FRANCISCO
FACTS:

On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte a petition for
quo warranto and prohibition.

On July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the appointment of
respondent Palafox by respondent Mayor Barba.

Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the last regular barangay
election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of
the barangay. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the
25% requirement provided by law. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition and set recall
election date. To prevent the holding of recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional
Trial Court a petition for injunction which was later dismissed. Petitioner filed petition
for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction, insisting that the recall election is barred by the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government Code (LGC)

which states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK elections, where the
recall election is for Barangay post.
HELD:
NO. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic.
RATIO:
Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall
election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due
to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official
concerned. The electorate could choose the officials replacement in the said election who
certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election.
It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to
construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the
local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
By the time of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of the limitation stated under
the same Section 74(b) now referred to as Barangay Elections.

FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape
and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several
dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to
escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral,
exemplary and attorneys fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China
Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act
be made applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: NO.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as
it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this
case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply
with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar
deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

CONCURRING OPINION:
DAVIDE:
A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by
those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are
registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one
requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on
registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).
Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local
Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in
a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK
elections be considered a regular election (whether national or local).
_________________________________________________________________________
SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural
Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION
vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and
GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award
of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the
economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still
exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being
unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law
failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as
the case before us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking
System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from
foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the
foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit
encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws
because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain
his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a
transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to
a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest

like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which
provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
___________
NOTES:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured
petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg
Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to
rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989.
On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli
was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from
Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303,
US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account
China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money
(P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the
complainant.

Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of
summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial
court granted said motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of
its evidence.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer,
alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section
19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court.
Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such execution with
the clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because the same
was filed way beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari contending that the court committed
grave abuse of discretion since it has no jurisdiction due to improper service of summons,
failure to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes and upholding technicality over
equity and justice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a failure on the part of the trial court to furnish Petitioner with
copies of orders and processes issued in the course of the proceedings

_________________________________________________________________________

SANTOS V. PNOC
G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008
FACTS:
December 23, 2002, PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint for a sum
of money against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be
collected was the petitioners unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent
when he was still a member of its board of directors.
Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter cannot
be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on
respondents motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent
caused the publication of the summons inRemate, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication and the affidavit of
service of respondents employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by
registered mail to petitioners last known address.

HELD:
No, Santos failed to file an answer in time, which is why he had to file an Omnibus Motion to
Admit Attached Answer. The disputed order of September 11, 2003 was a finding that the
Santos was in default for failure to file an answer or pleading within the period fixed. It is
illogical to notify him of the order simply on account of the reality that he was no longer
residing and/or found on his last known address and his whereabouts unknown thus the
publication of summons. Santos could not reasonably demand that copies of orders and
processes be furnished him. His residence or whereabouts is not known and he cannot be
located. In the case at bar, there is obviously no way notice can be sent to him and the
notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does not require that the impossible be
done. Nemo tenetur ad impossible. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws
and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common
sense, reason and practicability. Be that as it may, a copy of the September 11, 2003 order
was still mailed to him at his last known address but it was unclaimed.
_________________________________________________________________________
CLARO SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant, VS. PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO
MIRANDA AND ROSARIOCORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965
FACTS:
Pedro Santillon died without testament leaving his wife, Perfecta Miranda andone son,
Claro.

Four years after Pedros death, Claro filed a petition for letters of administration which was
opposed by his mother and spouses Benito Miranda and Rosario Corrales. The court
appointed commissioners to draft a project of partition and distribution of all properties of
Pedro. Claro then filed a motion to declare share of heirs and to resolve conflicting claims of
the parties invoking Art.892 of the New Civil Code insisting that after deducting from the
conjugal properties (conjugal share of Perfecta), the remaining must be divided as follows:
for her and for him. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed besides her conjugal half, she
was entitled under Art. 996 of the NCC to another of the remaining half. After due notice
and hearing, the court held that Perfecta is entitled to shares and the remaining share
for Claro after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
The manner of division of share of the estate of an intestate decedent when the
onlysurvivors are the spouse and one legitimate child.
RULING:
Intestate proceedings in the New Civil Codes chapter on legal or intestate succession, the
only article applicable is Art. 996. Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference
from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code form which Art.
996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the
widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the
widow or widower survives with only one child(exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the
second situation, thereby indicating the legislators desire to promulgate just one general
rule applicable to both situations.

Surviving spouse concurring with a legitimate child entitled to one-half of the intestate
estate.
When an intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with only one legitimate
child of the deceased is entitled to one-half of the estate of the deceased spouse
under Art. 996 of the Civil Code.