You are on page 1of 18

1

CIVPRO CASES part 2


Replevin
BPI CREDIT CORP. VS. CA
In a replevin case, the Rules of Court
expressly provides that:
After a trial of the issues the court shall find
in whom is the right of possession and the
value of the property and shall render
judgment in the alternative for the delivery
thereof to the party entitled to the same, or
for the value in case delivery cannot be
made, and also for such damages as either
party may prove, and for costs.
There can be no question that although he
had not yet fully paid its purchase price,
Cabacungan became the owner of the
vehicle, otherwise the seller would not have
accepted it in mortgage. He was entitled to
its possession and use until appropriate
lawful proceedings would have been taken
by Filinvest to obtain possession of the
vehicle preliminary to foreclosure of the
mortgage. Absent such proceedings, as in
this case, Cabacungan was entitled to
recover its possession. But the writ of
replevin could not be and was not in fact
implemented for the reason already adverted
to. The conclusion is thus inescapable that
return of the vehicle was rendered
impossible by Filinvest. So, from 12
September 1983 up to at least 28 April 1987,
when the trial court rendered its decision,
and even up to the present or for at most
a little over eight (8) years Cabacungan
was effectively deprived of the possession
and use of the vehicle. Undoubtedly, whether
it is being used or just kept Idle somewhere
by Filinvest, its value has significantly been
reduced. It is obvious that Cabacungan had
abandoned any claim for its recovery and for
the restoration of its possession to him. He
did not appeal from the decision which was
silent on that point. Considering the lapse of
more than eight (8) years since the illegal

seizure
of
the
vehicle,
its
possible
deterioration and diminution in value as a
result
thereof,
equity
demands
that
Cabacungan should be paid its value, which
is the second alternative provided for in
Section 9, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, and
that he should not be held liable for the
remaining unpaid installments on the
promissory note.

NLRC Decision
DOLE VS. ESTEVA
The Court in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction may look into the records of the
case and re-examine the questioned
findings. As a corollary, this Court is clothed
with ample authority to review matters, even
if they are not assigned as errors in their
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary to arrive at a just decision of the
case. The same principles are now
necessarily adhered to and are applied by
the Court of Appeals in its expanded
jurisdiction over labor cases elevated
through a petition for certiorari; thus, we see
no error on its part when it made anew a
factual determination of the matters and on
that basis reversed the ruling of the NLRC.
Hold Departure Order
RE: HDO ISSUED BY JUDGE SARDIDO
In order to avoid the indiscriminate issuance
of Hold-Departure Orders resulting in
inconvenience to the parties affected, the
same being tantamount to an infringement
on the right and liberty of an individual to
travel and to ensure that the Hold-Departure
Orders which are issued contain complete
and accurate information, the following
guidelines are hereby promulgated:
1. Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued only
in criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts;
2. The Regional Trial Courts issuing the HoldDeparture
Order
shall
furnish
the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the
Bureau
of
Immigration
(BI)
of
the

2
Department of Justice with a copy each of
the Hold-Departure Order issued within
twenty-four (24) hours from the time of
issuance and through the fastest available
means of transmittal;
3. The Hold-Departure Order shall contain
the following information:
a. The complete name (including the middle
name), the date and place of birth and the
place of last residence of the person against
whom a Hold-Departure Order has been
issued or whose departure from the country
has been enjoined;
b. The complete title and the docket number
of the case in which the Hold-Departure
Order was issued;
c. The specific nature of the case; and
d. The date of the Hold-Departure Order.
If available, a recent photograph of the
person against whom a Hold-Departure
Order has been issued or whose departure
from the country has been enjoined should
also be included.
4. Whenever (a) the accused has been
acquitted; (b) the case has been dismissed,
the judgment of acquittal or the order of
dismissal
shall
include
therein
the
cancellation of the Hold-Departure Order
issued. The courts concerned shall furnish
the Department of Foreign Affairs and the
Bureau of Immigration with a copy each of
the judgment of acquittal promulgated or the
order of dismissal twenty-four (24) hours
from the time of promulgation/issuance and
through the fastest available means of
transmittal.
RE: HDO ISSUED BY JUDGE OCCIANO
In order to avoid the indiscriminate issuance
of Hold-Departure Orders resulting in
inconvenience to the parties affected, the
same being tantamount to an infringement
on the right and liberty of an individual to
travel and to ensure that the Hold-Departure
Orders which are issued contain complete

and accurate information, the following


guidelines are hereby promulgated:
1. Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued
only in criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts;
The language of the circular is very
simple. It is clear that respondent judge had
indeed no authority to issue a hold-departure
order in Criminal Cases Nos. 7353 and 7363,
since the said cases do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent judge fully knows the
coverage of the Circular. Yet, he refused to
recognize and follow it. This is evident from
his Comment wherein he declared that
notwithstanding Circular No. 39-97, he firmly
believed that he had the authority to issue
the hold-departure order. This is not just
grave abuse of authority amounting to a
grave misconduct or a conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service; it is
disrespect for, and a willful violation of, a
lawful circular of the highest court of the land
to which he owes fealty.
Judge Occiano cannot take refuge behind
his alleged zeal for the early termination of
the criminal cases in question. Against the
demands of sheer speed in disposing of
cases, judges should be reminded that their
mission above all is to see that justice is
done. (People vs. Aranzado, G.R. Nos.
132442-44, 24 September 2001). In the
instant matter, Judge Occiano issued the
hold-departure order without authority. It was
a clear case of a violation of the accuseds
right and liberty to travel. The very essence
of Circular No. 39-97 is to avoid the
indiscriminate issuance of hold-departure
orders resulting in inconvenience to the
parties affected which is tantamount to an
infringement on their right and liberty to
travel.

Residual Jurisdiction
ANGELES VS. CA
Prior to the transmittal of the original record,
the trial court may order execution pending
appeal.21 The residual jurisdiction of trial
courts is available at a stage in which the
court is normally deemed to have lost
jurisdiction over the case or the subject
matter involved in the appeal. This stage is
reached upon the perfection of the appeals
by the parties or upon the approval of the
records on appeal, but prior to the
transmittal of the original records or the
records on appeal. In either instance, the
trial court still retains its so-called residual
jurisdiction to issue protective orders,
approve compromises, permit appeals of
indigent litigants, order execution pending
appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the
appeal.
Totality Rule (Rule 2, Sec. 5 (d))
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS
STANDARD INSURANCE CO. INC

VS.

Sec. 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court


provides the following requirements for a
permissive joinder of parties: (a) the right to
relief arises out of the same transaction or
series of transactions; (b) there is a question
of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or
defendants; and (c) such joinder is not
otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the
Rules on jurisdiction and venue.
In this case, there is a single transaction
common to all, that is, Pantrancos bus
hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is
also a common question of fact, that is,
whether petitioners are negligent. There
being a single transaction common to both
respondents, consequently, they have the
same cause of action against petitioners.
To determine identity of cause of action, it
must be ascertained whether the same
evidence which is necessary to sustain the
second cause of action would have been

sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first.


Here, had respondents filed separate suits
against petitioners, the same evidence would
have been presented to sustain the same
cause of action. Thus, the filing by both
respondents of the complaint with the court
below is in order. Such joinder of parties
avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the
convenient,
speedy
and
orderly
administration of justice.
There is NO MISJOINDER OF PARTIES if the
money sought to be claimed is in favor of the
same plaintiff/s and against the same
defendant/s.
On the issue of lumping together the claims
of Gicale and Standard, Section 5(d), Rule 2
of the same Rules provides:
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party
may in one pleading assert, in the alternative
or otherwise, as many causes of action as he
may have against an opposing party, subject
to the following conditions:
xxx
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of
action are principally for recovery of money
the aggregate amount claimed shall be the
test of jurisdiction.
Further, the Court reiterates the Totality
rule exemplified by Sec. 33 (1) of BP
129: where there are several claims or
causes of action between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall
be the totality of the claims in all the causes
of action, irrespective of whether the causes
of action arose out of the same or different
transactions.

FLORES VS. MALLARE-PHILIPPS


The lower court has jurisdiction over the case
following
the
"novel" totality

4
rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and
Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
Section 33(l) of BP129
That
where
there
are several claims
or causes of action between the same
or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all
the causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out
of the same or different transactions. ...
Section 11 of the Interim Rules
Application of the totality rule. In actions
where the jurisdiction of the court
is dependent on the amount involved,
the test
of
jurisdiction shall
be
the aggregate sum of all the money
demands, exclusive only of interest and
costs, irrespective of WON the separate
claims are owned by or due to different
parties. If any demand is for damages in a
civil action, the amount thereof must be
specifically alleged.
former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948
Where there are several claims or causes
of
action
between
the
same
parties embodied in the same complaint,
the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the demand in all the causes
of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions; but where the claims
or causes of action joined in a single
complaint are separately owned by or
due to different parties, each separate
claim shall furnish the jurisdictional
test. ...
Comparison of former and present rules
Present Rules
Where
a
plaintiff sues
a defendant
on two or

Totality of the claims in all the


causes of action irrespective of
whether the COA arose out of
the same or diff transactions.

more
separate
causes
action

If the total demand exceeds


P20K RTC has jurisdiction

If
P2

If the causes of action are


separate and independent,
their joinder in one complaint
is
permissive
and
not
mandatory, and any cause of
action where the amount of
the demand is 20K or less may
be the subject of a separate
complaint
filed
with
a
metropolitan or MTC.

If
se
the
is
ma
ac
the
be
co
me

Where the claims or causes of


action joined in a single
complaint
are
separately
owned by or due to different
parties, each separate claim
shall
furnish
the
jurisdictional test

Th
of
ag
de
the
of
sh
of
Se

of

Two or more
plaintiffs
having
a
separate
causes
of
action
against
a
defendant
join
in
a
single
complaint

The former rule applied only to


cases of permissive joinder of
parties plaintiff. However, it
was also applicable to cases of
permissive joinder of parties
defendant.

Brillo vs. Buklatan (former rule):


Separate
claims
against
several
defendants of different amounts each of
which is not more than P2,000 and falls
under the jurisdiction of the justice of the
peace court. The several claims do not
arise from the same transaction or
series of transactions and there seem to
be no questions of law or of fact
common to all the defendants as may
warrant their joinder under Rule 3,
section 6.

5
The difference between the former and
present rules in cases of permissive joinder
of parties may be illustrated by the two
cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de
Rosario
vs.
Justice
of
the
Peace as exceptions to the totality rule.

Soriano y Cia vs. Jose 29 dismissed


employees joined in a complaint against the
defendant to collect their respective claims,
each of which was within the jurisdiction of
the municipal court although the total
exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this
Court held that under the law then
the municipal court had jurisdiction.
Although the plaintiffs' demands were
separate, distinct and independent of one
another, their joint suit was authorized
under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each
separate
claim
furnished
the
jurisdictional test.
International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza,
25 dismissed teachers jointly sued for unpaid
salaries, the MC had jurisdiction because the
amount of each
claim
was
within,
although
the
total
exceeded,
its
jurisdiction and
it
was
a
case
of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff
under Section 6 of Rule 3.
Under the present law, the two cases would
be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Similarly, Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs.
Martinez, if the separate claims against the
several defendants arose out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and
there is a common question of law or fact,
they would now be under the jurisdiction
of the RTC.
In cases of permissive joinder of parties,
whether
as
plaintiffs
or
as
defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3,
the total of all the claims shall now
furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless
to state also, if instead of joining or being
joined in one complaint separate actions are

filed by or against the parties, the amount


demanded in each complaint shall furnish
the jurisdictional test.
The lower court correctly held that the
jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on
joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of
Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the
complaint, it appears that there is a
misjoinder of parties for the reason that the
claims against resps Binongcal and Calion
are separate and distinct and neither of
which falls within its jurisdiction.

Class Suit (Rule 3, Sec. 12)


JUANA
COMPLEX
I
HOMEOWNERS
ASSOC. INC. VS. FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC.
The necessary elements for the maintenance
of a class suit are:1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons;2) the parties
affected are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all to court;
and3) the parties bringing the class suit are
sufficiently numerous or representative of
the class and can fully protect the interests
of all concerned.
In this case, the suit is clearly one that
benefits all commuters and motorists who
use La Paz Road. The individuals sought to
be represented by private respondents in the
suit are so numerous that it is impracticable
to join them all as parties and be named
individually as plaintiffs in the complaint.
Venue of Personal Actions (Rule 4,
Sec.2)
GOLDEN ARCHES DEV. CORP. VS. ST.
FRANCIS SQUARE HOLDINGS, INC.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the plaintiff to make a choice of
venue for personal actions whether to file
the complaint in the place where he resides
or where defendant resides. With respect to
a domestic corporation, it is in a
metaphysical sense a resident of the place
where its principal office is located as stated

6
in the articles of incorporation or otherwise
the place where it had actually been
residing or holding its principal office.
St. Francis Squares complaint, being
one
for
enforcement
of
contractual
provisions and recovery of damages, is in the
nature of a personal action which, under
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, shall
be
filed
at
the
plaintiffs
residence. Specifically with respect to a
domestic corporation, it is in a metaphysical
sense a resident of the place where its
principal office is located as stated in the
articles of incorporation.
The letters of Golden Arches itself to
St. Francis indicate the address of the latter
to be at St. Francis Square Mall, Julia Vargas,
Ortigas Center, just as the letters of St.
Francis Square to Golden Arches before the
filing of the complaint indicate its address to
be at St. Francis Square Mall, Julia Vargas,
Ortigas Center. Golden Arches was thus put
on notice that at St. Francis Squares filing of
the complaint, the latters business address
has been at Mandaluyong.
Although,
St.
Francis
Squares
Amended Articles of Incorporation of 2007
indicates that its principal business address
is at Metro Manila, venue was properly laid
in Mandaluyong since that is where it
had actually been residing (or holding its
principal office) at the time it filed its
complaint. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court authorizes the plaintiff (St. Francis
Square in this case) to make a choice of
venue for personal actions whether to file
the complaint in the place where he resides
or where defendant resides. St. Francis
Squares choice must be respected as the
controlling factor in determining venue for
cases is the primary objective for which said
cases are filed. St. Francis Squares purpose
in filing the complaint in Mandaluyong where
it holds its principal office is obviously for its
convenience and for orderly administration
of justice.
Venue of Real Actions (Rule 4, Sec.1)
UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. VS.
ROOSEMORE MINING & DEV. CORP.

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of


Rosemoor, and affirming the ruling of the
lower courts that there was no violation of
forum shopping Ratio: The Malolos case was
filed for the purpose of restraining the Bank
from proceeding with the consolidation of the
titles over the foreclosed Bulacan properties
because the loan secured by the mortgage
had not yet become due and demandable.
While the right asserted in the Manila case is
to receive the proceeds of the loan, the right
sought in the Malolos case is to restrain the
foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to
secure a loan that was not yet due.
Moreover, the Malolos case is an action to
annul the foreclosure sale that is necessarily
an action affecting the title of the property
sold. It is therefore a real action which should
be commenced and tried in the province
where the property or part thereof lies. The
Manila case, on the other hand, is a personal
action involving as it does the enforcement
of a contract between Rosemoor, whose
office is in Quezon City, and the Bank, whose
principal office is in Binondo, Manila.
Personal actions may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendants or any of the principal
defendants resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. It was subsequent to the filing of the
Manila case that Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual
saw the need to secure a writ of injunction
because the consolidation of the titles to the
mortgaged properties in favor of the Bank
was in the offing. But then, this action can
only be commenced where the properties, or
a portion thereof, is located. Otherwise, the
petition for injunction would be dismissed for
improper venue. Rosemoor, therefore, was
warranted in filing the Malolos case and
cannot in turn be accused of forum-shopping.
Sole Proprietorship (Rule 3, Sec.1)
JUASING HARDWARE VS. MENDOZA
I.
Whether or not Juasing Hardware has
the capacity to sue? Juasing Hardware has no
capacity to sue
The Supreme Court held that Section 1, Rule
3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that
only natural or juridical persons or entities

7
are authorized by law to be parties in a civil
action.
Since petitioner is not a natural person, it
cannot also be considered as a juridical
person since Article 44 of the New Civil Code
enumerates what are juridical persons and
as single proprietorship, is it not included in
the enumeration.
"Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and
entities for public interest or purpose,
created by law; their personality begins as
soon as they have been constituted
according to law;
(3)
Corporations,
partnerships
and
associations for private interest or purpose to
which the law grants a juridical personality,
separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member."
There
is
no
law
authorizing
sole
proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in
court. The law merely recognizes the
existence of a sole proprietorship as a form
of business organization conducted for profit
by a single individual, and requires the
proprietor or owner thereof to secure
licenses and permits, register the business
name, and pay taxes to the national
government. It does not vest juridical or legal
personality upon the sole proprietorship nor
empower it to file or defend an action in
court.
MANGILA VS. CA
The petition is GRANTED on the grounds of
improper venue and invalidity of the service
of the writ of attachment. The decision of the
Court of Appeals and the order of respondent
judge denying the motion to dismiss are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The grant of the
provisional remedy of attachment involves
three stages: first, the court issues the order
granting the application; second, the writ of
attachment issues pursuant to the order
granting the writ; and third, the writ is
implemented. For the initial two stages, it is
not necessary that
jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant be first obtained.
However, once the implementation of the
writ commences, the court must have

acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for


without such jurisdiction, the court has no
power and authority to act in any manner
against the defendant. Any order issuing
from the Court will not bind the defendant.
The trial court cannot enforce such a
coercive process on petitioner without first
obtaining jurisdiction over her person. The
preliminary writ of attachment must be
served after or simultaneous with the service
of summons on the defendant whether by
personal service, substituted service or by
publication
as
warranted
by
the
circumstances of the case. The subsequent
service of summons does not confer a
retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her
person because the law does not allow for
retroactivity of a belated service
Lack of Certification Against
Shopping (Rule 7, Sec.5)
BAUTISTA VS. CAUSAPIN

Forum

Civil Procedure; Certificate of Non-Forum


Shopping; Court has held that the certificate
of non-forum shopping should be signed by
all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and
that the signing by only one of them is
insufficient and constitutes a defect in the
petition.No doubt this Court has held that
the certificate of non-forum shopping should
be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in
a case, and that the signing by only one of
them is insufficient and constitutes a defect
in the petition. The attestation requires
personal knowledge by the party executing
the same, and the lone signing petitioner
cannot be presumed to have personal
knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his
co-petitioners of any action or claim the
same as or similar to the current petition.
Same; Same; Before a complaint can be
dismissed for lack of a proper certificate of
non-forum shopping, notice and hearing are
required.Before a complaint can be
dismissed for lack of a proper certificate of
non-forum shopping, notice and hearing are
required.
Same; Judge Causapin neither conducted
such a preliminary hearing or trial on the
merits prior to dismissing Civil Case No.
1387-G.Going by the foregoing rule, Judge

8
Causapin had the discretion in Civil Case No.
1387-G of either (1) setting a preliminary
hearing specifically on the defect in the
plaintiffs certificate of non-forum shopping;
or (2) proceeding with the trial of the case
and tackling the issue in the course thereof.
In both instances, parties are given the
chance to submit arguments and evidence
for or against the dismissal of the complaint.
Judge Causapin neither conducted such a
preliminary hearing or trial on the merits
prior to dismissing Civil Case No. 1387-G.
CRUZ-AGANA VS. SANTIAGO-LAGMAN

ISSUE: Whether

or

not

Voluntary Appearance (Rule 14, Sec.20)


JIMENEZ VS. SORONGON
Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to
the RTCs jurisdiction
As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief
is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings
seeking
affirmative
relief
constitutes
voluntary appearance, and the consequent
jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction
of the court.

compulsory

counterclaim requires a certification for nonforum shopping.


HELD: No. A counterclaim is not an initiatory
pleading. Administrative Circular No. 04-94
does not apply to compulsory counterclaims.
The circular applies to initiatory and similar

Thus, by filing several motions before the


RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal
case,
respondent
Alamil
voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Custody of the law is not required for the
adjudication of reliefs other than an
application for bail.

pleadings only. A compulsory counterclaim


set up in the answer is not an initiatory or
similar pleading. The initiatory pleading is
the

plaintiffs

(Aganas)

complaint.

respondent (Serrano Ent.) has no choice but


to raise a compulsory counterclaim the
moment the plaintiff files the complaint.
Otherwise,

respondent

compulsory

counterclaim.

waives
In

short,

the
the

compulsory counterclaim is a reaction or

Declaration in Default (Rule 9, Sec. 3)


OTERO VS. TAN
A defendant who fails to file
answer loses his standing in court.

an

The effect of a defendants failure to file an


answer within the time allowed therefor is
primarily governed by Section 3, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court, viz:

response, mandatory upon pain of waiver, to


an initiatory pleading which is the complaint.
Is

the

rule

the

same

for

permissive

counterclaims?
No. If it is a permissive counterclaim, the lack
of a certificate of non-forum shopping is
fatal. If it is a compulsory counterclaim, the
lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping is
immaterial.

Sec. 3. Default; declaration of. If the


defending party fails to answer within the
time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon
motion of the claiming party with notice to
the defending party, and proof of such
failure, declare the defending party in
default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed
to render judgment granting the claimant
such relief as his pleading may warrant,
unless the court in its discretion requires the
claimant to submit evidence. Such reception

9
of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of
court. x x x (Emphasis ours)

executory, he may file a petition for relief


under Section 2 of Rule 38; and

A defendant who fails to file an answer may,


upon motion, be declared by the court in
default. Loss of standing in court, the
forfeiture of ones right as a party litigant,
contestant or legal adversary, is the
consequence of an order of default. A party
in default loses his right to present his
defense, control the proceedings, and
examine or cross-examine witnesses. He has
no right to expect that his pleadings would
be acted upon by the court nor may be
object to or refute evidence or motions filed
against him.14

d) He may also appeal from the judgment


rendered against him as contrary to the
evidence or to the law, even if no petition to
set aside the order of default has been
presented
by
him.
(Sec.
2,
Rule
16
41) (Emphasis ours)

A defendant who was declared in


default
may
nevertheless
appeal
from
the
judgment
by
default,
albeit on limited grounds.
Nonetheless, the fact that a defendant has
lost his standing in court for having been
declared in default does not mean that he is
left sans any recourse whatsoever. In Lina v.
CA, et al.,15 this Court enumerated the
remedies available to party who has been
declared in default, to wit:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time
after discovery thereof and before judgment,
file a motion, under oath, to set aside the
order of default on the ground that his failure
to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect, and that he
has meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered
when the defendant discovered the default,
but before the same has become final and
executory, he may file a motion for new trial
under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default
after the judgment has become final and

Indeed, a defending party declared in default


retains the right to appeal from the judgment
by default. However, the grounds that may
be raised in such an appeal are restricted to
any of the following: first, the failure of the
plaintiff to prove the material allegations of
the complaint; second, the decision is
contrary to law; and third, the amount of
judgment is excessive or different in kind
from that prayed for.17 In these cases, the
appellate tribunal should only consider the
pieces of evidence that were presented by
the plaintiff during the ex parte presentation
of his evidence.

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION VS. JANOLO,


JR.
As the trial court observed, the motion to
vacate or set aside the order of default failed
to comply with paragraph (b), Section 3, Rule
9 of the Rules of Court,[56] it noting, inter
alia, that the motion was not under oath, it
failed to explain or justify why movants have
not filed any opposition to the petition, and it
was not accompanied by an affidavit of
merit.
Indeed, a trial court has no authority to
consider a motion to lift the order of default
where such motion was not made under
oath.[58] Moreover, a motion to lift an order
of default must allege with particularity the
facts constituting the fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect which caused
the failure to answer.

10

Notice of Lis Pendens (Rule 13, Sec. 14)


GAGOOMAL VS. VILLACORTA
Petitioner's argument that he acquired
a superior right over the subject
property by virtue of the earlier
annotation of a notice of lis pendens on
June 11, 1999 by his predecessor-ininterest RAM on the same title cannot
be given credence.
Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens. - In an action
affecting the title or the right of possession
of real property, the plaintiff and the
defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed
in his answer, may record in the office of the
registry of deeds of the province in which the
property is situated a notice of the pendency
of the action. Said notice shall contain the
names of the parties and the object of the
action or defense, and a description of the
property in that province affected thereby.
Only from the time of filing such notice for
record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of
the property affected thereby, be deemed to
have constructive notice of the pendency of
the action, and only of its pendency against
the parties designated by their real names.

The notice of lis pendens hereinabove


mentioned may be cancelled only upon order
of the court, after proper showing that the
notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it
to be recorded. [emphasis ours]
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a
dual effect: (1) to keep the property subject
matter of the litigation within the power of

the court until the entry of the final judgment


in order to prevent the defeat of the final
judgment by successive alienations; and (2)
to bind a purchaser, bona fide or otherwise,
of the property subject of the litigation to the
judgment that the court will subsequently
promulgate.
Relative thereto, a notice of lis pendens is
proper in the following actions and their
concomitant proceedings
(a) an action to recover possession of real
estate;
(b) an action to quiet title thereto;
(c) an action to remove clouds thereon;
(d) an action for partition; and
(e) any other proceedings of any kind in
Court directly affecting the title to the land or
the use or occupation thereof or the
buildings thereon.26

Thus, a notice of lis pendens is only valid and


effective when it affects title over or right of
possession of a real property.

In this case, it cannot be denied that Civil


Case No. 67381, which RAM, predecessor-ininterest of petitioner, instituted against
Zearosa was for collection of sum of money
with damages a purely personal action.
Hence, the notice of lis pendens in favor of
RAM annotated on the cancelled TCT No.
170213 and carried over to Tan's TCT No.
10206 conferred upon it no rights over the
subject property and, as a necessary
consequence, upon petitioner, its successorin-interest.
Execution of Barangay Settlement (Rule
16, Sec. 1 (j))
CHAVEZ VS. CA

11
Indeed,
the
Revised
Katarungang
Pambarangay Law[8] provides that an
amicable settlement reached after barangay
conciliation proceedings has the force and
effect of a final judgment of a court if not
repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is
filed before the proper city or municipal court
within ten (10) days from its date.[9] It
further provides that the settlement may be
enforced by execution by the lupong
tagapamayapa within six (6) months from its
date, or by action in the appropriate city or
municipal court, if beyond the six-month
period.[10] This special provision follows the
general precept enunciated in Article 2037 of
the Civil Code, viz.:

A compromise has upon the parties the


effect and authority of res judicata; but there
shall be no execution except in compliance
with a judicial compromise.
Thus, we have held that a compromise
agreement which is not contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals or good
customs is a valid contract which is the law
between the parties themselves. It has upon
them the effect and authority of res judicata
even if not judicially approved, and cannot
be lightly set aside or disturbed except for
vices of consent and forgery.
However, in Heirs of Zari, et al. v. Santos, we
clarified that the broad precept enunciated in
Art. 2037 is qualified by Art. 2041 of the
same Code, which provides:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide
by the compromise, the other party may
either enforce the compromise or regard it as
rescinded and insist upon his original
demand.

Not Real Party in Interest


Sec.2)
AGUILA VS. CA

(Rule 3,

Rule 3, 2 of the Rules of Court of 1964, under


which the complaint in this case was filed,
provided that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the
real party in interest. A real party in interest
is one who would be benefited or injured by
the judgment, or who is entitled to the avails
of the suit.[7] This ruling is now embodied in
Rule 3, 2 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Any decision rendered against a
person who is not a real party in interest in
the case cannot be executed.[8] Hence, a
complaint filed against such a person should
be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action.
Under Art. 1768 of the Civil Code, a
partnership has a juridical personality
separate and distinct from that of each of the
partners. The partners cannot be held liable
for the obligations of the partnership unless
it is shown that the legal fiction of a different
juridical personality is being used for
fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purposes.[10] In
this case, private respondent has not shown
that A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co., as a separate
juridical entity, is being used for fraudulent,
unfair, or illegal purposes. Moreover, the title
to the subject property is in the name of A.C.
Aguila & Sons, Co. and the Memorandum of
Agreement was executed between private
respondent, with the consent of her late
husband, and A. C. Aguila & Sons, Co.,
represented by petitioner. Hence, it is the
partnership, not its officers or agents, which
should be impleaded in any litigation
involving property registered in its name. A
violation of this rule will result in the
dismissal of the complaint.[11] We cannot
understand why both the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals sidestepped this
issue when it was squarely raised before
them by petitioner.

12
FELS ENERGY
BATANGAS
Indispensable Party (Rule 3, Sec.7)
PAMPLONA
PLANTATION
CO.,
TINGHIL

VS.

Non-Joinder of Parties
Granting for the sake of argument that the
Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation is
an indispensable party that should be
impleaded, NLRCs outright dismissal of the
Complaints was still erroneous.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
[34] At any stage of a judicial proceeding
and/or at such times as are just, parties may
be added on the motion of a party or on the
initiative of the tribunal concerned.[35] If the
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable
party despite the order of the court, that
court may dismiss the complaint for the
plaintiffs failure to comply with the order. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed
to be indispensable.[36] In this case, the
NLRC did not require respondents to implead
the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation
as respondent; instead, the Commission
summarily dismissed the Complaints.
In any event, there is no need to implead the
leisure corporation because, insofar as
respondents are concerned, the leisure
corporation and petitioner-company are one
and the same entity. Salvador v. Court of
Appeals[37] has held that this Court has full
powers, apart from that power and authority
which is inherent, to amend the processes,
pleadings, proceedings and decisions by
substituting as party-plaintiff the real partyin-interest.

Res Judicata (Rule 16, Sec.1 (f))

INC.

VS.

PROV.

OF

Courts will simply refuse to reopen what has


been decided. They will not allow the same
parties or their privies to litigate anew a
question once it has been considered and
decided with finality. Litigations must end
and terminate sometime and somewhere.
The effective and efficient administration of
justice requires that once a judgment has
become final, the prevailing party should not
be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by
subsequent suits on the same issues filed by
the same parties.
This is in accordance with the doctrine of res
judicata which has the following elements:
(1) the former judgment must be final; (2)
the court which rendered it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3)
the judgment must be on the merits; and (4)
there must be between the first and the
second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action. The application
of the doctrine of res judicata does not
require absolute identity of parties but
merely substantial identity of parties. There
is substantial identity of parties when there
is community of interest or privity of interest
between a party in the first and a party in
the second case even if the first case did not
implead the latter.[43]

To recall, FELS gave NPC the full power and


authority to represent it in any proceeding
regarding
real
property
assessment.
Therefore, when petitioner NPC filed its
petition for review docketed as G.R. No.
165113, it did so not only on its behalf but
also on behalf of FELS. Moreover, the
assailed decision in the earlier petition for
review filed in this Court was the decision of
the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490,
in which FELS was the petitioner. Thus, the

13
decision in G.R. No. 165116 is binding on
petitioner FELS under the principle of privity
of interest. In fine, FELS and NPC are
substantially identical parties as to warrant
the application of res judicata. FELSs
argument that it is not bound by the
erroneous petition filed by NPC is thus
unavailing.
Questioning Interlocutory Order
SILVERIO, JR. VS. FILIPINO BUSINESS
CONSULTANTS
First, interlocutory orders are those that
determine incidental matters that do not
touch on the merits of the case or put an end
to the proceedings.[8] The proper remedy to
question an improvident interlocutory order
is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not
Rule 45.[9] A petition for review under Rule
45 is the proper mode of redress to question
final judgments.[10]
An order staying the execution of the writ of
possession is an interlocutory order.[11]
Clearly, this order cannot be appealed. A
petition for certiorari was therefore the
correct remedy. Moreover, Silverio, Jr., Esses
and Tri-Star pointed out that the RTC Balayan
acted on an ex-parte motion to suspend the
writ of possession, which is a litigious matter,
without complying with the rules on notice
and hearing. Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star
also assail the RTC Balayans impending
move to accept FBCIs evidence on its
subsequent ownership of Esses and Tri-Star.
In effect, Silverio, Jr., Esses and Tri-Star
accuse the RTC Balayan of acting without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion, which is within the ambit of
certiorari.
However, in the exercise of our judicial
discretion, we will treat the appeal as a
petition under Rule 65.[12] Technical rules
must be suspended whenever the purposes
of justice warrant it, such as in this case

where substantial and important issues await


resolution.

Judge who penned decision, not the


same judge who heard the case
CITIBANK, N.A. VS. SABENIANO
What deserves stressing is that, in this
jurisdiction, there exists a disputable
presumption that the RTC Decision was
rendered by the judge in the regular
performance of his official duties. While the
said presumption is only disputable, it is
satisfactory unless contradicted or overcame
by other evidence.[29] Encompassed in this
presumption of regularity is the presumption
that the RTC judge, in resolving the case and
drafting his Decision, reviewed, evaluated,
and weighed all the evidence on record. That
the said RTC judge is not the same judge who
heard the case and received the evidence is
of little consequence when the records and
transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) are
complete and available for consideration by
the former.
In People v. Gazmen,[30] this Court already
elucidated its position on such an issue
Accused-appellant makes
an issue of the fact that the
judge who penned the decision
was not the judge who heard
and
tried
the
case
and
concludes therefrom that the
findings of the former are
erroneous. Accused-appellants
argument does not merit a
lengthy discussion. It is wellsettled that the decision of a
judge who did not try the case
is not by that reason alone
erroneous.
It is true that the judge
who ultimately decided the case
had not heard the controversy
at all, the trial having been
conducted by then Judge Emilio
L. Polig, who was indefinitely
suspended
by
this
Court. Nonetheless,
the

14
transcripts
of
stenographic
notes taken during the trial
were
complete
and
were
presumably
examined
and
studied by Judge Baguilat
before
he
rendered
his
decision. It is not unusual for a
judge who did not try a case to
decide it on the basis of the
record. The fact that he did not
have the opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses
during the trial but merely
relied on the transcript of their
testimonies does not for that
reason
alone
render
the
judgment erroneous.
(People vs. Jaymalin, 214
SCRA 685, 692 [1992])
Although it is true that
the judge who heard the
witnesses testify is in a better
position
to
observe
the
witnesses on the stand and
determine by their demeanor
whether they are telling the
truth or mouthing falsehood, it
does not necessarily follow that
a judge who was not present
during the trial cannot render a
valid decision since he can rely
on
the
transcript
of
stenographic notes taken during
the trial as basis of his decision.
Accused-appellants
contention that the trial judge
did not have the opportunity to
observe
the
conduct
and
demeanor of the witnesses
since he was not the same
judge
who
conducted
the
hearing is also untenable. While
it is true that the trial judge who
conducted the hearing would be
in a better position to ascertain
the truth and falsity of the
testimonies of the witnesses, it
does not necessarily follow that
a judge who was not present
during the trial cannot render a
valid and just decision since the

latter can also rely on the


transcribed stenographic notes
taken during the trial as the
basis of his decision.
(People vs. De Paz, 212
SCRA 56, 63 [1992])
At any rate, the test to
determine the value of the
testimony of the witness is
whether or not such is in
conformity with knowledge and
consistent with the experience
of mankind (People vs. Morre,
217 SCRA 219 [1993]). Further,
the credibility of witnesses can
also be assessed on the basis of
the substance of their testimony
and
the
surrounding
circumstances
(People
v.
Gonzales,
210
SCRA
44
[1992]). A critical evaluation of
the
testimony
of
the
prosecution witnesses reveals
that their testimony accords
with the aforementioned tests,
and carries with it the ring of
truth end perforce, must be
given full weight and credit.
Irrefragably, by reason alone that the judge
who penned the RTC Decision was not the
same judge who heard the case and received
the evidence therein would not render the
findings in the said Decision erroneous and
unreliable. While the conduct and demeanor
of witnesses may sway a trial court judge in
deciding a case, it is not, and should not be,
his only consideration. Even more vital for
the trial court judges decision are the
contents and substance of the witnesses
testimonies, as borne out by the TSNs, as
well as the object and documentary evidence
submitted and made part of the records of
the case.
Final Order vs. Interlocutory Order
REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF ORIBELLO
Petitioner contends that the 12 September
1997 Order of the trial court, deeming it to
have abandoned the case, is interlocutory in

15
nature;
thus,
is
not
appealable.14
Respondents argue otherwise, maintaining
that such Order is a dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of failure to
prosecute which is, under the Rules,15
considered an adjudication on the merits,
and hence appealable.
A final order is defined as "one which
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety
or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing else to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court."
Conversely, an interlocutory order "does not
dispose of the case completely but leaves
something to be decided upon" by the court.
Its effects are merely provisional in character
and substantial proceedings have to be
further conducted by the court in order to
finally resolve the issue or controversy.

Fresh Period Rule


NEYPES VS. CA
To standardize the appeal periods provided in
the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall
also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from
the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review
from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasijudicial agencies to the Court of Appeals; and
Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to
the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform,
to be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.

YU VS. TATAD
While Neypes involved the period to appeal
in civil cases, the Court's pronouncement of
a "fresh period" to appeal should equally
apply to the period for appeal in criminal
cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
following reasons:
a. BP 129 makes no distinction between the
periods to appeal in criminal and civil cases
when it categorically stated for appeal from
final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments,
or decisions of any court in all cases shall be
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of
the final order, resolution, award, judgment,
or decision appealed from
b. The provisions of R41S3 and R122S6
although differently worded, mean exactly
the same. There is no substantial difference
between the two provisions insofar as legal
results are concerned - the appeal period
stops running upon the filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration and starts to run
again upon receipt of the order denying said
motion for new trial or reconsideration. It
was this situation that Neypes addressed in
civil cases. No reason exists why this
situation in criminal cases cannot be
similarly addressed.c. While the SC did not
consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal in
criminal cases, it did include R42 on petitions
for review from the RTC to the CA and R45
governing appeals by certiorari to the SC,
both of which also applies to appeals in
criminal cases.3. Clearly, if the modes of
appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC
exercisedits appellate jurisdiction) and to the
SC in civil and criminal cases are the same,
no cogent reason exists why the periods to
appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and
criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41
and Section 6 of Rule 122 should be treated
differently.
Factual-Issue Bar Rule
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
BERNARDO

VS.

16
As a general rule, only questions of law may
be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
because the Court is not a trier of facts.
When supported by substantial evidence, the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and binding on the parties and
are not reviewable by this Court, unless the
case falls under any of the following
recognized exceptions: (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the findings set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioners main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by
evidence on record.

NLRC Decision
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME VS. NLRC
Subsequently under RA 7902, effective
March 1995, the mode for judicial review
over NLRC decisions in that of a petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65. The same confuses
by declaring that the CA has no appellate
jurisdiction over decisions falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of SC, including the
NLRC decisions.
Therefore, all references in the
amended Section 9 of BP 129 to supposed
appeals from NLRC to SC are interpreted and
hereby declared to mean and refer to

petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. All such


petitions should henceforth be initially filed
in the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Case remanded to CA.
Collateral Attack on the Judgment
CO VS. CA
Anent the issue on whether the counterclaim
attacking the validity of the Torrens title on
the ground of fraud is a collateral attack, we
distinguish between the two remedies
against a judgment or final order. A direct
attack against a judgment is made through
an action or proceeding the main object of
which is to annul set aside, or enjoin the
enforcement of such judgment, if not yet
carried into effect; or, if the property has
been disposed of, the aggrieved party may
sue for recovery. A collateral attack is made
when, in another action to obtain a different
relief, an attack on the judgment is made as
an incident in said action. This is proper only
when the judgment, on its face, is null and
void, as where it is patent that the court
which rendered said judgment has no
jurisdiction.
It is evident that the objective of such claim
is to nullify the title of private respondents to
the property in question, which thereby
challenges the judgment pursuant to which
the title was decreed. This is apparently a
collateral attack which is not permitted under
the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens
title. It is well settled that a Torrens title
cannot be collaterally attacked.
Remedy is Dispossession of Property,
not Contempt of Court
PASCUA
VS.
HEIRS
OF
SEGUNDO
SIMEON
Mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of
petitioners to relinquish the properties would
not constitute contempt. The contumacious
act punishable under Rule 71, Section 3(b) is:

17
(b)
Disobedience of or resistance to a
lawful writ, process, order, judgment or
command of a court, or injunction granted by
a court or judge, including the act of a
person who after being dispossessed or
ejected from any real property by the
judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such
real property, for the purpose of executing
acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the
person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
Note that the writ of possession was directed
not to petitioners, but to the sheriff for him
to deliver the properties to respondents. As
the writ did not command the petitioners to
do anything, they cannot be held guilty of
"disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment or command
of a court."
The proper procedure if the petitioners
refuse to deliver possession of the lands is
not for the court to cite them for contempt
but for the sheriff to dispossess them of the
premises and deliver the possession thereof
to the respondents. However, if subsequent
to such dispossesion., petitioners enter into
or upon the properties for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession or
in any manner disturb the possession of
respondents, then and only then may they
be charged with and punished for contempt
Additional ground for Annulment
Judgment (Denial of Due Process)

Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the


Rules of Court provides that annulment of a
final judgment or order of an RTC may be
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
lack

of

jurisdiction,

jurisprudence

recognizes as additional ground therefor


denial of due process.[22] So Arcelona v. Court
of Appeals[23] teaches:

Remedy to Appeal in Decisions in Small


Claims Cases
A.L. ANG NETWORK VS. MONDEJAR
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for
Small Claims Cases states that:
SEC. 23. Decision. After the hearing, the
court shall render its decision on the same
day, based on the facts established by the
evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall
immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court
in the court docket for civil cases and a copy
thereof forthwith served on the parties.

of

SIAN VS. PNB

and

It is clear then that to set aside a final and


executory judgment, there are three
remedies available to a litigant: first, a
petition for relief from judgment under Rule
38 of the Rules of Court on grounds of fraud,
accident, mistake and excusable negligence
filed within sixty (60) days from the time
petitioner learns of the judgment but not
more than six months from the entry
thereof; second, a direct action to annul for a
judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud;
and third, a direct action for certiorari or
collateral attack to annul a judgment that is
void upon its face or void by virtue of its own
recitals. Thus, Macabingkil did not preclude
the setting aside of a decision that
is patently void where mere inspection of the
judgment is enough to demonstrate its
nullity on grounds of want of jurisdiction
or non-compliance with due process of
law. [Emphasis in original]

The decision shall be final and unappealable.


Considering the final nature of a small claims
case decision under the above-stated rule,
the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the
prevailing party may, thus, immediately
move for its execution. Nevertheless, the
proscription on appeals in small claims
cases, similar to other proceedings where
appeal is not an available remedy, does not
preclude the aggrieved party from filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.XXX
xxx

18
In this relation, it may not be amiss to
placate
the
RTCs
apprehension
that
respondents recourse before it (was only
filed to circumvent the non-appealable
nature of [small claims cases], because it
asks [the court] to supplant the decision of
the lower [c]ourt with another decision
directing the private respondent to pay the
petitioner a bigger sum than what has been
awarded. Verily, a petition for certiorari,
unlike an appeal, is an original action
designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction

and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is


therefore incumbent upon petitioner to
establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the
MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either
grant or dismiss the petition based on an
evaluation of whether or not the MTCC
gravely abused its discretion by capriciously,
whimsically,
or
arbitrarily
disregarding
evidence that is material to the controversy.

You might also like