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LARRY ESTACION, Petitioner,

vs.
NOE BERNARDO, thru and his guardian ad litem ARLIE BERNARDO,
CECILIA BANDOQUILLO and GEMINIANO QUINQUILLERA, Respondents.

decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was


denied. Hence, the herein petition for review.

G.R. No. 144723

Issues:

February 27, 2006

Facts:
Noe Bernardo was a passenger of jeepney driven by Geminiano
Quinquillera , owned by respondent Cecilia Bandoquillo, Noe hung or
stood on the left rear carrier of the vehicle. The jeepney stopped by the
right shoulder of the road to pick up passengers. Suddenly, an Isuzu
cargo truck, owned by petitioner and driven by Gerosano, which was
traveling in the same direction, hit the rear end portion of the Fiera, the
cargo truck smashed respondent Noe against the Fiera crushing his legs
and feet which made him fall to the ground. Noe was brought to the
Silliman University Medical Center where his lower left leg was
amputated. Noe, through his guardian ad litem Arlie Bernardo, filed with
the RTC of Dumaguete City a complaint for damages arising from quasi
delict against the registered owner of the cargo truck and his driver
Gerosano. And he prayed for actual damages, loss of income, moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs of
suit.
Owner of the truck and driver Gerosano filed an answer denying
the allegations in the complaint. They filed a third party complaint
against respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera, as owner and driver
of the Fiera. The reckless imprudence of the respondent driver was the
proximate cause of the accident. Respondents Bandoquillo and
Quinquillera filed their answer to the third party complaint asking for the
dismissal of the third party complaint and for payment of attorneys
fees.
Driver Gerosano was charged criminally for reckless imprudence
resulting to multiple physical injuries with damage to property before
the MCTC of Negros Oriental. MCTC finding him guilty of the crime
charged and was sentenced him and to pay the costs. RTC rendered its
judgment in the civil case ordering defendants Gerosano and Estacion,
to pay plaintiff, jointly or solidarily to the actual damages, moral
damages, attorneys fee and the litigation expenses. Petitioner appealed
to the CA. CA rendered the assailed decision which affirmed in toto the

(1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that Larry Estacion
exercised a due diligence as of a good father of the family to prevent
damage despite the abundance of evidence to that effect;
(2) Whether the court of appeals erred in not holding that Larry Estacion
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee
and in maintaining his cargo truck roadworthy and in good condition
(3) Whether the court of appeals erred in exonerating respondents
Cecilia Bandoquillio and Geminiano Quinquillera.
Held:
(1) The court held that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of
negligence thus he is liable for the negligence of his driver Gerosano;
the respondents failed to prove it otherwise. The obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
(2) There was also no proof that he exercised diligence in maintaining
his cargo truck roadworthy and in good operating condition. While
petitioners mechanic driver testified that he made a routine check up
on October 15, 1982, one day before the mishap happened, and found
the truck operational, there was no record of such inspection.
(3) Modification for the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondents
Bandoquillo and Quinquillera are liable for the negligent act of their
driver. The judgment was ordering defendants Gerosano and Estacion,
as well as third party defendants Bandoquillo and Quinquillera, to pay
plaintiff, jointly and solidarily, the award of damages, since there was
contributory negligence on the part of respondent Noe, petitioners
liability should be mitigated in accordance with Article 2179.

PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. and ROGACIONES MANILHIG,


petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF THE LATE RAMON ACUESTA,
respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

victim. The latter did not even give any signal of his intention to
overtake. The petitioners were not able to present their evidence, as
they were deemed to have waived that right by the failure of their
counsel to appear at the scheduled hearings. The trial court then issued
an Order declaring the case submitted for decision. Motions for the
reconsideration of the said Order were both denied. The trial court
handed down a decision ordering the petitioners to jointly and severally
pay the private respondents.

G.R. No. 120553 June 17, 1997


The petitioners interposed this appeal by way of a petition for
review the Decision of the Court of Appeals that affirming the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, which ordered the petitioners to pay the private
respondents damages as a result of a vehicular accident.
Facts:

Issues:
The private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty
of gross negligence, recklessness, violation of traffic rules and
regulations, abandonment of victim, and attempt to escape from a
crime. To support their allegations, the private respondents presented
eight witnesses. Petitioners filed an Answer wherein they alleged that
petitioner Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employees, including petitioner
Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone
months of rigid training before he was hired.

The petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the


victim in overtaking two tricycles, without taking precautions such as
seeing first that the road was clear, which caused the death of the

IN APPLYING ART. 2194, INSTEAD OF ART. 2180, OF THE CIVIL


CODE, AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER PHILTRANCO CAN NOT
INVOKE THE DEFENSE OF DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A
FAMILY.

IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO RESPONDENTS AND/OR IN NOT


FINDING THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES EXCESSIVE.

Held:

The Supreme Court have consistently held that the liability of the
registered owner of a public service vehicle, like petitioner
Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortious acts of the
driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with the
driver. As to solidarity, Article 2194 expressly provides. Since the
employer's liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only
recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to
recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the
fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasidelict. Article 2181 of the Civil Code.

The trial court erroneously fixed the "death indemnity. We concur


with petitioners' view that the trial court intended the award of
"P200,000.00 as death indemnity" not as compensation for loss
of earning capacity. Even if the trial court intended the award as
indemnity for loss of earning capacity, the same must be struck
out for lack of basis. There is no evidence on the victim's earning
capacity and life expectancy.

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FILCAR TRANSPORT, INC., and FORTUNE INSURANCE
CORPORATION, respondents.

Issue:

G.R. No. 118889

(2) Whether or not its insurer held liable for fault or negligence of the car
lessee in driving the rented vehicle

March 23, 1998

(1) Whether or not the damages suffered by a third party, may be an


action based on quasi-delict against a rent-a-car company

Facts:
Held:
Two-car collided at dawn. Both are Mitsubishi Colt Lancers,
cruising along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City, figured
in a traffic accident. The other owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being
driven by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car, owned by respondent
FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as
lessee. The car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left
side of the car of Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did
not possess a Philippine driver's license. FGU Insurance Corporation,
paid the latter by way of subrogation, it sued Dahl-Jensen and
respondent FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation
(FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City.
Summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen he was no longer
staying at his given address; upon motion of petitioner, Jensen was
dropped from the complaint. The trial court dismissed the case for
failure of petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation. Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court although only the fault or
negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of
respondent FILCAR, petitioner failed to establish its cause of action for
sum of money based on quasi-delict. Petitioner insists that respondents
are liable on the strength being the registered owner of a vehicle and is
liable for damages suffered by third persons although the vehicle is
leased to another.

(1) Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code which
provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the use of
due diligence, prevented the misfortune . . . . If the owner was not in the
motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously,
this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence
of master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and DahlJensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action against respondent
FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against
respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.
(2) Petitioner failed to prove the existence of one of the requisites; the
(b) fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or
negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of
FILCAR. The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made
responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care
and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from
causing damage. Yet, as correctly observed by respondent court, Art.
2180 is hardly applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned
therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent FILCAR
being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car
leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris between
them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way
be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being
an employer of the latter. Therefore only Dahl-Jensen is held liable.

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and L.C. DIAZ and COMPANY, CPAs, respondents.

G.R. No. 138569. September 11, 2003

Facts:

L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank, through its


cashier, Mercedes Macaraya. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C.
Diaz, Ismael Calapre (Calapre), to deposit the money with Solidbank.
Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook. Macaraya,
together with Calapre, went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6
the deposit slip and check. When Macaraya asked for the passbook,
teller told that someone got the passbook but she could not remember
to whom she gave the passbook. When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if
Calapre got the passbook, Teller No. 6 answered that someone shorter
than Calapre got the passbook.

L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive Officer, Luis C. Diaz (Diaz),
called up Solidbank to stop any transaction using the same passbook
until he could open a new account. On the same day that L.C. Diaz
learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before, The withdrawal
slip bore the signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz,
namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied
signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received the
P300,000.

In an Information L.C. Diaz charged its messenger, Emerano


Ilagan (Ilagan) and one Roscon Verdazola with Estafa through
Falsification of Commercial Document. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the criminal case after the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to
Dismiss. L.C. Diaz through its counsel demanded from Solidbank the
return of its money. Solidbank refused. L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint for
Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank with the Regional Trial
Court. The trial court rendered a decision absolving Solidbank and
dismissing the complaint. L.C. Diaz then appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Court of Appeals issued its Decision reversing the decision of
the trial court.

On the other hand Court of Appeals issued its Resolution denying


the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank. The appellate court,
however, modified its decision by deleting the award of exemplary
damages and attorneys fees. Solidbank seeks the review of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals

Issues:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER


BANK SHOULD SUFFER THE LOSS FOR ALLOWING THE
WITHDRAWAL OF P300,000.00 TO RESPONDENTS MESSENGER
EMERANO ILAGAN.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT MITIGATING THE


DAMAGES AWARDED AGAINST PETITIONER UNDER ARTICLE 2197
OF THE CIVIL CODE, NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FINDING THAT
PETITIONER BANKS NEGLIGENCE WAS ONLY CONTRIBUTORY.

Held:

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of


Appeals L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the
hands of the impostor. Solidbank was in possession of the
passbook while it was processing the deposit. After completion
of the transaction, Solidbank had the contractual obligation to
return the passbook only to Calapre, the authorized
representative of L.C. Diaz. Solidbank failed to fulfill its
contractual obligation because it gave the passbook to another
person.

In this case, L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a


withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands
of an impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank should be reduced. L.C.
Diaz must shoulder 40% of the actual damages awarded by the
appellate court. Solidbank must pay the other 60% of the actual
damages.

DELSAN TRANSPORTATION
VS.
C & A CONSTRUCTION, INC.
G.R. no. 156034

October 1, 2003

Facts:
C & A construction, construct a deflector wall at the Vitas
reclamation Area in Tondo, Manila it was not formally turnover to
National Housing Authority though it was completed in 1994. On 12:00
midnight of October 20, 1994 Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan
Express receive a report that that a typhoon was going to hit Manila
after eight (8) hours. At 8:35 a.m. he tried to seek shelter but it was
already congested. At 10:00 a.m. Capt. Jusep drop the anchor at the
vicinity of Vitas mouth, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet.
The ship was dragged by the wind toward the Napocor power barge
Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel to avoid the collision but
when the engine was re-started, it hit the deflector wall constructed by
the respondent. P456,198.24 was the damaged cause by the incident. C
& A construction demanded payment of the damages from Capt. Jusep
but the latter refused to pay due to the cause of the incident was by a
fortuitous event. The trial court ruled that Captain Jusep was not guilty
of negligence in applying the emergency rule because it had taken
necessary precautions to avoid accident. The Court of Appeals reversed
& set aside the decision of the trial court. Captain Jusep was found guilty
of negligence in transferring the vessel only at 8:35 a.m. of October
21,1994 and held liable for damages in waiting until 8:35 a.m. before
transfering the vessel to sought shelter.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is solidarily liable under Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code for Quasi-Delict.
Held:

(1) The court finds Captain Jusep is guilty of negligence, the failure to
take immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances, despite
the knowledge that there is typhoon but he waited for the lapse of eight
(8) hours instead. Captain Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and
caution which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the
same situation. The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule
because the danger where Captain Jusep found himself was caused by
his own negligence.
(2) The court finds the petitioner liable for the negligent act of Capt.
Jusep. Whenever an employees negligence causes damage to another,
it instantly arise a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the
care and diligence of supervision of his employee. In Fabre ,jr. v Court
of Appeals held that due diligence requires consistent compliance of
rules & regulation for the guidance and actual implementation of rules.
But the petitioner fails to give any evidence that its rule are strictly
implemented and monitored in compliance therewith petitioner is
therefore liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. The amount of P
456, 198.27 due earn 6% interest per annum from October 3, 1995 until
the finality of the decision.

ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS


PARDO, February 6, 2002

NATURE

Ratio. For the school to be liable, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must
be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the
injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.
Reasoning. The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim.

Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR

-The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in
the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.

FACTS

-Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on
A219 is unfounded.

(this case was already assigned in PFR)


-Sherwin Carpitanos, together with James Daniel II (then 15, driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva
(then in possession and was driving the jeep, Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the
jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when
the vehicle turned turtle. It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached. Carpitanos
sued the school, James Daniel II, his parents, and Vivencio Villanueva.
-TC: absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II, held parents and school liable
-CA: school liable under A218 and 219, FC, finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive
the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them.

ISSUE (regarding liability of St. Marys Academy)


WON St. Marys Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos, and therefore, liable
for damages

HELD
NO. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

-There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep,
and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep.
-Liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily.
The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between
the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.Considering that the negligence of the minor
driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva
was an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate
cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
- It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals[18] and that of the trial court.[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for
determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys Academy, Dipolog City. No
costs. SO ORDERED.

Smith Bell and Company v CA | Feliciano G.R. No. L-56294, May 20, 1991
|

Road This has something to do with foresight and safety measure which
the captain should observe another ship is approaching.

FACTS In the early morning of 3 May 1970at exactly 0350 hours, on


the approaches to the port of Manila near Caballo Island, a collision took
place between the M/V "Don Carlos," an inter-island vessel owned and
operated by private respondent Carlos A. Go Thong and Company ("Go
Thong"), and the M/S "Yotai Maru," a merchant vessel of Japanese
registry. The "Don Carlos" was then sailing south bound leaving the
port of Manila for Cebu, while the "Yotai Maru" was approaching the port
of Manila, coming in from Kobe, Japan. The bow of the "Don Carlos"
rammed the portside (left side) of the "Yotai Maru" inflicting a three (3)
cm. gaping hole on her portside near Hatch No. 3, through which
seawater rushed in and flooded that hatch and her bottom tanks,
damaging all the cargo stowed therein. The consignees of the
damaged cargo got paid by their insurance companies. The insurance
companies in turn, having been subrogated to the interests of the
consignees of the damaged cargo, commenced actions against private
respondent Go Thong for damages sustained by the various shipments.
2 Civil Cases were filed against Go Thong. In Case No.1, the SC ruled
through JBL Reyes that the "Don Carlos" to have been negligent rather
than the "Yotai Maru. This was contrary to the findings of the CA. This
is Case No. 2. The parties agreed that the cases be tried under the same
issues and that the evidence presented in one case would be simply
adopted in the other.

The second circumstance constitutive of negligence on the part of the


"Don Carlos" was its failure to have on board that night a "proper lookout" as required by Rule I (B) Under Rule 29 of the same set of Rules, all

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS


W/N Don Carlos is the proximate cause of the collision.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
"Don Carlos" had been negligent and that its negligence was the sole
proximate cause of the collision and of the resulting damages.
Three factors were considered in determining who the proximate cause
is:
The first of these factors was the failure of the "Don Carlos" to comply
with the requirements of Rule 18 (a) of the International Rules of the

consequences arising from the failure of the "Don Carlos" to keep a


"proper look-out" must be borne by the "Don Carlos." The third factor
constitutive of negligence on the part of the "Don Carlos" relates to the
fact that Second Mate Benito German was, immediately before and
during the collision, in command of the "Don Carlos." Second Mate
German simply did not have the level of experience, judgment and skill
essential for recognizing and coping with the risk of collision as it
presented itself that early morning when the "Don Carlos," running at
maximum speed and having just overtaken the "Don Francisco" then
approximately one mile behind to the starboard side of the "Don Carlos,"
found itself head-on or nearly head on vis-a-vis the "Yotai Maru. " It is
essential to point out that this situation was created by the "Don Carlos"
itself.

146 Crisostomo vs. CA | Ynares-Santiago G.R. No. 138334, August 25,


2003 | 409 SCRA 528
FACTS Petitioner Crisostomo contracted the services of respondent
Caravan Travel and Tours International, to arrange and facilitate her
booking, ticketing, and accommodation in a tour called Jewels of
Europe. She was given a 5% discount and a waived booking fee
because her niece, Meriam Menor, was the companys ticketing
manager. Menor went to her aunts residence to deliver Crisostomos
travel documents and plane tickets and get her payment. Menor told her
to be in NAIA on Saturday. When Crisostomo got to the airport on
Saturday, she discovered that the filight she was supposed to take had
already departed the previous day. She complained to Menor, and was
urged by the latter to take another tour, instead British Pageant.
Upon returning from Europe, Crisostomo demanded P61,421.70 from
Caravan Tours, representing the difference between the sun she paid for
Jewels and the amount she owed the company for British Pageant.
Caravan refused. Thus, Crisostomo filed a complaint against Caravan
for breach of contract of carriage and damages. The trial court held in
favor of Crisostomo, and ordered Caravan to pay her, because it was
negligent in erroneously advising Crisostomo of her departure. However,
Crisostmo is also guilty of contributory negligence (for failing to verify
the exact date and time of departure). CA declared that Crisostomo is
more negligent. As a lawyer and well-travelled person, she should have
known better. MR of Crisostomo was also denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N respondent Caravan is guilty of negligence
and is liable to Crisostomo for damages. o Crisostomo: Respondent did
not observe the standard of care required of a common carrier, i.e.
extraordinary diligence in the fulfillment of its obligation. o Caravan:
Menor was not negligent. The date and time of departure was legibly
written on the plane ticket and the travel papers were given 2 days
before the flight. It performed all obligations to enable Crisostomo to join
the group and exercised due diligence in its dealings with the latter.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
CARVAN NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES.

A contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain


person or association of persons obligate themselves to transport
persons, things, or news from one place to another for a fixed price.
Respondent is not engaged in the business of transporting either
passengers of goods and is therefore not a common carrier.
Respondents services as a travel agency include procuring tickets and
facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking customers for
tours. A common carrier is bound by law to carry as far as human care
and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons and with due regard for all circumstances. But since Caravan is
a travel agency, it is not bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
performance of its obligations. For them, the standard of care required
is that of a good father of a family. This connotes reasonable care
consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have
observed when confronted with a similar situation. We do not concur
with the finding that Menors negligene concurred with that of
Crisostomo. No evidence to prove Menors negligence. The negligence
of the obligor in the performance of the obligations renders him liable for
damages for the resulting loss suffered by the obligee. Fault or
negligence of an obligor consists in the his failure to exercise due care
and prudence in the performance of the obligation. The degree of
diligence required depends on the circumstances of the specific
obligation and whether one has been negligent is a question of fact that
is to be determined in the case.
Petition denied. CA affirmed.

334 Air France v. CA | Padilla G.R. No. 76093 March 21, 1989| 171 SCRA
399
FACTS Private respondent Morales, thru his agent, bought an airline
ticket from petitioners Manila ticketing office. The itinerary covered by
the ticket included several cities with certain segments thereof
restricted by markings of non endorsable and valid on AF (Air France)
only. While in New York, respondent obtained medical certificates
attesting to an ear infection which necessitated medical treatment. After
a few more trips to other cities in Europe, he requested to the petitioner
(twice) to shorten his trip by deleting some of the cities in his itinerary
so that he can go back to Manila and have his ear checked. Petitioner
informed respondent that as a matter of procedure, confirmation of the
Manila ticketing office must be secured before shortening of the route.
His requests were eventually denied. This prompted the respondent to
buy an entirely new set of tickets to be able to go back home. Upon
arriving in Manila, respondent sent a letter-complaint to petitioner thru
its Manila ticketing office. The petitioner advised the respondent to
surrender the unused flight coupons in order to have them refunded but
the respondent kept the said coupons and instead, filed a complaint for
breach of contract of carriage and damages. RTC held in favor of
respondent. CA modified the judgment but it was still for the
respondent.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N there was really a breach of contract of
carriage on the part of the petitioner, as to justify the award to private
respondent of actual, moral, and exemplary damages?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
THERE WAS NO BREACH OF CONTRACT. PETITIONER IS NOT LIABLE.
International Air Transportation Association (IATA) Resolution No. 275 e,
2., special note reads: "Where a fare is restricted and such restrictions
are not clearly evident from the required entries on the ticket, such
restrictions may be written, stamped or reprinted in plain language in
the Endorsement/Restrictions" box of the applicable flight coupon(s); or
attached thereto by use of an appropriate notice." Voluntary changes to
tickets, while allowable, are also covered by (IATA) Resolution No. 1013,
Art. II, which provides: "1. changes to the ticket requested by the
passenger will be subject to carriers regulations. Private respondent

wanted a rerouting to Hamburg, Geneva, Rome, Hongkong and Manila


which shortened the original itinerary on the ticket issued by AF Manila
through ASPAC, its general sales agent. Considering the original
restrictions on the
ticket, it was not unreasonable for Air France to deny the request.
Besides, a recurring ear infection was pleaded as reason necessitating
urgent return to Manila. Assuming arguendo a worsening pain or
discomfort, private respondent appears to have still proceeded to four
(4) other cities covering a period of at least six (6) days and leaving
open his date of departure from Hongkong to Manila. And, even if he
claimed to have undergone medical examination upon arrival in Manila,
no medical certificate was presented. He failed to even remember his
date of arrival in Manila. With a claim for a large amount of damages,
the Court finds it unsual for respondent, a lawyer, to easily forget vital
information to substantiate his plea. It is also essential before an award
of damages that the claimant must satisfactorily prove during the trial
the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal
connection to defendant's acts. Air France employees in Hamburg
informed private respondent that his tickets were partly stamped "nonendorsable" and "valid on Air France only." Mere refusal to accede to the
passenger's wishes does not necessarily translate into damages in the
absence of bad faith. To our mind, respondent has failed to show
wanton, malevolent or reckless misconduct imputable to petitioner in its
refusal to re-route. Air France Manila acted upon the advise of its
Manila ticketing office in denying private respondent's request. There
was no evident bad faith when it followed the advise not to authorize
rerouting. At worst, the situation can be considered a case of
inadvertence on the part of petitioners Manila ticketing office in not
explaining the non-endorsable character of the ticket. Of importance,
however, is the fact that private respondent is a lawyer, and the
restriction box clearly indicated the nonendorsable character of the
ticket. Omissions by ordinary passengers may be condoned but more is
expected of members of the bar who cannot feign ignorance of such
limitations and restrictions. An award of moral and exemplary damages
cannot be sustained under the circumstances, but petitioner has to
refund the unused coupons in the Air France ticket to the private
respondent.

Mercury Drug Corporation and Rolando J. Del Rosario vs. Spouses Huang,
and Stephen Huang | Puno June 22, 2007
FACTS Petitioner Mercury Drug is the registered owner of a Mitsubishi
truck, with petitioner del Rosario as driver. Respondents Richard and
Carmen Huang are parents of respondent Stephen Huang, who owned a
Sedan. The two vehicles got into an accident as they were traversing a
highway. The Sedan was on the left innermost lane while the truck was
on the next lane to its right, when the latter swerved to its left and
slammed in the front right side of the car. As a consequence, the car
was wrecked and Stephen Huang incurred massive injuries and became
paralyzed. The parents of Stephen faulted Del Rosario for committing
gross negligence and reckless imprudence, and Mercury Drug for failing
to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its driver. The RTC found the petitioners jointly and
severally liable for damages. The CA affirmed, hence this appeal.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Mercury Drug is liable as employer of Del
Rosario. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Mercury Drug is liable.
Mercury Drug is jointly and solidarily liable with Del Rosario, as the
employer of the latter. In order to be relieved of such liability, Mercury
should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family,
both in the selection and supervision of the employee in the
performance of his duties. Mercury failed in both respects. In selecting
employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. With respect to
supervision, the employer should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for their breach. To establish such, concrete proof, such as
documentary evidence must be submitted by him. In the case at bar,
it was shown that Del Rosario didn't take driving tests and psychological
exams when he applied for the position of a Truck Man. In addition,
Mercury didn't present Del Rosario's NBI and police clearances. Next, the
last seminar attended by the driver occurred a long 12 years before the
accident occurred. Lastly, Mercury didn't have a backup driver for long
trips. When the accident happened Del Rosario has been out on the road
for more than 13 hours. As to negligence with regard to supervision

over its employees, Mercury didn't impose any sanction on Del Rosario
when the latter reported to the former about the incident. Hence,
Mercury didn't exercise due diligence.
In the end, the SC found that Mercury and Del Rosario are jointly and
solidarily liable to the Huangs.

Picart v Smith

The left hind leg was hit by the flange of the car
and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off

Lessons Applicable: Negligence (Torts and Damages)

with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died.


Amado received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

FACTS:

December 12, 1912: Amado Picart was riding on his pony

ISSUE: W/N Frank was negligent in accordance to negligence tests

over Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union

Before he had gotten half way across, the Frank Smith


driving an automobile came from the opposite direction at the rate
of about 10-12 miles/hour
As Frank Smith neared the bridge he saw a

horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.


He continued his course and after he had

taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared


to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the
rule of the road
Amado saw the automobile coming and heard the

HELD: YES. lower court must be reversed, and judgment is her


rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two
hundred pesos (P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here
awarded is estimated to include the value of the horse, medical
expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his
apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery.
The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of
such character as not to be recoverable

person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is

warning signals
being perturbed by the novelty of the

apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely

guilty of negligence

over to the other side

the situation before him.

determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts

and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop

When he had gotten quite near, there being then


no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, Frank

involved in the particular case

became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its
head toward the railing

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee


harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the

quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the
horse alongside of the railing but because it got close the horse

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a


prudent man in a given situation must of course be always

The pony had not as yet exhibited fright,

The existence of negligence in a given case is not


determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in

up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going
to the left because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that

duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm

Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in


the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect

harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing


conduct or guarding against its consequences

It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were
not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff (wrong side of the road) by
an appreciable interval.

Under these circumstances the law is that the person who


has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do
so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party.

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