THE MEANING OF INCEST

Author(s): David M. Schneider

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of the Polynesian Society, Vol. 85, No. 2, INCEST PROHIBITIONS IN
MICRONESIA AND POLYNESIA (JUNE 1976), pp. 149-169
Published by: The Polynesian Society
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THE MEANING OF INCEST

David M. Schneider
University of Chicago
During the late 1960s it became clear to many anthropologists that
the notion of the incest taboo or the prohibition on incest (which are not
quite the same thing) was not universal and that its definition as a com
parative or analytic tool was not standardised. Furthermore, they realised
that these definitions which were being applied to different cultures often
did not accord with the culture's own meaning or definition of incest and
that such definitions varied widely from one culture to another. As a

consequence the idea that the prohibition against incest could be viewed
as a unitary phenomenon and systematically compared and analysed
seemed untenable. For these reasons it seemed useful to take a close look
at a particular area?the Oceanic area was the choice?and
review both
the ethnography and the different ways in which different scholars
the problem. Thus the participants in the symposium held
approached
at the American Anthropological Association meetings in 1971 (in which
many of these papers were first presented) were not instructed on how to
define incest, nor were they instructed on what data should be included or
excluded from their papers. After the symposium and in preparation for
this publication I reviewed all the papers and wrote brief queries on each
paper to which the author was invited to respond with revisions ifhe so
chose. Some chose to, others quite properly chose not to.
These papers therefore reflect not only the variable definitions of the
prohibition on incest of these different scholars but also the variable
definitions of incest and its prohibition (or lack of it,where this informa
tion was given) in the different cultures they describe.

The problem of the incest prohibition is as old as anthropology and

itsvicissitudes parallel that history. Every new theory advanced to account
for the presumed universality of the prohibition on incest seems to reflect
a new trend in anthropological
thought. When exogamy was viewed as
themoving force in establishing bonds between small kin groups (believed
to be the universal form of social organisation during the very earliest
periods of man's history or evolution or both) which then formed larger
societies, it was the incest prohibition which was seen as the sanction
or "biosocial
enforcing exogamy. And today when "sociobiologists"
are biosocial
are
with
there
their
vigour
position
stating
anthropologists"
149

THE MEANING

OF

INCEST

anthropological papers on incest,11} and as the "cultural" or "symbolic

anthropology" view is becoming more vocal, there are papers from that
perspective too.(2)
I have reviewed the various attempts to account for the incest pro
hibition in an unpublished paper,(3) in which I present the theories in
detail and discuss what I regard as theirmajor strengths and weaknesses.
Suffice it to say that there does not seem to be any theory or combination
of theories which does more than define a part of the problem and worry
rather simple-minded
it vigorously. This holds as much forMalinowski's
assertions about the presumed disorganising effects of sexual jealousy on
themaintenance of the nuclear family(4) as for the genetic and ethological

word-plays of Fox.(5)
One factor which has contributed to the present state of chaos in this
field is that from the time that some of the first theories were offered until
now the conception of what the facts are, and what constitutes a good
theory, has changed radically. On one hand, the assumption of the
universality of a formal, normatively defined prohibition is now in serious
doubt. On the other hand, there seems to be more (but by no means
conclusive) evidence than was available before thatmost ifnot all human
beings tend to avoid sexual intercourse with members of their primary
socialisation unit. This is said to be true of many kinds of animals as
well as man and many geneticists and ethologists take this hypothesis
quite seriously. This, of course, reinstates the old Westermark hypothesis
(which was sometimes facetiously put as "familiarity does not breed")
as at least worthy of consideration after ithad been all but laughed out of
court 30 to 40 years ago. Another important example of changing assess
ment is the genetic argument (also dismissed by many social anthropolo
gists and sociologists) which stated that inbreeding was not a bad thing
but a very good thing because it got rid of all of the deleterious recessive
genes after which the highly inbred population could live (genetically)
happily ever after. Unless, of course, some immigrant brought in some
deleterious recessive genes again. There is some evidence, which some do
not regard as conclusive or at least are not sure applies to humans, that
highly inbred populations suffer from "inbreeding depression" (however
that may be defined) even long after the deleterious r?cessives are bred
out. Consequently,
the role of the immigrant is reversed; he introduces
heterozygosity, which is genetically a "good thing"/6)
Not only have the conceptions of how to deal with the facts been
1. Bischof 1975; Fox 1972and 1975.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

1972.
Wagner
n.d.
Schneider
1932.
Malinowski
Fox
1975b.
reached by a
sentences nearly verbatim from the conclusions
I draw the above
on incest and its prohibition
conference
by the Social Science Research
sponsored
for
at the Center
and chaired by Dr Gardner
and convened
Council
Lindzey
March
Stanford California,
Advanced
15-17,
Sciences,
Study in the Behavioural
there were many
of that conference;
the conclusions
1976. These
do not exhaust
for much
more which I did not use in this paper. I am indebted to that conference
influenced the writing of this paper. The conference
which
stimulating discussion
in which I have altered the wording
for the manner
should not be held responsible
I used, nor the way in which I have used them.
of the few conclusions

150

DAVID

M.

SCHNEIDER

variable and uncertain, changing with every theoretical change in the

climate of intellectual opinion, but just what the facts are remains at
issue at almost every step. It is hard to build good theory with such
materials.

One source of difficulty has been a set of conceptual confusions which

as they are?
make the interpretation of the ethnographic facts?such
even more difficult than necessary.
First, there is the question of the definition of incest itself. Should this
be confined to heterosexual intercourse between primary kin or can it
refer to such relationships between any kin, however distantly related?
One approach has been to distinguish between primary kin who make up
the nuclear family and regard all others as so-called "extensions". But
this introduces two implicit assumptions neither ofwhich seems supportable
at this time. One is that the nuclear family (whose members are primary
kin to each other) is universal. The other is that the nuclear family is
itself in some way prior either logically, functionally, historically or
evolutionally to all other kin or kin groups. There was a time early in the
history of anthropology when the firstkin group was held to be the clan,
out of which the nuclear family evolved. But now some take the opposite
view, so that the nuclear family is seen as the cornerstone on which the
whole of society is built, the unit out of which all other kin groups emerge
and so on. Such assumptions hardly seem needed, and the distinction
posed between incest among nuclear family members (other than spouse)
and among persons who do not stand in such relationships requires some
justification if it is to be used.
Second, as I have hinted above and as was first raised as a question in
1963,(7) there is the problem of whether incest should be defined as
heterosexual intercourse or include homosexual sexual relations as well.
This question is now clarified at least on the empirical side. As Kelly(8)
has shown, the Etoro of New Guinea believe that semen is necessary to
the proper growth and maturation of boys and so they are fed semen
direct from its source, by mouth, as often as is deemed necessary. The
ideal inseminator is the boy's father's sister's husband, but other older
men may perform this function as well. Kelly says(8) that the definitions
of incest, and the prohibitions on marriage, are isomorphic with the
prohibitions on the insemination of boys, except of course that in the one
case heterosexual pairs are involved, in the other pairs of the same sex.
the same belief. He
Schieffelin reports(9) of the Kaluli of New Guinea
states that the inseminator chosen by the father, is a man, who is usually
an in-law (possibly sister's husband though this is not clear) or an unrelated
older man. For both the Etoro and theKaluli such a relationship between
a boy and his father or brother is considered incestuous and is prohibited.
For the geneticist who
7. Aberle

et al.

is interested in the outcome of fertile unions the

1963.

8. Kelly (in press).

9. SchiefTelin

1976.

151

THE MEANING

OF

INCEST

relations may also be defined as in

question of whether homosexual
cestuous and prohibited may be trivial. But where homosexual relations
are institutionalised, legitimate and proper, this question is important for
anthropologists viewing incest against the background of sexual behaviour
in general, and itmust certainly be central to the cultures concerned. Also,
interesting questions may be raised about those cultures where homo
sexual activity is disapproved. The evidence for America is not decisive,
but what little psychopathological
evidence there is suggests that incest
is defined as both hetero- and homosexual.
Third, there is a tendency, as I did above, to lump all sexual relations
the nuclear family or outside it?into one category
between kin?within
and call them "incest". Is it not wiser to keep the door open as to whether
father-daughter relations are conceived by the natives as equivalent or
different from mother-son or brother-sister, and so on for relations
beyond primary kin? Indeed, some theories find it easy to account for
parent-child prohibitions, but have difficulty with sibling relations and
only lamely then explain the prohibitions between members of the same
clan or the same kindred as "extensions" of some mystical or mysterious
sort. This is to raise the question as to whether incest is in this sense a
unitary phenomenon or whether thismight best be regarded as an empirical
question to be put to any particular body of data.
This problem is important at two levels. On the one hand, systems with
unilineal descent may clearly distinguish between persons related by
descent and persons not related by descent but in other ways. Thus
fornication, adultery and incest may be distinguished. On the other hand,
as I have indicated, certain theories make apparent sense when applied
to certain dyads of the nuclear family but do not when applied to others/10)
Fourth, there has been a consistent, almost overwhelming, confusion
between sexual intercourse and marriage, incest and exogamy, throughout
the course of the long debate on incest from the mid-19th century to
today.

It is certainly true that in Western European

culture marriage and
sexual intercourse are very closely associated. Indeed, in many quarters
the two are seen as synonymous and some sets of words overlap within
their meanings: "union", "wedding", "marriage", "joining" and so on.
There is thus strong ethnocentric ground for confusing the two, or,
perhaps more accurately, for tending to conflate the two before any
attempt ismade to separate them.
culture, and in many others as
Furthermore, inWestern European
in
confirms
the sexuality and or the fertility
certain
well, marriage
rights
a
not
of
the woman. For those cultures
spouse?usually
always both)
(but
where the relationship between sexual intercourse and conception is taken
as a fact, then the control over a woman's sexual activity assures certainty
of paternity.
There is no doubt that in some cultures, and under some circumstances,
sexual intercourse and marriage tend to converge almost to the point of
isomorphism, but there is equally little doubt that in certain cultures this
10. For

example,

see Fox

1967:

174.

152

DAVID

M.

SCHNEIDER

is emphatically not the case. For analytic purposes the two should be
distinguished so as to avoid a host of confusions. An example of such
confusion is that which has been foisted on anthropology for so many
years by such eminent figures as Evans-Pritchard, Fortune and to some
extent now by L?vi-Strauss. The confusion arises from the idea that the
prohibition of sexual intercourse is the necessary condition for either
enforcing exogamy or for affirming the value of the exchange which
exogamy represents.
All other considerations set aside (not an easy trick, but conceivable),
it is not impossible to imagine a system inwhich marriage is an arrange
ment of alliance, of affiliation, of co-operation in the establishment of and
of a co-operative economic productive unit within which
maintenance
sexual intercourse is permitted but where there is no bar against extra
marital affairs with father, brother, son, mother, daughter, sister or any
other kin. The rate at which adultery and extramarital affairs occur in
many societies, not all of them Oceanic by any means (although in the
popular imagination Pacific Islands excel at this sort of freedom), is ample
testimony to the fact that a well run kinship system can manage to sustain
a very high rate of extramarital sexual relations.
The point is simple. To see exogamy and marriage as nothing more
than breeding systems, to see exogamy and marriage and an incest pro
hibition as no more than the hominid conditions within which genetics
can be studied may well apply to some societies, but it is certainly not
true for all of them. There is far far more to incest, exogamy, marriage
and kinship than simply the regulation of breeding. That some kinship
systems may indeed play a role?but by no means the only role?in the
breeding system may be true, but it is an empirical question which ones
do and which ones do not. And in any event, as I have said, there is far
more to kinship than the regulation of sexual behaviour, while repro
duction and breeding from a genetic point of view is yet another matter.

Further, where for animals "incest" is a matter of relations within

groups, for humans it is a matter of relations between groups in so far as
itmay be connected with exogamy and exchange (as Marshall Sahlins has
pointed out to me). Incest is, therefore, a very different problem for
animals and man, even when it is considered in terms of its relation to a

breeding system.
Finally, an important fact remains that in some societies sexual relations
may be permitted between those who are not permitted tomarry (Tallensi
and Trobriands are two examples) so that many marriage prohibitions
do not depend on the prohibition of incest at all. That is,many exogamic
imperatives do not rest on the sanction of the prohibition of incest but
depend on other factors such as status discrepancy or the explicit aim of
widening the circle of kin (Bali is an example of the former, Ifugao of the
latter). Hence the idea that incest can be understood as only and no more
than the sanction to enforce exogamy is an error. Conversely, the idea
that exogamy or marriage prohibitions depend entirely on the prohibition
of incest is equally erroneous.
Fifth, there is a clear distinction between a pattern of behaviour which
153

THE MEANING

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INCEST

is socially prohibited and one which is seldom observed. A prohibition is

a culturally defined, morally conceived pattern of behaviour. It is quite
distinct from what is actually done, the rate at which it is done, or even
the specific incidence (that is, themotivating features of a particular actor).
A special case of a prohibition is a taboo. A taboo is a prohibition with
which sacred or supernatural features are associated.
Thus itmay be said, for example, that as a general rule humans tend
to avoid sexual intercourse with members of their primary socialisation
unit. But this is an empirical generalisation, if it is in fact supported by the
data. It is in no way related to a prohibition or a taboo. However, if it is
said that in human societies one finds, with notable exceptions, dis
approval of sexual intercourse with primary kin, then this too is an em
pirical generalisation, but of a very different order, for it invokes
"disapproval" which implies a prohibition. It is precisely this distinction
which has led to so much confusion in the anthropological
literature.
Where previously itwas taught that the one sure, absolute feature which
was universal to all cultures was the incest prohibition, it is now learned
that although indeed there is on the whole a tendency to avoid sexual
intercourse with members of the primary socialisation unit, there is by no
means a universal prohibition against such activity/n)
And this leads, therefore, to the very important question of what it is
that anthropologists are setting out to explain. Are we trying to explain
a prohibition? Or are we attempting to explain a general behavioural
trend, a tendency, an empirically demonstrable infrequency of a certain
kind of action? These are quite different problems which in certain rare,
limiting cases may turn out to be the same, but until such cases can be
demonstrated they must not be assumed. For it is also apparent that in
some human societies there is the encouragement of sexual relations with
primary kin, and/or members of the primary socialisation unit under
to the incest prohibition
certain conditions. The so-called "exceptions"
are cases in point : the royal Hawaiian marriages of brother and sister,
the royal brother-sister marriages of Pharaonic and Ptolemaic Egypt, and
the apparent lack of an incest prohibition in ancient Iran.(12) There are
ritual events which permit certain persons such activity in other groups,
in some Australian
for example, the orgiastic occasions
groups, and
special conditions may also occur, such as that in Bali, where aristocratic
twins of opposite sex, viewed as having already been intimate in thewomb,
may have sexual relations within marriage.
to the incest taboo can easily be mis
Indeed, these "exceptions"
interpreted to mean that the prohibition itself can in certain cases be
overridden, that the prohibition holds universally even when it is "trans
gressed" as in the Hawaiian, Egyptian and other cases. This is plainly a
mistaken view. It is precisely these "exceptions"
(as well as others
mentioned below) which show that the incest prohibition is not universal.
to what Marshall
Sahlins tells me, marriage and/or sexual
According
relations among the royal family of Hawaii are simply not regarded as
11. Middleton
12. Middleton

1962 and personal

1962 and personal

communication.
communication.

154

DAVID

M.

SCHNEIDER

incest at all, and there is reason to believe that the same is true for Peru,
Egypt and so on. It is only an ethnocentric definition of incest, imposed
a priori, that enables such cases of permitted brother-sister sexual relations
to be labelled "incest" and consequently an assertion to be made that
"incest" is permitted. What is permitted is sexual relations, not "incest".

Why make such subtle distinctions between what people tend to do

and whether or not they have formal socially defined or culturally stated
rules about them? For the very good reason that that is what socio
cultural anthropology is all about. It is the study of man's social organisa
tion and culture, the rules and regulations which he sets himself, how they
are formulated, how they function, how they relate to behaviour, how
they form a system (if indeed they do form a system). For the biologist it
may be sufficient to know whether there is or is not inbreeding, and if
there is, just what the rate of inbreeding may be. But the anthropologist
should not be confused with, nor should he confuse himself with, an
ethologist. There is no reason why ethologists should not study patterns
of human behaviour as they study patterns of primate behaviour or the
patterns of avian behaviour. But there is every reason in the world for the
ethologist to recognise that there is something just a little different about
humans and that is their complex symbolic systems, prominent among
which is their language and cognitive systems, and their cultural systems.
Hence these distinctions are imperative or human beings will end up
and the
being totally zoomorphised (to borrow a phrase fromWagner)
whole of language and culture and the implications of these will be
omitted from consideration. To repeat: ethology should not be confused
with anthropology. There is some overlap in the questions they ask and
in the data they use, but there remains a vast difference between the kinds
of questions and the problems they pose, and these differences cannot be
overridden. Nor can the problems of the anthropologist be merely reduced
to those of genetics or innate tendencies. It is one thing to say that all
humans have the innate capacity to learn and use language but it is a very
different problem to analyse particular languages and to set out the
differences between them. Such differences cannot be reduced to the same
innate capacity to use language.

There is a final point to be made about the problem of "prohibition".

I said, much of the problem is related to the assumption that the
prohibition against incest was universal, and its very universality made
it different from any ordinary prohibition. L?vi-Strauss03) makes much
of this, just as his predecessors did. And so too do those concerned with
the problems of cross-cultural comparison who look for universals as
fixed points of reference in terms of which their analyses can proceed.
The claim to universality can, of course, be negated by a single exception.
But leaving this aside, there is an obvious bias in the way inwhich I have
discussed the problem of "prohibition-no
prohibition" above. I have
a
on
case
notion that social
kind
of
Durkheimian
based
my
implicitly
norms rest on a claim to moral authority, that there is a moral and not
merely practical quality to social norms, or social rules. This Durkheimian
As

13. L?vi-Strauss

1969 (1949).

155

THE MEANING OF INCEST

view is one that I certainly subscribe to. But I think that it must be
modified in some degree, for so often ethnographic data are encountered
in which it is quite clear that what is a moral issue for one culture is a
matter of practicality for the next. Thus, as will be seen below, one might
well argue that Samoa does not have a prohibition against incest in this
sense even though people show moral outrage over it. Their concern
seems fundamentally practical; to act contrary to any of the rules mixes
things up and causes confusion. It is this confusion and confounding of
what should be kept apart that seems to me to be their chief concern, not
a Durkheimian,
Judeo-Christian ethical sense of morality. I am not
suggesting or implying that the Samoans are an immoral people, or that
sense of morality than theDurkheimians,
they have a less well-developed
or those of the Judeo-Christian tradition. I am only saying that their
formulation of themoral, their formulation of what a prohibition means,
is not quite the same as that ofWestern Europeans.
It thereforemay very
well be a red-herring to debate whether the Samoans have a prohibition
against incest, to debate whether there is or is not a universal prohibition
against incest. This red-herring quality rests on two considerations:
(1)
the quality of norms varies from culture to culture and so it is not easy to
compare prohibitions as if they were all exactly the same thing; and (2)
the assumption of the privileged or special status of a universal as against
a common trait has been, in my view, highly overestimated. (However,
I will not detour from the issues at hand to discuss why universality does
not make as much difference as some writers seem to feel.)
Sixth, it is important not to confound a series of different problems in
one undertaking. As I have said before, there may well be circumstances
when two different questions or problems converge and can be answered
by the same solution, but this is a limiting case and cannot be presumed
from the outset. The most frequent confusion found in the literature in
my experience is the confusion between the question of the origin of the
prohibition on incest and the question of why it ismaintained long after
the conditions which may account for its origin have passed. To say that
early man formed small kin groups which were precarious if they were
viable and had, therefore, to use exogamy to establish bonds between kin
groups to form larger co-operating units, and that the sanction, themotive
force for exogamy, was the invention of the prohibition on incest, does not
explain why there is still any bother with this prohibition today when the
world population is so large, and the size of most co-operating societies is
large enough to permit them to have agamous marriages (no rule on
marrying out or in) and even permit incestuous marriages. Even if it is
granted that in a population of the size of theUnited States every brother
will marry every available sister, there will still be a large number of
non-sibling marriages simply because many families will have no sons and
many will have no daughters, or the proportion of sons and daughters in
one family will be unequal and so (barring sibling polygyny) the total
number of brother-sister marriages will be smaller than the total number
of marriages. But however this may be, it is hard to conceive of how the
origin of the prohibition against brother-sister marriages could explain its
156

DAVID

M.

SCHNEIDER

present existence in the United States if indeed its origin lay in the need
to establish co-operative relations between small, barely viable family
units.

Another hypothesis that sometimes confuses questions of origin with

those of maintenance is the sexual jealousy argument. It may indeed have
been that given two ways of ordering sexual relations, one by scheduling
and one by total prohibition, except for the parent couple, randomly
distributed groups of early man chose one or the other of these solutions
to that problem/14) and given "inbreeding depression"
those groups
tended to survive which chose the total prohibition solution. But again,
the effect of "inbreeding depression" on small populations which are only
marginally viable is not the same as on large populations such as that of
Sweden, which recently has considered repealing the laws against incest.
The reason for the origin of the prohibition certainly cannot be applied
to the question of why the Swedish still have the prohibition and are now
considering its repeal.
The confusion between questions of origin and of maintenance appears
in another guise. I recently saw a manuscript which made the familiar
point that if incest were permitted the statuses of the family members,
and even those beyond the nuclear family, would become unalterably
confused. Thus, ifa father were permitted relations with his daughter, the
mother with her son, and brother with his sister, then the distinction
between mother and daughter would be blurred, while the status of
brother would become the same as the status of husband with respect to
the sister who would also be wife. The point that ismade is that if incest
were permitted the family composed of certain statuses arranged in certain
relations would be utterly confused. Where in a given family the same man
may be father to his son and daughter he is also husband to his wife; the
same woman who ismother to her son and daughter iswife to her husband ;
and the son is also the brother of his sister, who is otherwise also a
daughter. Incest would confound these.
At first glance this is certainly not an origin argument, but is in fact a
maintenance argument, for it asserts that if the way things are is changed
then things will get mixed up. But the argument has an interesting grain
of profound truth in it. Consider for the moment a prohibition on incest
and a tendency to inhibit sexual intercourse among members of the
primary socialisation unit to be the same thing. If this is done, itbecomes
apparent, as Wagner points out,(15) that this feature is built into kinship
systems as a part of their most fundamental conception. All kinship
systems seem to require at least four distinct persons to occupy the eight
statuses of husband-father, wife-mother, son-brother, and daughter-sister
with respect to each other.
If all known kinship systems have the incest prohibition or the tendency
to inhibit sexual intercourse among these primary kin built into them as
part of their most fundamental conception, then it suggests that the
problem is not being approached in the most sensible way. For although
14. See Aberle
et al.
15. Wagner
1972.

1963.

157

THE MEANING OF INCEST

this does not say why or how it all began (the origin question), it does say
that the separation of the question of the incest prohibition from an
understanding of the structure of the total kinship system is at best a
curious strategy.
This point then becomes central. Questions about the incest prohibition
and the inhibition of sexual intercourse between members of the primary
socialisation unit cannot be separated from questions about the whole
kinship system of which it is an integral part. It can no more be argued
that the incest prohibition can be seen as the key element on which
exogamy depends than it can be argued that exogamy is the cause of the
incest prohibition or inhibition. For such arguments postulate a degree of
independence between the prohibition and inhibition on one side and
exogamy and marriage systems on the other. And such arguments in turn
imply that either the incest prohibition or exogamy has some privileged
position with respect toman's history or evolution, when all that is certain
is that these things are related in a single interdependent and interconnected
unit.

This view does not invalidate the many useful functional relations
which have been spelled out as obtaining between the incest prohibition
and other parts of the kinship system. But it does argue that perhaps
the wrong question is being asked, or asked in the wrong way, when the
incest prohibition is singled out as the object of our enquiry.
Ill

I have spoken of the tendency for humans to avoid sexual intercourse

with members of their primary socialisation unit, except for certain
notable exceptions (the royal brother-sister marriages of Egypt, Hawaii,
ancient Iran, orgiastic and ritual occasions)/16)
I will accept Lindzey's statement, as given, for which there is more
supporting evidence now than there was when he firstwrote it that :

... there is compelling theoretical rationale, and a variety of empirical

at both human and lower-animal levels, to imply that the
consequences of inbreeding are sufficiently strong and deleterious
to make it unlikely that a human society would survive over long
periods of time if it permitted, or encouraged, a high incidence of
incest. In this sense, then, one may say that the incest taboo (whatever
other purposes itmay serve) is biologically guaranteed/17)

data

But I will, of course, underline his parenthetical phrase, "whatever other

purposes itmay serve", as being crucial to any discussion of this subject.
The tendency for humans to avoid sexual intercourse with members of
their primary socialisation unit sounds, and is intended to sound, like a
human tendency rather than a culturally defined, normatively governed
mode of social action. For the moment I shall hold in abeyance the
obvious question of how an innate human tendency can exist independent
of some normative, culturally defined aspects.
16. See above

and notes

17. Lindzey 1967:1055.

11 and

12.

158

DAVID

M.

SCHNEIDER

It is just this view of human behaviour as a set of tendencies, with

whatever cultural or normative aspects may be associated with them
treated as indistinguishable and not worth distinguishing, which moves
the ethologists, primateologists and the students of evolutionary biology
into high gear so that they react with all the full vigour of their newly
hybridised field. Since it is all innate, some of the more vulgar ones
might argue, and it is all grounded in the genes, we must look to some
theory of innate tendencies which shape the socio-cultural material. For
surely culture does not go against innate human nature. Or does it? Or
does it shape human nature?
If man has a complex symbol system and'a
capacity for cognitive
activity which is sufficiently different in degree from all other animals,
so that itmay even be different in kind, then by that very token the genetic
or innate basis for his behaviour cannot be equated with that same basis
in other animals. Certainly not in one-to-one terms. There must be a
difference in the genetic structures and their functions which makes
culture possible inman but does not allow it in other animals.
But this is precisely the problem. If Lindzey's position is accepted?
and there seems no way around it?then no problem is solved, but rather,
the full complexity of the problem that requires solution has been more
precisely stated. For if no human tendency, no hominid genetic element
or systemmanifests itselfwithout the influence, the distortion, the direction
or re-direction by its normative and cultural context, then the problem
is precisely that of stating what kind of genetic mechanism this is, and
how it differs from those genetic mechanisms which operate in other
animals without culture or complex symbolic systems.
Until the geneticist comes up with some more specific, better grounded
theories than the general statement thatman, like every other animal both
large and small, has a genetic apparatus and that this bears some more or
less complex relationship to his behaviour?an
unexceptionable statement
no
must
be
set
?this
aside.
There
is
other
way to handle it.
question
IV
I will also set aside problems of origin on either of two grounds, and
the reader may choose which he prefers. Problems of origin are funda
mentally insoluble since the questions they pose can only be answered
conjecturally at best considering the present state of our knowledge.
Further, the conjectures are weak and it is not easy to put reasonable
statements of probability on any one or another of them. Or, since origin
does not bear directly on the cultural problem as it is stated below, it can
be set aside as irrelevant on that ground.

Further, convergence or whatever apparent similarities there are

between man and other animals cannot be ascribed to innate or genetic
conditions in the absence of convincing evidence for that connection and
without a clear analysis of the relation between these and man's culture.
The fact that man has culture, and even those animals closest to him do
not, makes the problem a special and different one for man. And the
special quality of that problem is the cultural problem. Leaving the genetic
159

THE MEANING

OF

INCEST

problem to the geneticist, anthropologists can be left to focus on the

problem that is really theirs, that is the cultural problem. How are the
prohibition on incest and the tendency to avoid sexual intercourse with
members of the primary socialisation unit to be understood as a cultural
problem ?
the incest problem is inextricably embedded not only in
Moreover,
the kinship system. It is also embedded in areas of culture far beyond
the boundaries of the kinship system. It is thus only as part of a total
culture that the problem can be understood in cultural terms, and any
attempt to isolate it or treat itmerely as an aspect of marriage rules (for
instance?the confusion with exogamy) is doomed to failure (as Shore's
paper in this collection shows so clearly). The point that the whole range
of cultural considerations of sexual activity must be taken into account
ismade most clearly by Goody.(18)
If culture is taken as a system of symbols and meanings/19) the problem
can be even more precisely formulated. What is the meaning of incest in
any particular culture? What does incest symbolise, what do these symbols
mean ?What place has it, that is to say, in the total symbolic and meaning
ful system which constitutes a culture? How do the symbols and meanings
of one culture compare with those of others ?
This brings immediately to the fore the problem posed at the outset.
definition of incest is to be taken? The fundamental axiom of
Whose
cultural analysis is that it is the native definition which is the basic data,
it is the very stuif of which a cultural analysis consists. The imposition of
a priori definitions of incest on a variety of different cultures is precisely
what must be avoided.
The solution is really quite simple and is one used all the time: starting
with theWestern European cultural definition and then looking in each
culture for something that is vaguely like it, then proceeding to identify
the similarities and the differences, and by continuing to compare, ex
panding the horizon to the point where there are a series of different
cultural definitions, a series of different cultural meanings and an array of
various symbols for those meanings. This provides not only a comparative
study of the general area, but also should provide a series of intensive
studies of particular cultures. And this is just what needs to be learned.
What does incest mean in different cultures? How is it symbolised? How
is it conceptualised? What part does it play in the total system of symbols
and meanings of a particular culture ? How do cultures differ in the way
inwhich they formulate, symbolise and attribute meaning to this congeries
of roughly similar, overlapping and interlocking things called by the
convenient

name

"incest".

In this case the task ismade especially difficult because, almost from
the first, incest was taken as a self-evident, unitary phenomenon and the
number of good, extensive, detailed descriptions of incest, the prohibitions
and all of their related elements are very scarce in the literature. There are
look with horror on
many statements on the order of: "The Bongo-Bongo
18. Goody
1956.
19. Schneider
1968,

1972,

1976.

160

DAVID

M.

SCHNEIDER

the idea of incest and claim that it never occurs", full stop, end of report.
There are very few extensive, finely detailed and sensitively reported works
like that of Devereux,(20) which is precisely the kind of report that is
needed to do the kind of analysis which is envisioned here.
This does not mean that the literature on the incest prohibition is
meagre. It is nothing if not copious. It is, however, largely speculative,
highly theoretical, and presumes that everyone knows what is being talked
about when they talk about incest and prohibition. The other false
assumptions usually made are that it is a simple unitary phenomenon
which is universal and, therefore, can be treated as the same thingwherever
and whenever it occurs. A couple of good "thick descriptions" of the sort
which Geertz(21) recommends and does so well would do far more good
than the acres of wood pulp already consumed by this subject.
Here then lies one of the major contributions of this collection. It is a
set of papers which at least approach the model of what a good cultural
analysis of this problem might be, which explore the definition of incest
and its prohibition, if there is one, in extensive and intensive detail in
terms of itsmeanings, its associations, and the wider context?usually
at
least the kinship context?in which it is set. In this the collection is unique,
containing papers of uniformly high quality, which are the only ones I
know to provide such detailed and rich information so consistently
within one cover.
I have taken a look at the various papers to see what is to be learned
from them. Some of the points theymake are by no means new, but their
contextualisation is new and this should not be overlooked.
First, of course, there is thematter of the universality of the prohibition.
One paper which is not reproduced here but was given at the time of the
is probably the clearest
symposium, that by Vern Carroll on Nukuoro,
on this point. Sexual relations between father-daughter, mother-son,
brother-sister are not explicitly prohibited in the sense inwhich the term
is defined above. There is a clear sense that such relations are to be
avoided because "people will talk" and such talk will be injurious. But
this is not quite the same thing as an explicit prohibition. Indeed, it is
much closer to a pragmatic statement concerning an impractical course
of action, a pattern of action which will bring undesirable social difficulties
and therefore is to be avoided on that ground alone. Carroll was quite
explicit in pursuing the question and the upshot of a detailed discussion
with one informant was that ifhe and his mother were alone on a hypo
thetical island, and no others could possibly see them or discover the fact,
therewould be no reason to avoid sexual relations with his mother. There
remains the question of why "people would talk" and of just what they
would say, but unfortunately Carroll was not able to include his paper
in this collection.(22)
Similarly, it is strongly suggested that explicit prohibition of a moral
order does not exist on Ponape, or Samoa, provided that it is accepted
that the definition of a prohibition is a repugnant act, one which breaches
20. Devereux
1939.
21. Geertz
1973.
22. Carroll, personal

communication.

161

THE MEANING

OF

INCEST

proprieties and which is explicitly forbidden. This should of course be

distinguished from an impractical act, an act which brings its own punish
ment by virtue of some understandable and reasonable state of affairs.
Thus for example there is no prohibition inAmerica against putting one's
hand in boiling water. But it is an act that brings its own "punishment"
and would be considered ill-advised, but not morally wrong. Odd, but not
immoral. Silly, but not improper. Foolish, but not reprehensible.

However, some caution is needed about how the data are interpreted
for the situation is not nearly so simple as I have presented it. Shore's
material on Samoa, for example, affirms that there is a prohibition, then
goes on to say that the relationships between father and daughter, mother
and son, are taken as "most serious" because there is a transgression of
what should be a relationship of protection, guidance and authority
between the generations when it is transformed into one of intimacy. He
adds that a person adopted into an "?iga should not marry within it, but
that this does happen, and when it does, itupsets people, again because
it requires the restructuring of a set of relationships into new forms. In
the case he reports the relationship of two men changes from one of
intimacy and warmth as "brothers" to one of distance and tension as
"brothers-in-law".

However,

Shore

adds

later

that

"...

common

explanation of why it iswrong for a man to sleep with his "?iga is that he
should look outside the "?iga for a wife".
It is hard to tell from this to what extent the issue is one of upsetting
otherwise clearly structured relationships, or of some moral prohibition
which is in some sense prior to, or which underlies, the configuration of
normatively defined interpersonal relations which embody the pro
hibition. For this reason the whole question of the prohibition as such
may be quite beside the point, a carry-over from a time when it was
assumed that the prohibition was universal, and, by virtue of its uni
versality, of some special significance.

One very common statement is that incest is something animals do,

not human beings. It is thus themark of humanity, as against the animal
world. I am not sure that this can be universally construed as a statement
of culture against nature, nor am I at all clear about just exactly what
L?vi-Strauss means by "nature" much of the time that he uses that
opposition. It is possible to interpret some of his statements as indicating
that it is a cultural interpretation of nature that ismeant; at other times
he seems to speak of an objective, reified, existential reality quite outside
and distinct from culture, rather like a natural scientist would speak of it.
Be that as itmay, his hint that one way inwhich many cultures mark the
distinction between the human and animal (or non-human) is that humans
do not engage in incestuous behaviour, and that thismakes them superior
to animals seems to be supported by these data. Unless there is a bias
introduced by the facts that all of the groups have been exposed to
Europeans and that most of them have become Christian, the frequency
with which the statement appears in these papers that incest is animal-like,
and not "human" behaviour, is notable.
Even more notable perhaps is the association of incestwith cannibalism.
162

DAVID

M.

SCHNEIDER

This occurs both in theMicronesian cultures of Yap and Ponape and in

Tahiti (see Hooper footnote 10). In the Yap case, as clearly explained
by Labby, the conception of incest is not merely of a set of relations
contrary to those held proper, but of symbolic connections between
elements which make cannibalism a meaningful aspect of incest in Yap
culture. This would be clearly unintelligible in American or Western
European conceptions. The associations between incest, eating and food
which are explicated in some of these papers again make no sense in terms
of American conceptions of incest.
It is, of course, through the systematic explorations of such associations
that the meaning of incest in a particular culture may be understood and
contrasted with the Western European conception. Then, the meaning
of eating, of food, of cannibalism, of being human as against animal can
be explored until their connection with "incest" becomes comprehensible.

By the same token, what ismeaningful in one culture makes no sense

in another. Where Y?pese treat incest as a very serious thing indeed and
make a great ado about it, composing vicious poems about persons, and
where inYap the mere mention of the word for coconut shell may pre
cipitate a fight (since coconut shell is associated with skull, skull with the
skull of one's mother for a man, and to mention a man's mother to him
except in the most circumspect way is to suggest that they have been
cohabiting), Samoans just do not seem to get so worked up about it.
This is not the same problem as the problem of "horror" so commonly
in the traditional literature, to which the Australians and
mentioned
others are supposed to be subject. Furthermore, what is done about
incest varies inmuch the same way. On Yap the "punishment" or con
sequences are that the subjects will die sooner or later and that vicious
poems will be circulated about them.
But none of these special conditions can be analysed properly or
understood outside the context of the particular culture in which they
occur, and to be understood they must be analysed as a part of that
particular culture.
In the same way, any universal theory about which form of incest
father-daughter, mother-son, brother-sister is treated with most gravity
seems futile since even within this small Oceanic
sample there is no
as
serious
than the other
treat
less
father-daughter
consistency. Y?pese
two; Samoans treat all forms as being equally serious but in different
ways. Hence a look at each culture and themeaning of incest within it is
essential even to answer such seemingly straightforward questions.
A further and very important dimension of variation is that hardly
two of these eight cultures define incest in the same way. For the Samoans
it is the intention to commit the act that is as much incest as the act itself,
and conversely people who discover after marriage that there was a
genealogical linkwhich would have prohibited them from sexual relations
or marriage are not blamed since they acted without intending to. For
theY?pese it is again not merely the act itself,nor is intention a significant
consideration, for incest is committed by any act which is deemed too
familiar, too close, too intimate. Being found alone in a house with one's
163

THE MEANING OF INCEST

sister is included in the definition of incest, just as the Yap definition of
adultery covers not merely sexual intercourse with someone else's wife,
but also speaking to her in an intimate, friendlymanner on a public path
even though standing too far apart for physical contact. While Tokelauans
include in the term, that would normally be translated as "incest", ". . .
any relatively serious breach of ordered kinship relationships such as
when children or those of a junior generation openly flout the authority
of seniors or when members disobey a leader."
It is precisely this sort of thing thatmakes the cross-cultural comparison
of "incest" (and/or its prohibition) as if itwere a unitary phenomenon
if not absurd, at least curious, and certainly leaves one with the question
of what has been compared, parts of a single anthropological
theory or
some m?lange of theories supported by flotsam and jetsam of different
bits of culture taken entirely out of their context and without regard to
theirmeaning.

What conclusions can be drawn from what was known before and from
what these fine papers add?
Before replying to my own question, I must first declare that causal
statements, "explanations", modes of "accounting for" are all eschewed
here. The problem is quite narrowly limited to attempting to understand
the symbols and meanings of "incest" and the "incest prohibition" where
it exists in human societies. I will not "demonstrate" anything in any
positivist sense.
Framing the problem in this way will permit me to accept Lindzey's
restriction as a fact?persistent
inbreeding over a long period of time
will terminate a society by the extinction of itsmembers. It also allows
me to accept as a tentative empirical generalisation that there is indeed a
tendency for humans to avoid sexual intercourse with members of the
primary socialisation unit. The facts seem to point in this direction,
is by no means decisive. But that problem is
though the documentation
not mine at thismoment. And by the same token I can tentatively accept
as an empirical generalisation the proposition that in most, though by
no means all, human societies one finds disapproval of sexual relations
with primary kin, while in some societies there is positive encouragement
of such relations under certain conditions. Thus the so-called "exceptions"
?the
Egyptian and Hawaiian
royal families, and such others as have been
noted and may yet be discovered.
And I can proceed as was indicated earlier; "incest" can tentatively
be defined as sexual relations between members of the nuclear family. But
I immediately must alter that definition in the light of the knowledge
that in every culture with such a concept, other kinsmen are also included.
And again, from ethnographic knowledge I know that in some cultures
"incest" includes sexual relations with persons who are not considered to
be kinsmen. Moreover,
in some cultures "incest" includes homosexual
relations. Further, "incest" is by no means always confined to sexual
intercourse; itmay include as well such things as the intention to have

164

DAVID

M.

SCHNEIDER

intercourse, too great familiarity, too close a personal interest, too much
intimacy.
What has happened to the concept of "incest"? It has merely been
revised in the light of some of the data that have been readily at hand for
years, and some of the data which are repeated or newly revealed in this
collection of papers.
What
is the nature of the revisions I have made? First, the concept
is not confined to kinsmen. Second, it is not confined to sexual intercourse.
Third, it is centred on modes of behaviour or, more accurately, on kinds of
relationships. And yet it retains the original feature, that except for certain
such relationships are disapproved.
special situations (the "exceptions")
The degree of disapproval varies from very mild to very strong. I will
leave aside the whole problem of punishment, but not because
it is
irrelevant. The questions of what kind of punishment, who has the right
to punish, who is punished and so on are an integral part of the problem
of the meaning of "incest". However, there is no space here to work out
this aspect of the problem.(23)
I made the point at the outset that sexual relations must be distinguished
from marriage. Yet time and again in these papers and in other ethno
graphic data the disapproval of "incest" is associated with marriage and
so a word of clarification on this point is in order.

First, of course, the Western European notion of "incest" as sexual

relations and sexual relations alone has dominated almost all of the
ethnography and ethnographic reports. Second, the Western European
notion of marriage includes as one of its central features sexual relation
and rights in sexual activity and this too has dominated not only the field
work but the ethnographic reports. There is, then, a distinct bias in the
reporting in the direction of the association of sexual intercourse and
marriage. Where the data conform to that bias, the reporting has been
accurate of course. But I am not convinced that all of the data so reported
are accurate. I am convinced, moreover, that the association is one which
must be treated with some caution. As can be seen from the papers in this
collection, sexual intercourse is often conceived of as a part of marriage,
but incest is as often conceived of as a kind of relationship which, although
often including sexual intercourse, and including marriage equally often,
still does not necessarily imply either. The point is not to arbitrarily deny
that sexual intercourse has anything whatever to do with marriage, or
vice versa, but only to keep the question open for each culture studied
and to affirm the caution that much of the ethnography may be biased
in some degree toward the identity of the two.
And so the conclusion must be that where the disapproval of "incest"
includes a disapproval of sexual intercourse, then that must be taken as
the fact; that where the disapproval of "incest" includes the disapproval
of the marriage of those who might be so related, then it includes that;
and where sexual intercourse and marriage are closely associated, then
23.

1957 for one statement of this aspect

See Schneider
in this volume deal with it explicitly.
papers

165

of the problem.

Certain

of the

THE MEANING OF INCEST

the disapproval

of "incest"

also

stands for the disapproval

of such

marriages.

Another kind of bias enters into the ethnographic reports. It is not easy
to tell when this bias has distorted the observations and so I do not wish
to say that it has in general, or mostly, or even often. I only want to urge
caution and some skepticism that the report may be overstated in a
particular direction. This bias is that "incest" is primarily, if not ex
clusively, concerned with the relationship between kin. The association
between "incest", sexual intercourse, marriage, exogamy, all would lend
support to such an interpretation. But the question may be raised of
whether in some cultures "incest" does not also apply to the relationships
of persons who are not considered kinsmen. I cannot name such a culture
at this point, but I would not foreclose the possibility that one exists.
However, I must not lean over backwards in this matter. The record
from the papers in this collection and from other ethnographic material
is certainly clear; most of the reports are that "incest" concerns sexual
relations primarily(24) and the record is equally clear that the majority of
known cultures regard sexual relations as an inescapable part of marriage,
and in so far as sexual relations between persons of two categories are
disapproved, then theirmarriage will also be disapproved. But let it not
be forgotten that the Tallensi and theTrobrianders both permit "incest",
that is to say, sexual intercourse with clan members whom they neverthe
less are strictly forbidden tomarry.

My aim, therefore, is only to keep thematter in some perspective and

not to insist on universals or even wholesale empirical generalisations
without exercising some caution.
Given these cautions and caveats, how can "incest" be understood in
cultural terms? The answer is given time and again in these papers.
"Incest" is symbolic of the special way in which the pattern of social
relationships, as they are normatively defined, can be broken. "Incest"
stands for the transgression of certain major cultural values, the values
of a particular pattern of relations among persons. For those who should
be respectful "incest" signals the lack of respect. For those who should
have responsibility and authority it is a sign that responsibility has been
abrogated and authority misused or broken down entirely. "Incest"
means the wrong way to act in a relationship: as father-son, as father
as brother-sister, as
as mother-daughter,
daughter, as mother-son,
cousins, as kinsmen, as '?iga members, as tabinauw members, as k?iga
members, and so on. To act not merely wrong, but to act in a manner
opposite to that which is proper. It is to "desecrate" relationships. It is to
act "ungrammatically". And each particular definition of "incest"?as
the special meaning
"cannibalism", as "animal", as "eating blood"?gives
of the "desecration", themeaning that is special to that particular system
of symbols and meanings, the culture, that is, inwhich it is embedded.
It is for this reason that a careful study of the differentmeanings of the
symbol "incest" becomes so important, for it is those meanings which
24. Huntsman
however,

and Hooper
say specifically
that the term most commonly

"It is to sexual
refers."

166

contacts

between

kinsmen,

DAVID

M.

SCHNEIDER

spell out the particular junctures, the particular facets, the particular
aspects of the particular system of social relations which are the focus of
that segment of itwith which
the epitomising symbols of the culture?or
"incest" is concerned.
Contrast "incest" with "treason". Each, in American culture, applies
to a different area : the one to the narrow sphere of the family, the other
to the relation between the individual and his country. In one respect
they are the inverse of each other. "Incest" brings together in a sexual
relationship persons who should be kept apart sexually. There is thus a
kind of union, of loyalty, of cathexis where there should be disjunction.
And the symbol is precisely sexual, an aspect of the epitomising symbol
of the whole of the American kinship system.(25) "Treason"
is a funda
mental act of disloyalty where loyalty is required and loyalty is the sine
qua non of the relationship, just as the inhibition of sexual intercourse is
the sine qua non of the relationship of parent to child and siblings to each
other in the kinship system. And so it is not apathy which is the symbolic
cancer of the body politic, it is "treason", active disloyalty. And it is
loyaltywhich is structurally the highest value where the state is concerned,
just as it is the many aspects of sexual intercourse around which, as an
epitomising symbol, the kinship and family system is formed.
The frequency with which "incest" is stated in sexual terms correlates
with the frequency with which sex?either as intercourse or as sex difference
?is
the epitomising symbol of that segment of the cultural system. And
the frequency with which "incest" is given as a bar tomarriage and hence
an aspect of exogamy is simply related, in direct proportion, to the
frequency with which sexual intercourse is defined as a crucial aspect of
marriage.

To summarise briefly then, the meaning of "incest", as it appears in

known societies where it is disapproved (without qualification, without
it symbolises or stands for
ambiguity), is that it is a "desecration",
"ungrammatical love", it constitutes "cannibalism".
What then of the exceptions, those places and those times when "incest"
is not prohibited, when it is positively valued and actively undertaken?
Then, of course, ithas a different symbolic meaning. A close examination
of those instances suggests that its symbolic value is not so extraordinarily
different,but only different in some crucial aspect. For the royal Hawaiians,
the Egyptians, for Samoa (as Shore describes the situation), for aristo
cratic twins in Bali (as Belo describes the situation), the problem is of
maintaining the sacred qualities which are carried "in the blood" so that
they are not so dissipated as to lose their power, yet at the same time to
maintain such ties with less sacred lines so that one line does not have a
total monopoly of the royal, sacred quality.
I cannot undertake to analyse each case here, but must be content to
merely assert what I think the case to be. Further study can test this
hypothesis.
I have done far less here than I had hoped. Properly I should have
prepared a detailed analysis of a particular culture, or two, and set forth
25.

Schneider

1968,

1972,

1976.

167

THE MEANING OF INCEST

the symbols and meanings of which it consists. This would then have
permitted me to stipulate precisely what "incest" meant in each such case
and to show (if it can be shown) that "incest" is a kind of specific symbol
for what is at themost general level the quality of evil which is anti-social,
hence so often seen as "animal" and associated with witchcraft, and what
this anti-social or evil consists in precisely for the particular culture.
It would then be understood precisely what ismeant by "eating blood"
or "cannibalism"
or "desecration" or "ungrammatical
love" and so on,
that is one of the meanings of incest on Yap
and why it is "cannibalism"
and Ponape but not on Tokelau or Samoa, of why "eating blood" makes
sense on Tahiti but not Bellona.
But the main point I want to make, and this applies to the "problem
of incest" as well as other perennial "problems"
in anthropology, is to
stop looking for causal explanations of origin, functional explanations
of maintenance and to start looking at it as a problem inmeaning in its
cultural context. At the very least descriptions will be fuller and a whole
new and different set of questions will be raised. And most important,
the understanding of culture as a system of symbols and meanings will be
advanced significantly.

REFERENCES
Aberle, D. F. et al., 1963. "The Incest Taboo
American

Animals."

., 1975.

Bischof,

"Comparative

and theMating Patterns of

65:253-65.

Anthropologist,

of Incest Avoidance,"

Ethnology

in Fox

(ed.),

Biosocial Anthropology. London, Malby Press.

Devereux, G., 1939. "The Social and Cultural Implications of Incest among
the Mohave

Indians."

Psychoanalytic

Quarterly,

Fox, R., 1967. "Totem and Taboo Reconsidered,"

-

Study

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and To temi sm.

Tavistock.

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8:510-33.

inLeach (ed.), The Structural

1972. "Alliance and Constraint: Sexual Selection in the Evolution of

Human Kinship Systems," in Campbell (ed.), Sexual Selection and the
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Aldine.
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1975a. Biosocial
Anthropology.

London,

Malby

Press.

1975b. "Primate Kin and Human Kinship," in Fox (ed.), Biosocial

Anthropology. London, Malby Press.
1973. "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of
Geertz, C,
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in Geertz,

The

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Interpretation

New

York,

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Goody, J., 1956. "A Comparative Approach to Incest and Adultery." British
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Kelly, R., in press. Etoro Social Structure: A Study in Structural Contra
diction. Ann Arbor, University ofMichigan Press.
L?vi-strauss, C, 1969 (1949). The Elementary Structures of Kinship, Second
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Boston,

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Beacon

Lindzey, G., 1967. "Some Remarks concerning Incest, the Incest Taboo and
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