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destroyed by order of Muh: ammad. The most likely explanation of this phenomenon of Arabianism is that at least the
higher strata of Nabatean society were of northern Arabian
origin: this would also explain the probable use of a form of
Arabic as a vernacular and the predominance of Arabian-type
personal names.
Because of the sparsity of the evidence, there are few aspects of Nabatean religiosity on a personal level that can be
teased out in any detail. A certain fondness among a minority
for devotional cults associated with particular gods (Isis and
others) may reflect personal religion. The repeated use in
graffiti of the religious formula Remembered be . . . envisages a pious passer-by bringing blessing on himself by
mentioning the name of the inscriber before the god.
Nabatean religious tradition was heavily influenced by
northern Arabian religion, both in the particular gods venerated and in some of the forms that veneration took: the reluctance to depict deities in human form is a good example.
Historically more important, perhaps, is the distinct
tendency to restrict attention and worship to the main deities, Dushara and Allat/al-EUzza (if the latter is a single deity,
as argued above). Other gods were worshiped by specialist
groups (special ethnically, geographically, socially), but Dushara and Allat formed a divine pair par excellence, and the
cult of these two appears to be the official cult of the state.
This is a modified form of monotheism, though involving
a pair of deities rather than just one. This type of dyotheism was not neweven the Old Testament Yahweh was regarded by many Israelites as having a spouse.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hackl, Ursula, Hanna Jenni, and Christoph Schneider. Quellen
zur Geschichte der Nabater: Textsammlung mit bersetzung
und Kommentar (Novum Testamentum et Orbis Antiquus 51).
Freiburg and Gttingen, 2003.

NABU was a god, possibly of West Semitic origin, who became a major divine figure in Babylonia and Assyria of the
first millennium BCE. He is first mentioned in official Babylonian documents of the time of Hammurabi (c. 1760 BCE)
and may have been brought to Babylonia by the West Semites, who migrated there in large numbers in 20001800
BCE. Nabu was closely aligned with Marduk, whose minister,
scribe, and ultimately son he was considered to be. The cult
of Nabu began to spread in the Old Babylonian period. He
grew in importance, becoming the god of the Ezida temple
and the city of Borsippa by the beginning of the first millennium BCE. Nabu and Marduk are frequently mentioned together as the major pair of gods in Babylonia. Nabu appears
in many personal names, including Nabu-Kudurri-usur (the
biblical Nebuchadrezzar), which means Nabu protect our
boundaries. In Assyria, Nabu was revered as one of the most
important gods, and his popularity was still increasing at the
end of the Assyrian empire.
Nabu appeared in several important cultic festivals of
the first millennium BCE. The most important was the Akitu,
the spring New Year festival, which began when Nabu came
in solemn procession from Borsippa to Babylon. The festival
celebrated the reign of Marduk, but Nabus participation was
important enough that the absence of the festival during a
period of political disturbance was referred to as when Nabu
did not come from Borsippa. He also appeared in the Babylonian celebration of his marriage to Nana and the Assyrian
celebration of his marriage to Tashmetum.
Nabu is best known as the god of writing. He was the
patron of scribes, displacing Nisaba, who played this role
until the Old Babylonian period (18001590 BCE). As
Marduks scribe, Nabu was the writer of the tablets of destiny. He was associated with Marduk and Ea and consequently
was considered a god of wisdom. By the end of Assyrian history Nabu was also assuming some of the characteristics of
the hero figure Ninurta.

Healey, John. The Nabatean Tomb Inscriptions of Madain Salih

(Journal of Semitic Studies Supplement 1). Oxford, 1993.

SEE ALSO Akitu; Marduk; Ninurta.

Healey, John. The Religion of the Nabateans: A Conspectus (Religions in the Graeco-Roman World, 136). Leiden, 2001.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Starcky, Jean. Ptra et la Nabatne. In Dictionnaire de la Bible:

Supplment, edited by Henri Cazelles et al., vol. 7, cols. 8861017. Paris, 1966.

For further information on Nabu, see Francesco Pomponios

Nab: Il culto e la figura di un dio del pantheon babilonese ed
assiro (Rome, 1978).

Tholbecq, Laurent. Les Sanctuaires des Nabatens: tat de la

question la lumire de recherches archologiques rcentes.
Topoi 7, no. 2 (1997): 10691095.

New Sources
Wiseman, D. J., and J. A. Black. Literary Texts from the Temple
of Nab. London, 1996.

Wenning, Robert. Die NabaterDenkmler und Geschichte

(Novum Testamentum et Orbis Antiquus 3). Freiburg/
Gttingen, 1987.

TIKVA FRYMER-KENSKY (1987)

Revised Bibliography

Wenning, Robert. Bemerkungen zur Gesellschaft und Religion

der Nabater. In Religion und Gesellschaft: Studien zu ihrer
Wechselbeziehung in den Kulturen des Antiken Vorderen Orients I (Alter Orient und Altes Testament 248), edited by
Rainer Albertz, pp. 177201. Mnster, 1997.
JOHN F. HEALEY (2005)

NAGARJUNA, best known as the first Mahayana philosopher in India, is a highly complex figure whose philosophical works, iconic image, and esoteric meditations are
studied, honored, and practiced in many Mahayana traditions to this day. He developed his systematic philosophy of
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emptiness (sunyata) some time during the second century

CE. According to most hagiographic traditions, however, he
attained the alchemical ability to extend his life, and the esoteric texts that some traditions attribute to him were apparently composed several generations after his philosophical
works. In Tibet, where his philosophical texts were widely
studied, these esoteric writings also became revered and
widespread. Whatever the historical reality of Nagarjunas
life and authorship may be, the great span of his life and the
great breadth of his alleged corpus stand as metaphors for his
prominence within Mahayana Buddhism.
Many of Nagarjunas hagiographies, all of which come
from China and Tibet, recount an episode that illustrates
Nagarjunas importance for the Mahayana. Probably the earliest texts of the Mahayana were in a style that came to be
known as Perfection of Wisdom (prajaparamita). These
texts teach a challenging theory: addressing much of what
early Buddhists held to be ultimately true and real, Perfection of Wisdom claims that such things actually are not ultimately true or real at all. According to Mahayana accounts,
these texts were taught by the Buddha himself, but they were
so challenging that they were kept secret for several centuries
after the Buddhas passing; otherwise, their radical doctrines
might have led some disciples astray. For their safekeeping,
the Perfection of Wisdom texts were conveyed to the land
of the nagas, usually depicted as serpent-spirits, who secretly
guarded the texts until the world was ready to receive the Perfection of Wisdom. Eventually, Nagarjunas fame became
known to the naga king, and he invited Nagarjuna to come
teach his philosophy to his subjects. Having traveled magically to the naga kingdom, Nagarjuna taught the king and
his subjects the philosophy of emptiness, and his hosts were
so delighted that they conferred on him the long hidden
texts. With Nagarjuna on hand to explain the texts meaning,
it was clear that the world was ready to receive these difficult
teachings.
While Nagarjunas journey to the naga world may be
difficult to confirm, there is no doubt that he did indeed
champion the Perfection of Wisdom by explaining and defending the notion of emptiness (sunyata), the central theme
of those texts. His philosophy of emptiness is one of
Nagarjunas main contributions to the Mahayana, and to
understand that philosophy, one must see how it is rooted
in the previous Buddhist theories that emptiness challenges.

PHILOSOPHY OF EMPTINESS (SUNYATA). From its earliest period, Buddhist thought rested on the notion that humans
seek above all to eliminate suffering, and that the only way
to eliminate suffering is to eliminate its causes. According to
the strand of Buddhist thought that most concerns
Nagarjuna, suffering is caused by ignorance (avidya), a way
of seeing the world that distorts all of ones cognitions. Centered on an erroneous view of ones personal identity as fixed
and absolute, ignorance is said to afflict all of the mental
states of all ordinary persons. And since ones actions are
therefore guided by erroneous and distorted mental states,
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they cannot fully succeed; hence, all attempts to eliminate

suffering end in frustration.
To resolve this problem, one must eliminate ignorance,
that is, the pervasive error about ones personal identity that
distorts ones experiences. In conceptual terms, this error is
the belief that, in some fashion or another, one has an essentially real and immutable identity, a personal self or atman.
One way to eliminate that belief is to demonstrate convincingly that its object, the alleged self, does not truly exist. And
to negate the self, early Buddhist thinkers used a type of reductive analysis: one exhaustively categorizes all of the constituents of mind and body so as to leave no item unexamined, and one then carefully examines those constituents or
elements (dharmas) in order to determine whether any
singly or in combinationcould be the self. Using various
contemplative techniques, ones thorough search demonstrates that no such self is to be found anywhere in body and
mind, and knowing that nothing other than the constituents
of mind and body could be a self, one is convinced that no
such self exists. One proceeds to deepen this realization of
no-self (anatman) in meditation, and eventually, ignorance
is completely overcome. One thus attains nirvan: a, utter freedom from suffering.
Nagarjuna accepts this model, and he is also familiar
with the early Buddhist style of reductive analysis. To put
it simply, one analyzes an entity by attempting to break it
into its component parts, and if it cannot be broken down
further, the entity is ultimately real. The traditional example,
a water-jug, is not ultimately real because it can be broken
down into more fundamental parts existing at discrete moments of time. Eventually, the analytical process reaches its
conclusion: one discovers the irreducible elements that are
the stuff of the mental and physical universe. Only these elements are ultimately or truly real.
It is important to note that, while a reductive analysis
of this kind leads to the conclusion that entities such as
water-jugs are not ultimately real, it does not totally deny the
reality of such entities. That is, in ultimate terms a water-jug
is actually just irreducible bits of matter; only those irreducible elements are ultimately real (paramarthasat); the waterjug is not. Nevertheless, in practical and linguistic terms, one
can still use the term water-jug successfully. Hence, a waterjug is conventionally real (sam: vr: tisat).
This notion of the two realitiesthe ultimate and the
conventionalis crucial for Nagarjunas thought, and he
readily accepts it as well. He is not satisfied, however, with
simple reduction as a way to discover what is ultimately real.
His main critique focuses on the notion of essence
(svabhava) that the aforementioned reductive analysis assumes. Essence is implicated in the reductive analysis because, in order to truly know that there is no self in mind
and body, one must be able to say what mind and body truly
are. Since mind and body are just a bundle of elements, this
comes down to knowing what the elements truly are. And
in order to know what each element truly is, one must know

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what kind of thing it isthat is, one must recognize its true
nature or essence (svabhava).
Nagarjuna responds to this emphasis on essence by redefining the notion of ultimate reality. He appears to draw
on an intuition about parts and wholes in the reductive approach. In order for that analysis to succeed, one must call
into question the relation between, for example, the waterjug as a whole and the irreducible particles of matter that are
its parts. The analysis concludes that such a whole-part relation cannot be rationally defended; hence, since wholes clearly cannot exist without parts, they must be unreal. The intuition here is that, rather than directly critiquing the notion
of a whole such as a water-jug, the analysis attacks the reality
of the relation that allegedly ties the whole to its parts.
Whether or not this intuition directly inspires Nagarjuna, it
is clear that he supplants the reductive approach with a relational analysis that, moving beyond just the whole-part relation, critiques all forms of relationality and ends in the denial
of all essences.
Nagarjunas relational analysis begins by admitting that,
if an entity were ultimately real, it would indeed need to have
an essence or svabhava, but he argues that for an entity to
have an essence, it is not sufficient that it be irreducible. Instead, when one says that an entity has an essence, one actually means that the entitys identity is utterly devoid of any dependence on other entities. Thus, to have an essence, the
entity must have an utterly independent or nonrelational
identity. Since only an entity with such an essence can be ultimately real, to know whether an entity ultimately exists,
one need only determine whether its identity is in any way
dependent; in other words, can one know what this thing
truly is without referring to something other than that thing?
If one can know that entitys identity without referring to
other entities, then that entity is indeed utterly independent
and, hence, ultimately real. But if the entitys identity is inextricably linked to other entities, then that entity is dependent, and as such, the entity has no essence. Hence, that entity is not ultimately real; it can only be conventionally real,
at best.
Nagarjuna applies this relational analysis especially to all
those allegedly elemental things that are the mental and
physical stuff of the universe according to most early Buddhist thinkers. And he finds that all those things, even the
most cherished elements of the Buddhist path, are utterly
lacking in essence because none exist independently. Even
nirvan: a itself lacks any essential, nonrelational identity, for
it depends upon its opposition to sam: sara, the world of suffering. And since nirvan: a, as with all things, lacks essence,
it is not ultimately true or real.
For Nagarjuna, the realization that all things lack essence is the cure for ignorance, which he construes as any
grasping (graha) to essential, fixed identities, whether of
persons or things. The realization that counteracts ignorance
comes in the meditation on emptiness, the metaphor that
he uses to evoke this utter lack of essence. His detailed argu-

ments for emptiness examine many forms of relationality.

His best known text, for example, begins with an analysis of
causality which demonstrates that any entity produced by
causes cannot be ultimately real because its existence depends
on its causes. These arguments, however, are not themselves
sufficient to eliminate ignorance because, as a deeply ingrained cognitive state, ignorance requires more than just argumentation for its elimination. Instead, the conclusion of
the argumentsnamely, that all entities are utterly empty of
any essencemust be cultivated in a contemplative experience through which one becomes fully absorbed in that emptiness.
Nagarjuna never clearly specifies the way in which one
must meditate on emptiness; this and other thorny details
are left to later Mahayana thinkers. One issue, however, is
clear: whether in meditation or in argument, emptiness itself
must not be essentialized, for in that case, one would fall into
an incurable nihilism. In other words, emptiness is the conclusion to the question, What is this entity really or truly?
It is the discovery that there is no ultimately real or true identity to be discovered. But if that discovery (i.e., the emptiness
of essence) is itself thought to be ultimately or essentially real,
then one will have interpreted it as a kind of absolute nothingness at the core of all things. To do so would be to contradict Nagarjuna; he specifies that no entity has any essence,
but if emptiness is interpreted as an absolute nothingness,
then one has made emptiness into every entitys essence, albeit in an utterly nihilistic way. Nagarjuna sees the danger
of such an interpretation, and he therefore speaks of emptiness itself as not really being emptiness. In other words, just
as a person, being empty of any essence, is not really or ultimately a person, so too emptiness, lacking any essence, is not
truly or ultimately emptiness. In this way, Nagarjuna avoids
the nihilism that would ensue from construing emptiness as
an absolute nothingness that is the essence of all things.
Using his relational analysis, Nagarjuna argues that all
entities are empty of essence and, thus, that no entity (not
even emptiness) is ultimately real. Following, however, the
paradigm of the two realities mentioned above, Nagarjuna
does accept that we can speak intelligibly of many things as
conventionally real. Thus, even though the stuff of the universe does not ultimately exist, it most certainly does exist
conventionally in terms of our practical actions and our use
of language. A key issue for Nagarjuna is seeing that the way
in which entities exist conventionally is deeply linked to his
notion of emptiness. In short, emptiness describes things ultimate mode of existence: they are not ultimately real because
they are empty of any fixed, nonrelational identity. Things
conventional mode of existence must be the inverse: they are
conventionally real because they are filled with fluid, relational identities. Speaking of this fluid relationality that characterizes conventional reality, Nagarjuna calls it interdependence or prattya-samutpada.
The relationship between emptiness and interdependence is central to Nagarjunas thought, as is exemplified by
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NAGARJUNA

an exchange in Nagarjunas best known text, the

Mulamadhyamaka-karika (Fundamental wisdom of the
Middle Way). Raising an objection to the philosophy of
emptiness, an opponent asks, if everything is empty of essence, then how is reality possible? That is, if no entity is ultimately real because every entity is empty of essence, then
how can a seed produce a sprout? Or, more significantly,
how can the practice of the Buddhist path lead to nirvan: a?
According to Nagarjuna, seeds are not truly real, but how
then could they produce anything? And if the Buddhist path
is also not truly real, how could it lead one to spiritual
freedom?
Nagarjunas response is to turn the question on its head:
if everything were not empty of essence, then how could reality be possible? If a cause had an essence, then being ultimately real, it would have an utterly nonrelational identity:
what it is in and of itself could in no way be dependent on
anything else. But an entity is a cause only in relation to an
effect; if the effect were irrelevant to the causes identity, then
clearly anything would be a cause for anything. In short,
identities such as seed or path are clearly relational, and
as such, they cannot be ultimate. If they were ultimate, then
they would be nonrelational, and a nonrelational world is an
utterly inert, unchanging world. Seeds would never produce
sprouts, and the path would never lead to nirvan: a.
NIRVAN: A AND COMPASSION. Nagarjunas philosophy of
emptiness correlates with a significant change in the conception of nirvan: a as it becomes articulated in Mahayana Buddhism. In early Buddhism, nirvan: a stands in strict opposition to sam: sara, the world of suffering. As Mahayana
develops, however, this duality is called into question, such
that Perfection of Wisdom texts include episodes in which
sam: sara itself is transformed into nirvan: a. Thus, as
Nagarjuna puts it, in ultimate terms there is no distinction
between sam: sara and nirvan: a.
Two prerequisites for this shift in the alterity of nirvan: a
are found in Nagarjunas work. The first is the combination
of emptiness and interdependence discussed above. If
sam: sara itself is to be the locus of nirvan: a, then sam: sara cannot be composed of irreducible elements that are immutable
in their fixed and ultimate essences. They must instead be
capable of radical transformation, and this possibility is expressed in philosophical terms through Nagarjunas notions
of emptiness and interdependence: being empty, things are
not fixed in any particular essence, and being interdependent, they can assume new identities in accord with the new,
interdependent context in which they are located. The second prerequisite is that there must be some means to achieve
that transformation, or to put it more accurately, there must
be some principle that guides the transformative process such
that it ends in nirvan: a. For Nagarjuna, that principle is great
compassion (mahakarun: a).
Nagarjuna does not treat compassion as a philosophical
concept for which one must argue; instead, it is an indispensable ethical principle that, on his view, distinguishes
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6393

Mahayana Buddhism. Although he never provides a precise

definition, later commentators specify that great compassion
is an overwhelming need to eliminate the suffering of all beings. Nagarjuna maintains that, for the Mahayana path to
be effective, it must combine the philosophy of emptiness
with that type of powerful motivation, in part because without such an intense driving force, one could not attain the
final goal of the Mahayana, namely, the state of buddhahood
itself.
In stressing the cultivation of compassion, Nagarjuna
carefully links it with early Buddhist ethical practices, such
as adherence to monastic discipline. In this way, Nagarjunas
radical denial of the ultimate reality of Buddhist notions is
accompanied by a consistent, even vigorous defense of Buddhist ethical norms. If one were to examine only Nagarjunas
best known philosophical texts, one might not get this impression, and it is therefore important to recall that, even if
one examines only the works of Nagarjuna the philosopher
(and not the esoteric adept), one still encounters a wide range
of writings.

LITERARY CONTRIBUTIONS AND ESOTERIC WRITINGS. Putting aside the question of Nagarjunas Tantric esoterica, the
philosopher Nagarjuna, who was active during the second
century CE, wrote a large number of texts, some philosophical, some ethical and prescriptive, and others poetic. These
texts are all composed in Sanskrit, and this itself is unusual.
Prior to Nagarjuna, Buddhist thinkers wrote in languages
such as Pali that were most likely rooted in earlier, regional
dialects. Nagarjuna may have been the first Buddhist thinker
to compose a philosophical text in Sanskrit, and all
Mahayana thinkers follow his example.
Stylistically, Nagarjunas works were also original, in
that he composed nearly all of his works in verse and chapter.
Buddhists prior to Nagarjuna certainly employed verse to
compose philosophical texts, but Nagarjuna generally divided his texts into chapters, each of which generally contains
a sustained argument in verse. This style, which Nagarjuna
may have borrowed from non-Buddhist authors, also becomes the norm for later Mahayana philosophers.
Although neither ornate nor metrically sophisticated,
Nagarjunas poems are also influential for later thinkers. Cast
as praises (stotra) to the Buddha, his poetical works convey
his philosophy in a manner that is not possible through systematic argument. Using various tropes, such as antithesis
and paradox, Nagarjunas praises become a model for
Mahayana philosophers, many of whom follow his lead in
writing both systematic philosophy and poetical praises.
In later Indian Buddhism and especially in Tibet, the
image of Nagarjuna as poet-philosopher expands to include
Nagarjuna the Tantric adept. From an historical standpoint,
it is difficult to accept that the author of Nagarjunas philosophical texts is also the author of the much later Tantric
texts. Nevertheless, the Tibetan Buddhist traditions do see
the authors as identical, and as a result, Nagarjuna becomes

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an awesome figure whose philosophical prowess is easily

matched by his magical powers. The esoteric texts in question are especially important for the forms of Tibetan Tantra
that developed after the eleventh century CE. In detailed but
highly abstruse language, Nagarjuna the adept recounts the
means to reproduce the death process so as to enter into the
subtlest state of mind, namely, the form of mind that transfers from one life to the next. While in that subtle state, one
is to realize the emptiness of even this most basic form of
consciousness, thus greatly accelerating the process of eliminating ignorance. In this way, the image of Nagarjuna combines for Tibetans the most advanced meditative practices
with the most sublime form of Buddhist thought.
SEE ALSO Madhyamika; Nirvan: a; Prattya-samutpada;
Sunyam and Sunyata.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Burton, David F. Emptiness Appraised: A Critical Study of
Nagarjunas Philosophy. Richmond, U.K., 1999. A useful critique of Nagarjuna.
Dreyfus, Georges, and Sara L. McClintock, eds. The
Svatantrika-Prasangika Distinction: What Difference Does a
Difference Make? Boston, 2002. Focuses on later interpretations of Nagarjunas thought.
Galloway, Brian. Some Logical Issues in Madhyamaka
Thought. Journal of Indian Philosophy 17 (1989): 135. A
difficult but very useful analysis of Nagarjunas style of reasoning.
Garfield, Jay L., trans. and commentator. The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjunas Mulamadhyamakakarika. Oxford, 1995. A complete translation of
Nagarjunas main text, along with a philosophical commentary.
Hayes, Richard P. Nagarjunas Appeal. Journal of Indian Philosophy 22 (1994): 299378. A somewhat hyperbolic but insightful critique of modern scholarship on Nagarjuna.
Siderits, Mark. Nagarjuna as Anti-realist. Journal of Indian Philosophy 16 (1988): 311325. Interprets Nagarjunas thought
in relation to contemporary philosophy.
Williams, Paul, and Anthony Tribe. Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition. London, 2000. An
accessible presentation of Mahayana thought that helps to locate Nagarjuna within a wider context.
JOHN D. DUNNE (2005)

NAGAS AND YAKS: AS and their female counterparts,

nags and yaks: s, are pre-Aryan fertility deities of the Indian

subcontinent whose fundamental relationship with agricultural pursuits has led to their incorporation into the Hindu
and Buddhist pantheons as low-level devas (gods), or as a
separate category of deities between devas and demons and
ghosts. In addition, nagas and yaks: as, often likened to the
guardian nats of Thailand and phi of Burma, are intimately
related with kingship symbolism and play a significant role
in the myths and rituals of the Buddhists of South and
Southeast Asia.

Early Hindu and Buddhist texts state that nagas and

yaks: as reside in caityas, ancient places of worship marked by
a tree, stone altar, pool, or stream, and a railing to designate
sacred territory. From these sacred sites, nagas and yaks: as are
believed to determine the fertility and wealth of a bounded
territory as small as a paddy field or as large as a state. If properly worshiped, these deities can guarantee abundance and
health to a region through their control over water and its
essences, such as semen and sap. They can also bestow gems
and the wealth of the underworld, which they are believed
to protect. If, however, these territorial fertility deities are
slighted, they can withdraw their gifts, bringing famine and
spreading disease. This ambivalent power over life and death
is revealed in many sculptures in which a naga or yaks: a in
human form wields in the right hand a sword to protect or
chastise and in the left a jar of fertilizing liquids.
In myths and art, nagas are represented as living among
the roots of trees or on anthillsentrances to the underworld. They appear as cobras with one or many hoods or can
metamorphose into humanlike creatures with dilated cobra
hoods springing from the neck and spreading over the head.
Yaks: as, who are said to live in tree trunks, can also take
human forms that may disguise a demonic side. The female
yaksis are often portrayed as voluptuous maidens, with large
breasts and hips, clinging to trees in full blooman important fertility motif in India.
As guardians of a regions abundance, nagas and yaks: as
have come to be intimately associated with kingship in South
Asia. In ancient India the caitya altar was used as a place of
coronation, a practice suggesting that the kings authority
was guaranteed or enhanced by deities such as nagas and
yaks: as. This thesis is supported by Jataka tales and many dynastic myths in which kings are granted rule over a region
by forming an agreement with a nagaraja (naga king) or a
liaison with a nag or yaks: . If the king fails in his duties,
these deities withdraw their fertilizing powers and bring an
end to the kings reign.
The portrayal of nagas and yaks: as in the Theravada
canon and in the Buddhist myths and rituals of Southeast
Asia suggests the incorporation of the symbolism of kingship
into the figure of the Buddha and the taming of the powers
of nature through the Buddhas dharma. These themes reveal
an interesting relationship between the otherworldly thrust
of Buddhism and the importance of Buddhism for thisworldly existence. In widespread myths the Buddha confronts evil nagas and yaks: as who are ravishing a region, reveals
his greater command of the forces of nature in combat with
these deities, converts the deities with the force of his virtues,
and leaves behind a relic as a symbol of the contract that
guarantees the good behavior of the deities. These myths,
which parallel the Buddhas confrontation with the yaksalike Mara, seem to emphasize the chaotic powers of nagas
and yaks: as in order to reveal the Buddhas virtues and assert
his continuing rule over a region. It appears that very early
in Buddhism worshipers honored the Buddhas relics placed
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