1. The Scretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines vs.

Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo. G.R. No. 180906

PARTIES:
PETITIONERS: SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
Supreme Court: Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
Supreme Court: Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to treat their Existing Petition as Amparo
Petition
Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily heard the
Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a judgment which is the subject of
the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
FACTS:
On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter referred to as Raymond) and
Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter referred to as Reynaldo) were abducted by military men
belonging to the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they
were members and supporters of the New Peoples Army (NPA). After eighteen (18) months of
detention and torture, the brothers escaped on 13 August 2007.
On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents
from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. In a Resolution dated 24
August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense
and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), their agents,
representatives, or persons acting in their stead, and further enjoined them from causing the
arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to
Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim
and Final Amparo Reliefs.
While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24
October 2007. Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion
to treat their existing peti tion as amparo petition.

On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition as a
petition under the Amparo Rule. The Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo and
remanded the petition to the Court of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the
petition.
On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The
Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to
furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the
custody of Raymond and Reynaldo, confirm the present places of official assignment of two
military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of Raymond and
Reynaldo while under military custody.
Aggrieved, the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP filed an appeal
with the Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is sufficient for amparo petitions.
Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a person may
be invoked.
ANSWER:
It depends on the credibility and candidness of the victims in their statements. No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1.

ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS

Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of evidence required
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim
during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will
come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their
credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be
corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or
landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military
officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as
no surprise.
2.

ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO PETITION

Permutations of the Right to Security A closer look at the right to security of person would
yield various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is
freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

(UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and
belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people. Some scholars postulate that freedom from fear is not only an aspirational
principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the right to security of
person as the word security itself means freedom from fear. Article 3 of the UDHR
provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general
rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries
inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a
search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and
painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself
escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because
they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the
right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to
security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity)
under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the
policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective
if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or
threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
Freedom from fear as a right In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from
fear is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong.
Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same
stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of
fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo
context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is actually the freedom from threat.
Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the
Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the
provision.

2. MVRS Pulbication Incorporated versus Islamic Da wah Council of the philippines,

Incoporated G.R. No. 135306
FACTS:
Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local federation of more than 70
Muslim religious organizations, filed a complaint for damages against MVRS Publications, Inc.,
arising from an article, which reads:
"ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na
sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at
sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag
nilang 'Ramadan'."
ISSUE:
W/N this is an action for defamation (libel) or an emotional distress tort action
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that there is no cause of action for defamation.
DEFAMATION DEFINED:
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character,
fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure
reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite
derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is
injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute.
Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the
community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.
GROUP LIBEL/DEFAMATION:
where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the
statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or
class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the
defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if
need be.

The statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not specifically identify nor refer
to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication.
Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting
in damages.
The action likewise is not for emotional distress.
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS v. DEFAMATION:
Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by
an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his
character. It has no application in the instant case since no particular individual was identified in
the disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article, assuming there
was any, falls under the principle of relational harm which includes harm to social relationships
in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm
which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of
emotional distress. In their complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the
standing of Muslims in the community, especially to their activities in propagating their faith in
Metro Manila and in other non-Muslim communities in the country. It is thus beyond cavil that
the present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for
defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on which the concept of emotional distress
properly belongs.
WHEN PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER:
To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) The
conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct
was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection between the defendant's conduct
and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe.
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society. The defendant's actions must have been so
terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.
"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish,
shock, fright, horror, and chagrin. "Severe emotional distress," in some jurisdictions, refers to
any type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally
recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so, including posttraumatic stress
disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia.

The plaintiff is required to show, among other things, that he or she has suffered emotional
distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it; severity of the
distress is an element of the cause of action, not simply a matter of damages.
Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety,
vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether the tort of outrage
had been committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to be hardened to a certain
amount of criticism, rough language, and to occasional acts and words that are definitely
inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard the
conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough.
Interferences with Contractual Relations
Art. 1314: Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party.

3. Republic of the Philippines versus Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 104768.

ANTECEDENT FACTS
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG
to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates.
EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power
(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the
purposes of this order and
"(b) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this
order.
The PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board
(AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.
The AFP Board investigated various reports
of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas). On
27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the
reported unexplained wealth of Ramas.
The relevant part of the Resolution reads:
FINDINGS and EVALUATION:
1. Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City.
2. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327
square meters.
3. The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.
4. The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of
Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all
covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC,
PA. These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her
use by respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.

5. Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team
was also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the
house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
6. Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit,
Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna,
disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent.
That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in
Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and
kisses respondent.
That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of Elizabeth
Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.
7. Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that
Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by respondent for she was
formerly a mere secretary.
8. Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military
equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he
being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.
This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There
was an intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth.
Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp
Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have never
been known.
Respondents response:
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim
to the Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a
residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of
proportion to his salary and other legitimate income.

He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and
other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint.
Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978
only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land
titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.
The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they are
subordinates of former President Marcos.
RULING OF THE SANDIGANGBAYAN
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and Republic v. Migrino which involve the same issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted
against Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture
petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 or Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
2. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence is constitutional.
3. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from
Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence is constitutional.

COURTS RULING
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate
Private Respondents: PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandigangbayan .
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of
EO No. 1.
These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration
of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close
associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence.
(2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns
their cases to the PCGG diganbayan and Republic v. Migrino.
Second Issue: Proprietary of Dismissal of case before completion of Presentation of Evidence
This court DISAGREE.
Petitioner has only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First,
this case has been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed
its Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17
April 1989.
Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence.
However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its
evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions.
Even before the date set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a
Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint.
The motion sought to charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioners
evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant
Dimaano alone .
The pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss
the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against private
respondents.

This court holds that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of
the presentation of petitioners evidence.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
This issue bears a significant effect on petitioners case since these properties comprise most of
petitioners evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to
support its case against private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant
captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.
Dimaano was not present during the raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid.
The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not
included in the search warrant.
The raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of
5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash consisting of
P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that
the raiding team conducted the search and seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days after the
successful EDSA revolution.
Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking
power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people.
Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the
1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986.
As succinctly stated in President Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA
Revolution was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.
The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as
the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.

Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment excepting
sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the
amendment as Section 26,[ Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders
would not stand the test of due process under the Bill of Rights.
1. The Constabulary raiding team seized items NOT included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant.
On the grounds that:
Q.There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for
instance, jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the
jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they brought along
also these articles. I do not really know their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that
these were taken because they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelery and land titles that the raiding team confiscated.
2. The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated
them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without
showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure.
Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items. The seizure of these
items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they
must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them.
However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the
search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor.
We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano. The petition for
certiorari is DISMISSED
The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992
in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such
appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liabilityof respondent Elizabeth
Dimaano, are AFFIRMED

Echegaray versus Sec. of Justice G.R. No. 132601

Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10
year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty
for the said crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both
motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty
from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT
DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him
under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of
due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue
delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the
power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to
respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality
of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust,
excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No.
8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more
humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the
imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to
respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing
rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear
as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. They
alleged similarly with Echegarays arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the
petition.

Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass
constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue
delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.
Issue:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?
Held:
No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in
carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in
administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are
uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of
execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the
possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection
inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the
execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes
not. For reasons discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are
properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the
time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death
convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is the

trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen
(15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court
below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty
as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of
the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A.
No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1)
year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty
became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18)
months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor
wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications
in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar
as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the
expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered
are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution
by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without
any other evidence whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that
all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of
such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the
death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to
give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be
said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for
this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted
man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any
method employed to extinguish life humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."

2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:

In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only
for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of
the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out
pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court." The punishment was subject to the
limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the
General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said
document.
3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its
limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates
the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177
specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director
of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the
person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to
the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that
the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the
convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of
lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." The Court cannot see that
any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the
definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already
imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of
discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws
that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of
the implementing rules which provides a manual for the execution procedure. It was supposed to
be confidential. The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a
vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual
on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a
mode of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the
Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the
administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No.
8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph
invalid.

4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent
Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be
suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by
lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date
of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In
this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for
being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that
Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express
amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No.
7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or
within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No.
7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within
one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period
following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for
suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended,
which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view,
tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an
impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain
consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.

5. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party versus COMELEC G.R No. 190582

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against
the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the
First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No.
09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs
refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941,
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.
FACTS:
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals and
transgender) community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point
guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members
and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. On August 17, 2009,
Ang Ladlad filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which
offends religious beliefs, and advocates sexual immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied
accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when
it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to
comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Furthermore, states
COMELEC, Ang Ladlad will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to
the teachings of our faith. When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, COMELEC still, on
December 16, 2010, upheld the First Assailed Resolution.
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad a Petition, praying that the Supreme Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang
Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the
COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for
the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional
guarantees against the establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma.
2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened the constitutional rights to privacy,
freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, of Ang Ladlad, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based
on sexual orientation.
HELD:
1. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
The Supreme Court ruled that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Rather than
relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on
whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere
conformity to religious doctrine. The government must act for secular purposes and in ways that
have primarily secular effects.
2. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang
Ladlad. Even the Office of the Solicitor General agrees that there should have been a finding
by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are committing immoral acts.
Respondent have failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Under our system of laws, every group has the right to
promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal
democratic means. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but
also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Absent of any compelling state interest, it is not for
the COMELEC or the Supreme Court, to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the
COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an
approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors. This is in accord with the countrys international obligations to protect and promote
human rights.

The principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated

in the UDHR and the ICCPR should be recognized. The Constitution and laws should be applied
uninfluenced by public opinion. True democracy should be resilient enough to withstand
vigorous debate due to conflicting opinions.
The Petition was GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November
11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) was SET ASIDE and the COMELEC
was directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.