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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 94753. April 7, 1993.


MANOTOK BROTHERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (Branch VI), and SALVADOR
SALIGUMBA, respondents.
Antonio C. Ravelo for petitioner.
Remigio M. Trinidad for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW AGENCY AGENT'S COMMISSION WHEN ENTITLED'
RULE APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. In an earlier case, this Court ruled
that when there is a close, proximate and causal connection between the agent's

efforts and labor and the principal's sale of his property, the agent is entitled to a
commission. We agree with respondent Court that the City of Manila ultimately
became the purchaser of petitioner's property mainly through the efforts of private
respondent. Without discounting the fact that when Municipal Ordinance No. 6603
was signed by the City Mayor on May 17, 1968, private respondent's authority had
already expired, it is to be noted that the ordinance was approved on April 26, 1968
when private respondent's authorization was still in force. Moreover, the approval
by the City Mayor came only three days after the expiration of private respondent's
authority. It is also worth emphasizing that from the records, the only party given a
written authority by petitioner to negotiate the sale from July 5, 1966 to May 14,
1968 was private respondent.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
Petitioner Manotok Brothers., Inc., by way of the instant Petition docketed as G.R.
No. 94753 sought relief from this Court's Resolution dated May 3, 1989, which
reads:
"G.R. No. 78898 (Manotok Brothers, Inc. vs. Salvador Saligumba and Court of
Appeals). Considering the manifestation of compliance by counsel for petitioner
dated April 14, 1989 with the resolution of March 13, 1989 which required the
petitioner to locate private respondent and to inform this Court of the present
address of said private respondent, the Court Resolved to DISMISS this case, as the
issues cannot be joined as private respondent's and counsel's addresses cannot be
furnished by the petitioner to this court." 1
In addition, petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to prevent
irreparable injury to itself pending resolution by this Court of its cause. Petitioner
likewise urged this Court to hold in contempt private respondent for allegedly
adopting sinister ploy to deprive petitioner of its constitutional right to due process.
Acting on said Petition, this Court in a Resolution 2 dated October 1, 1990 set aside

the entry of judgment made on May 3, 1989 in case G.R. No. 78898 admitted the
amended petition and issued a temporary restraining order to restrain the execution
of the judgment appealed from.
The amended petition 3 admitted, by this Court sought relief from this Court's
Resolution abovequoted. In the alternative, petitioner begged leave of court to
refile its Petition for Certiorari 4 (G.R. No. 78898) grounded on the allegation that
petitioner was deprived of its opportunity to be heard.
manotok bros

The facts as found by the appellate court, revealed that petitioner herein (then
defendantappellant) is the owner of a certain parcel of land and building which
were formerly leased by the City of Manila and used by the Claro M. Recto High
School, at M.F. Jhocson Street, Sampaloc Manila.
By means of a letter 5 dated July 5, 1966, petitioner authorized herein private
respondent Salvador Saligumba to negotiate with the City of Manila the sale of the
aforementioned property for not less than P425,000.00. In the same writing,
petitioner agreed to pay private respondent a five percent (5%) commission in the
event the sale is finally consummated and paid.
Petitioner, on March 4, 1967, executed another letter 6 extending the authority of
private respondent for 120 days. Thereafter, another extension was granted to him
for 120 more days, as evidenced by another letter 7 dated June 26, 1967.
Finally, through another letter 8 dated November 16, 1967, the corporation with
Rufino Manotok, its President, as signatory, authorized private respondent to
finalize and consummate the sale of the property to the City of Manila for not less
than P410,000.00. With this letter came another extension of 180 days.
The Municipal Board of the City of Manila eventually, on April 26, 1968, passed
Ordinance No. 6603, appropriating the sum of P410,816.00 for the purchase of the
property which private respondent was authorized to sell. Said ordinance however,
was signed by the City Mayor only on May 17, 1968, one hundred eighty three
(183) days after the last letter of authorization.

On January 14, 1969, the parties signed the deed of sale of the subject property.
The initial payment of P200,000.00 having been made, the purchase price was fully
satisfied with a second payment on April 8, 1969 by a check in the amount of
P210,816.00.
Notwithstanding the realization of the sale, private respondent never received any
commission, which should have amounted to P20,554.50. This was due to the
refusal of petitioner to pay private respondent said amount as the former does not
recognize the latter's role as agent in the transaction.
Consequently, on June 29, 1969, private respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner, alleging that he had successfully negotiated the sale of the property. He
claimed that it was because of his efforts that the Municipal Board of Manila
passed Ordinance No. 6603 which appropriated the sum for the payment of the
property subject of the sale.
Petitioner claimed otherwise. It denied the claim of private respondent on the
following grounds: (1) private respondent would be entitled to a commission only if
the sale was consummated and the price paid within the period given in the
respective letters of authority and (2) private respondent was not the person
responsible for the negotiation and consummation of the sale, instead it was
Filomeno E. Huelgas, the PTA president for 19671968 of the Claro M. Recto High
School. As a counterclaim, petitioner (then defendantappellant) demanded the sum
of P4,000.00 as attorney's fees and for moral damages.
salvador saligumba

Thereafter, trial ensued. Private respondent, then plaintiff, testified as to the efforts
undertaken by him to ensure the consummation of the sale. He recounted that it
first began at a meeting with Rufino Manotok at the office of Fructuoso Ancheta,
principal of C.M. Recto High School. Atty. Dominador Bisbal, then president of the
PTA, was also present. The meeting was set precisely to ask private respondent to
negotiate the sale of the school lot and building to the City of Manila. Private
respondent then went to Councilor Mariano Magsalin, the author of the Ordinance
which appropriated the money for the purchase of said property, to present the

project. He also went to the Assessor's Office for appraisal of the value of the
property. While these transpired and his letters of authority expired, Rufino
Manotok always renewed the former's authorization until the last was given, which
was to remain in force until May 14, 1968. After securing the report of the
appraisal committee, he went to the City Mayor's Office, which indorsed the matter
to the Superintendent of City Schools of Manila. The latter office approved the
report and so private respondent went back to the City Mayor's Office, which
thereafter indorsed the same to the Municipal Board for appropriation.
Subsequently, on April 26, 1968, Ordinance No. 6603 was passed by the Municipal
Board for the appropriation of the sum corresponding to the purchase price.
Petitioner received the full payment of the purchase price, but private respondent
did not receive a single centavo as commission.
Fructuoso Ancheta and Atty. Dominador Bisbal both testified acknowledging the
authority of private respondent regarding the transaction.
manotok

Petitioner presented as its witnesses Filomeno Huelgas and the petitioner's


President, Rufino Manotok.
Huelgas testified to the effect that after being inducted as PTA president in August,
1967 he followed up the sale from the start with Councilor Magsalin until after it
was approved by the Mayor on May 17, 1968. He. also said that he came to know
Rufino Manotok only in August, 1968, at which meeting the latter told him that he
would be given a "gratification" in the amount of P20,000.00 if the sale was
expedited.
Rufino Manotok confirmed that he knew Huelgas and that there was an agreement
between the two of them regarding the "gratification".
On rebuttal, Atty. Bisbal said that Huelgas was present in the PTA meetings from
1965 to 1967 but he never offered to help in the acquisition of said property.
Moreover, he testified that Huelgas was aware of the fact that it was private
respondent who was negotiating the sale of the subject property.

Thereafter, the then Court of First Instance (now, Regional Trial Court) rendered
judgment sentencing petitioner and/or Rufino Manotok to pay unto private
respondent the sum of P20,540.00 by way of his commission fees with legal
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until payment. The
lower court also ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the amount of
P4,000.00 as and for attorney's fees. 9
Petitioner appealed said decision, but to no avail. Respondent Court of Appeals
affirmed the said ruling of the trial court. 10
Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by respondent appellate court in
a Resolution dated June 22, 1987, petitioner seasonably elevated its case on Petition
for Review on Certiorari on August 10, 1987 before this Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 78898.
Acting on said Petition, this Court issued a Minute Resolution 11 dated August 31,
1987 ordering private respondent to comment on said Petition.
It appearing that the abovementioned Resolution was returned unserved with the
postmaster's notation "unclaimed", this Court in another Resolution 12 dated March
13, 1989, required petitioner to locate private respondent and to inform this Court
of the present address of private respondent within ten (10) days from notice. As
petitioner was unsuccessful in its efforts to locate private respondent, it opted to
manifest that private respondent's last address was the same as that address to
which this. Court's Resolution was forwarded.
Subsequently, this Court issued a Resolution dated May 3, 1989 dismissing
petitioner's case on the ground that the issues raised in the case at bar cannot be
joined. Thus, the aboveentitled case became final and executory by the entry of
judgment on May 3, 1989.
Thereafter, on January 9, 1990 private respondent filed a Motion to Execute the
said judgment before the court of origin. Upon discovery of said development,
petitioner verified with the court of origin the circumstances by which private

respondent obtained knowledge of the resolution of this Court. Sensing a fraudulent


scheme employed by private respondent, petitioner then instituted this instant
Petition for Relief, on August 30, 1990. On September 13, 1990, said petition was
amended to include, in the alternative, its petition to refile its Petition for
Certiorari (G.R. No. 78898).
The sole issue to be addressed in this petition is whether or not private respondent
is entitled to the five percent (5%) agent's commission.
It is petitioner's contention that as a broker, private respondent's job is to bring
together the parties to a transaction. Accordingly, if the broker does not succeed in
bringing the minds of the purchaser and the vendor to an agreement with respect to
the sale, he is not entitled to a commission.
Private respondent, on the other hand, opposes petitioner's position maintaining that
it was because of his efforts that a purchase actually materialized between the
parties.
We rule in favor of private respondent.
At first sight, it would seem that private respondent is not entitled to any
commission as he was not successful in consummating the sale between the parties,
for the sole reason that when the Deed of Sale was finally executed, his extended
authority had already expired. By this alone, one might be misled to believe that
this case squarely falls within the ambit of the established principle that a broker or
agent is not entitled to any commission until he has successfully done the job given
to him. 13
Going deeper however into the case would reveal that it is within the coverage of
the exception rather than of the general rule, the exception being that enunciated in
the case of Prats vs. Court of Appeals. 14 In the said case, this Court ruled in favor
of claimantagent, despite the expiration of his authority, when a sale was finally
consummated.

In its decision in the abovecited case, this Court said, that while it was respondent
court's (referring to the Court of Appeals) factual findings that petitioner Prats
(claimantagent) was not the efficient procuring cause in bringing about the sale
(prescinding from the fact of expiration of his exclusive authority), still petitioner
was awarded compensation for his services. And We quote:
"In equity, however, the Court notes that petitioner had diligently taken steps to
bring back together respondent Doronila and the SSS,.
xxx xxx xxx
The court has noted on the other hand that Doronila finally sold the property to the
Social Security System at P3.25 per square meter which was the very same price
counteroffered by the Social Security System and accepted by him in July, 1967
when he alone was dealing exclusively with the said buyer long before Prats came
into the picture but that on the other hand Prats' efforts somehow were instrumental
in bringing them together again and finally consummating the transaction at the
same price of P3.25 per square meter, although such finalization was after the
expiration of Prats' extended exclusive authority.
xxx xxx xxx
Under the circumstances, the Court grants in equity the sum of One hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) by way of compensation for his efforts and
assistance in the transaction, which however was finalized and consummated after
the expiration of his exclusive authority . . ." 15 (Emphasis supplied.).
From the foregoing, it follows then that private respondent herein, with more
reason, should be paid his commission, While in Prats vs. Court of Appeals, the
agent was not even the efficient procuring cause in bringing about the sale, unlike
in the case at bar, it was still held therein that the agent was entitled to
compensation. In the case at bar, private respondent is the efficient procuring cause
for without his efforts, the municipality would not have anything to pass and the
Mayor would not have anything to approve.

In an earlier case, 16 this Court ruled that when there is a close, proximate and
causal connection between the agent's efforts and labor and the principal's sale of
his property, the agent is entitled to a commission.
We agree with respondent Court that the City of Manila ultimately became the
purchaser of petitioner's property mainly through the efforts of private respondent.
Without discounting the fact that when Municipal Ordinance No. 6603 was signed
by the City Mayor on May 17, 1968, private respondent's authority had already
expired, it is to be noted that the ordinance was approved on April 26, 1968 when
private respondent's authorization was still in force. Moreover, the approval by the
City Mayor came only three days after the expiration of private respondent's
authority. It is also worth emphasizing that from the records, the only party given a
written authority by petitioner to negotiate the sale from July 5, 1966 to May 14,
1968 was private respondent.
Contrary to what petitioner advances, the case of Danon vs. Brimo, 17 on which it
heavily anchors its justification for the denial of private respondent's claim, does
not apply squarely to the instant petition. Claimantagent in said case fully
comprehended the possibility that he may not realize the agent's commission as he
was informed that another agent was also negotiating the sale and thus,
compensation will pertain to the one who finds a purchaser and eventually effects
the sale. Such is not the case herein. On the contrary, private respondent pursued
with his goal of seeing that the parties reach an agreement, on the belief that he
alone was transacting the business with the City Government as this was what
petitioner made it to appear.
While it may be true that Filomeno Huelgas followed up the matter with Councilor
Magsalin, the author of Municipal Ordinance No. 6603 and Mayor Villegas, his
intervention regarding the purchase came only after the ordinance had already been
passed when the buyer has already agreed to the purchase and to the price for
which said property is to be paid. Without the efforts of private respondent then,
Mayor Villegas would have nothing to approve in the first place. It was actually

private respondent's labor that had set in motion the intervention of the third party
that produced the sale, hence he should be amply compensated.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and finding no reversible error
committed by respondent Court, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court in its Resolution
dated October 1, 1990 is hereby lifted.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1.

Rollo of G.R. No. 94753, p. 12.

2. Ibid., p. 77.
3.

Ibid., p. 47.

4.

Rollo of G.R. No. 78898, p. 12.

5.

Supra, note 1 at p. 156.

6.

Ibid., p. 160.

7.

Ibid., p. 161.

8.

Ibid., p. 162.

9. Decision rendered by then Court of Instance, Branch VI, Manila in Civil Case
No. 76997, Rollo, pp. 1318.
10. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza and concurred in by
Associate Justices Manuel C. Herrera and Jorge S. Imperial. Rollo, pp. 1928.
11. Supra, note 4 at p. 67.
12. Ibid., p. 69.

13. Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 331 (1975).


14. 81 SCRA 360 (1978).
15. Ibid., pp. 383385.
16. Reyes vs. Manaoat, et al., 8 C.A. Rep. 2d 368 (1965).
17. 42 Phil. 133 (1921).

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 102784
ROSA LIM, petitioner,

February 28, 1996

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR
No. 10290, entitled "People v. Rosa Lim," promulgated on August 30, 1991.
On January 26, 1989, an Information for Estafa was filed against petitioner Rosa
Lim before Branch 92 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.1 The
Information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of October 1987, in Quezon City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to gain,
with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one VICTORIA SUAREZ, in the following
manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned said accused got and received
in trust from said complainant one (1) ring 3.35 solo worth P169,000.00, Philippine
Currency, with the obligation to sell the same on commission basis and to turn over
the proceeds of the sale to said complainant or to return said jewelry if unsold, but
the said accused once in possession thereof and far from complying with her
obligation despite repeated demands therefor, misapplied, misappropriated and
converted the same to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in the amount aforementioned and in such
other amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
After arraignment and trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Finding accused Rosa Lim GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code
2. Sentencing her to suffer the Indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and
TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of
prision mayor as maximum
3. Ordering her to return to the offended party Mrs. Victoria Suarez the ring or
its value in the amount of P169,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
insolvency and
4.

To pay costs.3

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction with the
modification that the penalty imposed shall be six (6) years, eight (8) months and
twentyone (21) days to twenty (20) years in accordance with Article 315,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the appellate court on
September 20, 1991, but the motion was denied in a Resolution dated November
11, 1991.
In her final bid to exonerate herself, petitioner filed the instant petition for review
alleging the following grounds:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTION, THE RULES
OF COURT AND THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN NOT
PASSING UPON THE FIRST AND THIRD ASSIGNED ERRORS IN
PETITIONER'S BRIEF
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE PRINCIPLE THAT

THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE WAS WAIVED WHEN THE PRIVATE


PROSECUTOR CROSSEXAMINED THE PETITIONER AND AURELIA
NADERA AND WHEN COMPLAINANT WAS CROSSEXAMINED BY THE
COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER AS TO THE TRUE NATURE OF THE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHEREIN IT WAS DISCLOSED
THAT THE TRUE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES WAS A SALE OF
JEWELRIES AND NOT WHAT WAS EMBODIED IN THE RECEIPT
MARKED AS EXHIBIT "A" WHICH WAS RELIED UPON BY THE
RESPONDENT COURT IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER and
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT FAILED TO APPLY IN THIS CASE THE
PRINCIPLE ENUNCIATED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT TO THE
EFFECT THAT "ACCUSATION" IS NOT, ACCORDING TO THE
FUNDAMENTAL LAW, SYNONYMOUS WITH GUILT: THE PROSECUTION
MUST OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE WITH PROOF
OF GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. TO MEET THIS STANDARD,
THERE IS NEED FOR THE MOST CAREFUL SCRUTINY OF THE
TESTIMONY OF THE STATE, BOTH ORAL AND DOCUMENTARY,
INDEPENDENTLY OF WHATEVER DEFENSE IS OFFERED BY THE
ACCUSED. ONLY IF THE JUDGE BELOW AND THE APPELLATE
TRIBUNAL COULD ARRIVE AT A CONCLUSION THAT THE CRIME HAD
BEEN COMMITTED PRECISELY BY THE PERSON ON TRIAL UNDER
SUCH AN EXACTING TEST SHOULD SENTENCE THUS REQUIRED THAT
EVERY INNOCENCE BE DULY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE PROOF
AGAINST HIM MUST SURVIVE THE TEST OF REASON THE STRONGEST
SUSPICION MUST NOT BE PERMITTED TO SWAY JUDGMENT. (People v.
Austria, 195 SCRA 700)5
Herein the pertinent facts as alleged by the prosecution.

On or about October 8, 1987, petitioner Rosa Lim who had come from Cebu
received from private respondent Victoria Suarez the following two pieces of
jewelry one (1) 3.35 carat diamond ring worth P169,000.00 and one (1) bracelet
worth P170,000.00, to be sold on commission basis. The agreement was reflected
in a receipt marked as Exhibit "A"6 for the prosecution. The transaction took place
at the Sir Williams Apartelle in Timog Avenue, Quezon City, where Rosa Lim was
temporarily billeted.
On December 15, 1987, petitioner returned the bracelet to Vicky Suarez, but failed
to return the diamond ring or to turn over the proceeds thereof if sold. As a result,
private complainant, aside from making verbal demands, wrote a demand letter7 to
petitioner asking for the return of said ring or the proceeds of the sale thereof. In
response, petitioner, thru counsel, wrote a letter8 to private respondent's counsel
alleging that Rosa Lim had returned both ring and bracelet to Vicky Suarez
sometime in September, 1987, for which reason, petitioner had no longer any
liability to Mrs. Suarez insofar as the pieces of jewelry were concerned. Irked,
Vicky Suarez filed a complaint for estafa under Article 315, par l(b) of the Revised
Penal Code for which the petitioner herein stands convicted.
Petitioner has a different version.

lim

Rosa Lim admitted in court that she arrived in Manila from Cebu sometime in
October 1987, together with one Aurelia Nadera, who introduced petitioner to
private respondent, and that they were lodged at the Williams Apartelle in Timog,
Quezon City. Petitioner denied that the transaction was for her to sell the two
pieces of jewelry on commission basis. She told Mrs. Suarez that she would
consider buying the pieces of jewelry far her own use and that she would inform
the private complainant of such decision before she goes back to Cebu. Thereafter,
the petitioner took the pieces of jewelry and told Mrs. Suarez to prepare the
"necessary paper for me to sign because I was not yet prepare (d) to buy it."9 After
the document was prepared, petitioner signed it. To prove that she did not agree to
the terms of the receipt regarding the sale on commission basis, petitioner insists

that she signed the aforesaid document on the upper portion thereof and not at the
bottom where a space is provided for the signature of the person(s) receiving the
jewelry. 10
On October 12, 1987 before departing for Cebu, petitioner called up Mrs. Suarez by
telephone in order to inform her that she was no longer interested in the ring and
bracelet. Mrs. Suarez replied that she was busy at the time and so, she instructed the
petitioner to give the pieces of jewelry to Aurelia Nadera who would in turn give
them back to the private complainant. The petitioner did as she was told and gave
the two pieces of jewelry to Nadera as evidenced by a handwritten receipt, dated
October 12, 1987. 11
Two issues need to be resolved: First, what was the real transaction between Rosa
Lim and Vicky Suarez a contract of agency to sell on commission basis as set out in
the receipt or a sale on credit and, second, was the subject diamond ring returned
to Mrs. Suarez through Aurelia Nadera?
Petitioner maintains that she cannot be liable for estafa since she never received the
jewelries in trust or on commission basis from Vicky Suarez. The real agreement
between her and the private respondent was a sale on credit with Mrs. Suarez as the
ownerseller and petitioner as the buyer, as indicated by the bet that petitioner did
not sign on the blank space provided for the signature of the person receiving the
jewelry but at the upper portion thereof immediately below the description of the
items taken. 12
The contention is far from meritorious.
The receipt marked as Exhibit "A" which establishes a contract of agency to sell on
commission basis between Vicky Suarez and Rosa Lim is herein reproduced in
order to come to a proper perspective:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY, that I received from Vicky Suarez PINATUTUNAYAN
KO na aking tinanggap kay ___________ the following jewelries:

ang mga alahas na sumusunod:


Description
Mga Uri
Price
Halaga
l ring 3.35 dolo
P

169,000.00

1 bracelet
9170,000.00
total
Kabuuan
P

339,000.00

in good condition, to be sold in CASH ONLY within . . . days from date of signing
this receipt na nasa mabuting kalagayan upang ipagbili ng KALIWAAN
(ALCONTADO) lamang sa loob ng . . . araw mula ng ating pagkalagdaan:
if I could not sell, I shall return all the jewelry within the period mentioned above
if I would be able to sell, I shall immediately deliver and account the whole
proceeds of sale thereof to the owner of the jewelries at his/her residence my
compensation or commission shall be the overprice on the value of each jewelry
quoted above. I am prohibited to sell any jewelry on credit or by installment
deposit, give for safekeeping: lend, pledge or give as security or guaranty under any
circumstance or manner, any jewelry to other person or persons.
kung hindi ko maipagbili ay isasauli ko ang lahat ng alahas sa loob ng taning na
panahong nakatala sa itaas kung maipagbili ko naman ay dagli kong isusulit at

ibibigay ang buong pinagbilhan sa mayari ng mga alahas sa kanyang bahay


tahanan ang aking gantimpala ay ang mapapahigit na halaga sa nakatakdang halaga
sa itaas ng bawat alahas HINDI ko ipinahihintulutang ipauutang o ibibigay na
hulugan ang alin mang alahas, ilalagak, ipagkakatiwala ipahihiram isasangla o
ipananagot kahit sa anong paraan ang alin mang alahas sa ibang mga tao o tao.
I sign my name this . . . day of . . . 19 . . . at Manila, NILALAGDAAN ko ang
kasunduang ito ngayong ika _____ ng dito sa Maynila.
___________________
Signature of Persons who
received jewelries (Lagda
ng Tumanggap ng mga
Alahas)
Address: . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rosa Lim's signature indeed appears on the upper portion of the receipt
immediately below the description of the items taken: We find that this fact does
not have the effect of altering the terms of the transaction from a contract of agency
to sell on commission basis to a contract of sale. Neither does it indicate absence or
vitiation of consent thereto on the part of Rosa Lim which would make the contract
void or voidable. The moment she affixed her signature thereon, petitioner became
bound by all the terms stipulated in the receipt. She, thus, opened herself to all the
legal obligations that may arise from their breach. This is clear from Article 1356
of the New Civil Code which provides:
Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into,
provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. . . .
However, there are some provisions of the law which require certain formalities for
particular contracts. The first is when the form is required for the validity of the

contract the second is when it is required to make the contract effective as against
third parties such as those mentioned in Articles 1357 and 1358 and the third is
when the form is required for the purpose of proving the existence of the contract,
such as those provided in the Statute of Frauds in article 1403. 13 A contract of
agency to sell on commission basis does not belong to any of these three categories,
hence it is valid and enforceable in whatever form it may be entered into.
Furthermore, there is only one type of legal instrument where the law strictly
prescribes the location of the signature of the parties thereto. This is in the case of
notarial wills found in Article 805 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by
the testator himself . . . .
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof,
except the last, on the left margin. . . .
In the case before us, the parties did not execute a notarial will but a simple
contract of agency to sell on commission basis, thus making the position of
petitioner's signature thereto immaterial.
Petitioner insists, however, that the diamond ring had been returned to Vicky
Suarez through Aurelia Nadera, thus relieving her of any liability. Rosa Lim
testified to this effect on direct examination by her counsel:
Q:

And when she left the jewelries with you, what did you do thereafter?

A:
On October 12, I was bound for Cebu. So I called up Vicky through
telephone and informed her that I am no longer interested in the bracelet and ring
and that I will just return it.
Q:

And what was the reply of Vicky Suarez?

A:

She told me that she could not come to the apartelle since she was very busy.

So, she asked me if Aurelia was there and when I informed her that Aurelia was
there, she instructed me to give the pieces of jewelry to Aurelia who in turn will
give it back to Vicky.
Q:

And you gave the two (2) pieces of jewelry to Aurelia Nadera?

A:

Yes, Your Honor. 14

This was supported by Aurelia Nadera in her direct examination by petitioner's


counsel:
Q:

Do you know if Rosa Lim in fact returned the jewelries?

A:

She gave the jewelries to me.

Q:

Why did Rosa Lim give the jewelries to you?

A:
Rosa Lim called up Vicky Suarez the following morning and told Vicky
Suarez that she was going home to Cebu and asked if she could give the jewelries
to me.
Q:

And when did Rosa Lim give to you the jewelries?

A:

Before she left for Cebu. 15

On rebuttal, these testimonies were belied by Vicky Suarez herself:


Q:
It has been testified to here also by both Aurelia Nadera and Rosa Lim that
you gave authorization to Rosa Lim to turn over the two (2) pieces of jewelries
mentioned in Exhibit "A" to Aurelia Nadera, what can you say about that?
A:
That is not true sir, because at that time Aurelia Nadera is highly indebted to
me in the amount of P140,000.00, so if I gave it to Nadera, I will be exposing
myself to a high risk. 16<
The issue as to the return of the ring boils down to one of credibility. Weight of
evidence is not determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of the
witnesses testifying to a given fact. It depends upon its practical effect in inducing

belief on the part of the judge trying the case.17 In the case at bench, both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals gave weight to the testimony of Vicky Suarez that
she did not authorize Rosa Lim to return the pieces of jewelry to Nadera. The
respondent court, in affirming the trial court, said:
. . . This claim (that the ring had been returned to Suarez thru Nadera) is
disconcerting. It contravenes the very terms of Exhibit A. The instruction by the
complaining witness to appellant to deliver the ring to Aurelia Nadera is
vehemently denied by the complaining witness, who declared that she did not
authorize and/or instruct appellant to do so. And thus, by delivering the ring to
Aurelia without the express authority and consent of the complaining witness,
appellant assumed the right to dispose of the jewelry as if it were hers, thereby
committing conversion, a clear breach of trust, punishable under Article 315, par.
1(b), Revised Penal Code.
We shall not disturb this finding of the respondent court. It is well settled that we
should not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the
credibility of witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. The reason is that the trial court is in
a better position to determine questions involving credibility having heard the
witnesses and having observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial. 18
Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods,


or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make

delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence under this subdivision are as
follows. (1) That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same (2) That
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender
or denial on his part of such receipt (3) That such misappropriation or conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of another and (4) That there is a demand made by the
offended party to the offender (Note: The 4th element is not necessary when there
is evidence of misappropriation of the goods by the defendant) 19
All the elements of estafa under Article 315, Paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, are present in the case at bench. First, the receipt marked as Exhibit "A"
proves that petitioner Rosa Lim received the pieces of jewelry in trust from Vicky
Suarez to be sold on commission basis. Second, petitioner misappropriated or
converted the jewelry to her own use and, third, such misappropriation obviously
caused damage and prejudice to the private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., concurs in the result.

Footnotes
1 Docketed as Criminal Case No. Q892216.
2 Records, p. 1.
3 Ibid., p. 168.
4 Rollo, p. 66.
5 Rollo, pp. 1314.
6 Records, p. 49.
7 Exhibit "B" Records, p. 50.
8 Exhibit "C" Records, p. 51.
9 TSN, June 29, 1989, p. 5.
10 Exhibits "1", "1b" Records, p. 49.
11 Exhibits "2", "2a" Records, p. 93.
12 Exhibit "1," supra.
13 Tolentino, Arturo, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Volume IV, 1991 ed., p. 543.
14 TSN, June 29, 1989, pp. 78.
15 TSN, November 16, 1989, p. 12.
16 TSN, November 21, 1989, p. 9.
17 Francisco, Ricardo J., Evidence, 1993 ed., p. 11.
18 People v. Lagrosa, Jr., 230 SCRA 298 [1994].
19 Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 13th ed., p. 658.

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