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Cause of accusation Miranda v.

SB GR 154098 Jul 27, 2005


FACTS: The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, under preventive
suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to 25 January 1998 for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Subsequently,
then Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. Vice Mayor Navarro
contended that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of usurpation of authority or official functions. Mayor Miranda
asserted that he reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and in good faith. He also averred that, on the day he
reassumed office, he received a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to vacate
his office and he immediately complied with the same. Notably, Mayor Mirandas counter-affidavit also stated that
he left the mayoralty post after coercion by the Philippine National Police.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing its Resolution of 4 February 2002,
preventively suspending the petitioner for 90 days.
RULING: No. instant petition is DISMISSED there being no showing that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in issuing its Resolution of 4 February 2002, preventively suspending the petitioner for 90 days.
RATION: This Court finds no reason to disagree with the Sandiganbayan. Its conclusions are amply supported by
the record. Additionally, the issue of whether petitioner committed fraud upon the government or public funds or
property is essentially factual.
In a special civil action for certiorari, the only question that may be raised is whether or not the respondent acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court cannot correct errors of fact or law
which do not amount to grave abuse of discretion.
We are not a bit persuaded by the posture of the petitioner that he reassumed office under an honest belief that he
was no longer under preventive suspension. Petitioners pretense cannot stand scrutiny.
By petitioners own admission, he refused to leave his position despite the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez
and left only a few days after receipt thereof due to the coercion of the Philippine National Police. This contradicts
his assertion that he immediately complied with the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez. [35] Petitioner cannot
escape from his own admission.
People v. Hilvano:
There is no excuse for defendant-appellant. In the beginning he might have pleaded good faith, invoking the
designation by the Mayor; but after he had been shown the letter of the Executive Secretary and the opinion of the
provincial fiscal, he had no right thereafter stubbornly to stick to the position. He was rightfully convicted.
Petitioners excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension is too flimsy to merit even a side-glance. He
alleged that he merely followed the advice of his lawyer. If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect for the
rule of law, they should have assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court instead of taking the law into
their own hands.
The records will show that petitioner did not file a motion to quash the information or a motion for bill of particulars
before pleading to the information. It is basic that entering a plea waives any objection the petitioner may have to the
validity of the information except on the following grounds: (1) the information charges no offense;
(2) the trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(3) the penalty or the offense has been extinguished; and
(4) double jeopardy has attached.
Objections to the sufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information do not fall among the exceptions to the
rule. They fall under the objection that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.
Needless to state, the petitioner has by his acts acquiesced to the validity and sufficiency of the Amended
Information. It is, thus, incorrect for the dissenting opinion to peddle the proposition that the petitioner has been

deprived of his constitutional right to be apprised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Worse, it is
improper for the dissenting opinion to raise this issue motu proprio.
Under our Rules of Court, it is the petitioner who should raise this objection in a motion to quash or motion for bill
of particulars before entering his plea. The irregular procedure followed by the dissent would encourage the
pernicious practice of sandbagging where counsel foregoes raising a pleading defect before trial where it can be
easily corrected only to raise the defect later in the hope of obtaining an arrest of judgment or new trial from a
sympathetic magistrate. It is precisely this evil that is addressed by Rule 117, Section 9 of our Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the
accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison detreof the rule is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense. A perusal of the Amended Information will bear out that it has hurdled this legal bar.
Using this test, it cannot be said that the Amended Information failed to properly apprise the petitioner of the charge
against him. The information charged the petitioner with assuming the duties and performing acts pertaining to the
office of Mayor willfully, unlawfully and knowingly under the pretense of official position. Moreover, it states some
of the specific acts which constitute usurpation of official functions, namely, issuing directives and memoranda and
appointing certain persons to various positions in the city government. These allegations are clear enough for a
layman to understand. Indeed, even the petitioner does not complain about their ambiguity. Only the dissent does.
With due respect, the dissent fails to focus on the proper issue. The issue before this Court is whether
the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion in suspending the petitioner for 90 days. The validity of
the Ombudsmans order of preventive suspension of the petitioner for 6 months is not the one assailed in the case at
bar.
Section 63 of the Local Government Code does not govern preventive suspensions imposed by the Ombudsman, which is a
constitutionally created office and independent from the Executive branch of government. The Ombudsmans power of preventive suspension is
governed by Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, which provides:
SECTION 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c)
the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not
more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.

The six-month period of preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman was indubitably within the limit
provided by its enabling law. This enabling law has not been modified by the legislature.
The dissenting opinion submits that providing for a six-month limit for the Ombudsman while keeping the
limit for executive officials at sixty days violates the constitutional proscription against equal protection of the law.
In essence, it avers that there is no substantial distinction between preventive suspensions handed down by the
Ombudsman and those imposed by executive officials. On the contrary, there is a world of difference between them.
The Constitution has endowed the Ombudsman with unique safeguards to ensure immunity from political
pressure. Among these statutory protections are fiscal autonomy, fixed term of office and classification as an
impeachable officer. This much was recognized by this Court in the earlier cited case of Garcia v. Mojica.
Moreover, there are stricter safeguards for imposition of preventive suspension by the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman Act of 1989 requires that the Ombudsman determine: (1) that the evidence of guilt is strong; and (2)
that any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The dissenting opinion finally points out the possibility of abuse by the Ombudsman in imposing
preventive suspensions. The short reply is that all powers are susceptible of abuse but that is no reason to strike
down the grant of power. Suffice it to say that the proper remedies against abuse in the exercise of power are a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure or amendment of the Ombudsmans
enabling law by the legislature, not a contortionist statutory interpretation by this Court.
We further hold that the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion when it ruled that petitioners
act fell within the catch-all provision x x x or for any offense involving fraud upon government. The term fraud is
defined, viz.: An instance or an act of trickery or deceit esp. when involving misrepresentation: an act of deluding
It is obvious to the eyes that the phrase fraud upon government means any instance or act of trickery or
deceit against the government. It cannot be read restrictively so as to be equivalent to malversation of funds as this is
covered by the preceding phrase any offense involving . . . public funds or property. It ought to follow that fraud
upon government was committed when the petitioner allegedly assumed the duties and performed acts pertaining to
the Office of the Mayor under pretense of official position.
3. Contents of the information People v. Ibanez 523 SCRA 136
FACTS: Zaldy Ibaez y Francisco was charged with 3 counts of Rape with lewd designs and by taking advantage of
his moral ascendancy over his own daughter, AAA, then twelve (12) years old and by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with AAA, a
minor, against her will and consent.
Appellant denied raping his daughter. As alibi, he claimed that he was often away from home and usually returned
only four days after because he was hooked on gambling and drugs. He would usually return home in the morning
after his wife had gone to work to avoid quarrels. By then, AAA would already be in school. He admitted being in a
rehabilitation center for sometime, but continued to take drugs upon his release. He also admitted that he would beat
and threaten his wife if she did not give him money for drugs. He testified further that in January 1999, he left the
house, stayed in Pasig and returned home only to steal his wife's car. His wife threatened to have him arrested if he
did not return the car. He asked his cousin to return it minus the stereo. When he returned home, his family had gone
and he started to sell their things to buy shabu.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in not considering the information in the other criminal cases
where it is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction for failure of the prosecution to state the precise dates of
the commission of the alleged rapes, it being an essential element of the crime charged.
RULING: RTC- GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
CA - AFFIRMED
SC - Decision of the CA finding Zaldy Ibaez y Francisco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified
rape is AFFIRMED with modification
RATION: An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of the crime charged.
Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not
the time of its commission. The gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. The precise time of the
crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore, it is not essential that it be alleged in the information
with ultimate precision.
It cannot be seriously asserted that appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him when the prosecution failed to state the exact date of the commission of the
offense. This Court has previously upheld complaints and informations in prosecutions for rape which merely

alleged that a rape has been committed "sometime in the month of April 1993," for a rape which was committed in
1993; "on or about May 1998," for a rape committed sometime in the first week of May 1998; and "sometime in the
month of September 1998," for a rape committed on an evening in September 1998.19 The allegation in the
informations that the appellant committed the rape "sometime in June 1997"20 and "sometime in April 1999"21was
sufficient to inform appellant that he was being charged of qualified rape committed against his daughter. The
allegation adequately afforded appellant an opportunity to prepare his defense. Thus, appellant cannot complain that
he was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
It is now too late for appellant to question the sufficiency of the criminal informations regarding the dates of the
commission of the offense. Appellant could have filed a motion for a bill of particulars before his arraignment or a
motion to quash on the ground that the informations alleged erroneous dates prior to his entry of plea. However, he
did not. Instead, he had himself arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the crime of rape. Such being the case,
appellant has waived his right to object to the informations on the ground of an error as to the time of the alleged
rape.
Withal, we are in agreement with the submission of the Court of Appeals and the OSG that the RTC erred in the
imposition of the appropriate penalty because it imposed only one penalty of death for two convictions of rape. The
penalty imposed on the appellant should be modified so that in each case, the conviction of rape should separately
be penalized by death. However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting
the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty in each case to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua.
4. Authority of prosecutor Tolentino v. Paqueo 523 SCRA 377
FACTS: June 22, 2001, State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino filed an Information charging private respondent
Benedict Dy Tecklo, the owner/proprietor of Qualistronic Builders, of violation of Sec. 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 28
(e) of Republic Act No. 8282 for failing to remit the premiums due for his employee to the Social Security System
despite demand. The Information contains a certification by State Prosecutor Tolentino.
The case was raffled to the RTC of Naga City, Branch 23, presided by respondent Judge Pablo M. Paqueo,
Jr. It was set for arraignment on August 7, 2001. On said date, counsel for private respondent moved for the
deferment of the arraignment and requested time to file a motion to quash the Information, which request was
granted by the court.
On August 10, 2001, private respondent filed a Motion to Quash.
On August 16, 2001, State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an Opposition to Motion to Quash.
August 24, 2001, RTC issued an Order quashing the Information and dismissing the case.
State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an Objection and Motion praying that the Order dated August 24, 2001 be
set aside and that the case entitled People v. Tecklo be scheduled for arraignment without unnecessary delay.
In an Order dated October 15, 2001, respondent Judge denied Tolentinos Objection and Motion.
Petitioners, thereafter, filed this petition praying for the nullification of the Orders dated August 24,
2001 and October 15, 2001.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino is duly authorized to file the subject Information
without the approval of the City Prosecutor?
RULING: petition for certiorari and mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

RATION: In their Memorandum, petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Tolentino was duly authorized to file the
Information based on the following:
1. Petitioner Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan, per Regional Order dated July 14, 1997, authorized State
Prosecutor Tolentino to file the necessary Information for violations of Republic Act No. 8282 in the Bicol
Region, except Masbate and Catanduanes, and to prosecute the same in courts of competent jurisdiction. This
was in response to the request of the SSS, Region V for the designation of a Special Prosecutor to handle the
prosecution of said criminal cases with the Office of the City Prosecutor and Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of the cities of Naga, Legaspi and Iriga and all provinces of the Bicol Region.
2. Per ruling of the Chief State Prosecutor in his letter dated October 24, 2000, . . . the information to be filed in court by
prosecutors-designate do not need the approval of the Regional State Prosecutor or the Provincial or City
Prosecutor. An administrative opinion interpreting existing rules issued by agencies directly involved in the
implementation of the rules should be respected and upheld.

Respondent judge quashed the Information based on Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure in relation to the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
Rule 112. Sec 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. x x x
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Rule 117. Sec. 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.

Notably, changes in the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 were introduced in the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000. It is noted that the letter dated October 24, 2000 of
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, upon which State Prosecutor Tolentino relies to support his authority to file
the subject Information without the approval of the City Prosecutor, was issued before the changes in the third
paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 were introduced in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
While the old 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, stated that no complaint or information may
be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or
city fiscal of chief state prosecutor, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that [n]o complaint or
information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval
of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. Since the provision is
couched in negative terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated, it is mandatory.
An examination of the functions of the Regional State Prosecutor under Sec. 8 of Presidential Decree No.
1275 showed that they do not include that of approving the Information filed or dismissed by the investigating
prosecutor. It is a rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence
implies the exclusion of all others, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers authorized to approve the filing
or dismissal of the Information of the investigating prosecutor, the Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor
Tolentino did not comply with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to quash the Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Petitioners also contend that the accused must move to quash at any time before entering his plea and the
trial court is barred from granting further time to the accused to do so; and that there is no evidence in support of the
motion to quash.
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the Motion to Quash provides:
SECTION 1. Time to move to quash.At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the
complaint or information.
SEC. 2. Form and contents. The motion to quash shall be in writing, signed by the accused or his counsel and
shall distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds. The court shall consider no grounds other than those stated in the
motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.

The Court finds that there is substantial compliance by private respondent with the rule above quoted, as it
was satisfactorily explained in his Memorandum that his counsel orally moved to quash the Information before the
arraignment on August 7, 2001. In an Order issued on the same date, respondent Judge required private respondents
counsel to file a motion to quash within five days from the issuance of the Order. Accordingly, the motion was filed
on August 10, 2001.
Moreover, there was no need to submit any evidence to support the ground for quashing the Information,
since it was apparent and within judicial notice that petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino was not the City Prosecutor
or the Provincial Prosecutor.
As regards the allegation of willful miscitation of the ground for quashing the Information, the Court finds
that respondent Judge failed to cite in his Order the correct paragraph under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court where
the ground relied upon for quashing the Information is enumerated. What is important, however, is that he correctly
cited the ground for quashing the Information.
Certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weigh
pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation.
In this petition for certiorari, the Court finds that respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in
dismissing the Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino for failure to comply with the
third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
5. Sec 3 Santos-Concio et al v. DOJ Sec GR 175057 Jan 29, 2008;
FACTS: In the days leading to February 4, 2006, people started to gather in throngs at the Philsports Arena
(formerly Ultra) in Pasig City, the publicized site of the first anniversary episode of Wowowee, a noontime game
show aired by ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN). With high hopes of winning the bonanza,
hundreds queued for days and nights near the venue to assure themselves of securing tickets for the show. Little did
they know that in taking a shot at instant fortune, a number of them would pay the ultimate wager and place their
lives at stake, all in the name of bagging the prizes in store.
Came the early morning of February 4, 2006 with thousands more swarming to the venue. Hours before the show
and minutes after the people were allowed entry through two entry points at six oclock in the morning, the obstinate
crowd along Capt. Javier Street jostled even more just to get close to the lower rate pedestrian gate. The mad rush of
the unruly mob generated much force, triggering the horde to surge forward with such momentum that led others to
stumble and get trampled upon by the approaching waves of people right after the gate opened. This fatal stampede
claimed 71 lives, 69 of whom were women, and left hundreds wounded which necessitated emergency medical
support and prompted the cancellation of the shows episode.
The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through then Secretary Angelo Reyes, immediately
created an inter-agency fact-finding team to investigate the circumstances surrounding the stampede. The team
submitted its report to the DOJ on February 7, 2006.
By Department Order No. 90 of February 8, 2006, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez (Gonzalez) constituted
a Panel (Evaluating Panel) to evaluate the DILG Report and determine whether there is sufficient basis to proceed
with the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the basis of the documents submitted.
The Evaluating Panel later submitted to Gonzalez a February 20, 2006 Report concurring with the DILG Report but
concluding that there was no sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation in view of
the following considerations:
a) No formal complaint/s had been filed by any of the victims and/or their relatives, or any law enforcement agency
authorized to file a complaint, pursuant to Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure;

b) While it was mentioned in the Fact-Finding Report that there were 74 deaths and 687 injuries, no documents were
submitted to prove the same, e.g. death certificates, autopsy reports, medical certificates, etc.;
c) The Fact-Finding Report did not indicate the names of the persons involved and their specific participation in the Ultra
Incident;
d) Most of the victims did not mention, in their sworn statements, the names of the persons whom they alleged to be
responsible for the Ultra Incident.

Respondent NBI-NCR, acting on the Evaluating Panels referral of the case to it for further investigation, in
turn submitted to the DOJ an investigation report, by a March 8, 2006 transmittal letter (NBI-NCR Report),
with supporting documents recommending the conduct of preliminary investigation for Reckless
Imprudence resulting in Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries against petitioners and seven
others as respondents.
Acting on the recommendation of the NBI-NCR, Gonzalez, by Department Order No. 165 of March 8, 2006,
designated a panel of state prosecutors (Investigating Panel) to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case,
docketed as I.S. No. 2006-291, NCR-NBI v. Santos-Concio, et al., and if warranted by the evidence, to file the
appropriate information and prosecute the same before the appropriate court. The following day or on March 9,
2006, the Investigating Panel issued subpoenas directing the therein respondents to appear at the preliminary
investigation set on March 20 and 27, 2006.
At the initial preliminary investigation, petitioners sought clarification and orally moved for the inhibition,
disqualification or desistance of the Investigating Panel from conducting the investigation. The Investigating Panel
did not formally resolve the motion, however, as petitioners manifested their reservation to file an appropriate
motion on the next hearing scheduled on March 27, 2006, without prejudice to other remedies.
On March 23, 2006, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals which issued
on March 27, 2006 a Resolution granting the issuance of a temporary restraining order, conducted on April 24,
2006 a hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, and subsequently promulgated the assailed
two issuances.
In the meantime, the Investigating Panel, by Resolution of October 9, 2006, found probable cause to indict
the respondents-herein petitioners for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries,
and recommended the conduct of a separate preliminary investigation against certain public officials. Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration of the said October 9, 2006 Resolution, filed on October 30, 2006 with abundance of
caution, is pending resolution, and in the present petition they additionally pray for its annulment.
ISSUE: 1) Whether or not Department Orders were issued within the scope of authority of the DOJ Secretary
pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 bestowing general investigatory powers upon the DOJ.
2) Whether or not appellate courts committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with the preliminary
investigation given the fatal defects in the supposed complaint.
3) Whether or not respondents to have lost the impartiality to conduct the preliminary investigation since they had
prejudged the case, in support of which they cite the indecent haste in the conduct of the proceedings.
RULING: petition is DENIED.
RATION: 1) The measures taken by the Evaluating Panel do not partake of a criminal investigation, they having
been done in aid of evaluation in order to relate the incidents to their proper context. Petitioners own video footage
of the ocular inspection discloses this purpose. Evaluation for purposes of determining whether there is sufficient
basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation entails not only reading the report or documents in
isolation, but also deems to include resorting to reasonably necessary means such as ocular inspection and physical
evidence examination. For, ultimately, any conclusion on such sufficiency or insufficiency needs to rest on some
basis or justification.
Had the Evaluating Panel carried out measures partaking of a criminal investigation, it would have gathered the
documents that it enumerated as lacking. Notatu dignum is the fact that the Evaluating Panel was dissolved functus

oficio upon rendering its report. It was the NBI, a constituent unit of the DOJ, which conducted the criminal
investigation. It is thus foolhardy to inhibit the entire DOJ from conducting a preliminary investigation on the sheer
ground that the DOJs constituent unit conducted the criminal investigation.
Moreover, the improbability of the DOJ contradicting its prior finding is hardly appreciable. It bears recalling that
the Evaluating Panel found no sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation. Since the
Evaluating Panels report was not adverse to petitioners, prejudgment may not be attributed vicariously, so to speak,
to the rest of the state prosecutors. Partiality, if any obtains in this case, in fact weighs heavily in favor of petitioners.
2) A complaint for purposes of conducting a preliminary investigation differs from a complaint for purposes
of instituting a criminal prosecution. Confusion apparently springs because two complementary procedures adopt
the usage of the same word, for lack of a better or alternative term, to refer essentially to a written charge. There
should be no confusion about the objectives, however, since, as intimated during the hearing before the appellate
court, preliminary investigation is conducted precisely to elicit further facts or evidence. Being generally
inquisitorial, the preliminary investigation stage is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the preparation of a complaint or information.
Consider the following pertinent provision of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:
SEC. 3. Procedure. The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are
respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must
certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

As clearly worded, the complaint is not entirely the affidavit of the complainant, for the affidavit is treated as a
component of the complaint. The phraseology of the above-quoted rule recognizes that all necessary allegations
need not be contained in a single document. It is unlike a criminal complaint or information where the averments
must be contained in one document charging only one offense, non-compliance with which renders it vulnerable to a
motion to quash.
The Court is not unaware of the practice of incorporating all allegations in one document denominated as complaintaffidavit. It does not pronounce strict adherence to only one approach, however, for there are cases where the extent
of ones personal knowledge may not cover the entire gamut of details material to the alleged offense. The private
offended party or relative of the deceased may not even have witnessed the fatality, in which case the peace officer
or law enforcer has to rely chiefly on affidavits of witnesses. The Rules do not in fact preclude the attachment of a
referral or transmittal letter similar to that of the NBI-NCR. Thus, in Soriano v. Casanova, the Court held:
A close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP and PDIC to the DOJ shows that these were not intended to
be the complaint envisioned under the Rules. It may be clearly inferred from the tenor of the letters that the officers merely
intended to transmit the affidavits of the bank employees to the DOJ. Nowhere in the transmittal letters is there any
averment on the part of the BSP and PDIC officers of personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of the
criminal violations alleged to have been made by the accused. In fact, the letters clearly stated that what the OSI of the
BSP and the LIS of the PDIC did was to respectfully transmit to the DOJ for preliminary investigation the affidavits and
personal knowledge of the acts of the petitioner. These affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who
executed them before a notary public. Since theaffidavits, not the letters transmitting
them, were intended to initiate the preliminary investigation, we hold that Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court was
substantially complied with.
Citing the ruling of this Court in Ebarle v. Sucaldito, the Court of Appeals correctly held that a complaint for purposes of
preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the offended party. The rule has been that, unless the offense
subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes,
by any competent person. The crime of estafa is a public crime which can be initiated by any competent person. The
witnesses who executed the affidavits based on their personal knowledge of the acts committed by the petitioner fall
within the purview of any competent person who may institute the complaint for a public crime.

A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of any competent person, without
the referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having been sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal
complainant. To require otherwise is a needless exercise. The cited case of Oporto, Jr. v. Judge Monserate does not

appear to dent this proposition. After all, what is required is to reduce the evidence into affidavits, for while reports
and even raw information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the preliminary investigation stage can be
held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated which may warrant the eventual prosecution of
the case in court.
In the present case, there is no doubt about the existence of affidavits. The appellate court found that certain
complaint-affidavits were already filed by some of the victims, a factual finding to which this Court, by rule,
generally defers.
A complaint for purposes of conducting preliminary investigation is not required to exhibit the attending structure of
a complaint or information laid down in Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) which already speaks of the People of
the Philippines as a party, an accused rather than a respondent, and a court that shall pronounce judgment. If a
complaint or information filed in court does not comply with a set of constitutive averments, it is vulnerable to a
motion to quash. The filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit is proscribed by the rule on
preliminary investigation, however. The investigating officer is allowed to dismiss outright the complaint only if it is
not sufficient in form and substance or no ground to continue with the investigation is appreciated.
The investigating fiscal, to be sure, has discretion to determine the specificity and adequacy of averments of the offense
charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he otherwise finds
no ground to continue with the inquiry, or proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper
form. It certainly is not his duty to require a more particular statement of the allegations of the complaint merely upon the
respondents motion, and specially where after an analysis of the complaint and its supporting statements he finds it
sufficiently definite to apprise the respondents of the offenses which they are charged. Moreover, the procedural device of a
bill of particulars, as the Solicitor General points out, appears to have reference to informations or criminal complaints filed
in a competent court upon which the accused are arraigned and required to plead, and strictly speaking has no application to
complaints initiating a preliminary investigation which cannot result in any finding of guilt, but only of probable cause.

3. Petitioners fears are speculatory. Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer
cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For ones prompt dispatch may be
anothers undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant
consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with
such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a
mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the
Investigating Panels initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular
performance of not just one but five state prosecutors.
As for petitioners claim of undue haste indicating bias, proof thereof is wanting. The pace of the proceedings is
anything but a matter of acceleration. Without any objection from the parties, respondents even accorded petitioners
a preliminary investigation even when it was not required since the case involves an alleged offense where the
penalty prescribed by law is below Four Years, Two Months and One Day.
Neither is there proof showing that Gonzalez exerted undue pressure on his subordinates to tailor their decision with
his public declarations and adhere to a pre-determined result. The Evaluating Panel in fact even found no sufficient
basis, it bears emphatic reiteration, to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation, and one member of
the Investigating Panel even dissented to its October 9, 2006 Resolution.
To follow petitioners theory of institutional bias would logically mean that even the NBI had prejudged the case in
conducting a criminal investigation since it is a constituent agency of the DOJ. And if the theory is extended to the
Presidents declaration, there would be no more arm of the government credible enough to conduct a criminal
investigation and a preliminary investigation.
On petitioners citation of Ladlad v. Velasco where a public declaration by Gonzalez was found to evince a
determination to file the Information even in the absence of probable cause, their attention is drawn to the following
ruling of this Court in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:[
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to
the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general

rule that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are,
however, exceptions to this rule enumerated in Brocka vs. Enrile. In these exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately
resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation x

Even assuming arguendo that petitioners case falls under the exceptions enumerated in Brocka, any resolution on the
existence or lack of probable cause or, specifically, any conclusion on the issue of prejudgment as elucidated
in Ladlad, is made to depend on the records of the preliminary investigation. There have been, as the appellate court
points out, no finding to speak of when the petition was filed, much less one that is subject to judicial review due to
grave abuse. At that incipient stage, records were wanting if not nil since the Investigating Panel had not yet
resolved any matter brought before it, save for the issuance of subpoenas. The Court thus
finds no reversible error on the part of the appellate court in dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari and
prohibition and in refraining from reviewing the merits of the case until a ripe and appropriate case is
presented. Otherwise, court intervention would have been only pre-emptive and piecemeal.
6. Sec 3- Racho v. Miro GR 168578 Sep 30, 2008;
FACTS: November 9, 2001, DYHP Balita Action Team (DYHP) of the Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. addressed a
letter on behalf of an anonymous complainant to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro. The letter
accused Nieto A. Racho, an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)-Cebu, of having accumulated wealth
disproportionate to his income. Photocopied bank certifications disclosed that Racho had a total deposit
of P5,793,881.39 with three banks.
Pio R. Dargantes, the Graft Investigation Officer I (GIO) assigned to investigate the complaint, directed DYHP to
submit a sworn statement of its witnesses. Instead, the latter filed a Manifestation dated October 16,
2002 withdrawing its complaint for lack of witnesses. Consequently, GIO Dargantes dismissed the case. He ruled
that the photocopied bank certifications did not constitute substantial evidence required in administrative
proceedings.
Then, in two separate Memoranda dated May 30, 2003, Ombudsman Director Virginia Palanca-Santiago disapproved
GIO Dargantess Resolution. In OMB-V-A-02-0214-E, Director Palanca-Santiago held Racho administratively liable
for falsification and dishonesty, and meted on him the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits
and perpetual disqualification to hold office. In OMB-V-C-02-0240-E, Director Palanca-Santiago found probable cause
to charge Racho with falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code. The latter
moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the Deputy Ombudsman.
May 30, 2003, Racho was charged with falsification of public document in RTC of Cebu. Racho appealed the
administrative case and filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals to question the ruling
in OMB-V-C-02-0240-E. In a Decision dated January 26, 2004, the appellate court annulled both Memoranda and
ordered a reinvestigation of the cases against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss dated July
21, 2004. The same was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated August 24, 2004.
On reinvestigation, petitioner submitted a Comment dated January 4, 2005 along with supporting documents. On January
10, 2005, the OMB issued the assailed Reinvestigation Report. Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied by the
OMB in the Joint Order dated April 1, 2005.
ISSUE: 1) Whether Ombudsman Director Palanca-Santiago gravely abused her discretion when she did not inhibit
herself in the reinvestigation;
2) Whether there was probable cause to hold petitioner liable for falsification under Article 171(4) of the Revised
Penal Code.
3) Whether petitioner was denied due process of law on reinvestigation

RULING: instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 is
hereby ORDERED to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case.
RATION: 1. After considering the contentions and submissions of the parties, we are in agreement that the instant
petition lacks merit. The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested primarily in the OMB. For
this purpose, the OMB has been given a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers under the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989). Its discretion is freed from legislative,
executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the OMB is insulated from any outside pressure and improper
influence. Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from interfering with
the exercise of the Ombudsmans powers, and will respect the initiative and independence inherent in the latter who,
beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the guardian of the integrity of the public service.
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information
with the appropriate courts. Such finding of probable cause is a finding of fact which is generally not reviewable by
this Court. The only ground upon which a plea for review of the OMBs resolution may be entertained is an alleged
grave abuse of discretion. By that phrase is meant the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to
an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty; or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law; or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondents. As already well-stated, as long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsmans ruling, his decision
will not be overturned. Here, the finding of the Ombudsman that there was probable cause to hold petitioner liable
for falsification by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts rests on substantial evidence.
2. Petitioner argues that his culpability should not be ascertained on the basis of photocopied bank
certifications. Apparent from the records, however, is the Order dated August 27, 2004 of the OMB which required
petitioner to comment on the certified true copies of bank certifications issued by BPI and Equitable PCIB. All the
same, even if we exclude his deposit in Metrobank, a significant disparity between his declared cash on hand
of P15,000 and cash in bank of P2,860,985.12 subsists when compared to his total bank deposits duly certified for
the same year.
Indeed, the determination of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained
of constitutes the offense charged. The trial of a case is conducted precisely for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge. A finding of probable cause merely binds the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
Moreover, we are unable to agree with petitioners contention that he was denied due process when no hearing was
conducted on his motion for reinvestigation. In De Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, we ruled that a clarificatory
hearing is not required during preliminary investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is
optional on the part of the investigating officer as evidenced by the use of the term may in Section 3(e) of Rule 112,
thus: (e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the
parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or crossexamine.

This rule applies equally to a motion for reinvestigation. As stated, the Office of the Ombudsman has been granted
virtually plenary investigatory powers by the Constitution and by law. As a rule, the Office of the Ombudsman may,
for every particular investigation, whether instigated by a complaint or on its own initiative, decide how best to
pursue such investigation. In the present case, the OMB found it unnecessary to hold additional clarificatory
hearings. Notably, we note that a hearing was conducted during preliminary investigation where petitioner invoked
his right to remain silent and confront witnesses who may be presented against him, although there was none
presented.

Besides, under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Administrative Order No. 07), particularly
Rule II, Section 7(a), in relation to Section 4(f), a complainants active participation is no longer a matter of right
during reinvestigation. Admittedly, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in
administrative proceedings. Thus, it is settled that administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense.
3. Petitioner complains of how quickly the reinvestigation proceedings were terminated. The OMB issued the
Reinvestigation Report on January 10, 2005, barely a week after petitioner filed his Comment dated January 4,
2005. Thus, the latter surmises that no reinvestigation was actually made. However, a review of the facts would reveal
that after the Court of Appeals directed a reinvestigation of the case, the OMB issued an Order dated August 27,
2004 requiring petitioner to submit a comment within 10 days from receipt. The latter failed to comply. On December
1, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment of 30 days; the OMB granted the same for 15
days. On December 17, 2004, petitioner asked for another extension of 30 days reckoned from December 19,
2004 within which to submit a comment; the OMB gave him up to December 28, 2004. On December 28, 2004,
petitioner moved for a third extension. Then, without waiting for the OMBs resolution of his latest motion, petitioner
filed his Comment on January 4, 2005. But with his repeated motions for extensions, he already contributed to palpable
delay in the completion of the reinvestigation.
Clearly, the requirements of due process have been substantially satisfied in the instant case. In its Order
dated December 22, 2004, the OMB warned petitioner that no further extension will be given such that if he fails to
file a comment on December 28, 2004, the cases against him will be submitted for resolution. Even so, the OMB
considered petitioners belatedly-filed Comment and the documents attached therewith in its Reinvestigation
Report. In our view, petitioner cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process in this case, where as a party
he was given the chance to be heard, with ample opportunity to present his side.
Equally clear to us, there was no manifest abuse of discretion on the part of Director Palanca-Santiago for her
refusal to inhibit herself in the reinvestigation. Even if a preliminary investigation resembles a realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of the case, public prosecutors could not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the person charged. They are not considered judges, by the nature of their functions, but merely
quasi-judicial officers. Worth-stressing, one adverse ruling by itself would not prove bias and prejudice against a
party sufficient to disqualify even a judge. Hence, absent proven allegations of specific conduct showing prejudice
and hostility, we cannot impute grave abuse of discretion here on respondent director. To ask prosecutors to recuse
themselves on reinvestigation upon every unfavorable ruling in a case would cause unwarranted delays in the
prosecution of actions.
Finally, we note that petitioner failed to attach a certified true copy of the assailed Resolution in OMB-C-C-030729-L in disregard of paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 65 on certiorari. As previously ruled, the requirement of
providing appellate courts with certified true copies of the judgments or final orders that are the subjects of review is
indispensable to aid them in resolving whether or not to give due course to petitions. This necessary requirement
cannot be perfunctorily ignored, much less violated

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